

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

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I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese

Foreign Office, hereby certify that

the document hereto attached in English consisting

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for the reference of the Information Bureau,

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No. 25 (Oct. 1932)"

is an exact and true copy of an official document of the

Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 7<sup>th</sup> day of March, <sup>1947.</sup>  
1946.

K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness :

K. Urabe



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Excerpts from Materials for the reference of the Information Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office.

No. 1 (June 1932) - No. 25 (Oct. 1932)

*By Doc #1017*  
(A) Replies of Viscount Saito to A.P. Questionnaire.

June 2nd, 1932.

1. It is impossible to say that withdrawal from the League might not in some circumstances be the right course for Japan to pursue. But I hope that such circumstances may not arise. Japan will, of course, fulfil her pledges as a Member so long as she remains one.

2. This government have recently and repeatedly stated that no danger whatever of war with the Soviet Union exists. The attitude of the Soviet government in respect of affairs in Manchuria has been perfectly correct, and the Japanese government only wish that the Union government might see their way to repose such a further measure of confidence in their sincerity as would enable the Union to discontinue all concentrations of troops in the Far East, - a concentration which, the Japanese Government believe, is the real source of the recent unfounded rumours of dissension between the two countries. At the same time it is feared that the effect of concluding a treaty of non-aggression with the U.S.S.R. would be to weaken the force of the Kellogg Treaty and to cast a shadow on the relations of Japan



with every State with which no "angi-aggression treaty" existed. It would amount to the setting up of those special intimacies which have so often been deprecated. Accordingly the most serious consideration must be devoted to all the circumstances attending the subject before any definite decision can be arrived at. The interests which the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics may have in the Chinese Eastern Railway are not considered to militate in any way against the legitimate interests of Japan in Manchuria, where the policy of the Open Door is in full force, and where full effect ought to be accorded to every vested interest of whatever national complexion.

3. For the above reasons it is not considered desirable that Japan should acquire any interests possessed by others in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

4. The recognition of Manchukuo must depend on the usual conditions for the recognition of a new State, including its proved capacity for maintaining itself as such. Clearly, her propinquity and the vital interests of Japan in Manchuria make this a matter on which it is peculiarly proper for Japan to come to a decision. The annexation of Manchuria is certainly not desired; nor does Japan wish in any illegitimate way to control the policy of the Manchukuo authorities. She desires only to obtain from them the satisfaction of her rights and



interests in the regions under their control. The question of despatching more troops to Manchuria is one which entirely depends upon circumstances, and here again it is obviously impossible to prophesy. Nor is it possible to say how long military operations there may have to be continued. If the countenance afforded to bandits by the present unsettled state of political affairs in China should be ended through the recognition on the part of the League of Nations of the unsubstantial nature of the National government's claims in this region, military operations there would probably come to a speedy and successful end.

5. It need scarcely be repeated that the Japanese Government adhere firmly to the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity for all nations in Manchuria. No Customs Union or Economic Federation between Japan and Manchuria is even contemplated.

6. In the matter of military discipline, the Ministers for War and of the Navy are always doing their utmost to see that it is maintained. I am informed that, after the deplorable incident of May 15th last, both Ministers immediately issued allocutions to the whole of the officers and men of the Services directed to the strict observance of discipline and order. It is not understood what is meant by the terms "rightwing" and "reactionary": nor whose political power is supposed to be liable to be increased by such a "revolution" as is referred to.



Nor is it understood what is meant by "the so-called Fascist movement". If what is meant is the widespread discontent which is felt throughout the world with party politics, as unrepresentative of the true feeling of nations, this government feel that such discontent can only be controlled by the co-operation of leaders of all parties in satisfying the national desire for good government.

7. The Japanese Government would not be unwilling to co-operate in a revision of the Instruments in question, if such a revision were desired by others. They feel, however, like their predecessors, that what is really necessary is a substitution of confidence and good feeling for criticism and suspicion. In the absence of this, they could not feel that any revision of the Treaties would be of much avail, or that it might not be superseded before long by some change in the ever-changing circumstances of China.

