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POLITICAL  
DISQUISITIONS, &c.

Μετα τον περι Θεων λογον, κ. τ. λ. After treating of our duty to the *Gods*, it is proper to teach that which we owe to our *Country*. For our *Country* is, as it were, a *secondary God*, and the first and greatest *Parent*.—It is to be *preferred* to Parents, Wives, Children, Friends, and all things, the *Gods* only excepted.—And if our *Country* perishes, it is as impossible to save an *Individual*, as to preserve one of the fingers of a mortified hand.

HIEROCL.

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# POLITICAL

## DISCUSSIONS

1848

THE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS OF  
THE REV. JOHN W. FOSTER, D.D.,  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,  
AND THE REV. J. W. ALLEN, D.D.,  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO,  
IN CONNECTION WITH THE  
REV. J. W. ALLEN, D.D.,  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

NEW YORK: PUBLISHED BY  
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, 245 NASSAU ST.

TO THE REV. JOHN W. FOSTER, D.D.,  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,  
AND THE REV. J. W. ALLEN, D.D.,  
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POLITICAL  
DISQUISITIONS:

OR,

An ENQUIRY into public ERRORS,  
DEFECTS, and ABUSES. Illustrated by,  
and established upon FACTS and REMARKS,  
extracted from a Variety of AUTHORS,  
ancient and modern.

CALCULATED

To draw the timely ATTENTION of GOVERN-  
MENT and PEOPLE to a due Consideration  
of the Necessity, and the Means, of RE-  
FORMING those ERRORS, DEFECTS,  
and ABUSES; of RESTORING the  
CONSTITUTION, and SAVING  
the STATE.

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VOLUME II.

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LONDON:

Printed for EDWARD and CHARLES DILLY.

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# P R E F A C E

## TO VOLUME II.

I SHALL, perhaps, be accused of deviating towards superstition, if I observe, that the favourable reception given by the public to the former volume of these collections has the appearance of a good *omen*, that the people will at last direct their attention to the important subjects treated in them, and to the fearful and alarming condition, into which the villainous arts of a succession of wicked ministers have brought this great empire; and that they will be no longer abused by those at the helm; but will insist upon such a change of measures as may save our country, if our sins have not unchangeably pointed against us the vengeance of the supreme Governor of states and kingdoms.

I am afraid, the public has found in the former volume, and will find in this, many inaccuracies, as well as other deficiencies, not such as the great *Roman* critic comprehends under his phrase, *maculæ, quas incuria fudit*; for indeed I cannot accuse myself of carelessness in preparing these collections for the public, excepting only that I have not pretended to bestow much

time in polishing and working up the style of those parts which are written by me; because indeed, as I have hinted in the general preface, I should have thought such labour supererogatory and impertinent in a work of this kind. The inaccuracies I am anxious about, are those, which *Horace* understands by the words immediately following the above-quoted, *quas humana parum cavit natura*, those faults, to which the weakness of human nature, or of such poor abilities as mine at least, exposes a writer, as a less advantageous disposition of the matter, a seeming repetition of the same thoughts, and the like. My apology for these deformities must be drawn from the vastness of the variety of the matter I had to dispose of, which made it difficult to remember every thought and fact I had set down, and made it almost impossible to avoid repeating some of the same thoughts and arguments, as they occur repeatedly in the different quotations I have collected, and I could not always leave out the part, which was a repetition, without disfiguring the speeches in such a manner, as would have made them incoherent, and displeasing to the reader.

The public will, I hope, agree, that it was better to insert a weighty argument twice, than to run the hazard of leaving it out, through suspicion of its being already inserted.

I hope

I hope it will be acknowledged, that far the greatest part of the matter I have collected from authors and speakers in parliament, is weighty, forcible, pertinent to the purpose for which I advance it, and decisive upon the great political points proposed to be determined.

I beg leave just to mention, that the II<sup>d</sup> book, which treats of the COLONIES, differs from the others, both in the former volume and this, in that there is a great deal of the matter in it, not written by me, and yet not referred to the respective authors, from whom I extracted it, particularly what I have transcribed from a collection in 6 or 8 volumes 8vo. being a set of all the best pamphlets and tracts written since the beginning of the contest between *Britain* and the colonies. When I collected from those volumes, the passages, which are inserted in the II<sup>d</sup> book of this volume, I neglected quoting the pages of the authors, and could not afterwards, without more labour than the matter was worth, because the authority of those pamphlets and tracts is not of great consequence, unless readers will make farther enquiry, or happen, which is generally the case, to know that what is affirmed in them is true.



BOOKS quoted, or referred to, in this Second  
Volume.

A

*A*RISTOTELIS POLITICA.

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*Beccaria,* ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

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*Camden's* BRITANNIA.

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*Emmii* (*Ubbonis*) RESPUBLICA ATHENIENSIS.

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*Guthrie's* HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

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GRANDEUR ET DECADENCE DES ROMAINS.

*Gee*, ON TRADE AND PLANTATIONS.

H

*Horatii* OPERA.

*Hume's* HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

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*Harrington's* OCEANA.

I

*Janiçon*, ETAT PRESENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DES PROVINCES UNIES.

*Johnson's* ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

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*Lipsii (Justi.) DE MAGNITUDE ROMANA LIBER.*

*Laet (De) PERSIÆ DESCRIPTIO.*

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M

*Milton's PARADISE LOST, and POLITICAL WORKS.*

*Macaulay's HISTORY OF ENGLAND.*

MAGAZINES.

*Montalbani RERUM TURCICARUM COMMENTARIUS.*

*MAGNI MOGOLI (COMMENTARIUS DE IMPERIO).*

*Montesquieu L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, 3 Tom. 8vo.*

*Mountague ON ANTIENT REPUBLICS.*

*MODERN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, 44 Vol. 8vo.*

N

*Nepos (Corn.) VITÆ, &c.*

P

*PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, 24 Vol. 8vo.*

*POLITICAL REGISTER.*

*Pierre (St.) OUVRAGES DE:*

*Pope's WORKS.*

*Plutarchi APOPTHEGMATA, &c.*

*Polybius (PREFACE TO A FRAGMENT OF).*

*Petyt's RIGHTS OF THE COMMONS.*

R

*Rapin's HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 2 Vol. Fol.*

*Richelieu's TESTAMENT POLITIQUE.*

*Robertson's HISTORY OF CH. V.*

*Rushworth's COLLECTIONS.*

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*STATE TRACTS in the time of k. William, 3 Vol. Fol.*

*STATUTES AT LARGE.*

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*Schoech*, DE REPUBLICA ACHÆORUM LIBER.

*Suetonii CÆSARES*.

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*Thurloe's* STATE PAPERS.

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*Temple's* (Sir *Will.*) WORKS.

*Thyſii* (*Antonii*) DE REPUBLICA ATHENIENSE LIBER.

*Trenchard's* HISTORY OF STANDING ARMIES.

U V W

UNIVERSAL HISTORY (ANTIEN) 21 Vol.

————— MODERN, 44 Vol.

*Valerii Maximi* HISTORIÆ.

*Virgilio* ÆNEID.

*Voltaire's* ESSAIS SUR L'HISTOIRE.

WHITEHALL EVENING POST.

*Whitelocke's* MEMOIRS.

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E R R A T A.

- Page 2, Line 10 from the Bottom, for *parliament*,  
read *parliaments*.
- 39, — 10 from the Bottom, for *have wrote*,  
read *have written*.
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all*, read *have but their all*.
- 360, — 5, for *A. D.* . read *A. D. 1718*.

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POLITICAL  
DISQUISITIONS, &c.

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BOOK I.  
Of Places and Pensions.

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CHAP. I.

*Idea of a Parliament uninfluenced by Places and Pensions; taken from the best historical and political Writers, &c.*

**A**FTER wading so long in the Serbonian bog of corruption, after having

Escap'd the Stygian pool, tho' long detain'd

In that obscure sojourn, whilst in our flight

Through utter and thro' middle darkness borne,

With other notes, than to th' Orphean lyre

We sung of Chaos and eternal night;                      MILTON.

[ministerial influence in parliament will soon bring *chaos and eternal night* upon *England*, if not dissipated by the exertion of the spirit of a brave people] to speak plain prose; after tracing out such a multitude of foul and shameful instances of the ascendancy ob-

tained by flagitious courts over parliament, it may be some relief (it will certainly be some instruction) to the reader, to observe the *difference* between the conduct of *corrupt*, and that of *uninfluenced* parliaments.

What a parliament compleatly *independent* would be; and what parliaments accordingly have sometimes been, may, in some measure, be conceived from this chapter, which he who can read, comparing the idea here given of incorrupt parliaments with what we have seen in our debauched times; the *Englishman*, I say, who can read what follows without grief and indignation, must either be *incapable* of forming any judgment, wherein the interest of his country lies, and *ignorant* of what intimately concerns every subject of the *British* empire; or he must be *void* of all regard for his country, and consequently of every virtuous attachment; or he must be attached to an interest *contrary* to that of his country, by the sordid love of money, as being himself a dealer in rank bribery and corruption.

Every free *Briton* has reason to wish that darkness may overshadow the anniversary of *his* birth, who first introduced places and pensions into parliament. When I have made a few observations on the complexion of parliament in those times, in which it is certain that the court did not, because it could not influence them by emolumentary means, every reader who recollects any thing of the politics of modern times (the present always excepted) will, on making a comparison, join me in saying

Hoc fonte derivata clades

In patriam populumque fluxit.

HOR.

From this impure fountain flows the stream, which is likely to poison our country and posterity.

In



In ancient times, when the parliaments of *England* were unpenfioned, we find them, even in fpite of *Popifh* darknefs, and of the extravagant notions of prerogative which were the difgrace of thofe ages, ever faithfully labouring for the public good, and efppecially feizing all opportunities for obtaining an enlargement of liberty.

So early as 1290, we find a fet of unjuft judges mulcted by parliament, to the amount of 100,000 marks. The parliament obtained of *Edw. I.* a promife, that he would (contrary to the uſage of former times) quit all pretention to the right of levying taxes by his own authority, and would raife none but with conſent of the “ archbifhops, biſhops, and other prelates, earls, barons, knights (of ſhires), burgeſſes, and other freemen of this realm.” The numerous confirmations of *Magna Charta* were obtained by parliaments, and always with reluctance on the part of the kings, as the firſt grant was extorted by the barons (which, by the bye, ſhews the juſtnefs of the obſervation, that parliaments are as naturally friends to liberty as kings are to prerogative.) So high was the reputation of the commons, in the ſame reign, for integrity and judgment, that the barons propoſed to the king, that they ſhould have the choice of the chancellor, chief juſtice, and other great officers of ſtate. To which that prince answered them by asking, Why they did not demand his crown? That they choſe their own ſervants: Why might not he enjoy the ſame privilege? [not conſidering that the people are deeply concerned in the choice of the king’s ſervants; whereas nobody has any thing to do with thoſe of a duke or an earl.] In *Edw. III*d’s time, we find the commons refuſing to grant an aid, till they had conſulted their conſtituents. [In thoſe days they con-

sidered themselves as responsible not to the ministry, but the people.] In the same reign we find it recorded by historians, “ That since the aids given in the last parliament were not duly answered to the king by those who had the care thereof, certain persons were appointed to take the accounts of *William de la Pole*, and others, who had received the money, wool, [taxes were, in those days, often paid in wool] &c. and they had a day assigned them to produce their accounts, and in the mean time several noblemen and gentlemen of fortune became bound, &c.” [This was the true way of preventing complaints against defaulters of millions.] In the same reign (about four hundred years ago) we find the commons refusing to grant supplies till grievances were redressed; fixing by law what shall be deemed treason; proposing regulations for preventing the subjects being compelled to make loans to the king, for that it was “ against reason, and the franchise of the land;” making an act for holding annual parliaments [no ministerial schemes to be gained by rewarding, with places and pensions, those who voted seven years together as they were bid] limiting the power of the clergy and the lawyers; preventing the union, in the same persons, of legislative power and of court emoluments, by a law prohibiting any collector of taxes to represent any place in parliament; [so early were our ancestors aware of the usefulness of a place-bill, repeatedly rejected in our degenerate times.] In *Rich. II*’s days, we find the commons requesting that he would inform them how the public money was laid out, and who were to be his counsellors and great officers; to which requests they insisted on, and obtained an *answer*. In the same reign the commons refuse to lay any taxes on the people, because they were disgusted, as had just before appeared by

*Wat Tyler's* insurrection. [In those days some regard was shewn to the sense of even the lowest of the people.] The commons request the removal of *Michael de la Pole*. The king gives them an answer in character, that is, a silly one. But they insist on compliance, and after some struggles, not only overthrow the minister, but at last dethrone the king himself. The parliament appoints a commission of enquiry to try the favourites. They impeach them of engaging the king to stand by them; right or wrong; of excluding all persons without the circle of the junto; of embezzling the public money; of laws dispensed with; of unjust punishments and pardons; of bribes taken of both parties, &c. In consequence, the archbishop and others are declared guilty of high treason, *Michael de la Pole* is impeached; the high treasurer, *Tresilian, Brembre*, and many others; are hanged. [Thus, in the heat of their honest zeal for the public good, overleaping their due boundaries, as a *third* part only of the legislature, and breaking into the sphere of the executive. See vol. i. p. 205. *et seq.*] Yet this very parliament, in the midst of severity, remembers decency. They make an express resolution for exempting the king, and laying the whole blame on his ministers. Happy had he stopped while his ruin might have been prevented! They oblige him to renew his coronation oath. [Kings often want to have their memories refreshed on this subject.] He shews a mighty desire of holding the reins of government in his own hand. He no sooner gets power, than he shews his incapacity for being trusted with it. He displaces all the faithful servants of the state, to make room for his worthless favourites. He seizes the charters of *London*, imprisons the mayor and sheriffs, fines the city, and

losing the inestimable affections of the inhabitants of the capital, hastens his own destruction. He tries to pack parliaments, to influence returning officers, to force elections, to raise money without parliament; obtains, by unfair means, the opinions of his servile judges in favour of his wicked measures; the very proceedings which afterwards brought *Charles I.* to the block. [If the old saying be true, *experientia docet stultos*, it is plain, that kings are not fools; for experience does not teach some of them.] The parliament impeaches him for unwarrantable liberality to worthless favourites; encouraging a junto to take upon them parliamentary power; causing the parliament roll to be altered and blotted at his pleasure; forbidding his subjects to petition him; sending into the house men not elected by the people, but nominated by himself; biasing members by threats and promises; refusing the faithful advice of his subjects, and threatening those who offered it, &c. The parliament formally dethrones him, as is known to every reader.

Uninfluenced parliaments, instead of giving, as we have seen, the people's money by millions upon every call of the minister, have been remarkably delicate upon that point.

*Hen. III. A. D. 1255*, demands an aid. Parliament requires two conditions, *viz.* 1. Observance of the two charters; and 2. That parliament have the appointing of the justiciary, treasurer, and chancellor. *Henry*, instead of complying, prorogues the parliament <sup>a</sup>.

The struggle between *Ch. I.* and his brave and free parliament is one of the most striking instances in the history of the world, of the glorious effects produced

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<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, 1. 329.

duced by the love of liberty and their country in the uninfluenced minds of a set of honest and courageous representatives. Let us contemplate a few instances of what is so much to the honour of human nature.

When that prince begun to demand money of parliament, there was great opposition made. *Pym*, and the other patriots, said, the war was entered into rashly, and therefore the nation was not obliged to support it. He demanded an account of the money raised by *James I.* by resumption of crown-lands, and sale of titles and places. The commons accordingly, instead of supplies, proceeded to the consideration of grievances<sup>a</sup>. The king dissolves the parliament, because they would grant nothing<sup>b</sup>. When he sent repeated messages to the commons, pressing them to go upon supplies, and let grievances alone, Sir *Robert Philips* proposed to address the king, and let him know what they intended to do, if he would not interrupt them. If the king would not suffer them to go on with the publick business, they must then depart in peace, and every man betake himself to prayer, that the confusions to be apprehended might be averted. The speaker, by the king's order, interrupts Sir *J. Elliot* in his remarks on the conduct of the ministry. Upon this, Sir *Dudley Digges* said, "If we must not speak of these things in parliament, let us be gone." A mournful silence, for some time, ensued. Then Sir *Nathaniel Rich* observed, "That it was necessary they should take care of those, who sent them to parliament;" and proposed to go to the lords, and, with them, wait on the king. The commons resolve, that neither Sir *J. Elliot* (who was interrupted by the slavish speaker) nor any other member, had spoken any

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thing

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. VI. 402.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 403.

thing undutiful during that parliament. A committee is ordered to consider what may be done for the safety of the kingdom, and that no member leave the house, on pain of being sent to the Tower. The speaker desired to go out for half an hour. Mr. *Kirton* observed, that this was unprecedented and ominous. It was observed by Mr. *Kirton* (with too much good-nature) that the king was a good prince; but persuaded by enemies to him and the nation. ‘Let us try to discover them,’ says he, ‘and I doubt not, but God will lend us hearts, hands, and swords, to cut all his and our enemies throats.’ Sir *Edw. Coke* observed, ‘That greater moderation never was known, than theirs had been, considering, that their liberties had been so shamefully violated. That former parliaments had boldly pointed out evil counsellors about the kings.’ [He mentions several instances; but, as they occur in other parts of these collections, I shall not enumerate them here.] ‘How shall we answer to God and men,’ says he, ‘if we do not make proper enquiry into the abuses of our times? Nothing grows to abuse, but this house hath power to treat of it. All men agree, that the duke of *Buckingham* is the cause of all the evil,’ &c. The slavish speaker, who had stolen to the king (which was what he meant by asking to go out for half an hour) returned, and brought a message from the king, adjourning the house, and all committees, till next morning<sup>a</sup>. The speaker, by the king’s command, adds, That he did not mean to *restrain* them in their just privileges; but only, that they should avoid reflections [no matter how *just*] on himself and his ministers<sup>b</sup>. What would have been, according

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. VIII. 191, 192, 196.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 197.

According to this monarch's idea, *restraining*, if it was not *restraining*, to stop the commons from enquiring into the conduct of bad ministers? A power, which, as Sir *Edw. Coke* shews, had been so *constantly* assumed by parliament. Which shews the common apology for *Charles I.* viz. That he did not *abridge* liberty; but only refused to grant *new* privileges; to be greatly too indulgent to the violences of that desperate tyrant.

The commons instructed their speaker to answer to one of his threatening messages, That it is the ancient right of parliament to debate in their own method, without interruption from the sovereign. That it is their ancient custom to consider of grievances first, and supplies afterwards. That they thought it absolutely necessary to join with the supplies a due care of the essentials of liberty, without which there is no government, nor any thing great or valuable that can be done either in peace or war<sup>a</sup>.

In one of their remonstrances to the king, *A. D.* 1626, they express themselves in these words:—‘Your faithful commons, who *can* have no private end, no object but your majesty's service, and the good of our country<sup>b</sup>.’ [Had there been in that house of commons two or three hundred placemen, they would not have dared to say, ‘We *can* have no private end.’] ‘It hath been the ancient, constant, and undoubted right and usage of parliaments to question, and complain of all persons, of what degree soever, who have been found grievances to the commonwealth in abusing the power committed to them by their sovereign—without which liberty in parliament, the  
‘common-

<sup>a</sup> *PARL. HIST.* VII. 441.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* VI. 467.

‘ commonwealth *might* languish under the pressure [of  
 ‘ those grievances] without redress.’

The intractableness of his parliaments (an honest parliament will always be intractable, because a court will always be making exorbitant demands) made him determine to govern without them. When he could no longer put it off, he called one; but, says *Voltaire*<sup>a</sup>, ‘ C’etait assembler des citoyens irritez;’ this was calling together a set of enraged subjects, and giving them an opportunity of consulting about the destruction of his tyranny. For the court had not then, as now, millions to dole away, by which to put a grumbling house of commons in good humour.

The fashion was not in those days, as we have seen it since, to stifle all enquiries into the disposal of the public money. Therefore it was ‘ ordered, *A. D.*  
 ‘ 1648, by the house of commons, That the com-  
 ‘ mittee of *Goldsmith’s Hall* do print all their receipts  
 ‘ for compositions, and how the moneys have been  
 ‘ disbursed, that aspersions upon parliament may be  
 ‘ cleared<sup>b</sup>.’

In those tyrannical times, the *instruments* of the tyranny were the grandees of the court, who were gainers by it; and the *vindicators* of the public liberty were the *commons* of *England*, who had no share in the spoils, but were losers, and had nothing to make up their losses. Had the commons of those days had a fellow-feeling with the court; had there been two or three hundred placemen in the house of commons, would they have stood up so boldly for the interest of their country? It was the court that imposed ship-money, that condemned *Prynne*, *Bastwick*, *Burton*,  
*Leighton*,

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<sup>a</sup> *Volt. Ess. SUR L’HIST. IV. 147.*

<sup>b</sup> *Whitel. MEM. 308.*



*Leighton*, &c. It was the brave commons that reversed the cruel sentences, and cast their enemies in damages for unjust imprisonment, tyrannical seizure of papers, exorbitant fines, cruel pilloryings and mutilations, star-chamber, court of *York*, &c.

‘Resolved, (*A. D.* 1647) That no member shall receive any profit of any office, grant, or sequestration from parliament: That whatever any members have received shall be repaid for public use, and the estates of members liable for their debts<sup>a</sup>.’ A day was appointed for hearing complaints against members, and no member to receive any reparation for losses, till the public debts be paid. [Our gamblers are wallowing in the public money, while the nation is in debt 130 millions.] And tho’ the self-denying ordinance was not strictly kept; (for *Ireton*, *Fleetwood*, *Harris*, and others, were elected into the house) a few corrupt men could carry no point; and the ordinance itself shews the sense of the times, and of all times, and all men, who pretend to have any regard for their country, concerning *placemen* in the house. And the many regulations made since for the pretended purpose of making parliament free, though ineffectual, and perhaps not always intended to be effectual, yet have a decent appearance, as coinciding with the general sense of mankind on this point.

The commons under *Ch.* I. were almost always unanimous. No wonder: they had no indirect interest to divide them; no places, no pensions, &c. to put them upon opposing what was plainly for the public good. Therefore we do not find in those times any abandoned speechifiers in the house, like our *Walpoles* and our *Pelhams*, supporting the useful-

ness of court-influence in parliament, in direct opposition to common sense and common decency.

‘Resolved, (A. D. 1640) That no monopolist or ‘patentee shall sit in the house.’ Many were expelled, and new writs issued<sup>a</sup>. Parliament, A. D. 1645, publishes a declaration, ‘That it would be an acceptable ‘service, if any person would inform of any members ‘taking bribes for any matter depending in the house<sup>b</sup>.’ The brave commons under *Ch. I.* brought the lord keeper *Finch* upon his knees before them, and proving inexorable, obliged him to make his escape<sup>c</sup>. They prosecuted *Strafford* and *Laud* to death, they forced *Windebanke* to fly. They struck with terror all the tools of the tyrant, and punished all their proceedings, however supported by precedent, which were not warranted by some express law<sup>d</sup>. They condemned the monopolies restored by *Charles* after their being, by a former parliament, solemnly declared illegal; and punished those concerned in them, expelling some members of their own house on that account. They changed, in less than a month, the face of affairs in *England*, from the most absolute monarchy to a democracy, without other disturbance than a scuffle between the king’s army and the *Scotch* at passing the *Tyne*; and roused that spirit in the nation, which brought the bloody tyrant, commonly called the blessed martyr, to his merited end<sup>e</sup>.

Sir *Harbottle Grimstone* thus describes a parliament answering the design and exhibiting the true spirit of a parliament. ‘Of such awful predominancy is the  
‘very

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. IX. 148.

<sup>b</sup> PARL. HIST. XIV. 140.

<sup>c</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, I. 244.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 246.

<sup>e</sup> *Ibid.* 247.

‘ very name of a parliament to the nation, that it strikes  
 ‘ with terror and despair all *evil doers*, and enriches and  
 ‘ *comforts* the spirits of many groaning under the bur-  
 ‘ den of oppression, inflicted on them unjustly and  
 ‘ maliciously by unmerciful and wicked men, who  
 ‘ have usurped to themselves places and offices of  
 ‘ power and authority in church and state. It is not  
 ‘ only the powerfullest of all courts, but the *wisest* ;  
 ‘ made and compacted not only of men found in  
 ‘ *religion*, and well *learned*, but *ripe* in their judg-  
 ‘ ments, selected from all parts of the kingdom,  
 ‘ chosen with the *free* consent of the *whole* body politic  
 ‘ of the kingdom.’ [A man must be out of his wits to  
 describe parliaments in our times in this manner.]  
 ‘ This great and high council is not only of such  
 ‘ power and wisdom, but endowed with the greatest  
 ‘ privileges, that not only the meanest of his majesty’s  
 ‘ subjects, but the greatest persons of the kingdom are  
 ‘ in danger, if infringers of the same, to be called  
 ‘ in question, and punished.’ *Grimstone’s* speech on  
 occasion of *Charles’s* demanding the five members<sup>a</sup>.  
 He then mentions the privileges of parliament: viz.  
 ‘ To speak or debate, vote, impeach, condemn,  
 ‘ acquit, protest, or remonstrate according to evi-  
 ‘ dence, and the state of things,’ [in spite of ministe-  
 rial, or regal interposition.] ‘ No member to be pro-  
 ‘ secuted but by the house for things said in the  
 ‘ house, nor to be apprehended, his study broke open,  
 ‘ or his papers seized, but by order of the house.  
 ‘ To make or unmake laws, raise taxes, do what  
 ‘ business they please first, without superior *compulsion*  
 ‘ or *influence* ; nor to be dissolved capriciously when  
 ‘ they are redressing wrongs and framing good laws,  
 ‘ or

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. x. 180.

‘ or prosecuting delinquents.’ To *Grimstone’s* speech may be added the answer of the commons in their declaration, *A. D.* 1642. The king pretended, that the measures he pursued, were more for the good of the kingdom, than those, which they proposed, on which account he rejected all their wise and pacific proposals, and was not to be satisfied, ’till he made his country a sea of blood.

‘ Is it likely, say they, that those, who are especially ‘ chosen’ [electors were then unbribed, and unterrified by ministers or by grandees] ‘ and introduced for the ‘ purpose, and who themselves must needs have so ‘ great a share in all grievances of the subjects’ [no member had then any idea of indemnifying himself, by a place, or a pension, of the burden he brought upon his country by voting according to the minister’s direction] ‘ should wholly cast off all care of the ‘ public good, and the king only take it up?’

‘ Heretofore, says *Mr. Holles*, in his speech before the ‘ lords, *A. D.* 1641, parliaments were the catholicon, ‘ the balm of *Gilead* which healed our wounds, restored ‘ our spirits, and made up all breaches of the land. Of ‘ late years they have been without fruit, &c.’ Parliaments were then become ineffectual because dissolved by the tyrant. Now we often wish them dissolved<sup>a</sup>.

Sir *William Jones* answered *Ch. II’s* proclamation, and apology for dissolving his parliament at *Oxford* in a pet, and says, *inter alia*, ‘ The court never ‘ dissolved a parliament abruptly and in a heat, but ‘ they found the next parliament more averse, and to ‘ insist on the same things with greater eagerness, than ‘ the former.—A parliament always participates of the ‘ present

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. IX. 298.

‘ present temper of the *people*<sup>a</sup>.’ Those times differed from ours (the present always excepted) for we have seen the times, when the true account of the matter would have been, that parliament is what the *court* (not the *people*) would have it to be.

When Mr. *Holles* impeached the nine peers before the lords<sup>b</sup>, in his speech he shewed the importance of parliaments, and that the enemies of the public tranquillity, have always sought the destruction or diminution of the power of parliaments. ‘ Parli-  
‘ ment, says he, is the foundation of government;  
‘ it creates and preserves law; watches over religion’ [the members in those days had some religion,] ‘ pre-  
‘ vents licentiousness of manners; preserves the rights  
‘ and liberties of the subject; provides for common ne-  
‘ cessities; prevents public fears; the kingdom can  
‘ rest on no other foundation, than that of parliament.’

It is remarkable, that, when he mentions the arts of enemies for defeating the use of parliaments, as refusing to call them, diverting, obstructing, interrupting, or abruptly dissolving them; he never mentions corrupting them by places, pensions, &c. the most effectual of all means for destroying their usefulness. What had been done in that way before those times, had answered little purpose. *Ch. II*’s pension parliament was the first successful experiment of that black art, so fatally improved since. ‘ When *Ch. I.* (says lord *Lyttelton*, in his speech on the *Spanish* convention<sup>c</sup>) ‘ told the commons, who were prepar-  
‘ ing complaints against *Buckingham*, that he would  
‘ not allow any of his servants to be questioned in  
‘ parlia-

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, I. 264.

<sup>b</sup> PARL. HIST. XI. 200.

<sup>c</sup> DEB. COM. XI. 312.

‘ parliament, he spoke the language of despotic power,  
 ‘ and such as this house would never endure. But if  
 ‘ instead of speaking so openly, he had a little softened  
 ‘ his style; confessed their right to question his ser-  
 ‘ vants, but at the same time denied them the means :  
 ‘ if *Buckingham* himself had challenged them to exa-  
 ‘ mine his conduct, or the conduct of those who acted  
 ‘ by his instructions and under his orders; and then  
 ‘ refused them the sight of these instructions, and the  
 ‘ regular methods according to the usage of parlia-  
 ‘ ment of examining into these orders; the appearance  
 ‘ indeed would have been fairer, but the proceeding  
 ‘ itself would have been equally dangerous, equally  
 ‘ fatal to the rights of this house. Sir, that parlia-  
 ‘ ment would not have borne it; for it was composed  
 ‘ of such men as had no influence upon them to abate  
 ‘ the spirit and zeal with which they proceeded to en-  
 ‘ quire into and punish mal-administration: such men  
 ‘ at their first meeting, before they would give one  
 ‘ penny of money to support the king in a war with  
 ‘ *Spain* which had been begun at the desire of par-  
 ‘ liament, appointed a committee to consider of secret  
 ‘ affairs, and another for grievances. They resolved  
 ‘ to enquire into the misemployment of the public  
 ‘ treasure, and dishonour brought upon the nation,  
 ‘ before they voted any supply, without apprehending  
 ‘ any reproach of want of zeal for the king or the  
 ‘ war; but that they might know the true state of  
 ‘ the nation, and carry on the war with more cheerful-  
 ‘ ness when justice was done upon those who had  
 ‘ involved them in so many difficulties, the same parlia-  
 ‘ ment declared, and it stands uncontroverted yet upon  
 ‘ your journals, That common fame is a good ground of  
 ‘ proceeding for this house either by enquiry, or if the  
 ‘ house

‘ house find cause, by impeachment. Accordingly  
‘ queries were drawn up to enquire into the conduct  
‘ of *Buckingham*, which were afterwards turned into  
‘ articles of impeachment against him; and the king  
‘ to save his minister had no other way than dissolving  
‘ that parliament; for the art of softening them by  
‘ corruption was not in use in those days. Sir, I hope  
‘ I have not mispent your time in calling back to  
‘ your memory the proceedings of a former house of  
‘ commons which deserve, I think, the greatest re-  
‘ spect, and are mentioned with reverence by the most  
‘ impartial historians. How history will mention ours,  
‘ I wish we may think worth our concern; but how  
‘ the nation will judge of them now, I am sure we  
‘ ought to consider. Sir, if a king has lost the esteem  
‘ and the hearts of his people, the interposition of par-  
‘ liament may awaken him to a sense of his error, and  
‘ by healing counsels reconcile and restore them again;  
‘ but if parliaments themselves act so as to lose their  
‘ own dignity and by consequence the esteem and  
‘ love of the people, who shall then interpose or  
‘ what mediator is left? It is such an evil as admits  
‘ of no remedy: it is the worst misfortune that can  
‘ ever befall a free government. To have approved  
‘ the convention, to have rejected a motion for laying  
‘ before parliament the instructions of the minister  
‘ who concluded and signed that convention, and then  
‘ to deny the means of examining into these negotia-  
‘ tions upon which *Spain* grounds these very preten-  
‘ sions, which we are now fighting to destroy—these  
‘ measures will certainly do us great honour in the  
‘ opinion of those who are this year to pay four  
‘ millions for supporting the war. What they will  
‘ think of all this I do not know; but I am apt to

‘ believe they will never think about it, without having  
 ‘ at the same time in their thoughts that the same  
 ‘ house of commons has three times rejected the place  
 ‘ bill.’

In the short, the too short period of the republic (for how happy had it been for *England* if she had been governed by the republican parliament during the period of her disgraces under *Charles II.* and *James II.*) in that short period we see what may be expected from a set of un-bribed, un-biassed men assembled together to consult for the public good, without fears, and without hopes, from a bribing court, and free from the incumbrances of such kings, or houses of peers, to negative, or at least to entangle and impede their measures for the general advantage. How unfriendly to liberty kings and lords have been, will too plainly appear on perusing the articles *Kings* and *Lords* in the sequel. I write in this seemingly republican strain, not that I have the least thought of suggesting the necessity, or propriety, of changing the form of government in *Britain*, from regal to republican, though the latter is undoubtedly preferable to the former, supposing a state to be *settling* its form of government; but to caution kings and lords, not to bring on, as they have formerly done by their misbehaviour, their own exclusion. But let us hear our incomparable female historian.

‘ On the subject of the glory acquired by the *English*  
 ‘ republic in this infant state, we shall observe the fol-  
 ‘ lowing incautious testimonies of its inveterate ene-  
 ‘ mies. *Heath*, on entering into the subject of the  
 ‘ parliament’s forced dissolution, and the ruin of the  
 ‘ republic, breaks out in the following exclama-  
 ‘ tion. “ Now to the reproach of Fortune and her  
 ‘ glorious



‘ glorious pageant of an *English* commonwealth,  
 ‘ which she had set up for another wonder of the  
 ‘ world, to brave the pyramids of stone, and colossus  
 ‘ of brass, as to the defiance of time’s injury, having  
 ‘ subdued all likelihood of danger from without; all  
 ‘ princes being ready to entertain their friendship.”—  
 ‘ *Clarendon*, who with a heart replete with selfish  
 ‘ malice, in prospective saw and sighed over the  
 ‘ future grandeur of his country, on speaking of the  
 ‘ political conduct of cardinal *Mazarine*, makes the  
 ‘ following observation: “ After the battle of *Naseby*  
 ‘ was lost, and the king seemed so totally defeated,  
 ‘ that he had very little hope of appearing at the head  
 ‘ of an army which might be able to resist the enemy,  
 ‘ the cardinal was awakened to new apprehensions,  
 ‘ and saw more cause to fear the monstrous power of  
 ‘ the parliament, after they had totally subdued the  
 ‘ king, than ever he had to apprehend the excess of  
 ‘ greatness in the crown.” Treating of the *Dutch*  
 ‘ war he observes: “ The United Provinces now  
 ‘ discerned, that they had helped to raise an enemy  
 ‘ which was too powerful for them, and which would  
 ‘ not be treated as the crown had been.” *Gutbrie*, an  
 ‘ historian of monarchical principles, makes the fol-  
 ‘ lowing observation: “ *Mazarine* imagined, and that  
 ‘ not without good grounds, that the natural interest  
 ‘ of *France* led her to wish *Cromwell* to be at the head  
 ‘ of the *English*, rather than it should be formed into  
 ‘ a republic of brave and wise patriots.”

‘ On this act of violence,’ [*Cromwell*’s turning out  
 the republican parliament] ‘ *Coke* (an enemy) ex-  
 ‘ claims, “ Thus fell the victorious parliament, whose  
 ‘ mighty actions will scarcely find belief in future  
 ‘ generations; and to say the truth, they were a set of

‘ men most indefatigable and industrious in business,  
 ‘ always seeking for men fit for it, and never prefer-  
 ‘ ring any from favour and importunity. As they ex-  
 ‘ celled thus in civil affairs, so it must be owned they  
 ‘ exercised in matters ecclesiastic no such severity as  
 ‘ others before them, upon such as dissented from them.”  
 ‘ *Guthrie*, an anti-republican, expresses the following  
 ‘ favourable opinion of this parliament: “ The  
 ‘ *English* republicans by their vigor and spirit, struck  
 ‘ *Europe* with consternation; and the *English* flag was  
 ‘ such a protection to commerce, that the trade of the  
 ‘ world seemed now to center in *Europe*. Had this  
 ‘ vast expence been drained from the sweat of the  
 ‘ people, the furnishing it would not have so much  
 ‘ alarmed the *Dutch*: but there had been a great reduc-  
 ‘ tion in taxes, the customs alone furnished 250,000*l.*  
 ‘ clear of all deductions; the people scarce felt  
 ‘ their burthens; and even the greatest enemies the  
 ‘ government had, were pleased with the figure which  
 ‘ *England* made abroad. Historians in general, esti-  
 ‘ mating things by events and prejudices, have repre-  
 ‘ sented the late parliament in a pitiful light, despised  
 ‘ and disregarded by the people, which gave *Cromwell*  
 ‘ the boldness to act as he did. But the reverse of  
 ‘ this is true; for *Cromwell* dissolved them because he  
 ‘ knew they must in time win upon the people; that  
 ‘ the spirit with which they proceeded would soon  
 ‘ render him and his army usefess; and that they were  
 ‘ pointing towards an establishment which must check  
 ‘ the career of all inordinate ambition.” “ This  
 ‘ parliament (says *Trenchard*, in the History of standing  
 ‘ armies in *England*) made their name famous through  
 ‘ the whole earth, conquered their enemies in *England*,  
 ‘ *Scotland* and *Ireland*; reduced the kingdom of *Portu-*

‘ *gal* to their own terms, recovered our reputation at  
 ‘ sea, overcame the *Dutch* in several famous battles ;  
 ‘ secured our trade, and managed the public expences  
 ‘ with so much frugality, that no estates were gained  
 ‘ by private men upon the public miseries, and at last  
 ‘ were passing an act for their own dissolution and  
 ‘ settling the nation in a free and impartial common-  
 ‘ wealth.” *Ludlow* on the praises of this renowned  
 ‘ assembly writes. “ It will appear to unprejudiced  
 ‘ posterity that they were a disinterested and impartial  
 ‘ parliament, who though they had the sovereign power  
 ‘ of the three nations in their hands for the space of  
 ‘ ten or twelve years, yet did not in all that time give  
 ‘ away amongst themselves so much as they spent for  
 ‘ the public in three months.” In a *Discourse of the*  
 ‘ *national excellency of England*, here is the following  
 ‘ honourable character given of the *English* government  
 ‘ during the short time it remained a republic. “ If  
 ‘ you respect its infancy and beginning, it outwent  
 ‘ in warlike atchievement all other common-wealths.  
 ‘ I lay before me the exploits of *Sparta*, *Athens*, *Car-*  
 ‘ *thage*, and *Venice* ; and know that the *Venetians*,  
 ‘ *Switzers*, and *United Provinces* at this day, being  
 ‘ contemptible for territory, are those only that appear  
 ‘ fittest matches for the greatest empires. I know  
 ‘ also, that *Rome*, the only mistress of the world, was  
 ‘ justly celebrated for large conquests ; and yet none  
 ‘ of these states gave such starts, and made such  
 ‘ conquests at their rise as our *English* common-wealth.  
 ‘ Certainly so many advantages conduced to its great-  
 ‘ ness and increase, and at its first appearing so large  
 ‘ were its territories, that it may well be affirmed,  
 ‘ never was a commonwealth in that respect laid on so  
 ‘ large a foundation ; and if in our conceit we should  
 ‘ give it an answerable growth, we could not assign it

' less than the whole globe at last for its portion. At  
 ' first, if you will judge by the affections of the people,  
 ' it had not the hundredth part of *England* itself, and  
 ' was to go through difficulties which would have con-  
 ' founded any but a free state; yet how quickly had it  
 ' brought the nation to somewhat a better understand-  
 ' ing and a fair way of settlement: so that there are  
 ' some who question whether any natural prince of  
 ' *England* had ever been assisted on any occasion with  
 ' such great forces so suddenly and with such alacrity  
 ' raised, as they were at *Worcester*; and on the other  
 ' side, how few went over to the king of *Scots*, though  
 ' generally looked on as a rightful prince, deserves  
 ' consideration. It lived not out a lustre; yet con-  
 ' quered *Scotland*, (introducing more liberty and greater  
 ' privileges than they had before) *Ireland*, and several  
 ' other smaller islands; made other nations feel its force,  
 ' as the *French* and *Portuguese*; and was going on in  
 ' such a career of action as was not to be stopped by  
 ' human power. This government began a war with  
 ' the *Dutch*, which it would have ended with absolute  
 ' conquest, or fallen in the attempt; and after this pro-  
 ' bably, it would have entered on more honourable  
 ' enterprizes, and not suffered the nation to grow effe-  
 ' minate by ease and vice. In a word, it had brought  
 ' in an instant the nation to a full glory, and such a  
 ' splendour as cast a darkness, as it is affirmed by some,  
 ' on the greatest actions of former times. This is  
 ' certain, that the neighbouring states trembled at its  
 ' sudden and prodigious greatness, and remote poten-  
 ' tates did court and seek a good understanding from  
 ' its hands; and its dissolution brought no ordinary  
 ' content to those who had cause to fear it." "The  
 ' agent from the *Stewarts* (as a late writer reports) at  
 ' the

‘ the first appearance of this commonwealth urged the  
 ‘ United Provinces, that if *England* were free, it would  
 ‘ be formidable to them not only by interrupting their  
 ‘ fishing, and all other maritime advantages, but by  
 ‘ robbing them of traffic, as they had done the *Venetians*;  
 ‘ and not only so, but give law to all *Cbristendom* by  
 ‘ reason of the commodiousness of its harbours and the  
 ‘ number of its ships.” To the just and high elogiums  
 ‘ which have been made on the government of the par-  
 ‘ liament it is to be remembered, that to them is due  
 ‘ the singular praise of having pursued the true interest  
 ‘ of their country, in attending particularly to its ma-  
 ‘ ritime strength, and carrying on its foreign wars by  
 ‘ its naval powers. This example, which raised *Eng-*  
 ‘ *land* to so great an height of glory and prosperity, has  
 ‘ never yet been followed, and in all probability never  
 ‘ will, by the succeeding monarchs. The aim of  
 ‘ princes is to make conquests on their subjects, not to  
 ‘ enlarge the empire of a free people. A standing  
 ‘ army is a never-failing instrument of domestic tri-  
 ‘ umph; and it is very doubtful whether a naval force  
 ‘ could be rendered useful in any capacity, but that of  
 ‘ extending the power and prosperity of the coun-  
 ‘ try<sup>a</sup>.’

‘ If the very rump of a parliament’ (says a writer in  
 STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*) ‘ even in the  
 ‘ midst of domestic discontents, and beset on all sides  
 ‘ with foreign assaults, and invasions at home; if that  
 ‘ small and broken number without any head, and  
 ‘ under so many disadvantages, could by this only  
 ‘ means secure our peace, and so widely extend the  
 ‘ repute and honour of the *English* name; what country  
 ‘ or what region could ever give limits to the un-

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‘ bounded

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<sup>a</sup> *Macaul.* HIST. ENGL. V. 107.

‘ bounded reputation of a full and legal parliament so  
 ‘ nobly qualified? What nation could there be so  
 ‘ powerful as to resist our forces, or so politick as to  
 ‘ infatuate our counsels? There is nothing within the  
 ‘ compass of human wishes of which we might not  
 ‘ assure ourselves, from the wisdom and virtue of such a  
 ‘ disinterested assembly<sup>a</sup>.’

*Fairfax's* plan shews what an idea people had in those times, (*viz.* before parliamentary corruption prevailed) of the safety of confiding in them. He proposes that the two houses have the supreme judgment of offenders, with power of exposition and application of law without appeal. No state-criminal to be pardonable by the king, without their consent. The house of peers no longer to be alone the supreme court, grand juries to be nominated, not by the under-sheriff, but by the people of the counties mutually. Militia to be under power of parliament for ten years, and not under the king *alone*. The public treasure the same. Regulations for the militia or army to be made in parliament. Great offices of state to be disposed of by parliament for ten years. Afterwards parliament to give in to the king three names, and he to appoint one. No new-made peer to sit without leave of parliament. All declarations against parliament to be void. In modern times, it is altogether the same to the people, whether the command of the army, treasury, state-offices, &c. be in the court, the lords, or the commons. For these three are one.

When a reward was proposed for Mrs. *Lane*, for saving that blessed saint *Charles II.* some of the members said, the house had no right to give away in this manner the people's money to any but the king for public

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of King *William*, II. 644.

public use <sup>a</sup>. On the contrary, in modern times we see our parliaments so motherly to our ministers, they know not how to refuse them any thing they ask; at one time our kings are to have their civil list (formerly granted annually) settled on them for life; at another 500,000 *l.* voted to pay the civil list debts; at another an account of 250,000 *l.* of 60,000 *l.* of 35,000 *l.* passed unexamined, because the court gave their word of honour the money was all spent in the public service; of which more elsewhere.

*Clarendon* says, *Charles II.* despaired of his restoration, when he heard of the resurrection of parliament after *Richard Cromwell's* resignation. An incorrupt parliament is never very courtly, and contrariwise, a corrupt one can deny nothing to kings and courts. But if *Charles* had recollected, that his friend *Monk* had an army at his command, he would not have despaired. Armies and kings have a great tenderness for one another, and are particularly useful to one another. Both depend more upon *power*, than upon *justice*; both love to rule without *controul*; kings love armies, because an army can *support* them in tyrannical measures without the trouble of *satisfying* the subjects; and armies love kings, because they are *indulged* by kings (on account of their usefulness) in a different manner from what they experience under republican government. But of this I shall have occasion to treat fully in the article *Army*.

‘ There is nothing of greater importance to the  
 ‘ safety and good of the kingdom, (says Mr. *Pymme*,  
 ‘ *A. D.* 1641) than that this high court of parlia-  
 ‘ ment, which is the fountain of justice and govern-  
 ‘ ment, should be kept pure, uncorrupt, and free from  
 ‘ partiality

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. xxiii. 59.

‘ partiality and bye-respects. This would not only  
 ‘ add lustre and reputation, but strength and authority  
 ‘ to all our acts. In this the lords are specially inte-  
 ‘ rested, as being a third estate by inheritance and birth-  
 ‘ right. The commons are publickly interested by  
 ‘ representation of the whole body of the commons of  
 ‘ this kingdom, whose lives, fortunes, and liberties  
 ‘ are deposited under the custody and trust of the par-  
 ‘ liament <sup>a</sup>.’

—‘ Least of all will it be swallowed by a *parliament*,’  
 says *Thurloe*, in one of his letters, speaking of certain  
 schemes proposed for keeping *Cromwel* in power <sup>b</sup>. In  
 our times we never hear of any body afraid of parlia-  
 ment, but writers on the side of the opposition.

There were not wanting court-sycophants in the  
 time of *Charles II.* who celebrated him to the skies,  
 and justified all his ruinous proceedings. But his  
 parliaments did not always echo back, as in our times,  
 the false panegyric.

‘ Long, long, may that royal tree live and flourish,  
 ‘ upon which those fruits do grow!’ says *Shaftesbury*,  
 in his speech to parliament, *A. D.* 1673, with a great  
 deal more to the same beslobbering purpose, to blind  
 the eyes of both parliament and people, and to incline  
 them to be contented with the proceedings of the  
 times. *Shaftesbury* in this rhetorical flourish hits off  
 one undoubted property of *Charles*. He was so very  
 fruitful of bastards, that the wags of the times ob-  
 served, that he might be said almost literally, as well  
 as figuratively, to deserve the ancient most honourable  
 title of *pater patriæ*, the father of his people. Both  
 lords and commons however shewed themselves very  
 much

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. x. 13.

<sup>b</sup> *Macaul.* HIST. v. 199.



much discontented at the continuance of the *Dutch* war, the exorbitant power of *France*, prevalence of popish counsels, &c. which they take care to signify to the king in an address for a fast <sup>a</sup>. And the commons seeing at last his worthlessness in joining *France* against *Holland*, and that the design of his five villainous tools, whose initials form the famous word CABAL, was to make him absolute, oppose him openly. They resolve, that *Lauderdale*, and the *French* alliance, are grievances. The king prorogues them immediately. On their meeting again, they address him against his guards; and impeach *Buckingham* and *Arlington*. *Charles* finding that they were too honest to grant him further supplies for an odious war, makes peace with the *Dutch* <sup>b</sup>.

‘ Were the house of commons’ (says a writer in the STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*) ‘ a true representative, and free from external force and private bribery, nothing could pass there, but what they thought was for the publick advantage. For their own interest is so interwoven with the people’s, that if they act for themselves (which every one of them will do as near as he can) they must act for the common interest of *England*. And if a few among them should find it their interest to abuse their power, it will be the interest of all the rest to punish them for it: and then our government would act mechanically, and a rogue would as naturally be hanged as a clock strikes twelve when the hour is come. This is the fountain head from whence the people expect all their happiness, and the redress of their grievances; and if we can preserve them [*viz.* parliaments] free from corruption, they will take care to keep every body

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. I. 191.

<sup>b</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, II. 236.

‘ body else so. Our constitution seems to have pro-  
 ‘ vided for it by never suffering the king (till  
 ‘ *Charles Ist’s* reign) to have a mercenary army to  
 ‘ frighten them into a compliance, nor places  
 ‘ nor revenues great enough to bribe them into  
 ‘ it. The places in the king’s gift were but few, and  
 ‘ most of them patent places for life, and the rest  
 ‘ great offices of state enjoyed by single persons,  
 ‘ which seldom fell to the share of the commons, such  
 ‘ as the office of a lord chancellor, lord treasurer, privy  
 ‘ seal, lord high admiral, &c. and when these offices  
 ‘ were possessed by the lords, the commons were severe  
 ‘ inquisitors into their actions. Thus the government  
 ‘ of *England* continued from the time that the *Romans*  
 ‘ quitted the island to the time of *Ch. I.* who was the  
 ‘ first I have read of that made an opposition to him-  
 ‘ self in the house of commons the road to preferment,  
 ‘ of which the earls of *Strafford* and *Noy* were the  
 ‘ most remarkable instances; who from great patriots  
 ‘ became the chief assertors of despotick power. But  
 ‘ this served only to exasperate the rest; for he had  
 ‘ not places enough for all that expected them, nor  
 ‘ money enough to bribe them. It is true, he raised  
 ‘ great sums of money upon the people; but it being  
 ‘ without authority of parliament, and having no  
 ‘ army to back him, it met with such difficulties in the  
 ‘ raising, that it did him but little good, and ended at  
 ‘ last in his ruin; though by the means of a long and  
 ‘ miserable war which brought us from one tyranny  
 ‘ to another: for the army had got all things into their  
 ‘ power, and governed the nation by a council of war,  
 ‘ which made all parties join in calling in *Ch. II.* so  
 ‘ that he came in with the general applause of the  
 ‘ people, who in a kind fit gave him a vast revenue  
 ‘ for life. By this he was enabled to raise an army,  
 ‘ and

‘ and bribe the parliament, which he did to the pur-  
 ‘ pose: but being a luxurious prince, he could not  
 ‘ part with great fums at once. He only fed them  
 ‘ from hand to mouth: so that they found it necessary  
 ‘ to keep him in a constant dependance upon them,  
 ‘ as they were upon him. They knew he would give  
 ‘ them ready money no longer than he had an absolute  
 ‘ necessity for them, and that he had not places enough  
 ‘ in his disposal to secure a majority in the house: for  
 ‘ in those early days the art was not found out of  
 ‘ splitting and multiplying places; as instead of a lord  
 ‘ treasurer, to have five lords of the treasury; instead  
 ‘ of a lord admiral, to have seven lords of the admi-  
 ‘ ralty; to have seven commissioners of the customs;  
 ‘ nine of the excise; fourteen of the navy office; ten  
 ‘ of the stamp-office; eight of the prize-office; six-  
 ‘ teen commissioners of trade; two of the post-office;  
 ‘ four of the transports; four for hackney-coaches;  
 ‘ four for wine-licences; four for the victualling-  
 ‘ office, and multitudes of other offices which are  
 ‘ endless to enumerate. I believe the gentlemen, who  
 ‘ have the good fortune to be in some of those em-  
 ‘ ployments, will think I compliment them, if I  
 ‘ say, they have not been better executed since they  
 ‘ were in so many hands than when in fewer: and I  
 ‘ must confess, I see no reason why they may not be  
 ‘ made twice as many, and so on *ad infinitum* (unless  
 ‘ the number be ascertained by parliament) and what  
 ‘ danger this may be to our constitution I think of  
 ‘ with horror. For if in ages to come they should be  
 ‘ all given to parliament-men, what will become of  
 ‘ our so much boasted liberty? What shall be done,  
 ‘ when the criminal becomes the judge, and the male-  
 ‘ factors are left to try one another?’

The

The commons, *A. D.* 1673, vote in a grand committee that no more supplies ought to be granted during a certain period, unless they see necessity, on account of the *Dutch* war, and till the kingdom be secured against popery, and grievances redressed <sup>a</sup>.

The commons, *A. D.* 1678, vote supplies, but with strict limitations <sup>b</sup>.

The commons, *A. D.* 1678, give a direct denial to the king's request in his speech for an additional revenue of 300,000 *l.* a year <sup>c</sup>.

A supply was granted, *A. D.* 1679, but with an appropriation to certain purposes only, and penalty in case of misapplication <sup>d</sup>.

The commons complained of unaccounted millions, *A. D.* 1701 <sup>e</sup>. Now the *people* complain, not the commons. Why, indeed, should the commons complain? The *court* and *they* divide the spoil between them.

It is remarkable, how directly in the teeth of the court, the commons often proceeded in former incorrupt, or less corrupt, times. In former times the court and commons were generally opposite; in ours the constituents and representatives. There was much corruption in king *William's* time; but we sometimes see the stream of parliamentary proceedings in those days run very clear. King *William* had given away immense grants of forfeited estates in *Ireland*. The commons resolved, *A. D.* 1699, that a bill be brought in for reversing every one of those grants, and 'applying all the forfeited estates and interests in ' *Ireland*, to the use of the public, and that a judi-  
catory

<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, II. 672.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM. I.* 276.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 286.

<sup>d</sup> *DEB. COM. I.* 344.

<sup>e</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. I.* 479.

‘ catory be erected for determining claims, and that  
 ‘ they [the commons] will receive no petitions con-  
 ‘ cerning grants.’ The courtiers in the house moved,  
 That some part of the forfeited estates might be left  
 in the king’s disposal. It passed in the negative; and  
 they made a resolution condemning the advising and  
 procuring those grants to be passed <sup>a</sup>. The commons  
 addressed the king on these resolutions. The king  
 answered, that his intention in giving those grants  
 was to reward those, who had behaved well, particu-  
 larly in the reduction of *Ireland*, which he thought  
 himself in justice obliged to do. The uncourtly  
 commons thought he was more justly bound to pay  
 the just debts contracted in the late war; and they  
 thought the forfeited estates a very proper fund for  
 the purpose. How did the *Romans*, in their best times,  
 reward their heroes? With a wisp of hay round their  
 heads, or a ride through the town, and up to the  
 capitol. The commons, provoked at this answer,  
 resolved, That whoever advised it, intended to cre-  
 ate a misunderstanding between the king and people <sup>b</sup>.

All the proceedings were ordered to be printed, and  
 it was resolved, ‘ That the procuring, or passing exor-  
 ‘ bitant grants by any member of the privy council,  
 ‘ to his own private use, is a high crime and misde-  
 ‘ meanor <sup>c</sup>.’ Those brave men were jealous even of  
 our great deliverer, and would not bear mis-govern-  
 ment even by him. The lords (generally on the  
 wrong side) oppose these brave and wise measures.  
 Conferences followed, and warm disputes between  
 the houses. At last the good king desires the lords to  
 yield the point. Lord *Sommers* was found to be at  
 the bottom of all this opposition. The commons put  
 the

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. III. 123.    <sup>b</sup> Ibid. 124.    <sup>c</sup> Ibid. 126.

the question, that the king be desired to remove him. This was not carried; but a resolution was made, that no foreigner (except the prince of *Denmark*) be admitted to his majesty's counsels in *England*, or *Ireland*. The king, to avoid this address, prorogues, and afterwards dissolves the parliament.

The commons, *A. D.* 1700, went upon a scheme for applying the value of forfeited estates, granted away since 1688, to the payment of the public debts. The value of them was thought to be almost two millions. The commons resolve, That these grants were against the king's honour and the public good. This resolution was presented to the king in form of an address; to which the king gives an answer, justifying the grants, as given to deserving persons. The commons, enraged, make a resolution against the king's advisers. They proceeded to a bill of resumption. Thirteen trustees are appointed to hear claims, &c. None to be trusted, who had any dependence on the king. An address proposed to the king that he would remove lord *Sommers* from his councils and presence, because he had opposed the bill of resumption. The king, provoked, wants to overfet the bill. But many of the king's friends were for passing it to prevent mischief, the commons being fet upon it. The commons in those days were too mighty for the court. It is true, that, according to *Tindal*<sup>a</sup>, it was found afterwards, that the bill was not well contrived, and was therefore spontaneously dropt by the commons. But the bold opposition of the commons to the court, so different from what we see in our times, is what I mean to point out.

Incorrupt parliaments, instead of being slaves to ministers, have kept ministers in constant fear of  
 ' being

being called to an account by them. ‘ In former times, ‘ parliaments were every moment upon the wing, and ‘ kept this noble band [the privy council] in awe, ‘ by taking them into their cognizance, placing, or ‘ misplacing some, or all of them, directing, or bind- ‘ ing them by oath, as they saw occasion; of which ‘ the records are full <sup>a</sup>.’

It is observed by Mr. *Kirton* <sup>b</sup>, in his speech in the time of *Ch. I.* that ‘ former parliaments had boldly ‘ pointed out evil counsellors about the kings, as 30 ‘ *Edw. III.* *John of Gaunt*, the king’s son, lord *Lati- ‘ mer*, and lord *Neville*, who were sent to the Tower. ‘ 7 *Hen. IV.* and 11 *Hen. IV.* parliament complained ‘ of the king’s council, and obtained their removal, ‘ for besetting the king and dissuading him from the ‘ public good. 4 *Hen. III.* 27 *Edw. III.* and 13 *Rich. ‘ II.* parliament moderated the king’s prerogative.’

Lord *Middlesex* was accused, in the time of *Jam. I.* and convicted of gross and sordid griping, and of procuring good regulations to be altered, as those concerning the court of wards, &c. of extortion in creating new places, and enhancing the perquisites of the old, &c. All the commons to a man joined in the impeachment. Not one to stand by a public robber <sup>c</sup>. Hereby was fulfilled the prediction of lord *Bacon*, *A. D.* 1624, who, meeting *Middlesex* soon after his advancement to the head of the treasury, congratulated him, and wished him, and all great state-officers, always to remember, that a *parliament* will come <sup>d</sup>. [In our times, you may as well tell ministers of the day of judgment, as of parliament.]

VOL. II.

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To

<sup>a</sup> *N. Bacon's Disc. Gov. ENGL. P. II. p. 18.*

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST. VIII. 191.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid. VI. 132, et seq.*

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid. VI. 309.*

To the same purpose was the saying of lord *Coke*, That no subject, however potent, or subtile, ever jostled with the law, but it broke his neck. But, in our times, it may be said, as *Remus* remarked to his brother *Romulus*, ‘Laws serve only as cobwebs, to catch the small flies: the great ones break through them.’

The worthy and sagacious *Davenant*<sup>a</sup>, in the end of last century, wrote concerning parliamentary corruption, as if his pen had been guided by a prophetic inspiration. ‘Our wealth and greatness, says he, depend absolutely upon keeping the *legislative* power to future ages *untainted, vigilant* for the public safety, *jealous* of the people’s rights, *watchful* over ministers, *unawed* by armies, *unseduced* by preferences, bribes, or pensions. That we are safe at present; that this important post is well secured, is granted,’ [some honest hearts, on reading this, and comparing the state of things in latter times, will, perhaps, bleed for their degenerate country] ‘but writing for posterity, to which these papers may, peradventure, be transmitted, I think it needful to give these cautions.’

‘Let the injured resort to the courts of law, and if *there* they fail of justice, in *parliament* they may be confident to receive it.’ *Smith’s* speech on the state of the nation, 1641.<sup>b</sup>

Sir *Robert Naunton* ascribes the happiness in *Elizabeth’s* days, to the wisdom and patriotism of the members of the house of commons. There was nothing then to give them. Therefore they had nothing to draw them from the good of their country<sup>c</sup>.

‘Mem-

<sup>a</sup> II. 308.

<sup>b</sup> PARL. HIST. x. 16. *seq.*

<sup>c</sup> *Rap.* II. 155.



‘Members of parliament’ (says the learned judge *Blackstone*<sup>a</sup>) ‘are not thus honourably distinguished from the rest of their fellow subjects, merely that they may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics; that they may lift under party banners; may grant or withhold supplies; may vote with or against a popular or unpopular administration; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the *English* constitution, delegated to watch, to check, and to avert, every dangerous innovation; to propose, to adopt and to cherish any solid and well weighed improvement. Bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to transmit that constitution, and those laws to their posterity, amended if possible, but at least without derogation.’

*Camden* observes, that no tax disgusts the *English* which has the sanction of parliament. This is true in general. In former times, parliaments had the confidence of the people. Have parliaments the confidence of the people in our times? ‘The nation naturally loves parliamentary cures: but is jealous of all others<sup>b</sup>.’ If, therefore, at any time, the nation is *jealous* of parliament, it is to be supposed there is reason; because the prejudice of the people is in *favour* of parliament.

Colonel *Lundy* (though excepted out of the indemnity by the commons, *A. D.* 1689) *desires* to be examined by the commons<sup>c</sup>. The commons had then the *confidence* of the people; as juries, or arbitrators, have now. We have seen the times, when an honest,

<sup>a</sup> COMMENT. I. 9.

<sup>b</sup> *Burn.* HIST. OWN TIMES, II. 113.

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM.* II. 355.

and consequently obnoxious, man, who would have feared nothing, if to be tried by a jury, give his cause for lost, if ordered to appear before parliament. *G. Grenville*, a few years ago, told the house of commons, their manner of deciding contested elections was so gross, that not one of them would chuse to have any part of his property at the mercy of the house, if a jury of porters or carmen could be had.

‘ While the commons were raising money, [*A. D.* 1695] ‘ they wisely enquired into the disposal of ‘ former taxes, and discovered so much corruption, ‘ that they thought it was high time to punish, and ‘ prevent farther <sup>a</sup>.’

King *William* celebrates this parliament for forming the national revolution-association; for remedying the debasement of the coin; for restoring credit; for giving supplies for the war; for paying off debts; and for settling the civil list <sup>b</sup>. A great deal of business done in *one* parliament. We too have seen a great deal dispatched in one parliament, but business of another sort. We have seen in one parliament the power of election of members taken from the people, and usurped by the commons; the colonies irritated by taxing them without representation; the mother country so dissatisfied, that 60,000 petitioned to have parliament dissolved; 600,000 *l.* of the people’s money given, solely against their will, to pay debts, which none, but the ministry, knew to be real, or if real, how contracted; the *East India* company deprived of her rights and privileges, without pretence of transgression against government; religious liberty refused to two different sets of petitioners humbly request-

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* II. 446.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* III. 90.

requesting what all mankind have an unalienable right to enjoy, &c. of all which more fully elsewhere.

From these few pages may be formed such an idea of what parliaments ought to be, of what they have been, and of what, it is to be feared, we shall not quickly see them restored to, as may incline us to adopt the antient prophet's complaint;

‘How is the gold become dim! How is the most  
‘fine gold changed! The precious sons of Zion,  
‘comparable to vessels of fine gold, how are they  
‘esteemed as earthen pitchers, the work of the hand  
‘of the potter <sup>a</sup>!’

The true value is only to be restored to our debased parliaments by putting them into the refining furnace, and purging them of the gross alloy of places and pensions, which have so long debauched and disgraced them.

## CHAP. II.

*Placemen and Pensioners unfit for Members of Parliament, because not likely to be uninfluenced.*

ONE of the oldest, if not absolutely the oldest, writer in the world, threatens ‘a fire to consume the tabernacles of bribery <sup>b</sup>.’ A parliament filled with placemen and pensioners is literally a tabernacle of bribery. For it is impossible to give an *honest* reason for any number of placemen's or pensioners having *suffrage* in parliament. The house of commons ought to be the *people* in one room. And why must the people be bribed to consult their own interest? If indeed the

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court

<sup>a</sup> LAMENT. IV. I.

<sup>b</sup> JOB XV. 34.

*court* has schemes to carry, directly opposite to the people's interest, it may be convenient for the *court*, that many placemen crowd the house of commons.

It is not easy to imagine, even stretching charity till it cracks, that any one ever seriously thought the admission of place-men, pensioners, and officers, into the house of commons, safe, or decent; that any man of common sense can think of it otherwise, than as an open and impudent defiance of the sense of the whole independent people of *England*.

Our court advocates, however, sometimes divert themselves (on a too fatally serious subject) by treating the independent people like children, when they tell us, it is good policy to drop some *douceurs* among the members of both houses, to *attach* them more closely to their *country's* good. As if it were necessary to bribe mankind to consult their *own* interest. Take away your *douceurs*, and *every member's* interest will be the same with the *public*. Suppose I give out, that I will not eat, or drink, unless the court bribes me. Would the court think it necessary to settle an annual pension on me, to make me eat a dinner every day? or would it be thought proper to give me a place—any where, but in Bedlam? The court knows full well, that the direct contrary of their scandalous pretence is the truth; and that the members of the legislature would naturally consult but too well for their iniquitous purposes, their own interest, in consulting that of their country, did not they byass them by throwing *another* interest and advantage in their way; which for that reason they accordingly do, at an immense expence to the nation.

He knew human nature well, who said, The love of money is the root of all evil. He, who can resist the

the love of money, may be said to be tried as gold in the fire.

Quisquis ingentes oculo irretorto

Spectat acervos.

Hor.

But as we know, the number of men capable of standing this fiery trial, is very small, we ought to be the more cautious of laying temptations in the way of those, whose failure is to be apprehended, and whose failure may be of such ruinous consequence to the public. To trust our all, without account, to a set of frail men, and then put those men in such circumstances as are likely to lead them to betray us—what can be imagined more contrary to wisdom? Several millions a year laid out in supporting the power of the court! And this not sufficient; of such a growing nature is corruption! Nothing of this boundless unaccountable waste could have place in a republic. I do not mention this as any reflection on our *kings*. It is but a small part of this immense sum, that is consumed by them in their *propria persona*, or that is laid out on their families. But in a republic, judge *Blackstone*<sup>a</sup> would not have wrote as follows; ‘It is impossible to support that *dignity*, which a king of *Great Britain* should maintain, with an income in *any degree less*, than what is now established by parliament.’ According to the learned judge, whatever is, is right. But, surely, with all due submission, the *dignity* of a *British* monarch does not consist in his *spending* large sums of his poor people’s money; but rather in his *sparing* their purses, and setting them an example of frugality. With the learned judge’s good

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leave,

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<sup>a</sup> COMM. I. 333.

leave, it is the dignity (if dignity it may be called) of the *ministry*, and their crew, much more than the king's, that devours the civil list. So that the plain *English* of what the learned judge has written, will be what follows; 'It is impossible to support that influence which a *British* ministry should maintain, with an income in any degree less than several millions *per annum*.' Than which I cannot conceive a more ruinous political doctrine.

When Sir *W. Temple* dissuaded *Ch. II.* from all thoughts of making himself absolute, he observed to him, among other things, that it would be impracticable: for that *England* was quite a different sort of country from *France*, where absolute government was established. That in the land of slavery there was no such independent body as our middling gentry; and that, on the contrary, that country was full of priests, of needy noblesse, military officers, and revenue-men, all naturally devoted to the support of arbitrary power, as being all interested in it themselves; that *Charles* had but few places and pensions to give, and no army of considerable force <sup>a</sup>. [We have innumerable places and pensions to allure, and a formidable army to threaten our members into court-measures.] Accordingly the pension parliament was very compliant to the court at first; but grew more patriotic afterwards, most probably disappointed in their voracious expectations.

*Ch. I. A. D.* 1628, gave out, that it belongs only to the judges to declare the meaning of the laws <sup>b</sup>. But *Rapin* justly remarks, That this was making those men the interpreters of the laws, who depended

<sup>a</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, II. 240.

<sup>b</sup> *Rapin*, II. 276.

on him; for the king could then make or unmake the judges, as he pleased; which was throwing the liberties, properties, and lives of the subjects into the hands of the king or ministry. Is not the reasoning the same with regard to members of parliament? If they hold places, and expect preferments from the ministry, are they not the dependents on the ministry as much as *Charles's* judges were on him? And is it not as much to be expected, that they should be slaves to the ministry?

*Whitelocke*, in opposing the self-denying ordinance, observes, That the *Greeks* and *Romans* gave the greatest employments to their senators. But there is always a great difference between a monarchy and a republic. The latter has checks for overgrown power, which the former knows nothing of. And it is the peculiar evil of monarchy, that ministers screen themselves behind the throne; and, as kings are sacred characters, as our kings can do no evil, and parliaments are bribed, ministerial crimes go unpunished. Again; *Whitelocke* says, the *English* have always given great places to the members of both houses. But in those times, the number of places was so small, they could seldom produce any great effect. Accordingly we see how staunch parliaments were in *Ch. Ist's* time.

The proposals for more effectually putting the self-denying ordinance in force *A. D.* 1648, were at that time over-ruled, because many of the members held very profitable places. Yet it is certain there were not in those days places for a majority of the house, and all depends on the majority<sup>a</sup>. How then came the minority to gain such a point?

This

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<sup>a</sup> *PARL. HIST.* xvii. 386.

This shews, that the *effect* of places and pensions given to parliament-men extends much wider than the places and pensions themselves reach to. There are always in parliament a multitude of gapers, who hope to catch a sop by and by, and are therefore ready to curry court-favour by shewing themselves to be on the court side. It is to be supposed, that was then the case.

The author of *Faction detected by Facts*, says, a pension-bill is impossible, because members may take the money, and conceal their crime. But why may not things be put on such a foot, that a minister should not know how to find money enough to bribe 300 men of fortune every time he has an unconstitutional point to carry? Besides, were a double penalty set upon both giver and receiver, the frequency of detection, in consequence of party-altercation, would render bribing very dangerous. And were parliaments annual, with exclusion of a certain number by rotation for three years, as the law requires in the case of sheriffs, it could be worth no minister's while to bribe.

Our house of commons pretends to have an absolute controul over elections, to determine who shall fit in their house, and who shall not. Why then have they never determined, that no member shall sit, who has given victuals, or drink, or money, to be elected? Why do they not determine that no man shall sit in their house, who has a dependence of any kind upon the court? The answer is plain. This would only be for the advantage of the *people*, and would ruin the trade of *parliamentearing*; for 'courtiers and king's servants (says *Whitlocke*) fit in parliament rather to promote their master's ends [and their own] than their country's rights<sup>a</sup>.'

On

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XIX. 231.



On this grievous subject, cruel is the sneer of the courtiers upon us, when we complain of placemen in the house, *viz.* ‘That the *people* themselves are in fault; Why do they re-elect them?’—Ah, ye traitors, who ‘grin horrible a ghastly smile,’ while ye are stabbing liberty to the heart! full well do ye know (at the very time ye are mocking us with this unjust and wicked recrimination of a fault, which owns yourselves only for its authors) that the wretched people *re-elect* upon the same principle as they *elect*. A handful of beggars either tempted by a *bribe*, or awed by the *threats* of a man in power, elect and re-elect as they are *bid*. And so the house comes to be filled with the tools of a minister. Nothing can therefore be imagined more farcical, than our pretending to make a law rendering it necessary to *re-elect* every member, who has accepted a place. The only law, that could, to any purpose, have been made, was utter *disqualification*.

One would imagine, there could not be much room for accusing the republican parliament of places and pensions. Yet it appears, that reflections were even then made upon that account, which shews the delicacy of those times. ‘What does the enemy say, ‘ nay what do many say, who were friends at the beginning of the parliament? even this. That the ‘ members of both houses have got great places and ‘ commands, and the sword into their hands, and what ‘ by interest in parliament, what by power in the army, ‘ will purposely continue themselves in grandeur, and ‘ not permit the war speedily to end, lest their own ‘ profit and power should determine with it. This I ‘ speak to our own faces. It is but what others do ‘ utter abroad behind our backs. I hope we have such ‘ true *English* hearts and zealous affections toward the

‘ general weal of our mother country, that no member  
 ‘ of either house will scruple to deny himself and his  
 ‘ private interest for the public good, nor account a  
 ‘ dishonour done to him, whatever the parliament shall  
 ‘ resolve upon in this weighty matter.’ *Cromwell’s*  
 speech, (the only sensible one he ever made) which  
 led to the self-denying ordinance <sup>a</sup>.

It was reckoned, there were 232 members of the first  
 parliament of *Geo. I.* who had places, pensions, or titles,  
 besides a great many brothers, and heirs apparent, of  
 the nobility, or persons otherwise likely to be under  
 undue influence; the number of which was not  
 below 50, which added to the 232 makes 282 <sup>b</sup>.  
 A frightful majority on the side of the court. And  
 there is no reason to suppose the *Augean* stable is gene-  
 rally cleaner now than it was then.

‘ Had our new barrier been well fortified,’ [that is,  
 the independency of parliament secured at the revolu-  
 tion] ‘ had the representative of the people been con-  
 ‘ trived to answer to the name, all our kings had been  
 ‘ queen *Elizabeths*. But our elections in inconsider-  
 ‘ able boroughs, and our members being qualified to  
 ‘ serve two masters, were such mistakes in our funda-  
 ‘ mentals, that, as they have produced our past misfor-  
 ‘ tunes, they must produce the like under bad princes,  
 ‘ or evil projecting ministers. With a house of com-  
 ‘ mons chosen truly by the people incapable of pensions  
 ‘ and places, the king and kingdom had been incapa-  
 ‘ ble of misfortune: they had been out of the reach of  
 ‘ all human power, and with due submission, above  
 ‘ fate; since such a government would have made us  
 ‘ the proper objects of divine protection, and not only  
 ‘ have

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XIII. 376.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. COM. VIII. 210.

‘ have secured our greatness and glory, but our religion and morals too, which I fear are all going together<sup>a</sup>.’ A parliament is not necessarily a security more than a court, (as the *French* king’s court) against slavery. *James* II. A. D. 1689, assembled a parliament in *Ireland*. But what sort of parliament? Let *Tindal*<sup>b</sup> answer. Slaves to the king, packed by him, bigotted to popery, and furious against the protestants, king *William*, and the revolution. Suppose a parliament thoroughly attached to the court by bribery, the effect would be the same as if attached by a false principle.

‘ We have seen and heard,’ says lord *Bolingbroke*, ‘ in a nation hitherto free, such maxims avowed and pleaded for, as are inconsistent with all the notions of liberty. Corruption hath been defended, nay recommended as a proper, a necessary, and therefore a reasonable expedient of government; than which there is not perhaps, any one proposition more repugnant to the common sense of mankind and to universal experience. Both of these demonstrate corruption to be the last deadly symptom of agonizing liberty. Both of them declare that a people abandoned to it are abandoned to a reprobate sense, and are lost to all hopes of political salvation. The dependence of the legislature on the executive power hath been contended for by the same persons, under the same direction, and yet nothing surely can be more evident than this; that in a constitution like ours, the safety of the whole depends upon the ballance of the parts, and the ballance of the parts on their mutual independency on one another; agreeably to which, *Thuanus* makes *Ferdinand* say in answer to the *Castilians*, who press’d him to take away the independency of the  
‘ states

<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*, II. 645.

<sup>b</sup> CONTINUATION, I. 85.

‘ states of *Arragon* ; That the public safety depends on  
 ‘ the equal ballance of the power of the king, and of  
 ‘ the power of the kingdom, and that if ever it should  
 ‘ happen that one outweigh’d the other, the ruin of  
 ‘ one, or of both, must undoubtedly follow <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ It is pleasant to observe a set of writers  
 ‘ charging others with forming republican schemes,  
 ‘ when they themselves are the persons who in  
 ‘ effect, and by the necessary consequence of their  
 ‘ way of reasoning, have been placing our excellent  
 ‘ constitution in a most ridiculous and contemptible  
 ‘ light. According to them it is no better than a jum-  
 ‘ ble of incompatible powers, which would separate  
 ‘ and fall to pieces of themselves, unless restrained and  
 ‘ upheld by such honourable methods as those of bribery  
 ‘ and corruption ; for how is it possible for any man  
 ‘ under any other notion, to plead for the necessity or  
 ‘ for the fitness of places and pensions, or any pecu-  
 ‘ niary influence among the members of the house of  
 ‘ commons ? If any dependence or bias created by  
 ‘ such motives were really necessary, it would prove  
 ‘ that the form of our government itself was defective  
 ‘ to a degree of ridiculousness ; that it was a constitu-  
 ‘ tion having a representative of the people which must  
 ‘ be engaged not to represent them, nor to vote and act  
 ‘ if uninfluenced by private interest or corrupt motives.  
 ‘ Now if such an influence or dependence was univer-  
 ‘ sal and unlimited throughout the whole house, the  
 ‘ monarchy would be absolute ; and whenever this in-  
 ‘ fluence prevails in any degree, it tends to arbitrary  
 ‘ power. For this reason the true friends of liberty  
 ‘ must perpetually guard against such influences, which  
 ‘ is

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<sup>a</sup> *Bolingbr. REM. HIST. ENGL. 29.*

‘ is not setting up a new form of government, but pre-  
 ‘ serving the old <sup>a</sup>.’

That placemen in parliament, are in our times a serious evil, appears from this, that ‘ the minister, before he introduces a bill, can foretell, almost with certainty, its fate in the house; and by means of the influence which he has over the members, can command, in most cases, a majority of votes. Nor will this influence appear in the least surprizing, if we consider the great number of lucrative places which the sovereign, that is, the minister, has to dispose of. For though the property of the subjects be much larger than that of the sovereign, yet is the property of this last by no means inconsiderable; and it is well known, that much less property, in a single hand, will counterballance a greater in several hands. According to the most exact computation, there are near three millions at the disposal of the crown. The civil list amounts to near a million, the collection of all taxes to another, and the employments in the army and navy, along with ecclesiastical preferments, to above a third million: an enormous sum, and what cannot fail to attach to the court an immense number of dependants; and as few placemen are excluded from seats in parliament, the sovereign’ [say rather the minister] ‘ must have a mighty influence upon all the deliberations of that august assembly. It ought also to be observed, that the great increase of our dominions, and the consequent necessity for the proportionable increase in our military establishment,’ [there is no need of a military establishment, a militia is every way preferable] ‘ are both of them pernicious to liberty; for seldom or never has it  
 ‘ been

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<sup>a</sup> *Bolingbr. POLIT. TRACTS, 251.*

‘ been known, that any nation has preserved its liberty,  
‘ after having greatly extended its conquests, and still  
‘ less after having established a large standing army. And  
‘ though the increase of commerce, which is likewise  
‘ the consequence of extensive dominions, be favoura-  
‘ ble in some measure to the cause of liberty, by intro-  
‘ ducing among the people a greater degree of equality,  
‘ and by drawing them into large towns, which always  
‘ breathe a republican spirit; yet does it also by this  
‘ very circumstance of drawing them into large towns,  
‘ tend evidently to corrupt their minds, and to enervate  
‘ their bodies, and thus to prepare them for the recep-  
‘ tion of that slavery, which a variety of other causes  
‘ is likely to bring upon them. With regard to the  
‘ people’s jealousy of the crown, which is said to be  
‘ inherent in the *British* constitution; this jealousy,  
‘ however great, may yet by an artful minister be laid  
‘ asleep. The power of the crown is certainly upon  
‘ the increase, but it advances, at the same time, with  
‘ such slow and imperceptible steps, as not to awaken the  
‘ jealousy of the public; and before this jealousy be effec-  
‘ tually awakened, the power of the crown may have be-  
‘ come so great, as to be altogether irresistible. Every  
‘ new tax that is imposed upon the people, every foot of  
‘ ground that is added to our dominions, every increase  
‘ that is made in our military establishment, all conspire  
‘ by their united influence to increase the power of the  
‘ crown; and if things be suffered to proceed in their pre-  
‘ sent course, and no extraordinary convulsion happens  
‘ in the state, the *British* liberties must at last be swallow-  
‘ ed-up in absolute monarchy. Might I presume, amidst  
‘ these opposite arguments, to deliver my own senti-  
‘ ments, I would affirm, that the *British* government  
‘ tends immediately neither to a republic, nor an abso-

lute monarchy, but to an aristocracy; though this  
last will in all probability only pave the way for the  
introduction of monarchy. The very essence of our  
liberty consists in the people's having the right, and  
the power to chuse their representatives in parlia-  
ment; that is in other words, in being their own  
legislators. But should we ever come to have a great  
number of hereditary legislators, or those who are  
such independent of the people's choice, and should  
these hereditary legislators be possessed of the whole,  
or of the greatest part of the national property, and  
should they, by means of that property, be able to  
influence the elections, and to controul the proceed-  
ings of the members of the lower house, though we  
may be still amused with the pleasing sound of liberty,  
and though the lower house may be permitted to sub-  
sist in its present form, the national liberties are from  
that moment ruined. For it is well known, that  
the forms of a constitution may long remain, after its  
spirit has been entirely extinguished. How far this  
is our case at present; or how far it is likely to be our  
case, in some not very distant period, any one may  
easily determine, by considering the great number of  
wealthy commoners, who within this half century  
past have been advanced to the peerage, and the spirit  
which still prevails of advancing others to the same  
dignity. The moment a commoner becomes trou-  
blesome in the lower house, if he is possessed of a  
competent fortune, he is immediately transplanted to  
the upper, where he at once strengthens the aristocra-  
tic, and proportionably weakens the democratic part  
of our government. And how great an influence the  
members of the upper, have upon the elections, and  
consequently upon the proceedings of those of the lower

' house, may be easily collected from perusing a  
 ' court calendar, where we shall see, that almost all  
 ' the noblemens sons in *England*, who are of a proper  
 ' age, are members of the lower house, and that many  
 ' commoners have obtained their seats there, by the in-  
 ' terest and countenance of some powerful nobleman.  
 ' In a word, we seem to be in a fair way of becoming  
 ' in a short time, a nation of great lords, and of needy  
 ' vassals; the consequence of which must infallibly be,  
 ' that the people, harrassed by the oppressions of the  
 ' great, conscious that their liberties are already ravish-  
 ' ed from them, and chusing rather to submit to one  
 ' mild master, than to two or three hundred petty ty-  
 ' rants, will petition the sovereign, as the last favour  
 ' he can grant them, that he will be graciously pleased  
 ' to establish an absolute monarchy. This was very  
 ' lately the case in *Denmark*, and if nothing extraordi-  
 ' nary happens, it will in all probability be very soon  
 ' the case in *Great-Britain*. How to prevent the im-  
 ' pending calamity, or if it cannot be prevented, how  
 ' it may at least be for some time warded off, I will  
 ' not take upon me to say. A peerage bill was some  
 ' years ago attempted, or an act to confine within  
 ' certain limits the number of peers. Perhaps such  
 ' a scheme may again be revived, but there seems very  
 ' little likelihood in the present disposition of parties,  
 ' that it would meet with success<sup>a</sup>.'

No one ever knew human nature better than He,  
 who said, 'No man can serve two masters.' It is a  
 romantic expectation, and unsuitable to what we know  
 of the frailty of our species, to think of a placeman's  
 or pensioner's being altogether unbiassed in favour of  
 the ministry, to which he owes his emolument, and

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<sup>a</sup> POLIT. REGIST. QUOTED LOND. MAG. 1767, p. 406.



consequently of those gentlemen's consulting in their speeches and votes the good of their country, with the same impartiality as they might be expected to do, if wholly independent. 'The wife of *Cæsar* ought to be not only innocent, but *unsuspected*.' Why must the wife of *Cæsar* be more unsuspected, than a *British legislator*? Could the *British* legislators think of passing unsuspected, if there were in the house of commons more than two hundred notorious *dependents* on the court? As we go on; this shocking sight may soon be seen.

The courtiers argue, that excluding placemen and pensioners from parliament, would seem to establish an opposition between the crown and people; as if those, who were employed by the one, could not be entrusted by the other. But indeed there seems to be no occasion for mincing the matter. Let us fairly own, that we do not think the same persons, who have the laying *out*, ought likewise to have the laying *on* of taxes. Since it is easy to imagine, that a member, who has a place, will be under little concern how heavily the people are taxed, as his income indemnifies him, and the heavier the taxes, the more money there will be for the court blood-suckers.

*Ch. I.* fairly declares his expectation of indirect service from his convention parliament at *Oxford, A. D. 1643*. 'I think most of you, says he, are in my service, either in a civil or a martial way<sup>a</sup>.' To what purpose does he mention this, but to put them in mind, that they ought to express their gratitude, by promoting his wicked schemes at any rate?

E 2

*Whitelocke*


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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XIII. 119.

*Whitelocke* tells us <sup>a</sup>, that *Charles*, being disappointed in his schemes, ‘took another course to gain eminent parliament men, who were against him, to become of his party, and to do him service. He took Sir *Tho. Wentworth* and Sir *Jo. Saville* into favour, and made them privy-counsellors. Sir *Dudley Digges* was made master of the rolls; *Noy*, king’s attorney, and *Littleton* solicitor.’ His dependent judges declared ship-money lawful. On which occasion the pious and virtuous lady of judge *Croke* (whose fame be immortal!) said to her husband, ‘she hoped he would do nothing against his honour, for fear of danger or loss, and that she would be content to suffer want or misery with him, rather than be an occasion for him to do, or say, any thing against his judgment or conscience <sup>b</sup>.’

Lord *Digby*, in his speech, *A. D.* 1640, for frequent elections, mentions *Noy* as once a great patriot, and promoter of the petition of right. Afterwards, when made attorney general, he proved the very inventor of ship-money. He likewise calls *Wentworth* a shameful apostate <sup>c</sup>.

*St. John*, one of the patriots in the time of *Ch. I.* was made solicitor general, and others were to be taken into places; but refused them, and stood by the parliament. It was afterwards suspected, that some, if they had accepted places, would have done the king’s cause more harm than good, by betraying the court-schemes to the people <sup>d</sup>. Besides, the king had not then places enough to bribe a majority of the commons. This, however, shews what the court then thought, as well as now, the true means for making members knaves.

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<sup>a</sup> MEM. 13.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 24.

<sup>c</sup> PARL. HIST. IX. 197.

<sup>d</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, I. 260.

knaves. And it was to take off the imputations, under which the republican parliament fell, on account of placemen being in the house, that the self-denying ordinance was first broached<sup>a</sup>.

Scripture directs to shun the appearance of evil. And whoever does not fear the appearance, is not far from the reality. On this principle the brave commons of the republican parliament write as follows to the Scotch commissioners.

‘ We know your lordships can and will witness  
 ‘ with us, that since our covenant and treaty, we have  
 ‘ not received any dignities or offices from the king<sup>b</sup>.’

When members of parliament are placemen, that is, when the same men have both legislative and executive power, how are we to expect that offenders in administration should be punished, the criminals being the judges? Can we think any set of men will be public spirited enough to hang themselves for their offences against their country<sup>c</sup>?

‘ *Walsley's* ambition (says *Elfyng*) first brought  
 ‘ the privy counsellors, and others of the king's ser-  
 ‘ vants, into the house of commons; from whence they  
 ‘ were anciently exempted. The effects are, the  
 ‘ commons have lost their chief jewel, freedom of  
 ‘ speech<sup>d</sup>.’

It is a maxim in *Richelieu's Testam. Polit.* That a king, that is, a minister, should never part with a tax he has once got established, even though he has no use for the money; because by giving up the tax, he

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loses

<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, II. 515.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* XV. 172.

<sup>c</sup> *Gord. TRACTS*, I. 61.

<sup>d</sup> *Elfyng's ANT. METH. HOLD. PARL.* 171.

loses the officers employed in collecting it. And these officers in parliament are sure cards.

*Hen. IV. of France* gave the marshal *d'Ornano* a staff to turn papist, and afterwards asked him which of the two religions he thought the best. 'The protestant, undoubtedly, replies the marshal; else your majesty would not have given me a marshal's staff to boot, to engage me to quit it.' I have forgot to set down the original writer of this anecdote. It is told in *Cato's letters*, &c.

A *British* minister gives places and pensions to those who vote for him. Suppose one of those members were asked, Whether the service of his country, or voting always with the court, is best; if he were as honest a knave as the marshal, what could he answer, but, 'That certainly voting for the country's good was preferable to slavery under a minister; else the minister had no occasion to give him a place or pension to boot, to engage him to quit his country's service for the minister's.' And is not this giving up the point?

The Emperor, and bloody *Mary* gave public pensions to the members of parliament.—With what view? To engage them to vote for the good of their country? No. To establish popery; To vote the queen's marriage with a papist, *Philip II. of Spain*; which that venal parliament did accordingly; thereby manifestly shewing how soundly *Philip* and *Mary* judged of the effect of bribing parliament<sup>a</sup>. What difference does it make to me, as a subject, whether I am voted into slavery for gold sent from the continent to bribe parliament, or for gold drawn out of the exchequer of  
*England?*

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<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, II. 38.

*England?* Of the two, modern bribery is the most disgraceful. It is making us pay for the rod, which is to beat us, and the chain, that is to bind us.

Sir *Ch. Wager*, first lord of the admiralty, *Fox*, surveyor general of the works, and *Pelham* (I do not recollect what place he held at that time) were the speakers against lord *Limerick's* motion, *A. D.* 1741, for an enquiry into the conduct of affairs during *Walpole's* 20 years administration, which was carried in the negative 244 against 242<sup>a</sup>. And it is, in general, the same in all debates of the kind. The placemen always speak and vote in one tone; so that before you begin their speeches, you are certain, by only reading the name of the speaker, and knowing, that he held a place, what the strain of his speech will be.

‘An unpensioned subject will always give the most faithful counsel to his prince. And it is the true interest of the prince to have about him those, who will not flatter him, or be the slaves of his passions for the sake of his money<sup>b</sup>.’

When Mr. *Pulteney* resigned his place, *A. D.* 1720, he said in the house, ‘He might now act with the freedom which became an *Englishman* ;’ which implied, that a place was incompatible with freedom<sup>c</sup>. The same gentleman was struck out of the list of privy counsellors by *Geo. II.* with his own hand, for his uncourtly behaviour. The duke of *Argyle*, the earl of *Stair*, Mr. *Pitt*, Mr. *Legge*, and many more, have been disgraced and displaced on the same account; which shews what courts expect of placemen. And are placemen then fit to be members of parliament?

<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIII. 147.

<sup>b</sup> *Bolingbr. POLIT. TRACTS*, 283.

<sup>c</sup> DEB. COM. VI. 120.

An omrah of *Shaw Jekan's* army having presumed to sit in his presence, the prince deprived him of his command. The disgraced officer went to the palace next day, and sat down in the presence chamber. Upon the *Shah's* reproving him, he answered boldly, 'Now I am not in your majesty's *pay*, I may use the freedom, which belongs to every independent man.' The emperor approved, and restored him <sup>a</sup>.

*Treby* moved, *A. D.* 1721, for the mutiny bill, which is not commonly brought in till the end of a session. *Jekyl* was for going on with the more necessary regulations for supporting credit. *Craggs* said, he wondered that a person who had received signal favours from the crown should oppose a bill so necessary for the safety of government. Lord *Molesworth* stood up, and said, 'Mr. Speaker, Is it come to this,' [I believe it is come to this] 'that every man who has a place must do all the drudgery that is enjoined him <sup>b</sup>?' On which principle, officers have been (as elsewhere observed) sent for from *Flanders* to vote for the minister.

In the year 1766, the governor of *New England* (*Bernard*) in his speech to the council and house of representatives, took occasion to blame their wise and patriotic conduct in excluding from the king's council the principal crown-officers. This proceeding (at all times proper, as the people cannot be too much on their guard against court-tools, nor too apprehensive of the danger of trusting power in their unhallowed hands) was peculiarly necessary at a time when the colonists had so lately seen a rapacious minister disposed to encroach in the most shameless manner on their liberty by loading them with taxes, to the payment of which they

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. VI. 383.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. COM. VI. 227.

they had not given, nor could give their consent, as having no representative in parliament, where those taxes were imposed.

Those brave *Americans* defended their conduct upon the principles of their charter right to choose and refuse as they please, which they should certainly not give up either to their governor, or to the secretaries of state. They insisted, that their governor's pretending to make observations on their elections, was a high breach of their privilege. That, while they observed the directions of their charter, they were accountable only to God and their own consciences, for the manner in which they gave their suffrages. And that their charter itself would be of very little value to them, if it required that they should in their elections be under the controul of their governors. It is with regret I find myself obliged to give only *heads* of this spirited piece, the strain of which is worthy of the most elegant, as well as the freest age or nation <sup>a</sup>.

