

ATLAS OF MIGRATION

New facts and figures
about people on the move



ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG

IMPRINT

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2022

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It is cities where most migrants end up, and it is local administrations that must deal with their everyday needs such as housing, healthcare and schooling. At the same time, migrants can reinvigorate towns and cities by providing labour and generating demand. An increasing number of city administrations see the benefits of migration and are campaigning for kinder policies.

50 GETTING ORGANIZED: TOGETHER WE ARE STRONG

Unskilled migrant workers in Europe are often forced to accept the only work they can find – picking fruit and harvesting vegetables – for ultra-low wages. By getting organized, they can combat illegal exploitation by unscrupulous employers.

52 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: WIN-WIN-LOSE

Migration is often a win-win-win situation. It benefits everyone: the migrants themselves, the destination country and the country of origin. But massive emigration can turn the country of origin into a big loser, especially if large numbers of young people turn their backs on it. The situation is particularly difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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INTRODUCTION

CHANGING THE PERCEPTION OF MIGRATION

This second Atlas of Migration from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is a completely new edition that addresses a range of current issues and topics. Along with examples from various countries and a focus on labour migration and the caring professions, we also put a spotlight on the effects of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Since the start of the war on February 24, 2022, 14 million Ukrainians have fled for their lives to other places within and outside Ukraine. Many young Russian men are now fleeing to avoid conscription by their government.

The previous edition of this atlas explained that most people seek shelter among their

neighbours. At that time, it was people from developing countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Now there is a neighbour in need in Europe.

Very few people migrate voluntarily. But climate change and its devastating consequences are forcing ever more people to abandon their homes. The search for work and a better income also motivates people to set out on the road. Migration has many realities. This atlas aims to support all those who are committed to a plural society. Its goal is to change the way we look at migration and promote openness and pragmatism.

Daniela Trochowski
Executive member of the board, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung

Johanna Bussemer, Dorit Riethmüller, Franziska Albrecht and Christian Jakob
Editors, Atlas of Migration

Some people can travel the globe freely or choose their place of residence because of their passport and the colour of their skin. But others are not allowed even to escape from poverty, war or terror. Today, 100 million people around the world are fleeing, most of them in the developing world. Some must spend years or even decades in an insecure situation that prevents them from reaching a safe place and leading a dignified life.

Furthermore, we can see that the members of the European Union continue to push a system of deterrence and suppression of rights in our immediate vicinity at the EU's external borders. In 2022, guards massacred dozens of people at the border fence of the Spanish exclave of Melilla. Every day, many more die in the Mediterranean, while the European countries who could prevent such tragedies not only have full knowledge of their situation, but actively hinder their rescue.

Military force and barricades are also the order of the day outside Europe. On the Mexico-US border, off the coast of Australia and in the Sahara – in all these places, highly armed states intervene in the movements of migrants so forcefully that people are killed by active violence or die for lack of assistance. The climate crisis, fuelled largely by companies in the developed world, will force increasing numbers of people to flee their homes. Organizations are right to fight for climate change to be recognized as a cause of flight.

As citizens of a state that has not only incurred unspeakable guilt through colonialization over the centuries, but also strongly influences world events today, we have a special responsibility to stand up for safe routes for refugees, for procedures based on the rule of law, and for good living conditions for all.

Clara Bünger

Member of the German Parliament, Die Linke,
Spokesperson for Refugee and Legal Policy

To find food or breeding grounds, many animals migrate at certain times of year to particular locations, ignoring any artificial boundaries. As in the animal world, people also move around. They are migrants, and they have in this manner spread out across the globe. They may change locations for just a short time, or for a longer period. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which enshrines this universal characteristic, says in its Article 13: “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

A closer look shows that the 1948 Declaration is anything but universal. At the time it was drafted, the majority white society regarded a large part of the non-white population as sub-

human. Even today, not everyone is free to move where they wish. Borders, which are insurmountable barriers for some, do not exist for others.

Are the humans who come up against these barriers seen as less valuable than migrating, roaming animals? Who decides on the right, or the prohibition, to cross particular borders? Is it easier for the rich to cross than for the poor? For centuries, the Global North, the West, colonized the globe because it was of the opinion that it owned it. So the question is: who owns the Earth today?