8. The new government are entirely at one with the two preceding Administrations in believing that a considerable and influential section of American and European Opinion too hastily came to an adverse opinion on the Japanese proceedings in Manchuria and Shanghai without troubling to acquire a full knowledge of the situation in either case. In particular, many treated the question as though it were one of the invasion of



a regularly organized State by Japan. They ignored the Chinese acts of violence against the Japanese railway and the Japanese marines - and they envisaged Manchuria as a part of the territories administered by the National Government at Nankin. These assumptions may have been natural, but they were not accurate and not necessary; and the whole Japanese people feel that to rush to embrace such suppositions and to brand Japan as aggressive in consequence was not the act of a real friend. The relations between Japan and the other Powers are now excellent, as the position of Japan comes to be better understood by the world at large. It would seem that the only policy to be followed by Japan is to adhere unswervingly to her engagements, to work for the maintenance of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity throughout the world, and to seek the restoration of the world's economic balance by the breaking down of the tariff walls which are at present stifling trade.

9. The Independence of the Philippines is conceived to be entirely a matter for the United States. It would scarcely be proper, therefore, to express an opinion as to whether such a step would embarrass Japan, or affect the development of trade relations with this country; still less would it be proper to consider the question of entering into any treaty guarantee. It may, however, be distinctly stated that Japan would not care to possess that archipelago.



QUESTIONS THE ASSOCIATED PRESS WOULD LIKE TO ASK THE PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, HIS EXCELLENCY, ADMIRAL VISCOUNT SAITO.

1. It has been frequently suggested during recent months that Japan withdraw from the League of Nations. Does the new government believe such a step will be necessary? Will every effort be made to remain within the League?
2. Abroad it is widely believed that there is real danger of war between Japan and Soviet Russia. Does the government believe such danger exists? Will the new government be willing to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Russia? Does the fact of Russia's joint ownership in the Chinese Eastern Railway constitute a menace to Japanese interests and purposes in North Manchuria?
3. Does the government believe it desirable for Japan to acquire Russia's interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, by purchase or otherwise? Will it be necessary for Japan to assume military control of this railway in order to complete the restoration of peace in Manchuria?
4. Will Japan recognize the new state of Manchoukuo? Does this government desire the annexation of Manchuria? Does Japan desire to control the policies of Manchoukuo through the numerous Japanese advisers in the employ of that state? Does the government believe it will be necessary to send more troops to Manchuria? How long will military operations in that region be continued?



5. Does the government favor the maintenance of the Open Door in Manchuria for the commerce of all nations? Does it contemplate the establishment of a customs union, or other form of economic federation, between Japan and Manchuria?
6. What measures are contemplated to ensure the enforcement of military discipline in Japan, to prevent the recurrence of terrorist disorders like those of May 15? Are measures to control the so-called Fascist movement considered necessary? Is there danger of any form of rightwing, or reactionary, revolution in Japan?
7. Does the Government favor revision of the Nine Power Treaty concerning China or the Four Power Pacific Treaty?
8. Does the new government feel that American and European opinion has been unjust to Japan in regard to Manchuria and the Shanghai conflict? What policies does the government expect to follow with a view to improvement of relations and understanding between Japan and the Western Powers?
9. Would this government welcome, or otherwise, granting of independence to the Philippines by the United States? Would it embarrass Japan by upsetting the equilibrium of the Far East or by encouraging independence agitation in her own dependencies? Would it be likely to improve or hinder the development of trade relations between Japan and the Philippines? If America frees the Philippines would Japan be will to enter into a treaty guaranteeing



the independence and integrity of the Philippine state?  
Would Japan care to possess the Philippines?