A resolution, *A. D.* 1683, passed the assembly of *Pensylvania*, ' That no person appointed by the governor to receive his fines, forfeitures, or revenues whatsoever, shall sit in judgment in any court of judicature, when a fine may accrue to the governor <sup>b</sup>.'

No man could be a magistrate at *Florence* if he had a brother or near relation in the magistracy <sup>c</sup>.

' *Tous ceux qui possèdent, &c.* All military officers are excluded from sitting in the assembly of the states general by a resolution, *A. D.* 1625 <sup>d</sup>.'

Tindal

<sup>a</sup> LOND. MAG. 1766, p. 332, 407.

<sup>b</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xli. 8.      <sup>c</sup> Ibid. xxxvi. 77.

<sup>d</sup> ETAT PRES. DE LA REPUEL. DES PROV. UNIES, par Janiçen, i. 78.

*Tindal* observes <sup>a</sup>, ‘ It was a very *unusual* thing in ‘ *England* for gentlemen who held such *posts*’ [of paymaster general and chancellor of the exchequer, held by Mr. *Pitt* and Mr. *Legge*] ‘ to *oppose* a secretary of ‘ state, who was supposed to know and to speak his royal ‘ master’s sentiments,’ in favour of continental connexions. Accordingly Mr. *Legge* was quickly, in reward for his *obstinacy* against the court, turned out. Yet our daring court-jesuits are ever sounding in our ears the *usefulness* of what can *alone* overthrow the *British* empire; I mean, court-influence in parliament. So little do they dread the tremendous curse of heaven pointed directly at the heads of those who put light for darkness, and darkness for light, who call good evil, and evil good.

The court-tools say, the influence of the court in parliament is necessary, and that places, pensions, and sinecures are necessary. But what did honest old *Epaminondas* say to the ambassadors of the king of *Persia*? ‘ If the king wants me to do any thing for ‘ the good of my country, I am ready to do it with- ‘ out a bribe. If he wants me to betray my country, ‘ his kingdom is below my price <sup>b</sup>’.

There might be some pretence for court-influence in parliament when there were many jacobites. There might in the time of *Charles I.* when there were many on the side of the tyrant. Yet the patriots of *Charles’s* time established the self-denying ordinance, on purpose to break through it. And they gained their point more effectually than *William’s* bribing ministry by the contrary conduct. It is true, he used to say, If he had places and pensions *enough* to

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<sup>a</sup> CONTIN. IX. 538.

<sup>b</sup> *Corn. Nep.* IN EPAM.



to give, he should soon reconcile whigs and tories<sup>a</sup>. But what did he mean by *enough*? A place for every jacobite of consequence in the three kingdoms? This is romantic. But this corrupt policy will go a certain length. And if ministers can but shuffle on a little and a little longer, they do not much care by what means, because the money is flowing in all the while. ‘Sir Robert,’ (says a friend of the arch-corruptor, whispering him in the house) ‘what are you doing?’ ‘This fiction will be detected to-morrow.’ ‘No matter,’ says the other; ‘it will stop that fellow’s [Pulteney’s] mouth to-day, and let to-morrow take care of itself.’

Judge *Hales* would not suffer a gentleman’s cause to be heard, till he *paid* him for a buck sent him by the gentleman, though the present was a customary one. Compare this delicacy of sentiment, which would not suffer those great men so much as to seem byassed, with the execrable grossness of our times, in which we see hundreds of court dependents sitting with grave and modest face in the house of commons, where there ought not to be the shadow of an influence likely to byass the members against the interest of their constituents.

Some of our court-writers own, that ‘pensions and bribes cannot be too vehemently decryed;’ but openly declare their opinion, that the crown ought to have employments in its gift to engage support. I own I do not understand what *need* there is of any support, but rectitude of measures; or how a lucrative place can be considered otherwise than as a bribe, if it inclines a man to support what he would not otherwise support;

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<sup>a</sup> *Rap.* II. 802.

Why do we refuse a right of voting at elections to those who receive *alms*? Because we suppose, that such persons, being needy, will of course be dependent, and under undue influence. Why do we suffer men to sit in the house of commons who do receive alms, that is, *pensions*, and are upon the parish, that is, the nation? Because—we have schemes to carry, which are *inconsistent* with the public good.

‘ Your lordships’ (says the earl of *Chesterfield* in the debate on a bill for making officers independent of the ministry, *A. D.* 1734 <sup>a</sup>.) ‘ are, I am sure, all convinced, that the happiness, the essence of our constitution does not depend upon outward forms, but upon realities. Our constitution does not depend upon our having always a parliament; but upon that parliament’s being independent of the administration; upon its being in the power of parliament to examine severely, and judge impartially the conduct and the measures of those employed in the administration, to represent the grievances, and watch over the liberties and the properties of the people of this nation, and to take away evil counsellors from before the king. But if ever a majority of both houses of parliament should come to be composed of gentlemen whose daily bread, or at least their chief support, depended entirely upon the favours of the crown, can it be imagined that it would then be in the power of parliament to examine freely, or judge impartially, the conduct of these favourites; to relieve the people from the oppressions brought upon them by such favourites; or to tell their sovereign any ungrateful truths about those whom he had thought fit to employ as his ministers? Would not

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, IV. 199.*

‘ an arbitrary negative be then put upon all such  
 ‘ questions in parliament? Would not the best de-  
 ‘ signs of the uncorrupted and independent few be  
 ‘ baffled by a corrupt and slavish majority? And shall  
 ‘ any question which tends towards the preventing  
 ‘ such a misfortune, have now the ill fate to be  
 ‘ rejected by your lordships?’

It is well remembered how much, and how justly, all ranks in the nation were pleased with the act made at the instance of the present king (whom God preserve!) *A. D.* 1762, for preventing the removal of the judges at the demise of every sovereign, which naturally tended to put them on courting the heir apparent, to the violation of justice in their sentences. But why were we pleased with this regulation? According to the opposers of all schemes for restoring independency to parliament, there was no need of any such regulation. According to them, there is no corruption, no dependency, no need of any schemes for making either judges, or members of parliament independent.

‘ It would be ridiculous’ (says the excellent *Trenchard*<sup>a</sup>) ‘ to throw away reason upon those banditti,  
 ‘ who go into parliament with the execrable intention  
 ‘ of carrying to market a country, which trusted them  
 ‘ with its all. Such men are worse than cannibals,  
 ‘ who only eat their enemies to satisfy their hunger;  
 ‘ but do not sell and betray their countrymen, who  
 ‘ have trusted them with the protection of their per-  
 ‘ sons and property.’

In the debate, *A. D.* 1742, about bringing in the place bill<sup>b</sup>, Sir *W. Will. Wynne* said, ‘ Gentlemen  
 ‘ often

<sup>a</sup> CATO'S LETT. III. 286.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. COM. XIV. 33—64.

‘ often change their sentiments with their situation,  
 ‘ and that a gentleman, after he becomes a *placeman*,  
 ‘ begins to entertain notions of the *prerogative* of the  
 ‘ *crown* and the *liberties* of the *people*, very different  
 ‘ from those he had whilst he was a plain, honest,  
 ‘ country gentleman. If any thing like this should  
 ‘ happen in the present debate, it may tend to dis-  
 ‘ appoint the motion; but with all those who are  
 ‘ neither placemen nor pensioners, I am sure it ought  
 ‘ to be an argument in its favour; and, I hope, it  
 ‘ will prevail with some gentlemen, who in former ses-  
 ‘ sions opposed this motion, to alter their sentiments  
 ‘ and their way of voting upon this occasion, when  
 ‘ they have such a plain proof before their eyes, that,  
 ‘ if a place does not induce a man to vote against his  
 ‘ honour and his conscience, it at least byasses his  
 ‘ judgment, and makes him conclude that to be  
 ‘ wrong, which he before thought and declared to be  
 ‘ right.’

Lord *Strange's* speech in answer to that of *Edw.*  
*Walpole*, *A. D.* 1742 <sup>a</sup>, is close to our present purpose.  
 ‘ As we seem to improve every day in those doctrines  
 ‘ that are introductory of arbitrary power, the doc-  
 ‘ trine of corruption has this day been pushed farther  
 ‘ than ever, I believe, it was in this house. It has been  
 ‘ represented not only as a harmless, but a necessary  
 ‘ implement of government; and all the laws we  
 ‘ have for excluding pensioners, and several sorts of  
 ‘ officers, from having seats in this house, may, by  
 ‘ the same sort of reasoning, be proved to be subver-  
 ‘ sive of our constitution, and introductory of anar-  
 ‘ chy, confusion, and arbitrary power. If a gentle-  
 ‘ man of a small estate, or an estate, however large,  
 ‘ that

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIV. 41.

‘ that cannot supply the wants of his luxury or avarice, cannot be supposed capable of being induced by any mercenary motive the crown can throw in his way, to consent to grants or regulations, or to approve of measures that tend towards the introduction of arbitrary power, or that appear to be inconsistent with the public good; why should we exclude pensioners, why should we exclude the commissioners and officers of our customs and excise; from having seats in this house? If the power of granting pecuniary and mercenary rewards to members be so necessary for the managing of this house, and for answering the necessary ends of government, why should we, in any respect, abridge that power, which if ever so extensive, can do us no harm, and which, if too much abridged, may overset both our government and constitution? Surely, no man of common sense would make the least approach towards a precipice, if he could keep his distance without the least danger or inconvenience; therefore, if we admit this doctrine, we must suppose those parliaments void of common sense, in which the laws we now have for excluding pensioners, and several sorts of officers, were agreed to. But experience in all ages, and all countries, must convince us that this doctrine is false, deceitful, and pernicious. In all countries where arbitrary power has been, or is now set up, corruption was the footstool upon which it mounted into the throne. By corruption men are induced to arm their magistrates, or supreme magistrate, with such powers, as will enable them to destroy first the essence, and afterwards the very face of public liberty.’

[His lordship then shews, that nations are enslaved not by a *coup de main*, but by slow and imperceptible, but therefore more formidable degrees. That designing men begin with flattering and bribing, in order to obtain of the people the necessary advantages; that, by this means, they accordingly do obtain first one degree of power, and then another; till at last they find bribery needless, and that they can carry their designs by main force. He then goes on as follows.]

‘ Let us consider, Sir, in what liberty and property truly consists, and we shall see, that where  
 ‘ any one man has in his power a large fund for corruption, both may be absolutely destroyed, and an  
 ‘ arbitrary power established before people become  
 ‘ generally sensible of their danger. A man’s personal liberty consists in its not being in the power  
 ‘ of any man, or magistrate, with impunity, to imprison or kill him, or inflict any personal punishment upon him, unless he has been formally tried,  
 ‘ and justly condemned by that method of trial, and  
 ‘ by those laws, which have been established, and are  
 ‘ approved of by the majority of the society to which  
 ‘ he belongs. Property again consists in a man’s  
 ‘ being secure of enjoying, and transmitting to his  
 ‘ posterity, what has been left to him by his ancestors,  
 ‘ or acquired by his own industry, unless the whole,  
 ‘ or some part of it, be taken from him, in pursuance of laws that have been established, and are  
 ‘ approved by the majority of the society to which  
 ‘ he belongs. Whilst this is the case, every man of  
 ‘ the society enjoys liberty and property in their full  
 ‘ extent; and this will be our case as long as our

elections and parliaments remain free from any influence either compulsive or corrupt. But, suppose, Sir, a majority of our house of commons consisted of such as held lucrative places from the crown, and suppose a judge were to be brought before them who, for the sake of some corrupt consideration, had, at the desire of the crown, illegally and unjustly condemned and imprisoned many of his fellow-subjects; would not the crown, I mean the ministers of the crown, endeavour to protect such a judge? Would not they give hints to their officers in this house, that a dismissal would be the certain consequence of their giving a vote against this tool? And can we suppose that many of these officers would chuse to lose a place of 500 *l.* or 1000 *l.* a year, rather than give a vote in favour of this judge? Sir, I have a very great opinion of our present judges, but, without any reflection upon them, I will say, that it is upon the independency and integrity of our parliaments that we must depend for the integrity and impartiality of our judges; for the crown has many ways to reward a pliable judge, and as many to punish an obstinate one. Nay, if parliaments were once become dependent upon the crown, an obstinate integrity would of itself be sufficient for getting a judge removed by the address of both houses of parliament; for if the majority of parliament were such as depended upon the crown for getting or holding some lucrative employment, they would easily be persuaded that such a judge had done injustice to the crown, or had fomented sedition by shewing favour to the seditious, and under this pretence they would vote for addressing to remove him, without considering that they thereby established arbitrary power; and

‘ made not only their own estates, but their lives and  
‘ liberties dependent upon the arbitrary will of their  
‘ sovereign; for by this precedent, all our judges  
‘ would be convinced, that they must take directions  
‘ from the ministers of the crown in all prosecutions,  
‘ trials, and causes that might afterwards come before  
‘ them; and what man could say he had any liberty  
‘ or property left, if the ministers of the crown had  
‘ it in their power to take his life, liberty, or estate  
‘ from him, whenever they pleased, by a false accu-  
‘ sation, and a mock trial? Even after such a fatal  
‘ turn in our constitution, as long as a spirit of cor-  
‘ ruption prevailed among the people, and the court  
‘ kept within the bounds of common decency, there  
‘ would be no occasion for any compulsive methods,  
‘ either at elections, or in parliament, because the  
‘ ministers would always find people enough, that would  
‘ be ready to take their money or their favours, and  
‘ in expectation or return would agree to vote as  
‘ directed; but if by the ridiculous conduct of the  
‘ court, a spirit of liberty should arise among the peo-  
‘ ple, the violent and compulsive methods usual in  
‘ such cases would be made use of. Informers, or  
‘ *delatores*, as the *Romans* called them, would be found  
‘ out and retained, and spread over the whole nation,  
‘ in order to bring false informations against those  
‘ who dared to oppose the court either at elections or  
‘ in parliament; and in both, men would be found  
‘ to vote according to the directions of a minister, in  
‘ order to preserve that property by a slavish subjec-  
‘ tion, which they had before been endeavouring to  
‘ increase by a villainous corruption. After what I  
‘ have said, Sir, I hope I need not particularly men-  
‘ tion all the other methods by which a corrupt de-  
‘ pendent parliament may sap the foundations of



‘ our constitution. Ensnaring laws may be made, or  
 ‘ the laws we have for securing our liberties may be  
 ‘ repealed, or suspended under various pretences,  
 ‘ without a corrupt man’s being sensible that he is  
 ‘ thereby exposing his own estate to the precarious  
 ‘ tenure of arbitrary laws. On pretence of a sham-  
 ‘ plot or a pretended disaffection, the *Habeas Corpus*  
 ‘ act, that corner stone of our liberties, may be sus-  
 ‘ pended for a twelvemonth, and under the same pre-  
 ‘ tence that suspension may be renewed for another,  
 ‘ and a third twelvemonth, till at last the annual sus-  
 ‘ pension of that salutary law may go as glibly down  
 ‘ as the mutiny bill, or malt tax, now does ; for when  
 ‘ these two bills were first introduced, no man sup-  
 ‘ posed they would ever become bills of course, to  
 ‘ be passed without opposition in every succeeding  
 ‘ sessions of parliament.’

Lord *Strange* then goes on to shew how, among other  
 particulars, a designing ministry might gradually in-  
 crease the army to such a pitch as would easily over-  
 throw liberty.

‘ Can we suppose, says his lordship, that any man  
 ‘ would risque his losing a lucrative employment by  
 ‘ voting against a small augmentation of the army ?  
 ‘ This, Sir, must convince every true lover of  
 ‘ liberty, how necessary it is, that no member of  
 ‘ this assembly, or at least as few as possible, should  
 ‘ be under such temptation. I shall grant, that in  
 ‘ most points, which come to be debated before this  
 ‘ house, some of our members may have a private  
 ‘ interest in opposing, or agreeing ; but as long as  
 ‘ this private interest does not proceed from the favours  
 ‘ they enjoy, or expect from the crown, it can never  
 ‘ injure the public good ; because if some have a  
 ‘ private interest in opposing, others will have a pri-

' vate interest in agreeing to what is proposed ; and  
 ' those whose private interest is no way concerned,  
 ' will always cast the balance in favour of the public  
 ' good. The granting of money is the only case  
 ' where we can suppose the members generally engaged  
 ' by their private interest, to oppose what is necessary  
 ' for the public service ; but this interest is so small,  
 ' with regard to each particular member, that it can  
 ' never be of any weight. This is demonstrated, Sir,  
 ' from the whole course of our history, for I defy any  
 ' man to give me one instance where the parliament  
 ' denied granting what was necessary for the public  
 ' service, unless they were denied justice with regard  
 ' to the redress of grievances, or unless they had well  
 ' grounded apprehensions that the money would be  
 ' misapplied. But let us see, Sir, how this argument  
 ' will stand upon the other side of the question. It is  
 ' certain that the parliament ought never to grant  
 ' more than is absolutely necessary for the public  
 ' service. It is likewise certain, that we never ought  
 ' to grant even what is necessary, till all grievances be  
 ' redressed, and our former grants regularly and  
 ' strictly accounted for. This is our duty as mem-  
 ' bers of this house : but shall we perform this duty  
 ' if a majority of us be greatly concerned in interest  
 ' to neglect it ? And this will always be the case if  
 ' a majority of us hold or expect some lucrative office,  
 ' or employment at the pleasure of the crown, because  
 ' it will always be the interest of ministers, and even  
 ' their safety may sometimes be concerned in our  
 ' not performing this duty. Suppose they ask from  
 ' parliament 500,000 *l.* or a million for carrying on  
 ' some whimsical, perhaps pernicious scheme of their  
 ' own ; will a member of this house, who is to pay  
 ' for his share not above 50 *l.* of this sum, refuse  
 ' granting

‘ granting it, when he is to get or hold 500 *l.* or  
 ‘ 1000 *l.* a year, by consenting to the grant? Will  
 ‘ a member of this house insist upon first redressing a  
 ‘ grievance by which he suffers little, perhaps no  
 ‘ sensible prejudice, when he is to get or hold 2 or  
 ‘ 300 *l.* a year by letting it remain? And finally,  
 ‘ Sir, will a member of this house call ministers to a  
 ‘ strict account by which he can never expect to put  
 ‘ a farthing in his own pocket, when by neglecting  
 ‘ to do so, he may get or hold a good post or employ-  
 ‘ ment, and perhaps procure a round sum, which he  
 ‘ himself has purloined from the public. Sir, I was  
 ‘ sorry to hear a young gentleman talk so much of  
 ‘ mens private passions and affections, and of every  
 ‘ man’s having a view to the service of some favourite  
 ‘ passion, in every vote he gives in parliament, or at  
 ‘ elections. I hope the case is far otherwise; but if  
 ‘ it is not, we ought to endeavour to make it so, by  
 ‘ putting it out of the power (at least as far as we  
 ‘ can, by such laws as this) of any man to serve him-  
 ‘ self by his way of voting in parliament or at elec-  
 ‘ tions, any further than may result to him from the  
 ‘ general good of his country. If we can do this;  
 ‘ if we can put it out of the power of the selfish and  
 ‘ mercenary to sell their votes in parliament, no man  
 ‘ will purchase a seat there at any high price, and this  
 ‘ will of course put an end to bribery and corruption  
 ‘ at elections; for no mercenary soul will purchase  
 ‘ what he cannot sell; and those who are prompted  
 ‘ by their ambition to purchase, will never go to  
 ‘ any high price, nor will they submit to be the  
 ‘ slaves of a minister after they have purchased. Even  
 ‘ ministers themselves would cease their bribery at  
 ‘ elections, because they could not depend upon hav-  
 ‘ ing their candidate’s vote in parliament, if he had

‘ no lucrative office depending upon his voting always  
‘ with the minister; and if the flood-gates of the  
‘ treasury were not opened at any election, I am con-  
‘ vinced we should soon have little or no bribery in  
‘ the kingdom. Whilst there are purchasers, Sir,  
‘ there will be sellers; I am afraid there are at pre-  
‘ sent too many of both: but if you can make it  
‘ worth no man’s while to purchase, you will put an  
‘ end to the traffic; and this is the design of the  
‘ bill now proposed. I have shewn, that if you do  
‘ not agree to it, there will be, there must be, a cor-  
‘ rupt dependency in parliament; that by such a  
‘ dependency our constitution may be overturned,  
‘ without any compulsive dependency: and that the  
‘ latter may be made use of by an arbitrary govern-  
‘ ment, and certainly will be made use of, as soon  
‘ as it becomes necessary for the support of its arbi-  
‘ trary power. Upon this side, Sir, the danger is  
‘ certain and inevitable. Let us then consider the  
‘ danger pretended to be on the other. If we exclude  
‘ officers, or the greatest part of them, from having  
‘ seats in this house, it is said, it will introduce  
‘ anarchy and confusion, because it will be impossible  
‘ to govern such a numerous assembly as this with-  
‘ out a power in the crown to reward those who  
‘ appear zealous in its service; and that as soon as  
‘ this impossibility is perceived, all our officers, civil  
‘ and military, will join with the crown in laying  
‘ aside the use of parliaments. What the honourable  
‘ gentleman may mean, Sir, by governing such a  
‘ numerous assembly, I do not know; but according  
‘ to the common acceptance of the word, I should  
‘ be sorry to see it in the power of ministers to govern  
‘ either house of parliament, by any other method  
‘ than that of convincing the majority that nothing is  
‘ pro-

‘ proposed or intended but what is for the public  
‘ good ; for if either house were to be governed by  
‘ the hopes of reward, I am sure it could be of no  
‘ service to the people, and of very little even to the  
‘ crown itself ; because the design and use of parlia-  
‘ ments is, that they may be a check upon the con-  
‘ duct of ministers ; and no man, whose behaviour in  
‘ this house is governed by his hopes of reward, will  
‘ ever set himself up for a check upon the conduct of  
‘ those who alone can bestow the reward he expects.  
‘ We must, therefore, suppose that ministers may  
‘ prevail with a majority of this house to approve or  
‘ agree to what appears to be for the public service,  
‘ without having it in their power to give a title,  
‘ post, or pension to every one that approves of their  
‘ measures ; otherwise we must conclude that no such  
‘ house ought to exist, and, consequently, that the  
‘ very form of a limited government ought to be  
‘ abolished in this selfish and corrupt nation. What  
‘ effect some late corrupt practices may have had  
‘ upon the genius and morals of the lower sort of  
‘ people, I do not know, but I hope it has as yet  
‘ had little or none upon the generality of those that  
‘ have any chance of being members of this house ;  
‘ and unless they are become very much degenerated,  
‘ we must, from experience, conclude, that when  
‘ our ministers pursue popular and right measures,  
‘ they may depend upon the assistance and approba-  
‘ tion of parliament. This, I say, we must from  
‘ experience conclude : for in former ages our mini-  
‘ sters had few rewards to bestow, and yet they never  
‘ failed of having the parliament’s approbation, when  
‘ their measures were such as were agreeable to the  
‘ people. Nay, from the very nature of the case,  
‘ we must draw the same conclusion ; for a house of

‘ commons freely chosen by the people must approve  
‘ of what the people approves of. If from selfish  
‘ motives they should disapprove or oppose such mea-  
‘ sures, the opposing members would be sure of being  
‘ turned out at the next election; and as the king  
‘ has it in his power to bring on a new election  
‘ whenever he pleases, his ministers may easily get  
‘ rid of such selfish mean spirited members, and may  
‘ consequently, if they desire it, always have a par-  
‘ liament generally composed of gentlemen of true  
‘ honour and public spirit; but the contrary is what  
‘ most ministers desire, as has of late been mani-  
‘ fested from the characters of those who were generally  
‘ set up as candidates upon the court interest. We  
‘ can never, therefore, be in danger of anarchy or  
‘ confusion from its not being in the power of a mini-  
‘ ster to bribe a majority of this house into his mea-  
‘ sures. When bribery and corrupt motives prevail  
‘ within doors, they will certainly prevail without,  
‘ and then we may see a member burnt in effigy one  
‘ year, in the public streets of his borough, and re-  
‘ chosen the year following as their representative in  
‘ a new parliament. We may see the most notorious  
‘ fraudulent practices by the underlings in power,  
‘ and these underlings encouraged by the minister,  
‘ and protected by a majority in parliament: we may  
‘ see the most unpopular and destructive measures  
‘ pursued by our ministers, and all approved, nay,  
‘ applauded by parliament. These things we may  
‘ see, Sir: these things we have seen within these  
‘ last twenty years; and this has brought affairs both  
‘ at home and abroad into the melancholy situation  
‘ which is now acknowledged by all, and will soon,  
‘ I fear, be severely felt by the whole nation.’

So juſt are theſe obſervations of lord *Strange* on the powerful effect of places and penſions on members of parliament, that the very next ſpeech confirms them. For in it we ſee Mr. *Sandys* (lately made chancellor of the exchequer) oppoſing the very bill which he himſelf was concerned in bringing in laſt ſeſſions <sup>a</sup>.

What makes all doctrines plain and clear ?

About two hundred pounds a year ?

And theſe, which were full plain before

Obscure again ? Two hundred more. HUDIN.

*Sandys* was very ſeverely handled by Mr. *Cornwal*. And Sir *John Barnard* diverted the houſe with the following sneers upon his ductility.

‘ From what has been ſaid <sup>b</sup>, by ſome gentlemen in  
 ‘ the debate, I foreſee, that if our parliaments continue  
 ‘ in time to come, as complaiſant to our miniſters as  
 ‘ they have been in time paſt, the fate of the queſtion  
 ‘ under this adminiſtration will be the ſame with that,  
 ‘ which was the fate of the queſtion about reducing  
 ‘ our army under the laſt. The worthy gentleman  
 ‘ who was at the head of our former adminiſtration,  
 ‘ and is now ſo deſervedly ſent to the other houſe,  
 ‘ had, whiſt he was a country gentleman, ſo ſtrenu-  
 ‘ ouſly oppoſed keeping up a numerous ſtanding army  
 ‘ in time of peace, that after he became a miniſter,  
 ‘ though exceſs of modeſty could never be reckoned  
 ‘ among his foibles, he had not the aſſurance directly to  
 ‘ oppoſe a reduction. No, Sir, during the firſt part of  
 ‘ his adminiſtration, he always declared himſelf for  
 ‘ a reduction as ſoon as a favourable opportunity ſhould  
 ‘ offer. But he always endeavoured to ſhew, that the  
 ‘ preſent, was not a proper opportunity; and at laſt  
 ‘ both

<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIV. 44.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 59.

‘ both he and his friends gathered assurance enough to tell  
 ‘ us, that even in times of the most profound tranquillity,  
 ‘ a greater number of regular troops was, and always  
 ‘ would be necessary, than that he had so strenuously  
 ‘ opposed in the year 1717, when there was the highest  
 ‘ probability of our being soon engaged in a war, both  
 ‘ with *Sweden* and *Spain*. This, Sir, was the conduct  
 ‘ of our former minister, with regard to the annual  
 ‘ question about reducing our army, and this I could  
 ‘ almost lay a wager will be the conduct held by our  
 ‘ present ministers, with regard to the bringing in,  
 ‘ and passing this bill. They cannot directly oppose  
 ‘ a bill which they have upon former occasions so often  
 ‘ and so strenuously patronized: but though last session  
 ‘ did, yet this session does not, it seems, afford us  
 ‘ a proper opportunity for applying a remedy to an evil  
 ‘ which they themselves allow, has brought *Europe*, as  
 ‘ well as this nation, to the brink of destruction;  
 ‘ and this I am afraid will be their way of reasoning  
 ‘ as long as they continue ministers, or at least until  
 ‘ they become as hardened as their predecessor, which  
 ‘ they may probably do, if they continue as long in  
 ‘ power, and then like him they will freely declare,  
 ‘ that they have actually changed their sentiments,  
 ‘ and that no such bill ought ever to be passed.’

The corporation of *London* shewed their opinion of  
 the precariousness of the principles of placemen and  
 pensioners, in their remonstrance to the king, *A. D.*  
 1770. ‘ The forms of the constitution, like those of  
 ‘ religion, were not established for the form’s sake, but  
 ‘ for the substance. And we call God and men to  
 ‘ witness, that, as we do not owe our liberty to those  
 ‘ nice and subtle distinctions, which pensions, and lu-  
 ‘ crative employments have invented, so neither will  
 ‘ we



‘ we be deprived of it by them : but, as it was gained  
 ‘ by the stern virtue of our ancestors, by the virtue of  
 ‘ their descendants it shall be preserved <sup>a</sup>.’

In 1774, the house of representatives of the province of *Massachusetts* bay, presented a petition and remonstrance to the governor and council, for the removal of *Peter Oliver*, esq; from the superior court. A court wholly erected and constituted by the general assembly, which power was granted by the royal charter.

They complain that the said *Peter Oliver* had taken a salary and reward from the king, which was contrary to the plain meaning of their charter, and against the known constitution of that province.

The governor refused to comply with their request, as it would be, he said, counteracting his majesty.

They pray that he would take the advice and assistance of his majesty’s council on the above petition and remonstrance, without which advice, he, they said, would act directly contrary to the most evident design of their charter.

### C H A P. III:

*That Placemen often hold a plurality of Employments, incompatible with one another.*

**P**LURALITIES in the state, as in the church, may be for the advantage of those, who hold them; but they are certainly a disadvantage to the public. Let a man’s abilities be what they will, he will certainly not fill *six* employments at the same time, with the same success as *one*.

*Aristotle*

*Aristotle* blames the *Carthaginians* for giving different public employments to the same men. What should we think, says he, of a legislator, who should order the same man to be both a shoemaker, and a musician? *Φυλον δ'αν δοξειεν, κ. τ. λ.<sup>a</sup>*

The *Guises*, when they had power in *France*, in order to gain popularity, made a regulation, that no person should hold more than one employment at a time <sup>b</sup>.

It was one of the charges against *Buckingham*, that he had engrossed more offices, than could be duly filled by any one man. That, by that means, he had too much power to do mischief; and too little to do good <sup>c</sup>.

When the first land-tax was laid on, in the time of *Hen. IV.* it was provided, that no member of parliament should be a collector, comptroller, &c. <sup>d</sup>

The old writ of parliament for the knights, says expressly; *Nolumus quod tu nec aliquis alius vic' dicti regis nostri aequaliter sit electus* [*electi sitis*, it should be] 'We will, that neither you [the sheriff, to whom the writ is directed] 'nor any lieutenant of the king's, be by 'any means elected.' Because it was supposed, in those simple times, a man could not be in two places, serving his country in two capacities, at the same time. We make nothing of a gentleman's being at the same time colonel of a regiment warring in *Flanders*, governor of a fort in *North-Britain*, and member of parliament at *Westminster*. The duke of *Shrewsbury* was in king *William's* time, lord treasurer, taking care of the king's money; lord chamberlain, taking care of the palace;

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<sup>a</sup> *Arist.* POLIT. II. 12.

<sup>b</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXIV. 237.

<sup>c</sup> PARL. HIST. VII. 50.

<sup>d</sup> PARL. HIST. II. 122.

palace; lord lieutenant of *Ireland*, governing that unruly, and (in those days) rebellious country; and an *English* peer, trying causes in the last resort; and voting in the greatest national concerns<sup>a</sup>. What abilities he must have had, to manage such great and widely distant affairs, at the same time!

A soldier goes altogether upon force. A senator ought to be as cool as a judge. It is therefore very unlikely, that a good officer should be a proper person to make a member of parliament.

Mr. *Wynne*, afterwards Sir *Watkin Williams Wynne*, in the debate on this subject, shews that placemen and officers are very unfit for being members of parliament. 'The business of the commons<sup>b</sup>, says he, is to represent to his majesty, the grievances of the people; to inform him if any of his ministers, or officers, makes an ill use of the power he delegates to them, and to impeach and present such evil ministers. Now I would be glad to know who are the most proper representatives for these purposes, gentlemen who have large properties in the country, who are independent of the ministers and officers of the crown, and who by living in the country, are perfectly acquainted with the circumstances of the people; or gentlemen who for their chief support, depend upon the ministers and officers of the crown, who know nothing of those they represent, and are not only ignorant of their true interests, but are really indifferent about their welfare. I hope it will not be controverted, but that the first sort of gentlemen are the most proper representatives of the people.'

The

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 368.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* VIII. 165.

The brave and free-spirited *Fletcher* of *Scotland*, who wrote *A. D.* 1698, speaks of the returning of military men for members, as a thing of a most formidable nature, and dangerous tendency <sup>a</sup>.

‘ The gentlemen of the sword, are not proper representatives of a people, whose civil constitution abhors standing armies, and cannot subsist under them. The fortunes and expectations of those gentlemen depend upon observing the word of command; and it is but natural, that they should support power, in which they are sharers. It is not to be expected that ever they should concur in a vote, or an address, to disband or reduce themselves, however desirable or necessary the same may be to us <sup>b</sup>.’

‘ My lord’s steward is a very honest man; but if I had an affair to settle with my lord, I would choose my neighbour, for a referee, rather than the steward <sup>c</sup>.’

Sir *Charles Sedley* observes, in his speech, *A. D.* 1699, that there were then 9 commissioners of excise, 7 of admiralty, 3 of the post-office, and 6 of the customs; and that great part of these places must be superfluous; but that all were *members of parliament*; and that many gentlemen held two offices, while they had seats in the house <sup>d</sup>.

It has been said, it might be dangerous to deprive the greatest part of those, who hold civil, military, or naval employments, of a share in the legislation, lest they be irritated against that institution from which they are excluded. The answer to this is very simple. Take away the infamous emoluments annexed to a seat

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<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher’s Works*, p. 37.

<sup>b</sup> *CATO’S LETT.* III. 25.

<sup>c</sup> *Bolingbr. POLIT. TRACTS*, 275.

<sup>d</sup> *DEB. COM.* III. 195.

seat in parliament, and you will presently remove all eagerness after seats in the house. Why should gentlemen want to be in parliament? To have a troublesome, unprofitable, expensive office? Do men want to be church-wardens, sheriffs, &c. Do they drink with clowns, kiss old women, and expend thousands in obtaining places, by which there is nothing to be got?

It was an article against the earl of *Orford* in king *William's* time, That he had held several inconsistent offices at the same time, by which means he avoided being called to account for his embezzlements<sup>a</sup>.

In the time of the late war in *Flanders*, the ministry were, on some occasion, likely to be so hard pressed, that they thought it necessary to send to *Flanders* for some officers, who were members (hopeful members, who had not the opportunity, in several years together, of once saying Aye, or No, in *St. Stephen's* chapel) to vote for the court. Some of them came accordingly. Others the duke of *Cumberland* would not suffer to leave the army<sup>b</sup>. This shews, that the court looks upon officers as bound to obey the commands of the minister, and to vote as ordered by him.

*A. D.* 1773, the duke of *Leinster* opposed his brother lord *Ch. Fitzgerald's* being member for *Dublin*, 'because he was an officer in the navy, and therefore  
' might by his necessary attendance on his naval duty  
' be prevented from doing that of a representative<sup>c</sup>.'

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. III. 147.

<sup>b</sup> GENT. MAG. Aug. 1747.

<sup>c</sup> See WHITEH. EVEN. POST, Dec. 7, 1773.

## C H A P. IV.

*Places and Pensions not given according to Merit.*

**I**F the nation is to be plundered, it would be some comfort to think that the spoil was divided among the deserving, if it might be supposed any deserving person would be concerned in plundering his poor indebted country. But it is too notorious, that courts reward according to a different system of morals from that which the antient philosophers, prophets, and apostles taught; which makes Dr. *Johnson's* definition of the word *pension*<sup>a</sup> appear but too accurate, viz. 'Pay given to a state-hireling for treason to his country.'

*Aristotle*<sup>b</sup> observes; that it is of great consequence in a state, that the persons employed in public business do possess not only valuable qualifications in general, but those particular qualifications which are necessary for the successful discharge of their respective duties. A man's being honest and benevolent, for instance, is not enough to recommend him to the office of a commander either by sea or land, if he is timid; or unskilful in war; and another's being full of military courage and conduct, is no reason why he should be a financier, or a treasurer. Τρια δε τινα, κ. τ. λ. We consider very little, whether the man be fit, or unfit, for the place. We consider chiefly whether the place, that is the salary, is fit for him; we consider what power he has, by parliamenteering, or otherwise, to support, or to prejudice, the schemes of the court. If he is likely to stand

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<sup>a</sup> *Johnson's* DICT. II. WORD PENSION.

<sup>b</sup> POLIT. V. 9.

stand in the minister's way, we kick him up stairs, if not, down.

*Aristotle* observes <sup>a</sup>, that those who enjoy the *honour* of great offices in the state, may expect to be envied by those who have no share in them. But that if, besides, they load themselves and creatures with the *spoils* of the public by turning their duty into a mere matter of emolument, they will be doubly hated by their countrymen, who find themselves excluded from this double advantage.

‘ *Pendant qu’ à Rome,*’ &c. ‘ While at *Rome* [during the first *Punic* war] ‘ the public employments ‘ were obtained only by merit, and were of no advantage to those who obtained them, but in so far as ‘ they gave a greater opportunity of being useful; at ‘ *Carthage* all was venal, and every service done by ‘ particulars to the public was paid for <sup>b</sup>.’

The *Carthaginians* allowed no man to fill any important post, unless he was possessed of *property* as well as *merit*. And surely, if it were not, that rich men are too commonly admitted to important stations merely in virtue of their *wealth*, without regard to merit, the *Carthaginian* regulation (with all due submission to *Aristotle*, who blames it) is not amiss. For power ought certainly, in some degree, to be annexed to property. Yet the *Carthaginian* law undoubtedly tended, as the philosopher observes, to exclude merit, which is often poor, to excite avarice, and promote bribery <sup>c</sup>.

Before *Tarquin*'s time, nobody solicited for a public employment <sup>d</sup>. Among us, all sorts of profitable em-

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ployments

<sup>a</sup> POLIT. v. 8.

<sup>b</sup> GRAND. ET DECAD. DES ROM. p. 32.

<sup>c</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. xvii. 260.      <sup>d</sup> Ibid. xi. 318.

ployments are solicited for (excepting the office of dissenting ministers only.) Every man holds himself duly qualified for the place, so the profits of the place be suitable to his circumstances.

*Augustus* ordered, that all, who bribed for offices, should be incapacitated for five years <sup>a</sup>. And for prevention of so great an evil, he ordered, that every candidate for an employment should deposit a sum of money to be forfeited, if he was convicted of corruption <sup>b</sup>.

*Antony* advanced to honours and emoluments all his friends and relations <sup>c</sup>. He gained *Lepidus* by making him *pontifex maximus*. So *Walpole* got places or pensions for all, who could claim the most distant relation or connexion with him.

The emperor *Antoninus* deprived many persons of pensions settled on them by *Adrian*; saying, he could not bear to see the state devoured by those who were of no use to it <sup>d</sup>.

The emperor *Julian* proposed only to employ men of merit, without paying any regard whatever to recommendation or interest <sup>e</sup>.

*Constantius* used to sell employments, which tempted those who bought them, to oppress the people, in order to indemnify themselves <sup>f</sup>.

The antient *Gauls* used to fight for posts and places. If our place-hunters should take to this practice, instead of the present method of obtaining them by selling their country; we should, besides other advantages, get rid of many worthless individuals. Yet the crime  
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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 514.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 531.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. XIII. 297.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. xv. 198.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid. xvi. 219.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. xvi. 227.



of shedding blood about a place would be the same as that of our duellists murdering one another about a point of honour, or a wh——.

*Abu Beer*, *Mohammed's* successor, used to reward merit with money. *Omar* gave money only to the necessitous. We give, or rather heap money upon those, who have neither *merit*, nor *necessity* to plead. *Omar* thought, merit was to be *honoured*, not paid.

King *John III.* of *Portugal* rewarded all services himself; by which means he knew that they were not over-looked, nor overpaid. He rewarded moderately; for the approbation of a wise and good king, who saw with his own eyes, was to be reckoned up as a prodigious enhancement of a moderate reward. He commonly made an apology, for that he had many to be bountiful to; which shewed, that he was well served. He created no new employments on purpose to gratify a set of court blood-suckers. He did not heap several employments upon the same persons. For he said, One public post, and a man's private concerns were business enough for any one man <sup>a</sup>.

The barbarous *Abyssinians* have a better notion of encouraging merit, than the civilized *English*. They do not allow a youth to cut his hair in the manly form, till he has done some feat of valour, and his honours increase according to his behaviour <sup>b</sup>.

The *Dutch East-India* Company do not prefer according to seniority merely, but according to merit <sup>c</sup>.

Cardinal *Ximenes* was very curious in enquiring into the characters and abilities of those, to whom he gave employments <sup>d</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXII. 237.<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xv. 44.<sup>c</sup> Ibid. x. 565.<sup>d</sup> Ibid. XXI. 214.

*Cath. of Medicis*, the mother of the *Parisian* massacre of diabolical memory, introduced into *France* the practice of selling court-places, and of mortgaging the revenues for ready money <sup>a</sup>.

How mean does lord *Bacon* appear in his letter to *James I* <sup>b</sup>. in which he sings his own praises, and labours to shew himself fitter for the place of chancellor, than the great and good lord chief justice *Coke*, or lord *Hobart*.

Dr. *Pinto*, who first set on the revolution in favour of *Portuguese* liberty and the duke of *Braganza*, was never advanced by him, never envied, nor looked upon as a favourite. But he had what he wanted, the king's private friendship and esteem <sup>c</sup>. How much disgust and contention had been avoided, had a certain noble earl of our times, very useful <sup>d</sup> in conducting the education of one, who was made for a good king, contented himself with being the king's *learned* friend, a station for which he was very fit, and had never aspired

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<sup>a</sup> *Volt. Ess. SUR L'HIST. III. 364.*

<sup>b</sup> Lord *Bacon's* LETT. p. 85.

<sup>c</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXII. 312.

<sup>d</sup> Of this I was repeatedly informed by the late excellent Dr. *Hales*, who professed himself a great admirer of that nobleman's abilities and dispositions; and I willingly lay hold of the opportunity of writing somewhat in *favour* of one, *against* whom so much has been so rashly thrown out. For I would be the defender (as far as lies within my reach) of those whom I see blamed beyond their demerits.

Non tibi Tyndaridis facies invisa Lacænae,  
Culpatufve Paris—Divôm inclementia, divôm

Has evertit opes—

VIRG.

It is not lord *B*—, but lord *Corruption*, that has brought the *British* empire to the condition, in which we see it.

aspired to that of a *statesman* and *treaty-maker*, for which he was very unfit!

One *Cunningham* was made governor of *Jamaica* for saving *Walpole's* bones, when attacked by the *London* mob, on account of his excise scheme<sup>a</sup>. 'A man 'totally *unqualified* either by abilities or experience, 'and who owed his preferment entirely to the partiality 'of the *minister*.' He died six weeks after his arrival of a fever contracted at an entertainment, being habitually intemperate.

While worthless pushing men obtain rewards for small services, often for cruel injuries, done their country, modest merit declines its deserved recompence.

*Piso*, the conqueror of the formidable insurrection of the slaves, modestly declined a triumph on the occasion.

*Cicero*, for saving the commonwealth from the fury of *Catiline*, was rewarded and satisfied with only a *corona civica*, that is, a wisp of hay put round his head. He had neither floating, nor fixed pension. Yet *Cicero's* times were not the simple ages.

The moderation of Sir *Henry Vane* was truly admirable. Finding, that, as treasurer of the navy, his income, at the low rate of 4*d.* in the pound commission, amounted, in the *Dutch* war, to 30,000*l.* a year, he said, it was a shameful robbery of the public, and desired to give up his patent, which he had received from the late king for life, and to have, instead of it, for an agent he had brought up to the business, a salary of 2000*l.* a year. Several of our blood-suckers, I mean commissaries, in the late *German* war, got from 50,000*l.* to 500,000*l.* and have never shewn any compunction on account of robbing the public.

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XLI. 409.

Gratuities were given to sufferers in the troubles under *Ch. I.* 5000*l.* offered Mr. *Hollis*, were refused by him. 10,000*l.* were given Mr. *Vassall* for the damages he suffered in opposing ship-money; and 5000*l.* to Mr. *Hampden* on the same account<sup>a</sup>. In this way the public ought to have compensated a popular gentleman for his late sufferings by ministerial oppression, and the truly laudable stand he made against a tyrannical court, by which the public is benefited, and therefore ought to shew its gratitude; but not by pushing a man into the station of a legislator, who so far from being qualified according to law, was at that very time collecting money to pay his debts; not by forcing into the office of a magistrate, a man, whose private conduct was notoriously obnoxious to the magistrate's just censure. But this by the by.

Dr. *Walker*, who defended *Londonderry* against *Jam. II.* and his popish army, when those, whose duty it was, deserted the place, was rewarded with the thanks of the commons. We do not hear of any money given him<sup>b</sup>.

*William Sacheverell* was offered by the king the place of one of the commissioners of the admiralty. He refused, saying, 'He would not accept the salary, because he did not understand sea affairs<sup>c</sup>.'

A bill was ordered in *A. D.* 1653, making those persons incapable of holding places who should solicit for them. A bill was proposed, *A. D.* 1692, against buying and selling offices<sup>d</sup>. It was found after the revolution, that there had been a most shameful selling of places under *James II.* A committee was therefore appointed

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<sup>a</sup> *PARL. HIST.* xv. 278.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* II. 360.

<sup>c</sup> *Tind. CONTIN.* I. 41.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 193.

appointed to enquire into it, and a bill to prevent the like for the future<sup>a</sup>. The commissioners for public accounts found, *A. D.* 1713, that one *Hutchinson* had paid 1000*l.* for the office of register of seizures to the earl of *Wharton*. ‘Resolved, That giving or taking  
‘ money for procuring offices relating to the manage-  
‘ ment of the public revenue is a scandalous corruption,  
‘ and highly detrimental to the public.’ But the offence having been committed before the queen’s pardon was published, the house proceeded no farther in the matter<sup>b</sup>.

To suffer the buying and selling of places is one of the most effectual methods that can be invented for plucking up by the roots out of the minds of the people all emulation, or desire of excelling in any thing either useful or ornamental to a country. If I know, that 5000*l.* properly distributed will procure me a place of 500*l.* a year, and that unless I carry in my hand the necessary *douceur*, I may in vain solicit, and employ friends to solicit for me, though they could with truth affirm, that I possessed every accomplishment that enriches the human mind; if I know all this, what am I naturally led to, but to endeavour by all possible means to get the necessary 5000*l.* not to lose time in acquiring a set of unprofitable accomplishments. Thus a deadly damp is struck to all laudable ambition in a people; and an endless avidity after sordid riches excited. The noblest disposition is checked, and in its place the basest encouraged. Our state-gardeners cultivate the weeds, and pluck up the useful plants.

Purchasing of places tempts the purchasers to extort from the people exorbitant perquisites in order to re-

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imburse

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. II.* 334.<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* v. 12.

imburse themselves. And then the business comes to be, not how to perform the duties of the place in the most faithful and effectual manner, but how to make the most of it.

By 12 *Edw.* IV. and 5 *Edw.* VI. any person, giving money, or reward of any kind, for any office, which, in any way, toucheth the administration of justice, the keeping of towns, or castles, &c. is disqualified for holding such place <sup>a</sup>.

There was a difficulty about the officers of the court of wards, if the bill abolishing it should pass, because they must lose their places. One said they ought to have nothing, because they had bought their places contrary to law. There was no provision for them <sup>b</sup>. This is the very argument in our times, for keeping up a multitude of burdensome places; that the annihilating them would ruin innumerable families. But it is a very frivolous pretence, because they may be put upon half-pay, with a provision for widows, and then to be abolished; instead of which, we are continually multiplying them.

Cardinal *Richelieu*, in his *TESTAM. POLIT.* (which the Abbé de *S. Pierre* thinks the greatest political work ever published before his times) condemns all buying and selling of places; because it leads the subjects not to emulate one another in merit, but in riches <sup>c</sup>.

The Abbé de *S. Pierre*'s proposal, of choosing by scrutiny to all places of power and trust, would make the office of a prime minister, a secretary of state, &c. much easier, and less exposed to envy, and animosity. For, if a candidate's companions in office did not re-  
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<sup>a</sup> *PARL. HIST.* VII. 54.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* XXIII. 61.

<sup>c</sup> *S. Pierre, OUVR. POLIT.* XVI. 20.

commend him, there could be no reflection made upon the minister, if he was not advanced. *Walpole* was always sorry, when a place fell vacant. By filling it, he gained one friend, and 20 enemies; any one of which could injure him, more than the person advanced could serve him. When men are gratified without merit, they are not so easily satisfied, as when they are rewarded in some proportion to their deservings. For this very proportion will in some degree regulate their expectations. Whereas those, who obtain what they have in no degree deserved, are led to form imaginary pretensions to unknown merits, without all bounds.

The Abbé *S. Pierre* thinks the *French* custom of making the great offices of the state, and even the descent of titles and honours, hereditary, hurtful and inconsistent with sound policy. All honours and powers (except, for plain reasons, the regal) ought to be personal only, and to be given to no individuals, but such as, upon scrutiny, were found to be men of such distinguished worth, as to deserve to be raised to distinguished places, though sprung of mean parents<sup>a</sup>. Suppose the silly son and heir of a truly great man, who had, by his conduct, raised himself to the rank of a duke, to have 500 *l.* a year settled on him out of the estate, would not that be sufficiently rewarding him for all the merit he has, in taking care to be the son of a duke? And would not this policy give greater scope for laudable ambition, than our present, which insures the most worthless and most uncultivated blockhead of a dukedom, and a seat in the house of peers, if he happens to be born by a duchess, whoever may have begot him? The eldest son of the archbishop of *Canterbury*,  
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<sup>a</sup> OUVR. POLIT. IX. 100, *et pas.*

(who ranks above the first duke in *England*) is only *John*, or *Thomas* such-a-one, esq. Yet the son of an archbishop, has as good a natural claim to be an archbishop, as the son of a duke, to be a duke.

Kings, and king's favourites often read their sin (in this as in other respects) in their punishment. If they will employ unqualified persons, their business will be done accordingly. The great *Dutch Nassau* fleet, fitted out by prince *Maurice* against the *Spaniards* in *America*, and officer'd according to the court interest, did nothing. A fleet of ships fitted out at private expence, and officer'd according to merit, did great feats<sup>a</sup>. The *French* affirm, that their disgraces in the last war, were occasioned by madam *Pompadour's* filling all the great posts in their fleet and army, with her creatures, and those who gained her interest by money.

That the merit chiefly regarded in our times, is the merit of seconding the views of the court, and that the greatest demerit, according to our modern way of estimating demerit, is opposing court measures; appears from the court's late proceedings against my incomparable friend, the great *Dr. Franklin*, whom they have deprived of his place of deputy post-master of *North America*, which place he himself improved from being a burthen upon the government, to its bringing in a revenue of several thousands a year;—all because that faithful trustee would not sit silent, and see his constituents betrayed.

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XI. 463.



## C H A P. V.

*Profusion in Places and Pensions.*

**I**T is not a little to the disgrace of human nature, that in any age, or in any country, any member of society should require to be paid, like a hireling, for serving his country. Every state is a great family. The king is, or should be, the father of it; the grandees, the elder brothers; and the people the younger children. But what should we think of a family, of which we saw the head, and the elder brothers, plundering the younger children of their portions, and reducing them to a starving condition; insisting that themselves ought to be supported in their grandeur, and recompensed for taking upon them the charge of domestic affairs, in such an exorbitant manner, as the younger part of the family could by no means support. If this head of a family, or these grandees, should demand a recompense for services done to a *neighbouring* family, we should not so much wonder or blame them for a fordid disposition. When the people of *Poland* wanted to have our celebrated *Sir Philip Sidney* for their king, it had been no matter of wonder, if he had required an ample civil list revenue, as a recompense for the innumerable disgusts and fatigues of the regal station, or that, like the *German* generals whom we have employed in our continental wars, he had been less sparing of the purses of the *Polish* people. If we were to do the *Dutch* any material service, it might be expected, that we should demand a proper compensation; but that *Englishmen* should hesitate about serving *Englishmen*, that a lord, who has no necessary business

to fatigue him, but drinking, whoring, masquerading, and *New-marketing*, should grudge a few hours in a week to serve his country, unless his country will recompence him ten thousand times above the worth of his service,—this gives a shocking idea of the sordid disposition of the grandees of modern times. At the same time the public ought not to be, and hardly ever is, ungrateful. But public rewards ought rather to be honorary, than pecuniary, and if they must be of the latter sort, they ought to be frugal, not profuse; else they do more mischief than good.

The salaries annexed to those places, the holders of which do *real* service to their country, naturally lead people to a very wrong way of thinking, *viz.* That we are not obliged to serve our country, unless we be *paid* for our service. Whereas, the truth is, that serving our country to the utmost of our power, is (like obedience to parents, providing for our wives and children, and worshipping God) our indispensable duty, *previously* to any *emolument* we may expect on that account. See Mr. *Southwell's* speech below.

As for the holders of sinecures, and those men who receive annual pensions for nothing, they may be compared to *Pluto's* three-headed mastiff, *Cerberus*, who gobbled up the sop thrown to him by the *Sibyl*, and immediately stretched out his hairy bulk in his kennel, and fell a snoring.

*Cerberus hæc ingens latratu regna trifauci  
Personat, adverso recubans immanis in antro.  
Cui vates, horrere videns jam colla colubris,  
Melle soporatam et medicatis frugibus offam  
Objicit; ille fame rabidâ tria guttura pandens  
Corripit objectam, atque immania terga resolvit  
Fusus humi, totoque ingens extenditur antro. VIRG.*

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The quoting of this passage from the famous sixth book of the *Eneid* inflames me with a desire to display a portion of the spirit of our learned bishop who has found in it a mystical sense, which nobody ever dreamed of before his DIVINE LEGATION, nor since. Were my genius brightened with a spark of his fire, I should shew (with no less success, than he has had in proving *Moses's* divine commission by what will equally establish *Lycurgus's*, viz. his designed neglect of the mention of future rewards and punishments, and with no less success than he has had in establishing the alliance between the two things in the world which ought the most carefully to be kept separate, viz. the state and the church)—were my mind, I say, tinctured with the true *Warburtonian* spirit of criticism, I should shew that by the sleeping mastiff *Virgil* intended to point out an idle hanger on at court; by *Vates*, (the old prophets, as *lucus a non lucendo*) the prime minister, as statesmen are less remarkable for their prophetic sagacity, than for their resemblance to old women; by the snakes on *Cerberus's* neck bristling up at the approach of the *Sibyl* and the hero, I would shew, that the poet meant the speechifying, and opposition made by the place-hunter. Being got so far as this, the *offa*, or sop, composed of honey, &c. would spontaneously explain itself into the place, and its *douceurs*. The dog's opening *three* throats to swallow *one* morsel, does most beautifully set forth the disproportion between a placeman's voracity and the richest income the minister can afford to give him. In this manner would I attempt to imitate, *non passibus æquis*, this great discoverer of secret meanings, who has left us one thing to regret, among so many things to admire, viz. That he has taken so much pains to find senses

where no body was at a loss, *viz.* in the *Encid*, and has declined pointing out sense, where no body has been able to find any, I mean, in the XXXIX ARTICLES, the CREEDS, and the HOMILIES, which he has subscribed, and therefore must understand. But to return to our subject, the profusion in places and pensions.

Lord *Molesworth* thinks, the servants of the crown should be paid by appointment of parliament. It may be said, all monies expended are subject to parliamentary enquiry. But there is a very great difference between appropriating beforehand, and finding fault afterwards, when the money is spent, and all that can be done is passing a vote. And even that is not to be expected, if our parliaments, instead of checks, are to be sharers in the plunder.

‘ A king, as such, ought not, of all men, to grant bounties ; because what he grants is not out of his own, but the property of others <sup>a</sup>.’ All that a king is, and all that he has as king, is on account of the public, whose servant (to use king *Jam.* Iſt’s expression) he is. Therefore, whatever he gives to his wh—, or his minion, is a robbery of the public, because his wh—, or his minion, are of no advantage to the public, and have not earned any part of the public money ; but on the contrary, deserve the strapado, or the gallows. And whatever a king gives, or suffers his ministers to give, to the undeserving, or what they give too profusely to the deserving, is a robbery of the public. A king’s income is not as a gentleman’s rent, a private fund at his disposal. For a kingdom is not a private estate ; but a trust for which the holder is accountable to his people. And

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<sup>a</sup> *St. Pierre*, vi. 54.

wo to those kings and ministers, who betray so awful a trust. A king is to dispense, not to spend the public money. There are many persons necessarily to be employed in a state. Them the king is to pay. How then (says *St. Pierre* <sup>a</sup>) can he have bounties to grant? unless he robs some of those who serve the public? Every guinea he gives to one, who has *not deserved* it, or who has not deserved it *all*, is so much kept back from one, who has deserved it, or would, if he had not been discouraged by seeing a traiterous king or ministry embezzling the public money, by throwing it away on the worthless, to the injury of the deserving. A king, as a gentleman, and out of his official and accountable character, may bestow upon his lawful pleasures, or upon those who have served his lawful private interests, more than a duke may lay out; but not more than *two* dukes may spend. If he lays out the public money, or suffers his crew to lay it out, in bribing villains to betray liberty, I have only to say, *I licitor, deliga ad palum, virgis cædito, caput obnubito, infelici arbori suspendito.*

Our courtiers find the parliament too ready to give. Therefore, according to the common saying, 'Lightly come, lightly gone,' they care not how they dissipate their ill gotten riches. *Ch. VII.* of *France*, a prince of an excellent character, was, at his accession, so low in both cash and credit, that he had not ready money to pay for a pair of boots, that were brought him; and the maker, not caring to trust his poor majesty, carried them away. This narrowness of circumstances gave that wise and good prince a handle to retrench unnecessary expences, and  
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<sup>a</sup> VI. 55:

set out on a foot of great frugality, which he continued after his finances were more flourishing <sup>a</sup>.

The enormous emoluments annexed to our great offices of the state, are big with every evil. They render the sincerity of real patriots suspected, and expose the administration to the certain execration of the people, who, by this means, are often reduced to an uncertainty whom to trust. Pensions and places are rightly bestowed in very few instances. They are a disgrace to men of family and fortune, be their services to their country what they will. For pensioning such men is making them appear to the public not noble, not generous, not magnanimous; but greedy, sordid hirelings. A pension may perhaps be rightly given to an ingenious, but poor man, to support him in his pursuit of arts, science, manufactures, commerce, or whatever may be for the public advantage. But care ought to be taken, that he be not over-fed, and by that means become lazy.

There is no magnanimity without some degree of self-denial. But what self-denial do our nobility and gentry shew, when they scramble for the profitable places, and will not serve their country, unless they be overpaid immensely beyond the worth of their services? If a nobleman has in his mind nothing more noble, or disinterested, than an artizan or a plough-driver, what claim has he to more respect than they would have, if they had as much money in their pockets, or as much lace on their waistcoats, as he has?

If the nobility were to serve their country in the great offices of the state gratis, the heroism would be  
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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxiv. 45.

nothing more than is shewn by private trustees, arbitrators, church-wardens, overseers of the poor, and other parish-officers. Are those poor low-bred creatures, whom our polite courtiers call the scum of the earth, more disinterested than the nobility of the land?

By 43 *Eliz.* any person elected overseer of the poor, and refusing to do the duty, is punishable, though he has no reward for doing the duty. Why should not all public offices be filled in this manner <sup>a</sup>? If it be alledged that this would be troublesome, and fall heavy upon the nobility, let them take the offices by rotation.

Even in the law some things are appointed to be done gratis <sup>b</sup>. It is hard, that our nobility should be loth to do for their country what the lawyers (a fordid enough set of men) do every day.

If the nobility and gentry declined serving their country in the great offices of the state, without fordid hire, let the honest bourgeoisie be employed. They will think themselves sufficiently rewarded by the honour done them.

Why should not our kings, when a court-place falls vacant, publish, that they want a secretary of state, or a lord chamberlain, or a lord steward; places which any man of common sense and common honesty can fill; the public business being all a mere routine. And why should they not order all persons desirous of the vacant employment to send in their proposals sealed (as when there is a fleet to victual, or a public work to be done) and accept him, who offers to serve his country on the most reasonable terms? Let

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<sup>a</sup> STAT. AT LARGE, II. 318.

<sup>b</sup> *Blackst. COMM.* III. 128.

the person chosen, bring in his bill of expences. There is no reason why the public should not repay what is fairly laid out for the public benefit. If it be thought proper to give a statesman, who has shewn himself able and honest, five hundred guineas for a ring, as was given the brave admiral *Drake* for services of greater danger and more importance, than those of fifty state-secretaries, I have no objection. But that half our nobility should be upon the parish, I mean, upon the public, I own I see no manner of reason; nor that a set of places, which might be filled at the expence of a few hundreds a year, must cost the nation many hundred thousands, while we are sinking in a bottomless sea of debt.

The grand *Turk*, when he thinks a wazir, an aga, a testardar, a pasha, &c. has, by oppression, spunged up a good deal of money in his service, squeezes him till he has reduced him to his former condition, which often helps up the sultan's exhausted treasure. If we were to introduce such a custom as this in *England*, the squeezings of a thousand or two of our overdrenched court-spunges, might do somewhat toward preventing the dreaded necessity of applying a sponge to our public debts.

It is commonly reckoned, that five or six of our places or pensions are equal in their annual amount to all that is paid in the three provinces of *Holland*, *Zealand*, and *Overyssel*, to placemen and pensioners. The burgomaster of a great town has perhaps 20*l.* a year salary. The deputies or members of parliament have 200*l.* a year. One happy consequence is, that there is 'little aspiring to preferment in the 'state, because there is little to be got that way<sup>a</sup>.'

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<sup>a</sup> *Burn. HIST. OWN TIMES, I. 290.*



No servant of the *Dutch East India* company has so mean an appointment, as to be pinched, nor so affluent, as to be above his business<sup>a</sup>.

Ask the courtiers, what produces the present clamours, and all clamours against government, which is always immaculate. They will answer, The desire of places and preferments. Which may be partly true. But why then do they not *reduce* the incomes of the places as low as in *Holland*? Why do they not *abolish* all that are useless? They do the very contrary. They are continually increasing the number, if not the value of them. They are constantly heaping on fuel, and then they swear and blaspheme, because the fire continues to rage.

‘I may suppose,’ (says Mr. *Southwell* in his speech on a motion for a deduction from salaries during the continuance of a war) ‘that our salaries and pensions above 50*l.* a year, amount to at least a million sterling. ‘If I said two, I believe I should not be mistaken,’ &c. If our placemen and pensioners consume 2,000,000 *l.* a year of the public income, they swallow up at once the whole land-tax at four shillings in the pound.

Mr. *Felham*, brother to the duke of *Newcastle*, used to say, he grudged the *great* incomes enjoyed by the *great* placemen; for that the *business* of the nation was done by the *clerks* in the offices, who have but 50*l.* a year, even as the business of the church is not done by the *bishops* and *deans*, but by the curates of 20*l.* and 30*l.* per annum.

Immediately after the treaty with *Portugal*, which settled *Ferdinand* and *Isabella* on the throne of *Spain*, the deputies from the cities insisted on a repeal of

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. x. 561.

grants made by *Hen. IV.* of crown lands (among other particulars, *Gibraltar* was granted to the duke of *Medina Sidonia*) and of pensions out of the revenues. They gave orders accordingly, and such reforms were made, that 30 millions of maravedis arose annually from the savings <sup>a</sup>.

The whole revenue given by the *Poles* for the support of their king's royal dignity, does not exceed 100,000 *l.* a year <sup>b</sup>. Five or six of our courtiers devour as much annually; for which they do nothing, but what were better let alone, as buying votes, and mis-governing the public affairs.

In the kingdom of *Siam*, the great officers of the state have no salaries. Therefore there can be no scrambling. But there is great injustice in the courts of law, because the judges have it in their power to enrich themselves by extortion <sup>c</sup>.

The governor of the *Dutch East-India Company* at *Batavia* is employed from day-break till night in the business of his office, so that he can hardly allow himself half an hour for dinner <sup>d</sup>. Our tinfelled placemen we

—stretch on the rack of a too easy chair,  
And hear their everlasting yawn confess  
The pains and penalties of idleness. *Pope.*

Pope *Sixtus V.* cut off at once an expence of 600,000 *l. per annum*, which it cost the apostolic chamber before his time in pensions and gratuities.

When the *Spanish* finances were low, *A. D.* 1608, and the ministry would not retrench the sums laid out on spies and pensioners, the nation was offended, and the

<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXI. 161, 192.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. XXXIV. 10.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. VII. 263.

<sup>d</sup> *Janiçon*, ETAT PRES. DES PROV. UNIES, I. 360.

the historians have handed down to posterity their infamy<sup>a</sup>. Let our posterity likewise read, for the honour of our ministers, that toward the end of the eighteenth century, when the public debt was greater than had ever been known, there was at the same time more pensioning, than ever was known.

‘ With a laudable frugality, they’ [the *Spaniards*, in the year 1739, when *Britain* declared war against them] ‘ retrenched all their extravagant pensions and salaries, and reduced their expences in all the departments of their government<sup>b</sup>.’ The *Spaniards* grew wiser, at last, than they were at first. Let us see, whether the *English* will go and do likewise.

*Alphonfus V.* of *Arragon*, surnamed the Wise, put off an extravagant, greedy courtier, who was always asking somewhat, by telling him, That a king, who thinks to satisfy his spendthrift courtiers, employs himself in a manner as fruitless, as he who should think to fill a hog’s head, which had holes in its bottom. He may impoverish himself, but will never enrich them.

When *Hen. III.* complained, that his revenues were hardly sufficient, *ad simplicem victum*, &c. for victuals, clothing, and the accustomed charities, much less for warlike expeditions; his counsellors faithfully told him, his poverty was occasioned by his giving so much away. The king took the hint; called many to account, and made them refund<sup>c</sup>. We give our ministers half a million on demand, to make good the pretended deficiencies of the civil list, without so much as asking how there comes to be a deficiency,

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXI. 336.

<sup>b</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. VIII. 425.

<sup>c</sup> *Brady*, II. 549.

much less calling any body to account, or making any one refund.

‘ The counsellors, and all officers, both great and small, (in the time of *Hen. III.*) were to swear, at their creation, that they would, to the utmost of their power, execute their offices, without any other reward than *meat and drink*<sup>a</sup>.’ Many a great placeman in our times has, from 500*l.* to 5000*l.* a year. If a minister, in our times, takes this oath, and if he calls 5000*l.* a year *meat and drink*, he must have a very hearty appetite, or a very nice palate; for, even in these dear times, a man may have for 50*l.* a year, as much mutton and small beer (and there is no better *meat and drink* than mutton and small beer) as any Christian can decently consume. But it will be answered, Our statesmen do not take this oeconomical oath. Upon which our statesmen will perhaps give me leave to observe, or, if they do not, I will make the observation without their leave, *viz.* That we have as much occasion for parsimony, as our ancestors in the time of *Hen. III.* The public debt was never in those times so high as one million, whereas we have seen the nation indebted to the value of 140 millions.

All the incomes of the government-places in *Elizabeth's* reign, amounted to only 18,000*l.* a year. 1 *Ch. I.* they were computed at 120,000*l.* a year<sup>b</sup>. In those days, the navy and army cost but little. In our times, it is computed, that the government has the disposal of 2 or three millions *per annum*, taking in the navy, the army, and the church: of which the first is our strength, and our glory, and therefore we can hardly cherish, and maintain it too nobly; the second

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<sup>a</sup> *Brady*, II. 644.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* VI. 367.

is worfe than ufelefs; for it is dangerous to liberty, as every officer is a court-place-man, and as the army is the neceffary and natural instrument of tyranny; as for the third; the mere *expençe* it cofts the nation, is hardly an object of confequence enough to alarm. Of which more in the fequel.

The yearly falary of the lord high treafurer of *England* in the time of *Hen. III.* was 100 marks. *Harley*, in queen *Anne's* time, faid, a lord high treafurer of *England*, if he were indifferent which of the two places he went to in the next world, might get 5,000 *l.* 10,000 *l.* 50,000 *l.* or what he pleased by his place <sup>a</sup>. Lord *Bacon* writes to king *Jam. I.* that the place of attorney general was honeftly worth 6000 *l.* a year <sup>b</sup>. 'The lord high treafurer *Middlefex*, in the time of *Jam. I.* declared, that the gains of that office had been 8000 *l. per annum*, nay more than he could well tell <sup>c</sup>.' In the time of *Hen. IV.* the profits of the hanaper in chancery were only 2000 *l.* a year <sup>d</sup>. The earl of *Wiltshire*, father to queen *Anne Boleyn*, had 20 fhillings a day, as lord privy feal <sup>e</sup>.

Queen *Elizabeth* enriched none of her favourites at the expence of her people. She pretended, that her people were her only favourites. She had fenfe enough to obferve a fpirit of liberty rifing, and humoured it prudently. *Jam. I.* and *Ch. I.* had not the fagacity to imitate her.

Parliament grants a large fubfidy, *A. D.* 1606, which enabled *James* to gratify his favourites, (his great joy) 'out of the money granted by parliament <sup>f</sup>.'

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<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, I. 387.

<sup>b</sup> Lord *Bacon's* LETT. p. 84.

<sup>c</sup> PARL. HIST. VI. 326. <sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* II. 80.

<sup>e</sup> *Andersf.* HIST. COMM. I. 366.

<sup>f</sup> *Rapin*, II. 172.

In this, *James* acted upon principles directly contrary to those of *Elizabeth*.

*Elizabeth's* wisdom kept her fleet and forts always in good order. Her frugality displeased her avaricious courtiers; but pleased her people. She bore great national expences with the ordinary revenues, and helped her neighbours; which her predecessors had never done. Most of them beggared themselves by gorging a few greedy courtiers. She 'discharged all the great expences of government, (which must be great, considering the number of enemies around her) out of the crown revenue, for she did not lavish her money upon the court-leeches like her predecessors<sup>a</sup>;' [and her successors, *Rapin* might have added.]

The pensions of 4*l.* per week (settled on about 70 members of the commons during the civil war, because their estates were sequestrated by the king [*Cb. I.*], or did not yield a subsistence) were afterwards taken off to relieve the public<sup>b</sup>. Compare this integrity and disinterestedness with our monstrous profusion in places and pensions needlessly bestowed on the worthless tools of the court, and kept up from year to year, from father to son, while the nation is sinking under a load of debt.

The queen sends a message, *A. D.* 1702, to the commons, That in reward of *Marlborough's* services, she had made him a duke, and given him 5000*l.* a year during her life, out of the post-house revenue, and wishes the house would think of means for continuing to him and his heirs, the pension, as well as the title. The whole house were struck dumb. The speaker stood up to see if any body would speak to the queen's

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<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, II. 65.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* xv. 59.

propofal. At laft a member opened. The debate ran very high, and it is faid that an old member fpoke thus: ‘ Though I have accepted an employment at court, I did not do it with the defign that my mouth fhould be fhut in this houfe, when any thing is offered that I think detrimental to my country.’ The houfe fent an addrefs to the queen, in which, after approving the efteem ſhe had expreffed for the duke of *Marlborough*, they beg leave to lay before her the confequences of making a precedent for future alienations of the revenue of the crown, which had been much reduced by the exorbitant grants of the laft reign, &c.<sup>a</sup> The commons in thofe days hesitated about fettling a penfion on a hero, whoſe actions will be celebrated as long as the world ftands. We make it a rule to penfion every man we employ, deferving and worthlefs. Becauſe a ſcoundrel has received 5000 *l.* a year for many years, for doing the buſineſs of a place, in which there is no buſineſs to do (that is, in plain *English*, 5000 *l.* a year for pocketing 20,000 *l.* a year) therefore we are to settle 2 or 3000 *l.* a year on him for life, after he has refigned his ſinecure; and perhaps continue the ſame to his booby ſon after him, while thouſands of our people are flying, for want of bread, to *America*, and the nation in continual danger of bankruptcy.

Inftead of the challenge<sup>b</sup>, Whoſe ox, or whoſe afs, has the king [or the miniſter] taken; we may aſk the crew, Whoſe farthing candle, or whoſe draught of ſmall beer, have they not taxed? A poor hard-working man, who has a wife and ſix children to maintain,

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. III. 210. *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 577.

<sup>b</sup> 2 *Sam.* XII. 3.

can neither enjoy the glorious light of Heaven, nor the glimmering of a tallow taper, without paying the window tax and the candle tax. He rises early, and sits up late; he fills up the whole day with severe labour; he goes to his flock-bed with half a belly full of bread and cheese, denying the call of natural appetite, that his wife and little starvelings may have the more. In the mean while the exactors of these taxes are revelling at Mrs. *Cornelly's* masquerade, at the expence of more money for one evening's amusement, than the wretched hard-working man (who is obliged to find the money for them to squander) can earn by half a year's severe labour.

*Thyſius* ascribes the continuance of the *Athenian* state, to their strict observance of the laws; their severe punishments for bribery, which was always capital; and their severity against offending magistrates<sup>a</sup>.

Noble was the answer of *Curius Dentatus* to the *Samnite* ambassadors, when they offered him as a bribe a large quantity of plate: they found him sitting on a wooden bench by the fire, cooking his victuals. He rejected their present with disdain, and said, My poverty<sup>b</sup> inspires you with hopes of corrupting me, but your attempts are vain. I had rather command the rich, than be rich myself. Carry back with you this fatal metal, which men make use of only for their destruction; and tell your countrymen, that they will find it as difficult to corrupt, as to conquer me.

The *Achæans* declined to their ruin, from the first violation of the salutary law, by which the whole confederacy

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<sup>a</sup> *Aut. Thyf. DE REP. ATHEN. 261.*

<sup>b</sup> *Plut. APOPHTH. Val. Max. IV. 3. ANT. HIST. XII. 139.*



federacy was bound to take no present, from any of the neighbouring kings<sup>a</sup>.

*Epicrates*, the *Athenian*, was, according to law, capitally condemned for taking a present in his embassy, though he had done great service to his country. *Callias* was fined 50 talents or several thousand pounds, for the same crime, though he had made a glorious peace for his country. *Philocrates* was punished for taking a present of *Philip* of *Macedonia*<sup>b</sup>.

‘*Nulla aut admodum exigua, &c.* Pecuniary rewards were scarce known among the *Athenians*. Virtue was its own best reward; and was thought to contain all that was desirable. The *Athenians* were greedy of nothing but glory. Therefore, an olive wreath was the highest of all prizes<sup>d</sup>.’

‘*Nihil opus pecunia, &c.* There is no occasion for money; (says the great and good *Epaminondas* to *Diomedes*, attempting, by order of *Artaxerxes*, to corrupt him) for if your king wants any thing of me, that is for the advantage of my country’, [*Thebes*] ‘I will do it for nothing. If he desires the contrary, he is not rich enough to bribe me; for I will not sell my country, for the wealth of the world<sup>e</sup>.’

The *Athenians* had their *logistæ*, *euthyni*, and *heliastæ*, or public auditors of all accounts, to whom all, who touched the public money, were answerable annually<sup>f</sup>.

‘*Isti quos paverant, &c.* Those who had been enriched by the public plunder for many years, when  
‘deprived

<sup>a</sup> *Schooch. REP. ACHÆOR. 32.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid. 33.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* <sup>d</sup> *Aut. Thyf. DE REP. ATHEN. 251.*

<sup>e</sup> *Corn. Nep. in EPAMIN.*

<sup>f</sup> *Aut. Thyf. DE REP. ATHEN. 257.*

‘ deprived by *Hannibal* of this unjust gain, thought  
 ‘ themselves injured, and in revenge, instigated the  
 ‘ *Romans* against that illustrious chief<sup>a</sup>.’

It is capital for a *Venetian* ambassador to receive a present in his embassy<sup>c</sup>.

The duke *d’ Epernon*, upon a stop of the exchequer in *France*, was advised to raise an income from the people under his government, as other grandees did. He answered, that it was not his business to condemn the proceedings of others; but that he could not think of extorting a subsistence from the miserable people, who were in want of bread<sup>b</sup>.

He afterwards refused to lay impositions on the people for the public service, and wrote to the king, desiring to be excused the odious office of oppressing the poor. The villainous courtiers immediately set up a clamour against him, that he only aimed at popularity, and was imagining treacherous schemes against the government<sup>c</sup>.

When *M. de Voisin*, chief clerk of the parliament of *Paris*, received orders to resume his office, *A. D.* 1771, the parliament having been before arbitrarily changed by the tyrant, he declared, that his honour, duty, and conscience, did not permit him to perform the functions of it. He therefore resigned his place, and was rewarded for his integrity by banishment, and confiscation of his office, which cost a million of livres, and brought in 100,000 yearly.

The great duke *de Sully*, ‘ instead of making his  
 ‘ ministry useful to himself by gaining friends, never  
 ‘ hesitated making himself enemies, by standing be-  
 ‘ tween

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<sup>a</sup> *Liv.*

<sup>b</sup> *LIFE of the DUKE d’ EPERNON*, p. 559.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 581.

‘tween his master and those importunate courtiers,  
 ‘who were perpetually craving in a degree out of all  
 ‘proportion to their merit<sup>a</sup>.’

‘By the spoils of conquered nations, *Cæsar* was  
 ‘enabled to corrupt the *Roman* people, and bribe them  
 ‘to be instruments of their own ruin, by erecting an  
 ‘absolute monarchy in his favour<sup>b</sup>.’

The states of *Arragon* told *Don Pedro IV.* their  
 king, that ‘pensions given to courtiers, are wages paid  
 ‘by the subjects to those, who labour for their destruc-  
 ‘tion<sup>c</sup>.’

By 29 and 30 *Car. II.* a tax of 2 shillings *per*  
 pound was laid on places, and one of 3, upon pen-  
 sions<sup>d</sup>.

In the year 1600, to the last year but one of queen  
*Elizabeth*, the whole of the ordinary public revenue  
 amounted to no more than 600,000*l. per annum*; in  
 1633, the 8th of *Ch. I.* to 800,000*l.* in 1660,  
 the 12th of *Ch. II.* to 1,200,000*l.* in the year 1686,  
 2d of *James II.* to 1,900,000*l.* in 1714, the 12th of  
*Anne*, to 3,200,000*l.* in 1751, the 25th of *Geo.*  
*II.* to something short of 6,000,000*l.* and in the  
 5th of his present majesty, the year 1765, to full  
 10,300,000*l.* Thus from queen *Eliz.* to *Ch. II.*’s  
 time, our public burdens were doubled, being a space  
 of about 60 years; and from thence to the last of  
 queen *Anne*, about 54 years, near treble; from 1714  
 again, to the year 1751, that again nearly doubled;  
 and what is still more extraordinary, this last enormous  
 burden encreased from 6 to upwards of 10,000,000*l.*  
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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXIV. 382.

<sup>b</sup> Preface to a FRAGMENT of POLYB. p. iii.

<sup>c</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXI. 70.

<sup>d</sup> *Tindal*; CONTIN. VIII. 13.

in the narrow compass of 14 years, from 1751, to 1765<sup>a</sup>.

There was one million of debt contracted on the 6*d.* per pound tax, laid *A. D.* 1760, on pensions<sup>b</sup>. The interest of a million, at 4 *per cent.* is 40,000*l.* per ann. Therefore the pensions must have amounted to 1,600,000*l.* per ann. at least. For 1,600,000 sixpences, are only equal to the 40,000*l.*

*A. D.* 1744, a motion was made, that the incomes of places and pensions should be taxed, at least during the continuance of the war, at the rate of 8 shillings in the pound. Objections were made to the motion, as might be expected. To these what follows was replied by *Robert Vynier, Esq.*

‘ I do not wonder, Sir, to hear a placeman affirm-  
 ‘ ing, that our public employments are attended with  
 ‘ vast trouble and expence, and the salaries and per-  
 ‘ quisites belonging to them are no more than they  
 ‘ deserve ; but most other gentlemen in the kingdom  
 ‘ are convinced, that few or none of our public em-  
 ‘ ployments are attended with any expence, and that  
 ‘ the business in every one of them might be performed  
 ‘ for much less than it is at present ; for as to the  
 ‘ expence, we all know that every shilling of it is, in  
 ‘ most of our public offices, defrayed by the public.  
 ‘ The officers are not obliged to furnish themselves  
 ‘ with so much as pens, ink, and paper out of their  
 ‘ salaries ; but have these and many other articles  
 ‘ provided for them at the public charge.’ [ In the  
 year 1773, it was found, that the public has long  
 been charged near 5000*l.* a year for pens, ink, and  
 paper for the house of commons.] ‘ And as to the  
 ‘ business, it is well known, that in all our offices,  
 ‘ those

<sup>a</sup> WHITEH. EVEN. POST, *Apr.* 10.

<sup>b</sup> LOND. MAG. 1760, p. 230.

' those who do the most business have the smallest  
 ' salaries. Nay, in many of our public posts, the  
 ' man who has the place with the salary annexed to  
 ' it, gets a deputy to do the business for, perhaps, a  
 ' tenth part of the salary, and sometimes the deputy  
 ' has no part of the salary, but the perquisites only,  
 ' or, perhaps, but a share of them. These being  
 ' facts notoriously known, I shall very readily agree  
 ' with the honourable gentleman, that a strict parli-  
 ' amentary enquiry into all our public posts and  
 ' offices is very necessary, and might be of great ser-  
 ' vice to the nation. If such an enquiry were strictly  
 ' and impartially carried through, we might not only  
 ' reduce the salaries and perquisites of most of the  
 ' officers and placemen in the kingdom, but a vast  
 ' number of useless officers and placemen might be  
 ' laid aside, and several of the offices that have been  
 ' of late years erected, might be entirely abolished;  
 ' which would not only be a great saving to the pub-  
 ' lic, but a great security to the liberty of the people.  
 ' But such an enquiry, Sir, I despair of ever seeing  
 ' set on foot, and much more of ever seeing it carried  
 ' on with effect; therefore, since we cannot remove  
 ' the evil, I am for making the most we can of it,  
 ' by subjecting all salaries and pensions to a double  
 ' tax; nor am I in the least afraid of doing injustice  
 ' to any placeman, by not leaving him a sufficient  
 ' compensation for all the business he does for the  
 ' public; for in all our offices there is so little business  
 ' done, or such a number of persons employed, that  
 ' one moiety of the salary, and in many cases much  
 ' less than a moiety, would be a sufficient reward  
 ' for all the business they do. With regard to pen-  
 ' sioners, I am so far from being afraid of doing them  
 ' injustice, that, as to most of them, I believe, if we  
 ' stripped

‘ stripped them entirely of their pensions, we should  
 ‘ do a piece of signal service, as well as justice to  
 ‘ the public; for I have a strong suspicion that most  
 ‘ of the pensions that have been granted of late years,  
 ‘ were granted for what ought rather to be called  
 ‘ ministerial than public service.’

‘ The customs and sentiments of a people always  
 ‘ depend upon the customs and sentiments of the rich  
 ‘ and great families amongst them. If the rich and  
 ‘ great are selfish and mercenary, the same spirit will  
 ‘ soon prevail generally among the people. Prevent  
 ‘ its being in the power of the rich and great to be  
 ‘ selfish and mercenary, and they will soon begin to  
 ‘ be actuated by motives of ambition and the desire  
 ‘ of public esteem; and from them the same spirit  
 ‘ will diffuse itself through the whole body of the  
 ‘ people. The monstrous salaries that have been of  
 ‘ late years annexed to all the high offices in our  
 ‘ government, and granted without distinction to the  
 ‘ rich as well as the poor, have raised such a selfish  
 ‘ spirit among the people, that a man is now reckoned  
 ‘ a fool or a madman if he gives himself any trouble  
 ‘ about serving his country without some pecuniary  
 ‘ reward.

*Quis nisi mentis inops oblatum respuat aurum?*

‘ Diminish those salaries, Sir, and grant them to  
 ‘ none but such as stand in need of them for their  
 ‘ support, or for supporting the dignity of their  
 ‘ office, and you will put it out of the power of the  
 ‘ rich to be governed by pecuniary motives. Among  
 ‘ them the motives of ambition and public esteem  
 ‘ will soon resume their proper seat, and a generous  
 ‘ desire to serve *one’s* country without any pecuniary  
 ‘ reward will from them diffuse itself through the  
 ‘ whole

‘ whole body of the people, infomuch that it may  
‘ very soon become scandalous to desire any of the  
‘ public money if a man can serve his country and  
‘ support himself without it. I know, Sir, it may  
‘ be said, that unless you grant such salaries as may  
‘ be a temptation to men of fortune to serve the pub-  
‘ lic, no man of fortune will ever enter into the public  
‘ service. This I take to be a very severe satire upon  
‘ our men of fortune. It is supposing that they are  
‘ governed by nothing but sordid and mean pecuniary  
‘ considerations ; that they have no regard for their  
‘ country, nor will do it any service unless they can  
‘ thereby supply their luxury or satisfy their avarice.  
‘ But I have not so bad an opinion of our men of for-  
‘ tune, or the men of fortune of any country. Put  
‘ pecuniary considerations out of the way, and mere  
‘ generous motives will take their place. Nay, men  
‘ of fortune would engage in the public service, if it  
‘ were for nothing else but to have something to do,  
‘ for a state of mere idleness is, above all others, the  
‘ most irksome ; of which we may be convinced, by  
‘ observing the many inventions of men for pre-  
‘ venting their being in such a state. Many other  
‘ motives would engage them in the public service,  
‘ and even in that service which, above all others, is  
‘ the most dangerous and toilsome ; I mean the army,  
‘ especially in time of war. This we may be con-  
‘ vinced of from what is now the case in *France* :  
‘ The pay of the officers of their army is so small,  
‘ that it can be a temptation to no man of fortune ;  
‘ and the colonel of a regiment must always, in that  
‘ service, be at a much greater expence than his pay will  
‘ answer. Yet there is hardly a man of fortune in that  
‘ country who is not, or has not been, in the army, unless  
‘ it be such as have been bred to the law. The case

‘ would soon be the same in this country, Sir, if  
‘ pecuniary temptations were once removed, or very  
‘ much diminished; and besides the public saving, it  
‘ would contribute not a little towards putting an end  
‘ to the luxury and extravagance that now prevails  
‘ among our quality and chief gentlemen; for among  
‘ men of fortune the public money, like money got  
‘ by gambling, is generally spent in luxury and ex-  
‘ travagance. I may say it is always so, except when  
‘ it falls into the hands of some covetous, avaritious  
‘ creature, and then it contributes, perhaps, to enrich  
‘ a family, that was before richer than is consistent  
‘ with the happiness and constitution of this king-  
‘ dom; for it is our business to have many rich fami-  
‘ lies amongst us, but none too rich: and I am sure  
‘ it is not the business of any state to contribute, at the  
‘ public expence, towards the supply of luxury or the  
‘ satisfaction of avarice, neither of which can ever be  
‘ fully supplied or satisfied, nor will ever say he has  
‘ enough. To a luxurious man, the more you give the  
‘ more methods of expence he will always invent; and  
‘ money to an avaritious man is like water to a drop-  
‘ fical, the more you give the more he will desire.  
‘ I believe no one who hears me will say, that public  
‘ spirit and disinterested regard for our country is not  
‘ now at a very low ebb, among the people of this  
‘ kingdom. What is the cause of this? The cause  
‘ is plain and evident. The great salaries, and many  
‘ unlawful, I may say, cruel, perquisites that have  
‘ been of late years connived at, or by law, or custom,  
‘ annexed to most of the high offices in the kingdom,  
‘ have introduced this spirit too generally amongst  
‘ our noble and rich families; and as such families  
‘ may be called the heart and vitals of the people, the  
‘ corruption has from thence diffused itself through  
‘ the



‘ the whole body. This is the true cause, Sir, and  
‘ the remedy is as obvious as the disease. The rich  
‘ and great will have a concern in the government of  
‘ their country, if they can. You have no occasion  
‘ to invite them by lucrative temptations. If you do  
‘ not invite them by such temptations, they will take  
‘ that concern from motives that are generous and  
‘ consistent with the public good. Public spirit, and  
‘ a desire of esteem, will then be their only motives  
‘ for engaging, or desiring to be engaged, in the pub-  
‘ lic service; and when this spirit begins to prevail  
‘ generally among the rich and great, the people, as  
‘ they always do, will soon begin to follow their  
‘ example. As men are naturally fond of power,  
‘ though attended with no fordid gain, ambition may  
‘ still cause a contention who shall serve their country  
‘ in the highest offices; but that contention will never  
‘ be so violent, as to produce faction, nor can it pro-  
‘ duce any dangerous opposition to a wise and upright  
‘ government, because among a people generally  
‘ governed by virtue and public spirit, no ambitious  
‘ man can form a party against such a government;  
‘ and much less can he form a party for overturning  
‘ the liberties of his country, because the ambition of  
‘ one man will always be a check to the ambition of  
‘ another; for no man who is actuated by ambition  
‘ only, will ever consent to give *himself* an abso-  
‘ lute master; but a luxurious or avaritious man may  
‘ very readily consent to give even *himself* an absolute  
‘ master, if he may thereby hope to supply his lux-  
‘ ury or indulge his avarice. We may thus see, Sir,  
‘ that a stop must be put to the selfish mercenary  
‘ spirit that now prevails among the people, if we  
‘ have a mind to preserve our liberties. Such a law  
‘ as I have mentioned would certainly be the most

' effectual method for this purpose. It must be con-  
 ' fessed by every one who can talk impartially of  
 ' matters relating to government, that officers and  
 ' placemen are proportionably more numerous in this  
 ' country than in any other on earth; and the profits  
 ' so vastly exceed the service required, that every man  
 ' is fond of getting a place under the government,  
 ' because in no sort of business he can earn so much  
 ' for so little service. Justice, therefore, can require  
 ' of us no exception, but that mentioned by my ho-  
 ' nourable friend who made you this motion, I mean  
 ' that of the judges; and no compassion can prompt  
 ' us to go further than to places or pensions of 50*l.* a  
 ' year and under. These are all the exceptions that  
 ' either justice or compassion can require of us, and  
 ' admitting these, I am convinced the additional tax  
 ' proposed would produce a very considerable yearly  
 ' revenue, especially if the commissioners of the land-  
 ' tax should fall upon a way of subjecting perquisites,  
 ' as well as salaries, to this double tax; which, I think,  
 ' they might easily do, and ought to do; for the  
 ' perquisites of offices are very different from the fees  
 ' of lawyers, physicians, or parsons, and still more  
 ' different from the wages of journeymen. These  
 ' are the price, and the only price they have for their  
 ' labour or attendance; but the perquisites of offices  
 ' are not the price of labour or attendance. They  
 ' have their salaries for the price of their labour and  
 ' attendance; and their perquisites are the price only  
 ' of their impudence and imposition, commodities  
 ' which, I am sure, ought to be taxed as high as any  
 ' that are produced or imported; and that they may  
 ' be highly taxed is one of my chief reasons for approv-  
 ' ing this motion <sup>a</sup>.'

Mr.

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. Deb. Com.* I. 313.

Mr. *Southwel* speaks excellently on this subject, as follows <sup>a</sup>.