Lilian Thuram

French author and former footballer, 1998 World Cup winner and director of the Fondation éducation contre le racisme, pour l'égalité (Foundation for Education against Racism and for Equality)

12 BRIEF LESSONS

ABOUT THE WORLD OF MIGRATION

1 Humankind has always been on the move. The **HISTORY** of humanity is also the history of migration. All modern **SOCIETIES** and all nations on Earth are the result of **MOBILITY**.



2 People flee war and natural disasters, or move so they can work and live in another country. Today, there are more migrants than ever before. But their **SHARE** of the total world population is **VERY SMALL**.



3 When migrants arrive at their destination, they are often subject to **DISCRIMINATION**. They are paid lower wages, have to settle for inferior housing and get fewer career opportunities. Such discrimination can persist for **MANY YEARS**. Their children and grandchildren may still be regarded as “foreign”.



4 Migrants often perform **POORLY PAID** or informal work because they are denied access to the regular job market or to social services.



5 Migrants' **CONTRIBUTIONS** to the economy are welcomed, but they must often **FIGHT** for their rights. **OTHERS** can also benefit from such struggles – including local workers who join in the battle against **EXPLOITATION**.



6 **WELL-EDUCATED** individuals often leave poor countries and move abroad in search of work and higher salaries. Because they generally **SEND** part of their earnings **BACK HOME**, and in some cases, **RETURN** with better qualifications and skills, migration is also good for developing countries.



7 People from the Global North can get **VISAS** easily. They can travel almost everywhere **UNHINDERED** and can emigrate to many other countries. Such freedom of movement is **DENIED TO MOST** other people around the world.



8 For the poor and for many refugees, there is **NO LEGAL WAY** to migrate. They must often **PAY** people smugglers large sums to cross a border. Migration routes are **VERY DANGEROUS**. Many people **DIE** while on the road.



9 More and more people must move house because of **CLIMATE CHANGE**. The lifestyles of people in the developed world are partly responsible. **CLIMATE REFUGEES** therefore have a right to their support.



10 The European Union is trying to stop migrants **FAR FROM ITS OWN SHORES**. In doing so, it implicitly accepts serious human-rights violations. Especially in Africa, people can **NO LONGER** move **FREELY** within their own regions.



11 An increasing number of **WOMEN AND GIRLS** migrate alone – to **FLEE** from danger, to **EARN** a decent living, to take control of their **OWN LIVES**, or to **HELP** their families. They need special **PROTECTION** both on the way to their destination, and after they arrive.



12 A society in which locals and migrants live together in peace is **NORMAL**, and not the exception. The basis for this is **SOLIDARITY** – the willingness to share.

HISTORY

CROSSING BORDERS, BREAKING BOUNDARIES

In the last few centuries, poverty, repression and violence have forced millions of people to leave their homes. For some, the perilous journey has ended in a better life. For others, it has meant generations of slavery.

Human history is the history of migration. Human-kind did not suddenly begin to up sticks and relocate in the modern era. Long before modern transport existed, people would move over long distances. And the idea that past migrations were permanent is a myth: return flows, seasonal migrations and variability have been features of local, regional and global movements in the past, just as they are in the present day.

Global migration – mobility from one continent to another – has been a major feature only since the start of the colonial era, and the slave trade played a big part. From the 16th to 19th centuries, as many as 12 million people were shipped from West Africa to the Americas. Millions more slaves were taken from East Africa, mainly to work on the Arabian Peninsula.


In the 19th century, the number of Europeans turning their backs on the old continent rose rapidly. A small part of these intercontinental migrants took the land route, trekking east and settling mainly in the Asiatic parts of the Russian Empire. A much larger number crossed oceans: of the 55 to 60 million people who went overseas between 1815 and 1930, more than two-thirds went to North America. Another fifth voyaged to South America. Seven percent ended up in Australia and New Zealand. Wherever they settled, the composition of the population changed radically: new Europes emerged.

The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the peak of Europe's emigration wave, also marked the beginning of Europe as a destination for immigrants, a trend that finally took hold after the Second World War. Many people came from the former colonies, especially to cities such as London, Paris and Brussels. As a result of the economic upswing in Western Europe after the war, national governments recruited "guest workers" from Southern Europe. These workers later brought their families to join them. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, many people fled, or moved, from the former Eastern Bloc to the West. After 1989 their numbers rose considerably.