外務省情報局参考資料抜萃

第一(昭和七年六月)一第三五(昭和七年十月)

A.P.通信の質問に對する藤十郎の回答

昭和七年六月三日

或る場合ニ於テ聯盟脱退ハ日本ニ取ツテノ正當ナ

道路ニテラストト云フ事ハ不可能ナル。然レ私ハソヤ子

場合が起ラヌコトヲ望ム。勿論日本ハ聯盟ノ員先限

一員トシテノ約束ヲ履行スルベカラシ。

ニ本政府ハ最近屢々蘇聯邦ト向ニ何等戰事ノ危險ナキコトヲ

聲明シテ滿洲事變ニ関スルソビエツト政府ノ態度ハ全ク正當

而シテ日本政府が望ムハ僅ニ聯邦政府が極東ニ兵力ヲ

集中スル事ヲ全ク中止スルニ如キ他ノ方針ヲ試見シテ信シセシム

モツト考ヘテクレル事ヲアル。コノ兵力ノ集中ガ

洞窟ニシテ



兩國間紛争ニ関スル最近ノ事更無根ノ風説ノ真因ヲアルト

日本政府ハ信スル。 同時ニ 蘇聯邦トノ不侵暴條約

締結結果ハ、ケロック條約ノ効力ヲ弱メ 不侵暴條約

ノ存在セサル 日本ト各國ト關係ニ陰影ヲ投スル事ニナルトイフ憂ガ凡

クハ 屢々反對セリ。 特殊友好關係ヲ確立スルニ異ノ事ナシ。

故ニ問題ニ關スル凡テノ環境ニ對シ 最モ忠實ノ考慮ヲ

決定 我々 樂毛前ニ 拂フニテ 東支鐵道ニ関シソグイニ

聯邦ガ有スル利益ハ 滿洲ニ於テ 日本ノ正當ナル 利益ニ對スル

反證トシ看做シ得ナイ。 滿洲ニ於テハ 門戸開放政策(完全也)カ施行セ

國內ノ報ヲ如何リ問ハス 凡テ既得利益ハソノ有効ナル 門戸開放政策

ノ恩澤ニ浴スニキテアル。 事ヲ認事ス先トスル。



三、上述ノ理由ニヨリテ 日本ガ 東支鐵道ニ関シ 他國有ル利益ヲ 獲得スルノハ 望ミシクナイ。

四、滿洲國承認ハ 新國家承認ニ在リ 自國維持能力ヲ 証明スルヲ 含ム 通例條件ニ 従ハネキラナイ。

明チ、ソノ 近縁性ト 滿洲ニ在ル 日本ノ 生命的利益ガ、ハ 日本ガ 此ノ 問題ヲ 決定スルニ 付 特有ノ モートスル 一ハ 昭カニアル。 此事ヲ 個ノ 事件トシテ 決テリ 之ニヨリ 決定スル 事ハ 日本ニ 依リ

軍備増大。 無論、滿洲國ノ 併合、<sup>ハ所ナク</sup> 望ミ、<sup>ハ所ナク</sup> 又、<sup>ハ所ナク</sup> 軍備

不當ナ 方法ニ 滿洲國當局ノ 政策ヲ 支配 <sup>スルニ付</sup> 日本ノ

欲 <sup>スル所</sup> 也。 又、滿洲國當局ノ 支配 <sup>スルニ付</sup> 日本 植民地ニ 對シ

報償 <sup>スル所</sup> 得ル 事ヲ 望ム。 滿洲ニ 對シ 兵力 増派 問題ハ

全ク 周圍ノ 状況カニ 左右セシ 問題ニ 對シ 之ヲ 豫言スルノハ



明ラカニ不可能ナリ。更ニ又、軍事行動有續期間ニ就キモ  
之ヲ言フ事ハ不可能ナリ。  
ガ何時ニテ終ケルカハ

若シ現在ノ支那ノ不子定ナ政情<sup>ガモタラス</sup>匪賊ノ跳梁<sup>ノ</sup>攘助<sup>ノ</sup>加比地方ニ

於テ国民政府ノ非實質的ナ<sup>主張ヲ</sup>要求<sup>ヲ</sup>依リテ國際聯盟ガ承認<sup>スルコト</sup>  
終ル<sup>ル</sup>事<sup>ト</sup>ハ<sup>ハ</sup>軍事行動ハ恐ラク急速且成<sup>ノ</sup>裡ニ終ル<sup>ル</sup>スルテ  
アラワ。