‘ Sir, As reformation of abuses in the church has  
 ‘ always been a most frightful word to priests, so re-  
 ‘ formation in government has always, for the same  
 ‘ reason, been equally terrible to ministers: Those  
 ‘ abuses in religion which make a reformation necessary,  
 ‘ have generally been introduced by the cunning of  
 ‘ priests, for increasing their own power or their reve-  
 ‘ nues; and those abuses in government which render  
 ‘ a reformation necessary, have generally been intro-  
 ‘ duced by the cunning of ministers, in order to encrease  
 ‘ their own power or profits. These two orders of  
 ‘ men have therefore the same reason to dread a refor-  
 ‘ mation, because it must be attended with a diminution  
 ‘ of their power or their profits, and probably with a  
 ‘ very great diminution of both. For this reason, Sir,  
 ‘ when I hear a minister running out against refor-  
 ‘ mation, and dressing it up in all the hobgobling  
 ‘ shapes his fancy can suggest, I always think of the  
 ‘ priests of *Diana at Ephesus*: It is not the danger that  
 ‘ threatens the public, but the danger that threatens  
 ‘ their shrine, which they are afraid of; and as the  
 ‘ over-grown power of ministers is of as pernicious  
 ‘ consequence to free government as the over-grown  
 ‘ power of priests is to true religion, a reformation is  
 ‘ as often necessary in one case as the other. This is  
 ‘ the foundation of that maxim laid down by *Machi-*  
 ‘ *avel*, that in order to preserve a free government, it  
 ‘ often becomes necessary to bring it back to the first  
 ‘ principles, which is a maxim the friends of liberty  
 ‘ will always take care to observe, and we may ex-  
 ‘ pect that it will be as constantly opposed by ministers,

I 3

‘ who

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. I. 330.*

‘ who always have been, and always will be, grasping  
‘ at arbitrary power. Upon this principle, Sir,  
‘ let us examine the motion now before us, in  
‘ order to see whether it is not returning a step back  
‘ toward our ancient constitution. I am sure, no  
‘ man, who has read the history of the nation, will  
‘ say that our ancestors the *Saxons* ever thought of  
‘ inviting men to serve the public by great salaries or  
‘ pensions. On the contrary, we know that all those  
‘ offices that are of the true *Saxon* originals, such as  
‘ sheriffs, parish offices, and most of our offices in  
‘ cities and boroughs, are attended with an expence,  
‘ instead of being of any advantage to the officers.  
‘ At least if they now make any advantage of them,  
‘ it is by some innovation unknown to our ancestors,  
‘ and such a one as they never would have allowed to  
‘ be introduced. But the crown, having, by some  
‘ means or other, got into its possession the arbitrary  
‘ disposal of almost all offices and places, ministers  
‘ soon found that the more valuable these offices and  
‘ places were made, the more their power would be  
‘ extended; therefore they resolved to make them lu-  
‘ crative as well as honourable, and from that time  
‘ they have been by degrees increasing, not only the  
‘ number of offices and places, but also the profits  
‘ and perquisites of each. Not only large salaries have  
‘ been annexed to every place or office under the  
‘ government, but many of the officers have been  
‘ allowed to oppress the subjects by sale of the places  
‘ under them, and by exacting extravagant and un-  
‘ reasonable fees, which have been so long suffered,  
‘ that they are now looked on as the legal perquisites  
‘ of the office. Nay, in many offices, they seem to  
‘ have got a customary right to defraud the public;  
‘ and we know how careful some of our late ministers  
‘ have

‘ have been to prevent or defeat any parliamentary  
‘ enquiry into the conduct and management of any  
‘ office. By these means, Sir, the expence of our civil  
‘ government is become so great, that it is hardly in  
‘ the power of the people to support it. At least it is  
‘ not in their power to support the expence of our  
‘ civil government, and at the same time to support a  
‘ foreign war with that vigour which is necessary for  
‘ bringing it to a happy and speedy conclusion. But  
‘ this is not the only inconvenience that attends the  
‘ multitude of offices and places under our government,  
‘ and the large salaries and perquisites annexed to  
‘ them: They not only render it impossible for us to  
‘ support or carry on a foreign war with vigour, but  
‘ they render it impossible for us to preserve our  
‘ liberties without some great reformation in our  
‘ constitution. The motion now before us does not  
‘ therefore proceed from any extravagant spirit of  
‘ reformation, but from a just sense of the danger we  
‘ are exposed to, if we do not reform. As to the  
‘ danger that threatens our liberties, I do not much  
‘ wonder at our ministers not being affected with it;  
‘ because from the whole course of our history, as  
‘ well as from late experience, I have observed that  
‘ as soon as a gentleman becomes a minister, or, as he  
‘ calls himself, a servant of the crown, he shakes off all  
‘ concern for the liberty of his country; and what-  
‘ ever professions some of our present ministers may  
‘ have formerly made, I am afraid it will be found,  
‘ that they have no more virtue than their predecessors.  
‘ For this reason, I say, Sir, I do not wonder at our  
‘ ministers not being affected with the danger our  
‘ liberties may be in from the number of our officers,  
‘ and the high salaries annexed to their several offices;  
‘ but as to the danger we are exposed to by our in-  
‘ ability

‘ ability to support a foreign war, I wonder that even  
 ‘ our ministers are not affected with it. My wonder  
 ‘ does not arise, Sir, from any high notion I have of  
 ‘ their virtue or love for their country, but from my  
 ‘ being convinced that they have a great love for them-  
 ‘ selves, and a paramount regard for their own safety  
 ‘ and interest.’

Mr. *Southwel* observes, that the ministry were in some danger, lest the people, provoked on thinking how they are taxed, while the courtiers are wallowing in places and pensions, might make an insurrection to the danger of their plunderers. Then he goes on as follows :

‘ Men, Sir, who are capable of judging without pre-  
 ‘ judice, I am sure, must be sensible of the great danger  
 ‘ our liberties are in from the vast influence the crown  
 ‘ has of late years acquired by the multiplication of  
 ‘ offices, and the increase of officers as well as the  
 ‘ increase of their salaries and perquisites ; for surely  
 ‘ no gentleman will say that our monarchy would  
 ‘ continue to be a limited monarchy, if the crown  
 ‘ were sure of having always a parliament at its  
 ‘ devotion ; and that this may be the case, that  
 ‘ this will be the case, is I think absolutely certain,  
 ‘ if some effectual methods be not very soon taken  
 ‘ to prevent it. A reformation therefore of some  
 ‘ kind or other is become absolutely necessary, if we  
 ‘ intend to preserve our liberties. A place-bill, and a  
 ‘ bill for excluding officers of all ranks and degrees,  
 ‘ with a very few exceptions, from voting at elections,  
 ‘ would have some effect ; but it is very certain that  
 ‘ the most effectual method would be to diminish the  
 ‘ number and value of those gifts which the crown  
 ‘ has a power to bestow ; and the motion now before  
 ‘ us, is, I think, the most obvious step, and the first  
 ‘ step we ought to take for this purpose. The motion  
 ‘ is

‘ is in itself so reasonable, and the honourable gentle-  
‘ man who made it has chosen such a seasonable and  
‘ critical conjuncture for offering it to our confide-  
‘ ration, that if it be not agreed to, I shall despair of  
‘ ever seeing any effectual law made for preventing  
‘ that corrupt influence which the crown has a power  
‘ to make use of both in parliament and at elections.  
‘ A new administration may, in order to gain a little  
‘ popularity, at their first entrance into power, connive  
‘ at the introducing and passing, or may themselves  
‘ introduce and promote, some bill, that has a specious  
‘ appearance of being in favour of liberty; but I shall  
‘ never expect an effectual bill from that quarter. I  
‘ have such an opinion of ministers, that I cannot be  
‘ easily convinced, that they will ever consent to have  
‘ their power effectually abridged; therefore I must be  
‘ of opinion, that if ever any such bill be passed, it must  
‘ make its way through this house against the power  
‘ and influence of the administration, and must be  
‘ forced through the other two branches of the legis-  
‘ lature, or one of them at least, by the obstinate  
‘ virtue of this assembly. Thank God, we have still  
‘ the power in our hands, in some measure, to compel  
‘ a compliance with what our constituents as well as  
‘ ourselves think absolutely necessary for the prefer-  
‘ vation of our constitution. But in the case now  
‘ before us, we have no occasion to make any extraor-  
‘ dinary use of our power: no tacking is proposed:  
‘ no refusal nor any delay of the supplies is desired:  
‘ What my honourable friend has proposed, comes  
‘ not only naturally but necessarily into a supply-bill,  
‘ and consequently must be agreed to by the other two  
‘ branches of the legislature, or the whole of this  
‘ branch of the supply must be lost. If therefore  
‘ such a natural and such a well-judged proposal as  
‘ this

‘ this in favour of our liberties be rejected by this  
 ‘ house, can I suppose that ever any other can make  
 ‘ its way against the torrent of ministerial favour?’

Mr. *Southwel* then goes on to shew the particular propriety of a saving scheme at a time, when the nation was engaged in a war against *France* and *Spain*, with no allies, but such as were more a burden than an advantage, overloaded with debts and taxes, the incomes of the sinking fund on the decline, foreign trade lessened, &c. Then he proceeds as follows :

‘ In these circumstances, Sir, and when we are in  
 ‘ so much danger of being run out before the war can  
 ‘ be brought to a period, will any gentleman say, that  
 ‘ we ought to allow our ministers, placemen, and pen-  
 ‘ sioners, to enjoy the same salaries and pensions they  
 ‘ were provided with in time of peace? Or that we  
 ‘ ought not to deduct some part of their salaries or  
 ‘ pensions, or subject them to some higher tax than  
 ‘ any other sort of people? But this, it is said, is the  
 ‘ practice of arbitrary government, or of princes that  
 ‘ are aiming at arbitrary power; and we ought not to  
 ‘ make their conduct a precedent for ours. Can this  
 ‘ be called reasoning? Because an arbitrary govern-  
 ‘ ment does a just or a right thing, therefore we are  
 ‘ never to do so. If we can find no precedent for this  
 ‘ in any of the free governments of *Europe*, it is be-  
 ‘ cause their ministers and officers have either no sala-  
 ‘ ries at all, or no more than is absolutely necessary for  
 ‘ supporting the dignity of their office. But our mi-  
 ‘ nisters and officers have higher salaries and perqui-  
 ‘ sites in proportion, than the ministers and officers  
 ‘ even of any arbitrary government in *Europe*; and  
 ‘ since we imitate them in granting high salaries and  
 ‘ pensions, we ought to imitate them in making deduc-  
 ‘ tions, when we are involved in a foreign war. This  
 ‘ was



‘ was done by the court of *Spain*, as soon as war was  
‘ declared against us, if there is any credit to be given  
‘ to our gazettes, and news-papers. In order to pro-  
‘ vide for the expence of the war, that court began  
‘ with reducing the appointments of all their officers,  
‘ both civil and military, and with annihilating the  
‘ perquisites of many others. The same thing was  
‘ done by the court of *Vienna*, when they found them-  
‘ selves attacked by *France* and *Spain*. In *Russia* like-  
‘ wise, they made large deductions from the salaries of  
‘ their officers during the war with *Sweden*; and even  
‘ lately in *Denmark*, when there was but the appearance  
‘ of a war with *Sweden*, his *Danish* majesty began  
‘ with laying a tax upon all salaries, in proportion to  
‘ their yearly produce. If no such thing has been  
‘ practised by *France*, it is because the quality in that  
‘ kingdom are proud of serving the government both  
‘ in the civil and military offices, especially the latter,  
‘ without any considerable pecuniary reward. As  
‘ many of our nobility and rich gentry are able enough  
‘ to support the dignity of any public office, they can  
‘ be preferred to, out of their own private fortunes,  
‘ surely no man will say, that it would not be generous  
‘ in them to do so at a time, when their country is in  
‘ such danger and distress. And even when an officer  
‘ has no private fortune of his own, but has a good  
‘ salary from the public, surely it would be generous  
‘ and right in him to contract his way of living, and  
‘ give up one half of his salary in a time of public dis-  
‘ tress. If our public officers will not voluntarily do  
‘ what is generous and right, they ought to be made  
‘ to do so by some public regulation, for which pur-  
‘ pose nothing better can I think be contrived, than  
‘ the proposal now under consideration. The opposi-  
‘ tion made by our ministers to this motion, is in  
‘ my

‘ my opinion a most convincing proof of the corrupt  
 ‘ influence that proceeds from the lucrativeness of our  
 ‘ public offices and employments. This of itself alone,  
 ‘ ought to be a prevailing argument with every lover  
 ‘ of liberty, to render them less lucrative, even suppos-  
 ‘ ing that the public distress did not make it necessary.  
 ‘ Ministers may perhaps think, that nothing but lucra-  
 ‘ tive motives will prevail with men to accept of  
 ‘ places or employments in the government of their  
 ‘ country, because nothing but a mercenary spirit can  
 ‘ prompt a man to accept of any such, upon the terms  
 ‘ they are generally offered by ministers, I mean upon  
 ‘ condition of betraying their country in parliament,  
 ‘ or at elections ; but if we have a mind to preserve our  
 ‘ liberties, I am sure we ought not to enable the crown  
 ‘ or its ministers, to get any servants upon such terms.  
 ‘ If the country is to be served by none but such as  
 ‘ will agree to betray its liberties, I had rather chuse  
 ‘ it should not be served at all ; for anarchy is better  
 ‘ than an established tyranny, because from confusion,  
 ‘ order may be brought forth ; whereas from an esta-  
 ‘ blished tyranny, nothing but irretrievable oppression  
 ‘ is to be expected. Therefore, if it were true, that  
 ‘ nothing but lucrative motives could in *England* pre-  
 ‘ vail upon men to serve their country, it would with  
 ‘ me be no argument against rendering the temptation  
 ‘ less cogent ; because a small salary may prevail upon  
 ‘ a poor man to serve the public, and a poor man is  
 ‘ not so able to support an oppressive government, as  
 ‘ an avaricious or luxurious rich man may be. But,  
 ‘ Sir, whatever our ministers may think, whatever  
 ‘ bad opinion they may have of their countrymen, I  
 ‘ have no such opinion of them. If nothing but  
 ‘ honourable services were required, men of honour  
 ‘ would engage in the service of their country, with-  
 ‘ out

‘ out any pecuniary reward. And I do not think it  
‘ in the least difficult to introduce such a custom,  
‘ as would make it dishonourable in any man of for-  
‘ tune to desire or accept of a sordid pecuniary reward  
‘ or salary, for any service he did, or could do his  
‘ country. To talk of a man’s right to a pecuniary  
‘ reward for serving his country, is to talk in that  
‘ vile mercenary style, which has been designedly in-  
‘ troduced of late years, in order to propagate minis-  
‘ terial corruption; but to talk justly, no man has a  
‘ right to a pecuniary reward for any service he can  
‘ do his country. Sir, the service of our country is  
‘ like the service of God; when we have done all we  
‘ can, we have done but our duty, and no man can  
‘ have a right to a reward, for doing no more than his  
‘ duty. The rewards therefore bestowed for public  
‘ services, are not what any man has a right to demand,  
‘ but such only as generosity, charity, or prudence,  
‘ may induce the country to bestow: and I am sure  
‘ neither generosity, charity, nor prudence, can be  
‘ pleaded for giving large, or indeed any pecuniary  
‘ rewards, to those who are already possessed of exor-  
‘ bitant riches; and when a country is itself in the  
‘ utmost distress, surely it ought not to grant such  
‘ high pecuniary rewards, even to those that stand in  
‘ need of them, as it may do when it is in affluent  
‘ circumstances; but our conduct in this country,  
‘ seems to have been directly contrary to these maxims.  
‘ I am sure it cannot be said that we have been in  
‘ affluent circumstances for these thirty years past: I  
‘ believe every impartial man will grant, that we have  
‘ been for that whole time in a declining condition;  
‘ and yet in that time, we have not only augmented  
‘ very needlessly the number of our public officers and  
‘ servants, but we have greatly augmented the salaries  
‘ and

‘ and perquisites of many of them. We may easily  
‘ guess, Sir, with what view these augmentations were  
‘ made, and we may be convinced that the same view  
‘ now creates an opposition to their being reduced.  
‘ It is not the danger, Sir, of drawing men of fortune  
‘ from the service of their country, but the danger of  
‘ drawing men of fortune from the service of ministers,  
‘ that creates an opposition to this motion; but this  
‘ is so far from being a reason for me to oppose it,  
‘ that it is one of the strongest arguments I can think  
‘ of for agreeing to it. I wish we could draw every  
‘ man of fortune from that service, for none but men  
‘ who are entirely governed by their avarice or luxury,  
‘ will ever enter into the service of ministers, upon  
‘ the terms they require; and in the hands of such  
‘ men, neither the counsels nor the treasure of the  
‘ country can be safe. A poor man may be honest and  
‘ faithful, but an avaricious man will be neither, if  
‘ he can safely indulge his avarice by being otherwise.  
‘ A poor man may live contented upon a small salary, but  
‘ a luxurious man no income can satisfy, therefore he  
‘ will endeavour by any means to get a supply. Can  
‘ we expect, Sir, that either the counsels or treasure of  
‘ our country will be safe in the hands of those, who  
‘ in order to get them into their hands, have agreed to  
‘ betray the liberties of their country. Sir, if they do  
‘ not sell the counsels of their country, it is because  
‘ they cannot find a purchaser; and if they do not  
‘ convert the treasure of their country to their own  
‘ use, it is because they are afraid of punishment.  
‘ There is more danger therefore, with regard to the  
‘ public counsels or treasure, in having such men of  
‘ fortune employed, than in having men of no fortune  
‘ employed in the public service; and with regard to  
‘ our liberties, the danger is infinitely greater, because  
‘ men

‘ men of no fortune could not betray the liberties of their  
‘ country by getting into parliament, nor could they  
‘ so powerfully assist an oppressive administration in  
‘ corrupting our elections. For this reason, Sir, we  
‘ ought not to provide any ministry with the means of  
‘ tempting the avaricious or luxurious rich to accept  
‘ of places or employments in the government ; and  
‘ much smaller salaries or profits, than are annexed to  
‘ most of these places, would be a sufficient temptation,  
‘ because they would be a sufficient support for gentle-  
‘ men of no fortune. There is therefore no weight  
‘ in the objection made to this proposal, That it  
‘ would drive all gentlemen of fortune and character  
‘ out of the public service; because it would drive no  
‘ gentlemen of fortune out of the service, but such as  
‘ ought not to be allowed to enter into it; or who  
‘ at least ought not to be tempted by lucrative confi-  
‘ derations to enter into it, especially as long as such  
‘ temptations are at the disposal of our ministers, and  
‘ as long as a lucrative place in the government is no  
‘ objection to a gentleman’s being a member of this  
‘ house. The only remaining objection I have heard  
‘ made to this proposal is, That it would make but a  
‘ very small addition to our public revenue, if we  
‘ make those exceptions which justice and compassion  
‘ require. I have already shewn, Sir, that justice has  
‘ nothing to do in the question, because no man has a  
‘ right to any pecuniary reward from the public ; and  
‘ as to compassion, it cannot I am sure carry us farther,  
‘ than the honourable gentleman who made the motion  
‘ has mentioned. Suppose then we except all salaries  
‘ and pensions of 50*l.* a year and under, will any gen-  
‘ tleman say that 4*s.* in the pound upon all salaries  
‘ and pensions above 50*l.* a year, would not produce a  
‘ very considerable revenue? I shall not pretend to  
‘ determine,

‘ determine, or even to guess at what it would produce ;  
 ‘ but I may suppose that our salaries and pensions  
 ‘ above 50l. a year amount to at least a million sterl-  
 ‘ ing ; if I said two, I believe I should not be mista-  
 ‘ ken ; but suppose no more than one, it would pro-  
 ‘ duce an additional annual revenue of 200,000l. a  
 ‘ year, without any additional charge ; and such an  
 ‘ additional revenue is I think far from being incon-  
 ‘ siderable, at a time when our government finds itself  
 ‘ under a necessity of indulging even the most destruc-  
 ‘ tive vice of the people,’ [the drinking of gin under  
 licence] ‘ in order to raise money by taxing it.’

The court-sycophants pretend, that the dignity of  
 the crown [the voracity of their extravagance, they  
 should say] requires a great expence to support it,  
 and particularly a numerous attendance at court. But  
 the truth is, the greatness of a prince is never estimated  
 according to the splendor of his court, unless it be by  
 women and children. All mankind agree to pro-  
 nounce him a great prince, who makes his enemies  
 fear him, and his allies and subjects love him. And  
 this is done by a procedure directly opposite to an  
 unbounded expence laid out upon a set of idle hangers-  
 on. But I shall have occasion to treat of regal parade  
 hereafter. In the mean time, on the exorbitant num-  
 ber of placemen, let us observe in what light the  
 court-list exhibits that abuse. There we find places  
 piled on places, to the height of the tower of *Babel*.  
 There we find a master of the household, treasurer of  
 the household, comptroller of the household, cofferer of  
 the household, deputy-cofferer of the household, clerks  
 of the household, clerks comptrollers of the household,  
 clerks comptrollers deputy-clerks of the household,  
 office-keepers, chamber-keepers, necessary-house-keep-  
 ers, purveyors of bread, purveyors of wine, purveyors  
 ‘ of

of fish, purveyors of butter and eggs, purveyors of confectionary, deliverers of greens, coffee-women, spicery-men, spicery-men's assistant-clerks, ewry-men, ewry-men's assistant-clerks, kitchen-clerk-comptrollers, kitchen-clerk-comptroller's first clerks, kitchen-clerk-comptroller's junior clerks, yeomen of the mouth, under-yeomen of the mouth, grooms, grooms children, pastry-yeomen, harbingers, harbingers-yeomen, keepers of ice-houses, cart-takers, cart-takers grooms, bell-ringers, cock and cryer, table-deckers, water-engine-turners, cistern-cleaners, keeper of fire-buckets, and a thousand or two of the same kind, which if I were to set down, I know not who would take the trouble of reading them over. Will any man say, and keep his countenance, that one in one hundred of these hangers-on is of any real use? Cannot our good king have a poached egg for his supper, unless he keeps a purveyor of eggs, and his clerks, and his clerk's deputy-clerks, at an expence of 500 *l.* a year? while the nation is sinking in a bottomless ocean of debt? Again, who are they, the yeomen of the mouth, and who are the under-yeomen of the mouth? What is their business? What is it to yeoman a king's mouth? What is the necessity for a cofferer, where there is a treasurer? And, where there is a cofferer, what occasion for a deputy-cofferer? Why a necessary-house-keeper? cannot a king have a water-closet, and keep the key of it in his own pocket? And my little cock and cryer, what can be his post? Does he come under the king's chamber window, and call the hour, mimicking the crowing of the cock? This might be of use before clocks and watches, especially repeaters, were invented; but seems as superfluous now, as the deliverer of greens, the coffee-women, spicery-men's assistant-

clerks, the kitchen-comptroller's first clerks and junior clerks, the groom's children, the harbinger's yeomen, &c. Does the maintaining such a multitude of idlers suit the present state of our finances? When will frugality be necessary, if not now? *Queen Anne* gave 100,000 *l.* a year to the public service. We pay debts on the civil list of 600,000 *l.* in one article, without asking how there comes to be a deficiency.

The pretence, that a king ought to have a number of attendants about him, to keep up his state, and strike the people with an awe of government, wants no answer. Was ever the parade of government kept up at a higher expence than in our times? Was ever government more despised by the subjects, than ours is now? Compare our times with those of *Queen Elizabeth*, who refused supplies, when offered her, saying, the money was as well in the people's pockets as in hers, till she came to want it.

*Julian* reformed the *Roman* court, dismissing many thousands who had pensions for no service<sup>a</sup>. Yet we do not find, that he lost the good-will of the people on that account. Our courtiers cry, There is no possibility of keeping things quiet without places and pensions. I own I am inclined to think there is another and better method of keeping things quiet, *viz.* By government's shewing, on all occasions, an unvarying uprightness and disinterestedness of conduct. And I am sure, that bribery is a very precarious instrument of government. For the more the court bribes, the more it must bribe. Nor is there any impossibility in diminishing the number of places. It is often done; though they are much oftener increased. In the year 1709, a third secretary of state was appointed,

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XVI. 249.



appointed, *viz.* the duke of *Queensbury*; and *Rowe*, the poet, was made under-secretary<sup>a</sup>. The number was since reduced again to two, without bad consequence. But there is always a lion in the way, when the reformation of an abuse is proposed.

*Sir Edw. Coke* complains heavily, about the beginning of *Ch. I.* of new-invented offices, with large fees, and useles old ones very chargeable; of a plurality of offices held by single persons; of extravagance in the king's household; of new tables set up in the palace; of voluntary annuities and pensions; of unnecessary charges in the king's living; of costly diet, apparel, buildings, &c.<sup>b</sup> Were he to see the proceedings of our times, he would soon forget those of *Ch. I.*

The commons address the queen, *A. D.* 1708, that the number of the commissioners for paying the *Scotch* equivalent money be reduced; the greatest part of the business being done<sup>c</sup>.

## C H A P. VI.

*That Places, Pensions, Bribes, and all the Arts of Corruption, are but false Policy, being endless and insufficient.*

**A**FTER all the shocking accounts here given of the enormous expence the nation is put to by the villainous art of a succession of ministers, it must be owned, that bribery and corruption are false policy at best, as being endless and ineffectual.

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In

<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. II. 119.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* VI. 363.

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM.* IV. 130.

In the most antient of all writings, I mean, the sacred, we find wisdom and virtue, synonymous terms, and vice and folly put promiscuously for one another. Wisdom is pursuing the noblest ends by the most promising means. But the ends a corrupt minister has in view are raising himself and his friends to power, and filling his own and their pockets. Are these the noblest ends a being formed for glory, honour, and immortality can propose to himself? And is bribing the most promising scheme for obtaining these noblest ends? I trow not.

Οὐ γὰρ κἀκὼς, κ. τ. λ. ‘He was a shrewd observer, who remarked, that whoever first introduces treats and presents among a people, to obtain their favour, paves the way for the destruction of that people<sup>a</sup>.’

The free states of Greece were ruined by *Philip* of *Macedon*, more by bribery than the sword. The *Asiatic* riches gained by the *Spartans*, corrupted and ruined them. The *Roman* commonwealth was overfct by corruption, in consequence of *Lucullus*’s conquests in the east. Till then honour was the reward of virtue; afterwards sordid wealth filled the place of honour in the minds of the *Romans*; which rapacity continued and increased, till the emperor’s throne was fairly bought by *Didius Julianus*.

No prince ever bribed more than *Philip* of *Macedon*. But the persons he bribed were his *enemies*; or *foreigners*. When he understood, that his son *Alexander* was endeavouring to gain the affections of the *Macedonians* by gifts, he checked him severely<sup>b</sup>.

Though, as a politician, he had a great opinion of the force of gold; and was wont to say, that no city was impregnable, through the gates of which an ass laden

<sup>a</sup> *Plut.* in *CORIOI.*

<sup>b</sup> *Cic.* DE OFF. II.

laden with that metal, could pass; though he was accustomed to retain pensioners in every state, and naturally lavish of his money to domestic flatterers; yet he checked this humour, as soon as he perceived it, in his son. He wrote him a letter on the subject full of excellent philosophy. ‘How came you, young man, said he, to reason so wretchedly with yourself, as to fancy those will serve you *faithfully*, whom daily you *corrupt* with money? Do you this, that the *Macedonians* may hereafter take you, not for their king, but for their steward or paymaster. If you discharge these offices well, you must make but a pitiful prince. They are spoiled who take gifts, by being taught thereby an habit of taking.’

*Sylla*, in the true spirit of a corruptor (of an *English* borough-candidate, I was going to say) feasts the whole *Roman* people <sup>a</sup>. Will any man pretend, that *Sylla* was at that expence for an honest purpose? Some of our court-sycophants pretend, that our borough-hunters are no way blameable for the same proceeding. But the sense of our wise ancestors was otherwise, who have made laws against giving victuals and drink to electors, as much as against bribing with hard money.

There never was a greater corruptor than *Cæsar*, who destroyed the liberties of his country. He invented new pretences for feasting and bribing the people of the city. He gave unusually magnificent shews, and largesses of corn without measure, presented many leading men with slaves and land estates, lent to needy senators large sums of money at low interest, or without; he descended so low as to bribe favourite slaves and freemen, and to crown all, he doubled the

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 94.

pay of the army <sup>a</sup>. By these extravagancies he run himself into debt to the amount of above 250,000 *l.* of our money, and he found, that bribing was endless. At last the wages of iniquity were raised so high, that it cost him 310,625 *l.* to buy off *Æmilius Raulus*, the consul, from *Pompey's* party <sup>b</sup>.

When he stood candidate for the consulship with *Luccius*, the patricians fearing, that two such consuls together should overset the republic, agreed to support *Bibulus's* interest against that of *Luccius*, by buying votes with the public money; even *Cato* himself countenancing the scheme <sup>c</sup> [*ne Catone quidem abnente*]. But did this temporary expedient save the state? Could *Cato* think it would? How, indeed, could he miss seeing, that it must hasten the ruin of liberty, because it hastened the destruction of the people's virtue, without which no people ever preserved their liberty?

*Brutus* and *Cassius* found the *Romans* so debased, that they thought it necessary to bribe on their part, as the *triumviri* did on theirs. And after all, the *Roman* legions (unworthy of the name of *Romans*!) basely deserted them to join the *triumviri* <sup>d</sup>.

*Octavius* (afterwards *Augustus*) gave undoubted and repeated proofs of his cowardice. Yet his army, the *Roman* legions, the despisers of cowardice, stood by him. Why? Because he bribed them with money, corn, and lands. See *Lipsius's* chapter of the gifts of *Augustus*, &c.

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<sup>a</sup> *Sueton.* IN JUL. § 26, 27. et pass.

<sup>b</sup> *ANT. UNIV. HIST.* XIII. 179.

<sup>c</sup> *Sueton.* IN JUL.

<sup>d</sup> *ANT. UNIV. HIST.* XIII. 389.

The *Roman* legions, accustomed to have the public money distributed among them, were much dissatisfied with *Galba* for leaving off that good old custom<sup>a</sup>. When princes once begin bribing, their tools will not suffer them to leave off. There never was a better pretence (if any pretence were good) for bribing, than that of king *William's* ministry, viz. buying off the jacobites. Yet who, that considered what a door it opened, would have advised such a measure?

Ambitious and avaritious men are insatiable. At the beginning of the reign of *Ch. VIII.* of *France*, the duke of *Lorraine* made very high conditions for himself and his party. They were granted. He seemed for some time contented. But soon after, he, and the constable *de Bourbon*, and many others, begun to hatch mischief<sup>b</sup>.

When the electors become universally corrupt, as well as the elected, ' the fate of *Rome* will be renewed  
' in *Britain*. The grandeur of *Rome* was the work of  
' many centuries, the effect of much wisdom, and the  
' price of much blood. She maintained her grandeur  
' while she preserved her virtue. But when luxury  
' grew up to favour corruption, and corruption to  
' nourish luxury, then *Rome* grew venal, the election  
' of her magistrates, the sentences of her judges, the  
' decrees of her senate, all was sold; for her liberty  
' was sold when these were sold, and her riches, her  
' honour, her glory, could not long survive her  
' liberty. She who had been the envy, as well as the  
' mistress of nations, fell to be an object of their scorn,  
' or their pity. They had seen and felt that she  
K 4 ' governed

<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIV. 489.

<sup>b</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXIV. 82.

' governed other people by will, and her own by law.  
 ' They beheld her governed herself by will; by the  
 ' arbitrary will of the worst of her own citizens, of  
 ' the worst of both sexes, of the worst of human kind;  
 ' by *Caligula*, by *Claudius*, by *Nero*, by *Messalina*, by  
 ' *Agrippina*, by *Poppæa*, by *Narcissus*, by *Calistus*, by  
 ' *Pallas*, by princes that were stupid or mad; by  
 ' women that were abandoned to ambition and to lust;  
 ' by ministers, that were emancipated slaves, parasites,  
 ' and panders, insolent and rapacious. In this miser-  
 ' able state the few, that retained some sparks of the  
 ' old *Roman* spirit, had double cause to mourn in  
 ' private; for it was not safe even to mourn in publick.  
 ' They mourned the loss of the liberty and grandeur  
 ' of *Rome*, and they mourned that both should be  
 ' sacrificed to wretches whose crimes would have been  
 ' punished, and whose talents would scarce have re-  
 ' commended them to the meanest offices, in the  
 ' virtuous and prosperous ages of the commonwealth.  
 ' Into such a state (the difference of times, and of  
 ' other circumstances considered) at least into a state  
 ' as miserable as this, will the people of *Britain* both  
 ' fall and deserve to fall, if they suffer, under any  
 ' pretence, or by any hands, that constitution to be  
 ' destroyed, which cannot be destroyed unless they  
 ' suffer it; unless they co-operate with the enemies of  
 ' it, by renewing an exploded distinction of parties;  
 ' by electing those to represent them, who are hired  
 ' to betray them; or by submitting tamely, when the  
 ' mask is taken off, or falls off, and the attempt to  
 ' bring beggary and slavery is avowed, or can be no  
 ' longer concealed. If ever this happens, the friends  
 ' of liberty, should any such remain, will have one  
 ' option still left; and they will rather chuse no doubt

‘ to die the last of *British* freemen, than bear to live  
 ‘ the first of *British* slaves <sup>a</sup>.’

The members of the *Polish* diet oppose the most salutary measures of the court, till they are bought off<sup>b</sup>. The court ought not to have *begun* buying off. If they had not, the expectation of being bought off would never have come into the heads of the members. And their requiring unanimity, is a great disadvantage, as making each single vote of too much consequence. Indeed nothing can be more absurd than giving one a negative against one hundred, in any case, where the interest of all is concerned. Did ever any man in his wits think of putting one guinea, or one ounce, in the balance against one hundred guineas, or one hundred ounces?

About the time when the ill-advised measure of taking off the jacobites by places and bribes was proposed to king *William III.* the earl of *Braidalbin* formed a scheme of quieting the highlanders by distributing money among them. A sum of 15,000*l.* was sent him. It was offered to be distributed among the chiefs of the clans. But it did not content them. On the contrary (as when a villain, instead of being set at defiance, is offered a bribe to prevent his setting up a false accusation) they rose in their demands. They thought their own importance must be very great, that the government should think it worth while to take them off. This is a weighty lesson to all courts and ministers, not to begin bribing; for once begun, no one knows where it will end; but to set the heads of parties at defiance, and trust, for the public approbation, and security in their places, not to bribes of  
 any ]

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<sup>a</sup> DISSERT. UPON PARTIES, 213.

<sup>b</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXXIV. 12.

any kind, but to a clear conduct, which will always support them, or enable them to sink with a grace.

Most sins are their own punishment even in this life. The court-corruptor may read his sin in his punishment, in the distress and vexation he brings himself into by raising a nest of hornets about his own ears, by disappointing (for he must disappoint) a multitude of expectants. And every disappointed man becomes a mortal enemy; and one enemy does him more mischief than ten friends do him service. Then he finds all his measures, even his most laudable ones, embarrassed.

*Walpole* often said, the vacancy of every place gave him anxiety; for he could only oblige one (the person to whom he gave it) and must disappoint many. One would therefore imagine, that even the court itself should wish the number of places diminished.

The market-price of a borough 30 years ago was 1500 *l.* Now they are thought pennyworths at 3000 *l.*

‘ He who undertakes to govern a free people by  
 ‘ corruption, and to lead them by a false interest  
 ‘ against their true interest, cannot boast the honour of  
 ‘ the invention. The expedient is as old as the world,  
 ‘ and he can pretend to no other honour than that of  
 ‘ being an humble imitator of the devil. To corrupt  
 ‘ our parliaments hath been often attempted, as well  
 ‘ as to divide our people in favour of prerogative, and  
 ‘ in order to set the arbitrary will of our princes loose  
 ‘ from the restraints of law <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ When pensions grow common, and are promiscu-  
 ‘ ously given to those who have deserved them and those  
 ‘ who have not, the demand and application for them  
 ‘ will grow universal. Every one will esteem it a sort  
 ‘ of

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<sup>a</sup> DISSERT. ON PARTIES, 217.



‘ of contempt to him to be left out, and think himself  
 ‘ as well intitled as another who is not intitled at all.  
 ‘ So that what is taken from the people’s industry  
 ‘ and given for the people’s protection, will be squan-  
 ‘ dered away to support laziness, prodigality and vice,  
 ‘ and the bread of the children will be thrown to  
 ‘ dogs <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ As the crown never was, so it is ridiculous to  
 ‘ believe it ever will be better for such irregular sup-  
 ‘ plies. The demand upon it will rise in exact pro-  
 ‘ portion to their fancied riches, and the weakness of  
 ‘ the ministry. Every one will think he has a right to  
 ‘ share in the profit who has had a share in the guilt;  
 ‘ and endless importunities must distract the court, as  
 ‘ well as exhaust the nation. Whereas a general good  
 ‘ husbandry will soon put an end to all wild and im-  
 ‘ pertinent solicitations. No one will pretend to what  
 ‘ no one has. Worthless men will not spend their  
 ‘ substance in hopes to repair themselves out of the  
 ‘ kingdom’s ruin; but the direction of public affairs  
 ‘ will fall naturally into hands who have no interest  
 ‘ but in the publick happiness <sup>b</sup>.’

‘ When it happens that the spring head shall be  
 ‘ tainted, from whence are to be drawn the men of  
 ‘ experience, action, and counsel; busy persons by  
 ‘ different arts, some by abject flattery, others by per-  
 ‘ plexing matters to be bought off, will soon prevail to  
 ‘ be let into many of the chief offices and dignities of  
 ‘ the state, which they will so pollute with their foul  
 ‘ dealings, and weaken and make contemptible by  
 ‘ their ignorance, that cleaner and abler hands will  
 ‘ afterwards be hardly invited in to restore things, and  
 ‘ give them a better complexion. And in such times,  
 ‘ the

<sup>a</sup> Gord. TRACTS, I. 242.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 239.

‘ the worst of men, who insinuate best, and are ever  
 ‘ the most active, will get into many posts of trust and  
 ‘ importance, and endeavour, if possible, to engross  
 ‘ the whole commonwealth to themselves, and invade  
 ‘ all her posts, where they will lie strongly in-  
 ‘ trenched and watchful to oppress virtue and merit of  
 ‘ any kind, with which they are at open war; for if  
 ‘ endowments of the mind, love to the nation, inte-  
 ‘ grity, experience, conduct, and solid wisdom, should  
 ‘ once obtain, get ground, and be taken notice of,  
 ‘ they who shine, and are recommended by no such  
 ‘ qualities, must quit their holds and withdraw, or re-  
 ‘ main the universal contempt of that people, whose  
 ‘ affairs they are so little able to administer <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ Bad men have ever given a false colour to their  
 ‘ proceedings, and covered their ambition, corruption,  
 ‘ and rapine, with the pretence of their master’s  
 ‘ service; they make him believe their greatness ad-  
 ‘ vances him; whereas truly it tends to his diminution,  
 ‘ and he is often weak for want of that wealth and  
 ‘ power which they share among one another. Their  
 ‘ riches have frequently brought envy upon the prince,  
 ‘ but we can hardly meet with an instance of any who  
 ‘ in his distress has been assisted from the purses of his  
 ‘ ministers: for they are commonly the first who fly  
 ‘ from his misfortunes, and though they pretend that  
 ‘ his power is revered in them, and that they make him  
 ‘ strong by the benefits he lets them bestow, yet a  
 ‘ wise king sees through all this artifice, and knows  
 ‘ that he, who would reap any advantage from his  
 ‘ favours in the opinions of men, must make them  
 ‘ sensible that they owe them singly to his goodness,  
 ‘ and not to the intercession of those about him <sup>b</sup>.’

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‘ Kings

<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* II. 58.<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* III. 20.

' Kings reduced to streights either by their own or  
 ' by the negligence of their predeceffors, have been  
 ' always involved in dark and mean intrigues; they  
 ' have been forced to court such as in their hearts they  
 ' abhor, and to frown upon those whose abilities and  
 ' virtues they secretly approve of and reverence. In-  
 ' stead of being heads of the whole commonwealth,  
 ' as in law and reason they ought to be, they have  
 ' often been compelled to put themselves in the front  
 ' sometimes of one and sometimes of another party,  
 ' as they saw it prevalent, a policy in the end ever  
 ' fatal to rulers. Being entangled, they have been  
 ' constrained to put into the chief administration  
 ' of their affairs, projectors and inventors of new  
 ' taxes, who being hateful to the people, seldom  
 ' fail of bringing odium upon their master; and  
 ' these little fellows, whose only skill lies that way,  
 ' when they become ministers, being commonly of  
 ' the lower rank of understandings, manage accord-  
 ' ingly; for their own ignorance in matters of govern-  
 ' ment occasions more necessities than their arts of  
 ' raising money are able to supply<sup>a</sup>.'

' Ill conduct in money matters of itself is sufficient  
 ' to raise a strength against them in power; and where  
 ' parties are already formed, it renders those the bolder  
 ' who design mischief to the state, because they know  
 ' how difficult it is for a government to resist its enemies,  
 ' when it is without treasure, and has not the affec-  
 ' tions of the people; which was the case of *Hen. III.*  
 ' of *France*, a prince full of natural valour, blessed  
 ' with early victories, and adorned with eloquence,  
 ' which was said to be irresistible; yet one of his own  
 ' subjects, not of the royal blood, came to his capital  
 ' city at the head of no more than seven persons, in  
 ' order

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* III. 4.

‘ order to begin a rebellion, which aimed at wresting  
 ‘ the sceptre from him. How came a man of the  
 ‘ duke of *Guise’s* caution and sagacity, to take in hand  
 ‘ an enterprize at first sight so unlikely to succeed,  
 ‘ but that he knew how low this king had brought  
 ‘ himself by a long series of mis-government; that  
 ‘ *France* impoverished by taxes was grown weary of  
 ‘ his rule; that the minds of the people were quite  
 ‘ alienated from him; that his riots and profusion had  
 ‘ quite exhausted that treasure wherewith his crown  
 ‘ was to be defended. And without doubt, this view  
 ‘ gave the house of *Lorraine*, the council of sixteen at  
 ‘ *Paris*, and the general faction of the league, courage  
 ‘ to begin that war <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ If it is asked, how it came to pass that so many  
 ‘ commonwealths and monarchies have been sub-  
 ‘ verted, the answer is easy; they did not sink under  
 ‘ invasions, or perish by foreign force, till the way  
 ‘ to conquest had been first opened by their own  
 ‘ misgovernment. But to come to particulars, and  
 ‘ to examine into the origin of these various mischiefs,  
 ‘ which have disturbed government, whence is it that  
 ‘ there have been factions in a state? In commonwealths  
 ‘ it was because they did not hold a strict hand over  
 ‘ their great ones, and took no care to keep out cor-  
 ‘ ruption. Hereupon the manners of the common  
 ‘ people were depraved, and they followed those whom  
 ‘ they thought most willing and most able to support  
 ‘ them in their vices; and this first divided *Rome*.  
 ‘ In a monarchy, parties thus took their rise; either  
 ‘ the prince was weak, unable to exert the regal  
 ‘ authority, and so private men grew upon him, and  
 ‘ not being in a condition to suppress both, he was  
 ‘ com-

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* IV. 429.

‘ compelled to court first one and then the other side,  
‘ as his necessities required; himself nourishing that  
‘ disease, which, in the end, wasted his power; or if  
‘ he had false cunning, and meditated in his mind to  
‘ overthrow the laws underhand, he encouraged par-  
‘ ties, kept them equally poised, and suffered them to  
‘ consume their strength one against the other, in  
‘ hopes they should be both so impaired by their mu-  
‘ tual strivings, as to be unable to give him opposi-  
‘ tion, and thus to become master of the whole at  
‘ last. Whence came it, that countries have been  
‘ ruined, by not consulting national interest? Either  
‘ the prince himself had bad designs, or not being  
‘ endowed with royal virtues, and destitute of wis-  
‘ dom, he committed the administration of his affairs  
‘ to unskilful or corrupt hands. Whence was it  
‘ that, affecting arbitrary rule has so often thrown  
‘ this kingdom into civil wars? The fault lay in the  
‘ judges, who wrested law, and made it serve the  
‘ turns of power; and in the ministers, who did not  
‘ perform their duty in representing to the prince the  
‘ danger of such measures. From whence have arisen  
‘ those schisms by which the church has been so often  
‘ rent asunder, but from neglect or unskilfulness in  
‘ the general administration? From neglect, when  
‘ the temple was suffered to be profaned by the licen-  
‘ tious living, the pride, ignorance, and vices of the  
‘ clergy, which might induce many to separate from  
‘ such whose lives, they thought, were a blemish to  
‘ their doctrine. From unskilfulness, when the  
‘ government has believed that diseases of long growth  
‘ could admit of a sudden cure, that to sharp humours  
‘ it was better to apply corroding medicines than leni-  
‘ tives, and that persecution was the only way of  
‘ reclaiming non-conformists from their errors. What

‘ has most frequently been the cause of public wants,  
 ‘ but a complication of mismanagements, as well in  
 ‘ the prince as in his ministers? He omitted his  
 ‘ part, which was to overlook them, and his negli-  
 ‘ gence produced their corruption. They encou-  
 ‘ raged profusion, as getting most by it, and he neg-  
 ‘ lected œconomy, because it gave him present  
 ‘ trouble. In governments ill administred, public  
 ‘ wants lead the way; but private poverty follows  
 ‘ close after; and when both happen together, which  
 ‘ must always be the case at last, then is ruin near at  
 ‘ hand. Which way soever we look, when any thing  
 ‘ has been out of order in a state, generally speaking,  
 ‘ the mischief did proceed from some omission in  
 ‘ the executive power, either from above or from  
 ‘ below; when vice abounds, we find the laws have  
 ‘ not been put in execution; when impiety and irre-  
 ‘ ligion prevail, they have not been sufficiently dis-  
 ‘ countenanced; when there is an uncommon decay  
 ‘ of trade, it is either not encouraged or not protected;  
 ‘ when the law is tedious and expensive, some great  
 ‘ corruption has been suffered to creep into the courts  
 ‘ of justice; in naval matters, when good conduct and  
 ‘ courage are wanting, negligence and cowardice  
 ‘ have met with too much impunity. Thus, in these  
 ‘ instances, and in many others, which have been ever  
 ‘ the subjects of complaint, as at first they were de-  
 ‘ rived from a bad, so they are to be corrected by a  
 ‘ better administration of affairs<sup>a</sup>.’ [Consequently  
 not by bribery and corruption.]

‘ Much nobler it is to enjoy the praises of an uni-  
 ‘ versal people living in plenty and at their ease, not  
 ‘ burthened by taxes and duties, than to have the good  
 ‘ words

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* v. 13.

words of a few flatterers, or those harpies which  
 commonly haunt a court, to gripe all they can ; who,  
 when they are gorged themselves, pollute all the re-  
 mainder with their obscene claws, so that nobody  
 else desires to touch it. Besides, we have hardly an  
 instance of any prince that in time of need was truly  
 assisted and defended by his minions, and the crea-  
 tures of his bounty and favour ; but a king beloved  
 for wise, just, and careful government, has been  
 very seldom deserted by his people <sup>a</sup>.

I wish (says the excellent Mr. *Trenchard*) our  
 dabblers in corruption would count their gains, and  
 balance their losses with their wicked advantages.  
 Let them set down in one column their mercenary  
 gifts and precarious dependencies ; sometimes half  
 purchased with money, sometimes by dividing the  
 profits with parasites, and always with the loss of  
 their integrity and reputation ; and on the other  
 side let them write down expensive contentions, and  
 constant attendance in town, to the neglect of their  
 families and affairs, and a manner of living often  
 unsuitable to their fortunes, and destructive to their  
 health, and at least one fourth part of their estates  
 mortgaged, and liable to the discharge of the public  
 debts ; and above all the rest, the insecurity of what  
 remains, which must be involved in every species of  
 public misery. And then let them cast up the ac-  
 count, and see where the balance lies <sup>b</sup>.

Let them consider, on the other hand, (says he)  
 what a figure they make in their several countries,  
 among their neighbours, their acquaintance, their  
 former friends, and often amongst their own rela-  
 tions.

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tions.

<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* II. 263.

<sup>b</sup> *CATO'S LETT.* III. 279.

‘ tions. See how they have been hunted and pursued  
 ‘ from place to place, with reproaches and curses  
 ‘ from every honest man in *England*; how they have  
 ‘ been rejected in counties and rich boroughs, and in-  
 ‘ deed only hoped for success any where, by the mere  
 ‘ force of exorbitant corruption, which has swallowed  
 ‘ up a great part of their unjust extortions. Then  
 ‘ let them set against all these evils, a good conscience,  
 ‘ a clear reputation, a disengaged estate, and being  
 ‘ the happy members of a free, powerful, and safe  
 ‘ kingdom; all which was once their case, and might  
 ‘ have continued so, if they had acted with integrity.  
 ‘ Sure it is worth no man’s time, to change an estate  
 ‘ of inheritance, secured to him by steady and impar-  
 ‘ tial laws, for a precarious title to the greatest advan-  
 ‘ tages, at the will of any man whatsoever <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ The public can never have a firm existence,  
 ‘ unless all the different ranks of men co-operate to  
 ‘ its preservation, not faintly, but with the utmost  
 ‘ spirit and vigour. For if among those in high stati-  
 ‘ ons, there is not an affection which warmly embraces  
 ‘ the honour and interest of the commonwealth, and  
 ‘ if the same genius does not universally possess the  
 ‘ inferior order of people, such supine negligence and  
 ‘ giddy administration will creep into the state, as  
 ‘ must be attended at last with sudden ruin. If it be  
 ‘ the interest of a great many to promote disorder, the  
 ‘ affairs of a country will proceed amiss, notwithstand-  
 ‘ ing all the endeavours of a wise and virtuous prince,  
 ‘ and a good senate. Therefore, to mend things  
 ‘ rightly, the whole people must be mended. To  
 ‘ bring this about, in all likelihood, the best ways are  
 ‘ by precepts and examples to inspire as many as  
 ‘ possible

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<sup>a</sup> CATO’S *LETT.* III. 280.



‘ possible with a true zeal and affection to their native  
‘ country; to cultivate in the minds of the common  
‘ people, a due reverence to religion; to advance  
‘ morality among the better sort; to give all men in  
‘ general, an honest interest; and to make virtue and  
‘ merit the only road to greatness and preferment.  
‘ It may perhaps be beneficial and safe in a tyranny,  
‘ to let all things loose, and deprave the manners of the  
‘ people; for the light is thereby extinguished, that  
‘ would otherwise be troublesome and too discerning;  
‘ but it is not so with lawful governments, where the  
‘ prince and people compose one body; since if the  
‘ inferior members are there infected, the disease will  
‘ produce such unwholesome fumes and vapours, as  
‘ may reach and hurt the head at last. After a country  
‘ has been long afflicted with calamities occasioned by  
‘ foreign or civil wars, the minds of the people will take  
‘ different turns, sometimes to great piety, and at other  
‘ seasons to the height of vice. The *Romans*, after the  
‘ *Gauls* had sacked and burnt *Rome*, were presently  
‘ kindled with new devotion. They revived their an-  
‘ cient justice and discipline, they restored those old  
‘ and almost obsolete laws, that were the chief strength  
‘ of their constitution, and they reassumed their former  
‘ virtue. But after the civil wars in the times of  
‘ *Galba*, *Otho*, and *Vitellius*, they were not at all bet-  
‘ tered by their miseries, (which is the worst symptom  
‘ of a depraved people) and rather plunged deeper into  
‘ wickedness. For when *Vespasian’s* party seized the  
‘ city, there were in some streets rapine and murders,  
‘ and in others, feasting and prostitution; so that one  
‘ and the same town, gave the view of a raging war,  
‘ and a riotous peace. Wise lawgivers and directors  
‘ of a people, may make advantage of a favourable  
‘ crisis. As for example, when a long war is at an

‘ end, they may take that time to reform the vices of  
‘ the age ; for at such a season, when poverty is grown  
‘ upon them, men will probably be more willing to  
‘ listen after virtue, and those methods, by which their  
‘ condition is to be restored. Nothing prevails more  
‘ with the multitude, nor operates better towards their  
‘ amendment, than the example of the great ones ;  
‘ if such are seen to content themselves with moderate  
‘ power, wealth, and honours, it teaches those below  
‘ them to be temperate in their desires ; by which  
‘ means, faction may be quite rooted out, which in  
‘ most soils is but a weed that grows from the disap-  
‘ pointment of ambitious hopes ; and where faction  
‘ can be destroyed, government is rendered much more  
‘ easy to the rulers, and without doubt less expensive ;  
‘ for when that reigns, men expect to be highly  
‘ courted, and largely paid, for looking after their own  
‘ safety. Dishonesty has nothing in it so very charm-  
‘ ing, but that mankind might be persuaded to lay it  
‘ quite aside, at least in relation to the public, if they  
‘ could do their business in the world with other aids,  
‘ and by any other way. For why in the late reigns  
‘ did so many protestants help on the designs of  
‘ popery ?—Because it was the only means of obtain-  
‘ ing greatness and preferment. Why in former times  
‘ were we betrayed by some persons ?—Because the  
‘ court had made selling the peoples rights, a gainful  
‘ traffic. But if men could have mounted up to  
‘ wealth and honours by any other steps, if those who  
‘ were then at the helm, had employed and rewarded  
‘ such as they had seen zealous for the religion of  
‘ their country, jealous of its liberties, and careful of  
‘ its safety ; if general integrity had been taken notice  
‘ of, and called into the offices of the state, by degrees  
‘ the age would have mended of itself ; vice and folly  
‘ must

‘ must have withdrawn, and been out of countenance,  
‘ and virtue and good sense might perhaps, at last,  
‘ have gotten the upper hand. Any body of men that  
‘ have but one way to honours and advancement,  
‘ will take that course, though it be never so much out  
‘ of the road of honesty; and if there is but one place  
‘ where offices and dignities grow, and are gathered,  
‘ thither men will get, whatever it shall cost them.  
‘ Any faculty of the mind, whether for use or for  
‘ pleasure, which is in great vogue and estimation,  
‘ will be cultivated and improved; and men will bend  
‘ their whole study to excel, in what they see most  
‘ pleasing or most advantageous. It is the same thing  
‘ with vice and virtue, either of them thrive, as they  
‘ are encouraged or discountenanced. Bar but the  
‘ gate to vice, and men will desire to enter and ad-  
‘ vance themselves in the world by courage, prudence,  
‘ temperance, integrity, zeal for the public, magnani-  
‘ mity, and true wisdom; but if another mark be set  
‘ up, and all their aims directed thither, they will en-  
‘ deavour to rise and prosper as others have done, by  
‘ fraud, servile compliance, treachery, artifice, bribery,  
‘ tricks, and corrupted eloquence; and when a com-  
‘ monwealth is thus abandoned, even some of those in  
‘ good esteem are contented to come in, and take their  
‘ share of the plunder. In a free country, it is the  
‘ concern and interest of princes, that virtue should  
‘ be restored to her just value, and rightful dominion;  
‘ and that vice should for ever be deposed, and especi-  
‘ ally banished from the place in which are bred up  
‘ the men of action and counsel. When men quit  
‘ the paths of virtue, which lead to true wisdom, they  
‘ are presently bewildered in error; and ’till they get  
‘ again into the right road, and observe her dictates and  
‘ directions, nothing is to be expected but misery and

' confusion. When men leave honesty, wisdom for-  
 ' sakes them, and mixes no longer in their counsels ;  
 ' and the general immoralities of a people, embolden  
 ' weak and ill persons, to thrust themselves into the  
 ' administration of business, who, void of all skill and  
 ' art, cast the commonwealth upon rocks, where she is  
 ' like to split and perish ; and in such a country, un-  
 ' less there be an universal tendency in the whole, to  
 ' be guided by the principles of former honour, its  
 ' affairs must impair daily, till at last, in the course of  
 ' a few years, it shall be quite lost, and utterly extin-  
 ' guished. In a free country, if a few of the most  
 ' conspicuous persons, do but agree to lay to heart  
 ' the honour and safety of the public, they will go  
 ' very far towards its preservation, or at least keep off  
 ' the evil day for a while. For when fortune had un-  
 ' dertaken to destroy the commonwealth of *Rome*, the  
 ' single virtue of *Cato* held her long in play, and gave  
 ' her a great deal of opposition ; much more then, in  
 ' a nation where many yet remain untainted, may  
 ' these good patriots, if they will exert themselves,  
 ' preserve its constitution against the attempts of de-  
 ' signing men ; who are very far from having the  
 ' wealth of *Crassus*, the fame of *Pompey*, or *Cæsar's*  
 ' conduct, and who indeed resemble the subverters of  
 ' the *Roman* liberty in nothing, but the luxury and  
 ' rage of *Clodius*. When things go amiss in a state,  
 ' men are apt to blame the ministers ; though such  
 ' errors, (the corruption of the people considered) per-  
 ' haps were not to be avoided. For a country may  
 ' have been so depraved, in a long process of time,  
 ' that its affairs cannot suddenly be capable of a good  
 ' and sound administration. But if any corruptions  
 ' are crept into the subordinate parts of this govern-  
 ' ment,

‘ment, they will be undoubtedly corrected in times  
‘of peace and quiet.’

‘Nor could it be difficult for former princes to  
‘corrupt both the electors and the elected; for in most  
‘kingdoms, the court has been a shop with wares in  
‘it to fit all kinds of customers; there is hope for  
‘some, which feeds many at a small expence; there  
‘are titles for the ambitious; pleasures for the young  
‘and wanton; places for the busy; and bribes to  
‘be clearly conveyed for such as desire to maintain an  
‘appearance of honesty, and to betray their trust but  
‘now and then in important matters. With these  
‘baits and allurements, princes might easily draw into  
‘their net the unthinking gentry of the land, and  
‘thereby poison the fountain head of the laws, and sap  
‘the very foundations of the political constitution<sup>a</sup>.’

Let us hear, on this subject, Sir *Francis Dashwood*  
in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1745<sup>b</sup>.

‘That there is a difference, Sir, between our con-  
‘stitution and establishment, that under the latter the  
‘former may be destroyed, and consequently the people  
‘divested of their rights and privileges, no one can  
‘deny, who considers the fatal effects of corruption;  
‘nor can any man pretend, that the people are not  
‘sensible of this difference, if he reflects upon the  
‘instructions that have been given by the people in  
‘all parts of the united kingdom, to their represen-  
‘tatives in this house. That the danger to which  
‘our constitution may be exposed by the success of  
‘the present rebellion is more imminent, no man, I  
‘believe, will openly deny; but that the danger to  
‘which it may be exposed by the success of corruption  
‘is more certain, every man must grant, who is not

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‘biased.

<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* II. 57.<sup>b</sup> *Alm. DEB.* COM. II. 331.

‘ biased by the post or pension by which his head is con-  
‘ founded, though his heart may not perhaps be as yet  
‘ corrupted. Should the rebellion be crowned with  
‘ success, which I think we are in very little danger  
‘ of; our constitution may be preserved even by the  
‘ good sense of the pretender himself, if he has any,  
‘ because a constitutionally limited monarchy is more  
‘ secure, and consequently more eligible to a king of  
‘ good sense, than the most absolute one; but the singular  
‘ misfortune of corruption is, that a king may thereby  
‘ be rendered absolute, even without his designing or  
‘ knowing any thing of it, till it becomes impossible  
‘ for him to govern by any other means. Gentlemen  
‘ I see, Sir, are surprized at such a new and extra-  
‘ ordinary doctrine; but there is nothing more plain,  
‘ if we consider the nature of government, and the only  
‘ two methods by which it can be supported. No  
‘ man, I believe, ever supposed that a government can  
‘ be supported by a king or other supreme magistrate  
‘ by himself alone. He must have a majority, or at  
‘ least a great number of people, engaged with him to  
‘ support the government, and these men must be en-  
‘ gaged by the public interest, or each man by his own  
‘ private interest. The multitude, I shall grant, may  
‘ be kept in awe by their fears; but the most absolute,  
‘ the most arbitrary tyrant must have a number of men  
‘ engaged by their private interest sufficient to impress  
‘ that fear. One single man may, by his authority,  
‘ persuade a multitude; but a single man never can  
‘ frighten a multitude. Every government must there-  
‘ fore have a number of men for its support, and those  
‘ men must be kept engaged to do so by the public, or  
‘ by their private interest. When those who support the  
‘ government are engaged to do so by the public inte-  
‘ rest alone, or by that chiefly, it is a free government,  
‘ even

even though by its form it be supremely administered  
by one sole monarch. But when they who support  
the government are engaged to do so by their private  
interest alone, or by that chiefly, it is an absolute  
government, even though by its form it be supremely  
administered by a king, lords, and commons; and  
such a government can be supported no way but by  
corruption. If such a government be supremely ad-  
ministered by a sole monarch, he must have a merce-  
nary army for his support, and money enough to  
hire or corrupt them; and if such a government be  
by its form supremely administered by a king and  
parliament, he must have money enough to hire or  
corrupt his mercenary parliament, as well as his  
mercenary army. To apply this, Sir, to our con-  
stitution, and to shew that by corruption our king  
may, without his own knowledge, be rendered not  
only absolute, but unable to govern by any other  
means; it is very certain, that the freedom of our  
constitution consists in every man's being directed  
with respect to his voting both at elections, and in  
parliament, by the public interest alone, or by that  
chiefly: Whilst this continues to be the case, our  
constitution will be preserved, and we shall continue  
to be a free people. For this purpose, a public and  
disinterested spirit must be propagated and preserved  
among the people, and it will always be the king's  
interest to do so, because he can have no interest sepa-  
rate or distinct from that of his people. But ministers  
have often a private interest which is distinct from,  
and opposite to that of the people; and when any  
such man happens unfortunately to become the  
king's prime minister, he will make it his business to  
root out all public spirit, and to plant a selfish spirit  
in its stead. All the favours of the crown, and all the  
posts

posts and offices in the kingdom will be bestowed,  
not upon those who deserve them, or are qualified  
for them, but upon those that vote in parliament, or  
at elections according to his direction, and without  
any regard to the national interest. This a cunning  
minister may do without its being possible for the king  
to discover it; because the king can know the merits  
or qualifications but of a very few of his subjects. By  
such means, a selfish venal spirit may be introduced  
into parliament, and from thence propagated through  
the whole nation; and then if the king has but  
money enough, or lucrative places and offices enough  
at his disposal, which a corrupt parliament will always  
take care to provide for him, he becomes, without his  
designing it, as absolute as if he had no parliament at  
all, and may act in a more oppressive manner than  
any sole monarch can venture to do, because he has  
the sanction of parliament for every thing he does,  
and has the principal families in the kingdom en-  
gaged to justify his measures. Thus, Sir, our king  
may be made absolute without his having ever  
entertained any design against our liberties; and the  
poison being once thoroughly diffused, which it may  
by such a minister's continuing long at the head of  
the administration, it will then be impossible for the  
king to support his government without corruption;  
for when the public interest is considered by no man,  
or but by a very few, when the whole or a great  
majority of the people are actuated by nothing but  
selfish mercenary views, can the king expect to have  
his government supported by a majority in parlia-  
ment, let his measures be never so much calculated  
for the public good, unless he makes it their private  
interest to do so? While he can do this, he may  
expect to reign absolute, and yet according to law;  
but



but the moment he ceases to do this, or ceases being able to do it, he must either put an end to parliaments, or the parliament will put an end to his reign; for all those who find they cannot make their market of him will join against him, in hopes of making a better market of his successor. I must therefore think, Sir, we cannot do a better service to our sovereign, than by passing such laws as are necessary for putting a stop to the progress of corruption, and reviving a public and disinterested spirit among the people; and as the people have loudly called for some such laws being passed, we cannot take a more proper opportunity for introducing them, because it will confirm and strengthen that spirit which now appears among the people without doors in favour of our present establishment, and will make them more ready to venture their lives in support of the government, should any future success of the rebels, or the landing of any foreign troops, make it necessary for us to call for the assistance of their hands as well as their purses. What our ministers may think, Sir, I do not know, having little or no correspondence with any of them; but as they enjoy the greatest advantages under our present government, and as the people have so generally shewn themselves zealous for supporting that government, under which they in particular enjoy so many advantages, I am sure every other man thinks they are in gratitude bound to give satisfaction to the people with regard to those laws which they think so necessary for securing their liberties against the fatal effects of corruption. Therefore I do expect in this session to see a very extraordinary change in the conduct of our ministers. Though in former sessions they have opposed every such law, yet now I hope they will

them-

• themselves be the introducers and the promoters of  
• every one of those laws which the people have so long  
• called for in vain; and if I should have the pleasure of  
• seeing such a change in their conduct, I make no  
• doubt of having the pleasure to see every one of  
• those bills passed into laws, without any opposition in  
• either house of parliament. These, Sir, are the  
• hopes I conceive from that spirit which has appeared  
• among the people for supporting our present most  
• excellent government, and our present most wise  
• administration. This is the return of grati-  
• tude I expect from our ministers, who have always  
• shewn themselves most grateful to those who have  
• served them in this house or at elections; and I hope  
• they will not be less grateful to those who have shewn  
• themselves ready to serve their king and country at a  
• time of such imminent danger. This return, I am sure  
• the people expect; and I think we should take this  
• first opportunity to give them some hopes of their  
• not meeting with a disappointment. As we do not  
• know how soon the rebels may enter *England*, as we  
• do not know how soon an army of foreign troops  
• may be landed amongst us, we ought not in prudence  
• to let slip this first opportunity of convincing the  
• people, that there is nothing they can desire for  
• securing their liberties, but what they may expect  
• from this government, and from this session of parlia-  
• ment. For this reason, Sir, I think it necessary to add  
• something to our address on this occasion. Therefore  
• I have prepared an additional paragraph; and I must  
• humbly move, that it may be added to what the  
• honourable gentleman has been pleased to propose.  
• The additional paragraph I have prepared is in these  
• words. “ And in order to the firmer establishment of  
• his majesty’s throne on the solid and truly glorious  
• basis

‘ basis of his people’s affections, it shall be our zealous  
 ‘ and speedy care to frame such bills, as, if passed into  
 ‘ laws, may prove most effectual for securing to his  
 ‘ majesty’s faithful subjects the perpetual enjoyment of  
 ‘ their undoubted right to be freely and fairly repre-  
 ‘ sented in parliaments frequently chosen and exempted  
 ‘ from undue influence of every kind. For easing their  
 ‘ minds in time to come of the apprehension they might  
 ‘ entertain of seeing abuses in offices rendered per-  
 ‘ petual without the seasonable interposition of parlia-  
 ‘ ment to reform them, and for raising in every true  
 ‘ lover of his king and country the pleasing hopes of  
 ‘ beholding these realms once more restored to that  
 ‘ happy and flourishing state, which may reflect the  
 ‘ highest honour on his majesty’s reign, and cause  
 ‘ posterity to look back with veneration and gratitude  
 ‘ on the source of their national felicity.”

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## C H A P. VII.

*The common Apologies for Corruption, as a supposed  
 necessary Engine of Government, shewn to be  
 false.*

**L**ORD *Walpole*, in his speech, *A. D.* 1739,  
 labours to shew, that ‘ the sovereign’s power  
 ‘ of rewarding merit is one of the most fundamental  
 ‘ and most useful parts of our constitution:’ [so a  
 learned bishop tells us, in his *Alliance between Church  
 and State*, that an established provision for the clergy  
 is the very foundation-stone of a church. I like those  
 honest men, who fairly own, that money is their great  
 object.] ‘ There are many sorts of public services’

(says lord *Walpole*) ‘ which cannot be immediately  
 ‘ explained, which it would be inconsistent with the  
 ‘ public good to divulge; and yet, if this bill [the  
 pension bill] ‘ should pass into a law, his majesty  
 ‘ could reward no services in any member of the other  
 ‘ house without explaining and divulging these services;  
 ‘ nay, and putting it in the power of that house to  
 ‘ judge, whether these services deserved such a reward,  
 ‘ which might occasion disputes between that house  
 ‘ and the crown, and would certainly discourage every  
 ‘ member of that house from rendering any secret  
 ‘ services to the public.’ [The *Dutch* carry on their  
 government very successfully without this waste of  
 the public money to reward secret services.] ‘ This,  
 ‘ my lords, would be a great prejudice to our civil  
 ‘ government; and the frequent oaths that are to be  
 ‘ introduced by this bill would be of the most dan-  
 ‘ gerous consequence, not only to our established  
 ‘ religion, but even to natural religion itself. In our  
 ‘ antient polity, both religious and civil, it was a  
 ‘ wise maxim, never to oblige or allow a man to  
 ‘ swear in any case where self-interest was concerned,  
 ‘ especially when the circumstances of the case were  
 ‘ such as made it impossible to convict him of perjury,  
 ‘ even though he should be guilty of it; but this  
 ‘ maxim seems to be quite overturned by this bill,  
 ‘ and, therefore, I am convinced it will introduce  
 ‘ amongst us an utter contempt of perjury, which is  
 ‘ always followed by an utter contempt of religion<sup>a</sup>.’

But will the unrestrained practice of speculation, with-  
 out oaths, be found consistent with religion and mora-  
 lity? Government, we know, never hesitates about  
 exposing the merchant, tradesman, manufacturer, or  
 ship-

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 374.

shipmaster to the danger of perjury for the sake of the revenue.

Some of the tools of power insisted in Mr. *Gordon's* time, *A. D.* 1722, as he tells us <sup>a</sup>, that ' matters are  
' come to that pass that we must either receive the pre-  
' tender, or keep him out with bribes and standing  
' armies. That the nation is so corrupt, that there  
' is no governing it by any other means. And, in  
' short, that we must submit to this great evil, to pre-  
' vent a greater; as if any mischief could be more  
' terrible than the highest and most terrible of all  
' mischiefs, universal corruption and a military govern-  
' ment. It is indeed impossible for the subtilty of  
' traitors, the malice of devils, or the cunning and  
' cruelty of our most implacable enemies, to suggest  
' stronger motives for the undermining and overthrow  
' of our excellent establishment, which is built upon  
' the destruction of tyranny, and can stand upon no  
' other bottom. It is madness in extremity, to hope  
' that a government founded upon liberty, and the  
' free choice of the assertors of it, can be supported  
' by other principles; and whoever would maintain  
' it by contrary ones, intends to blow it up, let him  
' alledge what he will. This gives me every day  
' new reasons to believe what I have long suspected;  
' for if ever a question should arise, Whether a nation  
' shall submit to certain ruin, or struggle for a re-  
' medy? these gentlemen well know which side they  
' will chuse, and certainly intend that which they  
' must chuse. I am willing to think, that those im-  
' potent babblers speak not the sense of their superiors,  
' but would make servile court to them from topics  
' which they abhor. Their superiors must know, that it  
' is

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<sup>a</sup> TRACTS, I. 335.

‘ is raving and phrenzy to affirm, that a free people  
‘ can be long governed by impotent terrors, that  
‘ millions will consent to be ruined by the corrup-  
‘ tion of a few; or that those few will join in their  
‘ ruin any longer than the corruption lasts. That  
‘ every day new and greater demands will rise upon  
‘ the corruptors; that no revenue, how great soever,  
‘ will feed the voraciousness of the corrupted; and  
‘ that every disappointment will make them turn upon  
‘ the oppressors of their country, and fall into its true  
‘ interest and their own. That there is no way in  
‘ nature to preserve a revolution in government but mak-  
‘ ing the people easy under it, and shewing them their  
‘ interest in it; and that corruption, bribery, and ter-  
‘ rors will make no lasting friends, but infinite and  
‘ implacable enemies; and that the best security of a  
‘ prince amongst free people, is the affections of his  
‘ people, which he can always gain by making their  
‘ interest his own, and by shewing that all his views  
‘ tend to their good. They will then, as they love  
‘ themselves, love him, and defend him who defends  
‘ them. Upon this faithful basis, his safety will be  
‘ better established, than upon the ambitious and  
‘ variable leaders of a few legions, who may be cor-  
‘ rupted, disobliged, or surprized, and often have been  
‘ so; and hence great revolutions have been brought  
‘ about, and great nations undone, only by the  
‘ revolt of single regiments. Shew a nation their  
‘ interest, and they will certainly fall into it. A  
‘ whole people can have no ambition but to be go-  
‘ verned justly, and when they are so, the intrigues  
‘ and dissatisfactions of particulars will fall upon their  
‘ own heads. What has any of our former courts  
‘ ever got by corruption, but to disaffect the people,  
‘ and weaken themselves? Let us now think of other  
‘ methods,

‘ methods, if it is only for the sake of the experi-  
 ‘ ment. The ways of corruption have been tried long  
 ‘ enough in past administrations. Let us try, in this,  
 ‘ what public honesty will do, and not condemn it,  
 ‘ before we have fully proved it, and found it ineffec-  
 ‘ tual; and it will be time enough to try other methods  
 ‘ when this fails.’

‘ That all-beholding eye which controuls the uni-  
 ‘ verse, pierces through all disguises, and perceives,  
 ‘ that the diffusion of vice through this nation is  
 ‘ derived from one source, the corruption of the  
 ‘ great; which, promoted by the most assiduous arts,  
 ‘ and vindicated by venal eloquence, has, at length,  
 ‘ absorbed all regard for the community into the two  
 ‘ selfish passions of ambition and avarice. And when  
 ‘ the most vigorous effort [by a place-bill] was made  
 ‘ to purge that place [the house of commons] which  
 ‘ once cleansed, would have transfused its own purity  
 ‘ through all orders and degrees of men, did not the  
 ‘ flagitious opposition to that attempt, so essential to  
 ‘ the very being of virtue, and solicited by the earnest  
 ‘ and universal cry of the whole people, produce  
 ‘ an instance of supererogatory prostitution, which  
 ‘ drew wonder from a minister? For want of this  
 ‘ barrier to confine corruption, honesty has been put  
 ‘ up to public sale, and found its price, to the cost of  
 ‘ a nation twice betrayed; hence a loose has been  
 ‘ given to public profusion, and rapine, unchecked,  
 ‘ and unchastised; and the illicit gains have been as  
 ‘ profusely squandered by individuals, in luxury, sen-  
 ‘ suality, and every unmanly gratification; and hence  
 ‘ the means of obtaining these ignominious emolu-  
 ‘ ments have been purchased by involving the nation  
 ‘ in perjury, treachery, and a general dissolution of  
 ‘ manners.’

Only able men are equal to the weight of just government. Every blockhead is capable of the scheme of government we have seen carried on in this country (not in the present incorrupt times) because every blockhead can pay a set of hirelings, while he can find the assets. To make straight what is crooked, to level mountains and raise vallies, to redress what is wrong, is matter of labour, as well as of genius, and ministers love ease better than toil, and the card-table and bottle of *Burgundy* better than reading and thinking. Then they cry out, You must not expect that statesmen should make themselves gally-slaves. Thus even laziness is dragged in as an apology for corruption. And then they pay on and drudge on in the beaten track, and all is well so long as they can hold their places; for their pockets are growing fuller and fuller every day. But the excellent *Davenant* shews this manner of reckoning to be fallacious, and that statesmen could not make such conclusions, if their calculations were just.

‘ What great hazard is there for a minister to con-  
 ‘ tend with the intrigues of here and there a courtier,  
 ‘ discontented because his immoderate hopes of getting  
 ‘ are not gratified? Or to suffer the obloquies of  
 ‘ a devouring crew, who may, perhaps, be angry  
 ‘ because the public is no longer exposed to be their  
 ‘ prey, and that they cannot make their wonted gains  
 ‘ by the high interest of money, large premiums, and  
 ‘ by discounting tallies? Is it not much more safe and  
 ‘ easy to bear all this, than to have an army mutinous  
 ‘ for want of pay, seamen clamorous for their wages,  
 ‘ the family officers grumbling for the want of their  
 ‘ arrears, and at the same time, the whole people  
 ‘ groaning under the weight of heavy taxes? All  
 ‘ which



‘ which are the sad effects of negligence and profusion in a court <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ It is true, an honest and wise minister, who observes this conduct, and is more frugal for the public than in his own private affairs, cannot avoid raising many enemies. In a bad age it is a virtue not without its dangers. They who have been so long fed with corruption, that their stomachs can digest no other diet, will dislike such measures; and a man treading these steps must arm himself with patience, for his temper must be often tried. They who would steal the golden apples, will hate the watchful eyes that are upon them; and he who undertakes this post, is to expect that secret malice will be working in the dark to undermine him: Perhaps he may be pursued by the most interested part of mankind with open clamours. Advantages will be taken of the least trip he makes. He must look for traverses, to be traduced, and to have his actions scanned and misinterpreted. However, let him persevere, for if a state be not quite devoted to ruin, he who acts thus uprightly for it, and with such care, will overcome all difficulties; and the wisdom and justice of his counsels will, at last, meet with universal approbation <sup>b</sup>.’

‘ When such as have this post are vigilant and frugal for the public, those in lower stations think it needful to tread in the same steps. When they who sit at helm have clean hands themselves, they can compel those below them to be honest; and hope of reward, or fear of punishment, working more than sense of duty, men begin to find it their interest to quit the ill courses they were in, especially when

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‘ they

<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* iv. 426.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 425.

' they see they have not the corruption of those above  
 ' them to resort to as a refuge. Thus great examples  
 ' from chief ministers may, by degrees, restore the  
 ' affairs of a whole kingdom. Besides, their vigi-  
 ' lance and frugality give such credit, and add such  
 ' real strength to any state, that they who rule it will  
 ' soon be able to reform abuses. On the other hand,  
 ' where there is a corrupt, negligent, and profuse  
 ' administration, does any thing go right? Is not the  
 ' bad influence of it felt from top to bottom? Who  
 ' is there that thinks it worth his while to serve well?  
 ' When the public is exposed to plunder, does not  
 ' almost every man forget the duties of his office, and  
 ' employ his whole thoughts in contriving how he  
 ' may have as large a share of the booty as any of his  
 ' fellow robbers? And do not the great thieves pro-  
 ' tect the less? In a state so disordered, what is there  
 ' to induce men to discharge their duty, but some-  
 ' times honour<sup>a</sup>?'

' In the year 1711, when the Tories were endea-  
 ' vouring to overturn the Whig administration, which  
 ' had reduced the power of *France* so low, and were  
 ' projecting the infamous treaty of *Utrecht*, *Burnet* says,  
 ' They finding the house of lords could not be brought  
 ' to favour their designs, resolved to make an expe-  
 ' riment, which none of our princes ventured upon  
 ' in former times; a resolution was taken of making  
 ' twelve peers at once. What has been the conduct  
 ' of the minister under similar circumstances? has  
 ' he not advised the creation of sixteen new  
 ' peerages, not, indeed, at once; that would have  
 ' been too explicit a declaration of his motives, but  
 ' all in the space of two years; and not content with  
 ' this,

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* IV. 423.

‘ this, he has likewise advised the giving pensions to  
 ‘ a great number of that house, under the denomina-  
 ‘ tion, indeed, of lords of the bed-chamber; but as  
 ‘ the number of these lords has been increased in the  
 ‘ present reign from twelve to twenty-two, the fact is,  
 ‘ that by whatever name they are called, the king has  
 ‘ so many more servants in his pay in that house, and  
 ‘ the m—— has the rod of deprivation hanging  
 ‘ over their heads, which has lately fallen most heavily  
 ‘ upon those who have presumed to exercise their free-  
 ‘ dom of voting against what he recommended. But  
 ‘ in the other house, and where it is more mate-  
 ‘ rial, this measure has been carried much farther.  
 ‘ We are informed by history, that from the time of  
 ‘ the revolution, it has been the characteristic mark  
 ‘ of those who opposed any increase of power in the  
 ‘ crown, to contrive by-laws, and every other method,  
 ‘ to prevent the influence of the crown in that house.  
 ‘ Several acts of parliament have been passed to limit  
 ‘ the number of officers who received their places  
 ‘ from the crown, to have seats in the house of com-  
 ‘ mons, and one particularly during the whig admi-  
 ‘ nistration of queen *Anne*, which declares that no  
 ‘ person possessed of an office, created after such a  
 ‘ period, should be capable of a seat in that house;  
 ‘ and this was afterwards enforced by another of *1 Geo.*  
 ‘ *I.* which was proposed by Mr. *Stanhope*, secretary  
 ‘ of state, and restrained persons having pensions dur-  
 ‘ ing pleasure, from sitting in the house of commons.  
 ‘ These laws were passed to be a restraint on the  
 ‘ crown, they are now in force, and mean to provide  
 ‘ for the liberty of the people, by preventing the  
 ‘ crown from creating a dependance upon it in the  
 ‘ representatives: but, like other human institutions,  
 ‘ they have been evaded; when a minister shall pre-

'sume to advise, in the teeth of those acts of par-  
 'liament, the creation of such a number of grooms  
 'of the bed-chamber, clerks of the green cloth, and  
 'other officers of the household, each with a salary of  
 '500*l. per annum*, as to be double the number of  
 'these of his late majesty; and when some gentle-  
 'men have been removed from these employments  
 'with pensions, to make room for members of the  
 'house of commons, that the law might be only  
 'evaded, not openly violated; and when we see  
 'gentlemen of the first fortunes, and who have the  
 'two last reigns prided themselves in their indepen-  
 'dency, eagerly and meanly thrusting themselves into  
 'this pitiful pension; I say, when we consider these  
 'things, where is the security of laws, or upon what  
 'principles of the constitution can these measures be  
 'defended? The reason, I understand, the minister  
 'gives for pursuing this measure, is the union of  
 'parties; the larger the source of bounty in the  
 'crown, the more general will be its dues. This  
 'may be plausible reasoning, but the fact is, and of  
 'this I confess myself jealous, that by these pensions,  
 'the crown has increased its influence in the house  
 'of commons; and with regard to the act of queen  
 '*Anne*, if a list of new erected places should, as was  
 'done the beginning of the late reign, be ordered to  
 'be laid upon the table of the house of commons,  
 'I cannot see but that those of the supernumerary  
 'offices of the household must be of the number;  
 'otherwise the crown may, in any future emergency,  
 'create as many as shall then be found necessary to  
 'answer the purposes of the minister <sup>a</sup>.'

There

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<sup>a</sup> CATO'S LETT. I. 51.

There arises infinite mischief from the ambition of particulars. But what ambition? The ambition of shining in the eyes of men of discernment? Of excelling in knowledge, or in virtue? Of being blessings to their country, and tutelar gods to mankind? Nothing less. Their ambition is only to get into *ranks* and *places*, which are distinguished; not to be men of distinguished *characters* in those ranks and places. They have not the sense to consider, that the cringing of the multitude is not to the *man*, but to the *star* and *garter*, the long wig, or the lacquered chair.

Compare a true great man, with a mean man in a great place, an *Epaminondas* with an *Alexander*, a *Scipio* with a *Cæsar*, a *Trajan* with a *Ch. V.* the effect will be the same, as that of placing an oriental diamond by a *Bristol* stone.

‘When vanity, luxury, and prodigality are in fashion, the desire of riches must necessarily increase in proportion to them: and when the power is in the hands of base, mercenary persons, they will always (to use the courtiers phrase) make as much profit of their places as they can. Not only matters of favour, but of justice too, will be exposed to sale; and no way will be open to honours or magistracies, but paying largely for them. He that gets an office by these means, will not execute it gratis: he thinks he may sell what he has bought, and would not have entered by corrupt ways, if he had not intended to deal corruptly <sup>a</sup>.’

‘However we shall venture to affirm, that if this nation should ever be under any great disorder, the truest course to mend it, will be to plant in the

‘ minds of the better sorts morality, and the shame of  
 ‘ doing ill to their country; and we shall presume to  
 ‘ assert, that observing the rules and dictates of virtue,  
 ‘ does not only lead to heaven and a blessed state here-  
 ‘ after, but it is the best way of securing to a people  
 ‘ in general, prosperity, peace, safety, and happiness,  
 ‘ in this present world <sup>a</sup>.’

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## C H A P, VII.

*Bills, Statutes, Resolutions, Speeches, &c. shew-  
ing the Sense of Mankind on the Evil of Place-  
men and Pensioners in Parliament.*

‘ **T**HE general principle, says the author of the  
 ‘ **D**ISSERTATION UPON PARTIES, p. 198.  
 ‘ That parliaments ought to be independent on the  
 ‘ crown, hath not only been always the same, but it  
 ‘ hath been always so declared in the most authentic  
 ‘ and solemn manner; and parliaments have not been  
 ‘ more intent on any national concern whatever, than  
 ‘ on maintaining this principle, and securing the ef-  
 ‘ fects of it. I say, parliaments have been constantly  
 ‘ thus intent, and especially in the best times, during  
 ‘ more than three centuries at least; for I would not  
 ‘ go back too far, nor grope unnecessarily in the dark.  
 ‘ What else did those laws mean, that were made in  
 ‘ the time of the *Lancaster* kings to regulate the elec-  
 ‘ tions, and to prevent the influence, which *Rich. II.*  
 ‘ had illegally and arbitrarily employed, and which  
 ‘ there was room to fear that other princes might  
 ‘ employ? What else do all those resolutions, all those  
 ‘ acts of parliament mean, that have been made so  
 ‘ often,

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven. II. 321.*

‘often, and enforced so strongly from time to time,  
 ‘and from those days to these, against the influence of  
 ‘the crown, either on the elections, or on the mem-  
 ‘bers of parliament?’

‘There is another question which I must ask.  
 ‘If this be so, what do these men mean, who are em-  
 ‘ployed, or rather what does he mean’ [*Walpole*] ‘who  
 ‘employs them, to plead in all places and on all  
 ‘occasions, even the most solemn, in favour of this  
 ‘very influence, nay of the very worst sort of it; of  
 ‘that influence which is created immediately by cor-  
 ‘ruption; for to that their arguments reach, by unde-  
 ‘niable consequence. Reason is against him and  
 ‘them, since it is a plain absurdity to suppose a  
 ‘controul on the crown, (and they have not yet ven-  
 ‘tured to suppose the contrary that I know of) and to  
 ‘establish at the same time a power and even a right  
 ‘in the crown to render this controul useless. Expe-  
 ‘rience is against them, since the examples of other  
 ‘countries, and at some times (former times I mean)  
 ‘of our own, have proved that a prince may govern  
 ‘according to his arbitrary will, or that of his mere  
 ‘arbitrary minister, as absolutely, and much more  
 ‘securely *with*, than *without* the concurrence of a  
 ‘parliament. Authority, even the uniform authority  
 ‘of our whole legislature is against them. The voice  
 ‘of our law gives them the lye. How then shall we  
 ‘account for this proceeding; this open and despe-  
 ‘rate attack upon our constitution, and therefore upon  
 ‘our liberty? Have these great men made any nice  
 ‘discovery that escaped the sagacity of our ancestors,  
 ‘and is above the narrow conceptions of all other  
 ‘men except themselves at this time? Is it less fit  
 ‘now, than the wisdom of this nation hath judged it  
 ‘to be for so many ages, that kings should govern

‘ under the constitutional *controul* of two other estates <sup>a</sup>?’

The XXXIst article of *Magna Charta* restrains the king’s officers from holding pleas of the crown. *Nullus vicecomes, constabularius, &c.* <sup>b</sup>

So early as *A. D.* 1375, the commons were sensible of the necessity of a place-bill. For in that year, they petitioned the king, that no member for county, or city, be a collector of taxes <sup>c</sup>.

The sense of our ancestors on pluralities, and incompatible places, appears by an act made, *A. D.* 1413, That no under-sheriff, sheriff’s clerk, receiver, or bailiff, be attorney in the king’s courts, while in any of those offices. At the same time was passed an act to prevent frauds in elections <sup>d</sup>.

In the parliament of *A. D.* 1451, it was provided, that no member should be a commissioner or collector <sup>e</sup>.

‘ We know,’ (says the brave *Fletcher* of *Scotland*)  
 ‘ that the customs have been taken from the farmers  
 [the customs were then farmed in *Britain* as now in  
*France*] ‘ only to bestow the collectors places upon  
 ‘ parliament men [ in *Scotland.*] Shall we make good  
 ‘ such funds as are exhausted by bribing men to betray  
 ‘ our liberty? If any justice were to be found in this  
 ‘ nation, the advisers of such measures had long ago  
 ‘ been brought to a scaffold. There is no crime under  
 ‘ heaven more enormous, more treacherous, and more  
 ‘ destructive to the very nature of our government,  
 ‘ than

<sup>a</sup> DISSERTATION ON PARTIES, 198.

<sup>b</sup> *Brady*, II. Append. p. 154.

<sup>c</sup> PARL. HIST. I. 337.

<sup>d</sup> *Rapin*, I. 505.

<sup>e</sup> PARL. HIST. II. 278.



‘ than that of bribing parliament<sup>a</sup>.’ What would this staunch old *Scot* have said, if he had seen some hundreds of notorious placemen sitting in the *British* senate, and voting 600,000*l.* at once out of the pockets of the poor people, to make good deficiencies in the civil list, exhausted by \* \* *hiatus* \* \* ?

On occasion of the king’s attorney being elected a member, *A. D.* 1614, Sir *Roger Owen* said, No attorney had ever been chosen, nor antiently any privy counsellor, nor any who took livery of the king. That, 7 *Rich.* II. a knight banneret was put out of the house. Sir *Thomas More*, who had been himself chancellor, and speaker, says, ‘ The eye of a courtier ‘ can endure no colour, but one; the king’s livery ‘ dazzling his sight.’ He compares them to clouds gilded by the sun’s rays, and to brass coin, which the king’s stamp makes current. After searching of precedents, it was resolved, That *Noy* should sit the remainder of the parliament; but no attorney-general after him<sup>b</sup>.

Pensioning was got to such a height, *A. D.* 1618, that an order was obtained from the king to the officers of the exchequer to pay no pension that he shall grant for the future<sup>c</sup>.

Even the king-killing parliament (*Que Dieu m’en conserve*, the *French* say, when they are frightened, *et la sainte Vierge*) proposed that no person serving for wages be a voter. How absurd then that members themselves be servants receiving wages of those whose interest it is to plunder and enslave their fellow subjects. They likewise exclude all members of councils  
of

<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher*, p. 357.

<sup>b</sup> *PARL. HIST.* v. 295.

<sup>c</sup> *ACT. REG.* iv. 305.

of state, officers in army or garrison, treasurers, or receivers of public money, and lawyers, ‘to the end all officers of state may be certainly accountable, and no factious men to maintain corrupt interests.’ They likewise propose very good regulations for carrying on elections, and restrain their proposed parliament from several things, as impressing men for foreign service, making void public securities, punishing arbitrarily without authority of law, men before the offence; giving up or taking away any of the common rights of the people<sup>a</sup>.

*A. D.* 1643, an attempt toward a place-bill was made. There was no great want of it in those days, the court having few places to dispose of. Yet *Cb. I.* tells his *Oxford* parliament, that most of them were in his service. This probably gave rise to the self-denying ordinance<sup>b</sup>.

The self-denying ordinance, *A. D.* 1645, was a signal exhibition, and *instar omnium*, of the sense of parliament, on this subject. It enacts by the authority of lords and commons, that all members of both houses be at the end of 40 days discharged from holding any place, civil or military, granted by parliament since *Nov.* 1640. All other officers, commanders, &c. to continue as before. The benefit of all offices, neither military nor judicial, hereafter to be granted by parliament, to go to such public use as parliament shall appoint, leaving to the persons holding such offices only such a competent salary as parliament shall appoint. Some places and offices are excepted<sup>c</sup>. But *Mr. Prynne* severely accuses the members of violating the self-denying ordinance. ‘There is scarce one  
‘ day,

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XVIII. 526, 527.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. XII. 463.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. XIII. 443.

‘ day, says he, or week at least, doth pass, but we are  
 ‘ still bestowing some place or office upon members,  
 ‘ for which we are censured in pamphlets,’ &c. <sup>a</sup>

‘ What do the enemy say? Nay, what do many say  
 ‘ who were friends at the beginning of this parlia-  
 ‘ ment? Even this, that the members of both houses  
 ‘ have got great places and commands, and the sword  
 ‘ into their hands. What by interest in parliament,  
 ‘ what by power in the army, they will perpetually  
 ‘ continue themselves in grandeur, and not permit the  
 ‘ war speedily to end, lest their own power should  
 ‘ determine with it.’ The words of *Cromwel* on the  
 self-denying ordinance <sup>b</sup>. The self-denying ordinance  
 passes the commons, is rejected by the lords, sent  
 again to the lords, and passed by them after four  
 months <sup>c</sup>; which, says *Whitelock*, began the fatal dif-  
 ference between the two houses, which ended in cutting  
 off the lords from parliament. Shameful that the lords  
 with their great estates should be more greedy than the  
 commons.

‘ Parliaments were thought by the known laws of  
 ‘ our nation to advise and regulate unruly kings <sup>d</sup>.’  
 [Not then surely to hold places under kings.]

Leave was given, *A. D.* 1679, to bring in a bill for  
 vacating the seat of members, accepting places <sup>e</sup>.

The commons concluded the year 1680 with a vote  
 worthy to be inscribed in letters of gold on the most  
 conspicuous place in *St. Stephen's* chapel; That no  
 member of the house should accept of any office or  
 place of profit from the crown, without leave of the  
 house, nor promise of any such office, or place of  
 profit,

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XVIII. 322.

<sup>b</sup> *Rapin*, II. 513.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* II. 516.

<sup>d</sup> *Milt. EIK.* 22.

<sup>e</sup> *DEB. COM.* I. 348.

profit, during such time as he continued a member of the house<sup>a</sup>.

Against pensioners in parliament, *A. D.* 1681, an anonymous speaker argues as follows.

‘ The name of a pensioner is distasteful to every *English* spirit; and all pensioners, I think, are sufficiently despised by their countrymen<sup>b</sup>.’ He expatiates on a pensioner’s breach of trust; his pocketing what is given by the people for the necessary charges of government. He observes, that receiving a pension is plundering the people, and distressing the king, and putting him and his ministry on wicked shifts, to satisfy a set of blood-suckers, which is endless; for the more the court gives, the more it must go on to give. That it naturally leads a king to think hardly of the most faithful counsellors, and incorrupt parliaments, who restrain the boundless waste of the public money. That it lays us open to our enemies abroad by exhausting our treasure, which should arm us against them, and disables us for paying our heavy debts. He observes, that the pensioners of the pension-parliament called themselves the king’s friends, and so they do now. That endeavours were used, but ineffectually, about 10 *Rich. II.* to get a corrupt parliament<sup>c</sup>. That there was another unsuccessful attempt about *A. D.* 1459, or 60. That about 20 *Hen. VIII.* many of the king’s dependents were in the house. But it does not appear that any parliament generally took money to vote, till the pension parliament, under *Ch. II.* [Every mischief must originate from a *Stuart.*] That parliament ‘perverted the very end of parliaments,

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<sup>a</sup> *Rapin*, II. 719.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* II. 148.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 150.