The liberalization of United States immigration laws in 1965 led to a second wave of migration to that country. By the end of 2021, the number of foreign-born residents in the USA had reached 46 million, almost half of them from Latin America.


Migrants rarely went to a completely unknown foreign country – and nor do they do today. Networks often play a considerable role in guiding mobility. Migration has never been an end in itself: the temporary or permanent stay in a new location is intended to give migrants the opportunity to have a bigger say in shaping their own

*Unequal living standards across the globe,
more information and better transportation
– all these foster international migration*



BY LAND AND BY SEA

Origins and destinations of migrants, 1500–1914, selected, millions of migrants



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lives. That is the case for people seeking employment, a better job with more money, or educational opportunities, as well as the pursuit of self-determination: the desire to escape from an arranged marriage, for example, or pursue a particular career.

One trigger for migration has always been war and violence – or threats of violence. The idea of using forced migration to consolidate power or achieve political goals is by no means new. Refugee movements, expulsions and deportations occur when particular groups – usually state actors – threaten life and limb, restrict rights and freedoms, limit opportunities for political participation, or inhibit sovereignty and individual or collective security to the extent that people see no other option than to leave their homes.

The holy scriptures of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are sprinkled with stories of people who seek protection and who are welcomed or rejected by the host communities. According to ancient authors, Rome became so powerful because it consistently gave shelter to large numbers of persecuted people. The following centuries saw rules governing asylum. But specific national and international norms for protecting people fleeing violence and perse-

From colonialism into the industrial era, over 100 million people travelled far across the globe, or were sold as slaves in foreign lands

cution emerged much later, after the First World War. The Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 is regarded as a milestone in international law.

Are more people migrating nowadays than ever before? This question cannot be answered. There are no data for many historical periods, and the concept of migration is defined in many different ways. However, we can establish whether the number of migrants within a particular territory has always been very high due to factors such as the long and far-reaching process of urbanization. The movement from the countryside to towns and cities was a cause and consequence of industrialization. But relatively few people have undertaken movements over long distances, across national boundaries or between continents.

Migration, especially over long distances, is a very demanding social process. Nevertheless, it remains a constant of human development. No modern society, no current nation, and no major city would exist without it. —

THE PRESENT

FINDING A NEW PLACE TO STAY

More people now live outside their home countries than ever before. They have many reasons for moving: some want to improve their lives, some move for love, while others fear for their survival.

The United Nations regularly records the number of people who live outside their country of birth or citizenship on a temporary or permanent basis. The absolute number of such international migrants has risen significantly in the last three decades: from 153 million in 1990 to 281 million in 2020. Were it not for the travel restrictions due to COVID-19, the rise would undoubtedly have been higher.

People decide to leave their country of origin for a range of reasons – to work, study, start a partnership or family, or fulfil their desire to determine their own future, to name just a few. Not everyone leaves their home voluntarily. War, persecution and violence may force them to seek refuge elsewhere. According to the United Nations refugee agency UNHCR, some 47 million people had fled their home countries by mid-2022, almost triple the number of people worldwide who fled abroad in 2000 (17 million). In 2022, one of every seven people who had to leave their home was a refugee or asylum seeker.

Even more people change their place of residence within their home country. The United Nations estimated that in 2009 there were a total of 749 million such inter-

national migrants. In China in 2020 alone, the national bureau of statistics counted some 286 million people who had moved from rural areas to the economically more prosperous cities in search of work.

What applies to cross-border migration is also true for migration within a country: it is not always voluntary. At the end of 2021, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre registered around 53 million people who had moved within their country to escape war and violence. Another 23.7 million were fleeing natural disasters such as floods, storms and earthquakes. Many such disaster-related migrations are only short-term: those affected will return to their places of origin as soon as the situation has improved. It can be expected that climate change will increase migrations due to gradual environmental shifts or sudden natural disasters. The majority of the people displaced in such ways are likely to stay within their country of origin.


In general, the majority of migration movements are rather small-scale. In 2020, around half of international migrants resided in a country in the same region of the world as that from which they originated. Europe's free movement of people also contributes to the fact that 70 percent of European-born migrants stay within the conti-

Reasons to move: war, the quest for a better life, luxurious places for the rich, jobs for the poor, religion, tax avoidance, and passports in exchange for investment



HOPE IN THE DISTANCE

Distribution of interregional migration by nine destination regions, in percent, 2020



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ment. Migrants in Asia and Africa are more likely to leave their home continent.