五、日本ガ滿洲<sup>ニ於テ諸島ニ對シ</sup>全國民對門戶開放機會均等ノ原則ヲシ

固執スル事ハ重ネテ出<sup>ル</sup>必<sup>ズ</sup>也。日本滿洲兩國間ニ

何等ノ関稅同盟モ經濟聯合計劃スラサレテヤナク

亦、軍紀ニ関シテハ陸海兩相ハ常ニソノ維持監督ニ最善

盡<sup>シ</sup>テヤル<sup>ル</sup>カノ悲<sup>シ</sup>ムベキ<sup>ニ</sup>五・一五事件後、兩相ハ直ニ全將校



及兵士訓練不充し規律嚴守ヲ命じたりト云フコトヲ内ニテヤ

右翼レ反動レ語カ何ク意味スルカ又問題<sup>セル</sup>上<sup>レ</sup>革命<sup>セル</sup>ニ

ヨリ誰レ政治力カ増大スル筈ナカ不明デアル更ニ所謂<sup>ス</sup>ラシヨ

運動カ何ク意味スルカ不明デアルモソノ意味ガ世界<sup>ノ</sup>痛<sup>ム</sup>ニ

政黨政策ニ對スル<sup>ナラバ</sup>廣範圍ノ不滿デアル<sup>ト</sup>コノ政黨政策

眞國民感情<sup>ト</sup>表スモノデハナ<sup>ラ</sup>ズ本政府ハ良イ政府ニ對スル

全國的希望ヲ満足セシム事<sup>ト</sup>全政黨<sup>指導者</sup>ノ協同ニヨリテ

コノ不滿カ抑<sup>ハ</sup>ラシムモノデアル日本政府ハ他國<sup>ノ</sup>利益<sup>ヲ</sup>

日本政府ハ若シ他國<sup>ノ</sup>利益<sup>ヲ</sup>問題<sup>ノ</sup>書籍<sup>修正</sup>ニ協力スル

コトヲ厭フモノデハナ<sup>ク</sup>然<sup>レ</sup>シナカラ<sup>現</sup>日本政府ハ他國<sup>ノ</sup>利益<sup>ヲ</sup>同<sup>シ</sup>ニ