‘ments, which have been and are the great refuge of  
 ‘the nation, which cure all its diseases, and heal all  
 ‘its fores. But those men’ [the pension-parliament]  
 ‘had made it a snare to the nation, and at best had  
 ‘brought it to be a mere engine to get money.’ Every  
 parliament which allows this evil practice is partaker  
 of this sin<sup>a</sup>. He proposes that the pensioners be  
 obliged to confess their fault on their knees, before  
 the house of commons, one by one, and that they refund.  
 ‘Our law, says he, does not allow a thief to keep what  
 ‘he has gotten by stealth, but of course orders resti-  
 ‘tution. And shall these proud robbers of the nation  
 ‘not restore their ill gotten goods?’ He then proposes  
 that every one of them be voted incapable of sitting  
 in parliament, or holding any office, civil or military;  
 ‘For it is not fit, that they who were so false and  
 ‘unjust in that trust, should ever be trusted again<sup>b</sup>.’  
 He says there ought to be a ‘sufficient mark of in-  
 ‘famy set on them, that the people may know who  
 ‘has bought and sold them.’

A debate in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1689,  
 about excluding placemen from thence, proved warm  
 and obstinate. Carried for the placemen, because  
 ‘otherwise the fittest persons for public employments  
 ‘would remain excluded, and be deprived of the op-  
 ‘portunity of serving either king or country<sup>c</sup>.’

Some lords protest, *A. D.* 1693, against the speaker  
 of the commons being allowed to sit, though he had  
 taken a place, because the speaker, if corrupt, could  
 do more mischief than a private member<sup>d</sup>.

A bill

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. I. 151.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

<sup>c</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 116.

<sup>d</sup> DEB. LORDS, I. 422.

A bill was sent from the commons, *A. D.* 1693, for incapacitating several persons holding places civil and military from sitting in the house of commons. The court lords oppose it vehemently. The earl of *Mulgrave* spoke for it. It appears by the speech, that the act was not then made which vacates the seat of a placeman, and obliges him to be re-elected. The courtiers brought, instead of this, a bill for the frequent meeting of parliaments. But *William* having no mind to part with the present during the war, refused his assent, though passed by both houses <sup>a</sup>.

A bill was brought in, *A. D.* 1690, to enable commissioners to take an account of all public monies, to be nominated by the commons, and might be members; but none to be dependant on, or accountable to the king or queen. To be chosen by ballot. Every member to put into a glass a list of the nine gentlemen he judged the fittest. *Sir Samuel Barnardiston* being chosen, owned, that he was one of the accountants to their majesties; on which another was put in his room. Some time afterwards, however, a new set of commissioners being to be chosen, *Sir Samuel* was one. Whether he kept his accountant's place at the same time, does not appear <sup>b</sup>.

One of the heads of the bill of succession, made in king *William's* time, was, That no placeman or pensioner under the king shall be a member of the house of commons.

Resolved, *A. D.* 1699, That no person be a trustee for the forfeited *Irish* estates, who has any place of profit

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, I. 417.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. COM. II. 378, 381, 388.

profit or trust, or is accountable to the king, or is a member of parliament<sup>a</sup>.

A bill was passed by the commons, the same year, for restraining the number of officers in parliament<sup>b</sup>. Rejected by the lords.

Resolved, the same year, That no member of the house of commons be a farmer, or manager of excise<sup>c</sup>.

A bill to prevent parliament men taking places, was sent to the lords, *A. D.* 1692. It was proposed, that those who accepted places, should be incapacitated. The bill was committed by the lords to a grand committee. Thrown out in the house of peers by two voices. This parliament was called the officers parliament, from the great number of them in the house. The people began to be afraid of falling under military government. Ambitious men aimed at popularity by promoting the place-bill. Government preferred them. They then went over to the court. Then the cry was, That the court was corrupting the house. The bill was rejected by the lords for a profound reason. 'It seemed to establish (they said) an opposition between the crown and the people, as if those who were employed by one, could not be trusted by the other.' And who can deny this? The very idea of a representative should be, one wholly detached from every connexion with all but his constituents. Can a representative be too free? Another employment is many times inconsistent with a seat in the house. An officer ought to be keeping his men in order. Or is the business of an officer in the army, like that of a church-officer? Some places

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* III. 125.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* III. 94.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* III. 124.

depend for their profits, on the quantity of money given by parliament. Is not this a temptation to vote away the people's money? Is not parliamentary privilege enough for one person to hold, without his having a place and pension besides? Have not the nobility and the court power enough, without lording it in the house of commons too? What good or lawful design can a king or minister have, in giving a place to a member? Will it attach him more to his country's interest? or to that of the court? which two are almost always opposite. One vote may determine the fate of a nation<sup>a</sup>.

*William III. A. D. 1693*, rejects the place-bill, though approved by both houses, and though it only hindered members taking places while members. The commons resolved, 'That whoever gave the king advice to refuse the royal assent to a bill, which was to redress a grievance, and take off a scandal from the proceedings of the commons in parliament, is an enemy to king and country, &c.' A representation to the king was drawn up, in which was a paragraph (afterwards rejected) signifying that members of parliament are responsible to their constituents; that the constituents will probably be offended at the refusal, and the commons knew not how to appease them, &c. Instead of this, such was the prevalency of court-influence, that they put a paragraph, praying that for the future, the king would follow the advice of his parliament, and not that of private and interested persons. The king gives a general answer, the matter drops<sup>b</sup>.

The commons order in a bill, *Dec. 13, 1696*, That no person be elected member of parliament, who holds any office, or employment of profit under the government,

<sup>a</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. I. 227, 229.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid. I. 250.*



ment, nor any member accept a place or employment<sup>a</sup>.

There are two clauses, 12 and 13 *Will. III. cap. 2.* by which all offices of trust, and all pensions from the crown, are made disqualifications<sup>b</sup>. This is the very *salvo* we wanted. But (behold the misfortune!) this excellent regulation never came to be in force: for it was not to take place before the arrival of a certain event (the *Hanover* family's succession, I suppose) and was too good for this nation; therefore was repealed before that time. But the author of *FACTION DETECTED* says, the clause concerning pensions has been restored since, *viz. A. D. 1715*; by a statute in which year a penalty was appointed of 20*l.* a day for any person sitting, or voting, who has a pension from the crown for any term, short of life.

The lords having by the regency-bill rejected the clause inserted in an act passed some years before for settling the succession, by which all civil and military officers were made incapable of sitting or voting in the house of commons after the queen's decease, and having sent down that bill to the commons, they seeing the barrier against court power thrown down, resolved in some measure to repair it by admitting only 47 civil and military officers into their house, and among them 10 privy counsellors; 5 flag officers, and as many generals. The bill thus amended, was sent up again to the lords, who (to shew themselves always friends to integrity, and enemies to corruption and tyranny) altered it, excluding only the commissioners of the prize-office, and all such new officers, as the court might create in time to come. Debates and conferences

N 2

fol-

<sup>a</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. I. 227.*

<sup>b</sup> *STAT. AT LARGE, III. 508.*

followed <sup>a</sup>. ‘The court party endeavoured to shew the  
 ‘injustice of excluding those, who were actually per-  
 ‘forming services to the nation.’ [If they were, how  
 should they serve in the house of commons?] That this  
 would be a restraint on the liberty of the counties  
 and corporations, [it would restrain them indeed from  
 injuring their country]; that it would discourage brave  
 men from serving their country in war, when they  
 found they were to be disgraced by exclusion from the  
 house of commons. The opposite party argued, that a  
 bad prince might make a bad use of his creatures and  
 dependents in the house of commons. The bill was  
 once likely to be carried, postponing some of the lords  
 amendments, [*i. e.* their amendments the wrong way]  
 but the court party being reinforced by some coming  
 round, who used to be on the contrary side, [bribed  
 most probably] the lords amendments were approved  
 with a few alterations, to which the lords agreed <sup>b</sup>.

*A. D.* 1704. To mortify some members, who had  
 taken places, a bill was brought in ‘for excluding out  
 ‘of the house of commons, all persons in any offices  
 ‘or employments erected since *Feb.* 6, 1684, or to be  
 ‘erected <sup>c</sup>.’ Passed the commons immediately, but  
 the lords (who had nothing to do with it) must go to  
 tinkering it, and the commons not liking (as they had  
 not much reason) their amendments, the bill was lost.  
 There was likewise another bill, immediately after, set  
 on foot by the commons, ‘to prevent persons entitled  
 ‘by their offices to receive any benefit by public an-  
 ‘nual taxes, to be granted, from being members of  
 ‘parliament: which being levelled against many brave  
 ‘and deserving members, who serv’d the nation by  
 ‘sea and land, occasioned some murmurs; to stifle  
 ‘which,

<sup>a</sup> *Deb. Com.* III. 453.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 454.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 458.

‘ which, the commons empowered their committee to  
 ‘ receive a clause, for excepting flag officers and cap-  
 ‘ tains in the navy, and all general officers and colonels  
 ‘ of the land forces and marines ;’ [a foolish excep-  
 tion ; they are some of the most dangerous people  
 in parliament.] The bill passes in the negative.

A bill was brought into the *Scotch* parliament for se-  
 curing the succession, in case of queen *Anne*’s death. It  
 proposed among other things, that no person shall have  
 a vote in regulating the succession, who has any place,  
 mediately, or immediately, under the crown. That all  
 election be by ballot. A lesser baron to be added to  
 parliament, for every new created nobleman, to balance  
 the two houses. The crown not to have the power of  
 making peace and war without parliament. All the  
 males between 16 and 60 to be trained. No in-  
 demnity for state-crimes without consent of parliament.  
 No place or pension in *Scotland* to be given, but by  
 parliament <sup>a</sup>.

Motion in the *Scotch* parliament, 1704, by lord  
*Anstruther*, that no officer of the customs or excise,  
 or collector, surveyor, manager of customs, nor any  
 farmer of any branch of the revenue, shall be a member  
 of parliament <sup>b</sup> ; which was afterwards enacted <sup>c</sup>.

‘ A general self-denying bill was offered, *A. D.*  
 ‘ 1705, by those very men, who, in the first session  
 ‘ of parliament, when they hoped for places them-  
 ‘ selves, had opposed the motion for such a bill with  
 ‘ great indignation. Now the scene was a little  
 ‘ altered. They saw they were not like to be favou-  
 ‘ rites, and therefore pretended to be patriots. This

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‘ looked

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VII. 21.<sup>b</sup> Ibid. VII. 32.<sup>c</sup> Ibid. VII. 35.

‘ looked so strangely in them, that it was rejected, but another bill of a more restrained nature passed, disabling certain officers from serving in parliament.’ To this a general clause was added, which disabled all who held any office created since *A. D.* 1684, or any in future. Passed readily the commons; The lords thought it too comprehensive. Altered it to some particular disabilities. The commons refuse their alterations. The excellent bill drops. So the public good is bandied from party to party <sup>a</sup>.

It was resolved, *A. D.* 1710, even under the tory-ministry, that no person be a commissioner (for stating the public accounts) who has any office of profit, or is accountable to the sovereign <sup>b</sup>. So suspicious were they of the effects of clashing interests. They allowed commissioners, however, to be chosen from the house of commons; not apprehending any effect from members holding such a sort of places, because they were not lucrative. They were chosen by ballot. One gentleman had 246 suffrages.

A bill was ordered in, *A. D.* 1711, for securing the freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of officers in the house <sup>c</sup>.

A committee was appointed by the house, *A. D.* 1711, to enquire what new offices or places of profit had been created or erected since the 30th *Oct.* 1705, and whether the number of commissioners for executing offices is increased, and to examine how the laws stand in respect of officers sitting in the house <sup>d</sup>.

A bill (formerly often attempted) for disabling members from holding places, was brought into the tory

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 685.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* IV. 196.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* IV. 255.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 257.

tory parliament, *A. D.* 1711; but dropped. The qualification of 600*l.* a year, for a knight of the shire, and 300*l.* for a burghers, passed. The design was to exclude courtiers, military men, and merchants, and to increase the influence of the landed interest. The qualification was not extended to *Scotland*<sup>a</sup>.

The bill for limiting the number of placemen in the house of commons was brought in and passed, *A. D.* 1712. ‘The scandal of corruption was thought to be more flagrant than ever; for it was believed that men were not only bribed for a whole session, but had new bribes for particular votes.’

Bill for securing freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of placemen in the house, read a second time, and committed. And because several bills for the same unquestionably salutary tendency had been lost in the blessed house of peers, it was proposed to tack it to a money bill. Question put. Passes in the negative, 160 against 111.<sup>b</sup> This smells strong of a collusion between the two houses, and that they both twisted the same cord, though seemingly contrary ways and at opposite ends.

The self-denying bill was brought into the house of commons, *A. D.* 1712, and passed. Many of the lords being irritated at the late creation of twelve new peers at once, it was expected it would pass their house too. But their lordships seemed suddenly to alter their way of thinking of it; and whereas it was drawn to take place after the present parliament, they altered it, to take place after the death of the queen; so that it was no more thought of<sup>c</sup>.

N 4

The

<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 200.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* V. 12.

<sup>c</sup> *Burn.* IV. 363.

The commons resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, *A. D.* 1715, to consider of the several lists of accounts, of annuities, pensions, bounties, &c. granted by the late queen, or his present majesty. Several were mentioned by the discontents [that is, those who had none themselves] which were bestowed on those who had no need of them. A motion made for an address to the king against them [because we have no share]. When it was moved to address the king to retrench unnecessary pensions; *Walpole* (in character) said, 'You ought not to stint the king's benevolence, nor debar his majesty [the minister] from the exercise of the most glorious branch of his royal prerogative, which is to bestow his favours' [in sordid pelf, and paltry pay] 'on such as distinguish themselves in his service <sup>a</sup>,' [that is, in doing dirty work].

*Walpole* and *Pulteney* resign, *A. D.* 1720, because lord *Townsend* was removed from his post of lieutenant of *Ireland*; and it was thought he influenced several members to oppose the supply against *Sweden*, which *Walpole* and *Pulteney* were for <sup>b</sup>. *Walpole* and *Pulteney* took care, both of them, to let the house know they had resigned. What does this shew? That places are odious, and the honour is to resign them. Why? because of the filthy lucre attending them. Were they only laborious, or were men voted into them by their country for merit, it would be no brag to resign them <sup>c</sup>.

*A. D.* 1728, the famous self-denying bill passed the commons, which provided, that no member should sit, till he had taken an oath, that he had no pension during

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. VI. 23.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid. VI. 120.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid. 120, 121.*

during pleasure, or for any number of years, nor any office in part, or in whole, from the crown, held by any person for his benefit, and that he would not receive any such emolument, during the time of his being a member, without giving notice to the house within 14 days after accepting the same, if parliament was sitting, or after its first sitting, on pain of wilful perjury, and incapacity of holding any office. Whoever refused, or neglected taking the oath, was to lose his seat, and forfeit 30*l.* each day he sat without taking the oath. It would have been very barefaced for the commons to have refused this bill; for it only enacted, that no member should be a court-tool without leave of the house. But, as the bill, if it had passed into a law, might have been troublesome, it was contrived, that it should be thrown out by the lords.

‘ It was now the opinion of the public, and not  
 ‘ without foundation, that the minister [*Walpole*] suf-  
 ‘ fered the pension-bill to pass in the house of com-  
 ‘ mons, only because he knew it would be thrown out  
 ‘ in the house of lords <sup>a</sup>.’

The following is the oath to be taken by members, if the pension-bill, passed, *A. D.* 1731, by the commons, and rejected by the lords, had passed into a law; ‘ I, *A. B.* do solemnly and sincerely swear, ‘ that I have not, directly or indirectly, any pension ‘ during pleasure, or for any number of years, from ‘ the crown, nor any office in part, or in the whole, ‘ from the crown, held for me, or for my benefit, ‘ by any person whatsoever. And I do solemnly and ‘ sincerely promise and swear that I will not receive,  
 ‘ accept,

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. VIII. 101.

‘ accept, or take, directly or indirectly, during the  
 ‘ time of my being a member of this parliament, any  
 ‘ pension during pleasure, or for any number of years,  
 ‘ or any other gratuity or reward whatever, &c. with-  
 ‘ out signifying the same to this house, within four-  
 ‘ teen days after I have received or accepted the  
 ‘ same, if the parliament be then sitting, or within  
 ‘ fourteen days after the next meeting of the parlia-  
 ‘ ment. So help me God <sup>a</sup>.’

Any member taking the oath, if found to have had a pension at the time, during pleasure, or for any number of years, &c. [as in the oath] without signifying the same to the house, was to be held guilty of perjury, and to suffer accordingly. Any member refusing to take the oath, was to lose his seat; or sitting and voting, through oversight of the house, to forfeit 30*l.* each day, and to be incapacitated for holding any office, &c.

A motion was made in the house of peers, *A. D.* 1730, to call for a list of pensions payable by the crown. Passes in the negative <sup>b</sup>. Several lords protested, Because no instance can be given, that the list of pensioners was denied, when called for by either house. ‘ Because we conceive, the refusal will  
 ‘ be misinterpreted without doors, as it will raise a jea-  
 ‘ lousy that there are too many members upon the list,  
 ‘ which aspersion ought to have been obviated, by pro-  
 ‘ ducing those lists, as in former times has been fre-  
 ‘ quently done.’

*A. D.* 1731, it was moved in the house of commons, that a committee be appointed to enquire,  
 ‘ whether any members of this house have, directly  
 ‘ or

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. VIII. Append.*

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. LORDS, IV. 29.*



‘ or indirectly, any pensions during pleasure, or for  
 ‘ any number of years, or any offices from the crown,  
 ‘ held on trust for them in part, or in the whole <sup>a</sup>.’

*Walpole* said, this was turning the house of commons into a court of inquisition: That if it was made effectual, it would oblige members to accuse themselves <sup>b</sup>. This, however, was trifling; for enquiry might have been made, and discoveries gained, as in all other cases of roguery, by means entirely consistent with liberty and the constitution.

*Sandys* moves, *A. D.* 1731, for a committee to enquire whether any member had any pension, directly or indirectly, during pleasure, or for years, or any office from the crown, holden in trust for him in part or whole <sup>c</sup>. This motion was vigorously opposed, though the pension-bill met with no opposition. It was carried in the negative, 206 to 143.

They did not choose, I suppose, to have it known what knaves they were. So a prudent pickpocket, being accused of purloining a missing watch in the company, where he was; declared himself very willing to purge himself by *oath*; but strongly refused standing the *search*. It was observed, however, on that occasion, that many members suspected to be on the black list, voted for the enquiry, to save appearances, well knowing that it would not proceed.

A motion was made in the house of peers, *A. D.* 1732, for restraining officers concerned in the salt-duty from interposing in elections. Passed in the negative; though the same is established with respect to other duties. Nineteen lords protested, because the officers of the customs are immensely numerous, and have

<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. VIII. 101.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM.* VII. 81.

have a prodigious influence in elections <sup>a</sup>. They form a second standing army, and often supply the place of the other, whose attendance at an election would be too gross a violation of the law. A house of commons influenced by the servants of the crown (it is observed by their lordships) might be ‘ a representative of an ‘ *administration*, or of a *minister*; but could no longer ‘ be a true representative of the *people*.’ Parliaments are so great a check on ministers, that they have always endeavoured either to enable the crown to govern without them, or to influence their elections, or to corrupt them so thoroughly, that their efficiency shall be lost. The antiquity of the statutes for preventing these evils, shews how early they began to prevail. There is little danger, since the revolution, of any attempt to govern without parliaments. ‘ The wisdom ‘ of this house has seemed, by rejecting the pension- ‘ bill three times successively, to think the laws already ‘ in force sufficient to prevent corruption in the mem- ‘ bers, but the influence of the servants of the crown ‘ in elections, must, in our opinion, be looked upon ‘ as a growing danger, whose consequences require ‘ the utmost watchfulness to prevent them, as the great ‘ multitude of the tax-gatherers are solely directed by ‘ the treasury. The number of these creatures of the ‘ court was too great before; and by the new estab- ‘ lishment of this duty, it is to be increased, and, at ‘ the same time, no restraint laid on their power, ‘ which is the more dangerous as it does no violence ‘ openly to parliaments; but operates secretly, silently, ‘ and securely.’

A pension-bill passes the commons, *A. D.* 1733; lost again among the worthy lords, as before <sup>b</sup>.

Several

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, IV. 85, et seq.*

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM. VII. 285.*

Several precedents were brought, *A. D.* 1733, of officers seats in the house vacated on their being promoted to governments of towns, forts, &c. Yet general *Wade* was allowed to sit after his acceptance of the government of three forts in *Scotland*<sup>a</sup>. *N. B.* *Wade* was on the orthodox side.

*Mr. Sandys* moves, *A. D.* 1733, to bring in again the pension-bill thrown out by the lords<sup>b</sup>. Which he said had passed for two or three sessions without opposition, and had as often been thrown out by the lords; that it had been observed, that there never was any thing brought into either house, that was in itself for the public good, but what by perseverance was at last carried into a law. Truth and reason will prevail at last; which encouraged him again to renew this motion; that the bill was ready, and he desired leave to bring it up. It was objected, That it was a new sort of motion to ask leave to *bring up* a bill. That the constant custom had been to move for *leave to bring in* a bill. It was answered, that on occasion of the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* act, the bill was brought up ready drawn, and passed without opposition.

‘ The remembrance of the excise scheme and the convention was revived [*A. D.* 1739.] and it was suggested, that they might have been fatal to the minister [*Walpole*] had he not had a majority of placemen in parliament, and therefore it was necessary to obtain a bill for excluding placemen and pensioners from sitting in parliament<sup>c</sup>.’ Accordingly at a court at *Guildhall*, instructions were given the *London* members, ‘ that they should make the  
‘ passing

<sup>a</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. VIII. 184.*

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM. VII. 261.*

<sup>c</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. VIII. 435.*

‘ passing of a place and pension-bill a previous step to  
 ‘ the passing of any money-bill whatsoever. The ex-  
 ‘ ample of the city of *London* was followed by the  
 ‘ cities of *York* and *Salisbury*, and other great corpo-  
 ‘ rations all over *England*, though many of their  
 ‘ members were known to have voted always on the  
 ‘ side of the minister <sup>a</sup>.’

The year 1739 is, above all others, famous for the place-bill then brought in, which occasioned a thorough agitation of that question, and produced many of the noblest harangues ever uttered in parliament or any where else; some extracts from which I have placed in this chapter <sup>b</sup>.

*A. D.* 1740, a motion was made in the house of commons for a place-bill, with exception of 150 places, which were to have leave to sit in the house. Rejected, 222 against 206 <sup>c</sup>.

In the *Devonshire* instructions, *A. D.* 1741, is the following article: ‘ Use your utmost endeavours to  
 ‘ limit the number of placemen in, and to exclude pen-  
 ‘ sioners from the house of commons <sup>d</sup>.’

It was ordered, the same year, that leave be given to bring in a bill for making more effectual the laws for disabling persons from being chosen members of or sitting or voting in the house of commons, who have any pension during pleasure, or for any number of years, or any office held in trust for them <sup>e</sup>. A place-bill was sent up to the lords the same year <sup>f</sup>.

A bill for limiting officers in the house of commons was read a second time in the house of peers,

*A. D.*

<sup>a</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. VIII. 435.*

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM. XI. 202. et seq.*

<sup>c</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. VIII. 452.*

<sup>d</sup> *DEB. COM. XII.*

<sup>e</sup> *Ibid. XIII. 187.*

<sup>f</sup> *Ibid. 138.*

*A. D.* 1741. Moved to commit it. Passes in the negative.

Several lords protested, because they conceived that the constitution points out this bill as one of its principal securities to preserve the independency of the three several constituent parts of the supreme legislative power; for if any one of these becomes dependent on the other, the constitution is dangerously altered: But if any two become dependent on the third, it is totally subverted, and the wisest establishment that ever was formed of a free government, shrinks and degenerates into a monarchical, an aristocratical, or democratical faction; and should the number of employments continue to increase, we may live to see a constant majority of placemen, meeting under the name of a parliament to establish grievances instead of redressing them; and because the freedom of parliament is not secured, by the law, which obliges a member who accepts a place to quit his seat, since experience shews, that he will be constantly re-elected. They observed, with concern, that a bill of this nature, had been thrice rejected by the commons. They said it was near the end of the present parliament, and therefore it was particularly seasonable, to provide for the freedom and independency of the next<sup>a</sup>.

*A. D.* 1760, some new regulations were made by an act relating to a tax of one shilling in the pound on all places above 100 *l.* a-year; and the ministry took that opportunity of adding to the influence of the crown, by erecting a needless new office, and officers, while the commissioners of the land-tax might have done all the new business, as before<sup>b</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VII. 736.

<sup>b</sup> LONDON MAG. Feb. 1760. p. 72.

In a committee of the whole house on the state of the nation, *A. D.* 1770, it was proposed, ‘ that leave  
 ‘ be given to bring in a bill to disqualify certain officers  
 ‘ of the excise and customs for voting at elections  
 ‘ for members of parliament<sup>a</sup>.’ The ministry gravely  
 opposed such a salutary bill, though it was observed  
 to them, that our wise ancestors had enacted, ‘ that  
 ‘ no commissioner of the customs, or excise, should sit  
 ‘ in the house of commons, or use interest in any elec-  
 ‘ tion.’ If this question could have been carried, it  
 ‘ would have been productive of great advantage to  
 ‘ the constitution, as the influence of the crown in  
 ‘ elections is very alarming indeed : many sea-port  
 ‘ boroughs are almost entirely carried by the numbers  
 ‘ of little places the court disposes of there ; and even  
 ‘ in cities and counties the antiministerial candidate  
 ‘ feels the power of the crown an heavy weight against  
 ‘ him. We are not surprized at the court’s carrying  
 ‘ the question, but a good deal so, that the country  
 ‘ gentlemen, who have so long been exclaiming against  
 ‘ the undue influence of the crown, should join with  
 ‘ them in this vote<sup>b</sup>.’

*A. D.* 1772, Mr. *Sawbridge* moved the house of commons that a new writ might be issued for chusing a member for *Warwick*, as lord *Greville*, the member for that town, was, according to the *Gazette*, appointed a commissioner of trade, which, by 6 *Ann*, c. 7. § 26. vacated his seat. That young nobleman was in the house. The ministry would not let him answer, whether he had accepted the place, or not. Mr. *Sawbridge* insisted, that his silence was sufficient reason for concluding, that he had accepted. That  
 it

<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. VIII. 230.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid. 231.*

it must often be difficult, if not impossible, for the house to prove, that a member has accepted a place (most of them being sinecures,) that therefore the house had a right to demand of the person, so charged, a categorical answer. ‘As the ministry durst not give a flat negative to the proposal, the words of the act being pretty clear, they were reduced to the chicane, that legal proof was not before the house. On this ground the matter was left. The ministry then moved for the order of the day, and carried it against issuing the writ, 117 to 7<sup>a</sup>.’ Had I been at Mr. *Sawbridge’s* elbow, I should have desired him to move, that the Statutes, which lie upon the table before the speaker, might be immediately carried out and burnt.

*A. D.* 1773, Sir *William Mayne*, moved for leave to bring in a bill for limiting the number of placemen and pensioners in the parliament of *Ireland*, and for enquiring into charges of government in *Ireland*, and what might be retrenched.

Placemen excluded from the house of commons, and not re-eligible by the laws now in being, summed up by the author of *FACTION DETECTED BY FACTS*, are the following, *viz.*

Commissioners, and farmers of excise; commissioners, comptrollers, auditors, of appeals; seven commissioners of revenue in *Ireland*; seven commissioners of the victualling office; the commissioner and clerk of the pells; all the deputies, inferior officers, and under-clerks of these offices; commissioners of the treasury, exchequer, and admiralty; secretaries of state, paymaster of the forces; great part of the *Gib-*

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. Deb.* IX. 336.

*raltar* and *Minorca* establishments; all new revenue-officers, established since 5 *W.* and *M.* all new placemen since 4 *Anne*, except those in the army or navy; commissioners, sub-commissioners, secretaries, receivers of prizes, comptrollers of the accounts of the army; commissioners of transports, of sick and wounded; agents for regiments; commissioners for wine-licences; governors, and deputy-governors of plantations; commissioners of the navy in the outports; pensioners of the crown during pleasure, or for a term of years. Riding, or splitting of places, is contrary to law. 500 *l.* fine for sitting contrary to the law, by which places vacate seats. The fine recoverable by any person who shall sue. No revenue-officer of the post-office is to persuade, or dissuade, any voter, on pain of 100 *l.* penalty, by 9 *Anne*. A law, 9 *Anne*, against fraudulent conveyances, with a view to elections, with oaths and penalties.

On one hand, to view the number of places which exclude from the house, one would imagine there could be no placemen in it; on the other, to think of the number of placemen in the house, as appears by the annual COURT CALENDAR, one would imagine there was no law for excluding placemen. How great then must the number of placemen in this country be upon the whole?



## C H A P. VIII.

*Speeches on the Danger of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.*

FROM the strain of the following speeches in parliament, and quotations from books, may be collected the sense of many of the ablest and best men of this country, on the danger of placemen and pensioners in the house of commons.

Hear Sir *Francis Winnington*, in his speech on this subject, in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1680<sup>a</sup>.

‘ Mr. Speaker. Sir, The last house of commons  
 ‘ being sensible how narrowly this nation escaped being  
 ‘ ruined by a sort of monsters, called Pensioners, who  
 ‘ sat in the late long parliament, had entered into a  
 ‘ consideration how to prevent the like from coming  
 ‘ into future parliaments; and in order thereto re-  
 ‘ solved, that they would severely chastise some of  
 ‘ those that had been guilty, and make the best laws  
 ‘ they could to prevent the like for the future; and  
 ‘ for that purpose a committee was appointed, of  
 ‘ which Mr. Sergeant *Gregory*, now Judge *Gregory*,  
 ‘ was chairman, by which many papers relating to  
 ‘ that affair came to his hands. Sir, I think it a  
 ‘ business of so great importance, that it never ought  
 ‘ to be forgotten, nor the prosecution of it deferred.  
 ‘ I have often heard, that *England* can never be de-  
 ‘ stroyed but by itself; to have such parliaments was  
 ‘ the most likely way that ever yet was invented. I  
 ‘ remember a great lawyer said in this house, when it  
 ‘ was debated in the last parliament, that it was *trea-*

O 2

‘ son;

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. II. 61.

‘ *son*; and he gave many learned arguments to make  
‘ it out. Whether it be so or no, I will not now  
‘ offer to debate; but I think, for those that are the  
‘ legislators of the nation to take bribes, to under-  
‘ mine the laws and government of this nation, that  
‘ they ought to be chastised as *traitors*. It was my  
‘ fortune to sit here a little while in the long parlia-  
‘ ment; I did observe that all those that had pen-  
‘ sions, and most of those that had offices, voted all of  
‘ a side, as they were directed by some great officer,  
‘ as exactly as if their business in this house had been  
‘ to preserve their pensions and offices, and not to  
‘ make laws for the good of them that had sent them  
‘ hither. How such persons could any way be useful  
‘ for the support of the government, by preserving a  
‘ fair understanding between the king and the people,  
‘ or rather how likely to bring in arbitrary power and  
‘ popery, I leave to every man’s judgment. They  
‘ were so far from being the true representatives of  
‘ the people, that they were a distinct interest from  
‘ both king and people; and their chief business was  
‘ to serve the ends of some great minister of state,  
‘ though ever so opposite to the true interest of the  
‘ nation. Sir, this business ought never to fall  
‘ (though there should be ever so many prorogations  
‘ and dissolutions of parliaments) before something be  
‘ done in it; I think it is the interest of the nation  
‘ that it should be prosecuted from parliament as if  
‘ there were an impeachment against them. And  
‘ therefore, Sir, I would humbly move you to send  
‘ some members of this house to Judge *Gregory* for the  
‘ papers he hath in his custody relating to this affair,  
‘ that so you may in convenient time proceed farther  
‘ herein, as you shall think good. And, Sir, being  
‘ there is a report that some of this house have now  
‘ made

‘ made a bargain at court for great offices, in order to  
 ‘ vitiate and corrupt their votes in this house ; which,  
 ‘ though but a project to cast a reflection on such  
 ‘ members, however, to satisfy the world, I pray,  
 ‘ Sir, let there be a vote pass that no member of this  
 ‘ house shall accept of any office under the crown  
 ‘ during such time as he continues a member of this  
 ‘ house.’

Lord *Mulgrave* in the house of peers, *A. D.* 1692, spoke as follows on the subject of placemen in parliament.

‘ My lords, I beseech you to consider the meaning  
 ‘ of that word representative. Can representatives do  
 ‘ any thing contrary to the mind of their constituents ?  
 ‘ It would be absurd to propose it : And yet how can  
 ‘ it be otherwise, if representatives, after being chosen,  
 ‘ may change their dependency, and engage themselves  
 ‘ in employments plainly inconsistent with the great  
 ‘ trust reposed in them ? And that I will take the  
 ‘ liberty to demonstrate to your lordships they now do,  
 ‘ at least according to my conception of the matter.  
 ‘ I will instance first in the least or lowest incapacity  
 ‘ they must be under who so take employments. Your  
 ‘ lordships must know but too well what a general  
 ‘ carelessness there appears every day more and more in  
 ‘ the public business ; if so, how is it likely that men  
 ‘ should be as diligent in their duty in parliament as  
 ‘ that business requires, when employments and other  
 ‘ business shall take up both their minds and their  
 ‘ time ? But then, in some cases, it is worse, as in  
 ‘ commands of the army and other employments of  
 ‘ that kind, when they must have a divided duty : for  
 ‘ it does admirably become an officer to sit voting  
 ‘ away money in the house of commons, while his  
 ‘ soldiers are perhaps taking it away at their quarters

‘ for want of his presence to restrain them, and of  
‘ better discipline among them. Nay, perhaps his  
‘ troop or regiment may be in some action abroad,  
‘ and he must either have the shame of being absent  
‘ from them at such a time, or from that house where  
‘ he is entrusted with our liberties. To this I have  
‘ heard but one objection by a noble lord, *viz.* That  
‘ if this act should pass, the king is not allowed to  
‘ make a captain a colonel without disabling him to  
‘ sit in parliament. Truly, if a captain has only  
‘ deserved to be advanced for exposing himself in par-  
‘ liament, I think the nation would have no great loss  
‘ in the king’s letting alone such a preferment. But,  
‘ my lords, there is another sort of incapacity yet  
‘ worse than this; I mean that of parliament-mens  
‘ having such places in the exchequer, the very profit  
‘ of which depends on the money given to the king in  
‘ parliament. Would any of your lordships send and  
‘ entrust a man to make a bargain for you, whose very  
‘ interest shall be to make you give as much as he  
‘ possibly can? It puts me in mind of a farce where  
‘ an actor holds a dialogue with himself, speaking first  
‘ in one tone, and then answering in another. Really,  
‘ my lords, this is no farce. It is no laughing matter  
‘ to undo a nation; but it is altogether as unnatural  
‘ for a member of parliament to ask first in the king’s  
‘ name for such a supply, give an account from him  
‘ how much is needful toward the paying such an  
‘ army, or such a fleet, and then immediately give by  
‘ his ready vote what he had before asked by his  
‘ master’s order. Besides, my lords, there is such a  
‘ necessity now for long sessions of parliament; and the  
‘ very privileges belonging to members are of so great  
‘ extent, that it would be a little hard and unequal to  
‘ other

‘ other gentlemen that members should have all the  
‘ places besides.

‘ All the objections that have been made may be re-  
‘ duced to these : First ; it is told us, that it is a disre-  
‘ spect to the king, that his servants or officers should  
‘ be excluded the house. To this I desire it may be  
‘ considered, that it is in this case as when a tenant  
‘ sends up a person to treat for him : Would any of  
‘ your lordships think it a disrespect ; nay, would the  
‘ king himself think it any, if the tenant would not  
‘ wholly refer himself to one of your own servants, or  
‘ the king’s commissioners in the case of the crown ?  
‘ And if he chuses rather some plain honest friend of  
‘ his own to supply his absence here, will any man  
‘ blame such a proceeding, or think it unmannerly ?  
‘ Another objection is, That this act may by its con-  
‘ sequence prolong this parliament, which they allow  
‘ would be a very great grievance ; and yet suppose  
‘ the king capable of putting it upon us, which I have  
‘ too much respect for him to admit of ; though I am  
‘ glad, however, that it is objected by privy counsellors  
‘ in favour, who consequently I hope will never advise  
‘ a thing which they now exclaim at as so great a  
‘ grievance. But pray, my lords, what should tempt  
‘ the king to so ill a policy ? Can he fear a freedom of  
‘ choice in the people, to whose good will he owes all  
‘ his power, which these lords suppose he may use to  
‘ their prejudice ? Give me leave to say, as I must not  
‘ suspect him of so ill a design as the perpetuating this  
‘ parliament, so he cannot, he ought not, to suspect a  
‘ nation so entirely, I was going to say so fondly de-  
‘ voted to him. My lords, no man is readier than  
‘ myself to allow that we owe the crown all submission  
‘ as to the time of calling parliaments according to  
‘ law, and appointing also where they shall sit. But

‘ with reverence be it spoken, the king owes the nation  
‘ entire freedom in chusing their representatives; and  
‘ it is no less his duty than it is his true interest that  
‘ such a fair and just proceeding should be used towards  
‘ us. Consider, my lords, of what mighty conse-  
‘ quence it may be, that so many votes should be free,  
‘ when upon one single vote may depend the whole  
‘ security or loss of this nation. By one single vote  
‘ such points may be carried as I almost tremble to  
‘ think of. By one single vote a general excise may  
‘ be granted; and then we are all lost. By one single  
‘ vote the crown may be impowered to name all the  
‘ commissioners for raising the taxes; and then, surely,  
‘ we should be in a fair way towards it. Nay, what-  
‘ ever has happened may again be apprehended; and  
‘ I hope those reverend prelates will reflect, that if  
‘ they grow once obnoxious to a prevalent party, one  
‘ single voice may be as dangerous to that bench, as a  
‘ general dissatisfaction among the people proved to be  
‘ once in a late experience: which I am far from  
‘ saying by way of threatening, and mean it only by  
‘ way of caution. My lords, we may think because  
‘ this concerns not the house of lords, that we need  
‘ not be so over careful of the matter; but there are  
‘ noblemen in *France*, at least such as were so before  
‘ they were enslaved, who that they might domineer  
‘ over others, and serve a present turn perhaps, let all  
‘ things alone so long till the people were quite mas-  
‘ tered, and the nobility themselves too, to bear them  
‘ company. So that I never met a *Frenchman* even of  
‘ the greatest rank (and some had 10,000 pistoles a year  
‘ in employments) that did not envy us here for our  
‘ freedom from that slavery which they groan under;  
‘ and this I have observed universally, excepting Mon-  
‘ sieur de *Louvois*, Monsieur *Colbert*, or such people,  
‘ because

‘ because they were the ministers themselves who occasioned these complaints, and throve by the oppressing of others.’

See *Danger of Mercenary Parliaments*, first printed, A. D. 1698<sup>a</sup>.

‘ Let us see’ (says that judicious writer) ‘ whether a house of commons full of officers and court-pensioners will answer those noble and laudable ends of their constitution. And here indeed I begin already to be ashamed of my undertaking; the proof of the negative is so ridiculous, that it looks too much like a jest to ask any one in his wits, whether a parliament filled with delinquents will ever call themselves to an account, or what account will be given if they should? Whether an assembly of public robbers will sentence one another to be punished, or to make restitution? Whether it is possible our grievances can be redressed that are committed by persons from whom there is no higher power to appeal? Whether there is any hope of justice, where the malefactors are the judges? Whether his majesty can be rightly informed in affairs relating to himself or the public, when they are represented to him only by such persons who design to abuse him? Whether the public accounts will be faithfully inspected by those, who embezzle our money to their own use? Whether the king’s prerogative can be lawfully maintained by such who only pervert it to their own sinister ends and purposes? Whether a parliament can be a true balance where all the weight is only in one scale? Or lastly, Whether a house of commons can vote freely, who are either prepossessed with the hopes and  
‘ pro-

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*, II. 638.

‘promises of enjoying places, or the slavish fears of  
‘losing them?’

The same writer goes on <sup>a</sup> faithfully to alarm his country against what was in those bashful days very alarming, because it was new. In our times (the present always excepted) as hackneyed wh—s, thieves, murderers, and the like, are proof against shame, we read and hear arguments every day gravely brought in defence, or at least in alleviation of the very practice which alone can, and must ruin liberty, if it has not already.

‘Here I must confess there are not many instances  
‘to be given; the project of corrupting parliaments  
‘being but of late date, a practice first set on foot  
‘within the compass of our own memories, as the  
‘last and most dangerous stratagem that ever was  
‘invented by an encroaching king, to possess him-  
‘self of the rights of a free born people; I mean  
‘*Ch. II.* who, well remembering with how little suc-  
‘cess both he and his father had made use of open  
‘arms and downright violence, to storm and batter  
‘down the bulwarks of our excellent constitution,  
‘had recourse, at last, to these mean arts and under-  
‘hand practices of bribing and corrupting with mo-  
‘ney those who were entrusted with the conservation  
‘of our laws, and the guardianship of our liberties.  
‘And herein he so well succeeded, that the mischiefs  
‘and calamities occasioned by that mercenary parlia-  
‘ment, did not terminate with his life and reign;  
‘but the effects of them are continued and handed  
‘down, and sensibly felt by the nation to this very  
‘hour.’

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*, II. 637.



The same judicious writer goes on<sup>a</sup> to observe, that the parliament which succeeded to the pensioned parliament, was, fortunately for the nation, composed of different men, who accordingly pursued different measures. That *James II.* was greatly advantaged in his designs against liberty, by having a way paved for him by the pensioned parliament. That he did not succeed in his laudable endeavours to corrupt his parliament. That, accordingly he was precipitated from the throne, and driven, with his execrable race, into perpetual banishment from his country, which made way for the revolution. That the revolution did not produce the expected advantages, because its effect was blasted by corruption in parliament. ‘ We were filled’ (says he<sup>b</sup>) ‘ with golden dreams, ‘ not only of a bare security for our estates and lives ; ‘ but an inexhausted affluence of all manner of blessings, a nation is capable of enjoying. But tho’ ‘ we have dreamt the dreams, yet we have not seen ‘ the visions. And the nation is by this time sadly ‘ sensible how wretchedly they have fallen short of ‘ their expected happiness, yet are they not all acquainted with the true spring and fountain from ‘ whence all their misfortunes flow, which is indeed no ‘ other than that barefaced and openly avowed corruption, which, like an universal leprosy, has so notoriously ‘ infected and overspread both our court and parliament. ‘ ’Tis from hence are plainly derived all the calamities and distractions under which the whole nation ‘ at present groans: ’tis this that has changed the ‘ very natures of *Englishmen*, and of valiant men made ‘ them cowards, of eloquent dumb, and of honest men ‘ villains.

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of King *William*, II. 641.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 640.

‘ villains. ’Tis this can make a whole house of com-  
 ‘ mons eat their own words, and countervote what  
 ‘ they had just before resolved on: ’tis this could  
 ‘ summon the mercenary members from all quarters  
 ‘ of the town in an instant, to vote their fellow cri-  
 ‘ minals innocent: ’tis this that can make the parli-  
 ‘ ament throw away the people’s money with the  
 ‘ utmost profusion, without enquiring into the ma-  
 ‘ nagement of it: ’tis this that put a stop to the exa-  
 ‘ mination of that scandalous escape of the *Toulon* fleet  
 ‘ into *Brest*: ’tis this that has encouraged the mis-  
 ‘ management of the admiralty in relation to the loss  
 ‘ of so vast a number of men of war and merchant  
 ‘ ships, as well as other miscarriages which were by  
 ‘ all men judged not to proceed from their want of  
 ‘ understanding in sea affairs: ’tis this that has hin-  
 ‘ dered the passing a bill so often brought into the  
 ‘ house for incapacitating members to bear offices:  
 ‘ ’tis this that could not only indemnify, but honour  
 ‘ a leading member for his audacious procuring and  
 ‘ accepting a grant of lands, which, by the parlia-  
 ‘ ment, had been set apart for the public service; a  
 ‘ vote that shall stand recorded in their own journals  
 ‘ to the never dying infamy of that mercenary assem-  
 ‘ bly: ’tis this could make the same person most con-  
 ‘ fidently affirm, that he was sure the majority of the  
 ‘ house would agree to what he was going to propose:  
 ‘ ’tis this that could make men of peaceable disposi-  
 ‘ tions and considerable estates, vote for a standing  
 ‘ army: ’tis this that could bring admirals to confess  
 ‘ that our fleet under their command, was no security  
 ‘ to us: ’tis this could make wise men act against  
 ‘ their own apparent interest. In short, ’tis this that  
 ‘ has infatuated our prudence, staggered our con-  
 ‘ stancy, sullied our reputation, and introduced a  
 ‘ total

‘ total defection from all true *English* principles.  
 ‘ Bribery is indeed so sure and unavoidable a way to  
 ‘ destroy any nation, that we may all sit down and  
 ‘ wonder that so much as the very name of a free  
 ‘ government is yet continued to us. And if by our  
 ‘ wary choice of members we should happen to recover  
 ‘ our antient constitution, we shall with horror and  
 ‘ amazement look back and reflect on the dreadful  
 ‘ precipice we shall have so narrowly escaped.’

The same patriotic writer observes <sup>a</sup>, that ‘ the ex-  
 ‘ ecutive power ought not to be lodged in the house  
 ‘ of commons, because it would deprive the kingdom  
 ‘ of that which is the noblest and most useful work  
 ‘ of their representatives, the calling ill ministers to  
 ‘ account, and the preserving a steady administration  
 ‘ in the subordinate officers of the government. But  
 ‘ in a house of commons abounding with officers, if  
 ‘ any one of them be attacked, it alarms the whole  
 ‘ fraternity, and they all engage to bring him off,  
 ‘ though it be by the scandalous way of putting the  
 ‘ question for candles, and carrying it in the negative.  
 ‘ This was the case of the admiralty last parliament,  
 ‘ and may be of the treasury this session, if fortune  
 ‘ proves so propitious, that one of their members be  
 ‘ made speaker. This point gained, the next will  
 ‘ probably be to establish the army, and then to suspend  
 ‘ or repeal the triennial act.’

*A. D.* 1698, the following remarkable paragraphs  
 appeared in the famous HUSH-MONEY PAPER, as it  
 was called, published by *John Lawten*, Esq.

‘ Two hundred thousand pounds a year bestowed  
 ‘ upon the parliament has already drawn out of the  
 ‘ subjects pockets more millions than all our kings  
 ‘ since

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*, II. 653.

' since the conquest have ever had from this nation.  
 ' And that this should be done without any rude com-  
 ' plaint, is a proof, that if a king can manage well  
 ' Mr. *Guy's* office, he may, without much ado, set  
 ' up for absolute. *Venalis est Anglia*, for *Venale est Par-*  
 ' *liamentum*. Heretofore, indeed, it was necessary  
 ' only that they should give reasonably, as *Flamock's*  
 ' rebellion, and others in *Hen. VIIth's* reign witness ;  
 ' and I believe our rolls will not furnish us with many  
 ' sessions, wherein money was given, and no one  
 ' country bill granted. But our ancestors were wise  
 ' enough to instruct their members, and our constitu-  
 ' tion so regular that we had frequent elections.  
 ' The house is now so officered, that by those who  
 ' have places and pensions, together with their sons,  
 ' brothers, and kinsmen, and those who are fed with  
 ' the hopes of preferment, and the too great influence  
 ' these have upon some honest mistaken country gen-  
 ' tlemen (who are possibly over frightened with the  
 ' *French*) the king can baffle any bill, quash all grie-  
 ' vances, stifle accounts, and ratify the articles of  
 ' *Limerick*. When I find the money the nation gives  
 ' to defend our liberties from foreigners abroad, is  
 ' like to undermine them at home, in a word, when  
 ' I see neither the one nor the other house can with-  
 ' stand the power of gold ; I say, when I perceive all  
 ' this, it is time to give warning, it is time to look  
 ' about us. If the members of parliament are to  
 ' overlook all the ill husbandry of the government,  
 ' that they may share in the profuseness and bribery  
 ' of it ; if our rights are to be set to sale by some and  
 ' neglected by others, when the very being of the go-  
 ' vernment depends upon our being satisfied, what  
 ' amendment, what confirmation shall we have of our  
 ' constitution, when all our dangers are over ? This is

‘ a thought which deserves our most serious reflections.  
 ‘ I could name a certain gentleman, who exactly re-  
 ‘ sembles *Henry Guy*, who the last sessions, when the  
 ‘ house was a little out of humour, disposed of no less  
 ‘ than sixteen thousand pounds in three days time for  
 ‘ secret service. Who are in places we may find out,  
 ‘ but God knows who have pensions, yet every man,  
 ‘ that made the least observation, can remember, that  
 ‘ some who opened loudly at the beginning of the last  
 ‘ sessions, who came up as eager as it is possible for  
 ‘ reformation, had their mouths soon stopped with  
 ‘ hush-money. It has been of some time whispered,  
 ‘ that if this will not at first pre-engage to do what  
 ‘ will be exacted at their hands, we shall have a par-  
 ‘ liament. I cannot tell whether a new parliament will  
 ‘ not be practised upon by the *Carmarthen* art; how-  
 ‘ ever, it is our last and best remedy: for if this  
 ‘ continues, God have mercy upon poor *England*.  
 ‘ Hitherto we have been, and we are like, for ought I  
 ‘ see, to be repaid for all our expences of blood and  
 ‘ treasure, with the smoke which *Boccalini* mentions  
 ‘ in his advices from *Parnassus*, whereby the enemies  
 ‘ of the government have but too great advantage  
 ‘ given them to ridicule us for our foolish credulity?’

‘ If men are to make fortunes by being of our  
 ‘ senate house, says the same gentleman<sup>a</sup>, we had  
 ‘ better ourselves pay the disbursements of those we  
 ‘ send, we had better ourselves allow them plentiful  
 ‘ salaries for sitting there; each particular county  
 ‘ would save by it in the public assessments, and find  
 ‘ their account in it, whilst they preserve their mem-  
 ‘ bers from the temptation, of being hired out of their  
 ‘ interest, and consequently get good laws for what  
 ‘ they

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<sup>a</sup> STATE TRACTS, time of king *William*, II. 370.

‘ they give. We can scarce pay too much for good  
 ‘ laws, and if we have not some that we have not yet,  
 ‘ we shall not, when the war is over (let it end which  
 ‘ way it will) be able to call what we have our own.  
 ‘ In the late times, the city of *London* often petitioned  
 ‘ for passing of laws: will they always lend money  
 ‘ now, and never expect a thorough alteration of the  
 ‘ ministry, and securities for the future, against court  
 ‘ projectors? In *James Ist’s* time, there were certain  
 ‘ sparks, who undertook for parliaments, that were  
 ‘ called undertakers; and there is a certain secret that  
 ‘ has stole out of our cabinet, that one of these, im-  
 ‘ mediately on the king’s refusing the triennial bill  
 ‘ last sessions, undertook that it should be thrown out  
 ‘ the next time they sat, with as much scorn and con-  
 ‘ tempt as was the judges bill. It is time to have  
 ‘ annual parliaments instead of triennial, since privy  
 ‘ counsellors and lords of the treasury, (both which  
 ‘ stations this person enjoys) can so perfectly feel the  
 ‘ pulse of a parliament during an interval.’

Sir *Charles Sedley* in his speech, *A. D.* 1699, thus  
 sets forth the danger from placemen in parliament.  
 ‘ I believe, Mr. Speaker, when we come to consider of  
 ‘ it, we shall find that it is convenient not only to  
 ‘ lessen the officers of the court and state in point of  
 ‘ profit, but in point of number too. We have  
 ‘ nine commissioners of excise, seven of the admiralty,  
 ‘ three of the post-office, six of the customs. I know  
 ‘ not why half may not do the business as well. But  
 ‘ when I consider, that all these, or most of them, are  
 ‘ members of parliament, my wonder is over; for  
 ‘ though it may be a dispute whether many heads are  
 ‘ better than one, ’tis certainly true, that many votes  
 ‘ are better than one. Many of these gentlemen have  
 ‘ two offices besides their seat in parliament, which re-  
 ‘ quire

'quire attendance in several places, and abilities of  
 'divers natures; but members of parliament, though  
 'well principled, have no privilege to be fit for any  
 'thing they please to undertake without practice,  
 'study, or application. Sir, we are called by the king,  
 'and sent up by the people; and ought to regard no  
 'interests but theirs, which, as I told you before, are  
 'always the same: let us therefore proceed accord-  
 'ingly. The late proposals of the courtiers them-  
 'selves to save the king money was, by applying the  
 'profits, salaries, and fees of their places that exceed  
 '800 *l. per annum*, to the war. Thus will the pub-  
 'lic charge lie easier upon the people, and the present  
 'reign be more and more endeared to them. What is  
 'necessary we shall cheerfully supply, when we see all  
 'men set their shoulders to the burden, and stand upon  
 'an equal footing for our common defence, and that  
 'what we give is applied to those uses for which we  
 'give, and the army paid. This offer, Sir, as I re-  
 'member, began when an observation was made by  
 'you of the long accounts, and that a great part of  
 'the king's revenue remained in the hands of the  
 'receivers; to which a worthy member answered,  
 'It could not be helped, by reason some receivers were  
 'members of parliament, and stood upon their  
 'privileges. To which another member answered,  
 'That we could not deprive members of their privi-  
 'leges; but that to remedy the like for the future,  
 'we were ready to pass a vote, that no member of par-  
 'liament should be a receiver of the king's revenue.  
 'This alarmed the whole body of men in office; so  
 'that some stood up, and to prevent the house from  
 'harping any longer upon that string, said, They so  
 'little valued their own profit, that they were willing  
 'to resign all their fees, salaries, and perquisites ex-  
 'ceeding

‘ceeding 300 *l. per annum*, towards the next yearly  
 ‘charge. This, if really intended, was very generous;  
 ‘but if it were only a compliment, a shift, or expedi-  
 ‘ent to avoid the present vote we were upon, that no  
 ‘member of parliament should be a receiver of the  
 ‘revenue, nothing was more disingenuous; nor could  
 ‘a greater abuse be offered to the house; for we pro-  
 ‘ceeded so far as to vote, that judges, and some others,  
 ‘should not be comprehended. People abroad, who  
 ‘received our votes, will think strangely of it, if  
 ‘after all these preparations we do nothing in it, and  
 ‘suffer ourselves to be thus gulled. But I hope better  
 ‘of the worthy gentlemen, and cannot but think they  
 ‘were in earnest with this house upon so solemn a  
 ‘debate<sup>a</sup>.’

Mr. *Trenchard* proposes, in order to check corrup-  
 tion, that parliament establish a commission for enquir-  
 ing, by oath, into all abuses of the civil list and other  
 revenues; into useless offices, salaries, perquisites,  
 bills of offices, pensions, &c. excepting only the  
 king’s privy-purse; report to be made to parliament.  
 And that all members of parliament receiving pensions,  
 purses, &c. in a corrupt or clandestine manner, be  
 guilty of high treason<sup>b</sup>.

Thus harangues, on the same subject, the excellent  
*Hutcheson*, in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1716<sup>c</sup>.

‘In the late reigns, and particularly in the long  
 ‘pensionary parliament in the reign of *Ch. II.* the  
 ‘nation became very sensible of the mischievous con-  
 ‘sequences which had already happened, and the  
 ‘more fatal which might still result, from the dan-  
 ‘gerous

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* III. 195.

<sup>b</sup> *Gordon’s TRACTS*, I. 245.

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM.* VI. *Append.* p. 8.



gerous breach which had been made in our ancient constitution. It was now evident to the meanest capacity, that a designing prince, who, with the assistance of a wicked ministry, should be able, after several trials, at last to procure a parliament to his purpose, would have the liberties of the people entirely in his power, and might govern them at pleasure; from which state of slavery it was evident, that nothing less than a revolution could rescue them; and if they failed in that experiment, that then their chains would be riveted for ever. Under this melancholy prospect of affairs the nation groaned, and complaints were heard in every corner of our streets; and even the very pensioners in that parliament were not arrived to such a pitch of impiety as to take pleasure in the drudgery they had engaged in, but acted with reluctance and remorse, and, as we have been very lately told in this place, betrayed the cause they had so wickedly espoused, and frequently gave notice to the friends of *England* of the attempts which were to be made on the liberties of their country. This pensionary parliament was at last dissolved, but with what view, and by what advice, I will not pretend to say. Certain it is, that that prince never had it afterwards in his power, in a parliamentary way, to destroy the liberties of the people. The resumption of charters was then put in practice, with many other expedients towards the establishment of an absolute monarchy, which had been long in view; but by the death of that prince, and the unskilful conduct of his next successor, an end was put to these designs for that time, the people having unanimously applied the only remedy in such cases; and this brought about the late happy revolution.'

In the year 1734, as above-mentioned, a bill for securing the freedom of parliament, by limiting the number of officers in the house, was read twice; and when it was moved that it should be committed, and that motion opposed, Mr. *Sandys* spoke as follows :

‘ Sir, As this <sup>a</sup> bill met with no opposition, either  
 ‘ when it was moved for, or when it was brought in  
 ‘ and read the first time, I was very little apprehensive  
 ‘ that we should have had any debate upon it; and  
 ‘ much less was I apprehensive that our going  
 ‘ into a committee upon it would have been opposed;  
 ‘ for as yet it can be called little more than a blank;  
 ‘ it cannot well deserve the name of a bill, till it has  
 ‘ gone through the committee, where the many blanks  
 ‘ which are now in it are properly to be filled up. I  
 ‘ was indeed surprized to hear the worthy gentleman,  
 ‘ who spoke last, say, that he thought it the most ex-  
 ‘ traordinary and unreasonable bill that he had ever  
 ‘ seen brought into this house; for if the gentleman  
 ‘ will look into our Journals, he will see that this very  
 ‘ bill has been often brought in, and has almost al-  
 ‘ ways been passed in this house;’ [in confidence of  
 its being thrown out by the lords, which looks more  
 decent] ‘ and I am sure, if ever it was thought  
 ‘ reasonable by this house, it must now be thought  
 ‘ much more so, when the number of placemen is  
 ‘ much greater in this house than it was heretofore.  
 ‘ The worthy gentleman has likewise told us, that  
 ‘ he thinks the bill unjust, both with respect to the  
 ‘ crown, the people, and the gentlemen who have the  
 ‘ honour to be employed by the crown. As to which  
 ‘ I shall take notice, in general, that by the same  
 ‘ method of reasoning he may pretend to shew us,  
 ‘ that

‘ that all the laws that were ever made for regulating  
‘ elections were unjust, and were encroachments upon  
‘ the rights of the people. I shall readily agree with  
‘ him, that the people are the properest judges who  
‘ ought to be chosen by them for representatives in  
‘ parliament; and I am confident, that were they left  
‘ to a free choice, we should not see so many civil  
‘ and military officers brought into parliament. The  
‘ people, I believe, would always think themselves  
‘ more secure in being represented by country-gentle-  
‘ men, with whom they are well acquainted, and  
‘ who can have no interest separate from them, than  
‘ by clerks of offices, or such other persons, whom  
‘ they perhaps never saw, or heard of, before they  
‘ came down to be chosen their representatives, and  
‘ whom probably they may never see again, till they  
‘ return to ask the same favour; which every gentle-  
‘ man here knows to be often the case of many of our  
‘ little boroughs in *England*. But to say that it  
‘ would be any injustice to lay a restraint upon the  
‘ people as to the choice of their representatives, seems  
‘ to me very extraordinary, when we consider the laws  
‘ now in being, by which the people are restrained  
‘ from choosing any gentleman for their representative  
‘ who is not possessed of such an estate. Surely we may,  
‘ with respect to elections, without being guilty of  
‘ any injustice, lay what restraints we think necessary  
‘ for the good of the public, and the preservation of  
‘ our constitution; for I am sure that whatever is for  
‘ the benefit of the people cannot be justly said or  
‘ thought to be injurious to the crown. It is extra-  
‘ ordinary to say, that what is proposed by this bill  
‘ would be an injustice done to those who are thereby  
‘ to be made incapable of being elected; for have not

‘ we already a law, by which all the officers con-  
 ‘ cerned in the collection of the customs and excise,  
 ‘ are rendered incapable of being chosen members of  
 ‘ parliament, and yet I have never before heard it  
 ‘ urged that there was any injustice done to those  
 ‘ gentlemen by excluding them from having seats in  
 ‘ parliament as long as they are in an office, which is  
 ‘ inconsistent with their being members of this house.  
 ‘ I will allow, that the choice made by the burgesſes  
 ‘ of a little borough, or by the freeholders of a county,  
 ‘ if it falls upon an officer, civil or military, ſhews  
 ‘ that the majority of thoſe electors, at that time, did  
 ‘ not think the office he then enjoyed incompatible or  
 ‘ inconsistent with his being their repreſentative; but  
 ‘ I hope it will not be ſaid that the burgesſes of a  
 ‘ little borough, or even the freeholders of a county,  
 ‘ are better judges in this reſpect than the repreſenta-  
 ‘ tives of the whole people of *Great Britain* met in  
 ‘ this houſe, eſpecially when the opinion of this houſe  
 ‘ is approved of and confirmed by the other two  
 ‘ branches of our legiſlature. As to the alternative  
 ‘ pretended, that if this bill ſhould paſs into a law,  
 ‘ it would render either the officers civil and military  
 ‘ contemptible, or this houſe contemptible, in the  
 ‘ eyes of the people; I cannot imagine how it could  
 ‘ produce either of theſe effects; for as to the officers,  
 ‘ civil or military, is it to be imagined, that a ſuc-  
 ‘ ceſſful general or admiral, a brave and experienced  
 ‘ captain by ſea or land, or a civil officer, honeſt,  
 ‘ expert, and diligent in the ſtation he is in, would  
 ‘ be contemned becauſe he was not capable of being  
 ‘ a member of this houſe? Were the clergy ever  
 ‘ brought into contempt by their being excluded the  
 ‘ privilege of being choſen members of parliament?  
 ‘ On the contrary, I believe they never got any ho-  
 ‘ nour

‘nour by being members of either house; and I believe there are very few officers, civil or military, in the kingdom, who ever gained much honour or much repute among the people by their being members of either house of parliament, unless when their being such was the occasion of their being turned out of the offices they enjoyed, and might have continued to enjoy to their own honour, and the advantage of their country, if they had not been members of parliament. As to the other part of the alternative, that this house may be rendered contemptible by what is now proposed, I am not in the least afraid of it; but I am very much afraid, that if some bill of this nature is not speedily passed into a law, this house will become contemptible in the eyes, not only of our own people, but of the whole world. Gentlemen may pretend that no man is influenced in his way of thinking, or in his manner of acting, in this house, by the post or the office he possesses, and from which he may be turned out, whenever a prime minister may have a mind; but while men are men, I am convinced there will always be a great number, by far, I fear, the greatest number, who will rather vote according to the directions of the prime minister for the time being, than run the risk of being turned out of the lucrative post or office they then hold at the pleasure of the crown; and if ever a majority of this house should happen to be composed of such men, I am sure it will become as contemptible as ever the senate of *Rome* was, after it became the political tool of their arbitrary and tyrannical emperors. I will likewise agree with the honourable gentlemen, that it may be necessary, at least it may be convenient, for this house always to have in it *some* of those gentlemen, who belong to, and are

‘ conversant in, the methods of transacting business  
 ‘ in the several great offices of the kingdom; and  
 ‘ therefore I am not for excluding from seats in par-  
 ‘ liament *all* those who are in offices, civil and mili-  
 ‘ tary. I believe no gentleman in this house ever had  
 ‘ any such thought in his head; and if gentlemen will  
 ‘ but peruse the bill, as it stands now, they will see  
 ‘ that there is to be an exception, which is now left  
 ‘ blank, as in all such cases is usual, in order that  
 ‘ when we go into a committee, gentlemen may then  
 ‘ propose the filling up in that blank as many officers,  
 ‘ or as many sorts of officers, as they have a mind.  
 ‘ About this, indeed, I expected there might have  
 ‘ been some debates; but considering the great num-  
 ‘ ber of officers of all sorts we have now in the house,  
 ‘ considering how greatly the number may be increased  
 ‘ in times to come; considering the great clamour al-  
 ‘ ready raised in the nation against so many officers  
 ‘ being in this house; I really did not expect that any  
 ‘ gentleman would have opposed the committing of  
 ‘ the bill, or would have pretended that the passing  
 ‘ of some such bill was not become necessary, both for  
 ‘ the honour of this house and the safety of our consti-  
 ‘ tution. To conclude, the bill is at present but a  
 ‘ blank; but I am confident it may be made a good  
 ‘ and reasonable bill, and agreeable to every gentle-  
 ‘ man in this house; therefore, I hope, the house  
 ‘ will agree to the going into a committee upon it,  
 ‘ because, if gentlemen do not like it after the blanks  
 ‘ are filled up, they may then drop it, or throw it out  
 ‘ upon the third reading <sup>a</sup>.’

In the famous year 1739, a place-bill, as above  
 mentioned, was proposed to the commons by Mr.  
*Sandys* in the following speech:

‘ Sir,

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. VIII. 122.

‘ Sir, I am now going to lay before you a proposal  
‘ which has already been several times made to you,  
‘ without meeting with that success which I thought  
‘ it deserved ; but as I think it a good one, and abso-  
‘ lutely necessary for the preservation of our consti-  
‘ tution, I am far from being discouraged by its former  
‘ bad success, nor shall I be discouraged from a future  
‘ attempt, even though it should now meet with as bad  
‘ a reception as heretofore, because I am fully con-  
‘ vinced of the truth of that observation, which was  
‘ long ago made by one of our best lawyers, That a  
‘ good bill or motion once proposed in parliament,  
‘ and entered upon our journals, can never die : It  
‘ may at first meet with bad success : it may meet  
‘ with repeated bad success ; but, unless our constitu-  
‘ tion be absolutely and irrecoverably destroyed, it will  
‘ by its own merits, at last force its way through the  
‘ several branches of our legislature.’ [This crite-  
‘ rion, if applied to the present times, when we have  
‘ reason to think no merits whatever would carry a bill  
‘ through the houses, unless it were favoured by the  
‘ ministry, is so shocking, that it will hardly bear to  
‘ be thought of.] ‘ The proposal, I am to make,  
‘ Sir, is plainly and in short, this, That criminals  
‘ may not be allowed to be their own judges ; and  
‘ that our liberties may not be committed to the keep-  
‘ ing of those who are retained to destroy them. It is  
‘ the duty of parliament to redress all public grie-  
‘ vances, and punish all high and heinous offenders,  
‘ who have been artful or powerful enough to evade  
‘ the laws of the kingdom. It is the duty of parlia-  
‘ ment to grant no more money for the public service  
‘ than what is absolutely necessary, and to see that  
‘ money properly applied and duly accounted for.  
‘ And it is the duty of parliament to watch over the  
‘ liberties

‘ liberties and privileges of the people, by taking care  
 ‘ not to pass any laws that are inconsistent with the  
 ‘ liberties and privileges of the people, and by pro-  
 ‘ viding speedy and effectual remedies against all en-  
 ‘ croachments that have been, or may be, made by  
 ‘ ambitious princes, or guilty ministers. These,  
 ‘ Sir, are among the chief of the duties of parliament;  
 ‘ but how can we expect a performance, if a majority  
 ‘ of the members be such, whose self-preservation or  
 ‘ security depends upon their neglecting or acting con-  
 ‘ trary to these duties? Can we expect, that public  
 ‘ grievances will be redressed, if a majority of par-  
 ‘ liament be such as have themselves been, or such as  
 ‘ are the friends and confederates of those that have  
 ‘ been the cause of these public grievances? Can we  
 ‘ expect that any high offender will be punished by  
 ‘ parliament, if the majority of it be such as have  
 ‘ been companions and sharers with him in his crimes,  
 ‘ or such whose chief subsistence depends upon screen-  
 ‘ ing him from justice? Can we expect that any sup-  
 ‘ ply demanded by the crown will be refused, if it is  
 ‘ to be granted by those, whose chief subsistence de-  
 ‘ pends upon making the grant; or that the public  
 ‘ money will be properly applied, or duly accounted  
 ‘ for, if those who have applied or may apply it  
 ‘ to their own use, are to be the only inspectors of  
 ‘ the public accounts? Or, lastly, Sir, can we expect  
 ‘ that a parliament will guard against the encroach-  
 ‘ ments of an ambitious prince or guilty minister, if  
 ‘ the majority of that parliament be such as have the  
 ‘ whole, or a necessary part of their subsistence, from  
 ‘ the places or pensions they hold at the arbitrary  
 ‘ will of that ambitious prince, or guilty minister?  
 ‘ These are questions, which, in my opinion, can be  
 ‘ answered in the affirmative by no man who will  
 ‘ and



‘ and dare make use of his reason ; and yet every  
 ‘ one of these questions must, I think, be answered  
 ‘ in the affirmative by those who affirm that our  
 ‘ constitution can never be in any danger from a  
 ‘ majority or near a majority of this house being  
 ‘ composed of such as hold places and pensions at  
 ‘ the arbitrary will of the crown. I shall grant,  
 ‘ Sir, that it may be necessary for us to have amongst  
 ‘ us some of the chief officers of the treasury, admiral-  
 ‘ ralty, and army, as well as several others of those  
 ‘ that are employed by his majesty as chief officers in  
 ‘ the executive part of our government. These, I  
 ‘ say, it may be necessary to have amongst us, in  
 ‘ order to give us such information, as may often  
 ‘ become necessary in the several branches of business  
 ‘ that come regularly before this house.’ [Here Mr.  
*Sandys* might have observed, that even supposing  
 the *presence* of some of the officers of state necessary  
 occasionally in the house of commons, it does not  
 follow, that their *voting* is necessary. The judges sit in  
 the upper house, as skilled in the laws ; but they do  
 not *vote*.] ‘ But I am sure it is no way necessary,  
 ‘ but on the contrary, quite inconsistent with the dig-  
 ‘ nity of this house, to have it filled with clerks of  
 ‘ offices, and inferior officers of our navy and army.  
 ‘ I confess I have the greatest regard for such of those  
 ‘ as we have at present amongst us ; because I hope  
 ‘ they have all so much honour, that they would disdain  
 ‘ to sacrifice their duty, as members of this house, to any  
 ‘ selfish consideration ; but we cannot be sure that those  
 ‘ who succeed them in their offices and employments  
 ‘ will be gentlemen of so much honour ; and as they  
 ‘ may likewise succeed them with regard to their seats  
 ‘ in this house, our constitution may be thereby  
 ‘ brought into the utmost danger ; for if I were not  
 ‘ well

‘ well assured of the honour of those officers we have  
 ‘ now amongst us, we have already such a number,  
 ‘ that I should think our constitution upon the brink  
 ‘ of destruction; and as the number may increase so  
 ‘ as, in a short time, to become the majority of this  
 ‘ house, whilst we have it in our power, we ought  
 ‘ to take care to provide against this danger by limit-  
 ‘ ing the number of officers that are to have seats in  
 ‘ this house; for if the majority of this house should  
 ‘ once come to be composed of officers, and these  
 ‘ officers such as had a greater regard to the places  
 ‘ they possess, or preferments they hope for, than to  
 ‘ the liberties and constitution of their country, it  
 ‘ would be ridiculous to think of getting the approba-  
 ‘ tion of this house to any such regulation. There-  
 ‘ fore, Sir, as this is not yet, I hope, our unfortunate  
 ‘ case, I shall beg leave to move, that leave may be  
 ‘ given to bring in a bill for the better securing the  
 ‘ freedom of parliament, by limiting the number of  
 ‘ officers to sit in the house of commons <sup>a</sup>.’

Mr. (late lord) *Lyttelton*, spoke in defence of it as follows.

‘ Sir, While this house is full of independent gen-  
 ‘ tlemen, or of such placemen only whose places are  
 ‘ not so much the best of their property, that they  
 ‘ cannot risk the loss of them without a spirit of mar-  
 ‘ tyrdom, who have something of their own sufficient  
 ‘ to outweigh their employments, and while the num-  
 ‘ ber even of these shall be confined within some mode-  
 ‘ rate bounds, a minister must regard this assembly as  
 ‘ an awful tribunal, before which he is constantly to  
 ‘ account for his conduct: He must respect your judg-  
 ‘ ments, he must dread your censures, he must feel  
 ‘ your

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XI. 202.

‘ your superintendency. But we can imagine a future  
‘ house of commons so crowded with placemen, that a  
‘ spectator in the gallery might be apt to mistake and  
‘ think himself at the levée of a minister instead of a  
‘ parliament. The benches here may be covered not  
‘ only with officers of rank in the government, not  
‘ only with the servants of the crown, but with the  
‘ servants, perhaps, of their servants; and what senti-  
‘ ments, Sir, have we reason to think the sight of a  
‘ house so filled would excite in a minister? Would  
‘ he think himself in the presence of his country, or in  
‘ the midst of a guard that would enable him to defy  
‘ its justice, and deride its resentment. The possibility  
‘ of this happening hereafter is the ground of this bill;  
‘ which therefore the people of *England* do not only  
‘ consider as a single point to be gained for them upon  
‘ any present necessity, but as a general security against  
‘ all they apprehend for the future. Sir, my worthy  
‘ friend, who made you this motion, in the opening  
‘ of it explained to you sufficiently, that there is no  
‘ intent of running into any extremes. If I thought  
‘ there was, I would oppose it as much as any man here.  
‘ I know but one thing more preposterous than such a  
‘ general place-bill as would exclude all persons in  
‘ office from a seat in this house, and that is to leave  
‘ the number of them under no limitation at all. But  
‘ for fear of starving, must we die of a surfeit? Be-  
‘ tween these two absurdities, can no medium be  
‘ found? Cannot we continue those amongst us who  
‘ are of any use to the house, who can give any  
‘ assistance, any weight, any facility, any grace to our  
‘ proceedings, and shut the door against others, whom  
‘ it is neither decent, nor safe, to admit? Sir, the  
‘ doing this is easy; it will be done by this bill, it is  
‘ what the wisdom of former parliaments would have  
‘ done

‘ done long before now. But the reason, they did it not  
 ‘ was, It never entered into their thoughts to conceive  
 ‘ that some, who have since sat in parliament, would  
 ‘ attempt to come there, I do not mean, from any  
 ‘ personal incapacity, but from the nature itself of  
 ‘ their offices, incompatible almost with the very idea  
 ‘ of a member of parliament. It is a surprizing  
 ‘ thing; but it is verified by what we see every day,  
 ‘ that the common practice of some ages goes beyond  
 ‘ even the fears of the past. We must, therefore,  
 ‘ supply from experience what our predecessors failed  
 ‘ to foresee; and we are called upon to do so by  
 ‘ the unanimous voice of the nation. Sir, the greatest  
 ‘ affairs before us are of less importance than this. It  
 ‘ is better *Spain* should invade the freedom of the  
 ‘ *American* seas, than the crown of *England* violate the  
 ‘ independence of parliament. It is not *Spanish* or  
 ‘ *French* arms, but *Spanish* and *French* maxims of  
 ‘ government, that we should have most to fear from,  
 ‘ if the vigilant caution, the jealous spirit of liberty  
 ‘ in this house did not concur with the goodness, the  
 ‘ natural goodness of his majesty, to secure our free  
 ‘ constitution. Let the cortes of *Spain*, let the par-  
 ‘ liament of *Paris*, be a warning to us; let them shew  
 ‘ us what we may come to, if we do not prevent the  
 ‘ growth of corruption, before it produces here the  
 ‘ insensible, gradual, fatal change it did there.

‘ Sir, I am trying to recollect what objections have  
 ‘ been made to this bill, and I protest I can find none  
 ‘ that seem to me to want a reply. One chiefly in-  
 ‘ sisted upon is, That it carries an air of suspicion.  
 ‘ Sir, in all the states that I have read of antient and  
 ‘ modern, the most suspicious people have been always  
 ‘ the latest enslaved. To suspect human frailty in  
 ‘ tempting circumstances, is a very natural jealousy;  
 ‘ and

‘ and a too secure confidence will hardly be thought a  
 ‘ parliamentary virtue. It is painful indeed to be sus-  
 ‘ pected, but the greater the pain, the greater the desire  
 ‘ should be to remove that suspicion. But, Sir,  
 ‘ against the present house of commons, no such sus-  
 ‘ picion can be conceived—Upon what grounds should  
 ‘ it be founded? Upon what probability? Has the  
 ‘ private discourse of such gentlemen here ever been  
 ‘ different from their public behaviour? Have they  
 ‘ ever talked one way and voted another? Have there  
 ‘ been any indications of a private interest, that of any  
 ‘ one man ever prevailing over that of the nation,  
 ‘ against fact, reason, or justice? Have not the ma-  
 ‘ jority here constantly shewn the strongest conviction,  
 ‘ that their conduct was strictly conformable to the  
 ‘ most disinterested love of their country? Such a  
 ‘ house of commons ought not to be, is not suspected:  
 ‘ But granting such a doubt to have been formed, Is  
 ‘ this the way to remove it? Will the rejecting this  
 ‘ bill clear our character, or can all the art and power  
 ‘ of calumny give half the weight to an imputation of  
 ‘ that kind as such a proceeding? Sir, to those who  
 ‘ treat this bill as a chimerical thing, an idle specu-  
 ‘ lative project, I will say but one word, That the  
 ‘ most chimerical thing in nature is the notion of a  
 ‘ free constitution, where the restraining powers are  
 ‘ not entirely exempt from dependency. Such liberty  
 ‘ is indeed a speculation fit for school-boys; for what  
 ‘ would terms and appearances avail, if independence  
 ‘ were lost? You might retain the vain ensigns of  
 ‘ your former authority, but would they give you any  
 ‘ dignity? Would they be of any use to the public?  
 ‘ The mace there upon your table, what would it  
 ‘ signify? It might be borne before you with ridiculous  
 ‘ pomp; but it would be what *Cromwel* called it once,

‘ a mere bauble ; or, if it had any weight, it would  
 ‘ be only to oppress, not to protect. Sir, the present  
 ‘ form of our government, keep it but free from cor-  
 ‘ ruption, is so wisely constituted, the powers in it  
 ‘ are so happily mixed, that it has all the advantages  
 ‘ of a republic without the defects and evils attending  
 ‘ one. But, on the other side, I must say that if it  
 ‘ should be corrupted, if the contracts of parliament  
 ‘ should be bought off by the crown, the very reverse  
 ‘ would be true ; and it would have all the defects, all  
 ‘ the evils of an absolute monarchy, without the ad-  
 ‘ vantages ; it would be a more expensive, and worse  
 ‘ administered absolute power. Sir, I hope it is under-  
 ‘ stood that in what I have said I am only contending  
 ‘ for a provisional security against a mischief not yet  
 ‘ felt in all its malignity, but yet of so increasing a  
 ‘ nature, and such ruinous consequences, that we must  
 ‘ be blind not to foresee, and worse than careless, not to  
 ‘ prevent them. I will only add, that every year we  
 ‘ delay this security, may probably add both to the  
 ‘ necessity and difficulty of obtaining it ; and that  
 ‘ people out of doors may be apt to doubt, from the  
 ‘ success of this question to-day, whether even now  
 ‘ it does not come a little too late <sup>a</sup>.’

Mr. *Pulteney*, on the same occasion, spoke as follows.

‘ Sir, The opposition made to this motion, is, in my  
 ‘ opinion, one of the strongest arguments that can be  
 ‘ made use of in its favour, and must I think appear  
 ‘ so to every man, who considers the persons concerned  
 ‘ in that opposition, and the arguments they make use  
 ‘ of for supporting it. Who are the persons that  
 ‘ oppose

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XI. 208.

‘ oppose this motion? Who were they that have al-  
 ‘ ways opposed such motions? Placemen, ministers,  
 ‘ and the favourites or pensioners of ministers. What  
 ‘ do they say for justifying their opposition? They  
 ‘ deny a principle, a maxim, which in all ages, in all  
 ‘ countries has hitherto been acknowledged; and upon  
 ‘ which many of our laws now in being, are founded.  
 ‘ That a gentleman’s behaviour in this house may be  
 ‘ influenced by a place or pension, is a maxim univer-  
 ‘ sally acknowledged, and in this kingdom so much  
 ‘ established, that we have already by law excluded  
 ‘ many of the former, and all the latter, from having  
 ‘ seats in this house. We have, I say, already by law  
 ‘ excluded all pensioners from having seats in this  
 ‘ house, and I should be glad to know the difference  
 ‘ between a pension of 1000*l.* a year, and a place  
 ‘ with a salary of 1000*l.* a year. I know of none,  
 ‘ save only that the latter is generally more valuable  
 ‘ than the former; and therefore a gentleman will be  
 ‘ more loth to lose it, or to give a vote in this house,  
 ‘ that may disoblige a minister, who can take it from  
 ‘ him. I say, Sir, that a place with a salary of 1000*l.*  
 ‘ a year, is more valuable, than a pension of 1000*l.*  
 ‘ a year; because a place furnishes a gentleman with  
 ‘ an opportunity to serve his friends, and perhaps to  
 ‘ provide some of them with little places, or offices  
 ‘ under him. To which I must add, that a place  
 ‘ often furnishes a gentleman who is not very scrupu-  
 ‘ lous, with an opportunity of plundering his country  
 ‘ yearly, of twice, perhaps ten times, the value of his  
 ‘ salary; and this, I must observe, makes another very  
 ‘ material difference, between a place and a pension.  
 ‘ A placeman may very probably be a person, whose  
 ‘ conduct this house ought to enquire into. He may  
 ‘ be a public criminal, and therefore he will certainly

' be againſt an impartial and ſtrict enquiry into the  
 ' conduct of any miniſter, officer, or placeman, leſt  
 ' the enquiry ſhould at laſt light upon himſelf. There  
 ' is therefore greater reaſon for excluding all place-  
 ' men, than for excluding all penſioners from having  
 ' ſeats in this houſe. Our admitting ſome of the for-  
 ' mer, does not proceed from an opinion, that a gen-  
 ' tleman's behaviour may not be influenced by a place,  
 ' as much as by a penſion, but from the neceſſity we  
 ' are under of having ſome great officers amongſt us,  
 ' in order to give us proper information and direction  
 ' in many affairs that muſt come under our considera-  
 ' tion. For this reaſon, when I hear gentlemen who  
 ' have very good places, gravely telling us, that no  
 ' gentleman of family or fortune can by any place he  
 ' may enjoy, or expect, be induced to join in meaſures  
 ' that may be of dangerous conſequence to the confi-  
 ' tution or liberties of his country, I think it is a clear  
 ' proof not only that the behaviour of a gentleman of  
 ' family and fortune may be influenced by the poſts he  
 ' enjoys or expects, but alſo that his judgment may be  
 ' byaſſed. He may thereby be induced to think  
 ' thoſe things indifferent, or of no moment, that are  
 ' far from being ſo. He may be thereby induced to  
 ' think the liberties of his country in no danger, when  
 ' they are upon the very brink of deſtruction. Sir, let  
 ' us conſider that of the 513 members who repreſent  
 ' *England and Wales*, there are but 92 choſen by  
 ' counties, and of the remaining 421, there are at leaſt  
 ' 350 choſen by cities, boroughs, and cinque ports,  
 ' where the adminiſtration would have the abſolute  
 ' command and direction. If this ſhould ever happen  
 ' to be our unlucky ſituation, can we ſuppoſe that any  
 ' gentleman would ſet up to be a member of this  
 ' houſe, or a representative even for any of our coun-



ties, but such as resolved to submit with regard to their behaviour here to the absolute direction of the prime minister? No gentleman of honour would put himself to expence, or expose himself to the resentment of an all powerful minister, if by setting up as a candidate at any election, he were absolutely certain that he could thereby do his country no service. Instead of gentlemen of family, fortune, character, or interest in their country, we should then see this house filled with the lowest tools and vilest sycophants of absolute power. Instead of this house's being a check upon ministers; it would then, like the parliament of *France*, or the *Roman* senates under their emperors, be an instrument for the oppressions of ministers, and a cloak for their crimes. The most rapacious plunderer, the most tyrannical oppressor would then insolently boast, that he did nothing but according to law, that the public treasure was regularly accounted for in parliament, and that he was at all times ready to submit his conduct to a parliamentary enquiry. Surely, Sir, no gentleman can think that the liberties of this nation consist in our having the resemblance of a parliament. We may have a parliament, that parliament may be chosen once every seven years, may sit annually as it does now, may pass laws, grant money, receive accounts, and even make enquiries, and yet we may have neither constitution, nor liberty left; for if it should once come to be in the power of the administration to have always a majority in parliament, ready to obey the directions given them by the ministers, there would be no necessity for destroying the form of our constitution, or for making a direct and absolute surrender of our liberties. Without either of these, our sovereign would be as absolute,

‘ and might be more tyrannical, than the *Grand Signiør*  
 ‘ himself. Such a parliament would grant him as  
 ‘ many spahis and janizaries as he thought necessary,  
 ‘ for keeping his slaves in subjection ; would give him  
 ‘ any revenue he pleased to demand, and would pass  
 ‘ whatever laws he might please to propose ; and the  
 ‘ judges being under no parliamentary restraint, would  
 ‘ in every part of his dominions give judgment accord-  
 ‘ ing to the directions of the prime vizier, or govern-  
 ‘ ing bashaw. Thus oppression would be countenanced  
 ‘ by the forms of law, the people plundered, and the  
 ‘ innocent murdered, by the administration of justice.  
 ‘ It is this sort of ruin, Sir, we have chiefly to ap-  
 ‘ prehend, and this sort of ruin we may step by step  
 ‘ be led into, without our being sensible of the several  
 ‘ steps. We shall certainly be led into it, if we trust  
 ‘ any longer the guardianship of our liberties to those  
 ‘ whose foresight is dimmed by the places they enjoy,  
 ‘ or expect. If a minister were to propose a law for  
 ‘ giving the crown a power of sending to every county,  
 ‘ city, and borough in the kingdom, such a *congé*  
 ‘ *d’elire* for the choice of members of parliament, as  
 ‘ is now sent to a dean and chapter for the choice of  
 ‘ a bishop, I believe very few gentlemen of family or  
 ‘ fortune, would, for the sake of any place, agree to it.  
 ‘ But an equivalent power may be got by multiplying  
 ‘ penal laws, and increasing the number and power of  
 ‘ officers ; and a gentleman of fortune, family, character,  
 ‘ and interest in his country may, by a good place, be  
 ‘ induced to believe, that such a law, or such an increase  
 ‘ of the number and power of officers, is necessary for  
 ‘ preventing fraudulent practices, or the like ; and may  
 ‘ therefore agree to it, without seeing the danger our  
 ‘ constitution may be thereby exposed to. Thus,  
 ‘ by degrees, he may be made to agree to such propo-  
 ‘ sitions,

‘ fitions, one after another, till he has thereby esta-  
‘ blished in the crown the absolute direction of most of  
‘ the elections in the kingdom. This, Sir, would  
‘ have been the certain consequence of the late excise  
‘ scheme; and yet there were many gentlemen of  
‘ family and fortune that approved of it. I am con-  
‘ vinced they did not foresee this consequence; nay,  
‘ I have so much charity as to believe, that the chief  
‘ patron of that scheme did not; but every impartial  
‘ man in the kingdom is now, I believe, sensible of  
‘ it. That scheme was indeed such a large step  
‘ towards giving the crown the direction of most of  
‘ our elections, and by good luck was so thoroughly  
‘ considered before it was brought into this house,  
‘ that most gentlemen became sensible of the danger  
‘ before it was too late; and that was the cause of its  
‘ meeting with the fate it deserved; but its fate will  
‘ be a warning to future ministers not to attempt  
‘ making such a large step at once: they will from  
‘ thence see that they must grasp at this power by  
‘ little and little, which they will certainly do, and  
‘ as certainly at last accomplish, unless we take  
‘ care to exclude from this house most of those  
‘ who, by the places they enjoy, are induced to have  
‘ a better opinion of ministers than any man ought  
‘ to have, that is entrusted with the guardianship of  
‘ the constitution and liberties of his country. The  
‘ question is not, Sir, whether a gentleman may  
‘ be induced by the office or place he holds or ex-  
‘ pects, to make at once, and in an open and direct  
‘ manner, an absolute surrender of the liberties of his  
‘ country. No prince, or minister, of common sense  
‘ will ever desire such a surrender, because, if he  
‘ can get into his hands an uncontrollable power  
‘ over most of our elections, and consequently the

direction of the parliaments chosen by this uncontrollable power, his power will in every respect be as absolute, and may be exercised in a more arbitrary manner, and with greater security to himself, than it could be without the appearance of a parliamentary authority; for every unpopular and oppressive measure would then be made the act and deed of the parliament; and the lenity of the minister in the execution of those penal laws enacted by parliament, or in the exercise of those powers granted him by parliament, would be set forth and extolled by his tools in a Gazetteer, or some such paper, published by his authority, and dispersed through the whole kingdom at the public expence. The question, therefore, now before us, is, Whether a gentleman's eyes may not, by a lucrative and honourable post or employment, be so overclouded as to prevent his seeing through the plausible pretences that may, from time to time, be made use of by an artful minister, for getting into his hands, or into the hands of the crown, such an uncontrollable power as I have mentioned; and this question, even with respect to gentlemen of family and fortune, will, I am sure, be answered in the affirmative by every man in this kingdom, who does not possess or expect some post or employment, or some of those titles of honour which, by our constitution, as it is now modelled, the crown has absolutely at its disposal. To tell us, Sir, that our liberties can never be in danger from a majority of placemen in this house, unless the people be generally abandoned as to all principles of virtue and public good, and unless the crown has, at the same time, formed designs against our liberties; and that the only method for removing this danger, in case we

‘ we should at any time be threatened with it, would  
‘ be to take proper measures for restoring virtue and  
‘ public spirit among the people, and for removing  
‘ evil counsellors from about the throne—to tell us  
‘ this, I say, Sir, in a serious manner, is something  
‘ very extraordinary : It is mistaking the effect for  
‘ the cause, and desiring us to begin at the wrong  
‘ end. Corruption, Sir, is not the effect, but the  
‘ cause of a general depravity of manners among the  
‘ people of any country, and has in all countries, as  
‘ well as this, been first practised and encouraged by  
‘ ministers and courtiers. It would therefore be ridi-  
‘ culous in us to think of restoring virtue among the  
‘ people, till we have once made it impossible for  
‘ ministers and courtiers to corrupt them ; and I am  
‘ sure it would be still more ridiculous in us to think of  
‘ removing an evil counsellor from about the throne,  
‘ till we have once removed his creatures and tools  
‘ out of this house. I hope, Sir, there are at present  
‘ no evil counsellors about the throne ; if there were,  
‘ I am sure no such counsellor has a majority of his  
‘ creatures and tools in this house. If this were the  
‘ case, it would have been very ridiculous to have  
‘ made such a motion as this now before us. It  
‘ would be very ridiculous to think of restoring our  
‘ constitution by any legal method. It is this mis-  
‘ fortune we intend to prevent by the bill now moved  
‘ for. It is a misfortune now foreseen by all unpre-  
‘ judiced men in the kingdom. I hope it is not yet  
‘ too late to think of preventing it by a legal method ;  
‘ for after we have once fallen into this misfortune,  
‘ it will be impossible to recover. If an ambitious  
‘ minister should once get a majority of his creatures  
‘ and tools into this house, can we suppose they  
‘ would consent to impeach or remove him from the  
‘ throne ?