Migration from one continent to another is also less likely because travelling large distances is associated with higher financial and social costs. So it is hardly surprising that most migrants do not come from the world's poorest countries. In 2020, around two-thirds of them came from middle-income countries. In addition, many states try to limit migration through restrictive immigration rules and strict border control policies. These also make mobility harder.

In 2020, two-thirds of all those living outside their countries of origin resided in just 20 countries. In absolute terms, the United States was the most common destination, with 51 million international migrants. It was followed by Germany (16 million) and Saudi Arabia (13 million). Next came the Russian Federation (12 million) and the United Kingdom (9 million).

A rather different picture emerges if we look at the number of migrants as a proportion of the total population. Taking this as a measure, various countries in the Persian Gulf count as major destinations for migrants. In 2020, immigrants comprised 88.1 percent of the population of the United Arab Emirates, compared to only 18.8 percent in Germany and 15.3 percent in the United States. Overall, North America is losing importance in international migration patterns, and the focus is gradually shifting to Asia. Central and South Asia experienced the biggest growth in international migrants between 2000 and 2020. India, with its large population, had the biggest diaspora: 18 million people from India lived outside the country in

Most international migration takes place between countries in Asia. At the same time, most intercontinental migrants also come from Asia


Two-thirds of all long-distance migrants head for the wealthier parts of the globe, to North America, Europe and the oil-rich Gulf states of western Asia

2020, followed by Mexico and the Russian Federation (11 million each), China (10 million) and Syria (8 million).

Migration does not have to be forever. Many people live abroad only for a limited period, then return to their home country or move on somewhere else. The media often reports about refugees, but less often about expatriates: skilled workers who are sent abroad by their employers. And who is aware that babies who are adopted from a foreign country are also classified as migrants? —

GLOBAL CROSSROADS

Migration movements within and between six continents and regions, in millions, 2020



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VIOLENCE

GETTING AWAY FROM THE FIGHTING

When violence breaks out, people have few choices: fight, hide or flee. For many, flight is the only realistic option, but fleeing is far from easy. It costs money and is fraught with danger, and finding a safe haven where one is welcome can be hard.

Violent conflicts are among the most important reasons that people leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere – either within their home country or outside it. Conflicts may pit state-controlled armies against each other, or they may involve non-state combatants. The number of conflicts between states has fallen since 1989. Yet the number, duration and complexity of so-called civil wars has risen in the last 10 years.

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research counted a total of 20 full-scale wars (including across borders) in 2021, along with 20 “limited” wars. Both types of conflict are characterized by intense armed violence and human suffering. A large number of these conflicts are based in the Sahel region of Africa and in the Middle East.


The fighting in regions such as in Syria, Yemen and Mali reflects the complexity of today’s conflicts. They are characterized by the diffuse, often contradictory interests

of non-state groups, national governments and international actors. This complexity makes it difficult to resolve such conflicts effectively and to end the humanitarian emergencies that result from them. Major triggers causing people to flee also include short-lived violent crises, such as those caused by terrorism or disputed elections, as well as organized crime, as occurs in Mexico. The humanitarian consequences of such triggers are often on par with conflicts as defined in international law.

The effects of conflict are severe. In 2021, over 145,000 people worldwide died as a result of wars, armed conflicts and other forms of political violence. The conflict in Afghanistan claimed the most lives (42,200), followed by Yemen (18,300) and Myanmar (10,400). More than half the people killed by explosive weapons were civilians.

The destruction of infrastructure such as farmland, houses, hospitals, roads and schools has a devastating impact on civil society. Some 77 million people suffer from hunger as a result of armed conflicts. Health care services have been seriously weakened by the bombing of hospitals in countries such as Syria and Yemen.

How many refugees can a society absorb? Small countries demonstrate to bigger developed countries that it is possible to take in more



UKRAINE

THE RESULTS OF WAR

All wars bring unnecessary suffering and cause people to flee for their lives. Other European countries have been generous in welcoming refugees from Ukraine – but their hospitality contrasts with the barriers they put up to people fleeing from other regions.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 triggered the second large-scale movement of refugees in Europe of the 21st century. Between the start of hostilities on February 24 and the autumn of the same year, more than 12 million people – over one-quarter of Ukraine's total population – left the country, at least on a temporary basis. Many have returned to Ukraine in the meantime, but around 7.4 million people are still registered as refugees in other European countries.