必要ナモノハ非難ト嫌疑<sup>ト</sup>代<sup>リ</sup>ニ確信ト好感ヲ持つコトニヤンノラ







理解の一般を乞うナラフ事カス。今亦良好ニナリ。

日本様へ唯一ノ政策ハ約束ヲ確守シ内ノ開放機會均等

ヲ世界中ニ維持スル事<sup>ヤウザク</sup>勸~~ム~~。世界ノ經濟ノ均衡ヲ今ノ現在ノ貿

易ノ制限ニ先由稅障壁ニ徹底ニヨリテ<sup>回復スル</sup>并復~~スル~~カカ

事ヲアルト思ヒル。

九、比島ノ獨立ハ東亞米國ニトシテ<sup>ハ</sup>問題<sup>ニ</sup>アルト思ヒル。従ツテ

十九年段カ日本ヲ苦シカカ<sup>ル</sup>或ハ此國トノ貿易ノ關係ノ進展ヲ查スカ

否カニ由スル意見ヲ述ビテ<sup>テ</sup>適當<sup>ナ</sup>。況ニテ<sup>テ</sup>貿易問題ノ貿易保証ニ

迄立ッテ考<sup>ル</sup>察<sup>ス</sup>元事ハ適當ナリ。然レモ日本ハ群島

所有ニ關ヘテキ事ヲ明確ニ言明シ得ル。



A.P.通信ヨリ總理大臣兼外相代理海軍大將子爵

齋藤閣下ニ宛テシテ質問書。

一、最近屢々日本が國際聯盟ヨリ脱退スルト言ハシテ居ル。

新内閣ハカカルニ段々必要トスルヤ。

聯盟ニ止ルベキ凡ソ

皆カヲナス意志ナリヤ。

二、國外ニ於テ廣ク日蘇戰事ノ眞ノ危険アリト信セラレテ居ル。

政府ハカク危険ノ存在ヲ信スルヤ。新内閣ハ、ロシヤニ對シ

不侵條約締結<sup>進言</sup>ノ意圖スルヤ。東支鐵道ニ於テ

ロシヤノ共有權ノ事實ハ北滿ニ於テ日本ノ利益及目的ニ  
脅威ヲ與ヘルヤ。



三、政府ハ、東支鉄道ニ於テ、露西臣ノ利益ヲ回復シ、其他ニヨリ  
獲得スル事カ、日本ニ取リ望ミシト信スルヤ。 満洲ノ平和回

復ヲ全カラシムル為、軍カ、此ノ鉄道ヲ統御スル事ハ、日本ニテハ、必  
スヤ。

四、満洲ニ於テ、新國號ヲ日本ハ承認スルヤ。 貴政府ハ、満洲併合

ヲ望ミシヤ。 日本ハ、満洲ニ<sup>産用</sup>飛来使用サレシルカ、致日本ノ顧問  
ヲ直レシ政策ヲ制限セト欲スルヤ。 満洲治安力増派ヲ

必要ト考ヘルヤ。 同地ニ於テ、甲申ノ行動存續ノ期間ハ如何。

五、政府ハ、<sup>諸</sup>同盟ノ再高、高、満洲ニ於テ、門中開放政策ノ

維持ヲ支持スルヤ。 又、日滿間ニ因稅同盟或ハ何等カ、

形式ニ於テ、經濟聯合ヲ企圖スルヤ。



六、日本は元々軍統勵行及テロリスト等五、五事件一、如  
 騷亂 華秩帝崩脱防止一、為如段々手段加計劃ナシテヤルカ。所謂  
 万口一ヲ運動<sup>取締</sup>制限ハ必要トナスヤ。 仍舊カノ形ニ於ル  
 右翼、反動、革命ノ危険ハ日本ニアリヤ。

七、政府ハ對テ九箇國條約及、四箇國太平洋條約修正ヲ  
 援助スルヤ。

八、新内閣ハ滿洲及上海事變ニ關テ歐米ノ意見ハ日本トシ  
 正當ナリト考ヘシヤ。 歐米諸國ト日本ト間ニ了解ト因テ  
 改善ノ馬ニ一先政ヲ政府ハ採ルソモリカヤ。

九、貴政府ハ米國カ比島ニ独立ヲ許容スル事ヲ歡迎ス  
 スルヤ否ヤ。



東洋<sup>ソレハ</sup> 独夫 極東ノ勢力均衡ヲ破壊シ、或ハ日本ノ屬領ニ

独立運動ノ氣運ヲ興ヘル結果 日本ニ迷惑<sup>ナラズヤ</sup> ヲ不<sup>カ</sup>カ。

又、コノ事ハ日比間貿易關係ノ發展ニ資スル<sup>ヤ</sup> 事<sup>カ</sup>カ。

或ハ<sup>ソレハ</sup> 獨夫<sup>トナル</sup> 事<sup>カ</sup>カ。

若シ米國が比島ヲ解放シタラ

日本、比律賓國ノ独立保全ヲ保證スル條約ヲ締結スル意志アリヤ。

或ハ日本ハ比島所有ノ意志アリヤ。