‘ throne? Can we suppose they would ever consent  
‘ to any bill that might tend to distress the administra-  
‘ tion of their master? Can we suppose they would  
‘ refuse any thing that might tend to prolong his ad-  
‘ ministration and increase his power? Every attempt  
‘ to restore the constitution would be branded with the  
‘ name of republicanism. The discontents of the  
‘ people would be called disaffection and jacobitism;  
‘ every opposition would be said to proceed from  
‘ malice and resentment; and the misfortune would  
‘ be, that many honest well-meaning men, induced  
‘ by their places to have a better opinion of ministers  
‘ than they ought to have, would give credit to these  
‘ pretences, and would believe that by agreeing to  
‘ the minister’s arbitrary schemes, they were only  
‘ strengthening the hands of the government against  
‘ republicanism, jacobitism, and sedition. If it were  
‘ possible to be merry in a debate of so great import-  
‘ ance, it would be diverting to observe the contra-  
‘ diction in the arguments made use of against this  
‘ motion. By some our gentlemen of family and for-  
‘ tune are represented to be men of such strict honour  
‘ and such clean heads, that no place or pension can  
‘ mislead their judgment, or misdirect their will; no  
‘ selfish consideration can make them overlook the  
‘ danger our liberties may be exposed to, or consent  
‘ to any thing they think may in the least endanger  
‘ our constitution. By others, again, our gentlemen  
‘ of family and fortune are represented as such selfish  
‘ mercenary creatures, that unless the government  
‘ would give them posts or pensions, they would  
‘ refuse to consent to those things that are absolutely  
‘ necessary for the ends of government and the pre-  
‘ servation of their country. Now these two contra-  
‘ dictory positions, though they cannot be equally  
‘ true,

‘ true, may be, and I believe they are, equally false.  
‘ We have, I believe, some gentlemen amongst us whose  
‘ judgment cannot be byassed, nor their will directed  
‘ by any selfish consideration. Such men, I hope, we  
‘ shall always have in some of our highest offices,  
‘ and these are not designed by this bill to be excluded  
‘ from having seats in this house; but their number  
‘ will always be small, and therefore not sufficient by  
‘ themselves alone to support the constitution against  
‘ a combination of all the fools and knaves that may  
‘ hereafter get into this house; therefore we must en-  
‘ deavour to prevent this combination, and this can  
‘ only be done by such a bill as is now proposed. On  
‘ the other hand, I believe, there may be some  
‘ amongst us, who propose nothing by their service  
‘ in this house, but their own private advantage; and  
‘ whilst we have placemen and pensioners amongst us,  
‘ such men will endeavour all they can to get into  
‘ parliament: Nay, it may become so customary for  
‘ every man that votes with the court to have a place  
‘ or a pension, that no man will do so without some  
‘ such reward. But if ever this selfish spirit should  
‘ get into parliament, our constitution will be undone;  
‘ and to prevent this is the design of the bill now  
‘ moved for: If no man could, by being a mem-  
‘ ber of parliament, propose to get any place, or  
‘ office, or any advantage to himself, the mercenary  
‘ and selfish would seldom endeavour to get themselves  
‘ chosen, at least they would never be at any expence  
‘ for this purpose; and as such men have seldom a  
‘ great natural interest in any part of the kingdom,  
‘ there would always be such a small number of them  
‘ in parliament, that their opposition could never ob-  
‘ struct or retard any thing that seemed necessary for  
‘ the just ends of government, or for the preservation  
‘ and

‘ and happiness of the society. The public good  
‘ would then be the only aim of ministers, as well as  
‘ members, because neither of them could hope for  
‘ success in any other ; and as men of good sense and  
‘ strict honour are the best judges, and the most ready  
‘ to agree upon what is necessary for the public good,  
‘ it would then be as much the business of ministers  
‘ to get such men chosen, as it is now their business to  
‘ get such members chosen as are men of mercenary  
‘ tempers or shallow understandings ; for all ministers  
‘ will have jobs to do in parliament as long as they  
‘ have any hopes of success, and the weak or mer-  
‘ cenary will always be the most proper for this pur-  
‘ pose. I am indeed surpris’d, Sir, to hear it said by  
‘ an honourable gentleman, whose attachment to the  
‘ present establishment is not to be doubted, that if  
‘ most placemen were excluded from this house, there  
‘ would soon be a majority of Jacobites in it. Such  
‘ a supposition is not to be made, without first sup-  
‘ posing that a great majority of the people are Jaco-  
‘ bites ; and to suppose this is, I am sure, no com-  
‘ pliment to our present royal family, and much less  
‘ to the king now upon our throne. As long as our  
‘ parliaments are independent, and our elections free,  
‘ there can never be any considerable number of Jaco-  
‘ bites either in this house or in the nation ; but if  
‘ there should once come to be a majority of place-  
‘ men and officers in the house, that majority would  
‘ soon create a majority of Jacobites in the nation ;  
‘ and in that case, though the majority within doors  
‘ might be a good security to ministers against parlia-  
‘ mentary prosecutions, yet it would be but a bad  
‘ security for the royal family against an insurrection  
‘ of the whole people without doors. The army,  
‘ upon



‘ upon which we now seem so much to depend, or a  
‘ great part of them, would probably join with the  
‘ people, and the certain consequence would be the  
‘ overthrow of our present establishment. This dan-  
‘ ger, I know, a guilty minister will always choose  
‘ to expose his master to, rather than expose himself  
‘ to a legal trial before a free and independent parlia-  
‘ ment; because, in a general conflagration, he may pos-  
‘ sibly escape notice, or may perhaps be able to sacrifice  
‘ his master by way of an atonement for himself; but  
‘ those who support him in thus exposing his master,  
‘ can have no great regard for their sovereign, and  
‘ in such an event would certainly meet with the  
‘ contempt and punishment they so highly deserved.  
‘ For this reason, Sir, as I have a greater regard for  
‘ the security of the royal family than I have for that  
‘ of our present ministers, or of any set of ministers,  
‘ that shall ever get into the management of our  
‘ public affairs, I shall be for putting it out of the  
‘ power of any future minister to over-turn our con-  
‘ stitution, by getting a majority of placemen and  
‘ pensioners into this house. This, I think, is now  
‘ become absolutely necessary for preventing our being  
‘ brought under one of the worst sort of tyrannical  
‘ governments that was ever contrived, or established.  
‘ For this purpose the bill now moved for is one of  
‘ the most certain, and one of the most obvious me-  
‘ thods that can be thought of. It can be attended  
‘ with no inconvenience. It is impossible to shew so  
‘ much as a plausible reason against it; and there-  
‘ fore, if this motion be rejected, it must afford a most  
‘ melancholy reflection to every one that understands our  
‘ constitution, and has a regard for the liberties of his  
‘ country.’

It

It was urged by Mr. *Southwell*, and others, that the voice of the people called for this bill; and that voice called for the serious attention of a wise legislature; and that voice would be heard, first or last, and will have its effect; that it could not be smothered, much less rejected with contempt. In that house, they said, they ought to see with the same eyes with their constituents, and ought to feel what the nation feels, which was a good reason for not admitting place-men or pensioners; for the seeing and feeling of those who receive and those who pay will be very different. That they had heard it delivered in that house, that no man ought to be allowed to keep his place under the crown, who voted against the minister's measures, or jobs, in parliament. It was said, that it was well known that many boroughs were so publicly venal, that their brokers dealt as openly for the sale of them, as bawds for the sale of a prostitute.

‘ A post in the army having fallen vacant, *A. D.*  
 ‘ 1741, the gentleman, who had the next right to  
 ‘ it, happened to be a member of parliament, and  
 ‘ one that had opposed the court, which few officers  
 ‘ do now-a-days: the ministers, as usual, were  
 ‘ against his preferment, because he had opposed the  
 ‘ king's [that is, *their own*] measures in parliament;  
 ‘ but the king told them, the gentleman had always  
 ‘ behaved well as an officer, and he had nothing to  
 ‘ do with his behaviour in parliament; so gave him  
 ‘ the commission he had by his rank a right to<sup>a</sup>.’

The sense of the city of *London*, on this subject, appears from the following instruction to their representatives, *A. D.* 1741.

‘ As

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIII. 199.

‘ As nothing can effectually secure the freedom of  
 ‘ our happy constitution, except an uncorrupt, and  
 ‘ independent representation of the people, we insist on  
 ‘ your utmost endeavours to procure a proper bill for  
 ‘ reducing and limiting the number of placemen in  
 ‘ the house of commons, especially as so many gentle-  
 ‘ men, in a situation of manifest dependence, were  
 ‘ known to have seats in the last parliament <sup>a</sup>.’

A motion was made, *A. D.* 1742, by Mr. *Cornwall*, that leave be given to bring in a bill for the better securing the freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of officers in the house of commons. Sir *Watkin Williams Wynne* seconded the motion to the following effect :

‘ Sir, As this motion was last session agreed to, and  
 ‘ as the bill itself was brought in, and in every step  
 ‘ approved of by this very house of commons, I should  
 ‘ with great confidence of success rise up to second  
 ‘ this motion, if I did not, from experience, know,  
 ‘ that gentlemen often change their sentiments with  
 ‘ their situation ; and that a gentleman, after he be-  
 ‘ comes a placeman, begins to entertain notions of  
 ‘ the prerogatives of the crown, and the liberties of  
 ‘ the people, very different from those he held whilst  
 ‘ he was a plain honest country gentleman. If any  
 ‘ thing like this should happen in the present debate,  
 ‘ it may tend to disappoint the motion ; but with all  
 ‘ those who are neither placemen nor pensioners, I  
 ‘ am sure it ought to be an argument in its favour ;  
 ‘ and I hope it will prevail with some gentlemen,  
 ‘ who, in former sessions, opposed this motion, to  
 ‘ alter their sentiments and their way of voting upon  
 ‘ this occasion, when they have such a plain proof  
 ‘ before

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIII. 16.

‘ before their eyes, that if a place does not induce a  
‘ man to vote against his honour and his conscience,  
‘ it at least byasses his judgment, and makes him con-  
‘ clude that to be wrong which he before thought,  
‘ and declared to be right. Another strong argu-  
‘ ment in favour of this motion, Sir, is, the melan-  
‘ choly and distressed condition which the affairs of  
‘ *Europe*, as well as of this nation, are now reduced  
‘ to. We have, for near thirty years, been in a  
‘ course of approving and supporting almost every  
‘ political measure the crown seemed resolved to pur-  
‘ sue. With regard to foreign affairs, we have ap-  
‘ proved and supported every one of them without  
‘ exception. Thank God, I have had no concern in  
‘ this general uninterrupted approbation. I have, at  
‘ the respective times, publicly declared my dislike of  
‘ many of them, and yet I am far from thinking that  
‘ any of those who approved voted at any time against  
‘ the plain dictates of their conscience; but I am  
‘ convinced that many of them were biassed in their  
‘ judgments by the fears of losing the places they pos-  
‘ sessed, or the hopes of getting the titles, places, or  
‘ preferments, they expected. In disputes on parti-  
‘ cular subjects in politics, it is very easy to impose  
‘ upon gentlemen who have never made that science  
‘ their study, and are never let into any secrets of state,  
‘ unless with a design to deceive them; therefore, in all  
‘ such cases, I have great charity for those who hap-  
‘ pen to differ from me in opinion. But when the  
‘ wickedness or folly of the measures begins to  
‘ appear from the fatal consequences they have pro-  
‘ duced, my charity begins to cease with respect to  
‘ those who persevere in their opinions, and refuse  
‘ coming into any method for preventing themselves  
‘ or their successors in this house from being deceived  
‘ by

‘ by the same byas towards a court. I have, Sir,  
‘ as great an opinion, as any gentleman ought to have  
‘ of the honour and impartiality of those who are  
‘ members of either house of parliament; but it is  
‘ arguing against common sense, and common expe-  
‘ rience to pretend that no member of this house will  
‘ be byassed in his opinion, or influenced in his vot-  
‘ ing by 500 or 1000, or perhaps, 5000*l.* a year.  
‘ It has in all countries, and in all ages, been held as an  
‘ established maxim, that no man ought to be allowed  
‘ to sit as a judge, or even as a jury-man, in any  
‘ cause where he is to get or lose by the event of the  
‘ suit; and as we sit as judges almost in every case  
‘ that can come before us between the people and  
‘ their sovereign, or those employed by him in the  
‘ executive part of our government, surely no man  
‘ ought to be allowed to sit here, who is to get or  
‘ lose the whole, or the chief part of his subsistence  
‘ by the judgment he passes upon any affair de-  
‘ pending in this house. In former times, Sir, when  
‘ we had no standing army, nor any officers of our  
‘ army kept in continual pay; when we had no  
‘ excise, nor excisemen; when we had few or no  
‘ taxes, and as few tax-gatherers, it was not neces-  
‘ sary to have any such law enacted; because no pub-  
‘ lic officer then ever thought of getting himself chosen  
‘ a member of parliament; whilst he remained in  
‘ pay, he was obliged to attend the duty of his office,  
‘ and consequently could neither attend the business,  
‘ nor be chosen a member of parliament. This is the  
‘ true reason why the high-sheriff of a county cannot  
‘ even now be chosen a member of this house; and  
‘ when this maxim was first established by common  
‘ law, or, as the lawyers call it, common reason only,  
‘ it fell by degrees into disuse, and public officers of  
‘ all

‘ all ranks and degrees may be, and are, now chosen  
‘ members of parliament except high sheriffs, and some  
‘ few others, who have been disqualified by express  
‘ statute. Thus, Sir, our constitution stands at  
‘ present; and as the number of our public officers  
‘ of all kinds, and in all stations, has been of late  
‘ years vastly increased, and is every day increasing;  
‘ as their yearly profits and emoluments have been  
‘ vastly augmented; and as their power is growing  
‘ every year more and more extensive, they have now a  
‘ great sway in all our elections, especially those for our  
‘ cities and boroughs; so that in a few years, we may,  
‘ nay, we *must* expect, that a majority of this house  
‘ will always consist of such as hold or expect offices,  
‘ places, or private pensions at the pleasure of the  
‘ crown; and what justice or mercy the people can  
‘ expect from such a house of commons, common  
‘ sense, I had almost said, common experience, may  
‘ instruct. For this reason, Sir, if we have a mind  
‘ to preserve our constitution; if we have a mind that  
‘ parliament should ever be of any use to the king or  
‘ his people; if we have a mind to prevent a parlia-  
‘ ment’s being a cumbersome clog to a good king,  
‘ and a cruel instrument of oppression in the hands of  
‘ a tyrannical one, we must pass a law for limiting  
‘ the number of officers in this house; and this we  
‘ ought to be the more ardent to have speedily done,  
‘ because if we are once caught in the snare, it will  
‘ be impossible for us ever to escape; for if a majority  
‘ of this house should ever once come to consist of  
‘ officers and placemen, it is not to be supposed they  
‘ would pass a bill for their own exclusion. On the  
‘ contrary, if they should entertain the least jealousy  
‘ of their not being able to get themselves, or a majori-  
‘ rity

‘ rity of such as themselves, chosen at a new election,  
 ‘ they would, by the authority of a late precedent,  
 ‘ continue themselves, or they would pass an excise-  
 ‘ bill, or some such bill, for giving the court an  
 ‘ absolute command over a majority of our elections,  
 ‘ and thereby establish an arbitrary power of the most  
 ‘ extensive, cruel, and tyrannical kind, I mean, an  
 ‘ arbitrary power supported by a corrupt parliament and  
 ‘ a numerous mercenary army. To prevent this, Sir, I  
 ‘ rise up to second the motion made by my worthy friend.  
 ‘ I shall always endeavour to prevent it by my vote in  
 ‘ this house, and if ever it should become necessary, by  
 ‘ the risk of my life and fortune in the field <sup>a</sup>.’

There is a curious speech of lord *Raymond* on occasion of the second reading of this bill; in which he declares against a place-bill, because it would prevent young men of fortune from accepting employments, when they found they could not sit in parliament. [But the independent *people* do not choose they should have places, and sit in parliament at the same time, because their places may bias their votes, and the people do not approve of lay-pluralities and non-residence any more than of clerical.] He says, if young men of fortune do not accept employments, they will not understand business. [If they be *members* of parliament, and *placemen* at the same time, they will certainly understand neither the business of parliament nor that of their places.] He says, the bill will exclude all young men of fortune from the army. [The independent people would be glad, that there were *no army*, and that, instead of it, we had a well regulated *militia*.] He says, the security of the nation consists in having the army officered by men

of fortune. [The security of a nation consists in the *people's* being armed, and capable to defend *themselves* against all enemies, foreign and domestic.<sup>a</sup>.]

Lord *Sandwich*, on this occasion, speaks as follows :

‘ In antient times, my lords, nay, I may say, till  
 ‘ after the restoration, we had no occasion for such  
 ‘ bills. The crown had but a few lucrative employ-  
 ‘ ments to bestow, and many of those it had at its  
 ‘ disposal, were such as were generally granted for  
 ‘ life ; consequently, no minister could hope by such  
 ‘ means to gain, much less to preserve, a corrupt  
 ‘ majority in either house of parliament ; and the  
 ‘ impossibility of success prevented their making any  
 ‘ such attempt. We had then no mercenary stand-  
 ‘ ing army, nor had the crown any lucrative military  
 ‘ commissions to dispose of. If an army was at any  
 ‘ time raised for foreign service, no officer employed  
 ‘ in that army could look upon his post as an estate  
 ‘ for life ; therefore, though a commission in the  
 ‘ army was considered as an honour, it was never  
 ‘ looked upon as a favour ; but on the contrary, those  
 ‘ landed gentlemen who had acquired a character in  
 ‘ their country for conduct, courage, and military  
 ‘ knowledge, were often solicited to accept of com-  
 ‘ missions in the army which was to be raised, and  
 ‘ when the service was over, they returned to  
 ‘ live upon their estates in the country without  
 ‘ being at any further expence to the public. We  
 ‘ had then, my lords, but very few customs, and no  
 ‘ excises ; consequently a minister could not spread  
 ‘ his excise-men over the whole kingdom to *influence*  
 ‘ elections in counties, or to *govern* them in most of  
 ‘ our inland boroughs ; and the salaries of custom-  
 ‘ house-

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VIII. 107.



‘ house-officers were so trifling, that no man of any  
‘ great character or fortune would accept of them ;  
‘ so that such officers had but very little influence in  
‘ any of our sea-port towns. But now, my lords,  
‘ the case is quite altered ; the posts in the army,  
‘ and in the collection of the public revenues, and  
‘ the other places in the disposal of the crown, are  
‘ become so numerous and so lucrative, that they must  
‘ have a great influence upon the members of the  
‘ other house, if there be no restraint upon the num-  
‘ ber of placemen allowed to have seats in that house.  
‘ This, I say, must be the consequence, unless we  
‘ suppose, that men will judge and determine as im-  
‘ partially in a case where they are to get 500 *l.* or  
‘ 1000 *l.* a year, as in a case where they are to get  
‘ or lose nothing by their judgment or determination ;  
‘ and to suppose this is so contrary to the nature of  
‘ mankind, and to the established maxims of all soci-  
‘ eties, that I am sure none of your lordships will  
‘ make any such suppositions. Parliaments, we know,  
‘ are designed to be a check upon ministers ; we like-  
‘ wise know, that almost every post in the disposal  
‘ of the crown, is left to the arbitrary disposal of  
‘ ministers ; and we also know that no minister ever  
‘ did or ever will give a lucrative post or employment  
‘ to a man who opposes his measures in parliament.  
‘ From late experience we know, that some of the  
‘ highest officers in the kingdom have been dismissed  
‘ for no other reason but because they disapproved of  
‘ the measures pursued by our ministers, and had  
‘ honour enough to declare their disapprobation in  
‘ parliament. Can we then expect, my lords, that  
‘ the other house will be a check upon the conduct of  
‘ our ministers, as long as there is a majority in that  
‘ house who enjoy, or expect, lucrative and honour-

able employments from the benevolence of these  
very ministers? I shall not say, that in such a case  
the members would all be corrupt in their determi-  
nations, but I will say, that in many cases they  
would be biassed in their judgments, and thereby  
induced to approve of what, in duty to their country,  
they ought to have disapproved of; or to put a nega-  
tive upon what, in duty to their country, they  
ought to have given their consent to. Therefore,  
my lords, if we intend that the other house should  
answer the end of its institution, by judging impar-  
tially, and determining wisely and justly in every  
case that comes before them, we must pass this bill,  
or such a bill as this; or we must pass a bill for  
taking from the crown the disposal of those posts  
and employments that are necessary for the execu-  
tive part of our government; and surely those lords  
who seem so mighty jealous of any incroachment  
upon the prerogative of the crown, will agree to  
the former rather than to the latter of these two  
expedients. The latter, I shall grant, would be an  
infringement of one of those prerogatives now enjoyed  
by the crown; but I cannot, for my life, see  
what the former has to do with the prerogative of  
the crown, nor can I conceive how any one pre-  
rogative of the crown is to be in the least affected  
by this bill. There is no confinement, nor the least  
restraint, proposed upon the power the king has to  
dispose of offices or employments. He may grant  
them as fully and freely as before: he may even  
grant them to members of parliament, notwithstand-  
ing any thing proposed to be enacted by this bill;  
and the member may enjoy the office or employ-  
ment so granted to him; only if it be such a one  
as is not excepted in this bill, he is not to be re-  
chosen.

' chosen. Is this, my lords, an infringement of any pre-  
 ' rogative of the crown? Has the king a power to tell  
 ' the people whom they are to chuse, or whom they are  
 ' not to chuse? No, my lords; but the legislature has,  
 ' and has already in many cases exercised that power.  
 ' The people are already, by law, restrained from  
 ' chusing a man for their representative who is not  
 ' possessed of 600 *l.* or at least 300 *l.* a year: they are  
 ' already restrained from chusing any man concerned in  
 ' collecting the public revenue: they are already re-  
 ' strained from chusing the high-sheriff to be their repre-  
 ' sentative; and now they are to be restrained from  
 ' chusing any placemen besides those excepted in the bill.  
 ' This, 'tis granted, is a new restraint; but it can no  
 ' more be said to be an infringement of the people's liber-  
 ' ties, than confining a madman can be said to be an in-  
 ' fringement of his liberty; for if the people were not  
 ' mad, or something worse, they never would chuse  
 ' a man as the guardian of their liberties, who must  
 ' either forfeit the lucrative post he enjoys, or betray  
 ' his trust to ministers, who can, and probably will,  
 ' take his post from him, if he does not; and who  
 ' have always, by experience, been found to be the  
 ' greatest enemies to the liberties of the people.'—

' No inconvenience, but great benefit, has accrued  
 ' from that law which disables commissioners and offi-  
 ' cers of our customs, or excise, from being members  
 ' of the other house. Experience must therefore give  
 ' a favourable opinion of this bill. Can it be said,  
 ' that in the year 1693 we were influenced by any  
 ' factious discontents? And yet in that year, such a  
 ' bill as this, which was intitled, *A Bill touching free*  
 ' *and impartial Proceedings in Parliament*, passed both  
 ' houses; but by the advice of the ministers was re-  
 ' fused the royal assent; as several others had been

‘ during the beginning of that reign. Can it be sup-  
 ‘ posed, that in the year 1701, we were governed by  
 ‘ any factious discontents; and yet in the act then  
 ‘ passed, there was an express clause for excluding all  
 ‘ placemen from having seats in the house of commons  
 ‘ after the settlement then established should take  
 ‘ place; which clause met with the approbation not  
 ‘ only of both houses of parliament, but of the crown  
 ‘ itself. And surely no man will derogate so much  
 ‘ from the known courage of king *William*, as to say,  
 ‘ that he would have allowed himself to be bubbled by  
 ‘ any faction or party into a regulation which he  
 ‘ thought would strike at the root of our constitution.  
 ‘ This clause, it is true, was afterwards in the queen’s  
 ‘ time repealed; but I wish the noble peers who were  
 ‘ the promoters of that repeal had considered a little  
 ‘ more their own characters as well as the constitution  
 ‘ of their country; for if they had, they might perhaps  
 ‘ have made some such exceptions as are contained in  
 ‘ this bill; but I am sure they would never have  
 ‘ agreed to and much less proposed a general and ab-  
 ‘ solute repeal of that clause<sup>a</sup>.’

On occasion of the debate on the pension-bill, *A. D.*  
 1730-31, an oath was proposed to be taken by mem-  
 bers, purging themselves of the guilt of receiving  
 any pension from the crown. Several lords protested  
 against its being rejected in their house; “ because the  
 bill would, if committed, have been regularly the  
 subject of debate, and amendments might have been  
 made as this house thought proper; and because the  
 commons had passed the bill with so much honour to  
 themselves; and because this bill only enforces the  
 observation, and prevents the evasions of former laws,

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, VIII. 107.*

By one of these laws, no person who has a pension from the crown during pleasure, can sit in the house of commons; but the effect of this law was or might have been evaded, in great measure, by grants of pensions for certain terms of years. To remedy this abuse, it was enacted by another law; that no person who enjoys a pension for any number of years, shall sit in that house, under certain penalties; but the effect of this law may be evaded by giving gratuities, or making annual presents; and the commons would find it difficult to obtain those accounts which can alone shew what pensions are paid to particular persons. By the laws now in force, whoever accepts any office or employment under the crown, cannot sit in that house, till he has been re-elected. But an office may be held by some person who is not a member of that house, in trust for one who is. The arguments used for the necessity of preserving an influence to the crown by the power of rewarding; are not to the present purpose, or if applied, they prove what is not much to the honour of this house; as rejecting this bill looks like approving all the evasions that have or can be invented or put in practice."

"Strictly speaking, all influence over either house, except that which arises from a sense of those duties which we owe to our king and country, is improper; for although this influence appears to be that of the crown, it may become virtually that of the minister; and if ever a corrupt minister should have the disposition of places, and distribution of pensions, gratuities, and rewards, he may create such an influence, as shall effectually deprive the prince of the great advantage of knowing the true sense of the people, and a house of parliament being prevailed upon to approve such measures as the whole nation dislikes; he may, for the

fake of an unworthy servant, lose the affections of his people, whilst he imagines that he both deserves and possesses them ; and this improper influence will always be most exerted in the support of ill measures and weak ministers."

" The trust reposed in parliament is much greater than it was, in respect to those heavy taxes which have been for many years past, and which must be, for all succeeding times [unless the national debt could be paid] annually laid by parliament, and also the immense debts which have been contracted."

" The service of the house of commons was formerly a real service, therefore often declined, and always paid for by the people ; it is now no longer paid for, no longer declined, but sought after at a great expence. How far these considerations, with that of the vast increase of the civil-list, and of the debts contracted on it, deserve to enforce the reasons for exacting some stronger engagements, from members of the house of commons to those whom they are chosen to represent, is we think sufficiently obvious."

" Although the multiplying of oaths ought to be avoided, yet an oath being the most solemn engagement men can lay under, we judge it on that account the more proper to be imposed ; nor will the probability of its being broke by the iniquity of mankind be an argument of greater force against this bill, than against any other law made for preventing any other crime <sup>a</sup>."

' It is well known, my lords,' (says lord *Chesterfield* in the debate on a bill for making officers independent on the ministry, *A. D.* 1734 <sup>b</sup>.) ' that there are many  
' officers of the army who have nothing, or at least  
' very little to subsist on but their commissions ; and it  
' is

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, IV. 29.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 198.

‘ is likewise well known that there are many gentle-  
‘ men of the army now in both houses of parliament.  
‘ There are now, my lords, more officers of the army in  
‘ each house of parliament than there were when we  
‘ had on foot an army of above 60,000 men : These are  
‘ facts which will not, I believe, be controverted. It  
‘ is, I do not know how, become of late years a pre-  
‘ vailing opinion, that the only way of getting prefer-  
‘ ment in the army is to have a seat in the other house  
‘ of parliament : This, it is true, my lords, must be  
‘ an erroneous opinion. It is impossible that any man  
‘ can justly and honourably acquire any preferment in  
‘ the army by his behaviour in either house of parlia-  
‘ ment, and therefore this must be an opinion for  
‘ which I hope there never was any ground. I am  
‘ sure there can be no ground for it under his present  
‘ majesty ; but erroneous as it is, it is become a gene-  
‘ ral opinion, and we know that mankind always were,  
‘ and always will be governed and influenced by general  
‘ opinions and prejudices ; and according as the pre-  
‘ valence of this opinion increases, we may expect an  
‘ increase of the number of officers in both houses of  
‘ parliament. We may expect, my lords, that in  
‘ future times, as soon as any gentleman has once got  
‘ a commission in the army, he will next employ all his  
‘ money and credit, and all his friends to procure him-  
‘ self a seat in parliament ; he will perhaps pawn the  
‘ last shilling’s worth he has in the world, besides his  
‘ commission, in order to procure himself a seat in the  
‘ other house of parliament ; and how dangerous it  
‘ may be to our constitution to have such a man de-  
‘ pending for the continuance of that commission upon  
‘ some future enterprising minister, I leave to your  
‘ lordships to judge. No man has a better opinion  
‘ than I have of the gentlemen who are at present the  
‘ officers

‘ officers of our army ; but I must say, that I think it  
 ‘ too hard a trial even for their virtue, especially in this  
 ‘ degenerate age, to have it in the power of a desperate  
 ‘ minister to tell them upon occasion of an impor-  
 ‘ tant question in parliament, “ If you do not vote,  
 ‘ Sir, as I direct, you shall starve.”

In the debate on the famous pension-bill, *A. D.*  
 1739<sup>a</sup>, lord *Walpole* observed, that a bill with the  
 same title had been four times sent up to the lords,  
 and as often rejected. That it was an affront to the  
 lords to send them the same bill five times. That it  
 is dangerous to make alterations. [The bill, how-  
 ever, was no alteration, but intended to enforce an old  
 law.] That the bill supposes corruption in the other  
 house, which is a slander on the house, and a reflexion  
 on the government. That it is impossible there should  
 be any pensioning ; because no pension can be granted  
 but by warrant from his majesty, and all monies are  
 to be accounted for to king and parliament. [So  
 that, in short ; corruption is, like the stories of ghosts  
 and goblins, a mere non-entity, at which only silly  
 people are scared.] That besides, the ministry have  
 no inclination to corrupt the members of the house of  
 commons. “ I have the honour, says his lordship, to  
 ‘ be nearly related to some of those employed in the  
 ‘ administration : From thence I have had an oppor-  
 ‘ tunity of knowing their most secret thoughts ; and  
 ‘ from thence I have formed my opinion. Therefore,  
 ‘ if it is neither in the inclination nor in the power  
 ‘ of any one employed in the administration to corrupt  
 ‘ the members of the other house, what occasion can  
 ‘ we have, would it not be altogether imprudent in  
 ‘ us to make an alteration in one of the most funda-  
 ‘ mental

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 372.



‘ mental parts of our constitution, in order to guard  
 ‘ against a grievance which is neither felt, nor can be,  
 ‘ in his present majesty’s reign, so much as supposed ?’

Lord *Talbot* answered lord *Walpole*, that the commons, by sending up the bill, shewed, That they believed not only the possibility, but the reality of corruption. That there were two statutes before calculated for the same purpose ; but ‘ that ministerial  
 ‘ craft working upon abandoned prostitution could  
 ‘ evade them.’ That the commons, if in earnest, might justly be offended, if the lords rejected the bill, which might produce a rupture between the houses, and might set the whole nation against the lords ; if the commons meant only to delude their constituents by a pretended zeal against corruption, trusting, that the lords would throw out the bill, would it be consistent with the dignity of the house of peers to be necessary to such abominable craft. That a private pension is not a reward of merit, but a breach of trust ; and to reject the bill would be giving a sanction to breach of trust. That it could not be said, that the lords passing the bill was a slur on the commons, when the commons originated it. That a parliament 2 *Hen. VIII.* passed an act to cancel all the debts the king had contracted upon loans ; and the historians account for this iniquitous proceeding from that parliament’s being filled with the king’s servants, with whom justice had not so much weight as complaisance to the crown.

‘ The numbers of placemen in that parliament,  
 (says his lordship) ‘ are not specified ; but I believe  
 ‘ they did not amount to near three hundred in both  
 ‘ houses ; nor is there mention made of a single pen-  
 ‘ sioner. The parliament, stigmatized by the name of  
 ‘ the pensionary parliament, proposed an expurgatory

‘ oath to clear themselves from that aspersi-  
 ‘ on, containing many particulars, one of which was, that  
 ‘ each member should swear he had never given his  
 ‘ vote in parliament for any reward or promise what-  
 ‘ soever. I sincerely wish, that to gratify the people  
 ‘ the same or such another oath should now be taken ;  
 ‘ and as the oath proposed by this bill will, I think,  
 ‘ be rather more effectual, therefore, I am for the bill’s  
 ‘ being committed, and hope it will be passed into a  
 ‘ law <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ To pretend’ [alluding to lord *Walpole*’s speech]  
 ‘ that we are not at present in any danger from the  
 ‘ private pensions that may be given to members of  
 ‘ the other house, must appear absurd to every man  
 ‘ that considers the nature of ministers, or the nature  
 ‘ of mankind. My lords, it is a danger we can never  
 ‘ be free from ; nor can we sufficiently guard against,  
 ‘ as long as it is in the power of a minister to give, or  
 ‘ of a member to receive. It is absolutely necessary  
 ‘ for a minister to have the consent or approbation of  
 ‘ parliament in almost every step of his conduct.  
 ‘ Therefore from the very nature of ministers, we may  
 ‘ suppose, that if he cannot obtain such consent or  
 ‘ approbation by his authority, he will endeavour to  
 ‘ obtain it by his power ; and from the nature of man-  
 ‘ kind we must suppose, that among such a number of  
 ‘ men as are in the other house, the minister will  
 ‘ always find some ready enough to prostitute their  
 ‘ consent or approbation for a considerable bribe, or  
 ‘ annual pension. Thus we must always be exposed  
 ‘ to this danger ; and now we are a great deal more  
 ‘ exposed to it, than ever we were heretofore ; because  
 ‘ our ministers now have infinitely more to give, and  
 ‘ custom

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 375.

‘ custom or example has, I am afraid, greatly added to  
 ‘ the number of those, that are ready to receive<sup>a</sup>.’

‘ By the very act of settlement itself, my lords, it  
 ‘ was expressly enacted, amongst other things, That  
 ‘ no person having a pension from the crown, should  
 ‘ serve as a member of the house of commons; and  
 ‘ though this clause was in general repealed by an act  
 ‘ of the 4th and 5th of queen *Anne*, yet it was then  
 ‘ again thought so reasonable to exclude pensioners  
 ‘ from having seats in the other house, that it was  
 ‘ a-new enacted, That no person having a pension  
 ‘ from the crown during pleasure, should be capable of  
 ‘ being a member of any future house of commons;  
 ‘ and by an act of the 1st of the late king, their in-  
 ‘ capacity was farther extended to all persons having  
 ‘ any pension from the crown, for any term or number  
 ‘ of years, either in their own names or in the name  
 ‘ of any other person in trust for them, or for their  
 ‘ benefit. Thus your lordships see, that by the laws  
 ‘ now in being, all persons who have pensions from  
 ‘ the crown during pleasure, or for any term or num-  
 ‘ ber of years, are rendered incapable of having seats in  
 ‘ the other house; and by these laws, great penalties  
 ‘ are inflicted upon those who presume to break through  
 ‘ them. But as no provision has been made by either  
 ‘ of these laws for discovering secret offenders, and as  
 ‘ every man must be sensible that such pensions may  
 ‘ be given privately, the gentlemen of the other house  
 ‘ have thought it, and I hope your lordships will think  
 ‘ it necessary, to provide the best remedy that can be  
 ‘ thought of for this defect, which is the chief, and  
 ‘ indeed the sole intention of this bill. I cannot help  
 ‘ therefore being astonished at its being pretended,  
 ‘ that

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 383.

‘ that this bill will occasion any alteration, or innova-  
 ‘ tion in our constitution ; and there is nothing con-  
 ‘ vinces me more of the necessity there is for passing it,  
 ‘ than the circumstances of the noble lords, who I  
 ‘ find oppose it. To the honour of the administration  
 ‘ in the first year of the late king, I must observe, that  
 ‘ the law passed at that time for excluding pensioners  
 ‘ from the other house, was introduced by a secretary  
 ‘ of state, and approved by most of those in the admi-  
 ‘ nistration ; and it was prudent and right in them to  
 ‘ do so. A minister that has no intention to make use  
 ‘ of bribery and corruption, has no occasion to oppose  
 ‘ any bill that can be thought of, for preventing such  
 ‘ infamous and illegal practices ; and therefore, when  
 ‘ I find such a bill opposed, by those who are the  
 ‘ known friends of a minister, it will always be a pre-  
 ‘ vailing argument with me, not only to think that  
 ‘ there is a present and pressing necessity for such a bill,  
 ‘ but also, that the bill proposed will be in some  
 ‘ measure effectual. It will at least raise the price of  
 ‘ prostitutes, because the more risk a man runs, the  
 ‘ higher wages he will of course expect ; and the  
 ‘ higher you raise the price of those who are liable to  
 ‘ be corrupted, the more difficult will every future  
 ‘ minister find it to corrupt, notwithstanding the  
 ‘ many and great boons our ministers have now to  
 ‘ bestow ; and then they must think of gaining the  
 ‘ consent or approbation of parliament by their autho-  
 ‘ rity in persuading, and not by their power in corrupt-  
 ‘ ing<sup>a</sup>.’

‘ I find (says the earl of *Carlisle*) some lords are, upon  
 ‘ this occasion, extremely apprehensive of corrupting the  
 ‘ morals of the people, by a multiplicity of new oaths.

‘ I wish

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 384.

‘ I wish the same apprehensions had prevailed, when such  
‘ an infinite number of oaths were contrived, for collect-  
‘ ing our customs and taxes. Most of these oaths are to  
‘ be taken by multitudes of people, and in cases where  
‘ there are great temptations for perjury. The oath  
‘ now proposed, is to be taken by none, but members  
‘ of the other house ; and the temptations to perjury  
‘ can never be great or frequent, but when our consti-  
‘ tution is in the utmost danger. It is therefore some-  
‘ thing strange, that we should be so little apprehensive  
‘ of corrupting the morals of the people, by a multi-  
‘ plicity of oaths, when we are contriving methods for  
‘ preserving the revenue of our sovereigns, and so very  
‘ apprehensive of the like effect, when we are contriv-  
‘ ing methods for preserving the constitution and liber-  
‘ ties of our country. A foreigner, upon considering  
‘ this behaviour, would be apt to judge we had very  
‘ little concern about the latter, provided we could  
‘ but enjoy a share of the former ; and if we should  
‘ reject this bill, without much better reasons than I  
‘ have yet heard against it, I fear most of our own  
‘ people will join in forming the same false opinion of  
‘ this honourable and august assembly. Your lordships  
‘ must be all sensible how prevalent the jealousy at  
‘ present is, of there being a great number of pen-  
‘ sioners in parliament : the gentlemen of the other  
‘ house have endeavoured to allay that jealousy, and  
‘ to vindicate the honour of their assembly, by sending  
‘ us up this bill. If it should be thrown out here,  
‘ what will the nation think ? Will it not be generally  
‘ supposed that this is the house, in which the number  
‘ of pensioners prevails, and that here the pensions have  
‘ the most infallible effect ? Or perhaps it will be  
‘ supposed, that there are pensioners in the other house  
‘ as well as in this, but that the pensioners in the  
‘ other,

‘ other, for the sake of recommending themselves to  
 ‘ their constituents, had leave from their masters to  
 ‘ agree to this bill, because their masters knew they  
 ‘ could depend upon the number and submission of  
 ‘ their pensioners in this, for throwing it out. I am very  
 ‘ sensible, my lords, there is no real ground for either  
 ‘ of these suppositions; but those without doors, who  
 ‘ do not know the reasons upon which your lordships  
 ‘ proceed, when they find a bill rejected which makes  
 ‘ no alteration in our constitution, which does not so  
 ‘ much as make an alteration in any former law,  
 ‘ which contains nothing but an enforcement of the  
 ‘ laws in being against pensioners; such persons, I say,  
 ‘ may think they have reason to make one or other  
 ‘ of these suppositions; and should not we be ex-  
 ‘ tremely cautious of giving the least shadow of reason  
 ‘ for judging so unworthily of our assembly<sup>a</sup>?’

‘ My lords, as the laws now in being for excluding  
 ‘ pensioners from the other house, must to every man  
 ‘ that considers them, appear to be altogether inef-  
 ‘ fectual, if this bill be rejected, I shall, even in  
 ‘ my time, if I live but a very few years, expect to see  
 ‘ the other house full of pensioners. I shall expect to  
 ‘ see a minister in that house, out of a wantonness of  
 ‘ power, by his single *veto*, or the monosyllable NO,  
 ‘ throw out a bill of the utmost importance, without  
 ‘ designing to give his slaves so much as one reason for  
 ‘ what he obliges them to do. This indeed, if it  
 ‘ should ever happen, I shall look upon as a sign of  
 ‘ his power, but not of his prudence; and I may  
 ‘ prophesy, that if ever a minister should get such a  
 ‘ power over the other house, his power in *this* will be  
 ‘ as absolute and equally insolent<sup>b</sup>.’

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 388.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 389.

The bishop of *Salisbury* [*Sherlocke*] opposed the bill, because it gave the commons the means of finding out transgressors more effectually. Perhaps his good lordship might think this was taking the business of reforming mankind out of the hands of the bishops, whose indefatigable labours, in season and out of season, in word and doctrine, in teaching and preaching, are equal to the pulling down of any strong holds of Satan. See bishop *Burnet's* panegyric on the diligence of the clergy, at the conclusion of the HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIMES.

By this bill, says the bishop, the commons are to become 'superior to the chief branch of the legislature, to the crown itself; for they are to judge of the actions of the crown, and may determine, that a well-merited reward, given by the crown for the most eminent public services, was a corrupt reward, given for a gentleman's corrupt behaviour in their assembly.'

Here his good lordship seems, with submission, to make a distress where there is none. For the supposed eminently serviceable gentleman had nothing to do but quit his seat in the house, and then the crown might give him a pension of 100,000 *l.* a year. But it does not seem easy to understand why a bishop should be so zealous about this supposed encroachment on the crown, so long as it did not break in upon the power of the king to manufacture parsons into bishops.

By what follows, one would imagine his lordship was disposed to be merry. 'If, says he, the other house should once render themselves superior to the crown, they would of course become superior to this house likewise, and would soon engross, as they have done before, the whole power of our govern-

‘ment. They would either vote this house usefefs, [what a dreadful thing it would be if they fhould vote the ineffimable bifhops usefefs!] ‘as they have ‘once done already, or they would render it infignificant, by making it entirely fufervient to them.’ All this power the commons would acquire by the fingle circumftance of having power to demand an oath of their members, that they were not the miniſter’s hirelings.

The bifhop afterwards expreffes an anxiety about too many oaths, as if corruption were not as bad as perjury; but he fays nothing about too many unintelligible and felf-contradictory articles to be fubfcribed by the clergy. ‘The laws of this kingdom, ‘fays the bifhop, have always been extremely cautious ‘of fubjecting a man to an oath, in any cafe where his ‘intereft may be concerned.’ Therefore the good bifhop ought to have been a great enemy to clerical fubfcription; for that, furely, is fubjecting a man to an oath, where his intereft is concerned, (fo is his taking the oaths to the government.) Yet the language of the bifhops is, Subscribe, or ftarve.

‘The oath propofed by this bill, fays the bifhop, ‘is, I think, fuch a one as can be underftood by no ‘man.’ [Is it more unintelligible, my good lord, than the *Athanaſian* creed, or the doctrine of predefination to eternal torments; which is fo full of ‘sweet, pleafant, and comfortable matter<sup>a</sup> ?’]

Some readers may obferve, that thefe remarks are rather *ad hominem*, than answers to the bifhop’s objections. True: but the bifhop’s objections are fo frivolous, and befides fo peculiarly unfuitable to the character of a bifhop, who ought to have rejoiced in an

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<sup>a</sup> See the xviii<sup>th</sup> article.



an opportunity for setting his face against corruption, that my treating him and his objections with *contempt*, where every friend of virtue and his country has a right to express *indignation*, ought to be considered as no small degree of candour. For the same reason I take no notice of his pretence, that it must be difficult to determine, what is a corrupt pension; that the innocent would have been in danger from this bill; that there was no danger from placemen or pensioners in the house of commons; that neither king nor ministry, were capable of corrupting any members of the commons; that those who are for putting a stop to corruption, are enemies to the constitution; that the opposers of *Ch. Ist's* tyranny, were only a disaffected party, &c. So much for a specimen of pontifical politics—*sic digerit omina Calchas*. VIRG. <sup>a</sup>

Lord *Carteret* observed, that nothing would cast a worse slur upon the house of peers, than their rejecting this bill; that corruption cannot be too soon guarded against; for that the only time to guard against it is, before it becomes prevalent, as after a majority in either house becomes corrupt, it will be impossible to get a good bill against corruption passed; that 99 persons in every hundred throughout the kingdom, thought there was real danger from corruption; that the passing of the bill would quiet the minds of the people, &c.

‘ I shall conclude (says he) with observing to your  
 ‘ lordships, that if you reject it, all those who think  
 ‘ we are in danger from corruption, will conclude,  
 ‘ that it is already become impossible to guard against  
 ‘ it by any legal means, and will therefore begin to  
 ‘ think of some other method for preserving our consti-  
 S 2 ‘ tution,

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 400.

‘tution, which may prove of dangerous consequence  
‘to the illustrious family, now upon our throne.’

On the same occasion, the duke of *Argyle* spoke  
as follows :

‘My lords, we are now upon a bill, for putting an  
‘end to, or at least preventing, one sort of corruption  
‘in the other house ; and from the opposition the bill  
‘meets with here, and the imaginary dangers that were  
‘suggested for supporting, or rather excusing that  
‘opposition ; those who are not personally acquainted  
‘with the noble lords, who have spoke upon that side  
‘of the question, would I think be apt to suppose  
‘their opinion to be either, that corruption is now  
‘become a necessary evil, without which the forms of  
‘our government could not be preserved, or that it  
‘is an evil of very little consequence, and not at all  
‘incompatible with the subsistence of a free govern-  
‘ment. Corruption my lords, has always hitherto  
‘been allowed to be vile, to be dangerous. I have  
‘for my own part discouraged it in all stations : I  
‘shall always disdain the obedience or the parasitical  
‘sort of assent, that is to be gained only by corruption,  
‘and I have always been sorry, when I have observed,  
‘it was not equally discouraged by others ; for if it  
‘were no way encouraged by those in high stations, it  
‘would never be possible for the mode in any country  
‘to cover that infamy, which naturally attends the  
‘corrupted ; nor would the quality of the offender  
‘ever atone for the wretched meanness of the offence.  
‘Corruption, my lords, is of all dangers the greatest  
‘our constitution can be exposed to, and the most to  
‘be apprehended. Its approach is imperceptible,  
‘but its blow, if not prevented, is fatal ; and you  
‘cannot prevent its blow, unless you prevent its ap-  
‘proach. The laws now in being for excluding  
‘penfioners

‘ pensioners from having seats in the other house, are  
‘ designed as a safeguard against corruption’s entering  
‘ in one shape at least within the walls of that house;  
‘ and when we are considering whether these laws  
‘ ought to be enforced, we have no occasion for  
‘ examining into late measures, or for supposing that  
‘ any late practices have been made use of for cor-  
‘ rupting the members of either house. We have  
‘ now as much reason to guard against the approach  
‘ of corruption as we had when these laws were made;  
‘ therefore we are now to consider only the laws  
‘ themselves, and if they appear insufficient, they  
‘ ought to be amended, whether any corrupt prac-  
‘ tices have lately been made use of or not. That  
‘ these laws are insufficient for the end intended,  
‘ must, I think, appear to any one that peruses them.  
‘ There are penalties, ’tis true, inflicted upon pen-  
‘ sioners that shall presume to sit or vote in the other  
‘ house; but it is evident that these penalties can  
‘ never be recovered, because the fact can never be  
‘ proved. A pension or a bribe may be given in such  
‘ a manner, that even he who gives it can be no  
‘ direct witness against the receiver; and it is always  
‘ given in such a secret manner that the criminal may  
‘ have good reason to think his crime can never be  
‘ discovered. For this reason no penalty you can  
‘ inflict will ever have a great effect; and this makes  
‘ it necessary, in cases of suspicion, to require an oath  
‘ from the party suspected. I shall not say, my lords,  
‘ that the oath required by this bill will have all the  
‘ effect that could be wished. There may be some  
‘ so abandoned as to despise the religious ceremony of  
‘ an oath; but it will have an effect upon a great  
‘ many; and even the most abandoned will be shy of  
‘ denying their having a pension upon oath in the

‘ very face, perhaps, of the man who pays them their  
 ‘ pensions. Nay, even prudence itself will make men  
 ‘ shy of being guilty of perjury, lest the concealment  
 ‘ of their crimes should afterwards be imputed to  
 ‘ them as a favour, and made use of as a handle for  
 ‘ obliging them to do as much dirty work afterwards,  
 ‘ without a pension, as they had done before for the  
 ‘ sake of a pension. It is an old and a true proverb,  
 ‘ That when I trust a man with my secret, I make  
 ‘ him my master. An avaritious, or an extravagant  
 ‘ and necessitous man may accept of iniquitous wages  
 ‘ from a minister, and yet he would not, perhaps,  
 ‘ chuse to be such an absolute slave to that minister,  
 ‘ as he must be, should he put it in his power to con-  
 ‘ vict him of perjury. Therefore the oath prescribed by  
 ‘ this bill will certainly have a very great effect; and  
 ‘ as the laws proposed to be enforced by this bill evi-  
 ‘ dently appear to be insufficient, this method of  
 ‘ enforcing them ought to be chosen, at least till a  
 ‘ more effectual one can be thought on <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ My lords, I look upon the present question to be  
 ‘ a trial of skill, the fate of which is to determine  
 ‘ whether or no our constitution is hereafter to be  
 ‘ destroyed by corruption, and the people reduced to  
 ‘ the fatal necessity of endeavouring to restore it by  
 ‘ the sword. If this should ever come to be the un-  
 ‘ lucky fate of this nation, those who now oppose  
 ‘ our making use of legal means for securing our con-  
 ‘ stitution, whilst it is yet in our power, will have no  
 ‘ great reason to rejoice in their past conduct. Let  
 ‘ us consider, my lords, the vast sums of money that  
 ‘ are now at the disposal, or under the direction of  
 ‘ the crown; the infinite number of lucrative posts,  
 ‘ places,

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 394.

‘ places, and employments, most of them unknown  
 ‘ to our ancestors, now depending upon the sole and  
 ‘ arbitrary pleasure of the crown; and the great  
 ‘ variety of penal laws, by one or other of which the  
 ‘ most innocent may be made to suffer, the most cau-  
 ‘ tious may be entrapped, and from which the most  
 ‘ guilty may be screened by virtue of that disposing or  
 ‘ mitigatory power, which, with respect to many of  
 ‘ them, is now lodged in the officers of the crown.  
 ‘ Let us, I say, my lords, consider these things, and  
 ‘ we must acknowledge that the present danger we are  
 ‘ in of having our parliaments converted into a  
 ‘ *Turkish* divan, is far from being imaginary; and  
 ‘ when we are under such well grounded apprehen-  
 ‘ sions, shall we rack our invention for visionary  
 ‘ dangers, in order to excuse our agreeing to any  
 ‘ method for guarding against a danger so real, and  
 ‘ which may, upon the first change of ministers or  
 ‘ measures, become inevitable and irresistable <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ In the end of the late queen’s reign, there was  
 ‘ just such another bill brought into this house, which  
 ‘ at that time met with so good a reception here, that  
 ‘ it was thrown out by only one vote; and its meet-  
 ‘ ing with that fate was occasioned by the fault of  
 ‘ one noble lord, who, at the time the question was  
 ‘ put, happened to be in the court of requests, with  
 ‘ two proxies in his pocket <sup>b</sup>.’

The duke of *Newcastle* said, he thought this bill  
 unnecessary, as it was well known that the members  
 of the other house were gentlemen of the best families  
 and fortunes in the kingdom. The preservation of  
 their estates, depended upon the preservation of the  
 constitution; and as bribing would destroy the con-  
 S 4 stitution,

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VI. 396.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 397.

stitution, and render even the bribe precarious; no member could be guilty of taking a bribe, because there could be no temptation to it. And he thought it would diminish the prerogative of the crown, therefore he could not agree to the bill.

He was answered by lord *Chesterfield*, that there was a suspicion of some such practices, because that house had frequently sent this bill to the lords. To pretend that this bill encroaches upon the prerogative of the crown, is somewhat strange. Has the crown a prerogative to infringe the laws? To say so, is destroying the credit and authority of the crown; but the crown has nothing to do with pensions, it is the minister's affair. Men of family and fortune may be avaricious or luxurious, and may not think of the dangerous consequences of corruption; certainly if they did, there would be no occasion to make laws against it; it would appear so horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to consider, that they do not sell their country only: that perhaps they may disregard; but they sell likewise themselves: they become the bond-slaves of the corruptor; who corrupts them, not for their sakes, but for his own. Therefore if people would but consider, they would always reject the offer with disdain. But history shews, that to satisfy the immediate cravings of some infamous appetite, the alluring bait is swallowed. This makes it necessary in every free state to contrive, if possible, to prevent corruption. The sooner a remedy is applied, the less will be our danger of falling into that fatal distemper; from which no free state, where it has once become general, has ever yet recovered <sup>a</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VII. 409.

In the committee on the bill for taxing places and pensions, *A. D.* 1744, Mr. *Archer* spoke as follows;

‘ Sir, There is a short but material amendment  
‘ which, I think, should be made to this question.  
‘ It is so adapted to the necessities of the present times,  
‘ and so much for the honour of the committee, that  
‘ I am satisfied it will be agreeable to you, and to  
‘ every other gentleman here. We are now so happy  
‘ as to enjoy a most profound calm without the least  
‘ ruffle of wind or weather. All opposition lies  
‘ hushed; but lest a storm should soon arise, I am  
‘ for making use of this happy juncture, this favour-  
‘ able opportunity, of proving to the world that this  
‘ extraordinary unanimity does not proceed from any  
‘ selfish views or expectations, but from a true disin-  
‘ terested public spirit; and if the amendment which  
‘ I shall beg leave to offer, should pass with the  
‘ same unanimity, as all other questions have hitherto  
‘ done, it will be a proof of it beyond contradiction.  
‘ Sir, what I propose, is to lay a double tax upon  
‘ places and pensions in ease of the landed interest of  
‘ this kingdom; and who is there in this committee  
‘ that can have any reasonable objection against it?  
‘ As for the gentlemen in place, they cannot but be  
‘ sensible what an uncertain and precarious situation  
‘ they are now in; and that they hold their places  
‘ by the weakest of all tenures, by nothing but the  
‘ smiles of a great man, which are more fickle and  
‘ inconstant than those of fortune. Perhaps it may  
‘ soon be proper for some of them to follow the ex-  
‘ ample of a noble earl, and resign; therefore it can-  
‘ not be worth their while to oppose it. Besides, it  
‘ may be some consolation to them that their landed  
‘ estates will receive some benefits from their places  
‘ which they themselves are so likely to lose; it is  
‘ impos-

‘ impossible, therefore, that any objection can come  
‘ from them. As for the gentlemen who are to suc-  
‘ ceed them, if they are the same as I have heard  
‘ mentioned, they are persons of such exalted notions  
‘ of honour and patriotism, that you could not put  
‘ a higher affront upon them than to imagine, that  
‘ the sordid lucre of the place has any share in their  
‘ thoughts. No, Sir, their patriotism, like virtue,  
‘ is its own reward, and the only one they desire;  
‘ and therefore, it is equally certain, they will not  
‘ oppose it. And as for the great man who has the  
‘ disposal of these places, it will be doing him a very  
‘ signal piece of service; for by lessening the value  
‘ of places, you will lessen the number of candidates,  
‘ and so far take off from that immense trouble  
‘ and fatigue, which he is forced daily, nay, hourly to  
‘ undergo from innumerable solicitations, visits, let-  
‘ ters, messages, and importunities; and besides this,  
‘ it will be a great honour to his administration, not  
‘ to stand in need of the mean assistance of places to  
‘ support it. Those gentlemen, therefore, who have  
‘ any regard for his ease or his honour, must all espouse  
‘ this motion. As for the rest of the house, they are  
‘ country gentlemen, who feel too much the weight  
‘ and burden of this tax upon their lands not to wish  
‘ for some relief; it is, therefore, fairly to be con-  
‘ cluded, that neither they nor any other gentlemen  
‘ in the committee, can disapprove of this amendment.  
‘ But, Sir, if all these reasons, strong as they are,  
‘ more particularly at this juncture, were laid out  
‘ of the case, the thing is so evidently right and just  
‘ in itself, that it cannot be opposed. Sir, it is a  
‘ fundamental rule of justice, as well as policy, that  
‘ all taxes for the support of the government, should  
‘ be laid with equality; and how can it be pretended  
‘ that



' that 4 s. in the pound upon land, and no more upon  
 ' places, is an equal tax? The land is taxed in pro-  
 ' portion to the rent, which is generally the full value,  
 ' every body being desirous to let their estates for as  
 ' much as they can get. The place is taxed in pro-  
 ' portion to the salary, which is seldom a quarter part  
 ' of the income, the fees and perquisites generally  
 ' amounting to five or six times as much. The rent  
 ' is subject to deductions for repairs and losses by  
 ' the tenants; the salary is subject to neither. Nay,  
 ' the land-owner is sometimes forced to pay the tax  
 ' for rent which he does not receive; whereas the  
 ' placeman never pays it, but upon the receipt of his  
 ' salary. The land subjects the owner to the expence  
 ' and trouble of serving many offices, particularly the  
 ' high-sheriff's, grand-jury-man's and others; the  
 ' place is so far from being liable to any of them, that  
 ' it is of itself an indemnification and excuse against  
 ' all. Then how can it be said, that this is acting  
 ' fairly and impartially? It is therefore high time  
 ' for us to rectify this unequal oppressive method of  
 ' taxation; and if you lay 8 s. in the pound upon  
 ' places and pensions, it is very obvious how many  
 ' advantages will flow from it. 1st, It will in some  
 ' measure operate as a place-bill; for by lessening the  
 ' value of the places, it will lessen that undue influ-  
 ' ence which is supposed to arise from them. 2dly,  
 ' It will corroborate and strengthen that favourite law,  
 ' the qualification act; for if it is necessary that the  
 ' members of this house should have an estate in land  
 ' to a certain value, the less charge you lay upon the  
 ' land, the more likely they will be to fulfil and  
 ' answer the intent of that good law. 3dly, It will  
 ' in like manner fortify the laws of election; for  
 ' if every freeholder is required to have 40 s. a year,  
 ' to

' to entitle him to a vote, do not take away a fifth  
 ' part of it from him by a tax of 4 s. in the pound  
 ' upon the land, but rather lay it upon places and  
 ' pensions. In short, Sir, almost all the good laws  
 ' made for the freedom and independency of parlia-  
 ' ment, will be in some measure assisted by this amend-  
 ' ment. But I do agree, that some places are of too  
 ' small value to admit of a double tax, as the excise  
 ' officers, and others, of 50 l. a year and under ; but  
 ' they might easily be provided for out of the contin-  
 ' gencies of the year ; and a few other places are of  
 ' too great importance and service to the state to  
 ' undergo any diminution, I mean the judges, upon  
 ' whom I am so far from levying a double tax, that I  
 ' would rather except them from all taxes whatsoever ;  
 ' for I think it a great dishonour and reproach to any  
 ' government not to support their magistrates with  
 ' splendor and dignity ; and if any other exceptions  
 ' should be thought proper, they might all be pro-  
 ' vided for in the body of the bill. But upon places  
 ' in general, a double tax is the true and just propor-  
 ' tion to be observed ; and that you may be fully  
 ' satisfied that this amendment is not only founded  
 ' upon reason but also upon precedent, I shall beg  
 ' leave to refer you to an act of parliament made 29  
 ' and 30 Ch. II. when, for carrying on the war vigo-  
 ' rously against *France*, 1 s. in the pound was laid  
 ' upon personal estates, and 3 s. upon pensions ; and  
 ' it is amazing to me, how so wise and useful a law  
 ' came to be so much neglected. Perhaps, Sir, some  
 ' gentlemen might think it better to appropriate a  
 ' greater share of the profits of places and pensions to  
 ' the service of the war, which I am far from disap-  
 ' proving of ; and indeed I have heard, they have  
 ' already done so in *Spain* and *Turkey* ; but at present  
 ' I chuse

‘ I chuse rather to move it in this unexceptionable  
 ‘ way to avoid all dispute, and to preserve that una-  
 ‘ nimity which has hitherto so happily subsisted  
 ‘ amongst us. The amendment, therefore, that I beg  
 ‘ leave to offer is, to insert in the question, after the  
 ‘ 4s. in the pound upon lands, &c. these words, “ and  
 ‘ the sum of eight shillings in the pound upon places  
 ‘ and pensions.”

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## C H A P. IX.

### *Of Qualifications for Members of Parliament.*

**T**HE wisdom of our ancestors, and their anxiety about the safety of the state, put them upon endeavouring, by all possible means, to prevent the mischiefs likely to arise from bribery and corruption; and, for that purpose, suggested the necessity of place and pension-bills, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter. To exclude corruption still more effectually, they added qualification-acts. They thought a member of parliament, who was himself a man of fortune, would both be less liable to ministerial influence, as being above want, and likewise would be more solicitous about the fate of his country, as having himself a considerable prize at stake. On this subject, various views are to be taken; and various considerations to be attended to. Experience shews us, that men are not always more or less obnoxious to corruption according to their circumstances; and that their greediness of the public money regulates more by their dispositions than their fortunes. The man, who loves money, whether with a view to hoard or to dissipate it, is the dangerous man, either as an elector or  
 a member.

a member. And of the two, the spendthrift is more likely to sell his country for money, than the miser.

Again, it must be owned, that in the present disorderly state of things, qualification-acts are likely to be of advantage; for every little check on corruption is wanted, and all too little.

But if representation were put upon an adequate foot, the power of commissioning legislators so divided, that it would be impossible to fill the house by corrupt means (which it would be, if it were necessary to bribe 206,000, the major half of 410,000, instead of 5,723; see vol. i. p. 39, *et seq.*) and if parliaments were annual, with exclusion by rotation, &c. it would be of much less consequence, that electors and members were men in independent circumstances, than as things are now.

No minister would find it for his advantage to tempt either elector, or member; and if there were no buyer, there could be no sellers. The only advantage, which would then appear to kings, lords, commons, ministers, electors, members, &c. would be that of the public; and that advantage every man would plainly see he might as well pursue as not; because his own advantage would be included in that of the public; and he would find that he could no other way seek his own private advantage, than by consulting that of the public.

The *Romans*, in the republican times, shew, that they thought it useful to see that those, who were entrusted with the care of the general safety, should be men of property. Accordingly, the qualification of a *Roman* senator was 6458 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.* raised by *Augustus* to 9687 *l.* 10 *s.*—which if a senator impaired, he lost his seat <sup>a</sup>.

A quali-

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<sup>a</sup> *Sueton.* IN AUG. *Cic.* XIII. 5.

A qualification-bill was rejected by the lords, *A. D.* 1697. They thought the nation should be at liberty to choose honest men, though poor, and pay them wages <sup>a</sup>.

The qualification-act, requiring members for counties to be men of at least 600*l.* a year, and burgessees of 300*l.* in land, was passed in the year 1711, when the majority of the commons were tories <sup>b</sup>. The design, *Burnet* says, was to exclude merchants and traders. But that, he thinks, was bad policy, because landed men are generally no judges of the interests of commerce, which is an object of great importance.

It was enacted 9 *Anne*, that every member for a county should have an estate at least for his own life of 600*l.* a year, and every member for city, or borough, 300*l.* (a most ridiculous difference! as all members have equal weight in the house) and that every election of a person not so qualified, should be void; every candidate, if called upon at his election, to be obliged to give in his estate upon oath. And the commons read twice a bill for explaining that act, and increasing the qualification of members <sup>c</sup>. It was dropped.

*A. D.* 1713, the commons, in a grand committee, considered the act of the ninth year of her majesty's reign, intituled, *An Act for securing the Freedom of Parliaments, by farther qualifying the Members to sit in the House of Commons*; and came to the following resolutions:—<sup>c</sup> I. That notwithstanding the oath  
<sup>c</sup> taken by any candidate on or after any election, his  
<sup>c</sup> qualification may be afterwards examined into. II.  
<sup>c</sup> That the person whose qualification is expressly  
<sup>c</sup> objected to in any petition relating to his election,  
<sup>c</sup> shall, within fifteen days after the petition read, give  
<sup>c</sup> to

<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 350.

<sup>b</sup> *Burn.* IV. 316.

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM.* XI. 296.

‘ to the clerk of the house of commons a paper signed  
 ‘ by himself, containing a rental or particular of the  
 ‘ lands, tenements, or hereditaments, whereby he  
 ‘ makes out his qualification; of which any person  
 ‘ concerned may have a copy. III. That of such lands,  
 ‘ tenements, or hereditaments, whereof the party hath  
 ‘ been in possession for three years before the election,  
 ‘ he shall also insert in the same paper, from what  
 ‘ person, and by what conveyance or act in law,  
 ‘ he claims and derives the same; and also the confide-  
 ‘ ration if any paid, and the names and places of  
 ‘ abode of the witnesses to such conveyance and pay-  
 ‘ ment. IV. That if a sitting member shall think fit  
 ‘ to question the qualification of a petitioner, he shall,  
 ‘ within fifteen days after the petition read, leave  
 ‘ notice thereof in writing with the clerk of the house  
 ‘ of commons; and the petitioner shall, within fifteen  
 ‘ days after such notice, leave with the said clerk of  
 ‘ the house the like account in writing of his qualifi-  
 ‘ cation, as is required from a sitting member <sup>a</sup>.’

The eldest sons of peers, the members for the uni-  
 versities, and the 45 members for *North Britain*, are  
 exempted from the qualification-law. Yet I should  
 think, it would not be easy to shew why any man,  
 whether he be the son of a duke or a cobbler, should be  
 trusted in a station, where he is likely to be tempted,  
 if he is in circumstances which render him obnoxious  
 to temptation. Nor is it easy to imagine, why a  
 member for *Middlesex* must shew his circumstances to  
 be above temptation, while a member for *Clackmannan*,  
 whose vote weighs as heavy as any other's, may be a  
 dependent beggar.

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. v. 62.

An estate, or income, for life only, is not a security against corruption. Yet it is admitted as a qualification. But a member may be tempted to seek, by indirect means, a provision for his family, who must come into distress after his death; if the income is for life only.

*A. D. 1761*, a bill was brought into parliament, by which it was proposed, it should be enacted, that every member, before he sat, or voted, should be obliged to give into the house of commons a rental or schedule of his estate, with all particulars, signed and sworn to, on pain of a severe fine in case of falsification, to be levied by any person suing for the same as an action for debt, in spite of privilege, &c. And, on every diminution of his annual income, during the sitting of parliament, to give an account of the same to the house. Eldest sons, or heirs apparent of peers or lords of parliament, members for the two universities, and for *Scotland*, (for no known reason) to be excepted from this salutary regulation; as if 50 or 60 members obnoxious to bribery were no grievance.

But when this bill came to be passed into a law, it was so amended (the wrong way) that it might as well not have been passed. For, first, it was not to be in force, till the determination of the then sitting parliament; and besides, it was so whittled down, that a member might give in a mock schedule or rental to the house, in the same manner as at his election; and he could not be challenged concerning his qualification any more during that parliament: Whereas by the bill, as first proposed, it would have been very dangerous to give a mock-qualification for seven years; and members would have been at any time liable to be accused of having reduced themselves to a condition obnoxious to bribery.

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 B O O K II.

 Of taxing the Colonies.
 

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## C H A P. I.

*That the Object, our Ministers have had in View in taxing the Colonies, was, enlarging the Power of the Court, by increasing the Number of Places and Pensions for their Dependents.*

**T**HE subject of our late broil with our colonies, the greatest evil that has arisen in the state for these many centuries past, is doubly entitled to a place in a work which contains an enquiry into public abuses, both as being itself one of the grossest *abuses*, and also as being particularly the consequence of *parliamentary* corruption.

It is the exorbitant *voraciousness* of the *court-tools*, the great *number* of those needy persons, and the fear our ministers are constantly subject to, from the hostility of their opponents, with the consciousness, that they hold their places by the tenure of *interest*, and not of merit; that has lately misled our ministry into the most fatal measure of laying taxes upon our colonies, who have no representation in the house of commons which taxes them. Our ministers have made a breach perhaps never to be closed; they have



have opened a wound perhaps never more to be healed—all to get a few more *places* for their wretched dependents.

Upon the modern plan of government, *viz.* *Buying* every necessary vote, a *British* ministry must be so distressed for money, as to be at any time ready to dig up the very foundations of *Pandæmonium*, if they thought there were either gold or diamonds to be found in that soil. Yet, when *Walpole* was at his wit's end for money to stop the mouths of his harpies, it was suggested to him, that the colonies could afford to pay taxes as well as the mother country, and that from thence a large income might in time be raised for the use of electioneering and pensioning, and that there might be many good posts and places established in the colonies for the advantage of the court-tools; even *Walpole* had, on that occasion, some consideration. He answered to those, who made this proposal, That the colonists, by the profits of our trade with them, *enabled* us to pay *our* taxes, which was the same as paying taxes to the mother country; and that, by the restrictions, under which we have laid their commerce, all their money comes to the mother-country; and the mother-country can at most have their all. His successors, however, have seen this object in a different light, and have considered a small advantage to themselves as of more consequence than a great benefit to the public. But so long as we see such villainous uses made of the public money by our ministers, we ought to discourage all the arts we see them using for bringing money into the treasury, or increasing their own influence, and therefore we ought to oppose their taxing the colonies, as an abuse, in which we are deeply concerned, and which may prove fatal to us, as well as to the colonists.

Bad ministers always shew an inclination for multiplying taxes. It gives an opportunity for them to embezzle; for in much handling of money, some will stick to the fingers. And a bad ministry want, above all things, money, to dole about, in order to keep in power. If they gain their present point, the spoils of the colonies will help up the supplies, and the influence of the court will be increased; they will have more trumpeters to defend their measures; success will sanctify rapine and bribery; the free spirit of the colonists (who seem at present to possess a larger measure of that virtue, than the mother-country) will be broken by the iron rod of oppression; and Corruption, like another leud *Cleopatra*, as described by *Dryden*,

(Her galley down the silver *Cydnos* row'd,

The tacklings silk; the steamers wav'd in gold, &c.) will sail in triumph through the whole *British* empire in *Europe*, *Asia* and *America*; her false and sophisticate charms will bewitch all eyes, and debauch all hearts, and all will be willing to sell their country, if a purchaser can be found.

It is not yet, but it will soon be, too late to ward off this horrible ruin.

In the year 1754, when our profound government, always too busy in the wrong place, proposed to tax the colonies by act of parliament, and to direct the governors to concert measures for their defence against the *French*, instead of leaving both to the colonists themselves, this wise scheme was communicated by governor *Shirley* to a gentleman of *Philadelphia*, then in *Boston*, who has very eminently distinguished himself, before and since that time, in the philosophical world, and whose judgment, penetration and candour, as well as his

readiness and ability to suggest, or carry into execution every scheme of public utility, have most deservedly endeared him, not only to his fellow-subjects over the whole *American* continent, but to multitudes on this side the *Atlantic*, and now suffers for that integrity which should have procured him reward. This sagacious gentleman (whose friendship the collector of these papers will ever account one of the most fortunate circumstances of his life) sent the governor a set of remarks, of which the following are the heads; and which do almost exhaust the subject.

That the people always bear the burden best, when they have, or think they have, some share in the direction.

That when public measures are generally distasteful to the people, the wheels of government must move more heavily.

That excluding the people of *America* from all share in the choice of a grand council for their own defence, and taxing them in parliament, where they have no representative, would probably give extreme dissatisfaction. [How soundly this extraordinary person judged of the sentiments of the colonists, let the history of the subsequent proceedings of our incorrigible government in attempting, in spite of this wise remonition, to tax them in parliament, bear witness.]

That there was no reason to doubt the willingness of the colonists to contribute for their *own* defence.

That the people themselves, whose all was at stake, could better judge of the force necessary for their defence, and of the means for raising money for the purpose, than a *British* parliament at so great a distance.

That natives of *America* would be as likely to consult wisely and faithfully for the safety of their native

country, as the governors sent from *Britain*, whose object is generally to make fortunes, and then return home, and who might therefore be expected to carry on the war against *France* rather in a way, by which themselves were likely to be gainers, than for the greatest advantage of the cause.

That compelling the colonies to pay money for their own defence, without their consent, would shew a suspicion of their loyalty, or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense, and would be treating them as conquered enemies, and not as free *Britons*, who hold it for their undoubted right not to be taxed but by their own consent, given through their representatives.

That parliamentary taxes, once laid on, are often continued after the necessity for laying them on, ceases; but that, if the colonists were trusted to tax themselves, they would remove the burden from the people, as soon as it should become unnecessary for them to bear it any longer.

That, if parliament is to tax the colonies, their assemblies of representatives may be dismissed as useless.

That taxing the colonies in parliament for their own defence against the *French*, is not more just, than it would be to oblige the cinque ports, and other coasts of *Britain*, to maintain a force against *France*, and to tax them for this purpose, without allowing them representatives in parliament.

That the colonists have always been indirectly taxed by the mother country (besides paying the taxes necessarily laid on by their own assemblies) inasmuch as they are obliged to purchase the manufactures of *Britain*, charged with innumerable heavy taxes; some of which  
manufac-

manufactures they could make, and others could purchase cheaper at other markets.

That the colonists are besides taxed by the mother country, by being obliged to carry great part of their produce to *Britain*, and accept a lower price than they might have at other markets. The difference is a tax paid to *Britain*.

That the whole wealth of the colonists centres at last in the mother country, which enables her to pay her taxes.

That the colonists have, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes, extended the dominions, and increased the commerce and riches of the mother country, [so much that in *Josb. Gee's* time, it was reckoned, that our colony trade was almost the only commerce, by which we were gainers] that therefore the colonists do not deserve to be deprived of the native right of *Britons*, the right of being taxed only by representatives chosen by themselves.

That an adequate representation in parliament would probably be acceptable to the colonists, and would best unite the views and interests of the whole empire.

A headstrong minister made afterwards so good use of these masterly observations, as to improve upon the stupidity of the blind pilots of 1754. For he almost set *America* in arms, by proposing to tax them in a time of peace, the money to be applied, not to their defence, but to the general purpose of all the *British* taxes, the support of a standing army, and gorging the rapacity of the state-bloodsuckers. He had the influence afterwards to obtain a parliamentary confutation of the colonists doctrine, and a declaration, that ‘ the  
‘ king and parliament of *Great-Britain* had, have, and  
‘ of right ought to have, full power and authority to

‘ make laws and statutes of sufficient force to bind the colonies, and his majesty’s subjects in them, in all cases whatsoever ;’ and consequently in the case of taxation without representation. This was literally *Pope’s* divine *right* of governing *wrong*. And the worthy gentleman above referred to, being asked in the house of commons, what he thought of the declaration, answered frankly, ‘ He thought it, and supposed that all the colonists would think it, arbitrary and unjust.’ Some of their blundering doings our profound ministers were afterwards obliged to undo, to the diversion of three kingdoms, and the colonists.

*Grenville* would have considered, had he been a man of conceptions large enough for a tradesman’s clerk, that by confining our colonists to trade only with us, we make them pay our taxes, without directly laying upon them any *internal* tax. For, if half our manufacturers are maintained by them, do they not pay the taxes, which we charge upon those manufacturers? Does not the *consumer* pay the whole charge of the article he consumes? But that short-sighted politician exclaimed, that our *chargeable* colonies ought not to expect immunity from those taxes, which come so heavy upon us, and of which charge a great part is occasioned by the defence of our colonies. Would *Grenville* then have approved of our getting rid of this chargeable appendage? I believe the *French* would have thanked him for a part of the incumbrance, and I believe his own countrymen would have torn him to pieces, if he had proposed alienating any part of what all considerate persons know to be of inestimable advantage to us, if we do not, by injustice and false policy, disappoint ourselves of the advantage.

The object which a commercial nation ought to have always in view, is the enlargement and establishment

ment of its commerce: nor is there any plan more promising for this purpose, than that of colonising. For colonists proceeding originally from a mother country, come into the world with a prejudice for that country, which will naturally lead them, in the conduct of their commerce, to favour that country above all others; and this happy prejudice can only be diminished, or eradicated, by ill usage on the part of the mother country. Nothing brooks constraint so little as commerce: nothing is more delicate, nothing more spontaneous. Whatever proceedings of the mother country therefore break in upon the freedom of commerce, defeat the very intention of colonising, and overthrow it to the foundation. By this rule let the wisdom of our ministers in taxing the colonies be judged of, or rather the distress they are in for a little money, and a few posts and places for their creatures.

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## C H A P. II.

*Our Colonies of great Advantage, and therefore deserved better Treatment.*

**G**RENVILLE's party, in order to defend their own folly in opening a breach between the mother-country and the colonies, endeavoured to depreciate the value of the colonies to *Britain*, and to shew, that were we even to lose them, the damage would not be great. They pretended, that colonies are naturally prejudicial to the populousness of a mother-country. But they only exposed their own ignorance. *Davenant*, if they had ever read him, (and they must be deep politicians who never read that capital

capital author) would have saved them the trouble of falling into this absurdity. ‘ It will peradventure (says ‘ that masterly writer) be a great security and encouragement to those industrious people’ [the colonists] ‘ if a declaratory law were made, That *Englishmen* ‘ have right to all the laws of *England*, while they ‘ remain in countries subject to the dominion of this ‘ kingdom<sup>a</sup>. The colonists, the noble discoverers and ‘ settlers of a new world, from whence, as from an ‘ endless source, wealth and plenty, and the means of ‘ power and grandeur unknown to former ages, have ‘ been pouring into *Europe* these three hundred years!’ What encouragement, what security do they not deserve to enjoy! With the design of setting up, and keeping up a standard, in favour of civil and religious liberty, did the heroic ancestors of the colonists fly from persecution in their native country; they crossed the vast *Atlantic*; they pierced those woods where no humanised foot from the creation had trod; they roused the deadly serpent in his hole, the savage beast in his den, and the brutal *Indian* in his thicket; they encountered all the danger and difficulties of forming those settlements which have made the *British* empire what it is.

‘ Generally speaking (says *Davenant*<sup>a</sup>) our colonies, while they have *English* blood in their veins, and have relations in *England*, and while they can get by trading with us, the stronger and greater they grow, the more this crown and kingdom will get by them; and nothing but such an arbitrary power as shall make them desperate, can bring them to rebel.

Colonies do not naturally produce depopulation in the mother country; but rather the contrary. For many

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<sup>a</sup> *Daven.* II. 36.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10.



many individuals emigrating, cause cheapness for those, who stay behind. They marry, and carry on population. The mother country thus coming to swarm with people, they find themselves obliged to cultivate trade and manufactures, &c.

*Davenant* accordingly shews<sup>a</sup>, that *England* is grown both more populous and richer, since the improvement of the colonies, than before; that, particularly, from the restoration to the revolution, viz. 28 years, the number of inhabitants was increased 900,000. What indeed has increased the wealth and power of the nation so much beyond queen *Elizabeth's* times, but the colonies?

“ We cannot but wonder, says that excellent author, at their policy who were the first promoters of that law in 1695, which puts a difficulty upon, and restrains the sale of any plantation or parcel of land in *America* to foreigners; whereas indeed we should invite and encourage aliens to plant in the *West-Indies*, whereby the crown gains subjects, and the nation gets wealth by the labour of others. This statute does peradventure want revising. And countries that take no care to encourage an accession of strangers, in a course of time will find plantations of pernicious consequence. It may be computed that there have gone from *England* to the *West-Indies* for many years by a medium about 1800 persons annually; but then there is reason to think, that for some time the persecutions abroad have brought over to us by a medium about 500 foreigners every year; and there are grounds to believe, that for these last 20 years the *West-Indies* have

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<sup>a</sup> II. 2.

have sent us back annually about 300 persons of their offspring with this advantage, that the fathers went out poor, and the children came home rich. But if such measures should hereafter be taken as will hinder the accession of strangers, or discourage the planters from returning back; then these colonies would drain us every year of 1800 persons.

‘ We shall shew, that the plantations are a spring  
 ‘ of wealth to this nation; that they work for us;  
 ‘ that their treasure centers all here; and that the laws  
 ‘ have tied them fast enough to us; so that it must  
 ‘ be through our own fault, and mismanagement, if  
 ‘ they become independent of *England*.’

Sir *Josiah Child* thinks, the *New-Englanders*, in his times, consumed ten times the value, in *English* manufactures, of what they sent to *England*. Yet he reckons *New-England* the least advantageous of all the colonies. He thinks, two-thirds of all the *English* shipping was, in his time, employed in the *American* trade, meaning chiefly the continental colonies.

*Poslethwayte* thinks half the *English* manufactures go to *America*.

At the time of the stamp-act, it was computed, that the *Americans* owed *Britain* four millions sterling: A proof of a prodigious commerce.

The king, *A. D.* 1721, recommended encouraging the colonies to furnish naval stores, which would not only be advantageous otherwise to both countries, but would divert the colonists from setting up, and carrying on manufactures, which directly interfere with those of *Britain*<sup>a</sup>.

*A. D.*

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 652.

*A. D.* 1723, the exports to *Pensylvania* were 15,992*l.* In 1742, they were increased to 75,295*l.*

From 1744 to 1748 inclusive, our whole Exports to *America.*

<i>Northern Colonies.</i>			<i>West-India Islands.</i>	
	£.			£.
1744,	640,114	————		796,112
5,	534,316	————		503,669
6,	754,945	————		472,994
7,	726,648	————		856,463
8,	830,243	————		734,095
	<hr/>			<hr/>
Total	3,486,266			3,363,333
	<hr/>	Difference		122,933
				<hr/>
		Total		3,486,266
				<hr/>

From 1754 to 1758, inclusive.

<i>Northern Colonies.</i>			<i>West-India Islands.</i>	
	£.			£.
1754,	1,246,615	————		685,675
5,	1,177,848	————		694,667
6,	1,428,720	————		733,458
7,	1,727,924	————		776,488
8,	1,832,948	————		877,571
	<hr/>			<hr/>
Total	7,414,055			3,767,859
	<hr/>	Difference		3,646,196
				<hr/>
		Total		7,414,055
				<hr/>

From this view of our whole exports to our *American* colonies, it appears, that our trade to the islands 27 years ago, *viz. A. D.* 1744, amounted to 796,112*l.* and thirteen years ago, *viz. A. D.* 1758, to 877,571*l.*

That

That in 1744 our whole exports to the continent of *America* amounted to 640,114*l.* but in 1758 to 1,832,948*l.* So that in 14 years, *viz.* from 1744 to 1758, our island trade has been neither much increased nor diminished; but that our trade to the continent was in the same period increased almost three-fold. And in the year 1758, we had not got possession of all *North-America*. For the peace, by which we have excluded the *French* from all that part of the continent, which is east of the *Mississippi*, and are become masters of a territory, whose extent baffles arithmetic, was made in 1763. Supposing our trade to the continent of *America* to increase at the same rate, which nothing was likely to hinder, but our enraging our colonists by *Grenville's* mad and unjust project of taxing them, without representation, it is evident, that this alone would have been an inexhaustible, and endless fund of trade. For, if in the last of the above quoted years, *viz.* 1758, our trade was increased three-fold beyond what it was 14 years before, it was to be expected, that in another period of 14 years, *viz.* *A. D.* 1772, the present year, it should be again increased more than three-fold, because our dominion, and number of people in the continent, have received an addition from an extraordinary cause, *viz.* the peace of 1763. If so, the amount of our exports to the continent of *America*, in 1772, ought to be 5,498,844*l.* And in 14 years more 16,496,532*l.* So that, if the fatal *Grenville* had never been born,

—patriæ et Trojæ communis Erinny's. *Virg.*

here was a fund of trade, which might have employed more manufacturing hands, than would have made this island as populous as *Holland*. For many ages will be past, before manufactures can come to be cultivated in  
*America*

*America* to any such effect as to supersede those of the mother-country. Because, for many ages to come, it will be more advantageous for the working people to take land, settle, and marry, than to be journey-men manufacturers. Which likewise secures a prodigious and still growing and accumulating increase of people. It is found, that, on the continent of *America*, the number of the people is at least doubled every twenty years. Therefore, if the number of *British* people on the continent of *America* be now two millions, (I put the lowest computation) twenty years hence it will be four millions. Let the reader only consider one moment, what sort of head that man must have had, who could think of risking the loss of four millions of customers for the manufactures of his country—all for the sake—of making a few places for collectors, and commissioners of duties and taxes, that he might have somewhat to stop the *Cerberian* barking of a pack of hungry court-curs. Statesmen have no right to expect our putting a more candid construction upon their proceedings. If they really meant the public good, we should see them aiming at the public good; we should see the national debt lessened, the army reformed, the number of places and pensions reduced, &c.—But to return.

‘ More than one-fourth part of the *English* shipping  
‘ is supposed to be employed in the trade to *America* <sup>a</sup>.’

The excellent *Dr. Franklin* says, the force of the *American* privateers in the last war, was greater, as to both men and guns, than all queen *Elizabeth*’s royal navy <sup>b</sup>. He thinks *Britain* can want no trade, but  
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<sup>a</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, I. 125.

<sup>b</sup> LETTERS, p. 206.

with her *American* colonies, which must be continually increasing.

I am aware, that, in diminution of the value of our colonies, the *Grenville* party have alledged, that the colonists are very deeply indebted to us, and that they have ever shewn a backwardness to acquit themselves of those just debts; so that our commerce with them is much less to be desired. But is it not notorious, that for many ages together the mother-country had no shadow of complaint of this kind against the colonies; and that the first cause of the interruption of payments from *America* was our minister's stopping the trade between our colonists and the *Spaniards* in that part of the world.

Such have our colonies been to us, and such, and more than we can imagine, they would have been to us.

And now it is a favourite object with us, to enslave and destroy those whom we ought both from gratitude and prudence, to support and cherish. For, whilst I am writing these lines, Hear, O Heavens, and give ear, O Earth; or rather may the memory of the transaction be annihilated both from heaven and earth—At this very hour, we are meditating to deprive the city of *Boston* of its port during an unlimited period, by which 25,000 people are to be punished, many thousands utterly beggared, and a loss of half a million brought upon the inhabitants of that great city for a riot committed by certain individuals unknown; the inhabitants offering to make up the damages. We are proposing to punish the innocent with the guilty, and to punish the guilty for acting somewhat outrageously, after we ourselves had by our tyranny put them out of their wits.

In the NEWS PAPERS of *April*, 1774, was published the following comparison between the proceedings

ings of government against *Boston* in *New England*, for a riot committed there by persons unknown, and the proceedings of government against the city of *Edinburgh*, on account of a riot, *A. D.* 1737, in which captain *Porteous*, of the town-guards, was, by persons to this hour unknown, taken out of prison, and put to death, for the slaughter of several people at an execution, for which he was condemned as a murderer, and afterwards reprieved by the queen regent, the king being abroad.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

*Edinburgh,*

*Boston,*

Began the 10th of *Feb.* 1737, and ended the 21st of *June*, having continued near four months.

Began the 14th, and ended the 31st of *March*, 1774, being in all seventeen days.

The provost and magistrates of *Edinburgh*, the judges of *Scotland*, and many other witnesses examined at the bar.

Witnesses examined at the privy council, and their evidence suppressed.

Counsel and evidence for the magistrates and city fully heard at the bar.

The agent refused a hearing at the bar.

Two members for *Edinburgh*, forty-five for *Scotland* in the lower house, and sixteen in the upper house.

Not one member for *Boston* in either house, nor for all or any part of *America*, nor even a voice in electing one.

Charge—An overt act of rebellion, and an atrocious murder—proved on a full hearing, and by competent evidence.

Charge—A riot and trespass—no evidence, and no hearing.

*Edinburgh.*

Frequent conferences held between the two houses to compare the evidence, &c.

Punishment — A fine of 2000 *l.*

For proof, see the JOURNALS of the Lords and Commons in 1737, and the BILL against *Edinburgh.*

*Boston.*

Not one conference.

Punishment—The loss of their port, to the injury of the town, at the lowest and most favourable estimate, of 500,000 *l.* the restoration of their port, and of the use of their property, left at the king's mercy, after they shall have paid for the tea the full price, and all damages, to the amount, we may presume, of 30,000 *l.*

JOURNALS of the Lords and Commons 1774, and the BOSTON PORT BILL.



## C H A P. III.

*The Colonies, though so valuable to Britain, have been greatly oppressed by the Mother Country.*

‘EVERY act of authority of one man’ [or body of men] ‘over another, for which there is not an absolute necessity, is tyrannical<sup>a</sup>.’

Our colonists have long complained, that we have needlessly hampered and restricted their trade; that, like awkward parents, we have exerted too much authority over our children; while the whole art of managing them consisted in letting them alone.

The colonists complain, that the governors we send them are generally needy men, whom we send thither chiefly to fill their pockets; that both governors and judges depend more upon the *British* court than upon the people whom they are to govern and to judge; that our court gives authority to the commissioners of customs to appoint and pay, at the expence of the people, without their consent, as many officers as they please, to the multiplication of placemen, the plundering the people, and the danger of liberty; that the whole people of *America* are put to expence and trouble merely to put a little money in the pockets of a few *Portuguese* merchants in *England*. The colonists must not import directly from *Portugal* even a little oil or fruit, without having them loaded with the expences of a voyage three thousand miles round by *England*, which, in war time, increases every article 30 per cent. and impoverishes the colonies. They must

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<sup>a</sup> *Beccaria*, CRIMES AND PUN. p. 10.

must not make a nail, a penknife, or a hat. We empty our jails on them, and fill their country with our rogues and thieves. We oblige their assemblies to provide quarters for our soldiers, and find them firing, bedding, candles, small beer, or rum, salt, vinegar, &c. at the expence of the provinces, in a time of profound peace, though they have little occasion for a military force at any time, being themselves all trained to arms. The colonists were, however, so pleased at the removal of the stamp-act, that they agreed to the quartering of troops, hoping that it would be only a temporary grievance. But that they might not give place to authority where it was unconstitutional, they made acts of their own assemblies, leaving out some of the small articles, as salt and vinegar. Even this was found to be rebellion, and the province of *New York* had its assembly annihilated for the offence.

The house of representatives of *Massachusetts Bay* petitioned the king to remove Sir *Fr. Bernard*, their governor; because, amongst other things, he had misrepresented the colonists to the ministry in such a manner, that it was thought necessary to send a military force among them (instead of sending them soldiers, they should have removed grievances.) Those military men turned the assembly room into a barrack for the common soldiers, and planted the centinels in such a manner, that the councillors and justices of the courts were interrupted and challenged in passing on their business. They endeavoured to quarter their troops in the town of *Boston*, while the barracks were useless. He dissolved the assembly at the most improper time, and arbitrarily refused to call another, though often petitioned for ten months together.

The colonists complain of general warrants, under which any officer or servant of the customs may  
break

break open any man's house, closet, chest, &c. at pleasure; of our court's establishing the arbitrary and oppressive power of the excise laws in the customs; of appointing judges, during pleasure, to try all revenue causes without jury; of compelling his majesty's subjects in all revenue-matters to take their trials in any of the colonies, however distant from their respective habitations, where their characters are known; of a secretary of state's sending a requisition to the assembly at *Boston*, with threats, tending to force their determinations, which ought to be free; of threatening and punishing the *American* assemblies for petitioning the king, though the act of settlement expressly secures this right to the subject; of misapplying several *American* revenues; of empowering the crown to seize and send over to *Britain*, for trial, those of the colonists who become obnoxious to the court, without legal indictment, or bill found by jury; of suspending the legislative power of the province of *New York*, so as to destroy that freedom of debate and determination which is the necessary, unalienable, and constitutional right of such assemblies, &c.

Governor *Bernard* complains heavily and repeatedly, that the election of the council at *Boston* in *New England*, gives the people too much power<sup>a</sup>. What idea, upon the principle of *salus populi*, can be formed of too much power in the hands of the people? Suppose a people should choose to keep all the power in their own hands, and delegate none? Oh, then, we the court, must be content to be a part of the people, and have no opportunity of wallowing in wealth and pleasure, and raising great fortunes from the spoils of the industrious.

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<sup>a</sup> See his LETT. TO LORD SHELBURNE.

So *Walpole* opposed all reformations of parliamentary abuses; because they tended to throw too much power into the hands of the *people*. This is the true spirit of *courts* and court-tools; and they, who cannot see the cloven foot, when thus uncovered to the knee, must obstinately shut their eyes.

Dr. *Franklin*, in his examination before the house of commons, declared, that the causes of the *British* parliament's having lost, in great part, the respect of the colonists, were, 'the restraints lately laid on their  
' trade, by which the bringing of gold and silver into  
' the colonies was prevented, the prohibition of paper-  
' money among themselves, and then demanding a  
' new and heavy tax by stamps, taking away at the  
' same time trial by juries, and refusing to receive  
' and hear their humble petitions <sup>a</sup>.'