A large proportion of these Ukrainians fled to neighbouring countries. Most of them, around 2.8 million, were registered in Russia and Belarus, and the second-highest number, about 1.4 million, in Poland. Germany is in third place, with slightly over 1 million registered refugees, of whom two-thirds are women and one-third children and youths.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), almost 7 million more people have been internally displaced within Ukraine. All in all, the Russian aggression has turned almost half the Ukrainian population into refugees, at least in the short term.


The sudden outbreak of war posed big challenges to


the destination countries. These were similar to those faced in the summer of 2015, when more than 1.3 million people, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, sought refuge in Europe from the conflicts in their own countries. Within a year, around 890,000 people registered with Germany's Federal Office for Refugees and Migration. Despite the huge level of solidarity, anti-democratic actors used – and continue to use – the refugee issue to agitate against minorities and social institutions.

The willingness to support refugees from the war in Ukraine is especially high in Poland and Germany, but it is also very pronounced in other countries in Europe. Governments have responded with far-reaching measures, such as Germany's decision to immediately grant work permits to Ukrainians. Nevertheless, such measures have generated controversial discussions with regard to a particular group of refugees. In the winter of 2021/22, thousands of people from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq tried to cross the border from Belarus into Poland. The Polish government tried every means at hand to prevent their entry, resulting in dramatic and inhumane situations.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine was home to more than 70,000 international students, mainly from India, Morocco, Nigeria and Central Asia. Some were prevented from fleeing, either within Ukraine or to a neigh-

The attack on Ukraine forced 14.5 million people to flee, 2 million more than those forced out of their homes in Syria since 2011





bouring country. They continue to be treated differently: in Germany, for example, they have not been granted the same rights as Ukrainian nationals who have sought refuge there.

The indignation about the unequal treatment of white refugees from Ukraine and non-white refugees – from Ukraine or from elsewhere – is justified. On the other hand, racism is not the only reason for the discrepancy. The following considerations have also played a major role in the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees.

Firstly, the idea that neighbouring countries should open their borders to refugees is a good and sensible one, and very few nations have not done so in recent history. But refugees cannot hope for such a feeling of solidarity if they come from further away. Secondly, the European Union’s visa-free rules for Ukrainians, which had been agreed previously, meant that they were able to enter central and western Europe quite legally after the outbreak of the war. This was not the case, according to a widespread conservative understanding, for refugees who crossed the Mediterranean – though this view does not take into account other rights, such as the human right to flee. Thirdly, the fear of more far-reaching aggression by Russia has gripped Western societies, leading to strong solidarity between western and central European countries and Ukraine – at least in the short term.

It is unclear how many Ukrainians have fled to Russia and Belarus, and how many have been deported there or have defected

While such unequal treatment cannot be justified on moral grounds, neighbourliness and differing legal statuses were part of the reason that European societies were ready to grant millions of people from Ukraine unlimited admission with all rights, while meeting comparatively small numbers of people arriving via Belarus or the Mediterranean with the toughest forms of deterrence.

With the partial mobilization that Russian President Putin ordered in September 2022, and with the country’s ever-intensifying political situation, more and more Russians are leaving their homeland. Because long prison sentences await Russian deserters, they could be forced to spend years abroad. The Russian war against Ukraine will have long-lasting consequences on the landscape of migration in Europe and the living conditions of those who have fled. Large numbers of Ukrainians will not return to their destroyed country, even if the war ends quickly. Russia’s unilateral shifting of international boundaries poses unforeseeable problems for the refugees. The traumatic consequences of destruction and flight will remain a reality of life for many people far into the future. —

STORMY CROSSING

It is impossible to stay in your home if it is underwater. You cannot grow crops or raise livestock if it has not rained for years. Many migrants are forced to leave their homes because of climate change. Their numbers can be expected to grow further.