Governor *Bernard* of *New England*, having refused to call a legal assembly of representatives, as above hinted, the people of a great many towns sent to *Boston* commissioners to meet and treat of public affairs, and prevent anarchy and confusion; but disclaiming all authoritative or governmental designs or acts. This committee of convention petitioned governor *Bernard* for a regular assembly as usual. The governor would not receive the petition, because that would have been acknowledging the legality of the committee of convention, which drew it up. He afterwards sent them a message, that he could not suffer them to continue sitting, after the assembly of the province was, by authority, dissolved and forbidden to sit; and that the committee of convention was, to all intents and purposes, an assembly under a different name. He therefore warns them of the consequences.

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. VII. 113.*

sequences. The committee of convention afterwards remonstrated to the governor against lodging troops in the city, while there were barracks fit for receiving them, and not full, as contrary to act of parliament. The committee of convention afterwards published a manifesto, signifying, that the design of their meeting was to preserve the peace, and to petition the king in favour of the province, that a regular assembly might be called, and grievances redressed. The members of the council of the province of *Massachusetts Bay* addressed general *Gage*, commander of the forces sent to *Boston*, excusing their own conduct, and the disturbances in *Boston*, and begging that the military might be moved to the barracks.

I believe they, who are so violent for loading our poor fellow subjects in *America* with taxes, would think themselves hardly used, if they were hampered in their manufactures and commerce by a people beyond the ocean, in the same manner as the colonists are by us in many instances, severe, useless, and impolitic. Such are our restraining them from the use of flitting-mills and steel-furnaces; our prohibiting them the cutting of white pines; our regulations, which oblige them to bring to us all their products, though they might find better markets elsewhere; which is obliging them to sell to us all their products at our own price; and those other regulations, by which they are prohibited manufacturing many necessary articles, or purchasing them of other nations, only that they may be obliged to have them of us at an advanced price; for we can afford no goods but at an advanced price, loaded as we are with 140 millions of debt, the interest of which, amounting to above 5 millions *per annum*, must be raised in great part out of the profits of our trade.

Thus we make the poor colonists sell to us as cheap as we please, and purchase our goods as dear as we please. This alone is taxing them with a vengeance.

The *Carthaginians* obliged the people of *Sardinia* (*væ victis!*) to buy corn of *them* exclusively, at the price they set upon it: but we do not hear that those tyrannical conquerors forced the enslaved *Sardinians* to sell them their products at a price of their own fixing; while we impose this law, not on the *conquered Welch* or *Irish*, or the once restless and rebellious *Scotch*; but on our colonists, our once tractable and obedient *children*, to whom we are under greater obligations than to *Scotch*, *Irish*, and *Welch*, all put together.

The colonists complain, that their trade is peculiarly restricted by laws made in a parliament, in which they are not represented; that they are taxed in the same parliament; therefore have no opportunity of giving, or with-holding, their consent; which produces a confusion of taxes, as their *own assemblies* are obliged to lay on taxes for defraying the necessary expences of their respective provinces, at the same time that the *mother-country* may be laying on other taxes so heavy, that both together may be beyond the abilities of the people. They complain of being obliged to find quarters, firing, bedding, candles, rum, &c. for the *army*, though they are obliged to keep up a *militia* of their own. That their money *raised* without and contrary to their consent, is to be *applied*, likewise, without and contrary to their approbation, *viz.* in paying the salaries of governors, judges, and other officers appointed by the court, and removeable at its pleasure. They affirm, that several of their original charters are, by late laws, set aside; so that the settlers are deceived out of the privi-

privileges, on the faith of which they first left their native country, crossed the ocean, and established those colonies, which have been of so great value to the mother country. They complain of having been restrained by the ministry from the privilege of petitioning against these oppressions, and having their assemblies annihilated for doing what the Bill of Rights allows to every *Englishman*; a stretch of power very much resembling that of *Ch. II.* in seizing the charter of the city of *London*.

The act of parliament, by which the stamp-act was repealed, asserted a power in king, lords, and commons to tax the colonies. But it seems, the secretary of state alone has power to dissolve, annihilate, and interdict their assemblies. Thus, if our proceedings against *America* are viewed on one side, the colonists are subject to *king, lords, and commons*; if, on the other, the *secretary of state alone* is their master.

Can it be with a favourable design to the colonies, that the ministry always recommend to the governors, who are generally their creatures, to obtain *permanent* salaries for the government-offices? Is there any better means for securing good behaviour in officers, than putting them upon the foot of *quamdiu se bene gesserint*? Stopping supplies our ancestors thought the only sure way to obtain redress of grievances. Give the *American* governors and other officers permanent salaries, so as they shall be independent on the people, and you give them the hint to erect themselves into petty despots and tyrants.

The colonists have long complained, that we needlessly hamper their trade with the ports of *Europe*. Why may not, say they, the colonists be allowed to fetch and carry in their own ships, to and from the several ports of *Europe*, whatever articles do not interfere

tere with the trade of the mother-country? Are the people of *Britain* afraid, lest the colonists be too thriving? They will only, in that case, be the better customers to the mother-country. For the more luxurious they grow, the more they will want of the *British* manufactures, unless we drive them to other shops by our ill usage, or exorbitant prices. Nothing requires more to be free and unconfined than commerce.

The duty of 3*d.* per gallon on melasses, they say, is more than the article will bear, and therefore operates as a prohibition; stopping their exportation of horses, lumber, flour, and fish, to the *French* and *Dutch* colonies; and the vent for them in *England* and the *West Indies* is not sufficient to take them off. The stopping the exportation of melasses into the continental colonies, hinders their distilling, and is a prejudice to the rum-trade with *Africa*, and throws it into the hands of the *French*, and hurts the fishery. There used to be imported into *Rhode-island* only 1,150,000 gallons of melasses annually; the duty upon which is 14,375*l.* sterling, a larger sum than ever was in circulation at any one time in the colony. The money to be sent out, never to return. How is this drain to be kept running? If the colonies be, by our clumsy laws, disabled from purchasing *British* manufactures, who will be the gainers? The restricting of the colonists from sending their products to better and more convenient markets, than *Britain*, is a loss to *Britain* of all the difference; for all the profits, the colonists get, have always come to *Britain*; and the more considerable their profits, the better for the mother-country.

The courts of vice-admiralty, they say, are a great grievance. A custom-house-officer may seize, for



what he calls probable cause, in *Georgia*, and carry the trial to *Halifax*, 1500 miles. The unfortunate owner of the seized goods must follow. When arrived there, out of the reach of his friends and acquaintance, he must give bond, else he cannot reclaim his goods. If the judge, perhaps with iniquitous views, pronounces, that there was probable cause for seizing them, the unhappy man may be ruined, and all his comfort will be the same with that of the sick man, who dies, *secundum artem*, of the doctor, that he is undone according to act of parliament. The patience of the colonists, for so many years, under such severe laws, deserved at our hands other treatment than we have lately regaled them with.

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## C H A P. IV.

### *Precedents respecting Colonies.*

THE conquered nations generally had each a protector in the *Roman* senate, as the *Allobroges* had for their patron *Quintius Fabius Sanga*, and they were wont to send ambassadors to *Rome*<sup>a</sup>. Our *American* colonies, though not conquered countries, have, constitutionally, no person in our senate to plead their cause, when we lay taxes on them, without knowing whether they are able to bear them. For the house of commons receives no petitions on money-bills, because it is to be supposed, every place, that is taxed, is represented by a member, or members. The rebellions of the *Germans*, *Pannonians*, &c. in *Augustus's*

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<sup>a</sup> See ANT. UNIV. HIST. Vol. XIII. p. 149.

*Augustus's* time, were owing chiefly to the extortion of the governors set over them, by the *Romans*. A lesson for our instruction with respect to our colonies<sup>a</sup>. And see *Tully's* orations against *VERRES*, prætor of *Sicily*.

King *John IV.* of *Portugal* (formerly duke of *Braganza*) consulting the states about raising two millions for the war with *Spain*, for the preservation of their lately recovered liberties, they desired the king to give out an edict for raising them in whatever way he pleased. But that magnanimous prince answered, 'That he would have no money, but by the grant of his people.' The people immediately raised him four millions<sup>b</sup>.

The city of *Ghent* refused, about 200 years ago, to pay its *quota* of a tax, laid on in the states of the united provinces, because, they pretended, they had a stipulation with *Charles's* ancestors, that they were to pay no tax, unless they gave their express consent to the laying it on. It was answered, that the subsidy was granted by the states of *Flanders*, in which their representatives sat. They resist; and are totally deprived of their liberties by *Charles c*.

The *Spanish Netherlands* were taxed last century by the imperial court under the denomination of the circle of *Burgundy*. But this was thought unjust, because they were subject to the states of the united provinces, and were taxed by their own government, as the *Americans* by their assemblies; so that they must have had the charges of two governments to defray, if they submitted to the imperial tax; which was imposed on the pretext,

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIV. 19.

<sup>b</sup> MCD. UNIV. HIST. XXII. 299.

<sup>c</sup> *Robertson's* CH. V. II. 430, 442.

pretext, of their having a voice in the council of the empire; whereas the *Americans* have no voice in the *British* parliament. They refused to submit to the imperial taxation<sup>a</sup>.

The *Spaniards* do not make the best of their colonies. They give their gold to the industrious nations for those manufactures, which themselves should make, and which would have rendered them a great maritime power<sup>b</sup>. *Philip* II. by sending vast sums into the *Netherlands* when carrying on his wars, enriched those countries, and made them powerful against himself. Thus the *Spaniards* are only factors for the rest of *Europe*. The king and grandees only see the gold, and then spread it all over the industrious nations, and their poor are the poorest in the world. The *Spaniards* have several times made attempts towards a spirit of manufactures, but wars have interrupted them. And now, 1771, it has been said, that the king has sent two merchants to travel through all *Europe*, and learn manufactures and commerce. The continual importation of metal into *Europe*, must in time defeat its own intention. Specie is now 32 times less valuable, than when the *Spaniards* discovered *America*<sup>c</sup>.

*Batavia* is more populous than *Holland*; yet continues subject to *Holland*, and of prodigious advantage to the mother country. Why then should we dread the defection or rebellion of our colonists, unless we mean to force them upon it?

‘*Portugal* holds almost her existence by her possessions in *Brazil*<sup>d</sup>.’ Every nation in *Europe* gains by colonising, the *Spaniards* excepted.

The

<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxx. 428.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xxxix. 213.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. 214.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. xxxviii. 2.

The once prodigious power of the *Portuguese* in the *East*, dwindled through the corrupt, effeminate, and unjust conduct of the viceroys they sent to *Goa*<sup>a</sup>.

The viceroy of *Manilla* continues in office only three years. His successor has power to examine him rigorously. Sometimes the successor has let himself be tampered with; to prevent which the people have taken the trial and punishment of wicked governors into their own hands<sup>b</sup>. If the people wish their business done, the sure way is to do it themselves.

*Davenant*, II. 8, thinks, the only danger we are to guard against, respecting our colonies is, their becoming powerful at sea; because, while we are their masters in naval force, we can secure their obedience to our commercial laws. But surely, in all cases of commerce, there is somewhat necessary, besides mere compulsory government. We may oblige our colonists to submit to our laws, and be very little the better for our colonies, if there be not a cordiality kept up between them and us.

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## C H A P. V.

### *Of Taxation without Representation.*

**I**T appears by Chap. III. above, that our colonists have at all times had sufficient ground of complaint against the mother-country; and that if they had been of that turbulent disposition, and as desirous of shaking off the connexion with us, as the *Greenvillians* falsely pretend, they must have given repeated proofs of those bad dispositions. On the contrary, we know, that no  
people

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<sup>a</sup> *MOD. UNIV. HIST.* ix. 290.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* ix. 460.

people ever were more peaceable, or better affected, than the colonists have all along shewn themselves; 'till we bethought ourselves of insulting them with taxes imposed upon them by our parliament, in which they have no representation, and with the direct design of raising money upon them for our own advantage.

To impose taxes, is one of the most dangerous parts of a king's, or government's business.

Periculosa plenum opus aleæ  
 Tractas, et incedis per ignes  
 Suppositos cineri doloso. HOR.

New taxes have raised sundry rebellions, and disturbances in *England*, as 9 *Edw.* III. 4 *Rich.* II. 9 *Hen.* VI. 4 *Hen.* VII. 16 *Hen.* VIII. &c. A parliament was summoned, 39 *Hen.* III. A demand was made by the court. The commons thought it exorbitant. Would grant nothing, so much were they offended; though they assembled with the design of granting. So the people of *Carolina* lately, at the very time, when they were expressing great rage against the government's proposing to tax them without representation, voluntarily taxed themselves, to a considerable value, to make a present to a person in *England*, whose public conduct pleased them. The *Roman* senate, when *Hannibal* was at their gates, knowing that people will do more voluntarily, than by force, for carrying on the war, proposed, not a tax, but a benevolence. The consequence was, that the *Mensarii* (tellers) could not receive the money, it came in so fast.

Nothing produces so much ill-blood, as touching people's money. The malt-tax, in *Scotland*, *A. D.* 1712, because thought contrary to the union, had almost broke the union, before it was 10 years old.

It

It was an unjust tax that produced the terrible insurrection under *Wat Tyler* and *Jack Straw*, which had almost overturned the state. It was an injudicious tax that put the whole kingdom of *Naples* in confusion under *Maffaniello* the fisherman. What effect the attempt to tax our own colonies may produce, remains to be seen—and felt. God forbid that it should equal the fears of wise and thoughtful men. To provoke three millions of people to their utmost rage, is no slight affair.

The two counties palatine of *Chester* and *Durham*, had (says *Petyt*, RIGHT OF THE COM. 45.) parliaments of their own, before the conquest, and were not subject to any of the laws of the land, unless they agreed to them.

It was debated, *A. D.* 1621, whether the county palatine of *Durham* should have representation in parliament, as the rest of *England*. It was agreed, that it should; but it did not pass into a law, 'till 25 *Car. II.* when it was settled, that the county should have two members, and the city of *Durham* two<sup>a</sup>.

Time was, when the city of *Chester* had no representation. The privilege of sending members was granted to that city, 'because (says the act 35 *Hen. VIII.* c. 13.) 'the inhabitants thereof have often been  
' touched and grieved with acts and statutes made in  
' parliament, as were derogatory unto the most antient  
' jurisdiction, liberties, and privileges thereof, as prejudicial unto the commonweal, quietness, and peace of  
' his majesty's subjects.'

In the same manner representation was granted to the bishoprick of *Durham*; and it was not taxed 'till represented in parliament.

MR.

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. v. 464.

Mr. *Molyneux* (the gentleman, I suppose, with whom Mr. *Locke* corresponded) wrote a pamphlet, *A. D.* 1698, to prove, that *Ireland* (though a conquered country) ought not to be taxed by the *English* parliament<sup>a</sup>. In our times it is not. How much less our brave colonists, who never were conquered?

‘ In the reign of *Hen. III.* says *Davenant*, we find  
 ‘ where parliaments have not been consulted, they  
 ‘ have not thought themselves obliged to pay the ex-  
 ‘ pence; for as we learn from *Mathew Paris*, king  
 ‘ *Hen.* held a parliament at *Winchester*, where he  
 ‘ desired an aid from his people, in regard his own  
 ‘ treasure had been exhausted with paying his sister’s  
 ‘ portion to the Emperor, and by his own wedding.  
 ‘ The parliament replied, That these things had been  
 ‘ done without advising with them, and without their  
 ‘ consent; and seeing they were free from the fault,  
 ‘ they ought not to participate of the punishment.  
 ‘ The *Poictovins*, to serve their own turn, had at ano-  
 ‘ ther time engaged him in an unseasonable war with  
 ‘ *France*; upon which he called a parliament, and  
 ‘ desired an aid. The barons told him, he had under-  
 ‘ taken it unadvisedly; and that his parliament won-  
 ‘ dered, he would undertake so difficult and dangerous  
 ‘ a business, without their advice and assent.’

In antient times, the lords have given the kings subsidies out of their own property. 13 *Edw. III.* the lords granted, for themselves, a tenth of all the corn growing upon their demesnes, the commons granting nothing at that time. At other times the knights of the shires, have granted separately from the other commoners; and at other times, the representatives of cities and boroughs have granted by them-  
 VOL. II. X selves.

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. III. 88.*

seives. But still they granted only what was their own to grant. They did not grant the property of people at the distance of 3000 miles, who had not one representative among them.

*Gee*, in his excellent piece on trade, remonstrates against all measures, which tend to hamper our colonies. What would he have said, if he had been told, that the time would so soon come, when we should, with horror, see our administration eager to send an armed force to dragoon them into submission to unjust laws, by which their property was to be seized contrary to their own consent, and those brave people by authority declared traitors, seditious, rebels, &c. for defending their property?

It has been said on the subject of taxing the colonists in parliament; Why may not the colonists be *taxed* by the same assembly, which has an unquestioned power of making *laws* for them? But this is a confused and undistinguishing way of reasoning. It is hardship enough on the colonies to find their commerce hampered by laws, in the making of which they had no hand, nor could even remonstrate against them, while they were under consideration. But there may be pretexts for making laws, whose operations may eventually bring inconvenience upon the colonists; while no pretext can justify taxing them, so long as they continue unrepresented. Legislation and taxation, are very different things. The *lords* cannot alter a letter in a *money-bill*, though they may amend any other. And it is always to the *commons* the king has recourse for supplies, and to whom he returns thanks for them. The reason is plain. The lords have no power over the property of the people. The members of the house of commons are the representatives of the commons of *England*; and as such have a dele-



a delegated power to grant supplies out of the property of the commons. The lords may at any time raise a sum of money for the crown out of their own property; but they cannot grant out of the property of the commons, because the commons have given them no such power, and because they sit in parliament upon their own account, and not as representatives.

The *British* house of commons proposing to tax the unrepresented colonies in *America* involves, therefore, in my opinion, some striking absurdities. What is, for instance, to be the business of the provincial assemblies of representatives in *America*, if the power of taxing the colonies be in the *British* parliament at *Westminster*? Is it not obvious, that these two powers are incompatible? It is notorious, that by their charters several, if not all the provinces have the right of laying on taxes. And how then is the provincial assembly of *New-England*, for example, to lay on a tax of half a crown in the pound, at the same time that, for ought that is known in *New-England*, the house of commons in *Old England* may be voting a tax upon the people of that province of seventeen and sixpence in the pound? If we may put any trust in the first rule in arithmetic, here is the whole pound gone. Again: What could be more absurd than the commons giving and granting what was neither their own property, nor that of their constituents, what they had no more right to give and grant, (no man can give away a free subject's property, but himself or his representative) than they had to give and grant the property of the people of *Holland* or *France*? Again: The king was, according to custom, to thank the commons for granting the *American* tax. But how was he to thank them? For sparing their own pockets, and taking out of those of the colonists against their

consent? Or was he to thank the colonists, who were to pay the money? Certainly not. They were to pay it against their inclination.

The taxing of the unrepresented colonies is so unjust, that were it ever so prudent, it ought not to be done. It is so impolitic, that were it ever so just, it ought not to be thought of.

‘If the king is to *take* at his pleasure, what have we to give?’ was the common argument against *Ch.* Ist’s raising money without consent of parliament; and may, with equal propriety, be used by our colonists against their being taxed by the *British* parliament, in which they have no representation.

*Edw. I.* summoning one of his parliaments, uses these words, *Ut quod omnes tangit ab omnibus probetur.* He would have them consult about public affairs, ‘that what concerns all, may be approved by all.’ A sound maxim surely. But would our taxing the colonists contrary to their approbation, be acting upon this principle?

Some short-sighted defenders of the late oppressive measures taken with our *American* brethren have attempted to wheedle them into a persuasion, that their being taxed by the *British* parliament, in which three millions have not one representative, is no greater hardship than what is suffered by the mother-country, in which, though representation, as I have shewn in the former volume, is as far from adequate, as can well be imagined; yet six millions have 558 representatives, and in which every man, woman, and child, by living in one *county* or other, is represented by one or two members, who cannot tax them without taxing themselves, their children, their friends, dependants, tenants, &c. If the three millions of colonists had 279 representatives in parliament (the half of 558) it

might then be time to make comparisons between their case and that of the mother-country. Till then, or till they have some shadow of representation, nothing can be more absurd.

We have lately seen all *England* besetting the throne with complaints, that *one county* is deprived not of representation, but of *one* particular favourite individual, as one of their two representatives, while they may chuse any other individual upon the island in his place; and this not to *perpetuity*, but only during *seven years* at most; this we have lately seen, and we wonder, that *three millions* should complain, that they are to be taxed from age to age to whatever amount it may please the *British* parliament to impose on them, in which they have not the shadow of a representative. Would they be the posterity of true *Britons*, if they did not complain of this?

The firmness shewn by the colonists against what to them is precisely the same oppression as to us it would be to have taxes laid on us by an edict from the throne, has, by very high authority, been pronounced *sedition* and *rebellion*: but with all due submission to authority, (—truth and justice are above all authority) when the illustrious *Hampden* resisted the lawful sovereign's unlawful demand of only three shillings and four-pence, because he had no voice in consenting to the laying on the ship-tax, was he too guilty of *sedition* and *rebellion*? If he was, we are all rebels, but the jacobites; and our gracious king *Geo. III.* (whom God preserve) is an usurper; for the revolution was brought about with the direct design of preventing any man's property being seized without his consent given either in person or by representative, which makes it the same to our colonists to be taxed by the parliament of *Britain* as by that of *Paris*.

Suppose the *British* parliament should imagine a tax to be paid exclusively by those who have *no vote* for members of parliament, as the people of *Manchester, Ely, &c.* Would not this be universally decried as the most flagrant partiality? Yet this would be more plausible than a *British* parliament's taxing *America*; because the members cannot be supposed competent judges of the abilities of the colonists to bear taxes; whereas they are undoubtedly judges of the ability of their own countrymen, whether voters or not. Again: Suppose the parishes in the county of *Middlesex* to send two representatives each to a parliament, or legislative assembly, excluding only that of *Islington* from representation. Suppose this legislative assembly to lay taxes on the unrepresented parish of *Islington*; Could it with any reason be expected, that the parishioners of *Islington* should quietly submit to such gross abuse? Yet this would be less inconsistent with equity than a *British* parliament's taxing *America*, because the representatives of the other parishes of *Middlesex* must be supposed competent judges of the ability of the *Islingtonians*; whereas the members of the *British* parliament can be no judges of the ability of the colonists.

*Magna Charta*, and the Bill of Rights, prohibit the taxing of the mother-country by prerogative, and without consent of those who are to be taxed. If the people of *Britain* are not to be taxed, but by parliament; because otherwise they might be taxed without their own consent; does it not directly follow, that the colonists cannot, according to *Magna Charta*, and the bill of rights, be taxed by parliament, so long as they continue unrepresented; because otherwise they may be taxed without their own consent?

At the time when the famous stamp-act of blessed memory was invented, the colonies were said to be indebted

debted to *Britain* to the amount of no less than four millions, occasioned by their want of ability to make remittances, the consequence chiefly of our severe restraints on their commerce. The colonists are almost all farmers, wholly dependant on the produce of their lands, contented, and consequently happy; but in no condition to bear taxes, otherwise than by enabling us to pay our taxes out of the produce of their tobacco, rice, indigo, corn, lumber, wood, fish, furs, &c. How poor in cash must those countries be, where the sheriffs, in raising the annual taxes laid on by the assemblies, are often obliged to make returns into the treasury, of household goods taken in execution for want of cash; which goods cannot be sold for want of money to purchase them; where men of the best credit cannot raise cash to pay debts inconsiderable when compared with their estates; where creditors, when they sue to execution, obtain orders for sale of lands and goods, and though they offer those lands and goods for almost nothing, they are nothing the nearer being reimbursed, because there are no monied men to purchase after repeated advertisements of the sales. Thus the debtor is stripped, and the creditor not paid, and they break one another all round. And this very distress has been increased by those very ministers, whose taxation-schemes particularly required all measures to be used, which were likely to promote a circulation of cash in the colonies. We have followed the example of the *Egyptian* task-masters, demanding money of the poor colonists at the same time that we put a stop to their trade with the *Spanish* colonies, the only means by which they could obtain wherewith to satisfy our demands. Here is a complication of blunders beyond the power of language to set forth in an adequate manner.

Even governor *Bernard* (no friend to the colonists) owns their inability to bear taxes. ‘ I can (says he) readily recommend that part of the petition, which prays relief against those acts which are made for the purpose of drawing a revenue from the colonies. For they are so little able to bear drawing money from them, that they are unable at present to pay the charges of their support and protection <sup>a</sup>.’

It was very fairly made out, that the colonists were not, generally speaking, in circumstances to pay the stamp-duty. And to raise the price of justice so high, that the people shall not be able to obtain it, is much the same as flatly denying them justice; while *Magna Charta* says, *Nulli negabimus, nulli vendemus justitiam, &c.*

By the *Grenvillian* politics, the *American* assemblies were not only to be stripped of the power of giving their own; but of defending their own. The stamp-duties were expressly declared to be for raising a revenue for making a more certain and adequate provision for the government of the colonies. As if the colonies had not common sense to consult for their own defence, and the administration of justice. Courts are always for over-governing. This was rendering the *American* assemblies useless. On this principle, any number of the creatures of a court might have been saddled upon the colonists, with salaries to any amount, and all on pretence of a certain and adequate provision for the support of government and administration of justice. This is the œconomy in *Ireland*; a conquered country. But the *Grenvillian* politics treat the colonies worse than *Ireland*. For we leave to the *Irish* the power of  
taxing

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<sup>a</sup> Governor *Bernard* to lord *Hillsborough*, July 16, 1768.

taxing themselves in their own parliament; while we tax the colonies in the *British* parliament, where they have not one representative.

Before the taxing of the unrepresented colonies was thought of, the ministry ought to have reduced exorbitant salaries, abated, or abolished excessive perquisites, annihilated useless places, stopped iniquitous pensions, withheld electioneering expences, and bribes for votes in the house, reduced an odious and devouring army, and taxed vice, luxury, gaming, and public diversions. This would have brought into the treasury ten times more than *Grenville* could ever expect from taxing, by force and authority, the unrepresented colonies.

Even a conquered city has time given it to raise the contribution laid upon it; and may raise it in its own way. We have treated our colonies worse than conquered countries. Neither *Wales* nor *Ireland* are taxed unheard and unrepresented in the *British* parliament, as the colonies. *Wales* sends members to parliament; and *Ireland* has done so. And as *Ireland* is not now represented in the *British* parliament, neither is it taxed in the *British* parliament.

It is frivolous to alledge, that because the mother-country has been at expences for the colonies, therefore the *British* parliament may tax them without allowing them any legal opportunity of remonstrating against the oppression. The mother-country has spent her blood and her treasure in supporting, at different times, *France* against *Spain*, and *Spain* against *France*, *Prussia* against *Hungary*, and *Hungary* against *Prussia*, and so on, without end. Does this give our parliament a right to tax all *Europe*?

What difference is there between the *British* parliament's taxing *America*, and the *French* court's laying

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ing *England* under contribution? The *French* court could but do this, if they had conquered *England*. Have we *conquered* our colonies?

But are then the colonists, it will be said, to be complimented with immunity from all share of the public burden, while they enjoy their share of the public protection? How will the necessary uniformity of the whole monarchy be preserved, if it be left to the discretion of a fifth part of the whole people, whether they will contribute any thing, and how much, to the general supplies?

The question was not, Whether the colonists should contribute to the public expence. The *Grenvillians* knew, that when requisition had been made by government, the colonists had answered their demands; particularly in the years 1756, 7, 8, 9, 1760, 61, and 62; they knew that the town of *Boston* contributed for several years together twelve shillings in the pound. Our government, therefore, thought it but just to reimburse the colonies a part of their excessive expences. But their successors, contrary to the sense of all mankind, thought it better to obtain by *force*, than with a *good-will*. Accordingly we find so early as *A. D.* 1765, immediately after the first of the colonists shewed a little courage in refusing to submit to taxation without representation, orders were given to governor *Bernard* to employ the military under general *Gage* in suppressing the spirit of liberty<sup>a</sup>.

Where would have been the harm of making a fair and moderate proposal to the colonies? If they raised the money in obedience to our requisition, as formerly, all was well. But surely it was soon enough  
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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. VII. 82.*



to propose levying money upon them by parliamentary taxation, when they refused to give upon requisition.

Instead of this, the court-language all ran in the imperative mood. ‘A spirit of faction in *America*—acts of violence, and resistance to the execution of the law—state of disobedience to all law and government—measures subversive of the constitution—a disposition to throw off all dependence on the mother-country—steady perseverance necessary to enforce the laws—turbulent and seditious persons, who, under false pretences, have deluded numbers in *America*, and whose practices cannot fail, if suffered to prevail, to produce the most fatal consequences to the colonies immediately, and, in the end, to the whole *British* dominions.’ Thus did our ministers put into the mouth of their amiable S—— a language as remote from his disposition, as integrity is from theirs; setting him before his people in the character of an *eastern despot*, and not of the *father* of his subjects. See a certain speech.

Could not *George Grenville* have proposed, That the colonies should send over a certain number of agents who, by act of parliament, should have session and suffrage in our house of commons, during a certain period, in order to settle what sum the colonies should raise in proportion to the contribution raised by *England*—and to determine concerning the colonies sending, or not sending, members to subsequent parliaments? If it had been objected to this proposal, that the colonists sending over a set of temporary members to our parliament was a thing wholly unprecedented, he might have answered, that at the glorious revolution the corporation of *London* was introduced, and sat and voted in the house of commons; and the acts of the convention parliament were afterwards established

established by a regular parliament composed in the usual manner, of king, lords, and commons. And as to the quota, or contingent, to be raised by the colonists, it might have been made to regulate, as that of *Scotland*, by the contribution in *England*, in such a manner, that when the taxes raised in *England* amount to a certain sum, *America* shall contribute a thirtieth, fortieth, or fiftieth part of that sum. The colonists would naturally have sent over their ablest men and best patriots. They would have been prejudiced in favour of what those men had agreed to; or those men would have satisfied our parliament, that it could answer no good end to lay taxes upon the colonies; as all their money centers at last in *England*, and the more we raise upon them by way of tax, the less we can gain by them in the way of commerce. The colonies could not then have complained of taxation without representation, or of having their money taken from them by force. This would have been treating them as *England* did *Scotland* at the union; and surely no one will pretend that *England* is not under greater obligations to the colonies than to *Scotland*.

In the time of *Edw. III.* a parliament was directed to meet at several different parts of the country at the same time, because the whole parliament could not assemble speedily enough at *Westminster*<sup>a</sup>. I suppose the provincial meetings communicated their resolutions to that part of the parliament which met at the seat of government; and those resolutions which were made by the greatest number of the provincial meetings were to pass into laws. Suppose, that in imitation of this plan, a correspondent parliament had been formed in *America*; their resolutions communi-  
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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. I. 308.

cated to the *British* parliament, would have regularly and constitutionally informed the latter, of the sense of the colonists upon every important point; which cannot now be done in any constitutional way; as the house of commons receives no petitions upon money bills, and the colonists have no members in the house. The reader sees that various ways might have been proposed for raising taxes upon the colonies, if it had been found proper to raise such taxes, none of which ways would so have irritated the colonists, or given them such an opportunity of exclaiming against the injustice and rapacity of the mother-country.

On the contrary, such was the relentless fury of the ministry, *A. D.* 1768, against the colonists, that they proposed to address the king to fetch over any of them, who had shewn opposition to taxing without representation, to be *tried in England*, for that no jury in *America* would find them guilty, the people being all of one sentiment relating to that subject. This was fairly declaring, that they would rather see the constitution (which requires that the accused be tried by persons of the vicinage, supposed to know his character and behaviour) violated, than not see the *Americans* punished<sup>a</sup>. And if such a law should ever be enacted, and the spirit of contention should be kept up, we may suppose a disturbance to happen in every town of *North America*, and that it will be necessary to fetch over half the people of the plantations as witnesses, or as attestors to the character of the accused persons. All the shipping that belongs to both mother-country and colonies, will be insufficient for bringing over and sending back the multitudes that will be wanted on such occasions. And how is this  
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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. VIII. 43.*

expenſe to be borne? the freight and charges; I mean, of ſo many hundred thouſands of witneſſes, as will be ſummoned? And how is the buſineſs of the coloniſts to be carried on during their abſence in *England*? How are the damages ariſing from their abſence to be made up? How is the loſs of many innocent lives to be made up? For many of theſe ſhips will of courſe be caſt away, and many paſſengers will contract deadly diſeaſes, by change of climate, &c. The objections to this ſcheme are, in ſhort, beyond reckoning, many of which will occur to every reader. An eminent member of the houſe of commons very lately declared in the houſe, that in his opinion, the whole proceedings of the miniſtry, with reſpect to the colonies, are *Frenzy*. But, to proceed,

The miniſtry, in the ſame year 1768, inſiſted on a declaration againſt the coloniſts founded upon a ſuppoſed illegal reſolution of the aſſembly of *Boston*, which reſolution they could not produce when called upon, and which governor *Pownal* aſſured the houſe had never been made in the aſſembly of *Boston*, and that the ſuppoſition of its having been made, was owing to a miſtake, and ſhewed how the miſtake aroſe. ‘The chorus-men, who, at proper times, call for the queſtion, helped them at this dead liſt, by an inceſſant repetition of *the queſtion, the queſtion*’ [that is, in plain *English*, Let us vote, right or wrong, as the miniſtry would have us.] ‘At length, at 4 o’clock in the morning, the whole houſe in confuſion, the reſolutions and addreſs were agreed to; upon which a member remarked, “That it was indecent to bring into the houſe reſolutions ready cut and dry, only for the drudgery of paſſing them. That it was more indecent to paſs them in ſo confuſed a manner;”

“but

“ but most indecent to answer all arguments with  
“ *The question, the question* <sup>a</sup>.”

If the colonists should object, that it will be very inconvenient for them to send members from such a distance, it may be answered, that so it is for the northern parts of *Scotland*. All these matters of convenience must be as chance orders them. Nor can any two parts of a great kingdom enjoy precisely the same advantages in all respects.

Were parliaments shortened, were they restored to their efficiency, and set free from court-influence, the colonists might send as representatives any set of men possessed of property and common understanding. Members would then have no interest to pursue, but that of their country. They would of course be honest, because they would have no temptation to the contrary. And an honest parliament would make all people in public stations honest.

Some of the *American* colonists charters expressly secure to them the privilege of taxing themselves. It would be flagrant treachery for the mother-country to tax those colonies; for nothing, but absolute necessity, and the safety of the whole, (which it would be ridiculous to mention on this subject) could justify deceiving the posterity of those people, who trusted to the faith of the mother-country, and settled those colonies upon the express stipulation of not being taxed by parliament. If the colonists charters give them the exclusive power of taxing themselves, the *British* parliament's taxing them, is destroying their charters. If the *American* charters may be destroyed, the charters of all the cities, and those by which all crown lands are held, may be annihilated.

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. VIII. 47.*

The purport of all the colony-charters is, That all the emigrants, and their posterity, do enjoy for ever, all the privileges and liberties, which *Englishmen* do in *England*. And they were to pay to the king, a fifth part of all the gold and silver ore found in *America*, and no other tax. Is it allowing them the privileges of *Englishmen* to tax them without giving them representation? Is not every *Englishman* represented by his county-members.

The *British* parliament cannot justly alter the charters of the colonies, without giving the colonists indemnification for whatever they may suffer in consequence of such alteration. And how shall several millions of people be indemnified for being obliged to what they never expected, and, on the contrary, thought themselves, by their charters, secured against. I mean, being taxed by those, whose interest it is, in order to lighten their own shoulders, to lay a grievous burthen on theirs.

The *Americans* are already under the same grievance as the mother-country, viz. Of being unequally represented in their own assemblies, which yet have power to tax them. To subject them to be taxed by the *British* parliament, would be subjecting them to two taxing powers. This would be an additional grievance, unknown in *Britain*, which is subject only to one; it would be an additional grievance, even supposing *America* represented in parliament, in an adequate manner, as many parts of *Britain* are. But how would the injustice be doubled and trebled, if the *Americans* were taxed in the *British* parliament, in which they have no representation adequate, or inadequate! The *British* parliament's taxing the colonies, without representation, is treating them as papists, or rebels. Nay it is treating them as *France* would treat *England*,

*England*, if, for our sins, we were become a conquered dominion under her.

*A. D.* 1772; governor *Pownal*, upon lord *Barrington's* moving, that the report of the committee on the mutiny-bill might be read, requested the house, that, before it passed, its effects on the colonies might be considered. That the question was of no less importance, than; ‘Whether or not there shall remain established by power against law and the constitution, a military government in *America*, exclusive of the supreme civil magistrate. I am sorry (says he) to find such a heedless inattention in gentlemen to the concerns of public liberty<sup>a</sup>.’ He then puts the house in mind of the remonstrances he had formerly offered on the same subject. ‘I stated (says he) the powers of the charters, and those of the military commissions. I shewed them to be incompatible and illegal.’ He then affirms, that the case was not fairly stated to the crown lawyers, who justified it, nor, consequently, were their opinions law. He therefore desired to have an opportunity of calling for the opinion of the attorney and solicitor general, in order to bring on in form the consideration of that great question; and that the further reading of the report be adjourned. Lord *Barrington* opposed all consideration; because the servants of the crown might come into censure. Governor *Johnstone* pronounced the military commission illegal, impracticable, and self-contradictory. Governor *Pownal* said, ‘I know, it is to no purpose to press a motion, which a majority can refuse. But if those gentlemen will let us have the case and opinion, and by that means, a proper ground for debating the question, I am ready to meet

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm.* FEB. IX. 337.

‘ them on that ground. And as I see in his place one  
 ‘ of the learned gentlemen, who signed the opinion,  
 [for the legality of the military commission] ‘ if he  
 ‘ will in his place rise up and defend the present esta-  
 ‘ blishment and practice, I am ready for the argument.’  
 The learned lawyer was afraid to engage with the  
 unlearned gentleman ; and the ministry, as usual, pre-  
 vailed.

*Egregiam vero laudem, spolia ampla refertis.*

VIRG.

It has been thought, that our misconduct with respect to our colonies has been the chief cause of the late unexampled confusions in credit. The colonists were accustomed to take from *Britain*; to the value of 500,000 *l.* annually in teas. Our wise taxation-schemes put them upon refusing our teas all admission into *America*. This prejudiced our *East-India* company, and lowered the price of *India* stock ; which occasioned many adventurers in that stock, both in *Britain* and *Holland*, to fail. Such mischief a rapacious and blundering ministry can bring upon their country, in scrambling after a little money to gratify their creatures.

I do not pretend to justify all the steps that have been taken by the colonists. It is not easy for the most stoical individual to keep up his philosophy when provocation runs high, much less for a mixed multitude of all sorts of people. The first aggressors in all such cases, are chiefly to blame ; though those who resist in an unjustifiable manner, are not innocent.

The *Bostonian* proceeding, *A. D.* 1773, in destroying the tea, on account of the duty laid upon it, must be given up as inexcusable ; since all they had to do was to keep firm in their resolution, not to buy or drink any



of it<sup>a</sup>. But why did our government provoke the people of *Boston*, by sending them these cargoes of tea, loaded with an invidious duty?

Nothing is more peaceful by nature, than the element of water; yet we see to what a height the waves upon the ocean are raised by the winds, with what fury they dash the strong ships of several thousand tons burden, and beat them to pieces. Nothing is more innocent than the cattle, of which so many hundreds are driven into this great metropolis every week, 'till they be provoked. A boy of fifteen may drive a whole herd of them before him; but if a set of brutal butchers, with their sticks and dogs, set themselves to enrage those placid animals, they immediately change their nature, and become as furious as lions and tygers; they toss with their horns whatever comes in their way, and happy is he that can make his escape. So our colonists had originally the very dispositions we could have wished; they had the most implicit respect for the mother country. Our prime minister's grey-goose-quill governed them, 'till that fatal hour in which the evil Genius of *Britain* whispered in the ear of *George Grenville*, 'George! erect thyself into a great financier.'

The ministry paid, from the beginning, no regard to the universal dissatisfaction occasioned by, and universal opposition made to taxing the unrepresented colonies.

*A. D. 1765, Jan. 17*, a petition was presented to the house of commons from the merchants of *London* trading to *America*, setting forth, that the colony trade, of infinite advantage to *Britain*, suffered grievously by

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<sup>a</sup> WHITEHALL EVENING, *March 15, 1774.*

the colonists being reduced to a state of inability to discharge the debts owing by them to *Britain*, by means of taxes and restrictions laid on them by government, particularly by the stamp-act. There came afterwards petitions to the same purpose from *Bristol*, *Liverpool*, *Halifax*, *Leeds*, *Lancaster*, *Manchester*, *Leicester*, and other great trading and manufacturing towns.

Here follow the heads of Mr. *Pitt*'s speech in the house of commons on the same subject.

He insisted, that every capital measure, the ministry had taken, was wrong. *George Grenville*, the *American* tax-master, sate by him. He says, he plainly discovers the traces of an over-ruling influence in the conduct of the then present ministry. Observes, that a more important subject had not been before the house since the revolution. He acknowledges the sovereignty of the mother-country over the colonies in all cases, but that of imposing taxes, which is no part of governing or legislative power. That in a free country the subjects represented in parliament are supposed to grant supplies voluntarily; but that the colonists had no opportunity of giving voluntarily, having no representation in parliament to grant for them. That it is an absurdity in terms for the house of commons of *Britain* to pretend to give, or grant, to the king, what was not their property, but that of the colonists.

‘ We, your majesty’s commons of *Great Britain*, being  
 ‘ unwilling to give or grant your majesty any farther  
 ‘ supplies out of our *own* pockets, have made a law for  
 ‘ obliging our fellow-subjects of *America* to pay,  
 ‘ whether willingly or unwillingly, what they have  
 ‘ no opportunity of *granting* voluntarily.’

*Grenville*

*Grenville* in answer said, he could see no difference between external taxation [meaning the mother-country's restricting the trade of the colonies, perhaps for the benefit of both] and internal [or ordering the colonists, in the style of conquerors, of robbers, I was going to say, to pay so much money, whether they choose to grant it, or not.] He then, in a jesuitical manner, observes, that many individuals and bodies of men in *England* are taxed in parliament who have no representation; while he knew, that every man in *England* is represented by his county-members at least; and that, while parliament (if unbribed) cannot over-tax the people without over-taxing themselves, on the contrary, the greater burden they lay upon the *Americans*, the less themselves will have to bear. He observes, that protection and obedience are reciprocal. That if *Britain* protects, *America* is obliged to obey [every just law; but not every unjust one.] He overlooks the great advantage *Britain* gains by *America*, by which she is enabled to protect herself, and her colonies, for her own sake. He raves against the colonists for shewing a little spirit in opposition to oppression; but he takes no notice of their hardships in being taxed without representation, except that he mentions *Chester* and *Durham* as having been taxed before they were represented, and accordingly they demanded, and immediately obtained representation. See the preamble to 34 and 35 *Hen. VIII.* in which the complaint of the people of the county palatine of *Chester* of the disherison and damages suffered by them for want of representation in parliament, might, *mutatis mutandis*, be exhibited by our *American* colonists.

Mr. *Pitt* went on afterwards, and applauded the spirit with which the colonists had resisted tyranny. He affirms, that *Britain* gains 2,000,000*l.* annually

by her colonies. That by means of this advantage, estates which 60 years ago were let for 2000*l.* a year, now yielded 3000*l.* and lands now sold for thirty years purchase instead of eighteen. That our profits by *America* carried us triumphantly through the late war. ‘And shall a miserable financier come with a boast, that he can fetch a pepper-corn into the exchequer to the loss of millions to the nation<sup>a</sup>?’

Suppose the taxing of the colonies should swell the treasury (which it will certainly not do, but the very contrary) we should then only have the colonists all. That we have now. Then we should have it with a grudge. Without taxing them, we always have had, and, for many ages, shall have, all the money they can raise. For they must have our manufactures. If we insist on taxing them, and irritate them in such a manner as to diminish our commerce with them, who will be the gainers? Such policy will neither suit ministry nor people.

I have been told by pretty good authority, that the neat produce of our judicious taxes on our colonies, by which we have lost (to mention only one article) the sale of teas to the amount of 500,000*l.* *per ann.*, amounted last year, *viz.* 1772, to the respectable sum of 85*l.* sterling money. Such is the wisdom of our ministers!

Is this a time for us to lessen our public income? Do we not, as we manage matters, find difficulty enough in defraying the public expence with the largest public revenue we can raise? Have we been able to ease the nation of any part of the heavy load which lies upon our commerce? Have ten years of peace

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<sup>a</sup> LOND. MAG. 1766, p. 511.

extinguished any part, worth mentioning, of the public debt? Do not our ministers know, that a comparison between the present state of the *French* finances and ours is enough to make an *Englishman's* blood run cold? If *France* should think of taking this opportunity to make an attack upon us, are we in a condition to go to war with that formidable enemy; or does it shew our ministry to be endowed with common sense, who can find no time but this to support the mis-named dignity of government, to compel the colonists to what they call a due submission to government, &c. Will the vindication of the pretended honour of government, if it were to be vindicated by the proposed measures, make up for the diminution it will produce in our trade and revenues? Will the conquest of our colonies indemnify us for our being conquered by *France*?

Supposing the effects of violent measures with the colonies to prove less fatal than the apprehensions of many, their lowest consequences must be a diminution of our trade and revenues. This we are from experience certain of; for we already feel it. But suppose those effects to prove such as may naturally be expected; how will it be with us, when we find the public revenue fall so short, that it will not stretch to pay the public creditors their whole dividends? What will a set of rash and hot-headed Statesmen be able to advance for defending themselves against the rage of many thousands stripped of, perhaps, half their incomes.

The more violent of the anti-colonistical party seem to build their main hope of reducing the *Americans* to obedience on a *military force*. But it may be remarked concerning this scheme, That it will either prove successful, or not: If the latter, then will the

impotence of our government appear more conspicuous to all *Europe, Asia, Africa* and *America*, and the advisers of the measure will be ashamed of it, and wish it had never been adopted. If, on the contrary, the colonists should find themselves obliged to yield so much against their inclination to this military force, notwithstanding the many advantages they have above what the mother-country can boast of for defeating a design upon their liberties—let the people of *England* consider with horror what a frightful hint this gives to the enemies of liberty for enslaving the mother-country. I am myself a friend to liberty, and therefore will not explain more minutely. These are hopeful politics, whose consequences are too shocking for a good citizen to explain.

In short; The new method of taxing our colonists in parliament, where they have no representation, *adequate* or *inadequate*, is subversive of liberty, annihilates property, is repugnant to the genius of the people, oppressive to their indigence; it strikes at the root of their charters, as colonists, and of their privileges as *British* subjects ever loyal and unoffending; it is derogatory from the faith of government, ominous to the liberty of the *British* empire, unjust in its principles, rigorous in its execution, and pernicious in its operation alike to the mother-country and the colonies. What public measure can the memory of man produce, deserving so many commendations? Whether it is yet time to reverse such proceedings, or whether it will be better policy to pursue still farther the measures, which have hitherto appeared so honourable, and proved so salutary, is humbly submitted.

To crown what I have to say on the grievance which makes the subject of this II<sup>d</sup> Book, I will subjoin a copy of the spirited **PROTEST** of eleven worthy noble-

noblemen, who have endeavoured to stop the torrent of ministerial fury against our abused colonies. I wish it were in my power worthily to celebrate the praises of those illustrious personages. The consequences of the violent proceedings, they have so bravely opposed, will, I am horribly afraid, make *their fame*, as well as the *disgrace* of the first movers of all this mischief, but too *lasting*.

After the Prot—t, I will add a copy of a PETITION from the *American* gentlemen resident in *London* to both houses, imploring their *forbearance* and *justice* in a manner, which does the *public spirit* as well as the *abilities* of the petitioners the highest honour.

I have in my hands a manuscript copy of an humble Petition of several Natives of *America* to the K—'s most excellent M——y, requesting the suspension of the R—l assent to the two fatal bills from which they apprehend the most lamentable consequences. But as this Petition is not yet presented, I do not think I can, with propriety, give it a place in these collections. It is but short, and the matter of it, *mutatis mutandis*, much the same with that of the other.

PROTEST against the bill 'for the better regulating  
' the government of the *Massachuset's Bay*, in *New*  
' *England*.'

#### DISSENTIENT,

“ Because this bill, forming a principal part in a system of punishment and regulation, has been carried through the house without a due regard to those indispensable rules of public proceeding, without the observance of which, no regulation can be prudently made, and no punishment justly inflicted. Before it can be pretended that those rights of the colony of *Massachuset's Bay*, in the election of counsellors, magistrates,  
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and judges, and in the return of jurors, which they derive from their charter, could with propriety be taken away, the definite legal offence, by which a forfeiture of that charter is incurred, ought to have been clearly stated and fully proved; notice of this adverse proceeding ought to have been given to the parties affected; and they ought to have been heard in their own defence. Such a principle of proceeding would have been inviolably observed in the courts below. It is not technical formality, but substantial justice. When therefore the *magnitude* of such a cause transfers it from the cognizance of the inferior courts to the high judicature of parliament, the lords are so far from being authorized to reject this equitable principle, that we are bound to an extraordinary and religious strictness in the observance of it. The subject ought to be indemnified by a more liberal and beneficial justice in parliament, for what he must inevitably suffer by being deprived of many of the *forms* which are wisely established in the courts of ordinary resort for his protection against the dangerous promptitude of arbitrary discretion.

“ 2dly, Because the *necessity* alledged for this precipitate mode of judicial proceeding cannot exist. If the numerous land and marine forces, which are ordered to assemble in *Massachusetts's Bay*, are not sufficient to keep that single colony in any tolerable state of order, until the cause of its charter can be fairly and equally tried, no regulation in this bill, or in any of those hitherto brought into the house, are sufficient for that purpose; and we conceive, that the mere celerity of a decision against the charter of that province, will not reconcile the minds of the people to that mode of government which is to be established upon its ruins.

“ 3dly,



“ 3dly, Because Lords are not in a situation to determine how far the regulations, of which this bill is composed, agree, or disagree, with those parts of the constitution of the colony that are not altered, with the circumstances of the people, and with the whole detail of their municipal institutions. Neither the charter of the colony, nor any account whatsoever of its courts and judicial proceedings, their mode, or the exercise of their present powers, have been produced to the house. The slightest evidence concerning any one of the many inconveniences stated in the preamble of the bill to have arisen from the present constitution of the colony judicatures, has not been produced, or even attempted. On the same general allegations of a declamatory preamble, any other right, or all the rights of this or any other public body, may be taken away, and any visionary scheme of government substituted in their place.

“ 4thly, Because we think, that the appointment of all the members of the council, which by this bill is vested in the crown, is not a proper provision for preserving the equilibrium of the colony constitution. The power given to the crown of occasionally increasing or lessening the number of the council on the report of the governors, and at the pleasure of ministers, must make these governors and ministers masters of every question in that assembly; and by destroying its freedom of deliberation, will wholly annihilate its use. The intention avowed in this bill, of bringing the council to the platform of other colonies, is not likely to answer its own end; as the colonies, where the council is named by the crown, are not at all better disposed to a submission to the practice of taxing for supply without their consent, than this of *Massachusetts Bay*. And no pretence of bringing it  
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to the model of the *English* constitution can be supported, as none of those *American* councils have the least resemblance to the house of peers. So that this new scheme of a council stands upon no sort of foundation, which the proposers of it think proper to acknowledge.

“ 5thly, Because the new constitution of judicature provided by this bill is improper, and incongruous with the plan of the administration of justice in *Great Britain*. All the judges are to be henceforth nominated (not by the crown, but) by the governor; and all (except the judges of the superior court) are to be removable at his pleasure, and expressly *without* the consent of that very council which has been nominated by the crown.

“ The appointment of the sheriff is by the will of the governor only, and without requiring in the person appointed any local or other qualification. That sheriff, a magistrate of great importance to the whole administration and execution of all justice, civil and criminal, and who in *England* is not removeable even by the royal authority, during the continuance of the term of his office, is by this bill made changeable by the governor and council, as often, and for such purposes, as they shall think expedient.

“ The governor and council thus intrusted with powers, with which the *British* constitution has not trusted his majesty and his privy-council, have the means of returning such a jury in each particular cause, as may best suit with the gratification of their passions and interests. The lives, liberties, and properties of the subject are put into their hands without controul; and the invaluable right of trial by jury is turned into a snare for the people, who have hitherto  
looked

looked upon it as their main security against the licentiousness of power.

“ 6thly, Because we see in this bill the same scheme of strengthening the authority of the officers and ministers of state, *at the expence of the rights and liberties of the subject*, which was indicated by the inauspicious act for shutting up the harbour of *Boston*.

“ By that act, which is immediately connected with this bill, the example was set of a large important city (containing vast multitudes of people, many of whom must be innocent, and all of whom are unheard), by an arbitrary sentence, deprived of the advantage of that port, upon which all their means of livelihood did immediately depend.

“ This proscription is not made determinable on the payment of a fine for an offence, or a compensation for an injury; but it is to continue until the ministers of the crown shall think fit to advise the king in council to revoke it.

“ The legal condition of the subject (standing untainted by conviction for treason or felony) ought never to depend upon the arbitrary will of any person whatsoever.

“ This act, unexampled on the records of parliament, has been entered on the journals of this house as voted *nemine dissentiente*, and has been stated in the debate of this day, to have been sent to the colonies, as passed without a division in either house, and therefore as conveying the uncontroverted universal sense of the nation.

“ The despair of making effectual opposition to an *unjust* measure, has been construed into an approbation of it.

“ An unfair advantage has been taken on the final question for passing that penal bill, of the absence of these

those lords who had debated it for several hours, and strongly dissented from it on the second reading; that period on which it is most usual to debate the principle of a bill.

“ If this proceeding were to pass without animadversion, lords might think themselves obliged to reiterate their debates at every stage of every bill which they oppose, and to make a formal division whenever they debate.

7thly, Because this bill, and the other proceedings that accompany it, are intended for the support of that unadvised scheme of taxing the colonies, in a manner new, and unsuitable to their situation and constitutional circumstances.

“ Parliament has asserted the authority of the legislature of this kingdom, supreme and unlimited over all the members of the *British* empire.

“ But the legal extent of this authority furnishes no argument in favour of an unwarrantable use of it.

“ The sense of the nation on the repeal of the stamp-act was, ‘ that in equity and sound policy, the taxation of the colonies for the ordinary purposes of supply, ought to be forborn;’ and that this kingdom ought to satisfy itself with the advantages to be derived from a flourishing and increasing trade, and with the free grants of the *American* assemblies; as being far more beneficial, far more easily obtained, less oppressive and more likely to be lasting than any revenue to be acquired by parliamentary taxes, accompanied by a total alienation of the affections of those who were to pay them. This principle of repeal was nothing more than a return to the ancient standing policy of this empire. The unhappy departure from it, has led to that course of shifting and contradictory measures, which

which have since given rise to such continued distractions; by which unadvised plan, new duties have been imposed in the very year after the former had been repealed; these new duties afterwards in part repealed, and in part continued, in contradiction to the principles upon which those repealed were given up; all which, with many weak, injudicious, and precipitate steps taken to enforce a compliance, have kept up that jealousy which, on the repeal of the stamp-act, was subsiding; revived dangerous questions, and gradually estranged the affections of the colonies from the mother-country, without any object of advantage to either. If the force proposed should have its full effect, that effect, we greatly apprehend, may not continue longer than whilst the sword is held up. To render the colonies permanently advantageous, they must be satisfied with their condition. That satisfaction we see no chance of restoring, whatever measures may be pursued, except by recurring, in the whole, to the wise and salutary principles on which the stamp-act was repealed.

<i>Richmond,</i>	<i>Rockingham,</i>
<i>Portland,</i>	<i>Abergavenny,</i>
<i>Abingdon,</i>	<i>Leinster,</i>
<i>King,</i>	<i>Craven,</i>
<i>Effingham,</i>	<i>Fitzwilliam.</i>
<i>Ponsonby,</i>	

* * The bill passed.	Contents,	with their proxies	
included,	—	—	92
Not Contents,	—	—	20

Copy of a Petition from the *American* gentlemen, who happened to be resident in *London*, to the two houses.

*The humble PETITION of several Natives of America,*  
Sheweth,

“ That your petitioners are constrained to complain to this right honourable house of two bills, which, if carried into execution, will be fatal to the rights, liberties, and peace of all *America*.

“ Your petitioners have already seen, with equal astonishment and grief, proceedings adopted against them, which, in violation of the first principles of justice, and of the laws of the land, inflict the severest punishments without hearing the accused.

“ Upon the same principle of injustice, a bill is now brought in, which, under the profession of better regulating the government of the *Massachusetts Bay*, is calculated to deprive a whole province, without any form of trial, of its chartered rights, solemnly secured to it by mutual compact between the crown and the people.

“ Your petitioners are well informed, that a charter so granted was never before altered or resumed, but upon a full and fair hearing; that, therefore, the present proceeding is totally unconstitutional, and sets an example which renders every charter in *Great Britain* and *America* utterly insecure.

“ The appointment and removal of the judges at the pleasure of the governor, with salaries payable by the crown, puts the property, liberty and life of the subject, depending upon judicial integrity, in his power.

“ Your petitioners perceive a system of judicial tyranny deliberately at this day imposed upon them,  
which,

which, from the bitter experience of its intolerable injuries, has been abolished in this country.

“Of the same unexampled and alarming nature is the bill, which, under the title of a more impartial administration of justice in the province of *Massachusetts Bay*, empowers the governor to withdraw offenders from justice; holding out to the soldiery an exemption from legal prosecution for murder; and in effect subjecting that colony to military execution. Your petitioners intreat this right honourable house to consider what must be the consequence of sending troops, not really under the controul of the civil power, and unamenable to the law, where the crime is committed among a people whom they have been industriously taught, by the incendiary arts of wicked men, to regard as deserving every species of insult and abuse. The insults and injuries of a lawless soldiery are such as no free people can long endure; and your petitioners apprehend, in the consequences of this bill, the horrid outrages of military oppression followed by the desolation of civil commotions.

“The dispensing power, which this bill intends to give to the governor, advanced as he is already above the law, and not liable to any impeachment from the people he may oppress; must constitute him an absolute tyrant.

“Your petitioners would be utterly unworthy of the *English* ancestry, which is their claim and pride, if they did not feel a virtuous indignation at the reproach of disaffection and rebellion, with which their countrymen have been cruelly aspersed. They can with confidence say no imputation was ever less deserved. They appeal to the experience of a century, in which the glory, the honour, the prosperity of *England*, have been, in their estimation, their own;

in which they have not only borne the burthen of provincial wars, but have shared with this country in the danger and expence of every national war. Their zeal for the service of the crown, and the defence of the general empire, has prompted them, whenever it was required, to vote supplies of men and money to the utmost exertion of their abilities. The journals of parliament will bear witness to their extraordinary zeal and services during the last war; and that but a very short time before it was resolved here to take from them the right of giving and granting their own money.

“ If disturbances have happened in the colonies, they intreat this right honourable house to consider the causes which have produced them among a people hitherto remarkable for their loyalty to the crown, and affection for this kingdom. No history can shew, nor will human nature admit of an instance of general discontent, but from a general sense of oppression.

“ Your petitioners conceived, that when they had acquired property under all the restraints this country thought necessary to impose upon their commerce, trade and manufactures, that property was sacred and secure. They felt a very material difference between being restrained in the acquisition of property, and holding it when acquired under those restraints at the disposal of others. They understand subordination in the one, and slavery in the other.

“ Your petitioners wish they could possibly perceive any difference between the most abject slavery, and such entire subjection to a legislature, in the constitution of which they have not a single voice, nor the least influence, and in which no one is present on their behalf. They regard the giving their property, by their own consent alone, as the unalienable right of the  
subject,



subject, and the last sacred bulwark of constitutional liberty. If they are wrong in this, they have been misled by the love of liberty, which is their dearest birth-right; by the most solemn statutes, and the resolves of this honourable house itself, declaratory of the inherent right of the subject; by the authority of all great constitutional writers, and by the uninterrupted practice of *Ireland* and *America*, who have ever voted their own supplies to the crown—all which combine to prove, that the property of an *English* subject, being a freeman, or a freeholder, cannot be taken from him but by his own consent. To deprive the colonists, therefore, of this right, is to reduce them to a state of villenage, leaving them nothing they can call their own, nor capable of any acquisition but for the benefit of others.

“ It is with infinite and inexpressible concern that your petitioners see in these bills, and in the principles of them, a direct tendency to reduce their countrymen to the dreadful alternative of being totally enslaved, or compelled into a contest the most shocking and unnatural with a parent state, which has ever been the object of their veneration and their love. They intreat this right honourable house to consider that the restraints, which examples of such severity and injustice impose, are ever attended with a most dangerous hatred.

“ In a distress of mind, which cannot be described, your petitioners conjure this right honourable house not to convert that zeal and affection, which have hitherto united every *American* hand and heart in the interests of *England*, into passions the most painful and pernicious. Most earnestly they beseech this right honourable house not to attempt reducing them to a state of slavery, which the *English* principles of liberty,

they inherit from their mother country, will render worse than death—they, therefore, pray that this right honourable house will not by passing these bills overwhelm them with affliction, and reduce their countrymen to the most abject state of misery and humiliation, or drive them to the last resources of despair :

“ And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

## B O O K III.

## Of the Army.

## C H A P. I.

*General Reflections on standing Armies in free Countries in Times of Peace.*

**I**N a survey of public abuses, it would be unpardonable to overlook that of a standing army in times of peace, one of the most hurtful, and most dangerous of abuses.

The very words, Army, War, Soldier<sup>a</sup>, &c. entering into a humane and christian ear, carry with them ideas of hatred, enmity, fighting, bloodshed, mangling, butchering, destroying, unpeopling, and whatever else is horrible, cruel, hellish. My inestimable friend, the late great and good Dr. *Hales*, was used to say, that if any thing might be called the peculiar disgrace of human nature, and of our world, it is war; that a set of wretched worms, whose whole life, when it holds out the best, is but a moment, a dream, a vision of the night, should shorten this their short

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span,

<sup>a</sup> The very word *soldier*, gives us the idea of a fordid Swiss, *hired* one time by one tyrant, and another time by another, to butcher mankind. It is derived from *soldarius*, and that from *soldum*, *pay*. See *Spelm. voc. Soldarius*.

span, should assemble by thousands and myriads, travel over vast countries, or cross unmeasurable oceans, armed with swords and spears and infernal fire, and when they meet immediately fall to butchering one another, only because a couple of frantic and mischievous fiends in human shape, commonly called kings, have fallen out they know not about what, and have ordered them to go and make havock of one another.

Yet such is the turn of mind of those who are at the head of the world, that they bestow more attention upon the art of war, that is, the art of destroying their fellow-creatures, than upon the improvement of all the liberal arts and sciences, and outvie one another in keeping up bands of those butchers of mankind commonly called standing armies, to the number of many thousands; and so prevalent is this infatuation, that even we, though surrounded by the ocean, must mimic the kingdoms on the continent, and beggar ourselves by keeping up an army of near 50,000 in times of profound peace.

The whole art of war from beginning to end is, at best, but a scene of folly and absurdity. Two kings, already possessed of more territory than they know how to govern, fall out about a province. They immediately take up arms. Immediately half a continent is deluged in blood. They carry on their infernal hatred, while either of them can find in the purses of their beggared subjects any money to squander, or while they can find any more of their miserable people, who, being by the fell ravage of war stripped of all, are glad to throw themselves into the army, to get a morsel of bread. And when the two mighty belligerent powers, the two venomous worms, have carried on the contest almost to the destruction of both, the point in dispute remains undecided as before, or they see, that it might have been infinitely

infinitely better decided by arbitration of indifferent states, without the spilling of one drop of christian blood.

War is not a more proper method of deciding controversies between kings, than single combat between individuals. All that can be determined by fighting is, that the conqueror is the best fighter of the two; not that he has justice on his side. As I should conclude that private person, who chose rather to decide a quarrel by a duel, than to appeal to the laws of his country, or stand to arbitration of a few friends, a ruffian and a murderer; so I do not hesitate to pronounce every king a butcher of mankind who chooses rather to appeal to the *ratio ultima regum*, than to arbitration of neutral princes.

Standing armies first became necessary, or the pretence of their necessity plausible, when the disbanded troops, called *tard-venus*, in *France*, took to plundering and mischief in times of peace. Then the neighbouring princes pretended they must be upon an equal foot with *France*. But what is that to *England*, surrounded by the sea, and guarded by a fleet equal to all the maritime force of *Europe*?

In former times we had no mercenary army. It was the militia that went to the holy war, that conquered *France*, &c. So at *Rome* there was no mercenary army in the best times of the republic. Our *Hen. VII.* raised no small jealousy by his 100 yeomen of the guards, augmented by him from 50, the whole standing army of his times. In the days of *Ch. II.* the army was got to 5,000; in our times to near 50,000. There can no account be given of this alarming increase, but the increase of corruption, and decrease of attention to liberty. And now, our patriotic parliaments

ments have made the army a sacred establishment, and the sinking fund a temporary expedient.

An army, in a free country, says judge *Blackstone*<sup>a</sup>, ‘ought only to be enlisted for a short and  
‘ limited time. The soldiers should live intermixed  
‘ with the people. No separate camp, no barracks,  
‘ no inland fortresses should be allowed.’ Yet it is  
notorious, that our soldiers are enlisted for life, on  
pain of death, if they desert; and that camps, bar-  
racks, and inland forts, are very common in our pre-  
tended free country. The mere slavery of a soldier’s  
life, and the rigorous discipline, and *Turkish* severities,  
so great a number of brave, and freeborn *English* sub-  
jects are exposed to in the army, are sufficient to render  
it the abhorrence of every true *English* spirit, and  
the peculiar disgrace of our country, and our times.  
See *Blackstone’s* COMMENTARIES, I. 415, where the  
learned author (no malecontent) shews the peculiar  
danger to liberty from enslaving so many subjects, (and  
thereby exciting their envy against their countrymen,  
who enjoy what they are for ever deprived of) and then  
arming those slaves, to enable them to reduce the rest  
to their condition, of which ill policy history furnishes  
many terrible examples.

‘ In a land of liberty it is extremely *dangerous* to  
‘ make a distinct order of the profession of arms. In  
‘ absolute monarchies, this is necessary for the safety  
‘ of the prince, and arises from the main principle of  
‘ their constitution, which is, that of governing by  
‘ fear: but in free states, the profession of a soldier,  
‘ taken singly and merely as a profession, is justly an  
‘ object of jealousy.—The laws, therefore, and con-  
‘ stitution of these kingdoms know no such state as  
‘ that

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<sup>a</sup> COMM. I. 413.

‘ that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession, than that of war <sup>a</sup>.’ Yet we see gentlemen breed up their sons for the army as regularly as for law, physic, or divinity; and, while in *France*, the land of slaves, the soldiery are engaged only for a certain time, ours are for life; that they may be effectually separated from the people, and attached to another interest.

The judge goes on to shew, that in the *Saxon* times, the military force was under the absolute command of the dukes, or heretochs, who were elected by the people. This the judge, as if he were fascinated in favour of prerogative, sees in a dangerous light. ‘ This large share of power, says he, thus conferred by the people, though intended to preserve the liberty of the subject, was perhaps unreasonably detrimental to the prerogative of the crown.’ And then he mentions one instance of its being abused. But will any *Englishman*, understanding what he says, gravely declare, that he thinks an armed force safer, in respect of liberty, in the hands of a *king*, than of a number of subjects elected by the *people*? Yet this very author prefers a militia to an army. If all this be either consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty, or with itself, it is to be understood in some manner, which I own to be out of my reach.

‘ Those, who have the command of the arms in a country, says *Aristotle* <sup>b</sup>, are masters of the state, and have it in their power to make what revolutions they please.’ Οἱ τῶν ὀπλῶν κυριοί, κ. τ. λ.

The soldiery are themselves bound for life, under the most abject slavery. For what is more perfect slavery, than

<sup>a</sup> *Blackst.* COMM. I. 407.

<sup>b</sup> POLIT. VII. 9.

than for a man to be, without relief, obliged to obey the command of another, at the hazard of his life, if he obeys, and under the penalty of certain death if he disobeys, while the smallest misbehaviour may bring upon him the most painful and disgraceful punishment? The sense of their own remediless condition may naturally be expected to excite in them the same disposition, which shews itself in the negroes in *Jamaica*, and the eunuchs in the eastern seraglios.

In the mutiny-act, it is always mentioned, that keeping up an army in time of peace, without consent of parliament, is unlawful. But there is no such clause for keeping up *marines*. Yet marines are as much an army as any other men; are mostly at land; and may, at any time, be applied to the enslaving of the people, as readily as the soldiery. 'Tis true, their number is at present inconsiderable; but that is entirely at the disposal of government.

Lord *Hinton's* arguments against a reduction of the army, *A. D.* 1738.

1. The army is only a change made in the management of the armed force of the nation, which was formerly kept up in the guise of a militia.

*Ans.* The army is the very creature of the court; and therefore likely to execute every order of the court. The army is detached from the people for life, and enslaved for life. A militia continues still a part of the people, and is to return and mix with the people again, which must keep up in their minds both an awe and an affection for the people.

2. Now all the countries about have regular disciplined armies.

*Ans.* This is no reason for our keeping up an army, who are separated from all our neighbours. It is a reason for our keeping up a fleet, and a militia.

3. Our



3. Our militia cannot be trusted. Our people are otherwise employed, than in learning military discipline.

*Ans.* The army are, on no account, preferable to a militia, but their being more thoroughly trained. Let the militia then be thoroughly disciplined. Fifty days exercise at different times in the year, will train them thoroughly. Let them have pay for those days, and carry on their business the rest of the year as at present. And let every male be trained; and then see, whether enemies will invade, or tumults disturb.

4. The army has not yet enslaved us. Experience shews us, that a standing army is not unfriendly to liberty.

*Ans.* We ought to depend on the *constitution* for the safety of our liberties; not on the moderation of the individuals, who command our army. If our army has not yet enslaved us; we know, that the far greatest part of the world has been enslaved by armies. But it is much to be questioned, whether we are not already so far enslaved, that the people could not now obtain of government what they requested, though the undoubted sense of the people was known to government.

5. An annual army is different from a standing army. The former may be dissolved, whenever it pleases parliament to give over providing for it.

*Ans.* There is no difference, as to the liberty of the subject, whether the army be on one foot, or the other; whether it be established by law, or whether it be constantly kept, and certainly never to be reduced.

6. An army is necessary to keep the peace. Turbulent people raise tumults about matters, which  
have

have had even the sanction of parliament, as excises, turnpikes, suppression of gin, &c.

*Ans.* Good government is a surer way to keep the peace, than keeping up a formidable and expensive army. The people may judge wrong, or be misled occasionally. But it is mal-administration that sets up popular demagogues, who could not excite the people to tumults, if government did not afford some cause for discontent. The sanction of parliament neither will nor ought to satisfy the people, unless the people be satisfied of the independency of the members, who compose it. So much for lord *Hinton's* arguments.

‘ Whatever it may be called, that government is  
 ‘ certainly, and necessarily, a military government  
 ‘ where the army is the strongest power in the coun-  
 ‘ try. And it is eternally true, that a free parlia-  
 ‘ ment and a standing army are absolutely incom-  
 ‘ patible <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ It is the interest of favourites to advise the king  
 ‘ to govern by an *army*: for if he prevails (over his  
 ‘ subjects) then they are sure to have what heart can  
 ‘ wish; and if he fail, yet they are but where they  
 ‘ were; they had nothing, and they can lose nothing <sup>b</sup>.’

Every officer in the army, almost, is an addition to the power and influence of the ministry. And every addition to their power and influence is a step toward aristocracy or absolute monarchy.

‘ All armies whatsoever, says *Davenant*, if they are  
 ‘ over large, tend to the dispeopling of a country, of  
 ‘ which our neighbour nation is a sufficient proof;  
 ‘ where in one of the best climates in *Europe* men are  
 ‘ wanting to till the ground. For children do not  
 ‘ proceed

<sup>a</sup> CATO'S LETT. III. 285.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. COM. II. 153.

‘ proceed from intemperate pleasures taken loofely  
 ‘ and at random, but from a regular way of living,  
 ‘ where the father of the family defires to rear up, and  
 ‘ provide for the offspring he fhall beget <sup>a</sup>.’

When a country is to be enslaved, the army is the instrument to be used. No nation ever was enslaved but by an army. No nation ever kept up an army in times of peace, which did not lose its liberties.

‘ An army is fo forcible, and, at the fame time, fo  
 ‘ coarfe an instrument, that any hand, that wields it,  
 ‘ may, without much dexterity, perform any opera-  
 ‘ tion, and gain any ascendancy in human fociety <sup>b</sup>.’

Mr. *Hume* <sup>c</sup> calls the army a mortal diftemper in the *British* government, of which it muft at laft inevitably perifh.

It was *Walpole*'s custom, if a borough did not elect his man for their member, to fend them a melfenger of *Satan* to buffet them, a company of fouldiers to live upon them.

In this way a ftanding army may be used as an instrument in the hand of a wicked minifter for crushing liberty.

There is much ftrefs laid, by thofe, who would lull us afleep, that we may not fee our danger from the army, on the behaviour of that of *James II.* who, on being put to the trial on *Hounflow-beath*, whether they would ftand by the tyrant, all laid down their arms. But we muft be weak indeed, if we fuffer ourfelves to be mifled by a precedent fo little in point as this. The army were all brought up proteftants, and *James* wanted to make ufe of them to eftablifh popery, of the cruelties of which he had given them  
 a pretty

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<sup>a</sup> *Davenant*, II. 189.

<sup>b</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, II. 91.

<sup>c</sup> *Ess.* II. 376.

a pretty specimen. Does it follow, that because a protestant army would not be the instruments of a tyrant in overthrowing the religion they were brought up in (even the soldiers had some zeal for religion in those days, though not a zeal according to knowledge) and establishing one they were from their infancy taught to dread above all earthly evils—does it follow, I say, that because an army would not do what must be so disagreeable to themselves, they would not do what may be supposed agreeable to themselves, that is, would not promote the establishing of a military government? All history confutes this reasoning. For all history shews, that the soldiery have ever been ready to enslave their fellow-subjects; and almost all nations have actually been enslaved by armies.

Lord *Clifford's* scheme for making *Charles II.* absolute, was liberty of conscience; security of property; upright judges, to keep the people in good-humour; the fort of *Tilbury* to be made sufficient to bridle the city. *Plymouth*, in the west; *Hull*, in the north, made tenable. Some addition to the army, and 200,000 arms in each of the above forts, all which might be done imperceptibly <sup>a</sup>.

‘The pretensions of a particular body of men, if not checked by some collateral power, will terminate in tyranny <sup>b</sup>.’ No body of men are more likely to form pretensions unfavourable to liberty, than the military, nor is any body of men so hard to check, or restrain within due bounds.

Under such kings as the present (whom God preserve) we should have little to fear, with an army as  
nume-

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<sup>a</sup> *Rap.* 11. 662.

<sup>b</sup> *Fergus.* HIST. CIV. SOC. p. 195.

numerous as that of *France*. But a tyrannical prince, or daring minister might bring this kingdom into dreadful confusion by having on his side an army of only 10,000 regulars; and we seem now to plead prescription for keeping up a force of above four times that number.

‘ The people will grow always too hard for the  
‘ prince, unless he is able to subdue and govern them  
‘ by an army <sup>a</sup>.’

When a country is so circumstanced, that frugality is peculiarly necessary, a standing army is peculiarly improper. The annual charge of keeping up from 30 to 50,000 men is not small. And I think it impossible to shew any occasion we have for 5000 men, if we were so wise as to keep the militia upon a proper foot. Upon this one article we might, if we had imitated the *Dutch*, have saved a sum much above half a million *per annum*, which would have kept the nation clear of this mountainous load of debt, which is now sinking it into bankruptcy and ruin. We find, that when the army was about 18,000, the charge was above 5 or 600,000 *l. per annum*. From this it is easy to compute what an expence the devouring army has cost, especially of late, since it has been so frightfully numerous.

The commons, in their remonstrance, *A. D.* 1628, complain of the army in time of peace, and of *Buckingham's* standing commission as general. We establish from year to year, a great army at an immense expence, while the nation is drowned in debt; and while no mortal can conceive from what quarter external danger can come upon us. ‘ We hold it far  
‘ beneath the heart of any free *Englishman* to think,  
‘ that

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<sup>a</sup> *Burz.* HIST. OWN TIMES, II. 102.

‘ that this victorious nation should stand in need of  
 ‘ *German* soldiers to defend their king and kingdom <sup>a</sup>.’  
 The duke of *Newcastle* and the whig-administration  
 did not think it beneath them to bring over *Hessians*  
 and *Hanoverians* in the year 1756, to defend the king  
 and kingdom. Mr. *Pitt* sent them a packing, and  
 without their help, over-conquered the *French*. For  
 he conquered them in *Germany*; whereas he had no  
 occasion to do any thing, besides destroying their  
 commerce by sea, taking their *American* continent  
 and islands, interrupting their fishery, and harassing  
 their coasts.

In the year 1697, when the subject of the army  
 was argued on both sides, the principal topick in  
 favour of it was taken from the practice of the neigh-  
 bouring nations, whose keeping up a standing force  
 makes it necessary, said they, for us to do the same <sup>b</sup>.  
 But we know, it is neither the interest, nor the incli-  
 nation, of any of the powers of *Europe*, but *France*  
 only, to give us any disturbance. And we know,  
 that the continental powers of *Europe* keep up armies  
 with other views than to us (*France* excepted); why  
 then should we keep up an army with a view to any  
 of them, but *France*? And why on account of *France*,  
 when we have naturally so great an advantage of  
*France* in our insular situation, and our powerful  
 fleet? And if these two be not sufficient, it is certain,  
 that a well regulated militia in the maritime counties  
 must render all thought of an invasion from *France*,  
 as an operation of war, romantic and absurd. There  
 is no reason to think that they, who stand up for an  
 army, do seriously think it necessary for any other  
 purpose

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. VIII. 227.

<sup>b</sup> Burn. HIST. OWN TIMES, III. 284.

purpose than to make a provision for a number of persons who depend on the court, and thereby strengthen ministerial interest.

Though there was, in the times when this debate was agitated, a pretender living, and under the declared support of *Louis XIV.* the inveterate enemy of king *William* and *British* liberty, and though there was then a restless and powerful jacobite party in the kingdom, our ancestors did not choose to trust their illustrious deliverer with more than 10,000 horse and foot; and the whigs lost much reputation by sticking for this small number, which, in the following year, was reduced to 7000. We keep up an army of above 40,000 in a time of profound peace, and without shadow of use for one soldier, but for a few garrisons abroad.

‘ We think neither king nor parliament ought to  
 ‘ keep up an army in the field when the war is ended,  
 ‘ to the vast expence and utter impoverishment of the  
 ‘ people. The trained-bands, which may be made  
 ‘ use of with little charge, and the forces, which may  
 ‘ be kept up in some chief garrisons, being sufficient  
 ‘ to suppress any commotion or disturbance that is likely  
 ‘ to arise from the occasions of the late trouble [Surely  
 then we have had no occasion since for a standing  
 army], ‘ and we conceive an army should only be kept  
 ‘ up in case of a powerful insurrection within the  
 ‘ kingdom, or of an invasion from abroad. [Even for  
 those occasions a militia is incomparably preferable  
 in an island.] ‘ To maintain a perpetual army in the  
 ‘ bowels of the kingdom at the expence of the subjects,  
 ‘ when there is no enemy to fight with, is but to en-  
 ‘ slave the king and kingdom under military bondage.’  
 Words of the *Scotch* commissioners in their remon-  
 strance to parliament for disbanding the *English* and

*Scotch* armies, *A. D.* 1647<sup>a</sup>. They add afterwards,  
 ‘ Armies were raised in defence of religion, the king’s  
 ‘ person and authority, the privileges of parliament,  
 ‘ and the liberty of the subject, and when they are  
 ‘ no more useful for that end, and the houses may  
 ‘ consult freely, and act securely, without hostile op-  
 ‘ position, it is high time to disband them, that the  
 ‘ laws of the kingdom may take place; [*i. e.* because  
 the laws are not likely to take place under the fear of  
 a standing army] ‘ Some of our neighbouring nations  
 ‘ are necessitated to keep up armies, because they have  
 ‘ enemies that lie contiguous to their borders. But  
 ‘ the sea is our bulwark.’ [N. B. The *English* fleet  
 was not then, nor before, to be compared with what  
 it has been in our times,] ‘ and if we keep up amity  
 ‘ and peace among ourselves, we need not fear foreign  
 ‘ invasions, &c<sup>b</sup>.’ By this passage it appears, that the  
*Scotch*, whom we have lately seen so blamed for their  
 slavish disposition, had, in those days, more of the  
 spirit of liberty than the *English* shewed then, or since.  
 In fact, the *English* people’s shewing so little uneasiness  
 under the grievances of a standing army, and the others  
 of our times, shews them to be but too ripe for slavery.

‘ The raising of one single regiment in *Spain* within  
 ‘ these six years, under colour of being a guard for the  
 ‘ king’s person, so inflamed the nation, that a rebellion  
 ‘ had ensued, if they had not been disbanded speedily<sup>c</sup>.’

Thus writes Mr. *Vernon* to the earl of *Manchester* :  
 ‘ We are more jealous of our constitution and liberty  
 ‘ than of our bad neighbours, and therefore have  
 ‘ allowed but 350,000*l.* for maintaining guards and  
 ‘ garrisons this year, (1698) which we compute will  
 ‘ keep

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XVI. 462.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> DEB. LORDS, 1. 291.



‘keep about 4000 horse and dragoons, and 6000  
‘foot <sup>a</sup>.’

‘Your royal progenitors have ever held their subjects  
‘hearts the best garrison of this kingdom.’ The  
speaker’s speech, *A. D.* 1621, to *Ch.* I. against billeting  
soldiers on private houses <sup>b</sup>.

A numerous army always gives cause to suspect that  
the government is either afraid of the people; or has a  
design upon the people.

The commons resolve, *A. D.* 1673, that the con-  
tinuance of any standing forces in the nation, besides the  
militia, is a great grievance and vexation to the people.  
They likewise resolve, that according to the laws of the  
land, the king has no guards but those called gentlemen-  
pensioners and yeomen of the guard; that an army  
has never been countenanced (but quite contrary) by  
parliament, which has always looked on them as a set  
of men unlawfully assembled; of vast charge to king  
and kingdom; altogether useles to the nation, as  
appears from the peaceableness of the king’s reign since  
the restoration. That the king accordingly was often  
without them; that guards, or standing armies, are  
only in use in arbitrary countries where princes govern  
more by fear than love, as in *France*; that a life-  
guard is a standing army in disguise, and that as long  
as they continue, the roots of a standing army will  
remain <sup>c</sup>. What a wonderful illumination has opened  
the minds of our parliaments since those ignorant  
times. A standing army is now an essential of the  
constitution.

A a 2

Oxford

<sup>a</sup> *Cole’s MEM.* 9.

<sup>b</sup> *Rapin*, 11. 265.

<sup>c</sup> *Chandl. DEB. COM.* I. 199.

*Oxford* (the friend of *France* and the pretender, the attainted *Oxford*) on the mutiny bill, says, ‘ While  
‘ he has breath, he will speak for the liberties of his  
‘ country, and against courts martial, and a standing  
‘ army in peace, as dangerous to the constitution <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ The most likely way to restore the pretender, is  
‘ maintaining a standing army to keep him out <sup>b</sup>.’

‘ Any man who would suggest to the king [*William*]  
‘ that he could not be safe unless he were surrounded  
‘ with guards, ought to be abhorred by every true  
‘ *Englishman* <sup>c</sup>.’

The sagacious *Fletcher* of *Scotland* dropped the  
friendship of lord *Sunderland*, because he voted for  
the army <sup>d</sup>.

An army in time of peace, unless by parliamentary  
authority, is illegal, says the declaration of rights at  
king *William*’s accession <sup>e</sup>. If there be reason to sus-  
pect parliament of corruption, it may be added, that  
even with parliamentary authority, it is dangerous to  
liberty.

The throne of tyranny, which is upheld by an  
army, is in continual danger of being overthrown by  
the army. The *Roman* army dethroned and massacred  
several emperors of their own setting up. So do the  
*Turkish* janizaries from time to time. Therefore the  
masters of both have been obliged to employ them as  
much as possible in wars, on any pretence, to keep  
them from raising seditions <sup>f</sup>. Thus tyranny is not  
only

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, III. 78.

<sup>b</sup> *Trenchard*.

<sup>c</sup> Lord *Sommers*.

<sup>d</sup> *Charact. from a Manuscript*.

<sup>e</sup> *Hume*, HIST. STUARTS, II. 456.

<sup>f</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 5.

only a curse to the people, who are immediately under it, but to all the surrounding nations.

Robbers, says Sir *Thomas More*, often prove gallant soldiers; but soldiers likewise often prove gallant robbers.

An able anonymous speaker in parliament, *A. D.* 1681, says, a king must govern either by a parliament or an army; and that when the parliament is laid aside, the army must come into its place. That honest gentleman did not think of the possibility of bribing a parliament.

Lord *Haversham*, in his speech on the occasional conformity-bill, *A. D.* 1703, complains heavily of the conduct of the war. ‘*England*, says he, is a strong ass crouching between two burdens, the navy and the army, and nothing material done for a great expence raised on the people<sup>a</sup>.’

‘I would fain know (says *Fletcher*, p. 37.) if there be any other way of making a prince absolute, than by allowing him a standing army; if by it all princes have not been made absolute; if without it any. Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a standing army will enslave us, neither reason nor experience will suffer us to doubt. Therefore no pretence of danger from abroad can be an argument for keeping up mercenary forces.’

The advocates for the army plead strongly for its usefulness in keeping the peace. Yet it is certain, that there have not been anywhere more terrible insurrections, than in countries where great standing armies have been kept up; as at *Rome* in the imperial times, where the majority of the emperors died violent deaths; in *Turkey*, where the janizaries from time to time rise

in a fury, and dethrone a grand signor, or oblige him, to save himself, to make a scape-goat, or rather a sacrifice of his wazir; at *Algiers*, where it is almost the established form of government for the dey to be murdered, and his murderer to succeed him, &c.

‘The barbarous common soldier’ (says *Whitelock*<sup>a</sup>, on occasion of *Sandford*’s being plundered and killed by those of his own party at *Colchester*, *A. D.* 1648) ‘will know no distinction between friends and foes. The goods of either come alike to his rapine; and upon a hasty word, he no more regards the blood of a friend, than of an enemy.’

In the debate on the army<sup>b</sup>, lord *Strafford* said, he commanded a regiment of dragoons in the reign of king *William*, and at that time there was not any such law as what was in this bill, that we had no yearly mutiny-bills; yet, in those days the men were as good, and as well disciplined as at any time since. If any of the soldiers committed any crime, they were sure to be punished; the officers delivered them up to the civil power, to be dealt with according to law.

‘The *French* and *Swiss* troops are certainly as well disciplined as ours; and yet in *France* a soldier has a right in time of peace to his discharge after six years service; and in the *Swiss* service their soldiers generally contract for a certain number of years, after which they may return home if they please, which is the true cause of that country’s being always full of disciplined soldiers<sup>c</sup>.’

Lord *Egmont*, in the year 1750, spoke as follows in favour of our soldiery, and against martial law.

‘Sir,

<sup>a</sup> MEM. 312.

<sup>b</sup> DEB. LORDS, IV. 58-64.

<sup>c</sup> *Alm.* DEB. COM. IV. 285.

‘ Sir, The commander in chief of our army may  
‘ make himself master of many of our elections ; and  
‘ where he cannot by such means make himself master,  
‘ he may do as *Caius Marius* did at *Rome*, he may  
‘ give private orders to his soldiers to murder any one  
‘ that shall dare to set himself up as a candidate against  
‘ the man he has recommended. For the first attempt  
‘ that great and wicked *Roman* made against the liber-  
‘ ties of his country, was to get his soldiers to murder  
‘ the man who stood candidate for the tribuneship in  
‘ opposition to the person he patronized ; and the  
‘ *Roman* soldiers were even by that time become so  
‘ abandoned, so lost to all sense of law or liberty, that  
‘ they readily obeyed their general’s orders, though he  
‘ was then out of command, and though it was about  
‘ 100 years after the end of the second *Punic* war,  
‘ and not above 150 years after the *Romans* first began  
‘ to keep the same army under military law for a  
‘ number of years together. For though the *Romans*  
‘ from the very first origin of their city were almost  
‘ continually engaged in wars, yet those wars were  
‘ always for the first 500 years carried on by fresh  
‘ armies ; so that it seldom happened that any number  
‘ of their troops were above a year without returning  
‘ to enjoy the happiness of freedom and liberty. By  
‘ this custom, their citizens continued all to be soldiers,  
‘ and their soldiers to be citizens ; but soon after they  
‘ began to keep up and carry on their wars by stand-  
‘ ing armies, their citizens lost that warlike spirit, and  
‘ their soldiers that love of liberty by which alone the  
‘ freedom of government can be preserved. For this  
‘ reason, Sir, we ought to be careful not to give the  
‘ meanest soldier of our army an occasion to think that  
‘ he is in a state of slavery : On the contrary, we  
‘ should, as far as is consistent with the nature of  
‘ military ;

‘ military service, furnish them with reasons for re-  
 ‘ joining in their being *English* foldiers, and conse-  
 ‘ quently in a condition much superior to that of the  
 ‘ slavish armies upon the continent.’

Debate about martial law<sup>a</sup>, *A. D.* . It was moved, that the offences committed by the soldiery be cognizable and punished in time of peace by the civil magistrate only. Carried for the martial law.

In slavish countries the army is generally the most numerous, and contrariwise in free countries.

The *Roman* army in *Augustus*'s time was 13 legions, supposed of 5000 men each, or 65,000 men. In the emperor *Alexander*'s time the *Roman* legions were 32, or 160,000 men, quartered in many different places<sup>b</sup>. In *Turkey*, the ordinary establishment is above 150,000 men<sup>c</sup>. Of their insolence to the prince and cruelty to the people, see *Montalb. RER. TURC. COMMENT.*, p. 5. The *Persian* army, when effective, consists of 309,000 horse, and 40,000 foot<sup>d</sup>.

The *Chinese* army is supposed to consist of 2,659,191 men<sup>e</sup>. Some of the inland kingdoms of *Africa* have raised armies of a million of men<sup>f</sup>. The *Mogul*'s army consisted in the beginning of last century, of no less than 1,068,248 horse<sup>g</sup>. The kings of *Pegu* in *India*, have had armies of a million, or a million and half of men<sup>h</sup>.

That

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. VI. 177.*

<sup>b</sup> *ANT. UNIV. HIST. XV. 361.*

<sup>c</sup> *Robertf. CH. V. I. 391.*

<sup>d</sup> *DE LAET. DESCR. PERS. 163.*

<sup>e</sup> *MOD. UNIV. HIST. VIII. II.*

<sup>f</sup> *Ibid. XVI. 470.*

<sup>g</sup> *COMM. DE IMP. MAGN. MOGOL. p. 146.*

<sup>h</sup> *MOD. UNIV. HIST. VII. 64.*

That of the king of *Congo* in *Africa*, is said to consist of 900,000 men, *A. D.* 1665<sup>a</sup>. *Pranjinoko*, an *East Indian* monarch, had an army of 1,700,000 men, besides 80,000 horse, and 1500 elephants. Yet he was conquered<sup>b</sup>. *Tamerlane's* army was 800,000 men. According to some authors double the number. *Bajazet's* not quite so numerous. In a slavish country, the army is always an important object<sup>c</sup>.

## C H A P. II.

*Facts relating to the Army.*

**A**L L wise states have been jealous of the army. The *Carthaginians* had a council of one hundred taken out of the senate, whose office was to watch the conduct of the generals and officers<sup>d</sup>.

*Pisistratus* having procured from the city of *Athens* fifty fellows armed only with cudgels for the security of his worthless person from pretended dangers, improved this handful into an army, and with it enslaved his country. When *Tyndarides* meditated the ruin of the *Syracusan* liberty, one of his first steps was to draw round him a multitude of needy and desperate people, by way of a guard<sup>e</sup>.

The *Romans* were startled at the sight of 120 licitors, or peace-officers for the guard of the decemviri. Such an army was dangerous, they said, to liberty.

What

<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XVI. 63.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. VII. 297.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. XII. 81.

<sup>d</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XVII. 258.

<sup>e</sup> *Ubb. Emm.* II. 118.

What would those jealous old *Romans*, what would our stern forefathers have said, had they seen 18,000 mercenary foldiers kept up in this free country (whose natural guard is a militia, and a fleet equal in force to that of all *Europe* put together) in a time of profound peace, in spite of all the repeated and continued remonstrances of all men of public spirit for ages, at the same time that our governors do not know how to defray the necessary charges of government, and the nation is plunged in a bottomless sea of debt.

When *Rome* was thought to be in the utmost danger from the contest between *Sylla* and *Marius*, the consul *Octavius* was advised to arm the slaves for the preservation of the republic. He rejected a proposal so unconstitutional. For the *Romans* thought it dangerous to put arms in the hands of slaves<sup>a</sup>. Our free *British* policy directs us hardly to trust arms in any other hands than those of slaves. For we have no slaves in *Britain*, but the soldiery. That they are slaves—slaves for life—in the strictest sense of the word, will appear manifest to every person, who attends to the proper definition of slavery, viz. being obliged to submit for life, to the absolute command of another, to do or to suffer whatever the superior imposes on him, without redress.

*Sylla*, on the contrary, gave liberty, citizenship, and arms, to 10,000 slaves, to attach them to his interest; breaking through all principles of the constitution, to gain his own ambitious views.

It is strange, says *Harrington*, that kings should be so fond as they are of standing armies. No order of men has suffered so much as they, by the soldiery.

‘ The

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 61.



The sons of *Zeruiah*, *Joab* captain of the host,  
 and *Abishai* his brother, were too strong for *David*;  
 thus the kings of *Israel* and of *Juda* fell most of  
 them by their captains or favourites, as I have else-  
 where observed more particularly. Thus *Brutus*  
 being standing captain of the guards, could cast out  
*Tarquin*; thus *Sejanus* had means to attempt against  
*Tiberius*; *Otho* to be the rival of *Galba*, *Casperius*  
*Ælianus* of *Nerva*, *Cassius* of *Antoninus*, *Perennis* of  
*Commodus*, *Maximinus* of *Alexander*, *Philippus* of  
*Gordian*, *Æmilianus* of *Gallus*, *Ingebus* of *Lollianus*,  
*Aureolus* of *Gallienus*, *Magnesius* of *Constantius*, *Maxi-*  
*mus* of *Gratian*, *Arbogastes* of *Valentinian*, *Ruffinus* of  
*Arcadius*, *Stilico* of *Honorius*. Go from the west into  
 the east: upon the death of *Marcianus*, *Asparis* alone,  
 having the command of the arms, could prefer *Leo* to  
 the empire; *Phocas* deprived *Mauritius* of the same;  
*Heraclius* deposed *Phocas*; *Leo Isaurus* could do as  
 much to *Theodosius Adramytinus*, as *Nicephorus* to *Irene*,  
*Leo Armenius* to *Michael Curopalates*, *Romanus Laga-*  
*penus* to *Constantin*, *Nicephorus Phocas* to *Romanus*  
*Puer*, *Johannes Zisnifces* to *Nicephorus Phocas*, *Isaat*  
*Comnenus* to *Michael Stratioticus*, *Botoniates* to *Michael*  
 the son of *Ducas*, *Alexius Comnenus* to *Botoniates*;  
 which work continued in such manner, 'till the  
 destruction of that empire. Go from the east to the  
 north: *Gustavus* attained to the kingdom of *Sweden*,  
 by his power and command of an army; and thus  
*Secechus* came near to supplant *Boleslaus III.* of  
*Poland*. If *Wallestein* had lived, what had become  
 of his master? In *France* the race of *Pharamond* was  
 extinguished by *Pepin*; and that of *Pepin* in like  
 manner, each by the major of the palace, a standing  
 magistracy of exorbitant trust. Go to the *Indies*:  
 you shall find a king of *Pegu* to have been thrust  
 out

‘ out of the realm of *Tangu*, by his captain general,  
‘ &c.’

*Cæsar* puts all *Rome*, and *Pompey* himself, into a consternation, by approaching the city at the head of a terrible army. *Domitius Abenobarbus*, fearing *Cæsar*’s vengeance, takes what he thinks to be poison.

*Sylla* bribes the legions, who were the instruments of his tyranny, with the confiscated lands of the friends of liberty<sup>a</sup>.

The army is as fickle as the people. Often turns upon its masters, as the lion sometimes devours his keeper.

In the contest between *Sylla* and *Marius*, the consular army was sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other.

When *Cæsar*, by every wicked art, procured the government of *Illyricum* for 5 years, with an army of 4 legions (not half the standing force now kept up by our ministers) *Cato* told the senators what they afterwards severely felt, That they were placing an armed tyrant in their citadel.

‘ Even the pension-parliament, in *Ch. II*’s time,  
‘ and *James*’s first passive-obedience parliament, stopped  
‘ short, and turned upon those corrupt ministries,  
‘ when the last stroke was levelled against liberty.  
‘ They saw that when they should be no longer neces-  
‘ sary, they would be used as traitors always are by  
‘ those, who take advantage of their treason, that is,  
‘ sacrificed to the resentment of the people. And  
‘ in king *William*’s time, the court party almost ruined  
‘ themselves by speaking up for the army<sup>b</sup>.’

*Pompey* brings home at one time spoils of war to the value of 12 millions sterling, with which he bribed the  
army,

<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 91.

<sup>b</sup> CATO’S LETT. III. 278, 289.

army, to attach them to himself, giving the private men fifty pounds each, and large sums to the officers<sup>a</sup>.

The greatest part of the *Roman* emperors set up by the prætorian guards. The same military men murdered the amiable *Pertinax*, for attempting to restore discipline<sup>b</sup>. ‘The soldiers would suffer none to reign, but tyrants<sup>c</sup>.’

The *Roman* legions were, by the *triumviri*, bribed against their country with the lands of their proscribed countrymen.

*Augustus* disposed of the army, so as to have them always within call. Their number computed to be 170,650, of which 10,000 were always in the neighbourhood of *Rome*<sup>d</sup>.

*Augustus* takes to himself the government of all the provinces, in which troops were, on pretence of insurrections, commonly kept; and leaves the others to be disposed of by the conscript fathers; thus cunningly keeping in his own hands the army, which lay in those provinces<sup>e</sup>.

*Aurelius* would not, like too many of his predecessors and followers, enrich the army with the plunder of the people<sup>f</sup>.

*Maximin*, and several others of the imperial tyrants, were massacred by the same army which set them on the throne. The case has been the same in most countries, where the prince rules by means of an armed force.

*Philippus*, the supposed poisoner of the excellent emperor *Gordian*, chosen emperor by the army, writes home

<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XIII. 148.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xv. 280.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. 281.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. XIII. 490.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid. 488.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. xv. 224.

home to the senate to inform them. They are obliged to acquiesce <sup>a</sup>. And when *Aurelian* was murdered, the senate did not dare to choose a successor, though the army left it to them, lest they should not make a choice agreeable to the army. Wretched *Romans!* could not even choose their tyrant <sup>b</sup>.

*Claudius*, and all the *Roman* emperors after him, gave the soldiers money on their accession <sup>c</sup>. It was they, who dragged him from behind the tapestry, where, through aversion to eminence, he had hid himself, and set him on the throne <sup>d</sup>. *Nero* was carried to the camp, to be received as emperor, before he was acknowledged by the people <sup>e</sup>. It was the prætorian guards, who raised, at their pleasure, almost all the emperors to the throne.

The *Roman* legions, taken by the *Gauls* in *Vespasian's* time, swear allegiance to them, and promise to give up their officers <sup>f</sup>. So little does principle prevail in the army, and so little are they to be trusted by princes.

Nothing but a bribed army would have supported the villainous *Roman* emperors. *Caracalla* attempted in the sight of the legions to stab his father the emperor *Severus*. He remonstrates to him on his bloody and unnatural disposition. *Caracalla* shews no remorse; on the contrary, he afterwards attempts to depose his father, and debauches, for that purpose, several of the officers. Murders his brother *Geta* immediately on his accession, and 20,000 of his domestics, and makes it death to utter his name. Murders in cold blood the whole youth of *Noricum*, and almost all the

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. xv. 409.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 469.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. xiv. 322.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. 320.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid. 368.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. xv. 14.

the *Alexandrians*, because they had lampooned him. Orders a tribune and soldiers to bring *Chilo* and murder him before his face. The people save *Chilo*. *Caracalla*, to appease the people, denies his having had any such design, and orders the tribune and soldiers to be put to death as the proposers of *Chilo's* murder. Massacres a daughter of *Aurelius* for expressing some concern for the cruel fate of *Geta*, and several of the sacred vestal virgins on the same account. Orders his soldiers to massacre a multitude of people in the theatre for not liking a charioteer in the *Circensian* games, whom he approved. The military ruffians, not distinguishing the delinquents from the rest, fell indifferently upon all, sword in hand, and made a dreadful havock of the helpless unarmed multitude, sparing only such as redeemed their lives with money. He loaded the people with taxes in all the provinces, saying, While I wear this sword, I shall never want money; and at *Rome* caused numbers to be put to death, sometimes out of revenge, for their censuring his tyrannical proceedings, sometimes for his diversion merely; for his supreme delight was the sight of streaming blood, and the sound of dying groans. No sex, rank, or age, escaped his fury. He wrote to the senate, that he knew, they disapproved his conduct; but that he neither valued nor feared them, while he had an army at his command. These are some of *Caracalla's* feats. Yet this devil (and surely the most inveterate of the infernals, if he were to come up hot from the regions of fire and brimstone, could not outdo such a character) was, after his being put to death by order of *Macrinus*, his successor, manufactured, by the irresistible army, into a god, and *Macrinus*, the emperor, was obliged by the army

to give his order to the senate for that purpose. Such are the blessings of a standing army <sup>a</sup>!

The danger of armies appeared in the *Florentines* war with the *German* banditti [mercenaries disbanded by making peace between the *Florentines* and *Visconti*] who amounted to 8000 horse, and 4000 foot, and plundered all *Italy*. Many towns paid whatever ransom those miscreants imposed on them. ‘ The fairest and  
 ‘ most populous provinces in *Italy* were laid under  
 ‘ contribution by a set of lawless ruffians, whose pro-  
 ‘ gress increased their numbers, as their barbarity did  
 ‘ the horror in which they were held. Wherever they  
 ‘ met with the least resistance, ruin to the inhabitants  
 ‘ was the certain consequence: they demolished  
 ‘ towns, desolated countries, slaughtered people, and  
 ‘ nothing but money could buy off their ravages. It  
 ‘ was upon this occasion that the wisdom and mag-  
 ‘ nanimity of the *Florentines* shone out with a lustre,  
 ‘ equal to that of the greatest states of antiquity.  
 ‘ Instead of being intimidated by the example of their  
 ‘ neighbours, or the numbers of the banditti, they  
 ‘ considered them as monsters, and were determined  
 ‘ to destroy them. The most respectable citizens of  
 ‘ the *Florentine* allies came to *Florence*, to persuade  
 ‘ the people, and magistrates, that they had no way  
 ‘ to avoid certain destruction but to send deputies to  
 ‘ treat with the ruffians; and that they might buy  
 ‘ their peace cheaper than their quarters for a single  
 ‘ day would cost them; this advice was disdained by  
 ‘ the *Florentines*. *Malatesta* led his troops to the  
 ‘ field against the banditti, and offered them battle,  
 ‘ but the robbers were startled at their valour, and re-  
 ‘ treated: the *Florentines* pursued them with success.

‘ And

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<sup>a</sup> ANT. UNIV. HIST. XV. 320—342.

‘ And now it appeared that true courage cannot animate a lawless set of men.

‘ The attention of all *Italy* had been employed for some time upon the firm conduct of the *Florentines*, and it now became their admiration. The most distant states interested themselves in the fate and support of so much magnanimity, and wanted to share in the glory.

‘ Thus ended, to the immortal honour of *Florence*, a danger that threatened great calamity to her state <sup>a</sup>.’  
Armies are dangerous, when kept up, and dangerous when disbanded.

So much is an army necessary to tyranny, that all the despotic power now in *Europe* is owing to standing armies being formed, and was, till then, unknown. *Ch. VII.* of *France* (where the first standing army was established) was very absolute, and *Lewis XI.* more. He humbled his nobles; divided them; increased his army and his revenue; and by threatening and bribing, biassed the assembly of the states <sup>b</sup>.

The revolution in which *Elizabeth*, daughter of *Peter* the Great, mounted the throne of *Russia*, was brought about by *Elizabeth*'s being more in favour with the army, than the great duké, whom she de-throned <sup>c</sup>.

When cardinal *Ximenes*'s authority for governing the kingdom of *Spain*, during the minority of *Ch. V.* was questioned by some of the grandees, he brought out to them the will of *Ferdinand*, and ratification by *Charles*, appointing him regent. Afterwards drawing them to a balcony, from whence they could see some troops exercising, ‘ If, says he, you be not contented

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‘ with

<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxxvi. 126.

<sup>b</sup> See *Robertf.* HIST. CH. V. I. 98.

<sup>c</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XLII. 344.

‘with the authority I have shewn you, look there ;  
 ‘by these I mean to keep up my power.’ He  
 was armed ; they unarmed. Which was likely to  
 prevail <sup>a</sup> ? *Ximenes* was a wise and good minister.  
 But had he been the worst that ever was possessed of  
 power, the army would probably have supported him.

When the silly commons of *Denmark*, *A. D.* 1660,  
 threw away their liberties (as children do the play-  
 things they are tired of) the king at first told them,  
 offering him absolute power; that he had scruples;  
*Nolo episcopari*; but he artfully shut the city gates on  
 pretence of keeping the peace; but in reality, because,  
 ‘having the army entirely in his power, it was im-  
 ‘possible for any of the nobility to retire to their  
 ‘estates without his leave, which brought his in-  
 ‘trigues to a speedy issue <sup>b</sup>.’

In the great kingdom of *Siam*, the governors of the  
 distant provinces often engage the troops under them  
 to revolt, and set up for themselves <sup>c</sup>.

When prince *Maurice* attempted to seize the liberties  
 of *Holland*, he filled the roads and avenues with his  
 soldiers <sup>d</sup>. ‘It was impossible for the cities of *Holland*  
 ‘to save themselves, because the statholder had the  
 ‘army at command, and the states of *Holland* were  
 ‘wholly disarmed <sup>e</sup>.’

In this very year 1772, the *Swedish* army has en-  
 slaved that country.

Unfortunately for the peace of mankind, armies  
 are but too easily found, ready to fight for any cause.  
 Did not that most worthless prince *Rich. III.* find an  
 army of *Englishmen* ready to fight for him against  
 liberty.

<sup>a</sup> See *Robesp.*: CH. V. II. 33.

<sup>b</sup> *MOD. UNIV. HIST.* XXXII. 20.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* VII. 264.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* XXXI. 230.

<sup>e</sup> *Ibid.* 232.



liberty. Did not *Ch. I.* find one? Was not the army under *Jam. II.* willing to support his tyranny, till they came to understand, that he intended to disband them the first opportunity, and to replace them with an army of papists? And did he not find an army to fight for him afterwards in *Ireland*?

An army may be led on to any violence, however contrary to the general sentiments, if there is a prospect of a plentiful harvest of spoil. *Ladislaus*, king of *Naples*, *A. D.* 1413, though himself a papist, and every soldier in his army a papist, plundered the holy Father's holy chapel and palaces, stripped the holy churches, seized the holy jewels, and holy shrines of the holy saints, and massacred several of the holy bishops <sup>a</sup>. *Charlemagne*, on the contrary, proposed to employ his soldiery in time of peace, in making canals and public works <sup>b</sup>. Ours are employed too in time of peace—in drinking, whoring, powdering for the reviews, and massacring the people.

The *Turkish* janizaries and priests rule all, and set up and pull down sultans at their pleasure. The *Roman* army, under the emperors, did the same. It is certain, that the janizaries and priests in *Turkey* could at any time obtain a *Magna Charta* for their country, and that the *Roman* army under the emperors could have restored the republican liberty, when they pleased. But such is the nature of man. A king will erect himself into a tyrant; and every common soldier is for supporting him, because he himself is a petty tyrant under the great one; which pleasure he knows he must lose, whenever general liberty is restored. Therefore he will certainly never promote a restoration of liberty.

<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxviii. 213.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xxiii. 146.

‘ In two years we have seen the constitution of  
 ‘ *France, Sweden, and Poland* overturned, and reduced  
 ‘ to military governments <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ By this,’ (says *Whitelock* <sup>b</sup>, speaking of the army’s  
 petition, *A. D.* 1646.) ‘ we may take notice how  
 ‘ soon the officers and soldiers of an army, though  
 ‘ ever so well disciplined, will, through want of  
 ‘ action, [an army can have no action in time of  
 ‘ peace], ‘ fall into disorder, and designs of trouble.’  
 Again: ‘ Here it was observed [in the house] that  
 ‘ a victorious army out of employment is very incli-  
 ‘ nable to assume power over their principals; and  
 ‘ this occasioned the parliament’s greater care for their  
 ‘ employment in *Ireland*.’ He observes, on the two  
 houses ordering their declaration against the army to be  
 erased from their journals, That ‘ then the parliament  
 ‘ begun to surrender themselves and their power into  
 ‘ the hands of their own army.’ When they removed  
 the king from *Holdenby*, they acted altogether by  
 their own authority; and when he asked by what  
 warrant, cornet *Foyce* answered, It was the plea-  
 sure of the army. Afterwards <sup>c</sup>, the soldiery beset the  
 house of commons, and extorted ordinances in their  
 favour. Then parliament found it necessary to enable  
 the city to raise the militia for their defence against  
 the army. The army advances. This report of  
 their approach puts all in terror. The committee  
 of safety is revived. The sheriffs and common-  
 council attend the house with letters from the army.  
 A committee of both houses sits all night. Letters  
 are sent from both houses requiring general *Fairfax*  
 not to come nearer than 15 miles of *London*. The  
 trained

<sup>a</sup> *Dalb.* II. 245.

<sup>b</sup> *Whitelocke’s MEM.* p. 245.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 254.

trained-bands were raised, and the shops for several days shut. Messages after messages from the parliament and city to the terrible army. The army at *St. Albans*. The trained-bands ordered to guard the house. The army sends demanding, that 11 members, obnoxious to them, be suspended, with other matters equally arbitrary. At length, says the same author <sup>a</sup>, ‘several counties, and the citizens of *London* begun to make all their applications to the general and army, omitting the parliament, and all looked upon the army as in the chief place, and were afraid of doing any thing contrary to them.’ And, the votes of the house shewed such a fear of the army as was much censured. The 11 members, for the sake of peace, though nothing was laid to their charge, left the house, and some of them the kingdom.

When *Ch. I.* ever bent on mischief, proposed to give *Spain* the *Irish* army, who had no visible want of them, the lords agreed immediately. But the wise, and consequently suspicious, commons found a design in this, *viz.* to keep up an embodied army, which he could call over from *Flanders* when he pleased. The mad king insists on performing his promise. Parliament publishes an ordinance forbidding all persons to assist in transporting them, on pain of being declared enemies to the state. Nobody dared, after this, to obey the king <sup>b</sup>.

In the tyranny of *Ch. I.* soldiers were billeted on private houses, as a punishment for resisting the king’s unparliamentary schemes for raising money. The people were afraid to go from home, even to church, lest their houses should be rifled the while.

<sup>a</sup> *Whitelocke’s MEM.* 257.<sup>b</sup> *Rap.* 11. 380.

The magistracy were resisted by them. Farmers fled, and the rents were unpaid. The manners of the people were debauched by the ruffian-foldiery. Robberies, rapes, and murders were committed by them, unpunished, unrestrained. The manufacturers, and other working people, were interrupted in their business by their violence. The markets were unfrequented, through danger of travelling. And insurrections and rebellions were the consequences to be expected from the discontents of the people <sup>a</sup>.

It is true, that alehouses and fots-holes are as great a nuisance as can be in a country; and therefore it is no great matter what burden be laid on them. But inns are absolutely necessary in a commercial country; and to fill them with useles and dangerous soldiers is a grievance they may very justly complain of, as it singles them out from all other house-keepers, and subjects them, like papists, to an extraordinary tax. And on the other hand, to place the army in garrisons and barracks, is separating them still more from the people, and leading them to think themselves and their interest totally distinct.

This, and a thousand other considerations, shew an army in a free country to be an institution incapable of being put on a proper foot.

In the year 1647, when general *Fairfax* entered the city with his army, where he behaved with much regularity, his power was so uncontrouled, that he might, probably, have assumed what station he pleased <sup>b</sup>. His having so great power by means of his forces, shews the tremendous importance of the army. His making so moderate a use of the ascendancy he had (compare his conduct with *Cromwell's* afterwards) shews extraordinary magnanimity.

When

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. VII. 450.

<sup>b</sup> *Macaul.* IV. 342.

When *Fairfax* saw himself at the head of the army, he assumed the authority of a king, as appears by his letters still extant. He protests against all proceedings of the parliament during certain periods. He insists on the punishment of the eleven members, who were obnoxious to the army; who afterwards grew very outrageous; they had some pretence, because parliament had resolved to disband them without satisfying their demands<sup>a</sup>. Cornet *Joyce*, and a party of soldiers seize the king at *Holdenby*. Parliament resolves (too late) to redress the army's grievances, and expunge the offence. By which resolutions, says *Whitelocke*, they gave themselves up to their own army.

The two new speakers send a strong remonstrance to *Fairfax* on the violences committed by the army<sup>b</sup>. They complain of his coming nearer the city than they had ordered, and desire him to return to his station. They complain of the army's attacking and killing several persons; and of warrants from him for raising men and money without authority of parliament; the very worst charge against *Ch. I.* himself.

The city was dreadfully alarmed at the approach of the army so near as *St. Albans*. The shops shut, and trained bands ordered out on pain of death. The guards about the two houses were doubled, and arms placed in the outer rooms<sup>c</sup>.

See a letter from the lord mayor, aldermen, &c. to *Fairfax*, flattering him most shamefully, and assuring him that no counter-army has been, or shall, with their consent, be raised. The army was then predominant above all.

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. xv. 394.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xvi. 207.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. xv. 443.

Parliament publishes (too late) an indemnity for the army. A committee of members sent to treat with them. All which made them only more insolent <sup>a</sup>.

The commons recant their votes against the army, and appoint a fast through fear of them <sup>b</sup>.

‘The army is a formidable body not to be provoked, and will be upon you before you be aware.’ General *Skippon* to the parliament <sup>c</sup>.

*Fairfax* marches into the city without opposition. Plants ordnance against the gate on the bridge. The citizens presently yield, and revoke all they had published against the army. They offer the general a golden ewer, value 1,000*l.* and invite him and his officers to a feast at *Guildhall*. He declines these forced compliments. He and his army march through the city with laurels as conquerors. The city sneaks. This is the true spirit of the army. The general receives the thanks of both houses [for enslaving them <sup>d</sup>.]

A remonstrance comes from the army for purging the house of the members disliked by them <sup>e</sup>. Upon which the lords order a letter of thanks to be sent to *Fairfax* for his care of the parliament’s *independency*. The army threatens open war, if any of the expelled members presume to sit, unless they acquit themselves of all blame to the satisfaction of the house <sup>f</sup>.

Delinquents, *i. e.* those whom the army disapproved, disqualified by a forced act of parliament for voting in elections for mayors, recorders, sheriffs, &c. but no mention of members <sup>g</sup>. In this manner did the army rule with a rod of iron.

*Cromwell*

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XV. 407.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 412.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. XVI. 239.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. 272.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. 413.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid. 251.

<sup>g</sup> Ibid. 311.

*Cromwell* and *Ireton* pretend to be much offended against the soldiers, while they were secretly encouraging them. Parliament suspects *Cromwell*, and designs to seize him. He hears of the design, and suddenly flies to the army, though just before, he had told the house he was hated in the army, and in danger of his life, because he was for the parliament<sup>a</sup>.

Many members, *A. D.* 1648, were seized and confined by the soldiery<sup>b</sup>. Treated with unexampled insolence; especially *Prynne*, who deserved so well of the public by standing up for liberty, for which he with *Bastwicke* and *Burton* was pilloried, and cruelly mangled.

Under *Cromwell*, the mock-patron of liberty, there was established a standing army of 10,000 horse, and 20,000 foot. This was his way of settling a free constitution<sup>c</sup>.

The sudden dissolution of the parliament, *A. D.* 1653, is ascribed by some to *Cromwell's* ambition, who wanted to take upon himself the charge of protector, and employed a set of members in the house to propose it. Some refusing to quit the house, were driven out by a file of musqueteers: So that what in *Charles I.* was called abominable tyranny, was acted anew by the liberty folks. O man! O my worthless fellow-creature! What a *Proteus* thou art! But thou art my fellow-creature; and therefore, if I could, I would do thee good. *Cromwell* protests that he knew nothing of their dissolving themselves till they came to him<sup>d</sup>. Immediately after he had done the

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most

<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. xv. 364.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xviii. 447.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. xx. 258.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. xx. 241.

most tyrannical thing ever heard of, *viz.* excluding by military force almost 100 members from the house, because they were not of his side, the commons request him to be king<sup>a</sup>. Such weight does the army give to the scale, into which it is thrown.

In the time of the republic, when *England* was in the way to her highest pinnacle of glory, the chief attention was paid to the fleet. Kings, on the contrary, trust chiefly to the army, as being the proper instrument for gaining the great object of kings. ‘It is doubtful,’ says our celebrated female historian, ‘whether a naval force could be rendered useful in any capacity, but that of extending the power and prosperity of the country<sup>b</sup>.’ She observes<sup>c</sup>, that *Cromwell* could not have established his usurpation, but by the army; that after the dissolution of the republican parliament, the army was the only visible acting power; and that they accordingly took upon themselves the whole government of the state, and sweet was the government they carried on.

Mr. *Pierrepoint* said, in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1660, it was inconsistent for an army and a parliament to subsist together, and that the trained bands were sufficient. Colonel *Birch* said, ‘The people’s liberties were not safe with such an army; that though he was a member of it himself, yet he moved it might be paid off<sup>d</sup>.’

See major *Robert Huntingdon*’s reasons for laying down his commission, *A. D.* 1647, RYM. FOED. xx. 558, in which he shews, that he saw plainly,  
*Cromwell*’s

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<sup>a</sup> PARL. HIST. XXI. 169.

<sup>b</sup> *Macaul.* HIST. V. III.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>d</sup> PARL. HIST. XXII. 365.



*Cromwell's* design was to set himself and the army above both parties, viz. king and parliament; and that *Cromwell*, with all his cunning, had often publicly declared in conversation with his friends, 'That the interest of honest men' [his own party] 'was the interest of the kingdom. That he hoped the army should be an army, as long as they lived. That it was lawful to purge the parliament, or put a period to it, and support his own party by force. That it was lawful to play the knave with knaves, &c.'

*Cromwell's* pranks shew plainly, that a man of courage backed by an army, is capable of any thing. The dialogue between him and *Whitlocke*, about *Cromwell's* taking the crown, is very curious. *Cromwell* shews, that he thinks public affairs on a very precarious foot on account of the quarrels between the army and parliament. Complains of the pride, ambition and avarice of the latter, ingrossing all places of profit and honour; their factious dispositions, delays of business, design to perpetuate themselves in power, scandalous lives, nothing to keep them in bounds, being the supreme power. *Cromwell* proposes to take upon himself the name of king [before he was lord-protector] *Whitlocke* told him, the cure would be worse than the disease; that he had the kingly power almost, without the invidious name. That the very contest was, whether *England* should be a monarchy, or a republic, not whether the king's name should be *Ch.* or *Oliver*. *Whitlocke* proposes that *Cromwell* restore *Ch.* II. and stipulate security for himself and friends. *Cromwell* not pleased with *Whitlocke's* sentiments, conceals his displeasure with much prudence, and sends *Whitlocke* soon after ambassador to *Sweden*<sup>a</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> *Whitlocke's* MEM. p. 523.

‘ In the short space of 12 years, the parliament had  
 ‘ entirely subdued an established tyranny of more than  
 ‘ 500. In the form of government built on its ruins,  
 ‘ they had recalled the wisdom, and the glory of an-  
 ‘ tient times. One revolted nation they had reduced  
 ‘ to obedience; another they had added to the *English*  
 ‘ empire. The United Provinces were humbled to a  
 ‘ state of accepting any imposed terms. And the  
 ‘ declared enemy of all the courts and states of *Europe*  
 ‘ was turned to humble and earnest solicitation for  
 ‘ friendship and alliance. At this full period of na-  
 ‘ tional glory, when both the domestic and foreign  
 ‘ enemies of the country were dispersed, and every  
 ‘ where subdued, when *England*, after so long a subjec-  
 ‘ tion to monarchical tyranny, bade fair to out-do in  
 ‘ the constitution of its government, and consequently  
 ‘ in its power and strength, every circumstance of  
 ‘ glory, wisdom, and happiness, related of antient, or  
 ‘ modern times; when *Englishmen* were on the point  
 ‘ of attaining a fuller measure of happiness, than had  
 ‘ ever been the portion of human society—the base  
 ‘ and wicked selfishness of one trusted citizen’ [at the  
 head of an army] ‘ disappointed the promised harvest  
 ‘ of their hopes, and deprived them of that liberty, for  
 ‘ which, at the expence of their blood and their trea-  
 ‘ sure, they had so long and so bravely contended<sup>a</sup>.’  
 Thus our incomparable female historian sets forth the  
 mischiefs which that extraordinary man was enabled  
 to do to his *country*, by means of the tremendous army.  
 Nor did he obtain for *himself* any honour or advantage,  
 which could in any degree compensate for the evils he  
 brought on *England*. He destroyed the liberties of his  
 country, and with them ruined the happiness of his  
 own

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<sup>a</sup> *Macaul.* HIST. v. 95.

own life. Wretched ambition! To what dost thou bring thy votaries! See *Cromwell*, who might have lived peaceful and happy, had he, immediately after settling the commonwealth, disbanded his army, and returned to a private unenvied station, and who might have been to all ages celebrated among the illustrious founders of states, the patrons of liberty, and destroyers of tyrants—behold him, canting, sneaking, and dissembling, to curry favour with those he despised; behold him tortured with guilt, and fear of assassination, and of damnation; scared at the sight of every stranger; terrified at pamphlets and paragraphs encouraging to destroy him; armed with a coat of mail under his cloaths; afraid to sleep two nights in the same chamber, or to return the same way he went; incumbered with guards, and afraid even of them; hated by his relations; distrusting, and distrusted by his domestics; dying just in time, surrounded with difficulties and distresses, from which he was not likely to extricate himself.

What availed his raising himself to the romantic height, to which he at last soared, when from a private gentleman, and a cornet of horse, he came to be every thing of a king but the name, and seemed by his answer to Monsieur *Bellievre* admiring his wonderful fortune, (*L'on ne monte jamais si haut, que lorsqu'on ne sçait ou l'on va*) to be himself astonished at his own elevation—What availed, I say, the wonderful feats he performed by means of the army, when he made all *Europe* stand aghast at the sound of his name? A very short space of time would, probably, if he had lived, have brought him down as low, as ever he was high. For nothing is permanent that is not founded in justice.

Afterwards

Afterwards the army fell into the hands of *Lambert*, whose officers make demands on the parliament. They resolve against them. Great contests between parliament and army <sup>a</sup>. At last *Lambert* stops the speaker in his coach, and hinders the house from meeting <sup>b</sup>. This was the second time of forcibly dissolving this parliament.

When the peaceable *Richard*, the son of *Cromwell*, succeeded to his father's protectoral power, he soon found that the officers designed to force him to dissolve the parliament <sup>c</sup>. He is obliged to yield to the army; loses all his authority. The army takes the government <sup>d</sup>.

The parliament would have established republican government, upon the resignation of *Richard Cromwell*, if they had not been bullied out of it by *Monk* and the army, who brought in again upon their country, the curse of the *Stuarts*.

There was in short nothing but doing and undoing in those times; the parliament being as much slaves to the army then, as they are in modern times [the present always excepted] to the court.

It is well known, that *Ch. II.* proposed, by means of the army, to enslave the kingdom.

The garrison of *Tangiers* being brought over to *England*, 'served to augment that small army, on which the king' [*Ch. II.*] 'relied, as one solid basis of his authority <sup>e</sup>.'

An honest, though too timid house of commons, addressed *Ch. II.* against his guards (which were but 6000) as unfavourable to liberty <sup>f</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> *Rap.* II. 609.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 610.

<sup>c</sup> *Rap.* II. 604.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 605.

<sup>e</sup> *Hume's Hist. STUARTS*, II. 335.

<sup>f</sup> *Ibid.* 234.

The commons in *Ch. II.*'s second parliament, voted the standing army, and king's guards, illegal<sup>a</sup>. Mr. *Hume* approves this as necessary to liberty<sup>b</sup>.

The parliament beginning to doubt, whether there had not been too great a confidence reposed in *Ch. II.* by that generation of fond fools, who received him at his restoration, and by their beslobbering, spoiled him; voted, that he should not have power to keep the militia under arms above a fortnight together, without consent of parliament<sup>c</sup>. They were jealous even of the *militia*. We are not afraid of above 40,000 *soldiery* wholly dependent on the crown, and detached for life from the people.

*Clarendon* at last persuaded *Ch. II.* that he could not be safe on his throne, without disbanding the *army*, which having once been above all other powers in the state, and having modelled it at their pleasure, would not be likely to brook submission to a king. It was accordingly broke, all but 1000 horse and 5000 foot. The *first standing army in England*<sup>d</sup>.

'It was generally believed that the design was to keep up and model the army now raised, reckoning, 'there would be money enough' [300,000 *l.* a year for three years, expected from the *French king*] 'to pay 'them, 'till the nation should be brought under military government.'

*Ch. II.* and his brother the duke of *York*, laid the main stress of their kingship upon the *army*.

'If once they (the duke of *York*'s enemies) get the navy, purge the guards and garrisons, and put new men in, they will be absolute masters.' The duke of *York*'s words in his letter to the prince of *Orange*<sup>e</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> *Hume's HIST. STUARTS*, II. 303.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 137.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 136.

<sup>e</sup> *Dalrymp. MEM.* II. 219.

‘ The king (*Ch. II.*) has yet the fleet, the garri-  
 ‘ sons and guards ; so that if he will stand by himself,  
 ‘ he may yet be a king.’ The duke of *York* to the  
 prince of *Orange*<sup>a</sup>.

‘ Upon the defeat of *Monmouth’s* rebellion, king  
 ‘ *James* became intoxicated with his prosperity. In-  
 ‘ stead of disbanding his army, he encamped it on  
 ‘ *Hounslow* heath, and resolved to make it the great  
 ‘ instrument of his power<sup>b</sup>.’

Mr. *Trenchard*, in the year 1722, defied the advo-  
 cates for standing armies, to produce a plausible pre-  
 text for keeping them up. What would he have said,  
 had he lived in our times, when every argument for  
 them is grown weaker<sup>c</sup> ?

‘ I presume, says he<sup>d</sup>, no man will be audacious  
 ‘ enough to propose, that we should make a standing  
 ‘ army part of our constitution.’ Is it not, in our  
 times, to every intent and purpose a part of our con-  
 stitution ?

Parliament under *William* and *Mary* were uncon-  
 querably resolute on disbanding the army, and sending  
 away the *Dutch* guards, though the king had in a  
 manner petitioned for their stay. *William* was highly  
 disgusted, so that he made a speech which he intended  
 to speak in parliament, and to abdicate, and go abroad.  
 It is uncertain how he was diverted from his purpose.  
 In his letter to lord *Galway*, he has these words.  
 ‘ It is not to be conceived how people here are set  
 ‘ against foreigners.’ And afterwards. ‘ There is a  
 ‘ spirit of ignorance and malice prevails here, beyond  
 ‘ conception<sup>e</sup>.’

King

<sup>a</sup> *Dalrymp.* MEM. II. 221.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 169.

<sup>c</sup> See CATO’S LETT. III. 248, *seq.*

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* 250.

<sup>e</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 389.

King *William*, in his speech, *A. D.* 1697, tells parliament that a land-force is necessary; and indeed there was, at that time, some pretence, because of the mad disaffected party which prevailed. Yet a militia was manifestly preferable then, and at all times. But the best kings love a mercenary army better than a free militia. Many of the members were offended at the king's recommending so strongly an army of land-forces. And the first resolution made was directly in the teeth of the king's speech, *viz.* That all the land-forces of this kingdom which have been raised since *September* 29, 1680, shall be paid and disbanded. The army consisted then of 17,656 infantry, and 6,876 horse and dragoons. Orders were given out for rewarding, paying off, and granting privileges to the soldiers, and for making the militia useful <sup>a</sup>.

It is said, that the same prince, enraged at parliament's refusing to let his *Dutch* guards stay with him, after he had requested it as a personal favour, swore, 'if he had a son, they should not leave him.' That is, it would have been worth his while to keep them in spite of parliament. And it is plain, he thought this practicable, and if it was, then any thing may be practicable by him, who has the command of the tremendous army.

The commons, staunch to the salutary doctrine of "No standing army in a free country in a time of peace," went on reforming the army, till at last they settled it at about 10,000. The king was highly offended at their jealousy of him, who had done so much for them; and never deceived them. Said to *Burnet*, that if he had

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. III. 76.

known how the *English* would treat him, he never would have meddled with them<sup>a</sup>. Did our glorious deliverer really think the people were not as anxious about their own safety as he could be? What was it to him, what army the people of *England* chose to keep up? Did not they know best? And was it not their affair much more than his?

Upon the disbanding of the army under king *William*, a larger provision was made for the sea service. The nation could better afford it<sup>b</sup>.

The *Dutch* keep up no more than 32,000 standing forces in time of war; though they are upon the same continent with, and their capital not many days march from the *French* dominions<sup>c</sup>.

So hard have the ministerial crew been put to it for arguments to defend the keeping up of a standing army, that we find in the *DEB. OF THE LORDS*, IV. 453, a pretence, taken from the number of standing forces kept up by *France*, for our keeping up an army proportioned to the *French*. Whereas we should have no more to fear from *France's* keeping up an army of a million of men, than of one thousand, unless their fleet was an overmatch for ours.

In *Walpole's* time, it was strongly alledged, that officers were advanced, or neglected according to their parliamentary conduct and connections. Does not this render the army dreadfully dangerous to liberty?

'In all deliberations of this kind,' (says Mr. *Pulteney* in the debate on the *Spanish* convention, *A. D.*

1739.)

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. I. 366, 368.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* I. 390.

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, IV. 452.



1739<sup>a</sup>.) ‘ I have constantly observed these military gentlemen very prudently consult the peace of their country, as well as their own glory, by being the first to approve of the minister’s most destructive schemes, and even his pacific measures. We all know, when it has happened otherwise, what was the consequence. They, who had the courage, to follow the dictates of their own breasts, were disabled from further serving their country in a military capacity.’

The author of the *Present State of the Nation*, estimates the yearly expence of the useles and dangerous army in a profound peace at 1,437,600 *l.* including ordnance; while the inestimable fleet, and militia, the natural strength of a free country surrounded with the sea, cost the nation only 1,600,000 *l.*

Every opportunity a minister and his tools have of embezzling the public money is an evil. The keeping up of a numerous standing army furnishes this very plentifully. It is alledged, that the great commanders under the umbrage of the ministry, have constantly several thousand men in their pockets. False musters were found, *A. D.* 1711. Not above two thirds of the muster-rolls were effective men. The annual estimate of the army in those times used to be about 700,000 *l.*; one third of which, therefore, or 233,000 *l.* a year, must have been sunk in certain pockets. Many debtors were protected by the military. *Chartres* guilty this way, and of tampering with witnesses, produced before the committee. The queen was to be informed, and desired to punish *Chartres*, and all other persons concerned. It was found, that subjects had been imprisoned in the *Savoy* without

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authority

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XI. 63.

authority in writing from a commission-officer; that they had been put in irons, and sold to be sent abroad. The queen was desired to give certain soldiers their dismissal from the service, and protection against pressing; for having witnessed these facts<sup>a</sup>. Thus the people are plundered, and amidst the shew of a numerous army, deprived of the advantage, if advantage there be, in the reality. See a motion about the absence of officers from *Minorca*<sup>b</sup>. Out of nineteen officers, only five were left on duty in the island, at a time when the invasion of it was threatened by *Spain*, so publickly, that all *Europe* knew it. See the examination of general *Anstruther*, lieutenant governor<sup>c</sup>.

The great victories gained in queen *Anne's* time over the *French* in land fights, were very prejudicial to *England*. For it was impossible we should gain any advantage by continental conquests, and it was chiefly from that time, that we attached ourselves to continental schemes, and became delighted with great armies and land wars, while the sea is our proper element (of which more elsewhere); and the unfortunate circumstance of two *German* princes filling the *British* throne immediately afterwards, who had no idea of an insular situation, nor of any security, but what depends on numerous standing forces; all these contributed to draw us into the fatal error of keeping up a large standing army in this kingdom surrounded by the ocean; and in times of peace, as well as of war. It is not 20 years since we thought it necessary, *A. D.* 1756, to send for *Hessians* and *Hanoverians* to defend us against an expected invasion from *France*; which measure even *Voltaire* condemns, and compares

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* IV. 214.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, VIII. 69.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid. seq.*

pares this proceeding with queen *Elizabeth's*, who defended herself, without foreign auxiliaries, against *Philip II.* of *Spain*, the duke of *Parma*, the queen of *Scotch*, the *Irish*, and the papists <sup>a</sup>. Yet *George I.* reduced his land-forces, *A. D.* 1718, though he was at war with *Spain*, and his three kingdoms swarmed with jacobites <sup>b</sup>.

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### C H A P. III.

*A Militia, with the Navy, the only proper Security of a free People in an insular Situation, both against foreign Invasion and domestic Tyranny.*

**A** Standing army, as those on the continent, continues, of course, from year to year, without any new appointment, and is a part of the constitution. Our courtiers affect to call the *British* land-establishment a parliamentary army, and would deceive us into the notion of a difference between a standing army and a parliamentary. The *British* land-forces, say they, are appointed from year to year, not only as to their number, but their subsistence; so that the parliament's neglecting to provide for their subsistence would be annihilating the army at once. But is the army the less a grievance for its being on this foot, than if it were on the same with those of *France* or *Spain*? Suppose that for twenty years together, we should have no parliament called. At the end of that period, could the grievance and loss to the nation be estimated as at all less upon the whole, than it would

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have

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<sup>a</sup> *Ess. SUR L'HIST. VI. 133.*

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM. VI. 183.*

have been, if the king had at the beginning of the twenty years, declared by edict, that there should be no parliament during that period? This would be a bolder stroke of tyranny, than merely neglecting, from year to year, or refusing, to let the writs be issued; but the people would be as really deprived of the advantages of parliaments by one proceeding, as by the other.

‘ No kingdom can be secured otherwise than by  
 ‘ arming the people. The possession of arms is  
 ‘ the distinction between a freeman and a slave. He,  
 ‘ who has nothing, and who himself belongs to  
 ‘ another, must be defended by him, whose property  
 ‘ he is, and needs no arms. But he, who thinks he  
 ‘ is his own master, and has what he can call his  
 ‘ own, ought to have arms to defend himself, and  
 ‘ what he possesses; else he lives precariously, and at  
 ‘ discretion. And though for a while, those, who  
 ‘ have the sword in their power, abstain from doing  
 ‘ him injury, yet by degrees he will be awed into  
 ‘ submission to every arbitrary command. Our ances-  
 ‘ tors’ [the *Caledonii*, see *Tacit. &c.*] ‘ by being  
 ‘ always armed, and frequently in action, defended  
 ‘ themselves against the *Romans*, *Danes* and *English*,  
 ‘ and maintained their liberty against the incroach-  
 ‘ ments of their own princes <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ We all know, that the only way of enslaving a  
 ‘ people, is by keeping up a standing army; that by  
 ‘ standing forces all limited monarchies have been  
 ‘ destroyed; without them none; that so long as  
 ‘ any standing forces are allowed in a nation, pre-  
 ‘ tences will never be wanting to increase them; that  
 ‘ princes have never suffered a militia to be put upon  
 ‘ any

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<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher*, p. 307.

‘ any good foot, left standing armies should appear  
 ‘ unnecessary <sup>a</sup>.’

Mr. *Fletcher* gives <sup>b</sup> the plan of a militia for *Britain*. He proposes three camps in *England*, and one in *Scotland*; and that every youth of every rank should spend one or two years in the camp, at his coming of age, and perform military exercise once every week afterwards. But a great deal less than this would be sufficient to make this, or any populous island inaccessible to a foreign enemy. If we had in *Britain* a sea and land militia, there would be no occasion for the scandalous practice of pressing.

The *Athenian* and *Spartan* militia conquered the *Persian* mercenary armies, though infinitely more numerous. The greatest part of *Alexander's* army was militia. The *Romans* conquered all nations, in the republican times, while their army was an unpaid militia. In the imperial times, when the army was hired, the northern militia drove them out of one province after another, and at last *Odoacer* made himself king of *Italy*. The *Turks* had more trouble in subduing the militia of *Hungary* and *Epirus*, than in conquering all their empire besides. *Scanderbeg*, with a small militia, was constantly successful in 22 battles against standing armies. *Hunniades* and *Matthias* fought the *Turkish* standing armies always with militia, ‘ and performed such actions as posterity can hardly believe.’

‘ The *Grecians* carried on their wars against *Persia*,  
 ‘ by means of their militia; and at last beat the nume-  
 ‘ rous mercenary armies, and subdued the vast empire  
 ‘ of *Persia*. The *Romans* carried on their wars against  
 ‘ *Carthage* by means of their militia; and, at last,  
 ‘ beat the mercenary armies of *Carthage*, and destroyed

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‘ that

<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher*, p. 346.<sup>b</sup> P. 54.

‘ that rich and populous city. But when the *Romans*,  
 ‘ in order to support the arbitrary power of their  
 ‘ emperors, began to put their whole trust in merce-  
 ‘ nary armies, their military glory soon began to  
 ‘ decline; and at last the *Goths* and *Vandals*, and other  
 ‘ northern nations, by means of their militia, drove  
 ‘ before them the mercenary armies of *Rome*, and  
 ‘ made that proud city submit to the yoke which  
 ‘ she had, in former times, by the same means, put  
 ‘ upon a great part of the world <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ *La constitution de Rome, &c.* The constitution of  
 ‘ *Rome* was founded upon this principle, That those  
 ‘ only should be soldiers, who had property to answer  
 ‘ to the republic for their conduct. The equestrians,  
 ‘ as being the richest, formed the cavalry of the legi-  
 ‘ ons. When their dignity was increased, they would  
 ‘ not serve any longer; so that it was necessary to  
 ‘ raise another cavalry. *Marius* took into his legions  
 ‘ all sorts of people. The *Roman* republic was  
 ‘ undone <sup>b</sup>.’

‘ At the conclusion of the first *Punic* war, the  
 ‘ *Carthaginians* were compelled, by their treaty with  
 ‘ the *Romans*, to evacuate *Sicily*. *Gisco*, therefore,  
 ‘ who commanded in that island, to prevent the dis-  
 ‘ orders which might be committed by such a multi-  
 ‘ tude of desperate fellows, composed of so many dif-  
 ‘ ferent nations, and so long inured to blood and  
 ‘ rapine, sent them over gradually in small bodies,  
 ‘ that his countrymen might have time to pay off  
 ‘ their arrears, and send them home to their respec-  
 ‘ tive countries. But either the lowness of their  
 ‘ finances, or the ill timed parsimony of the *Cartha-*  
 ‘ *ginians*;

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, v. 301.

<sup>b</sup> *Montesq.* L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, I. 287.

‘ *ginians*, totally defeated this salutary measure, though  
‘ the wisest that, as their affairs were at that time  
‘ circumstanced, could possibly have been taken. The  
‘ *Carthaginians* deferred their payment till the arrival  
‘ of the whole body, in hopes of obtaining some  
‘ abatement in their demands, by fairly laying before  
‘ them the necessities of the public. But the merce-  
‘ naries were deaf to every representation and proposal  
‘ of that nature. They felt their own strength, and  
‘ saw too plainly the weakness of their masters. As  
‘ fast as one demand was agreed to, a more unreason-  
‘ able one was started; and they threatened to do  
‘ themselves justice by military execution, if their  
‘ exorbitant demands were not immediately com-  
‘ plied with. At last, when they were just at the  
‘ point of an accommodation with their masters,  
‘ by the mediation and address of *Gisco*, two desperate  
‘ ruffians, named *Spendius* and *Mathos*, raised such  
‘ a flame among the unruly multitude, as broke out  
‘ instantly into the most bloody and destructive war  
‘ ever yet recorded in history. The account we have  
‘ of it from the *Greek* historians must strike the most  
‘ callous breast with horror; and though it was at  
‘ last happily terminated by the superior conduct of  
‘ *Hamilcar Barcas*, the father of the great *Hanibal*,  
‘ yet it continued near four years, and left the terri-  
‘ tories around *Carthage* a most shocking scene of  
‘ blood and devastation. Such was, and ever will  
‘ be, the consequence, when a large body of merce-  
‘ nary troops is admitted into the heart of a rich and  
‘ fertile country, where the bulk of the people are  
‘ denied the use of arms by the mistaken policy of their  
‘ governors. For this was actually the case with the  
‘ *Carthaginians*, where the total disuse of arms amongst  
‘ the lower class of people laid that opulent country  
‘ open,

‘ open, an easy and tempting prey to every invader.  
 ‘ This was another capital error, and consequently  
 ‘ another cause which contributed to their ruin. How  
 ‘ must any nation, but our own, which, with respect  
 ‘ to the bulk of the people, lies in the same defence-  
 ‘ less situation, how, I say, must they censure the  
 ‘ mighty state of *Carthage* spreading terror and giving  
 ‘ law to the most distant nations by her powerful  
 ‘ fleets, when they see her at the same time tremb-  
 ‘ ling, and giving herself up for lost at the landing of  
 ‘ an invader in her own territories <sup>a</sup> !’

‘ I hope the enemies to a militia will at least allow  
 ‘ those new levies, who composed by far the greatest  
 ‘ part of *Hamilcar’s* army upon this occasion, to be  
 ‘ raw, undisciplined, and ignorant of the use of arms,  
 ‘ epithets which they bestow so plentifully upon a  
 ‘ militia. Yet that able commander, with an army  
 ‘ consisting chiefly of this kind of men, totally destroyed  
 ‘ an army of desperate veterans, took their general,  
 ‘ and all who escaped the slaughter, prisoners, and  
 ‘ put an end to the most ruinous and most in-  
 ‘ human war ever yet mentioned in history. These  
 ‘ new levies had courage, a quality never yet, I believe,  
 ‘ disputed to the *British* commonalty, and were to fight  
 ‘ *pro aris et focis*, for whatever was dear and valuable  
 ‘ to a people; and *Hamilcar*, who well knew how to  
 ‘ make use of these dispositions of his countrymen,  
 ‘ was master of those abilities which *Mathos* wanted.  
 ‘ Of such infinite advantage is it to an army to have a  
 ‘ commander superior to the enemy in the art of gene-  
 ‘ ralship, an advantage which frequently supplies a  
 ‘ deficiency even in the goodness of troops, as well as  
 ‘ in numbers <sup>b</sup>.’

A militia

<sup>a</sup> *Mountague*, ANT. REPUB. 191.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 204.



A militia is the natural strength of a free people. The *Romans* had no regular forces on pay till the year of *Rome* 347, by which time they had gained most of their conquests, and which was their best period for public virtue.

When some of the *Chinese* emperor *Tay-tsong's* ministers warned him of the danger of training his subjects so carefully to arms, lest they should rebel against him; he answered, 'I carry my subjects in my bosom; and have no more to fear from them, than a father from his children.'

At the union of *Utrecht*, which was the basis of the union of the seven provinces against *Phil. II.* it was settled, that every male between 18 and 60 should be trained to arms <sup>a</sup>.

King *John III.* of *Portugal* established a militia (the kings of *Portugal* were in those times limited) by ordering, that every man of a certain income should find a foot-soldier, when wanted. One of double, a musqueteer; and he who was possessed of an estate of triple value, a trooper and horse <sup>b</sup>.

At the congress of *Munster* and *Osnabrug*, *A. D.* 1641, it was articulated, 'that both cities should be guarded by their own burghers and soldiers commanded by the magistrates <sup>c</sup>.' A proper militia.

Cardinal *Ximenes*, the patriot of *Spain*, raised a militia of 30,000 men without expence, able to defend themselves <sup>d</sup>.

The province of *Entre Minho e Dauro*, in *Portugal*, is 18 leagues long, and 12 wide. The standing militia is 16000 men. *Tra ls montes* is 30 leagues by

20.

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxxi. 82.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. xxii. 232.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. xxx. 249.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. xxi. 214.

20. Militia 10, or 12,000. *Beira* 34 leagues by 30. Militia 10,000 <sup>a</sup>.

The frugal *Dutch* have a militia in their *Indian* settlements <sup>b</sup>. The pay of army-officers generally amounts to a third of the whole expence. The *Dutch* save this. For their militia officers have no pay. They fight for the preservation of their property. The *frugality* of having a militia instead of an army, will, I am sensible, be no consideration with our court. For one of the principal ends they have in view, in keeping up an army in times of peace, is the maintenance of several thousands of gentlemen, as officers, who, by that means, are inviolably attached to the court.

When the northern nations in the time of *Charlemagne* made descents on many coasts in a piratical manner, that great prince established a militia in the maritime parts of *France* for the security of the kingdom, which proved effectual <sup>c</sup>. His son, *Lewis* the Pious, neglected to keep it up. The hostilities were renewed <sup>d</sup>.

‘For above two centuries, says *Vattel*, the *Swiss* ‘have enjoyed a profound peace, while the noise of ‘arms has resounded on all sides, and war has laid ‘waste the rest of *Europe*.’ He ascribes this to the courage and discipline of the people.

When the *Goths* and *Vandals* over-ran the western parts of the *Roman* empire (says *Fletcher* of *Scotland*) the generals of armies made themselves kings of the countries they conquered. They divided the lands among their officers, called barons, and they again gave small parcels to their soldiers, who became their vassals,

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<sup>a</sup> MOD. UNIV. HIST. XXII. 10.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. x. 553.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. XXIII. 148, 153.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. 180.

vassals, and held by military service. The king's revenue arose out of his demesne lands. There was no mercenary army. Every man was a soldier, obliged to fight for his superior; upon which tenure he held his lands. This continued to be the state of things in *Europe* for about 1100 years from *A. D.* 400. In that period, the sword was more properly in the hands of the barons, than of the kings. For the people held more immediately of the barons than of the kings. Now the sword is come into the hands of kings, by means of mercenary armies. The power of granting money is not alone a sufficient security for liberty. For a thousand disciplined ruffians will command the purses of a million of untrained people. 'Not only,' says he, that government is tyrannical, which is 'tyrannically administered, but all governments are 'tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a 'sufficient security against arbitrary power.' He means a militia, to balance the dangerous army: p. 9. Afterwards, in consequence of a more expensive way of living in more polished ages, the great land-owners were obliged to give their vassals up military service, and to take rent for their lands. Foreign invasions then put princes upon the pretence for setting up mercenary armies, whose pay was to be levied upon the people by taxes. Yet it is manifest, that a militia is the only natural defence of a free country both from invasion and tyranny. For who is so likely to defend property, as the proprietor? It was the carelessness of the people, that gave kings the opportunity of setting up tyrannies, and armies for supporting those tyrannies. Rich and luxurious people chose rather to pay than fight. So the sword went out of the hands of the people into those of the tyrant, and his hirelings. And now the people complain; whereas they should have

have prevented. Kings do not chuse to give up power, when once they have got it into their possession. War became a profession; and the army enabled the government to tax the people for the support of the idle soldier and court-sycophant. Our island, however, has no pretence for a standing army.

Some *French* counsellors about *Mary of Guise*, queen dowager, and regent of *Scotland*, induced her to propose a tax for maintaining a standing army to defend *Scotland* against *England*. Three hundred of the lesser barons, when the lords, too obsequious (as usual) to the court, consented, by silence, to the measure, remonstrated to the queen regent, and prevented the mischief. They were ready, they said, to defend their country. They would defend it better than mercenaries, men of desperate fortunes, who have no hopes, but in the public calamity, who, for money, would attempt any thing, and whose faith would follow fortune's wheel. The queen dowager was afraid to push the scheme; but *Mary* took it up, on pretence of *Bothwell's* having a design to seize her person. The army, however, was soon abolished, and *Jam. I.* when king of *Scotland*, had only forty gentlemen for his guard. Had *Ch. I.* only had 5000 regular forces, as a basis for his army, he would probably have conquered.

*Fletcher* answers the objection, That only a standing army can defend us against the standing army of *France*. He says, in our wars with *France*, our naval power ought chiefly to be trusted to. Mercenary troops are calculated, he says, to enslave a nation. They are composed of men, who make a trade of war; of detached ruffians freed from shame and connexion with their country for life; whereas a militia are to return again among the people after serving a certain number of years. *Cæsar*, in order to enslave his country, continued the same men beyond

the usual term of years. For the *Romans* intended, that both civil and military power should pass from hand to hand, and never grow inveterate among the same set of men.

Nothing will make a nation so unconquerable as a militia, or every man's being trained to arms. For every *Briton* having in him by birth the principal part of a soldier, I mean the heart; will want but little training beyond what he will have as a militia-man, to make him a complete soldier. A standing army, though numerous, might be routed in one engagement, if an engagement should happen in consequence of a *French* invasion. Whereas the militia of *Britain* would be a million of men; which would render a descent from *France* an operation of war not to be thought of<sup>a</sup>.

‘All the force, which the *French* can throw over to this country, before our fleet can come to our assistance, must be so inconsiderable, that their landing would deserve the name of a surprize, rather than of an invasion;’ says one, who will hardly be suspected of intending to derogate from the importance of the army; I mean, *John*, duke of *Argyle*<sup>b</sup>.

*De Wit* proposed to the *French* king, during the first *Dutch* war, an invasion of *England*. The king replied, that such an attempt would be fruitless, and would unite all the jarring parties in *England* against the enemy. ‘We shall have,’ says he, ‘in a few days after our landing, 50,000 men (meaning the militia) upon us.’

Mr. *Fletcher* adds afterwards what follows.

‘The essential quality of a militia consistent with freedom,

<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher's* WORKS, p. 31.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, VII. 79.

<sup>c</sup> *Hume*, *HIST. STUARTS*, II. 446.

‘ freedom, is, That the officers be named, and pre-  
 ‘ ferred, and they, and the soldiers maintained, not  
 ‘ by the prince but the people, who fend them out.  
 ‘ Ambitious princes [and he would have added, if he  
 ‘ had fore-known the late duke of *Newcastle’s* opposition  
 ‘ to the establishment of the militia, *corrupt ministers*]  
 ‘ have always endeavoured to discredit the militia, and  
 ‘ render it burdensome to the people, by never suffer-  
 ‘ ing it to be upon any right, or even tolerable foot-  
 ‘ ing; all to persuade the necessity of standing forces.  
 ‘ In the battle of *Naseby*, the number of forces was  
 ‘ equal on both sides; and all circumstances equal.  
 ‘ In the parliament’s army only nine officers had ever  
 ‘ seen actual service, and most of the soldiers were  
 ‘ *London* prentices, drawn out of the city two months  
 ‘ before. In the king’s army there were above 1000  
 ‘ officers, who had served abroad; yet the regulars  
 ‘ were routed by the prentices. A good militia is of  
 ‘ such importance to a nation, that it is the chief part  
 ‘ of the constitution of every free government. For,  
 ‘ though, as to other things, the constitution be ever  
 ‘ so slight, a good militia will always preserve the  
 ‘ public liberty; and in the best constitution ever  
 ‘ known, as to all other parts of government, if the  
 ‘ militia be not upon a right foot, the liberty of the  
 ‘ people must perish. The militia of antient *Rome*  
 ‘ made her mistress of the world. Standing armies  
 ‘ enslaved her. The *Lacedæmonians* continued 800  
 ‘ years free, because they had a good militia. The  
 ‘ *Swiss* are the freest people in our times, and like to  
 ‘ continue such the longest, because they have the  
 ‘ best militia <sup>a</sup>.’

However a corrupt government may intend to de-  
 feat the design of a militia by totally perverting it  
 from

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<sup>a</sup> *Fletcher’s* WORKS, p. 31, 42, 54.

from its original intention and use, this ought not to hinder all men of property from learning the use of arms. There is no law against a free subject's acquiring any laudable accomplishment. And if the generality of housekeepers were only half-disciplined, a designing prince, or ministry, would hardly dare to provoke the people by an open attack on their liberties, lest they should find means to be completely instructed in the exercise of arms before the chain could be rivetted. But without the people's having some knowledge of arms, I see not what is to secure them against slavery, whenever it shall please a daring prince, or minister, to resolve on making the experiment. See the histories of all the nations of the world.

The militia-act is long and intricate; whereas there was nothing necessary, but to direct, that every third man in every parish in *England*, whose house had 10 or more windows, should be exercised in his own parish, by an experienced serjeant, times every year, the days to be appointed; and every third part of every parish to be upon the list for three years, and free six years, so that in nine years every such housekeeper in *England* might have had all the knowledge he could acquire by field-days. The men never to be drawn out of their respective parishes, but to resist an invasion, quell an insurrection, or for some necessary purpose. Every healthy housekeeper of 10 windows and above, under 50, who refused to enlist and attend the exercising days, to be fined. No hirelings to be accepted. The commanders to be the men of largest property in each county.

A country, in which every man of property could defend his property, could have no occasion for a dangerous standing army, and would be incomparably

more secure against invasion, than it could be with a standing army of 50,000 men scattered over a whole empire.

Lord *Lyttelton* thinks the militia (the only permanent military force, our ancestors knew) was commanded by the heretoch of every county, who was annually chosen into his office by the freeholders in the folkmote, or county-court; and that after the *Norman* times, this command devolved upon the earl of each county.

A militia consisting of any others than the men of property in a country, is no militia; but a mungrel army.

Men of business and property will never choose to enter into the militia, if they may be called from their homes, and their business, for three years together, subject to martial law all the while.

Brigadier general *Townshend*, in his Dedication of the ‘*Plan of Discipline composed for the Militia of the county of Norfolk*, affirms, that he has made some persons masters of that exercise ‘in two or three mornings, so as to perform it with grace and spirit;’ and that the common men learned it in ‘seven or eight days time, some in less.’

The same gentleman complains heavily of the ‘discouragements, slights, delays, evasions, and unnatural treatment’ of the militia-act from those, whose duty it was to see it executed according to its intention. One would think the old militia law might have directed our government to avoid sending the militia out of their respective counties. This was always expressly guarded against, and was never to be done, but in the case of foreign invasion<sup>a</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> See Lord *Lyttelton*'s HIST. HEN. II. vol. III. p. 318.



The single circumstance of the national militia's being first settled by the great and good *Alfred*, ought to prejudice all friends to liberty in its favour. That able politician lord *Molesworth* thinks a militia infinitely preferable to an army, both on the score of safety from tyranny at home, and of invasion from abroad. Judge *Blackstone*<sup>a</sup> gives the preference to a militia. The *Polish* militia serve but 40 days in the year<sup>b</sup>.

Queen *Elizabeth's* whole reign may be almost called a state of defensive and offensive war; in *England* as well as in *Ireland*; in the *Indies* as well as in *Europe*; she ventured to go through this state, if it was a venture, without the help of a standing army. The people of *England* had seen none from the days of *Richard II.* and this cautious queen might perhaps imagine that the example of his reign and those of other countries where standing armies were established, would beget jealousies in the minds of her people, and diminish that affection, which she esteemed and found to be the greatest security of her person, and the greatest strength of her government. Whenever she wanted troops, her subjects flocked to her standard; and her reign affords most illustrious proofs, that all the ends of security and of glory too may be answered in this island without the charge and danger of the expedient just mentioned. This assertion will not be contradicted by those who recollect in how many places and on how many occasions her forces fought and conquered the best disciplined veteran troops in *Europe*<sup>c</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> COMM. I. 336.

<sup>b</sup> *Blackst.* COMM. I. 409.

<sup>c</sup> *Bolingbr.* REM. HIST. ENGL. 159.

The militia was established by *Alfred*, and fell into decay under the *Stuarts*. A proof, that a militia is good, and ought to be kept up. The *Stuarts* were friends to standing armies. A demonstration, that standing armies are dangerous. *James II.* at his accession declared the militia useless; and demanded supplies for keeping an army, he was to raise<sup>a</sup>. It is well known what armies *Charles I.* raised, and in what bloody business he employed them. *Charles II.* had, at the beginning of his reign, about 5,000 men. Toward the end of his reign, the army was increased to near 8,000. *James II.* at the time of *Monmouth's* rebellion, had on foot 15,000 men. At the prince of *Orange's* arrival, 30,000 regular troops<sup>b</sup>.

The command of the militia was only put in the hands of the crown, when the nation was in a state of insanity, and every man ready to lay down his head on a block, for the king [*Ch. II.*] to chop it off, if he pleased. As it is regulated by 30 *Geo. II. c. 25*, it remains too much on the same foot. For it is officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy-lieutenants and other principal land-holders, under a commission from the crown, which places it, as every thing else is, too much under the power of the court<sup>c</sup>.

The first commission of array is thought to have been in the times of *Hen. V.* When he went to *France, A. D. 1415*, he empowered commissioners to take an account of all the freemen in each county, who were able to bear arms, to divide them into companies, and to have them in readiness for resisting the enemy<sup>d</sup>.

‘ The

<sup>a</sup> *Hume's HIST. STUARTS, II. 388.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid. 446.*      <sup>c</sup> See *Blackst. COMM. I. 411.*

<sup>d</sup> *Hume's HIST. STUARTS, II. 321.*

‘ The citizens, and country gentlemen soon became excellent officers ;’ says Mr. *Hume*<sup>a</sup>. This shews what a militia may in a short time be brought to. For what is a militia-man, but a soldier, engaged for a limited time, and less completely trained ? And what is a soldier, but a militia-man completely disciplined, and enslaved for life ? The principal part of a soldier is the heart ; and that almost every *Briton* has by birth without training. A militia-man is a free citizen ; a soldier, a slave for life. Which is most likely to shew the most courage and the greatest attachment to his country ?

‘ The militia—if it could not preserve liberty to the people, preserved at least the power, if ever the inclination should arise, of recovering it<sup>b</sup>.’

‘ Against insurrections at home, the sheriff of every county has the power of the militia in him, and if he be negligent to suppress them with the *posse comitatus*, he is fineable. Against invasions from abroad, every man would be ready to give his assistance. There would be little need to raise forces, when every man would be ready to defend himself, and to fight *pro aris et focis*<sup>c</sup>.’ What would this honest man have said, if he had been told, that the time would come, when it would be called necessary to keep up a standing army in this free country, surrounded with the ocean, in peace as well as war, to the formidable number of above 40,000, a number superior to that with which *Alexander* conquered the world ?

Why must the *British* soldiery be enslaved for life, any more, than the sailors on board the navy ? Were

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the

<sup>a</sup> HIST. STUARTS, I. 360.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. I. 70.

<sup>c</sup> *Whitelocke's* speech on the militia. PARL. HIST., x. 278.

the militia put upon a right foot, the same individuals might serve either by sea or land, during a certain short period, and then return to their respective station. I know the court-sycophants will object to this, That a soldier requires a great deal of training and reviewing, before he comes to have the cool courage necessary in action, &c. But this is all pretence. We hardly ever have had, or can have occasion for any soldiery. Our wars with *France* in old times are now by all parties confessed to have been merely the loss of so much blood and treasure without possibility of advantage to this island. And our continental wars since the Revolution we have been drawn into chiefly by the unfortunate circumstance of our having on our throne a set of princes connected with the continent. There is no advantage we have ever gained by war, which would not have been greater, and cost us incomparably less, if we had kept to the sea. For we never can have a nation for our enemy that is not commercial, and we can certainly at any time force a commercial nation to yield to reasonable terms by attacking their commerce, their foreign settlements, their coast-towns, their fisheries, &c. And by sea we may always command the superiority. For every *Briton* is born with the heart of a soldier and a sailor in him; and wants but little training to be equal on either element, to any veteran of any country. Accordingly we never hear of the common men, in either service, shewing any appearance of cowardice.

‘ Immediately after the mutiny bill had passed the  
 ‘ lower house, Mr. *Thomas Pitt*, elder brother of Mr.  
 ‘ *William Pitt*, then paymaster general, moved, on the  
 ‘ 9th of *March*, 1749, for leave to bring in a bill  
 ‘ to limit respective times, beyond which no non-  
 ‘ commissioned officer or soldier, now, or who hereaf-

\* ter may be such in his majesty's land-service, shall be  
 \* compelled to continue in the said service. The  
 \* motion was seconded by Sir *Francis Dashwood*; but  
 \* very poorly supported in numbers. And at last, on  
 \* the 19th of *April*, it was, upon a division of 139  
 \* against 82, put off for two months, so that it was  
 \* no more heard of. Had this limitation taken place,  
 \* such a rotation of soldiers would have ensued among  
 \* the common people, that in a few years every peasant,  
 \* labourer, and inferior tradesman in the kingdom  
 \* would have understood the exercise of arms; and  
 \* perhaps the people in general would have concluded,  
 \* that a standing army, on whose virtue the consti-  
 \* tution of *Great Britain* seems to depend, was altoge-  
 \* \* ther unnecessary.<sup>a</sup>

Those incendiaries who go about to destroy our  
 constitution, have not blushed in the same breath to  
 admit, that standing armies have been generally the  
 instruments of overturning free governments, and to  
 affirm that a standing army is necessary to be kept in  
 outs; if you ask them against whom, they answer you  
 very frankly, against the people; if you ask them why,  
 they answer you with the same frankness, because of  
 the levity and inconstancy of the people. This is the  
 evil; an army is the remedy. Our army is not de-  
 signed, according to these doctors of slavery, against  
 the enemies of the nation. We are confident that the  
 present army is incapable of being employed to such  
 purposes, and abhors an imputation which might have  
 been justly cast on *Cromwell's* army, but is very un-  
 justly insinuated against the present<sup>b</sup>.

The great and good lord *Ruffel* was accused, among  
 other things, of intending to seize and destroy the  
 king's guards.

D d 4

The

<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. III. 335.*

<sup>b</sup> *Bolingbr. REM. HIST. ENGL. 273.*

The king's guards! (says Sir *Robert Atkins*, in his defence of lord *Ruffel*, p. 359.) What guards? Whom does the law understand or allow to be the king's guards for the preservation of his person? Whom shall the court, that tried this noble lord, whom shall the judges of the law, that were then present, and upon their oaths, whom shall they judge, or legally understand, by these guards? They never read of them in all their law books. There is not any statute law that makes the least mention of any guards. The law of *England* takes no notice of any such guards: and therefore the indictment is uncertain. The king is guarded by the special protection of almighty God, by whom he reigns, and whose vicegerent he is. He has an invisible guard of glorious angels.

Non eget Mauri jaculis nec arcu ;

Nec venenatis grava fagittis.

(Crede) Pharetra.

HOR.

The king is guarded by the love of his subjects. The next under God, and the surest guard. He is guarded by the law and courts of justice. The militia and the trained bands are his legal guard, and the whole kingdom's guard. The very judges that tried this noble lord, were the king's guards, and the kingdom's guards, and this lord *Ruffel's* guard against all erroneous and imperfect indictments, from all false evidence and proof, from all strains of wit and oratory misapplied and abused by council. What other guards are there? We know of no law for more; king *Hen. VII.* of this kingdom (as history tells us) was the first that set up the band of pensioners: since that the yeomen of the guard: since them certain armed bands, commonly now-a-days (after the *French* mode) called the king's life-guard, rid about, and appeared with naked swords

swords to the terror of this nation; but where is the law? where is the authority for them?

It had been fit for the court, that tried this noble lord on this indictment, to have satisfied themselves from the king's council, what was meant by these guards; for the alledging and setting forth an *overt fait*, or open deed, in an indictment of treason, must be of something that is intelligible by law, and whereof judges may take notice by law: and herein too, the indictment fails, and is imperfect.

*Barillon* writes to his court, that *James II.* intended to abolish the *militia* entirely, and to maintain the *army* with the money<sup>a</sup>. That both parliament and people disliked this very much, but that the king would keep the troops on foot, whether parliament provided for them or not, knowing that without them he could gain his point by his army and connexion with the *French* king.

‘ It does our *Hen. II.* great honour, (says lord  
 ‘ *Lyttelton*<sup>b</sup>) that he was the first author of a regula-  
 ‘ tion for arming his whole people; for no prince,  
 ‘ who desired to govern tyrannically, would have  
 ‘ thought of such a regulation; nor could any coun-  
 ‘ try, in which such a law was maintained, be either  
 ‘ enslaved by the crown, or much oppressed by the  
 ‘ nobles. It seems indeed that the antient constitution  
 ‘ of *England*, had always intended what this statute of  
 ‘ *Hen. II.* enacted; as all freeholders were required by  
 ‘ the common law of the land to assist in opposing  
 ‘ and driving out invaders; but the want of care to  
 ‘ provide the burgesies, and free socmen, who did not  
 ‘ hold any fiefs by military tenures, with proper  
 ‘ arms,

<sup>a</sup> *Dalrymp.* II. 169.

<sup>b</sup> LIFE HEN. II. III. 356.

‘ arms, rendered that obligation of little or no effect ;  
 ‘ whereas from this time, the whole community of  
 ‘ freemen were bound to have in their own custody,  
 ‘ and transmit to their heirs, the usual arms of a foot  
 ‘ soldier, and those who were worth 16 marks in  
 ‘ chatties or rents, were to provide heavy armour, nay  
 ‘ even those who had but 10, were to furnish them-  
 ‘ selves with scull-caps and habergeons of iron, toge-  
 ‘ ther with lances, and to leave them to their heirs.’

*Harrington* thinks, there ought, in a free country, to be no army, but a cavalry of the nobility and gentry, and an infantry of the commons.

See 13 *Edw.* I. cap. 6, for arming the people according to their possessions in lands<sup>a</sup>. In the Tower are the records of the militia grants for custody of shires, cities, towns, ports, &c. See the militia acts 25 *Edw.* III, cap. 8.—13 *Ch.* II. cap. 6.—13 and 14 of the same, cap. 3.—15 of the same, cap. 4, &c<sup>b</sup>. There is in *Riley's PLAC. PARL.* p. 458, an order, to the lord lieutenant of *Northamptonshire*, 20 *Edw.* I. that all who have 40 *libratas terræ*, have military arms. This order was founded in reason. Whoever has property, ought to be in a condition to defend his property. In *England* the arms are in one set of hands, and the property in another.

*Sir Robert Cotton* being consulted 3 *Car.* II. in a difficult state of affairs, amongst other things gave this advice at the council table<sup>c</sup>. ‘ There must be, to  
 ‘ withstand a foreign invasion, a proportion of sea and  
 ‘ land forces. And it is to be considered, that no  
 ‘ march

<sup>a</sup> STAT. AT LARGE, I. 120.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* II. *pass.*

<sup>c</sup> *Rusworth*, p. 469.



‘ march by land, can be of that speed to make head  
 ‘ against the landing of an enemy: then it follows,  
 ‘ that there is no such prevention as to be master of  
 ‘ the sea. For the land forces, if it were for an offen-  
 ‘ sive war, the men of less livelihood, were best spared;  
 ‘ and were used formerly to make such wars *purga-*  
 ‘ *menta republicæ*, if we made no farther purchase  
 ‘ by it. But for the safety of the commonwealth, the  
 ‘ wisdom of all times did never intrust the public  
 ‘ cause to any other than to such, as had a portion in  
 ‘ the public adventure. And that we saw in 1588,  
 ‘ when the care of the queen and of the council did  
 ‘ make the body of that large army no other than of  
 ‘ the trained bands.’ In the same advice to the king,  
 he lets him know how the people resented his keeping  
 up an army in the winter, though we were then in  
 war both with *France* and *Spain*. The words are  
 these. ‘ The dangerous distastes to the people are not  
 ‘ a little improved by the unexampled course, as they  
 ‘ conceive, of retaining an inland army in winter  
 ‘ season, when former times of general fear, as in  
 ‘ 1588, produced none such; and makes them in  
 ‘ their distracted fears conjecture idly, it was raised,  
 ‘ wholly to subject their fortunes to the will of power,  
 ‘ rather than of law, and to make good some farther  
 ‘ breach upon their liberties and freedoms at home,  
 ‘ rather than to defend us from any force abroad.’

Queen *Mary*, (*William* being in *Holland*) on the alarm  
 of an invasion from the *Pretender*, gives orders to put  
 the militia in readiness. Trained bands of the cities  
 of *London* and *Westminster*, to the number of 10,000,  
 under command of the lord-mayor, were drawn out.  
 The queen goes to see them; was pleased with their  
 activity and loyalty<sup>a</sup>.

The

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. .1. 200.

The two remarkable victories gained by the ruffian rebels, *A. D.* 1745, over the king's troops, shew that a militia is not so contemptible as the friends of a standing army affect to think it<sup>a</sup>.

‘ Though neither commanders, nor men, of the  
 ‘ *New-England* militia, who took *Louisburgh, A. D.*  
 ‘ 1745, had ever seen any military service; though the  
 ‘ ground between the place of landing and the town  
 ‘ was boggy, unequal, and almost impassable; though  
 ‘ the town was defended by several batteries, particu-  
 ‘ larly one of 35 cannon of 42 pounds each, a draw-  
 ‘ bridge, and circular battery of 16 guns, of 24 pounds  
 ‘ each, and at the mouth of the harbour, a battery of  
 ‘ 34 guns, 42 pounders; though the walls, ramparts,  
 ‘ and bastions mounted 64 guns, and though there  
 ‘ were in the place 10 mortars of 13 inches caliper,  
 ‘ and six of nine inches, and a garrison of 1200  
 ‘ regulars; those militia-men proceeded with all the  
 ‘ regularity and intrepidity of veterans, and took the  
 ‘ place accordingly<sup>b</sup>.’

In the year 1749, the number of sailors voted, was 1500, at the same time that the land forces were to be 18,857. It would have been more natural to imagine that parliament would vote the large number for the sea service, and the small one for the land. Accordingly Mr. *Nugent* observed, that it seemed as if those who draw up the estimates, had meant them for *France*, and not for *England*<sup>c</sup>.

Mr. *Thornton* moved, *A. D.* 1751, to bring in a bill to make the militia more useful. He said he had searched into the causes that rendered the militia weak  
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<sup>a</sup> See *CONTIN. Rap.* IX. 181, and 222.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 160.

<sup>c</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM.* IV. 8.

and contemptible, and the remedy would not be either difficult or tedious. He said the militia laws had been spoiled by design, that some villainous clauses had been artfully intruded into them, which were previously known to be such as would render them entirely useless. But a well constituted militia in the year 1745 would have saved the nation 3,000,000 *l.* and tho' it might cost the nation 10,000 *l.* a year, and there should be occasion to use it but once in thirty years, which was the space between the two last rebellions, we should then have had that service for 300,000 *l.* which has cost us 3,000,000 *l.* and that it was evident, that less labour would be lost by 200,000 militia, who would immediately return to their work, supposing that two days only in a month were set apart for their exercise, than by 20,000 regular troops, who consider every species of industry as incompatible with their station, or their duty <sup>a</sup>.

The bill was ordered to be committed.

In the year 1756 was published a collection of 43 addresses to the king, and instructions to members of parliament, from *London, Bristol*, and many counties, &c. complaining of the loss of *Minorca*, and other miscarriages, occasioned in great measure by the want of a militia, to secure the mother-country, which would have allowed sending out a sufficient force to defend *Minorca*, &c. In 34 of the addresses a militia is recommended. Yet that staunch old Whig the duke of *Newcastle* continued an enemy to the militia, and was the last to come into it.

Lord *Orford*, *A. D.* 1757, set the example to the kingdom by giving orders for putting the militia act in execution <sup>b</sup>.

*A. D.*

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. Deb. Com.* v. 19-25-29.

<sup>b</sup> *Rapin, Contin.* ix. 559.

*A. D.* 1759, an alarm being brought to *England* of 3000 hands being at work upon flat-bottomed boats, and other preparations in *France* for an invasion, the government expedited the raising of the militia, which before went on but heavily <sup>a</sup>. The king reviewed that of *Norfolk*, and expressed high satisfaction with them. Some thought the militia then no way inferior to regulars.

And we all remember what consternation we were in, *A. D.* 1756, when our enemies over-ran almost all our colonies, when we lost *Minorca*, *Oswego*, &c. because we were afraid to send men to their defence, and disgraced ourselves in the eyes of all *Europe* by importing foreigners to secure us against the flat-bottomed invasion, we pretended to apprehend from *France*. A well-appointed militia would, at both those periods, have saved the nation's honour.

In the year 1759, king *Geo. II.* sent a message to both houses, to notify, that he had information of a designed invasion from *France*, 'to the end, that his majesty may (if he shall think proper) cause the militia, or such part thereof as shall be necessary, to be drawn out, and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require <sup>b</sup>. The peers thanked the king for 'his intention to call out and employ the militia, if necessary,' &c. and the commons resolved, 'that an humble address be presented to his majesty to give directions to the lieutenants of counties for carrying the militia act into execution.'

Many remember what a condition we were in *A. D.* 1745, when a handful of highland ruffians penetrated to

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<sup>a</sup> *Tind. CONTIN. IX. 580.*

<sup>b</sup> *LOND. MAG. June, 1759, p. 296.*

to the very centre of *England*, and filled the whole nation with terror and dismay.

‘ That six or seven thousand men unprovided with  
‘ horses, with magazines, and many of them with  
‘ arms, should march from the extremities of *Scotland*  
‘ to within eighty miles of *London*, through a country  
‘ that abhorred their manners, and detested their cause;  
‘ and that they should return to *Scotland* without losing  
‘ above fifty men by death or desertion, is next to in-  
‘ credible. Upon their return, they were guilty of  
‘ many excesses in plundering the inhabitants of the  
‘ country, which they had forborne when they  
‘ marched into *England*. This was owing to the  
‘ chagrin they had conceived at their disappointment;  
‘ yet they were not accused of being sanguinary to the  
‘ people of the country, though it was said in the  
‘ skirmish at *Clifton* some of them called out to give no  
‘ quarter to the king’s troops. But their success in  
‘ a great measure may be accounted for by the dissimi-  
‘ larity of manners between them and their enemies.  
‘ Bred up in hardy, active, and abstemious courses of  
‘ life, they were always prepared to march, and never  
‘ at a loss for accommodation or provision: they were  
‘ devoted to enthusiasm to the cause they were engaged  
‘ in, and they thought no crime was equal to the dis-  
‘ obedience of the commands of their leaders, who,  
‘ during their march into *England*, sought all means to  
‘ conciliate the minds of the people to their interest.  
‘ The common people of *England*, on the other hand,  
‘ having been long used to pay an army for fighting  
‘ for them, had at this time forgot all the military  
‘ virtues of their ancestors. The militia, therefore,  
‘ was useless, and few but those who regularly en-  
‘ tered into the service of the government chose in  
‘ their own persons to venture any thing against the  
‘ rebels.

‘ rebels. They depended upon the army for their pro-  
 ‘ tection, and it was found by experience that the un-  
 ‘ wieldy motions of the regulars gave their enemies  
 ‘ a vast advantage, by rendering it next to impossible  
 ‘ to come up with them. This was the real cause of  
 ‘ their performing such amazing marches with so little  
 ‘ loss; and of their being able to hold out so long  
 ‘ against so great a superiority of numbers and disci-  
 ‘ pline <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ Why may not a militia be made useful <sup>b</sup>? Why  
 ‘ may not the nobility, gentry and freeholders of  
 ‘ *England* be trusted with the defence of their own  
 ‘ lives, estates, and liberties, without having guardians  
 ‘ and keepers assigned them? And why may they  
 ‘ not defend these with as much vigour and courage  
 ‘ as mercenaries who have nothing to lose, nor any  
 ‘ other tie to engage their fidelity, than the miserable  
 ‘ sixpence a day, which they may have from the  
 ‘ conqueror? Why may not a competent number of  
 ‘ firelocks be kept in every parish, for the young men  
 ‘ to exercise with on holy days, and rewards offered  
 ‘ to the most expert, to stir up their emulation? Why  
 ‘ may not a third part of the militia be kept up by  
 ‘ turns in constant exercise? Why may not a man  
 ‘ be listed in the militia till he is discharged by his  
 ‘ master, as well as in the army till he is discharged  
 ‘ by his captain? And why may not the same horse  
 ‘ be always sent forth, unless it can be made appear  
 ‘ he is dead or marred? Why may not the private  
 ‘ soldiers of the army, when they are dispersed in the  
 ‘ several parts of the kingdom, be sent to the militia?  
 ‘ And why may not the inferior officers of the army  
 in

<sup>a</sup> *Tind.* CONTIN. IX. 212.

<sup>b</sup> *Ann.* DEB. COM. III. 53.

' in some proportion command them? I say, these  
 ' and other like things may be done, and some of  
 ' them are done, in our own plantations, and the  
 ' islands of *Jersey* and *Guernsey*; as also in *Poland*,  
 ' *Switzerland*, and the country of the *Grisons*, which  
 ' are nations much less considerable than *England*,  
 ' have as formidable neighbours, no seas, nor fleet to  
 ' defend them, nothing but a militia to depend upon,  
 ' and yet no one dares to attack them. And we have  
 ' seen as great feats done formerly by the apprentices  
 ' of *London*, and in the war by the *Vaudois* in *Savoy*, and  
 ' *Miquelets* in *Catalonia*, and the militia in *Ireland*, as  
 ' can be paralleled in history. And so it would be with  
 ' us, if the court would give their hearty assistance  
 ' in promoting this design; if the king would appear  
 ' in person at the head of them, and give rewards  
 ' and honours to such as deserve them, we should  
 ' quickly see the young nobility and gentry appear  
 ' magnificently in arms and equipage, shew a generous  
 ' emulation in outvying one another in military exer-  
 ' cises, and place a noble ambition in making them-  
 ' selves serviceable to their country. They object,  
 ' that such a militia as this is a standing army, and  
 ' will be as dangerous and much more chargeable.  
 ' I answer, That there can be no danger from an  
 ' army, where the nobility and gentry of *England* are  
 ' the commanders, and the body of it made up of the  
 ' freeholders, their sons and servants; unless we can  
 ' conceive that the nobility and gentry will join in  
 ' an unnatural design to make void their own titles to  
 ' their estates and liberties; and if they could enter-  
 ' tain so ridiculous a proposition, they would never  
 ' be obeyed by the soldiers, who will have a respect  
 ' to those that send them forth, and pay them, and  
 ' to whom they must return when their time is ex-

‘ pired. For if I find a man, I will as surely chuse  
 ‘ one who will fight for me, as a mercenary officer  
 ‘ will chuse one, that will. And the governments of  
 ‘ king *Charles II.* and king *James*, are witnesses to the  
 ‘ truth of this, who debauched the militia more than  
 ‘ ever I hope to see it again, and yet durst never rely  
 ‘ upon them to assist their arbitrary designs, as we  
 ‘ may remember, at the duke of *Monmouth’s* invasion ;  
 ‘ their officers durst not bring them near his army for  
 ‘ fear of a revolt. Nay, the pensioned parliament  
 ‘ themselves turned short upon the court, when they  
 ‘ expected to give them the finishing stroke to their ruin.’

‘ I do not think our constitution and liberties will  
 ‘ ever be absolutely safe, until we return to our  
 ‘ ancient method, of making military exercises the  
 ‘ diversion and amusement of all ranks of men, and  
 ‘ of making it the custom or fashion for all laymen,  
 ‘ at least, to breed themselves up to arms and military  
 ‘ discipline ; and if we can accomplish this, I believe  
 ‘ it will be granted, we should then have no occasion  
 ‘ for a standing army, or for keeping a greater number  
 ‘ of regular troops in continual pay, than was neces-  
 ‘ sary for the grandeur and personal safety of our king  
 ‘ and royal family <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ This strength’ [says lord *Lyttelton*, viz. of the  
 national militia, when all the gentry were soldiers,  
 paid and maintained by the lands they held] ‘ could  
 ‘ never fail, as that of a mercenary army must at  
 ‘ sometimes, by the wealth of the state being con-  
 ‘ sumed and exhausted, but continued as fixed as  
 ‘ the lands disposed of in this manner, and ever  
 ‘ ready to oppose either foreign invaders, or in-  
 ‘ testine rebellion. I may add too, that it was equally  
 ‘ fitted to resist any tyranny in a king, being wholly  
 ‘ com-

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, v. 308.



‘ composed of those men, who, by their property in  
 ‘ the realm, and their rank in the state, were most  
 ‘ interested to guard the liberties of the subject against  
 ‘ the crown <sup>a</sup>.’ The noble author adds, that though  
 every landholder’s being a soldier gave the barons  
 frequent opportunity of disturbing the peace, yet ‘ it  
 ‘ was no easy matter for any of them to exercise their  
 ‘ tyranny long, without being checked—whereas in  
 ‘ absolute monarchies’ [which cannot subsist in coun-  
 tries where the people of property are armed] ‘ the  
 ‘ constitution affords no remedy against the despotism  
 ‘ of the prince.’ A strong recommendation of a  
 militia!

Mr. *Thornton*, *A. D.* 1751, made the following  
 remarks in the house of commons <sup>b</sup>.

‘ I must not omit to take notice that the militia  
 ‘ laws have been opposed by design; some villainous  
 ‘ clauses having been artfully intruded into them,  
 ‘ which were previously known to be such as would  
 ‘ render them entirely useles. As this cannot be  
 ‘ denied, I persuade myself, that after a very little  
 ‘ reflection, every gentleman present will concur in  
 ‘ my opinion, that some alteration is necessary with  
 ‘ respect to our militia, either to commence now, or  
 ‘ at a more convenient season; or, at least, at the  
 ‘ eve of a commotion, when their assistance shall be  
 ‘ wanted to surmount the danger which we would  
 ‘ not prevent. If our militia is not to be frequently  
 ‘ exercised, let there be some law, by which it may  
 ‘ be more effectually raised. Let us no longer ac-  
 ‘ knowledge the importance of a militia in the pre-  
 ‘ amble of many of our statutes, yet render this very  
 E e 2 ‘ militia

<sup>a</sup> Lord *Lyttelt*. HIST. HEN. II. 111. 95.

<sup>b</sup> *Alm.* DEB. COM. v. 20.

' militia ineffectual by suffering such destructive clauses  
 ' to remain, as will reduce the statute itself to a mere  
 ' form of words, and a dead letter, to the astonishment  
 ' of other nations, and the disgrace of our own. Let  
 ' us, Sir, repeal all the present laws concerning the  
 ' militia; we shall then evidently perceive our naked-  
 ' ness, and in what a defenceless state they will leave  
 ' us. Let us no longer be amused with the appearance  
 ' of a security, which they cannot give; nothing  
 ' more, surely, than the discovery of our danger, is  
 ' necessary to put us immediately upon our guard;  
 ' nothing more is necessary to determine us to enact  
 ' laws which shall be in effect what the present laws  
 ' are only in form; and I hope we shall, upon this  
 ' occasion, remember the great maxim of *Cosmo de*  
 ' *Medicis*, from whom *Machiavel* derived all his po-  
 ' litical knowledge; Defer not till to-morrow what  
 ' can and ought to be done to-day. A regulation,  
 ' Sir, by which our country is to be defended against  
 ' superstition and slavery, against the fury of an in-  
 ' vasion, or the rapine of rebellion, requires the most  
 ' mature and dispassionate deliberation. Shall we,  
 ' therefore, defer this regulation, till we hear the drum  
 ' of an enemy beat to arms? Shall we defer it till  
 ' every heart throbs with apprehension, and every mind  
 ' is confused with anxiety and terror? Till impatience  
 ' for obtaining the end shall cause us to mistake the  
 ' means? Till a time when an hypocritical zeal for  
 ' the safety of the public taking advantage of the  
 ' confusion, shall bring us into greater danger? Were  
 ' not the very clauses that have emasculated our sta-  
 ' tutes relating to the militia introduced in the time of  
 ' public and imminent danger, by designing men,  
 ' who under a pretence of increasing our security,  
 ' took away what security we had?

' Let

‘ Let us then in this interval of tranquillity, when  
 ‘ the mind is at leisure to examine and choose, set  
 ‘ about changing these ruinous clauses for such as will  
 ‘ be quite proper. Let us now establish our safety  
 ‘ upon a firm foundation, by passing such a law as  
 ‘ will furnish this country with a militia equally  
 ‘ effective, more easily raised, and maintained at a less  
 ‘ expence than that of any other nation in the world;  
 ‘ let us no longer trust our liberty and our lives, our  
 ‘ religion, our country and our posterity, to a merce-  
 ‘ nary army, that has no motive to defend us, but its  
 ‘ pay, and no concern for our liberties, because they  
 ‘ have given up their own.