Climate change is changing migration patterns around the world. Weather extremes such as floods and hurricanes, along with rising sea levels, are a cause of flight and displacement. Withered crops, burned pastures, livestock dying of thirst, mothers and children searching for water and food: three rainy seasons have failed in the Horn of Africa. The United Nations calls it the worst drought since 1981. In parts of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, more than 13 million people are threatened by hunger, according to the World Food Programme. In Somalia alone, 4.5 million people are affected by the drought.


Despite their own relatively low CO₂ emissions, low-income countries and marginalized populations are disproportionately affected by climate change. Extreme weather events such as drought destroy the basis of people's livelihoods and force them to leave – not only to seek work, but simply to survive. The majority of migration and

refugee movements take place within individual countries. If that is not enough and people do have to leave their home country, most go first to a neighbouring one. The World Bank estimates that by 2050, the effects of climate change may force as many as 216 million people to move within their own country.


In 2020 alone, 30.7 million people were forced to flee due to weather-related events, three times as many as were uprooted by conflict or violence. Most climate refugees are in Asia, where in 2021 more than 57 million people were affected. One in every three migrants worldwide comes from that continent. Rural villages are emptying, while megacities such as Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, are at risk. Some regions that are now densely populated will become unsafe or uninhabitable, warns a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Reasons include water shortages, crop failures, storm surges, flooding of river valleys, and other disasters.

Whether and at which point someone takes the drastic step of leaving their home depends not only on external threats. Social factors such as protection by the community and the individual's financial situation also play an important role. Migration – which may be temporary or seasonal – may be an important strategy to come to terms with the effects of climate change. But if those directly affected do not get support from the responsible agencies to adapt, they risk ending up in an even worse situation. While the right to migrate is universal, so too must be the right not to migrate, to be protected: for most, climate-induced migration is forced migration.

There is still no universally accepted definition for a person fleeing climate change. While the term "climate refugee" is widely used, the United Nations has not yet recognized environmentally related reasons as a cause for flight in their own right. Doing so would require a decision by its member states. The United Nations refugee agency UNHCR has merely suggested discussions about better protection for people who are displaced by disasters and climate change. In 2018, the United Nations adopted the Global Compact on Migration. This was intended to recognize climate change as a cause of migration. The final wording, however, implies that climate-induced migration is voluntary. The situations of people who actually have no choice were not considered. The International Organization for Migration uses the term "environmental



Victims of natural disasters can often return quickly to their homes. But 7 million of the 30.7 million people affected in 2020 had not returned home by the end of the year



migrant”, but its suitability is disputed because the term “migrant” has no legal definition.


The industrial countries, which are responsible for the biggest share of carbon dioxide emissions, are also the world’s biggest border guards. Seven of the largest greenhouse gas emitters – including the United States, Germany and France – spend on average 2.3 times as much on border and immigration controls as they do on funding climate-related measures.

In 2021, the German Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement called on the country’s government to take climate change into account as a cause of future migration. It recommended supporting countries in the Global South to combat climate change in order to prevent displacement and a consequent refugee crisis in Europe. In the case of those places where migration is best suited as an adaptation, the commission of experts suggested regional and global cooperation to create resettlement programmes, regular migration pathways and even climate passports for people from high-risk areas. These would be a powerful symbol for protecting refugees based on human rights. Germany must invest in helping the Global South adapt to climate threats, whether in the form of resilient infrastructure, early warning systems, disaster protection, humanitarian aid, compensation or reconstruction.

Climate change is a major cause of natural disasters. Housing policies and civil protection measures can help reduce the harm they inflict

Natural and human catastrophes displaced roughly equal numbers of people in 2020. Nowhere was completely spared

This is the way forward. An approach in the countries of the Global North that is based on human rights and migration would have to recognize that no one wants to be forced to leave their own home. As long as the underlying factors causing migration are not addressed in a fair and just manner, and as long as the Global North clings to its policies of containing and repressing migration, migrants will be forced to seek alternate, often dangerous, ways to survive. —



REGIONAL MOBILITY

IMPOSING BOUNDARIES WHERE NONE EXISTED BEFORE

In West Africa, migration has always been an accepted part of life. People move to escape poverty, to find work and to improve their lives. This benefits everyone: migrants, host communities and the families left behind. Colonial boundaries made it harder, and new rules are making it harder still.

When the European media report about migration in Africa, they often give the impression that millions of Africans are on their way to Europe by boat. But according to the United Nations, around 80 percent of the continent's international migrants move within their own region. In West Africa, there were an es-

timated 7.6 million migrants in 2020, of whom 90 percent relocated to other West African countries. Just 0.5 percent came to Europe.