‘ If it should happen, Sir, that a large military  
 ‘ force should suddenly be wanted at a time when the  
 ‘ parliament is not sitting, and his majesty is abroad,  
 ‘ how is it to be supplied? Will not the waiting for  
 ‘ an act of parliament produce the most dangerous  
 ‘ delay? And will not the same inconveniences follow,  
 ‘ that happened in the year 1745? Inconveniences,  
 ‘ which we now feel, and which will probably be long  
 ‘ felt by our posterity. A well constituted militia,  
 ‘ Sir, at that time, would have saved the nation  
 ‘ 3,000,000 *l.* and if it be admitted that such a militia  
 ‘ would be attended with an annual expence to the  
 ‘ whole nation of 10,000 *l.* and that there should be  
 ‘ occasion to use it but once in thirty years, which is  
 ‘ the space between the two last rebellions, we should  
 ‘ then have that service for 300,000 *l.* which has cost  
 ‘ us 3,000,000 *l.* and consequently save (which would  
 ‘ be good œconomy, instead of superfluous expence)  
 ‘ 2,700,000 *l.* upon the balance. Besides, those whom  
 ‘ the want of this force might encourage to interrupt  
 ‘ our tranquillity, may be deterred from their attempt  
 ‘ by observing that a new regulation hath rendered us

‘ sufficiently formidable. To prevent is certainly  
 ‘ still better than to cure. These considerations, Sir,  
 ‘ appear so formidable to me, that I cannot think any  
 ‘ gentleman will continue to oppose, or even on any  
 ‘ account to delay the measure which they have induced  
 ‘ me to undertake and recommend. But, Sir, lest any  
 ‘ gentleman should doubt whether this measure be  
 ‘ practicable, I shall observe, that the establishment of  
 ‘ a militia in any country, where the people are nume-  
 ‘ rous and industrious, is not only practicable, but  
 ‘ easy. *Switzerland* and *Germany*, which are poor  
 ‘ countries, thinly inhabited, have their militia, not-  
 ‘ withstanding the people must be necessarily dissipated  
 ‘ by the great extent of the lands which they cultivate.  
 ‘ And is a militia impossible in *England*? A country  
 ‘ that is remarkable for its fertility, and crowded with  
 ‘ men, where a few acres afford a plentiful subsistence,  
 ‘ and almost every parish could furnish a regiment.  
 ‘ If it be objected, that this militia cannot be exercised  
 ‘ without taking the husbandman or the manufacturer  
 ‘ from his labour, a circumstance which cannot but  
 ‘ be hurtful to a trading nation; I answer, our militia  
 ‘ may be exercised on holidays, according to the practice  
 ‘ in *Switzerland*; but supposing that two days in a  
 ‘ month were to be set apart for this purpose, it is  
 ‘ evident that less labour would be lost by 200,000  
 ‘ militia, who would immediately return to their work  
 ‘ from their exercise, than by 20,000 regular troops,  
 ‘ who consider themselves as gentlemen soldiers, and  
 ‘ every species of industry as incompatible with their  
 ‘ station, and indeed with their duty. I would not,  
 ‘ however, be thought an advocate for the total re-  
 ‘ duction of the army. I know that an army is  
 ‘ necessary, that there must be guards and some troops,  
 ‘ at our garrisons, in *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, and a  
 ‘ sufficient

‘ sufficient number of regular forces in *Ireland*, the  
 ‘ islands of *Scotland* and the *West-Indies*. But I think  
 ‘ such a reduction of the army is expedient, as  
 ‘ would cause a saving equivalent to the expence of  
 ‘ 260,000 militia, and that enough would still remain  
 ‘ for the above services. This number, Sir, of  
 ‘ 260,000 for the militia was our ancient contingent ;  
 ‘ and as they are dispersed through the several counties of  
 ‘ this island, will effectually repress, if not prevent any  
 ‘ invasion from abroad, and quell every disturbance  
 ‘ that may be fomented at home. They will be  
 ‘ always ready in every part of the kingdom to assist  
 ‘ the civil power, as well as to protect our coasts from  
 ‘ insult ; coasts of such extent, that if the present  
 ‘ standing army was doubled, it would not be able to  
 ‘ secure the island from being plundered in some part  
 ‘ or other, by the daring crew of a buccaneer, or a  
 ‘ desperate association of smugglers. And as it is our  
 ‘ coast that principally makes a military force of any  
 ‘ kind necessary, what must be our situation, when  
 ‘ without any force by which this coast can be secured,  
 ‘ and with scarce a fortified place in the kingdom, we  
 ‘ are not able to bring together 6000 men for the  
 ‘ defence of the capital, upon a sudden and unexpected  
 ‘ attack ? The marshals *Belleisle* and *Saxe* both re-  
 ‘ marked, that we must be easily over-run ; and it is a  
 ‘ common saying among the *French*, that *England*  
 ‘ would be only a breakfast :’ [But then the *French*  
 ‘ must give up the troops they send against us ; because  
 ‘ our fleet would effectually cut off their retreat :] ‘ And  
 ‘ I should be sorry if they should put us to prove the  
 ‘ contrary, before we have a militia established. Need  
 ‘ we have a better hint, or stronger motive to provide  
 ‘ for our safety ? *Fas est ab hoste doceri*. As to the  
 ‘ difficulty of reforming our militia, if it be said that

experiment is against me, and that experiment is stronger than argument; if it be alledged that former attempts to establish a militia have been ineffectual, it needs only to be considered by what means these attempts have been made. They were made in consequence of those very statutes which being perverted from their primary intentions are evidently *felo de se*; so that the militia, which was designed to be a regular and well-disciplined body, is degenerated into a mere mob: But even this mob has been known to do good service. I will not trespass, Sir, upon the indulgence of the house by proving self-evident propositions: It is sufficient only to state them. It is of absolute necessity we should have a military force sufficient to defend eleven millions of people, and it is acknowledged on all hands that our present force is not sufficient. There are but three ways by which this deficiency can be supplied; first, by a regular army of mercenaries; secondly, by foreign auxiliaries; thirdly, by a militia. A regular army of mercenaries we can neither afford to pay for living in idleness, nor spare from the trades in which they would be otherwise employed. The hiring of auxiliaries is attended with equal expence, and is yet less to be depended upon: For they who may be engaged to supply auxiliaries to us, may, when we want them, be scarce able to defend themselves, as was the case in the unhappy year 1745. Auxiliaries may be bought off by our enemy at the very minute we want them, or sent under restrictions, which will render them wholly unserviceable. There needs not indeed any argument to prove a measure to be impolitic, which has already incumbered us with debts, that it is scarce possible we should pay, and has reduced our neighbours, the *Dutch*, into yet more deplorable poverty  
and

‘ and distress. A militia, which would defend us by  
 ‘ men of property, whose interest is involved in that of  
 ‘ their country, and who would only circulate their  
 ‘ pay, and not carry it abroad, must be our only re-  
 ‘ source. Such a militia, Sir, has been rejected by  
 ‘ those who have had the management of this unhappy  
 ‘ country, who have, for reasons best known to them-  
 ‘ selves, squandered the public treasure in vain attempts  
 ‘ to obtain from foreign and domestic mercenaries what  
 ‘ a militia only can supply, [the duke of *Newcastle*,  
 ‘ the importer of 12,000 *Hessians* and *Hanoverians*,  
 ‘ *A. D.* 1756.] Let us then interpose in the behalf  
 ‘ of an injured nation; let us once more connect  
 ‘ the civil and military power, and direct their united  
 ‘ efforts to the same end. This, as it will give  
 ‘ us strength at home, will give us reputation abroad.  
 ‘ This is advised by *Machiavel*, as the surest means of  
 ‘ national greatness: This was successfully practised  
 ‘ by the *Spartans* and *Romans* of old, the *Goths* and  
 ‘ ancient *Germans*; and this is now the glory of the  
 ‘ *Swiss*, a nation which, however inconsiderable in its  
 ‘ extent, no ambitious power has dared to molest. I  
 ‘ therefore humbly move, that leave may be given to  
 ‘ bring in a bill for the good purpose that I have  
 ‘ mentioned.’

In the year 1758, the ministry pretended to con-  
 sider the militia as capable of real service. For we find  
 in that year a message from the king by Mr. *Pitt*,  
 That he is informed of a *French* invasion, and may  
 perhaps have occasion for the militia. The commons  
 return thanks for the information, and address the  
 king to give orders to the lieutenants of counties to  
 use their utmost diligence in ordering the militia <sup>a</sup>.

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<sup>a</sup> *Alm. DEB. COM. v. 237.*

## C H A P. IV.

*Parliamentary Transactions, Speeches, &c. relating to the Army.*

THE commons, *A. D.* 1673, vote the standing army a grievance, and were going to address the king against it. The king suddenly goes to the house of peers to prorogue the parliament. The lords, according to their slavish custom, hasten to attend him. The commons shut their door, and kept black rod out, till they vote the alliance with *France*, evil counsellors about the king, standing army, and duke of *Lauderdale* grievances <sup>a</sup>.

The commons address the king against *Lauderdale* on account of the army in *Scotland*, raised at *Lauderdale's* instance, which was to be ready to enter *England* on command from the privy council, and for openly affirming in council, that the king's edicts are equal to laws <sup>b</sup>.

It was observed in parliament, *A. D.* 1674, 'That  
' neither our ancestors, nor the people of any country,  
' free, like ours, whilst they preserved their liberties,  
' did ever suffer any mercenary or standing guards  
' around their prince; but chose that his safety should  
' be in them, as theirs was in him.'

A motion was made, *A. D.* 1717, for a supply for maintaining the army. Opposed by *Shippen*, *Windham*, *Walpole*, jacobites and discontented whigs together. The same *Walpole* afterwards kept up a more numerous army than 18,000, of which number he complains heavily here <sup>c</sup>.

All

<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. I. 185.<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 207.<sup>c</sup> Ibid. VI. 154.



All the arguments in favour of a standing army, Mr. *Shippen* said, were reducible to two propositions.

1. 'That the only danger of continuing the standing army is the expence of it. 2. That we ought to comply with the number of forces proposed, because it is demanded by the king, who is the best judge of our necessities.'

He said, 'it was very extraordinary, that the expence should be thought the only danger, for that was not the chief argument against a standing army; but the chief argument was, that the civil and military power could not long subsist together; that a standing army in time of peace would necessarily impede the free execution of the laws of the land.'

'It is the infelicity of his majesty's reign, that he is unacquainted with our language and constitution, therefore it is incumbent on his ministers to inform him, that our government does not stand on the same foundation with his *German* dominions. That a standing army supposes not only a distrust, but weakness in the government; and therefore could not promote his majesty's service.' He said, 'some of the freest and bravest people in *Europe* had, by this method, lost their liberties. The civil power was drawn in from time to time, by pretended exigencies, to allow and maintain an armed force in peace; but they found they had erected a power superior to themselves; that the soldiery, when they had tasted the sweets of authority, would not part with it; and that even their princes began to think, that ruling by an army was a more compendious way of government, than acting under the restraints of law. And now they wear the chains, and lament the loss of that freedom, which they consented to destroy.'

Mr.

Mr. *Shippen* said, ‘ I know these assertions interfere with what is laid down in his majesty’s speech ; but we are to consider that speech as the composition and advice of his ministry, and are therefore at liberty to debate every proposition in it ; especially those, which seem rather calculated for the meridian of *Germany*, than of *Great Britain*.’

It was said, the above words were highly dishonourable to, and unjustly reflecting on, his majesty’s person and government ; and therefore it was ordered, that *Wm. Shippen*, Esq. be, for the said offence, committed prisoner to the Tower.

‘ If the prince of *Orange*, (says *Trenchard* <sup>a</sup>) in his declaration, instead of telling us, that we should be settled upon such a foundation, that there should be no danger of our falling again into slavery, and that he would send back all his forces as soon as that was done, had promised us that after an eight years war (which should leave us in debt near twenty millions) we should have a standing army established, a great many of which should be foreigners ; I believe few men would have thought such a revolution worth the hazard of their lives and estates ; but his mighty soul was above such abject thoughts as these ; his declaration was his own, these paltry designs are those of our undertakers, who would shelter their own oppressions under his sacred name. I would willingly know, whether the late king *James II.* could have enslaved us but by an army, and whether there is any way of securing us from falling again into slavery, but by disbanding the army. It was in that sense I understood his majesty’s declaration, and therefore did early take up

‘ arms

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<sup>a</sup> HIST. ARMIES, p. 97.

‘ arms for him, as I shall be always ready to do.  
 ‘ It was this alone which made his assistance necessary  
 ‘ to us, otherwise we had wanted none but the  
 ‘ hangman’s.’

It is a common evasion of the advocates for the army, that we have only such a number, 12,000, or 20,000, in *England*, and that the rest are in *Ireland*, where they cannot annoy us, and are necessary there to keep the raw-head-and-bloody-bones-papists quiet. But neither is there any honest use for one regiment in *England* nor in *Ireland*, the people being, if only half disciplined, as able as the army both to keep the internal peace, and deter invaders; of which the histories of all the ages between *Richard II.* and *Charles I.* are vouchers; nor is the keeping an army in *Ireland* at all less dangerous to *British* liberty than in *England*.

Hear Mr. *Trenchard*:<sup>a</sup> ‘ An army kept in *Ireland* is  
 ‘ more dangerous to us than at home: For here, by  
 ‘ perpetual converse with their relations and acquaint-  
 ‘ tance, some few of them perhaps may warp towards  
 ‘ their country; whereas in *Ireland* they are kept as  
 ‘ it were in a garrison, where they are shut up from  
 ‘ the communication of their countrymen, and may  
 ‘ be nursed up in another interest. It is a common  
 ‘ policy amongst arbitrary princes often to shift their  
 ‘ soldiers quarters, lest they should contract friendship  
 ‘ among the natives, and by degrees fall into their  
 ‘ interest.’

‘ When the duke *d’Alençon* came over to *England*,  
 (says Mr. *Gordon* <sup>b</sup>) ‘ and for some time had admired  
 ‘ the riches of the city, the conduct of queen *Eliza-*  
 ‘ *beth*, the wisdom of her government, and the mag-  
 ‘ nificence

<sup>a</sup> HIST. STANDING ARMIES, p. 88.

<sup>b</sup> TRACTS, I. 26.

‘ nificence of her court ; he asked her, amidst so much  
 ‘ splendor, where were her guards ? Which question  
 ‘ she resolved a few days after, as she took him in  
 ‘ her coach through the city, when pointing to the  
 ‘ people (who received her in crowds with repeated  
 ‘ acclamations) “ These, said she, my lord, are my  
 ‘ guards ; these have their hands, their hearts, and  
 ‘ their purses, always ready at my command.” And  
 ‘ these were guards indeed, who defended her through  
 ‘ a long and successful reign of forty-four years against  
 ‘ all the machinations of *Rome*, the power of *Spain*, a  
 ‘ disputed title, and the perpetual conspiracies of her  
 ‘ own popish subjects ; a security the *Roman* empe-  
 ‘ rors could not boast of with their prætorian bands,  
 ‘ and their eastern and western armies.’

‘ Were not the *French* as powerful, says Mr. *Gor-*  
 ‘ *don* <sup>a</sup>, in *Charles II*’s and *James II*’s times, as they  
 ‘ are in this long and destructive war, and with a  
 ‘ weaker alliance to oppose them ? And yet we then  
 ‘ thought a much less army, than is now contended  
 ‘ for, a most insupportable grievance ; inso much that  
 ‘ in *Charles II*’s reign, the grand jury presented them,  
 ‘ and the pension-parliament voted them to be a nui-  
 ‘ sance, sent Sir *Joseph Williamson* to the Tower, for  
 ‘ saying, “ the king might keep guards for the de-  
 ‘ fence of his person,” and addressed to have them  
 ‘ disbanded. And now our apostates would make  
 ‘ their court, by doing what the worst parliament  
 ‘ ever *England* saw, could not think of without  
 ‘ horror.’

‘ Of 26 *Roman* emperors, 16 were deposed and  
 ‘ murdered by the soldiery. The *Turkish* sultans are  
 ‘ often massacred by the janizaries. The army under  
 ‘ *Cromwell*

‘ *Cromwell* expelled the parliament under which they  
 ‘ had fought. Afterwards under *Monk* they destroyed  
 ‘ the government they had set up, and brought back  
 ‘ the *Stuarts*, whom they were raised to expel.  
 ‘ *Charles II.* wisely disbanded them, lest they should  
 ‘ have sent him a packing again. *James II.*’s army  
 ‘ joined the prince of *Orange*, who came over on pur-  
 ‘ pose to exclude their worthless master, and all his  
 ‘ race. What better can be expected from men of  
 ‘ base principles, who call themselves soldiers of for-  
 ‘ tune? Who make murder their profession, and  
 ‘ enquire no farther into the justice of the cause, than  
 ‘ how they shall be paid; who must be false, rapa-  
 ‘ cious and cruel in their own defence. For having  
 ‘ no other profession or subsistence to depend upon,  
 ‘ they are forced to stir up the ambition of princes,  
 ‘ and engage them in perpetual quarrels, that they  
 ‘ may share of the spoils they make. Such men,  
 ‘ like some sort of ravenous fish, fare best in a storm <sup>a</sup>.’

Lord *Morpeth* moved, *A. D.* 1733, for an address  
 to the king to reduce the forces <sup>b</sup>.

It was urged, that there was a great necessity to  
 reduce the expences of the nation; [What was the  
 necessity then compared with that of our times?] and  
 that it might best be done by reducing the stand-  
 ing army, which in time of peace was not necessary,  
 but was absolutely inconsistent with the liberties of  
 the people.

To which it was answered, that they might as well  
 address the king to govern according to law; that it  
 was insinuating that the king did not take the first  
 opportunity of reducing the army, and thereby lessen-  
 ing

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<sup>a</sup> *Gordon's TRACTS*, I. 28.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. COM.* VII. 272.

ing the public charge. Did not every body know, that the king did not wish to reduce the army; but, on account of his wretched electorate, wished to keep foreign troops in pay, and a large army ready to fly to its defence, whenever it should be attacked? We had accordingly at one time in our pay as follows:

<i>Hessians per ann.</i>	£.	241,259
<i>Sweden,</i>	-	50,000
<i>Wolfenbuttel,</i>	-	25,000
		<hr/>
Total,	-	£. 316,259
		<hr/>

The duke of *Marlborough* brought into the house of lords, the same year, a bill to prevent the officers of the army below the rank of colonels from being deprived of their commissions otherwise than by court martial, or address of parliament<sup>a</sup>. This was intended for detaching military officers from all connection with and dependence on the ministry. Before the second reading, many lords called out for the question; the plain *English* of which is, Right or wrong, we are against this bill. Lord *Chesterfield* checked them severely. Lord *Hervey* said, the bill was an open and direct attack on the royal prerogative, (of which elsewhere) and might overfet the constitution, &c. The truth is, that, supposing parliament itself under ministerial influence, as it was then, and has been since (I do not say, that is, in our virtuous times, the case) it is of very little consequence, whether the army be under ministerial influence through the mediation of parliament or otherwise.

The

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, IV. 186.

The bill of *A. D.* 1735, for quartering the army in time of elections <sup>a</sup>, enacts, That, in order to the securing of the freedom of elections, the law of 3 *Edw.* I. be still in force, which forbids on great forfeiture, any man's disturbing the freedom of election by force, malice, or menacing; and that the secretary at war do give order for the removal, the day before, or sooner, of every regiment, troop, &c. to the distance of at least two miles from any place, where an election for the house of commons or *Scotch* peers is to be held; and to remain, till one day after the election; every officer disobeying, to be cashiered and incapacitated, besides forfeiture; the king's life guards, the guards attending on any of the royal family, and the garrisons of forts and castles only excepted; and allowing liberty for military officers and soldiers, who have right of voting, to attend. As the bill was first drawn, the offenders were to be tried in the *King's-bench*; but that constant friend to liberty the duke of *Newcastle*, proposed leaving out that clause, by which means the offending officers were to be left safe in the hands of the secretary at war, who generally having a good understanding with the ministry, would take care, that they should not be too severely punished, though they should stay, and take care of the minister's interest at an election; or in the words of one of the speakers <sup>b</sup>, 'if an officer should  
' bring his regiment, troop, or company, to the very  
' place of election, and plant centries to attend the  
' poll-books, he knows how he is to be tried; he is  
' to be tried by his brother officers in a court martial;  
' and I do not know, but their sentence may be  
' pleaded in bar to any future indictment brought  
VOL. II. F f ' against

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, IV. 460.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 473.

‘ against him upon the statute of *Edw. I.* for what  
 ‘ interpretations may hereafter be put upon this last  
 ‘ law, cannot now be so easily determined: And  
 ‘ therefore I hope your lordships will pass the bill in  
 ‘ the same shape the learned judges have brought it  
 ‘ in, unless some more convincing reason than any I  
 ‘ have yet heard should be given for turning it into  
 ‘ a form very different from that in which it is at  
 ‘ present.’

And the protesting lords afterwards observed on this subject, ‘ That it was much more necessary, that  
 ‘ officers and soldiers should be subject to be tried by  
 ‘ the civil power for an offence of this high nature  
 ‘ against the constitution, than for quartering a man  
 ‘ contrary to the method prescribed by the act to pre-  
 ‘ vent mutiny and desertion; for which crime they  
 ‘ are at present liable to be tried and cashiered by the  
 ‘ civil magistrate.’ They likewise observed, that the  
 offence being against civil society, came much more  
 naturally under the cognizance of the civil magistrate,  
 than of a court-martial, as a court-martial on the  
 other hand, is more competent to try military offences,  
 than the civil magistrate<sup>a</sup>.

Afterwards another amendment, the wrong way,  
 was made to the bill; by which the penalties, instead  
 of being inflicted on the offending officers and soldiers,  
 were to come upon the secretary at war, if he neglected  
 to issue orders for the removal of the soldiery. Several  
 lords protested, because they conceived, that ‘ the  
 ‘ leaving out of the clause would be defeating the effect  
 ‘ and intention of the whole bill<sup>b</sup>.’

In the debate about the land-forces, *A. D.* 1735<sup>c</sup>,  
 it was argued by those, who were for augmenting the  
 forces

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, IV. 485.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> *DEB. COM. IX. 52.*



forces to 25,744 men, that ‘events *might* happen,’ [so we are to be at a *certain* expence on account of what *might* happen] ‘that the affair of *Poland*, the ‘only bone of contention publicly owned, was what ‘*England* had little to do with; but if that *should*’ [what if it *should not*?] ‘appear not to be the real ‘motive to war; or if success *should* [what if it *should not*?] ‘encourage either side to extend their views, ‘the balance of power’ [ay the blessed balance of power, containing in one scale the inestimable electorate, and in the other the insignificant *British* empire] ‘may, at last, be brought into real danger, and then, ‘for the sake of preserving the liberties of *Europe*,’ [why not the liberties of *Asia*?] ‘upon which the ‘liberties of this nation will always depend, we must’ [fight all the windmills on the continent] ‘take a ‘principal share in the war.’ In this *convincing* manner did the *Walpolians* in those days argue for increasing the standing army. But whether it was not by arguments of greater *weight*, that they gained a majority in the house, is left to the reader. If the keeping up of a standing army of 40,000 men was now to be debated in the house of commons, our courtiers would be puzzled to find arguments as plausible as even the above drawn from *Poland*, and the bone of contention. It was observed by the opposers of the augmentation, that several of the princes of *Germany*, who were more immediately concerned, remained neutral, though they had, at that time, ‘large armies ‘unemployed, which would be all sent to the *Rhine*, ‘if they thought their country in any real danger, or ‘that *France* had any design to impose an emperor ‘upon them. While they remain so secure, while ‘they give themselves so little concern about the

‘ event of the war, why should we be so terribly fright-  
‘ ened <sup>a</sup> ?’

The insensible operation of prejudice in the most sincere, and intelligent minds, is very wonderful ; and we cannot be too attentive to ourselves to guard against it. The great and good duke of *Argyle*, in the debate, *A. D.* 1734, on the motion for addressing the king, to know, by whose advice the duke of *Bolton* and lord *Cobham* were removed from the command of their regiments, spoke as follows, without laughing ; ‘ I  
‘ hope, my lords, there are no gentlemen in the army,  
‘ that ever were, or ever can be prevailed on, either  
‘ to act or speak contrary to their conscience by the  
‘ fear of their being turned out of their commission.  
‘ I hope, there never will be any such in our  
‘ army <sup>b</sup>.’ And afterwards <sup>c</sup>, ‘ What signifies a prero-  
‘ gative, if the king is never to make use of it, with-  
‘ out being obliged to give an account to parliament of  
‘ his reasons for so doing ?’

‘ Without a presumption, (says lord *Carteret*) that  
‘ we are in circumstances of danger, no member of  
‘ this house can agree to the keeping up of a standing  
‘ army of 18,000 men, unless he thinks, such an army  
‘ ought to be kept up even when the nation is in the  
‘ greatest tranquillity and security ; a way of thinking  
‘ into which I hope no member of this house, nor any  
‘ *British* subject, ever will come : for if this should  
‘ ever be established as a maxim, a standing army of  
‘ 18,000 men at least, would become a part of our  
‘ constitution <sup>d</sup>.’ [Which prediction we see fulfilled.]

Lord *Carteret*, on the rejection of the bill for making military officers independent on the ministry,  
moved

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* IX. 56.

<sup>b</sup> *DEB. LORDS.* IV. 215.

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.* 216.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* v. 239. *A. D.* 1738.

moved for an address to know who advised the removal of the duke of *Bolton* and lord *Cobham* from their regiments, *A. D.* 1734<sup>a</sup>.

The court lords said, This was breaking in upon the king's, that is, the minister's royal prerogative. Lord *Bathurst* answered, That it was the duty of the lords, as the king's hereditary counsellors, and was accordingly usual for them, to desire to be informed, who were the advisers of such exertions of the royal prerogative, as gave umbrage to themselves, or the people. ' The army (he observed<sup>b</sup>) has really no dependence upon parliament. The king indeed depends upon parliament for a legal power to keep a standing army in time of peace, and for enabling him to pay them and discipline them according to law; but if in any future time the parliament should think it necessary to reduce a part of the army, and of consequence make no provision for their pay, the resolution of parliament could not break any one regiment, or any part of any one regiment in the kingdom; the officers might all legally continue in their respective commands, and if the king then upon the throne should not think fit to break any of them, they might indeed then very probably think they had a good right to their pay, as long as they continued in commission, and if they could not get it by law, they might probably join with the king in raising it contrary to law, especially if he, foreseeing what would happen, had taken care to model them for that purpose, which any king might soon do while the army continues upon the same footing it is on at present. And for this reason, my lords, I must be of opinion that all these

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' arguments

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, IV. 207.<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 211.

‘ arguments which have been used for shewing us the  
 ‘ danger of making an army independent, are so many  
 ‘ arguments for shewing the danger of an army’s being  
 ‘ entirely dependent upon one branch only of our  
 ‘ legislature, and consequently are good arguments for  
 ‘ the bill, which was designed to make the army not  
 ‘ entirely dependent upon any one, but upon all the  
 ‘ three branches of our legislature.’

*A. D.* 1740, near forty lords protested against an augmentation of the army, because nothing less than absolute necessity should prevail for that purpose; because the ministry had made but an indifferent use of the great forces employed in the late war; because the pretence of disaffection to government, rendering a great army necessary, was groundless; [there was much dissatisfaction with the conduct of the ministry; but that was to be removed by correcting the errors of government, not by keeping up a formidable and odious standing army] because the army then on foot, with the fleet, was sufficient to secure the kingdom against invasion; because our allies might be better assisted by us with money, than with men; because *France* is no example for *England*, the forms of government in the two countries being totally different; because adding to the number of officers is increasing the power of the ministry already too great, especially on the eve of a general election, which might give an incurable wound to the constitution; because the number of officers in parliament was continually increasing, and that the ministry expect officers to promote their schemes in parliament, appeared from a recent fact, viz. that the four eldest officers of the army were lately displaced, without any crime having being alledged against them; and ministerial arts in parliament, can alone destroy the essence of the

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the constitution, and open violence alone, the forms of it <sup>a</sup>.

There is no end to the evils of a standing army. ' In this discourse (says Mr. *Gordon*) I have purposely omitted speaking of the lesser inconveniencies attending a standing army, such as frequent quarrels, murders, and robberies; the destruction of all the game in the country, the quartering upon public, and sometimes private houses; the influencing elections of parliament, by an artificial distribution of quarters; the rendering so many men useles to labour, and almost to propagation, together with a much greater destruction of them by taking them from a laborious way of living, to a loose idle life; and besides this the insolence of the officers, and the debaucheries that are committed both by them, and their soldiers in all the towns they come into; the ruin of multitudes of women, dishonour of their families, and example to others; and a numerous train of mischiefs besides, almost endless to enumerate. These are trivial grievances in respect of those I have treated above, which strike at the hearts blood of our constitution, and therefore I thought these not considerable enough to bear a part in a discourse of this nature <sup>b</sup>.'

' If the army be continued but a few years, it will be accounted a part of the prerogative, and it will be thought as great a violation to attempt the disbanding it, as the guards in *Cb. II's* time. It will be interpreted a design to dethrone the king <sup>c</sup>.' Our times prove Mr. *Trenchard* a true prophet.

Mr. *Trenchard* <sup>d</sup> takes notice, that the prince of *Orange*, in his first declaration, set forth all the oppressions

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preffions

<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VII. 634.

<sup>b</sup> *Gord. TRACTS*, I. 28.

<sup>c</sup> *Trench. HIST. ST. ARM.* p. 103.

<sup>d</sup> *Ibid.* p. 80.

pressions of king *James* II's reign, excepting only that of his keeping up a standing army in time of peace; as if he had thought that no very great grievance. *William* promised, however, to send home the foreign forces he brought with him, as soon as he established a free parliament, liberty, and the protestant religion, &c. [*Burnet* blamed him to his face very severely for establishing corruption] and he kept his word so well, that he and his parliament had almost finally fallen out, because he would not send away his *Dutch* guards; so much are even good kings attached to power, and to armies, the instrument of power.

After much debating, voting, resolving, and disbanding, the army establishment was settled, *A. D.* 1697, at 10,000 landmen, and 3000 marines, which last it was pretended, were not a land-force, but a water-force. Nor did the ministry accomplish the parliament's intention.

‘ Thus, (says Mr. *Trenchard*<sup>a</sup>) what our courts  
 ‘ for above 1000 years together never had the effron-  
 ‘ tery to ask, what the pension parliament could not  
 ‘ think of without astonishment, what *James*'s parlia-  
 ‘ ment chosen almost by himself, could not hear  
 ‘ debated with patience, we are likely to have the  
 ‘ honour of establishing under a deliverance.’

Mr. *Trenchard*<sup>b</sup> throws out broad hints, that the strange and continual mismanagement of *sea* affairs in king *William*'s time, could hardly have come about any other way, than through a design of magnifying the importance of *land* armies. And I will take the liberty of likewise throwing out a broad hint, that we have seen the same traitorous policy carried on at different periods since that time by various ministers,  
 who

<sup>a</sup> HIST. OF STANDING ARMIES, p. 87.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. 84.

who were yet very good whigs. Let the reader cast an eye backward upon all our windmill expeditions to the continent, under *William, Anne*, and the two *Georges*; let him remember the loss of *Minorca*; let him observe how many reviews are made of the army, to one survey of the fleet; let him—but enough of this.

See Mr. *Gordon's Argument against standing armies*. TRACTS, Vol. I. in which, p. 7, he ascribes the preservation of *British* liberties to his times, *A. D.* 1697, merely to the smallness of the army. N. B. Our standing force now is double the number of what was then kept up. He observes, that neither the *Israelites, Athenians, Corinthians, Achaians, Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Samnites*, nor *Romans*, while they were free, kept any soldiers in pay at home. They never trusted arms in the hands of any, but those, who were interested in preserving the public peace. When the fatal ambition of extending their dominions put them upon conquering kingdoms, they were obliged to keep mercenary soldiers in the conquered provinces.

Ex illo fluere, ac retro sublapfa referri  
Spes Romanorum.

VIRG.

Even then they did what they could to prevent a military force from getting footing in *Campania*. They made a law, and put up an inscription at the passage of the *Rubicon*, ‘*Imperator sine miles, &c.* Let every ‘commander, soldier, and armed prince, leave here ‘his arms and standard, and not presume to come in ‘military array, farther than this river.’ Therefore *Julius*, having traiterously and rebelliously violated this law, had nothing left, but to push on his ambitious schemes, and endeavour to save himself, by the destruction of his country.

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The excellent Mr. *Gordon*, then goes on to mention some remarkable instances of free nations losing their liberties by suffering the establishment of mercenary standing armies. *Athens* was in this manner enslaved by *Pisistratus*; *Corinth* by *Timophanes*; *Syracuse* by *Agathocles*; *Rome* by *Julius*; *Milan* by *Sforza*; *Sweden* by *Gustavus Ericson*; *England* by *Cromwell*, &c. Mr. *Gordon* does not quote his authorities. But they are taken from authentic history.

‘ What I lament’ (says the writer of LET. TO TWO GREAT MEN <sup>a</sup>) ‘ as the greatest misfortune that can threaten the public liberty, is to see the eagerness with which our nobility, born to be the guardians of the constitution against prerogative, solicit the badge of military subjection, not merely to serve their country in times of danger, which would be commendable; but in expectation to be continued soldiers, when tranquillity shall be restored, and to be under military command during life. When I see this strange but melancholy infatuation so prevalent, I almost despair of the constitution. If it should go on in proportion as it has of late, I fear the time will at last come, when independence on the crown will be exploded as unfashionable. Unless another spirit possess our nobility; unless they lay aside their military trappings, and think they can serve their country more effectually as senators, than as soldiers, what can we expect, but to see the system of military subordination extending itself throughout the kingdom, universal dependence upon government influencing every rank of men, and the spirit, nay the very form, of the constitution destroyed. We have generally beaten the *French*, and always been foolish enough to follow their fashions. I was, however, in hopes we should never have taken  
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<sup>a</sup> A. D. 1760. p. 46.



‘ the fashion of *French* Government ;’ [the bill, of this year 1774, for the government of *Canada* is the very thing] ‘ but from our numerous armies, ‘ and the military turn of our nobility, I am afraid ‘ we are running into it as fast as we can. And ‘ unless something can be done to bring back ‘ our constitution to its first principles, we shall find ‘ that we have triumphed only to make ourselves as ‘ wretched as our enemy ; that our conquests are ‘ but a poor compensation for the loss of our liberties ; ‘ in a word, that, like *Wolfe*, falling in the arms of ‘ victory, we are most gloriously—undone.’

The vesting of courts-martial with the power of punishing with death in times of peace (the consequence of a standing army) was carried in the house of commons by a small majority, *A. D.* 1718, *viz.* 247 to 229. *Walpole* (in those days a flaming patriot) opposed all courts-martial. ‘ They (he said) who ‘ gave the power of blood, gave blood.’ Though afterwards, when he came to be a minister, he was better reconciled to standing armies and mutiny bills in times of peace ; he never dared to ask above 17,000 men. We have now doubled that number. His demand produced a debate every year. He founded his pretended necessity for a standing army upon jacobitism. In our times, a minister could not bring out the word without laughing. Our ministers, therefore, found it upon—upon—I profess I do not know what they found it upon, if it be not the necessity of keeping down the spirit of the people, enraged against corruption and peculation ; or the necessity of finding places in the army, the war-office, &c. for their tools, and the sons of their tools.

‘ There is one thing (says lord *Gage* <sup>a</sup>) fatal above ‘ all others, that must be the consequence of so great ‘ a body

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. XI.* 388.

‘ a body of troops being kept on foot in *England*, and  
 ‘ will be the finishing stroke to all our liberties. As  
 ‘ the towns in *England* will not be able much longer  
 ‘ to contain quarters for them, most of those, who  
 ‘ keep public houses, being near ruined by soldiers  
 ‘ billeted on them; so, on pretence of the necessity of  
 ‘ it, barracks will be built for quartering them, which  
 ‘ will be as so many fortresses with strong garrisons in  
 ‘ them, erected in all parts of *England*, which can  
 ‘ tend to nothing but by degrees to subdue and enslave  
 ‘ the kingdom. But if ever this scheme should be  
 ‘ attempted, it will be incumbent on every *Englishman*  
 ‘ to endeavour to prevent it by all methods; and as it  
 ‘ would be the last stand that could be ever made for  
 ‘ our liberties, rather than suffer it to be put in exe-  
 ‘ cution, it would be our duty to draw our swords,  
 ‘ and never put them up till our liberties were secured,  
 ‘ and the authors of our intended slavery brought to  
 ‘ condign punishment.’

Several lords protested on occasion of the election  
 of 16 *Scotch* peers, *A. D.* 1735, when ‘ a batallion  
 ‘ of his majesty’s forces were drawn up in the Abby  
 ‘ Court at *Edinburgh*, and three companies of it were  
 ‘ marched from *Leith* (a place of one mile distance)  
 ‘ to join the rest of the batallion, and kept under arms  
 ‘ from nine in the morning till nine at night, when  
 ‘ the election was ended; contrary to custom at  
 ‘ elections, and without any cause or occasion that  
 ‘ could be foreseen, other than the overawing  
 ‘ of the electors, we apprehend to be of the highest  
 ‘ consequence both to our liberties in general, and  
 ‘ the freedom of elections in particular; since what-  
 ‘ ever may have been the pretence, whatever appre-  
 ‘ hensions of disorders or tumults may have been  
 ‘ alledged in this case, may be equally alledged on  
 ‘ future

‘ future occasions ; especially as we have a number of  
 ‘ regular forces abundantly sufficient to answer such  
 ‘ calls : and we apprehend that the employment  
 ‘ assigned to this batallion will give great distrust and  
 ‘ uneasiness to many of his majesty’s subjects, who will  
 ‘ fear what use may be made of the rest of that very  
 ‘ great number of men now kept up in this nation <sup>a</sup>.’

Lord *Chesterfield* endeavours, *A. D.* 1741, to shew that the strength of this country consists in our fleets, and not in our land forces. ‘ That the fleets of *Great Britain* are equal in force and number of ships to the united navies of the greatest part of the world ; that our admirals are men of known bravery, and long experience, and therefore ‘formidable not only for real abilities and natural courage, but for the confidence which their presence necessarily excites in their followers, and the terror which must always accompany success, and enervate those who are accustomed to defeats ; that our sailors are a race of men distinguished by their ardour for war, and their intrepidity in danger, from the rest of the human species ; that they seem beings superior to fear, and delighted with those objects which cannot be named without filling every other breast with horror ; that they are capable of rushing upon apparent destruction without reluctance, and of standing without concern amidst the complicated terrors of a naval war, is universally known and confessed, my lords, even by those whose interest it is to doubt or deny it. Upon the ocean, therefore, we are allowed to be irresistible, to be able to shut up the ports of the continent, to imprison the nations of *Europe* within the limits of their own territories, deprive them of  
 ‘ all

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, IV. 427.*

‘ all foreign assistance, and put a stop to the com-  
 ‘ merce of the world. It is allowed that we are  
 ‘ placed the centinels at the barriers of nature,  
 ‘ and the arbiters of the intercourse of mankind.  
 ‘ These are appellations, my lords, which however  
 ‘ splendid and ostentatious, our ancestors obtained  
 ‘ and preserved with less advantages than we possess,  
 ‘ by whom, I am afraid, they are about to be forfeited.  
 ‘ The dominion of the ocean was asserted in former  
 ‘ times, in opposition to powers far more able to con-  
 ‘ test it, than those whom we have so long submis-  
 ‘ sively courted, and of whom we are now evidently  
 ‘ afraid <sup>a</sup>.’

‘ There is a very remarkable difference between a  
 ‘ standing law and a standing army. A standing law,  
 ‘ though it was at first made perpetual, though it  
 ‘ should be observed for ages together, yet it cannot  
 ‘ say to the legislature, You shall not repeal me ; but  
 ‘ an army, though it was never designed to be per-  
 ‘ petual, though it has been kept up but a small  
 ‘ number of years, may say to us, You shall not dis-  
 ‘ band me ; if you attempt to do so, I will turn you  
 ‘ out of doors. We know this by experience ; and  
 ‘ that experience may convince us that an annual  
 ‘ parliamentary check, such as it is pretended we now  
 ‘ have, would be of very little signification against  
 ‘ an army sufficient, and that army provided with a  
 ‘ general resolved, to make the parliament do what-  
 ‘ ever he had a mind. *Oliver Cromwell*, and the army  
 ‘ under his command, were faithful to that parliament  
 ‘ which established them, as long as the parliament  
 ‘ did nothing to displease them ; but as soon as the par-  
 ‘ liament began to think of disbanding them, they  
 ‘ immedi-

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, VIII. 12.

‘ immediately, and without any garbling, rebelled  
 ‘ against the parliament, and at last turned it out of  
 ‘ doors. And with a part of the same army, we  
 ‘ may remember, that general *Monk* in a few months,  
 ‘ and with but very little garbling, dissolved the rump  
 ‘ parliament, by whose authority he at first pretended  
 ‘ to act, and restored king *Ch. II.* <sup>a</sup>’

‘ The keeping up of a standing mercenary army in  
 ‘ a free country, necessarily destroys the martial spirit  
 ‘ and discipline of the rest of the people; and all  
 ‘ histories shew that a cowardly people must soon  
 ‘ become slaves to a foreign or domestic army. The  
 ‘ keeping up of such an army in a trading country  
 ‘ encourages and promotes a spirit of idleness, lewd-  
 ‘ nefs, debauchery, luxury, and extravagance among  
 ‘ all ranks and degrees of men; and every one knows,  
 ‘ that the trade of a country, especially where it has  
 ‘ many rivals, can be supported by nothing but by  
 ‘ the industry, virtue, sobriety, and frugality of the  
 ‘ people. The quartering of soldiers, even in this  
 ‘ country, is a terrible grievance and a heavy load  
 ‘ upon many private men, and of most dangerous  
 ‘ consequence to the freedom of our elections, because  
 ‘ it is a rod in the hand of our ministers, which they  
 ‘ make use of for correcting any corporation, or  
 ‘ county, that shall chuse a member whose face is not  
 ‘ agreeable to the court. The providing of a daily  
 ‘ support for so many hale, lusty fellows, most of  
 ‘ whom have been bred up to some laborious trade or  
 ‘ employment, greatly diminishes our profits by trade,  
 ‘ and consequently our national revenue, which every  
 ‘ one knows, depends upon the labour and industry  
 ‘ of our poor. These are disadvantages which are  
 ‘ univer-

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, v. 395.*

‘ universally acknowledged ; and therefore we ought  
 ‘ never to submit to the keeping up a standing mer-  
 ‘ cenary army, but in cases of the most urgent neces-  
 ‘ sity ; nor ought we at any time to keep up a more  
 ‘ numerous mercenary army than the present necessity  
 ‘ evidently requires <sup>a</sup>.’

The witty earl of *Chesterfield*<sup>b</sup>, answering the *wise* duke of *Newcastle*’s arguments for keeping up what was then, *A. D.* 1738, called a numerous army, *viz.* 18,000 men, speaks as follows.

‘ I need not, I believe, my lords, trace the noble  
 ‘ lord in his travels over *Europe*, in order to extenuate  
 ‘ the dangers he has endeavoured to pick up, for  
 ‘ shewing the necessity we are under at present for  
 ‘ keeping up such a numerous army. I think all the  
 ‘ dangers he has mentioned, either abroad or at home,  
 ‘ depend upon may be’s, which must always subsist.  
 ‘ A minister may die—a prince may have ambitious  
 ‘ views—a prince’s success may raise the jealousy of  
 ‘ others—his misfortunes may revive their hopes—  
 ‘ there may be a design to invade us, though we  
 ‘ have not at present the least item of it—*Spain* may  
 ‘ refuse to do us justice, or may be assisted by the  
 ‘ *French*, though we have yet no reason to expect either  
 ‘ the one or the other—A plot for an insurrection may  
 ‘ be forming, though we have not at present the least  
 ‘ intimation of any such thing, not even from common  
 ‘ reports or surmises—And all these may be’s, or possi-  
 ‘ bilities, will become probabilities, or certainties, if  
 ‘ we should reduce our army. Are these arguments,  
 ‘ my lords, that can convince any man in the kingdom  
 ‘ of our being under a present necessity for keeping up  
 ‘ a numerous standing army in time of peace ?

‘ If

<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS*, v. 252.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 269.

' If a parliamentary army (says he<sup>a</sup>) kept up from  
 ' year to year becomes an affair of course, I can see no  
 ' reason for not establishing it by a perpetual law. I  
 ' wish the bill now before us had been a bill of such  
 ' a nature. Such a bill would have made people  
 ' sensible of their danger; whereas by the method we  
 ' are in, we are like to have a perpetual army palmed  
 ' upon us, under colour of an annual bill. An army  
 ' kept up by a perpetual law, would be as much an  
 ' army kept up by consent of parliament, as an army  
 ' perpetually kept up by an annual bill. I can see no  
 ' difference between the one and the other: they are  
 ' both dangerous, and equally dangerous to our con-  
 ' stitution; and were thought so by the whole nation;  
 ' except a few courtiers, in the reign of *Cb. II.* when  
 ' the custom of keeping up a few regular troops under  
 ' the denomination of guards, was first introduced. I  
 ' do not know how the words "unless with consent  
 ' of parliament," crept into the claim of right; for  
 ' from the journals of parliament it appears, that the  
 ' house of commons in *Cb. II.*'s time were of opinion;  
 ' that the keeping up a standing army in time of peace  
 ' was inconsistent with our constitution; whether that  
 ' army was kept up with or without the consent of  
 ' parliament. In their resolutions there is no such  
 ' exception; and if the keeping up a standing army in  
 ' time of peace be wrong, as it must be, if it be incon-  
 ' sistent with our constitution, I am sure the sanction  
 ' of parliament, whether by an annual or perpetual  
 ' law, cannot make it right.'

' It is no argument<sup>b</sup>, my lords, to say, we have  
 ' kept up an army for a great many years without  
 ' being sensible of any danger. A young fiery horse  
 VOL. II. G g ' is

<sup>a</sup> DEE. LORDS, v. 268.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* 273.

' is never brought at once to submit to the curb, and  
 ' patiently to receive the rider upon his back. If you  
 ' put the bit into his mouth without any previous  
 ' preparation, or put a weak and unskilful rider upon  
 ' his back, he will probably break the neck of his  
 ' rider; but by degrees you may make him tamely  
 ' submit to both. A free people must be treated in  
 ' the same manner: by degrees they must be accus-  
 ' tomed to be governed by an army, by degrees that  
 ' army must be made strong enough to hold them in  
 ' subjection. If you should at once attempt to govern  
 ' your people by a military power, and before they are  
 ' a little prepared for the yoke; if you should mount  
 ' your army upon them before it has gathered strength  
 ' to keep its seat in the saddle, your people would  
 ' probably break the necks of those that attempted to  
 ' ride them. But we have already, for many years,  
 ' been accustoming our people to be governed by an  
 ' army, under pretence of making use of that army  
 ' only to assist the civil power; and by degrees we have  
 ' been for several years encreasing the number, and  
 ' consequently the strength of our army.'

' To pretend that our liberties<sup>a</sup> can be in no danger  
 ' from our army, because it is commanded by gentle-  
 ' men of the best families and fortunes in the kingdom,  
 ' is an argument I am surprized to hear made use of.  
 ' For our liberties ought to depend upon our consti-  
 ' tution, and not upon the honour of the gentlemen of  
 ' our army. I can, it is true, depend upon the honour  
 ' of those who are at present the officers of our army;  
 ' but my dependence is not founded upon their being  
 ' gentlemen of family or fortune: It is founded upon  
 ' their personal characters only. I have the honour

' to.

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, v. 278.



‘ to be acquainted with many of the chief officers of  
 ‘ our army : I know their honour, and the regard they  
 ‘ have for the liberties of their country ; and upon that  
 ‘ knowledge, I can depend. If I were not acquainted  
 ‘ with them, I should have but little regard to their  
 ‘ being gentlemen of family and fortune : for in all  
 ‘ countries where arbitrary power has been established,  
 ‘ many gentlemen of the best families and fortunes,  
 ‘ have, through fear or ambition, become the tools of  
 ‘ ministers, and have assisted or suffered them to  
 ‘ sacrifice the liberties of their country.’

Lord *Carteret* afterwards observes <sup>a</sup>, ‘ That all the  
 ‘ nations around, and especially *France*, were culti-  
 ‘ vating commerce and manufactures. That this made  
 ‘ it necessary for *England* to study all possible means  
 ‘ for reducing the price of her manufactures, in order  
 ‘ to be on an equal foot with her neighbours. That a  
 ‘ reduction of the army was one of the most obvious  
 ‘ measures for lessening taxes, and reducing manufac-  
 ‘ tures.’ [How much stronger is that argument now,  
 when we have more than doubled the national debt !]  
 ‘ So far, says he, have we been from being frugal ;  
 ‘ and saving upon this article, or indeed, any other  
 ‘ article of public expence, that we have for many  
 ‘ years kept up a more numerous standing army than  
 ‘ was in my opinion necessary ; and upon most of the  
 ‘ other articles we are every year increasing, instead of  
 ‘ diminishing. Our civil list revenue has been increased  
 ‘ from 4 or 500,000 *l.* to, I may say, near a million a  
 ‘ year. The expence of our army at home has been  
 ‘ of late years increased : the expence of our land forces  
 ‘ in the plantations, *Minorca*, and *Gibraltar*, has been

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. LORDS, v. 249.

‘ increasing for several years, and is this year higher  
 ‘ than it was the last : The expence of *Chelsea* hospital  
 ‘ is every year increasing ; and as we are almost every  
 ‘ year creating some new post, or adding some new officer  
 ‘ to the management and collection of our public reve-  
 ‘ nue, this, I believe, is a hidden and dangerous sort of  
 ‘ expence, which has been vastly increased of late years,  
 ‘ and is every year increasing. Many smalls, my lords,  
 ‘ make a great, as we may see by comparing our  
 ‘ present annual revenue with what it was forty or  
 ‘ fifty years ago. Before the revolution, the whole of  
 ‘ the public expence, which the people of this nation  
 ‘ were annually loaded with, was but about two mil-  
 ‘ lions. Now what we call the current expence, which  
 ‘ the parliament provides for every year, amounts to  
 ‘ above two millions besides the civil list, the interest  
 ‘ growing due every year to our public creditors, and  
 ‘ the sinking fund, which are provided for by estab-  
 ‘ lished, perpetual revenues ; and as the civil list re-  
 ‘ venue may be computed at near one million, the  
 ‘ interest growing due upon our public funds at near  
 ‘ two millions, and the sinking fund at above one  
 ‘ million yearly, we must reckon that the people of  
 ‘ this nation are now, even in time of peace, loaded  
 ‘ with a public expence of six millions, instead of the  
 ‘ two millions, which was the highest sum they were  
 ‘ ever loaded with in time of peace, before the late  
 ‘ happy revolution.’

Mr. *Lyttelton* (since lord *Lyttelton*, lately deceased)  
 on the subject of the standing army, spoke as follows  
 in the house of commons, *A. D.* 1739<sup>a</sup>.

‘ As I can see no good use that can be made of these  
 ‘ troops, and as I will not suppose that any bad one is  
 ‘ in-

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<sup>a</sup> DER. COM. x. 413.

‘ intended, I must conclude they are kept for ostentation alone. But is it for his majesty’s honour to put the lustre of his crown, to put his dignity upon that, in which he may be rivalled by the petty prince of any little state in *Germany*? For I believe there are few of them now that cannot produce at a review an army equal to ours, both in number and show. If the greatness of a state is to be measured by the number of its troops, the elector of *Hanover* is as great as the king of *England*. But a very different estimation ought to be made of our greatness; the strength of *England* is its wealth and its trade: Take care of them, you will be always formidable: lose them, you are nothing; you are the last of mankind. Were there no other reasons for reducing the army, it should be done upon the principle of œconomy alone. It is a melancholy thought to reflect how much we have spent, and to how little purpose for these 16 years past. Sir, could it be said, “ We are indeed loaded with debt; but for that charge we have encreased our reputation, our commerce flourishes, our navigation is safe, our flag is respected, our name honoured abroad,”—could this be said, there is a spirit in the people of *England* which would make them chearfully bear the heaviest burdens —On the other side, could an opposite language be held, could it be said, “ We have indeed no victories, no glory to boast of, no eclat, no dignity; we have submitted to injuries; we have borne affronts; we have been forced to curb the spirit of the nation; but by acting thus, we have restored our affairs, we have paid our debts, we have taken off our taxes, we have put into the power of the king and parliament, to act hereafter with more vigour and weight;”—could this be said, this also

‘ might be satisfactory.—But to have failed in both  
 ‘ these points, at the same time by a conduct equally  
 ‘ inglorious and expensive, to have lost the advantages  
 ‘ both of war and peace, to have brought disgrace and  
 ‘ shame upon the present times, and national beggary  
 ‘ upon ages to come, the consequence of which may  
 ‘ be national slavery; such a management, if such a  
 ‘ management can be supposed, must call down  
 ‘ national vengeance upon the guilty authors of it,  
 ‘ whosoever they be, and the longer it has been sus-  
 ‘ pended, the more heavy it will fall.’

Mr. Shippen, *A. D.* 1739, spoke on this subject as follows <sup>a</sup>.

‘ Can it be thought, that our influence at foreign  
 ‘ courts depends upon the number of land-forces we  
 ‘ keep in continual pay? No, Sir; our influence de-  
 ‘ pends upon the riches and number of our people, and  
 ‘ not upon the number of our regular regiments, or  
 ‘ the appearance they make at a review. We have  
 ‘ many thousands that would make as good an appear-  
 ‘ ance in the day of battle if their country were in  
 ‘ danger, though they are not at present masters of all  
 ‘ the punctilios proper only for a review. We have a  
 ‘ navy, which no nation in the world can equal, far  
 ‘ less overcome, by which we may carry the dread of  
 ‘ this nation into every country that is visited by the  
 ‘ ocean: And we have money, notwithstanding the  
 ‘ bad use we have made of so long a peace, to hire as  
 ‘ many foreign troops as we can have occasion for,  
 ‘ and to support them as long as we can have any  
 ‘ service for them. Therefore, while we are unanimous  
 ‘ amongst ourselves, while our government possesses  
 ‘ the hearts and affections of the people in general,  
 ‘ which

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. X.* 407.

‘ which every virtuous and wise government must neces-  
‘ sarily do, this nation must always have a great in-  
‘ fluence upon the counsels of every court in *Europe*,  
‘ nay of every court in the world, where it is necessary  
‘ for us to extend our influence. From hence we may  
‘ see, Sir, that in this nation we can never have occa-  
‘ sion for keeping up a great number or any number  
‘ of regular troops in order to give weight to our ne-  
‘ gotiations; and if any power in *Europe* should refuse  
‘ to observe or perform the treaties they have made  
‘ with us, we ought not to seek redress by negotiation.  
‘ We may make a demand; but it is beneath the dignity  
‘ of a powerful people to sue for justice. Upon the first  
‘ refusal or affected delay, we ought to compel them,  
‘ not by keeping an army at home, which would be  
‘ ridiculous, but by sending an irresistible fleet, with  
‘ an army on board to ravage their coasts; or by  
‘ getting some of their neighbours, with our assistance,  
‘ to attack them; both which will always be in the  
‘ power of every government of this country, that  
‘ preserve their influence abroad by preserving the  
‘ affections of the people at home; and that without  
‘ keeping any number of regular troops always in  
‘ pay; for whilst the spirit of liberty, which is the  
‘ nursing mother of courage, is preserved among our  
‘ people, we shall never want a great number of brave  
‘ men of all degrees amongst us, that will be ready to  
‘ venture their lives in the cause of their country; and  
‘ such men may in a few weeks be sufficiently disci-  
‘ plined for action, though they might not perhaps  
‘ observe all the punctilios so exactly as a parcel of  
‘ idle mercenary fellows, who have had perhaps  
‘ nothing to do for seven years together, but to dance  
‘ through their exercises. The keeping up of a stand-  
‘ ing army in this nation, can never therefore be

necessary, either for preserving our influence amongst  
 our neighbours, or for punishing such of them as  
 shall offend us; and with respect to our own defence,  
 as we have no frontier but the ocean, while we  
 preserve a superiority at sea, a popular government  
 in this country can never be under the least necessity  
 of keeping up any land forces, especially if they  
 would take care to have our militia but tolerably  
 armed and disciplined; for no nation will be mad  
 enough to invade us, while we are united among  
 ourselves, with a handful of troops, who must either  
 all die by the sword, or be made prisoners of war;  
 because we could by means of our navy prevent  
 their being able to return. And if any of our  
 neighbours should prepare to invade us with a great  
 fleet and a numerous army, we should not only have  
 time to prepare for their reception, but we might  
 lock them up in their ports by means of our navy,  
 or we might give them enough to do at home by  
 stirring up some of their neighbours upon the con-  
 tinent to invade them.'

In consequence of our attachment to continental mea-  
 sures, armies (says lord *Bolingbroke*) grew so much into  
 fashion, in time of war, among men who meant well  
 to their country, that they who mean ill keep them  
 still up in the profoundest peace; and the number of  
 our soldiers in this island alone is almost double to  
 that of our seamen. That they are kept up against  
 foreign enemies, cannot be said with any colour. If  
 they are kept for shew, they are ridiculous. If they  
 are kept for any other purpose whatever, they are  
 too dangerous to be suffered. A patriot king, se-  
 conded by ministers attached to the true interest of  
 their country, would soon reform this abuse, and  
 save a great part of this expence; or apply it in a  
 manner

' manner preferable even to the saving it, to the main-  
 ' tenance of a body of marine foot, and to the charge  
 ' of a register of thirty or forty thousand seamen.  
 ' But no thoughts like these, no great designs for the  
 ' honour and interest of the kingdom, will be enter-  
 ' tained, till men who have the honour and interest  
 ' of the kingdom at heart arise to power <sup>a</sup>.'

' At *Carthage* (says *Mountague*) their military institu-  
 ' tion was such that the power of their generals in the  
 ' field was absolute and unlimited; and if their conduct  
 ' was approved of, generally continued to the end of  
 ' whatever war they were engaged in. They had no  
 ' occasion for the dangerous resource of a dictator.  
 ' The watchful eye of their standing court-martial,  
 ' the committee of 104 of their ablest senators, was  
 ' a perpetual and never-failing check upon the ambi-  
 ' tion or ill behaviour of their generals <sup>b</sup>.'

' Our method of trying delinquents, (says lord *Car-*  
 ' *teret*) either in the land or sea service, by a court-  
 ' martial composed of their respective officers, has been  
 ' judged liable to many objections, and has occasioned  
 ' no little discontent in the nation. For as their en-  
 ' quiry is restricted to a particular set of articles in each  
 ' service, I do not see how a commanding officer, vested  
 ' with a discretionary power of acting, can strictly or  
 ' properly come under their cognizance, or ever be liable  
 ' to their censure, unless he is proved guilty of a direct  
 ' breach of any one of those articles. But as a com-  
 ' mander in chief may easily avoid any offence of that  
 ' nature, and yet upon the whole of his conduct in  
 ' any expedition, be highly culpable; a court-martial  
 ' thus circumscribed in their power of enquiry, can  
 ' never be competent judges in a cause where they  
 ' are denied a proper power of examining into the  
 ' real

<sup>a</sup> *Bolingbr. ID. PATR. KING, 196.*

<sup>b</sup> *Mountague, 357.*

‘ real demerits of the supposed offender. Much has  
 ‘ been said about trying offences of this nature like  
 ‘ other criminal cases by juries. A scheme which at  
 ‘ the very first sight must appear absurd and impracticable  
 ‘ to the rational and unprejudiced. As therefore in-  
 ‘ struction is the true end and use of all history, I  
 ‘ shall take the liberty of offering a scheme drawn  
 ‘ from that wise and salutary institution of the *Cartha-*  
 ‘ *ginians*, which is, That a select standing com-  
 ‘ mittee be appointed, to be composed of an equal  
 ‘ number of members of both houses, chosen annually  
 ‘ by balloting, with a full power of enquiring into the  
 ‘ conduct of all commanders in chief without any re-  
 ‘ straint of articles of war; and that after a proper  
 ‘ examination the committee shall refer the case with  
 ‘ their opinion upon it to the decision of his majesty.  
 ‘ This scheme seems to me the least liable to objections  
 ‘ of any I have yet met with. For if the members  
 ‘ are chosen by balloting, they will be less liable to  
 ‘ the influence of party. If they are chosen annually,  
 ‘ and refer the case to the decision of the crown, which  
 ‘ is the fountain of justice as well as mercy, they  
 ‘ will neither incroach upon the royal prerogative, nor  
 ‘ be liable to that signal defect in the *Carthaginian*  
 ‘ committee, which sat for life, and whose sentence  
 ‘ was final without appeal.’

‘ His late majesty [*Geo. I.*] even after the war with  
 ‘ *Spain* was begun, made a reduction of his land-  
 ‘ forces, and told his parliament he did so, because  
 ‘ he thought his fleet sufficient not only to give a  
 ‘ check to the ambitious views of *Spain*, but to compel  
 ‘ them to agree to reasonable terms. The event,  
 ‘ accordingly, answered his expectations: for by  
 ‘ means of his fleet, he soon convinced the *Spanish*  
 ‘ court how vain it was for them to contend with  
 ‘ this nation.—This is an example, which ought now



‘ to be followed. I wish it had always been followed.’  
Speech against the standing army, *A. D.* 1738<sup>a</sup>.

He then goes on to shew, that there is no more occasion for an army on account of the domestic state of affairs, than he had shewn there was on account of foreign. That there might be discontents; but there was no reason to apprehend disaffection. That there had been some mobs and tumults: but that it did not follow, that therefore an *army* must be kept up. ‘ A law, says he, which the civil power is unable to execute, must either be in itself oppressive, or it must be such a one as gives a handle for oppression. I hope this house will always have penetration enough not to pass a law which is in itself oppressive, or at least the goodness to repeal it, as soon as it appears to be so; and I hope we shall always have virtue and courage enough to send that magistrate or that officer to *Tyburn*, who shall dare to make an oppressive use of any law we give our consent to. Therefore if there be any laws now in being, which cannot be executed by the civil power, we ought to enquire into them, and the use that is made of them, in order to amend or repeal them; and to contrive some other methods or laws for answering those ends, for which they were intended. Surely we are not to make a sacrifice of our constitution and liberties, by establishing a military government for the support of oppressive or dangerous laws, which through inadvertency or want of foresight have been agreed to, either by ourselves or our ancestors. But suppose, my lords, that the mobs and tumults which have lately happened, and the

‘ opposition

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. LORDS, v. 247.*

‘ opposition that has in some cases been made to the  
 ‘ civil magistrate, have proceeded from nothing of  
 ‘ an oppressive nature in any of our laws, nor from  
 ‘ the oppressive use that has been made of any of them,  
 ‘ which I hope is the case; yet experience has taught  
 ‘ us that regular troops are far from being proper or  
 ‘ effectual instruments, for preventing such tumults,  
 ‘ or for aiding the civil magistrate in the execution of  
 ‘ our laws. The late atrocious murder committed by  
 ‘ the mob at *Edinburgh* was perpetrated within a few  
 ‘ hundred yards of a whole regiment of regular troops;  
 ‘ and even here in *Westminster*, nay even within the  
 ‘ verge of the court, we know that great affronts have  
 ‘ been offered to the government, and some murders  
 ‘ committed by mobs within the view of our regular  
 ‘ troops. It is impossible, my lords, to make our  
 ‘ regular troops proper or effectual instruments for  
 ‘ quelling mobs, or for enforcing the laws of their  
 ‘ country, unless you lodge the civil as well as mili-  
 ‘ tary power in the officers of your army; and such a  
 ‘ regulation, I am sure, no lord of this house would  
 ‘ agree to, nor would any officer of our army, I hope,  
 ‘ desire to see it established.’

The following is part of one of the parliamentary  
 speeches for a place bill. In separating it from the  
 rest, I have cut off the name of the speaker. It is  
 much to the purpose on this subject.

‘ The keeping up of a standing army in this island  
 ‘ in time of peace, was always, till the revolution,  
 ‘ deemed inconsistent with our constitution. Since  
 ‘ that time indeed, we have always thought the keep-  
 ‘ ing up of a *small* number [not 50,000; for that is  
 ‘ in my humble opinion a *great* number] ‘ of regular  
 ‘ troops is necessary for preserving our constitution,  
 ‘ or at least the present establishment. How far this  
 ‘ may

‘ may be right, I shall not pretend to determine. But  
‘ I must observe, that the famous scheme for over-  
‘ turning our constitution, which was published in  
‘ the year 1629, required but 3,000 foot for this pur-  
‘ pose ; and if *Charles I.* had, in the year 1641, been  
‘ provided with such a number of regular troops upon  
‘ whom he might have depended for overawing the  
‘ mob of the city of *London*, his fate, I believe, would  
‘ have been very different from what it was. I am  
‘ very far from thinking that such a very small number,  
‘ even now that our people are so much disused to  
‘ arms, would be sufficient for overturning our confi-  
‘ tution ; but there is a certain number which would  
‘ be infallibly sufficient for this purpose, and it is not  
‘ easy to determine how near we may now be come  
‘ to that number. Now suppose, we are come within  
‘ 2 or 3,000 of that number, and that a minister, in  
‘ order to render his success against our constitution  
‘ infallible, should, upon some specious pretence or  
‘ other, desire the parliament to consent to an aug-  
‘ mentation of 2 or 3,000 men to our army ; can we  
‘ suppose that such a small augmentation upon a  
‘ plausible pretence, would be refused by a parlia-  
‘ ment chiefly composed of officers and placemen ?  
‘ Can we suppose that any man would risk his losing a  
‘ lucrative employment, by voting against such a  
‘ small augmentation ? Some civil powers to be exe-  
‘ cuted by civil officers, and some military powers to  
‘ be executed by a standing army or a standing militia,  
‘ are certainly necessary in all governments : I am  
‘ afraid it is impossible to preserve a free government,  
‘ when all those powers are lodged in one single man ;  
‘ but when they are not only lodged in one single man,  
‘ but greatly increased beyond what is necessary for  
‘ the support of a free government, I am sure the  
‘ freedom of that government must be soon at an end ;

‘ and

‘ and it is very hard to distinguish between the powers  
 ‘ necessary for the support of a free government, and  
 ‘ these that are sufficient for establishing an arbitrary  
 ‘ one. The partition is so thin, that it may easily  
 ‘ be mistaken, and certainly will be mistaken by most  
 ‘ of those who are under a temptation to judge par-  
 ‘ tially in favour of arbitrary power.’

Part of sir *Charles Sedley*’s speech in parliament on the bill for disbanding the army, *A. D.* 1699 <sup>a</sup>.

‘ I hope my behaviour in this house has put me  
 ‘ above the censure of one who would obstruct his  
 ‘ majesty’s affairs. I was as early in the apprehensions  
 ‘ of the power of *France* as any man. I never stuck  
 ‘ at money for fleets, armies, alliances, or whatever  
 ‘ expences seemed to have the preservation of our new  
 ‘ settled government for their end. I am still of the  
 ‘ same mind; but that was war, and this is peace;  
 ‘ and if I differ from some worthy gentlemen who  
 ‘ have spoke before me, they will be so just as to be-  
 ‘ lieve it is not about the end, but the means, that  
 ‘ we contend. Some may think *England* cannot be  
 ‘ safe without a standing army of 30,000 men; and  
 ‘ will tell us the king of *France* has 200,000 in pay  
 ‘ disciplined troops; that all our neighbours are armed  
 ‘ in another manner than they were wont to be; that  
 ‘ we must not imagine we can defend ourselves with  
 ‘ our ordinary and legal forces. All this is very ma-  
 ‘ terial, and would have great weight with me if  
 ‘ *England* were not an island accessible only by sea,  
 ‘ and in that case not till the invaders have destroyed  
 ‘ our navy, which is or may be made superior to any  
 ‘ force that can be brought against us. It is very  
 ‘ difficult to land forces in an enemy’s country; the  
 ‘ *Spanish*

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM.* III. 190.

‘ *Spanish* armada was beaten at sea, and never set foot  
 ‘ on *English* ground; his present majesty with all the  
 ‘ shipping of *Holland* could bring over but 14,000, or  
 ‘ 15,000 men, and that so publickly, that nothing  
 ‘ but an infatuated prince would have permitted their  
 ‘ landing. Our attempt upon *Brest* shews us that it  
 ‘ is easy with a small force to prevent an assault from  
 ‘ the other side of the water. As we are capable of  
 ‘ being attacked in several places, so it may be urged  
 ‘ as reason for several troops more than our finances  
 ‘ can bear; but if we burden the people thus far in  
 ‘ peace, it may tempt some to wish for war again;  
 ‘ every change carrying a prospect of better times, and  
 ‘ nothing can make worse times than a standing army  
 ‘ of any number of men will at present. If we are  
 ‘ true to ourselves, 10,000 men are enough; and if  
 ‘ not, 100,000 are too few.’

If we had improved the militia, we might have had  
 at this time 500,000 men tolerably disciplined. This  
 would have put the power into the hands of the people,  
 where only it can be safe.

Mr. *Hutcheson*, in his speech on the forces for  
 1718<sup>a</sup>, observes, ‘ That no legislator ever founded a  
 ‘ free government, but he avoided this *Charybdis*’ [of a  
 mercenary army] ‘ as a rock against which his com-  
 ‘ monwealth must certainly be shipwrecked, as the  
 ‘ *Israelites*, *Athenians*, *Corinthians*, *Achaians*, *Lacedæmo-  
 ‘ nians*, *Thebans*, *Samnites* and *Romans*; none of which  
 ‘ nations, whilst they kept their liberty, were ever  
 ‘ known to maintain any soldiers in constant pay,  
 ‘ within their cities, or ever suffered any of their  
 ‘ subjects to make war their profession; well knowing  
 ‘ that the sword and sovereignty always march hand  
 ‘ in

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. VI. Append. p. 46.

‘ in hand ; and therefore they trained their own citizens  
‘ and inhabitants of their territories about them, per-  
‘ petually in arms ; and their whole commonwealths,  
‘ by this means, became so many formed militias. A  
‘ general exercise of the best of their people in the use  
‘ of arms, was the only bulwark of their liberties.  
‘ This was reckoned the surest way to preserve them  
‘ both at home and abroad, the people being secured  
‘ thereby as well against the domestic affronts of any  
‘ of their own citizens, as against the foreign invasions  
‘ of ambitious and unruly neighbours. Their arms  
‘ were never lodged in the hands of any, who had not  
‘ interest in preserving the public peace, who fought  
‘ *pro aris et focis*, and thought themselves sufficiently  
‘ paid by repelling invaders, that they might with  
‘ freedom return to their own affairs. In those days  
‘ there was no difference between the citizen, the  
‘ soldier, and the husbandman ; for all promiscuously  
‘ took arms when the public safety required it, and  
‘ afterwards laid them down with more alacrity than  
‘ they took them up. So that we find among the  
‘ *Romans*, the best and bravest of their generals came  
‘ from the plough, contentedly returning when the  
‘ work was over, and never demanding their triumphs  
‘ ’till they laid down their commands, and reduced  
‘ themselves to the state of private men. Nor do we  
‘ find this famous commonwealth ever permitted a  
‘ deposition of their arms in any other hands, ’till their  
‘ empire increasing, necessity constrained them to  
‘ erect a constant stipendiary soldiery abroad in fo-  
‘ reign parts, either for the holding or winning of  
‘ provinces. Then luxury increasing with dominion,  
‘ the strict rule and discipline of freedom soon abated,  
‘ and forces were kept up at home ; which soon proved  
‘ of such dangerous consequence, that the people were  
‘ forced

‘ forced to make a law to employ them at a conveni-  
 ‘ ent distance ; which was, that if any general marched  
 ‘ over the river *Rubicon*, he should be declared a public  
 ‘ enemy. See above page 441.

‘ Though we should admit, that an army might be  
 ‘ consistent with freedom in a commonwealth, yet it is  
 ‘ otherwise in a free monarchy ; for in the former, ’tis  
 ‘ wholly at the disposal of the people, who nominate,  
 ‘ appoint, discard, and punish the generals and officers  
 ‘ as they think fit, and ’tis certain death to make any  
 ‘ attempt upon their liberties ; whereas in the latter,  
 ‘ the king is perpetual general, may model the army  
 ‘ as he pleases, and it will be called high treason to  
 ‘ oppose him. This subject is so self evident, that I  
 ‘ am almost ashamed to undertake the proof of it.  
 ‘ For if we look through the world, we shall find in  
 ‘ no country, liberty and an army stand together ; so  
 ‘ that to know whether a people are free or slaves, it is  
 ‘ necessary only to ask, Whether there is an army kept  
 ‘ up amongst them ? This truth is so obvious, that  
 ‘ the most barefaced advocates for an army do not  
 ‘ directly deny it, but qualify the matter by telling us  
 ‘ that a number not exceeding twenty or thirty thou-  
 ‘ sand are a handful to so populous a nation as this.  
 ‘ Now I think that number may bring as certain ruin  
 ‘ upon us, as if they were as many millions ; and I  
 ‘ will give my reasons for it. It is the misfortune of  
 ‘ all countries, that they sometimes lie under an un-  
 ‘ happy necessity to defend themselves by arms against  
 ‘ the ambition of their governors, and to fight for  
 ‘ what is their own ; for if a prince will rule us with  
 ‘ a rod of iron, and invade our laws and liberties,  
 ‘ and neither be prevailed upon by our miseries, sup-  
 ‘ plications, nor tears, we have no power upon earth

' to appeal to, and therefore must patiently submit to  
 ' our bondage, or stand upon our own defence ; which  
 ' if we are enabled to do, we shall never be put upon  
 ' it, but our swords may grow rusty in our hands ;  
 ' for that nation is surest to live in peace, that is most  
 ' capable of making war ; and a man that hath a sword  
 ' by his side, shall have least occasion to make use of  
 ' it. Now I say, if a king hath thirty thousand men  
 ' beforehand with his subjects, the people can make  
 ' no effort to defend their liberties without the assist-  
 ' ance of a foreign power, which is a remedy most  
 ' commonly as bad as the disease ; and if we have not  
 ' a power within ourselves to defend our laws, we are  
 ' no government. For *England* being a small country,  
 ' few strong towns in it, and these in the king's hands,  
 ' the nobility disarmed by the destruction of tenures,  
 ' and militia not to be raised but by the king's com-  
 ' mand, there can be no force levied in any part of  
 ' *England*, but must be destroyed in its infancy by a  
 ' few regiments ; for what will twenty or thirty  
 ' thousand naked unarmed men signify against as  
 ' many troops of mercenary soldiers. What if they  
 ' should come into the field, and say, " You must  
 ' chuse these and these men your representatives ?"  
 ' Where is your choice ? What if they should say,  
 ' " Parliaments are seditious and factious assemblies,  
 ' " and therefore ought to be abolished ?" What is  
 ' become of your freedom ? If they should encompass  
 ' this house and threaten, if the members do not sur-  
 ' render up their government they will put them to  
 ' the sword ; What is become of your constitution ?  
 ' These things may be done under a tyrannical prince,  
 ' and have been done in several parts of the world.  
 ' What is it that causeth the tyranny of the *Turks* at  
 ' this



‘ this day, but servants in arms? What is it that  
 ‘ preserved the glorious commonwealth of *Rome*, but  
 ‘ swords in the hands of its citizens? I will add here,  
 ‘ that most nations were enslaved by small armies.  
 ‘ *Oliver Cromwell* left behind him but twenty seven  
 ‘ thousand men; and the duke of *Monmouth*, who  
 ‘ was the darling of the people, was suppressed with  
 ‘ two thousand; nay, *Cæsar* seized *Rome* itself with  
 ‘ five thousand, and fought the battle of *Pharsalia*,  
 ‘ where the fate of the world was decided, with twenty  
 ‘ two thousand. And most of the revolutions of the  
 ‘ *Roman* and *Ottoman* empires since, were caused by  
 ‘ the pretorian bands, and the court janizaries; the  
 ‘ former of which never exceeded eight, nor the latter  
 ‘ twelve thousand men. And if no greater numbers  
 ‘ could make such disturbances in these vast empires,  
 ‘ what will double or treble the force do with us?  
 ‘ And they themselves confess it when they argue for  
 ‘ an army; for they tell us we may be surprized with  
 ‘ ten or fifteen thousand men from *France*, and having  
 ‘ no regular force to oppose them, they will overrun  
 ‘ the kingdom.’

The fear of an invasion is no argument for an  
*army*; because a sufficient *fleet* to intercept invaders  
 in their return, with a sufficient *militia* to give them  
 a proper reception upon their arrival, is preferable  
 to an army, which must be scattered in different parts  
 of the kingdom, and could not be brought together  
 to resist the invaders before they had done a great  
 deal of mischief.

It was observed by Mr. *Pulteney*<sup>a</sup> in the house of  
 commons, *A. D.* 1729, in a debate on the number  
 of forces for that year, ‘ that one fundamental argu-

H h 2

‘ ment

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. VII. 38.

' ment for the establishment of our liberties in the  
 ' Bill of Rights is, that the keeping up a standing  
 ' army in time of peace is contrary to law ; that ac-  
 ' cordingly, after the peace of *Ryfwick*, the greatest  
 ' part of the army was disbanded ; and, though upon the  
 ' just fear of a new war, the parliament complimented  
 ' king *William* with an establishment of 10,000 men,  
 ' yet the same was not obtained without opposition ;  
 ' many honest and sober men among the warmest  
 ' sticklers for the revolution, looking upon it as an  
 ' encroachment on our liberties, and being justly  
 ' apprehensive it would prove a dangerous precedent :  
 ' that during the late war our land forces, together  
 ' with those in our pay, amounted to above 200,000  
 ' men, the load of which still lies heavy upon us ; but  
 ' after the peace of *Utrecht*, there was a general reduc-  
 ' tion, except about 12,000 men ; that upon the late  
 ' king's accession, when the rebellion broke out in  
 ' *Scotland* and *England*, the army was indeed aug-  
 ' mented with several regiments, and other additional  
 ' troops, but these were again reduced not long after ;  
 ' that in the year 1727, upon the prospect of the great  
 ' dangers that were apprehended from the treaty of *Vi-*  
 ' *enna*, an augmentation of about 8000 men was moved  
 ' for in this house, but the same was warmly opposed ;  
 ' nor was it granted, but upon assurance that this  
 ' expence should cease, as soon as the extraordinary  
 ' occasion that called for it was over : that the event  
 ' has shewn that most of those apprehensions were  
 ' groundless and chimerical.'

On the superior importance of the navy to the army,  
 Mr. *Potter* <sup>a</sup> spoke excellently in the house of com-  
 mons, *A. D.* 1751, as follows ;

' I am

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<sup>a</sup> *Ann. DEB. COM. IV. 268.*

‘ I am really astonish’d, Sir, when I consider how  
‘ inconsistent some gentlemen are, when they argue  
‘ for a number of *land* forces to be kept in the pay of  
‘ the public in time of peace, and when they argue for  
‘ a number of *seamen* to be kept in the pay of the pub-  
‘ lic. When the question before us is about the number  
‘ of land forces to be kept up in time of peace, they  
‘ never once think of the vast number of brave land-  
‘ men we have, and I hope always shall have in this  
‘ island: These are with them, upon that occasion,  
‘ of no account with regard to the strength or power  
‘ of the nation, which they then say consists only in  
‘ the number of men we have in actual pay, and sub-  
‘ ject to the slavish rules of military law; and when  
‘ any one proposes a diminution of the number, they  
‘ exclaim, What, will you weaken the hands of  
‘ government? Will you dismiss those men upon  
‘ whom alone you can depend for your protection?  
‘ But when the question comes about the number of  
‘ seamen to be kept in public pay, they then tell you  
‘ that the maritime power, or strength of this nation,  
‘ does not depend upon the number of seamen you  
‘ have in the actual pay of the public, but upon the  
‘ numbers that belong to the wide extended *British*  
‘ dominions, though many of them are at all times  
‘ dispersed over the whole face of the globe. These  
‘ you may reduce, these you may dismiss at pleasure,  
‘ without exposing yourselves to any danger. From  
‘ this way of arguing, Sir, would not an ignorant  
‘ stranger conclude that the government has no power  
‘ over the land men of this island, even in the case of  
‘ an invasion, or that a man might learn to be a com-  
‘ plete sailor in a few days, but could not learn to be  
‘ a complete soldier in a few years? One of these  
‘ conclusions an ignorant stranger would certainly

‘ draw ; and yet, with respect to both, we know that  
 ‘ the case is directly the reverse. Upon any threatened  
 ‘ invasion his majesty has as much power over the  
 ‘ land men, that is to say, the militia, so far as relates  
 ‘ to the proper use to be made of them, as he has  
 ‘ over the seamen ; nay more, because the landmen  
 ‘ are always at home, but great numbers of our sea-  
 ‘ men are at all times abroad ; and do not we all  
 ‘ know, that to make a complete seamen requires  
 ‘ several years service at sea, and early in life too ?  
 ‘ Whereas the most ignorant land man may learn all  
 ‘ the business of a common soldier in a few days : I  
 ‘ mean all the fighting business ; for as to all the  
 ‘ punctilios of a review, I shall grant, it may require  
 ‘ some months before he can go through them with  
 ‘ dexterity.’

Mr. *Sandys*<sup>a</sup>, *A. D.* 1740, spoke as follows on  
 the inconveniencies to which the subjects are reduced  
 by quartering soldiers.

‘ Sir, It is an unfortunate state we are fallen into,  
 ‘ that every session of parliament must be attended  
 ‘ with new laws, or new clauses in old laws, for  
 ‘ oppressing the industrious subject, and endangering  
 ‘ the liberties of the country. It is impossible to levy  
 ‘ high duties upon the necessaries or conveniencies of  
 ‘ life ; it is impossible to keep up numerous standing  
 ‘ armies without such laws, or such clauses, and yet  
 ‘ we have, for twenty years, been contriving how to  
 ‘ continue and increase both. The high duties we  
 ‘ groan under were introduced for supporting a heavy  
 ‘ and expensive, but necessary, war ; but how the  
 ‘ keeping up of a numerous standing army in time of  
 ‘ peace was introduced, I can no other way account  
 ‘ for,

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<sup>a</sup> *DEB. COM. XII. 127.*

‘ for, than by supposing, that it was necessary for sup-  
 ‘ porting unpopular destructive measures, and a hated  
 ‘ minister. I am surpris’d to hear the forcible quar-  
 ‘ tering of soldiers upon public or private houses  
 ‘ insisted on, as if it were a necessary means for the  
 ‘ support of our government. Sir, if we were to  
 ‘ attend strictly to our constitution, even as it stands  
 ‘ at present, we ought in no mutiny bill to admit of  
 ‘ the quartering of soldiers, even on public houses,  
 ‘ except for a few nights in their march from one  
 ‘ garrison to another, or for the first night after they  
 ‘ arrive at the place designed for their residence.  
 ‘ Though we now keep up, though we have long kept  
 ‘ up, a great number of standing forces in time of peace,  
 ‘ yet, properly speaking, they are no more than is  
 ‘ supposed to be necessary for guards and garrisons;  
 ‘ and accordingly, the resolution annually agreed to  
 ‘ in this house is, That the number of effective men  
 ‘ to be provided for guards and garrisons in *Great*  
 ‘ *Britain* for the ensuing year, shall be such a num-  
 ‘ ber as is then thought necessary. Before the revo-  
 ‘ lution we had guards and garrisons, even in time of  
 ‘ peace. But before the revolution, and some years  
 ‘ after, we had no quartering of soldiers, either upon  
 ‘ public or private houses, in time of peace, without  
 ‘ the consent of the owner. On the contrary, by an  
 ‘ express law, the latter end of *Ch. II*’s reign, it was  
 ‘ enacted, That no officer, military or civil, or other  
 ‘ person, shall quarter or billet any soldier upon any  
 ‘ inhabitant of this realm without his consent; which  
 ‘ law stood in force till near the end of the year 1692,  
 ‘ when the first law was made for quartering sol-  
 ‘ diers in public houses. Before that year, Sir, our  
 ‘ guards and garrisons, by which, I mean, all the  
 ‘ soldiers we had on foot, even in their marching

‘ from one place to another, were obliged to quarter  
 ‘ themselves, as other travellers do, in houses that  
 ‘ were willing to receive them; and when they came  
 ‘ to any garrison, or place where they were to reside,  
 ‘ every officer and soldier provided quarters for him-  
 ‘ self, in which, I believe, there was no inconveni-  
 ‘ ence found; for when soldiers behave civilly and  
 ‘ are agreeable to the people, there will always be  
 ‘ houses enough, either public or private, that will be  
 ‘ glad to receive them for what they are able to pay,  
 ‘ unless there be a greater number of them than the  
 ‘ place can conveniently accommodate. From the  
 ‘ revolution to the year 1692, we had a sort of civil  
 ‘ war amongst ourselves; for *Ireland* was not entirely  
 ‘ reduced till the end of the year 1691, and as *inter*  
 ‘ *arma silent leges*, perhaps, during that time some  
 ‘ liberties were taken with the laws in respect to quar-  
 ‘ tering or billeting of soldiers. But in the year  
 ‘ 1692, the domestic tranquillity of the three kingdoms  
 ‘ being re-established, the parliament began to think of  
 ‘ restoring the laws to their pristine force. However,  
 ‘ as we were then engaged in a dangerous foreign  
 ‘ war, and upon that account obliged to keep a greater  
 ‘ number of troops than usual; and as our troops  
 ‘ were often obliged to march in great bodies either  
 ‘ from one place of the kingdom to another, as danger  
 ‘ threatened, or through the kingdom in their way to  
 ‘ *Flanders*, the parliament saw it would be necessary to  
 ‘ provide quarters for them upon their march in a  
 ‘ different manner from what had been allowed by  
 ‘ law; and therefore, in the mutiny-bill for the en-  
 ‘ suing year, which then first begun to be entitled,  
 ‘ A bill for punishing officers and soldiers who shall  
 ‘ mutiny or desert their majesties service, and for  
 ‘ punishing false musters, and for the payment of  
 ‘ quar-

‘ quarters,” the clause for quartering soldiers in public  
 ‘ houses, without consent of the owner, was intro-  
 ‘ duced, and has ever since remained in all the mutiny  
 ‘ bills passed to this day; for a favourite power once  
 ‘ granted to the crown is seldom recovered by the  
 ‘ subject without some remarkable revolution in our  
 ‘ government.’

The transaction which, in the year 1741, occasioned the following reprimand, shews, in a very striking light, the evil of a standing army, and one of the bad uses it may be put to.

‘ Mr. *Blackerby*, Mr. *Howard*, Mr. *Lediard*! You  
 ‘ having at the bar of this house yesterday confessed,  
 ‘ that you did send for and cause to come, on *Friday*  
 ‘ the eighth day of *May* last, a body of armed soldiers,  
 ‘ headed by officers in a military manner, who did take  
 ‘ possession of the church-yard of *St. Paul, Covent-*  
 ‘ *Garden*, near the place where the poll for the election  
 ‘ of citizens to serve in this present parliament for  
 ‘ the city of *Westminster*, was taken, before the said  
 ‘ election was ended; and you having acknowledged  
 ‘ your offence therein, the house did order you to  
 ‘ attend this morning, to be brought to the bar to be  
 ‘ reprimanded on your knees by me for the said offence.  
 ‘ I cannot better describe to you the nature of this  
 ‘ offence you have been guilty of than in the words of  
 ‘ the resolution this house came to upon their examination  
 ‘ into that matter, which are; That the presence of a  
 ‘ regular body of armed soldiers at an election of mem-  
 ‘ bers to serve in parliament is an high infringement of  
 ‘ the liberties of the subject, a manifest violation of the  
 ‘ freedom of elections, and an open defiance of the laws  
 ‘ and constitution of this kingdom. And it is impos-  
 ‘ sible, if you will consider the terms of this resolution,  
 ‘ but

‘ but that you must have in your breast the deepest  
 ‘ sorrow and remorse for this rash act of yours, which,  
 ‘ if it had not been duly animadverted upon, might  
 ‘ have given the most dangerous wound to the consti-  
 ‘ tution of this free country that perhaps it ever had  
 ‘ felt.—This country is free, because this house is so ;  
 ‘ which this house can never be, but from the freedom  
 ‘ of election to it : And amidst the too many ways  
 ‘ for violating that, none can be more pernicious,  
 ‘ because none more quick, decisive, and permanent,  
 ‘ than what you might unhappily have set a precedent  
 ‘ for, and which might have grown to an extremity  
 ‘ under the specious and ready pretences of fears and  
 ‘ necessity that supersede all law ; a precedent that  
 ‘ would have received an authority from the place it  
 ‘ began in, the seat of the government and legislature  
 ‘ of this kingdom. Necessity, which is to take place  
 ‘ of law, must be left to the circumstances of every  
 ‘ particular case. The act must be presumed to be  
 ‘ wrong, enquired into as such, and excused only by  
 ‘ the clearest proofs, that the necessity for it was real.  
 ‘ What you have done is against one of the most essential  
 ‘ parts of the law of the kingdom. Has any real neces-  
 ‘ sity been shewn for it ? There might be fears ; there  
 ‘ might be some danger : but did you try the strength  
 ‘ of the law to dispel those fears, and remove that  
 ‘ danger ? Did you make use of those powers the law  
 ‘ has invested you with as civil magistrates for the  
 ‘ preservation of the public peace ? No : You deserted  
 ‘ all that ; and wantonly, I hope inadvertently, re-  
 ‘ sorted to that force the most unnatural of all others,  
 ‘ in all respects, to that cause and business you were  
 ‘ then attending, and for the freedom of which every  
 ‘ *Briton* ought to be ready almost to suffer any thing.



‘ More might be said ; but you have acknowledged  
‘ your offence, and have asked pardon for it. This  
‘ has disposed the house to lenity. Use it not to lessen  
‘ the sense of your crime ; but to raise in your hearts  
‘ that sense of gratitude you owe to the house for that  
‘ gentle treatment you have met with on this occasion ;  
‘ in expectation of which you are discharged, paying  
‘ your fees <sup>a</sup>.’

The confidence, which a standing *army* gives a minister, puts him upon carrying things with a higher hand, than he would attempt to do, if the people were armed, and the court unarmed, that is, if there were no land-force in the nation, but a militia. Had we at this time no standing army, we should not think of *forcing* money out of the pockets of three millions of our subjects. We should not think of punishing with military execution, un-convicted and un-heard, our brave *American* children, our surest friends and best customers. We should not insist on bringing them over to be tried *here*, on pretence of no justice to be had in *America*, in direct violation of the constitution, especially when we had so late an experience of their *candor* in *acquitting* an *officer* of the *army* charged with murdering one of their people, even *since* the commencement of the present unhappy *dissentions*. We should not think of putting them in a state of subjection to an *army* rendered *independent* on the *civil* magistrate, and secured from *punishment* even for the most atrocious offence, by their being to be sent 3000 miles to their mock-trial, across an ocean, where the *persons* and things indispensably *necessary* for their trial, *cannot* possibly be had. We should not think of putting

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<sup>a</sup> DEB. COM. XIII. 104.

ting a part of our western dominions, as large as all *Europe*, under *French* law, which knows nothing of our inestimable privilege of trial by *jury*, whilst our kings at their coronation solemnly swear to govern all the subjects by the *English* law. We should not think of giving our *kings* power to make not only laws, but legislators, for a vast multitude of the subjects, without concurrence of lords and commons. We should not propose to give the sanction of parliament to *popery*, in direct opposition to *revolution*-principles. We should not think of giving *papists* the power of making *laws* obligatory upon *protestants*, with severe penalties and sanctions. We should not imagine a government for a vast colony, vested merely in a *governor* and *council*, always supposed to be creatures of the *court*, without so much as the name of an assembly of *representatives*, without the *people's* having any hand in the making of their own *laws*, which is the very perfection of slavery. We should not think of resuming *unforfeited* charters. We should not think of making governors, the needy, and often worthless dependents of our corrupt court, lords paramount over our brave colonists, by giving them the power of appointing and removing judges at their pleasure, while the governors themselves, however tyrannical, are liable to no impeachment by the people. We should not—but there is no end to observations on the difference between the measures likely to be pursued by a minister backed by a standing *army*, and those of a court awed by the fear of an *armed people*.

I had collected a great deal more upon the *ARMY*, than what is here laid before the public. Fearing lest I should tire the reader, I have suppressed many speeches and quotations on this head, as well as most of the  
other

others I have treated of. What I have published will shew plainly, that the ablest men, and best citizens of this realm, have looked upon a mercenary army in times of peace, whether allowed from year to year, or established for perpetuity, as a dangerous and alarming abuse in a free country. They opposed it strenuously in treatises, pamphlets, and speeches. And we let it pass annually without question or dispute. Whether the fears of our ancestors, or our indifference, are most reasonable, time will shew. By the aspect of the present times, it is not improbable, that the point may very soon be decided.

END of the SECOND VOLUME.



