Internal and regional migration dominate movement patterns. The population of West Africa, which is composed of numerous ethnic groups, has been on the move for generations. It was colonization that created new territorial boundaries, splitting asunder ethnic groups such as the Nzema and Bono (Ghana and the Ivory Coast), Ewe (Ghana and Togo), Yoruba (Nigeria and Benin) and Hausa (Nigeria, Niger and Mali), who suddenly found themselves living in different countries.


But migration across the new national boundaries continued even after the lines were drawn on the map. It mainly took the form of seasonal labour movements from the poorer savannah areas into the more humid southern or coastal regions, where migrants sought work in the mines and cities. Most families in West Africa do not subsist on a single source of income, but piece together a living from farming and various other economic activities. The daily lives of many West Africans have therefore traditionally involved a combination of sedentism and mobility.

Because West Africa is particularly affected by climate change, declining soil fertility, armed conflicts and limited access to economic resources, migration is an important way for people to escape from poverty and food insecurity, either temporarily or more permanently. For many families, mobility is an option to diversify their incomes and thus secure their livelihoods.

It is important to distinguish between different forms of migration. Forced migration or displacement due to severe drought, conflict or terrorist attacks must be differentiated from seasonal migration in search of work. If someone wishes to migrate, they must have the financial means to do so. Someone who does not have enough money cannot move away. On the other hand, many people do not have the desire to leave their homes, even if they have the means to do so and if external factors such as the climate appear unfavourable.


To foster mobility and economic integration within the region, and to dismantle linguistic and national bound-

The European Union's Emergency Trust Fund of 2015 finances development projects to hinder migration – but it also entails concessions from recipient countries



LINES ON A MAP, NOT ON THE GROUND

Migration routes of Fulbe pastoralists with their herds in the rainy and dry seasons in West and Central Africa, 1972 to 2012



aries, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a freedom of movement regulation in 1979. But 43 years later, several factors continue to inhibit mobility in the region. While the right of entry and the abolition of visa requirements for stays under 90 days have been implemented in all countries, less progress has been seen in temporary and permanent residence rights. Only four countries currently grant special residence permits to ECOWAS nationals.

In addition, many citizens lack basic information about the requirements for entry into another ECOWAS country. Corruption occurs at some checkpoints. As a result, many migrants avoid the official border crossings, such as those between Nigeria and Benin, and cross the border elsewhere to avoid having to pay a bribe.

Apart from the stuttering implementation of the ECOWAS free movement protocol, the European Union also represents a significant obstacle to progress towards more freedom of movement in West Africa due to its desire to curb irregular migration in the continent. According to its logic, such irregular movements include the right to enter or leave a country without a visa. The EU has consequently thrown its support behind stronger control meas-

The numerous borders in the Sahel make life harder for the Fulbe, whose cattle are a major source of meat for coastal West Africa

ures at transit and border points, such as at the city of Agadez in Niger.

Over the past several years, the European Union and the International Organization for Migration have launched a number of projects to strengthen border controls within Africa. One has been the introduction of costly biometric passports by national governments. Another has been the establishment of checkpoints at which these passports can be read automatically. For the rural poor, they make traditional forms of migration harder or even impossible. The passports are also an obstacle to the freedom of movement in West Africa.

The African Union, on the other hand, is pursuing a comprehensive political programme to strengthen integration within the continent. This programme, Agenda 2063, aims for complete, continent-wide freedom of movement. The African Union wants to promote the free movement of people. The European Union wants to make it harder. —

MOVING BORDERS

For years, the European Union has been making special efforts to control migration from Africa. One of its most important goals is to cut the number of refugees who come across the Mediterranean. Or better: stop them from getting to its southern shore in the first place.

A few years ago, the European Union kept watch only over its own external borders. But it now increasingly monitors migrants' home countries and those that they pass through as well. Someone who does not have permission to enter Europe should not be able to get there in the first place, the reasoning goes. One consequence: more and more people are drowning in the Mediterranean as they try to reach the sanctuary of its European shore. Between 2014 and February 2022, at least 23,500 people lost their lives in this way, according to the International Organization for Migration, a United Nations body. Even more people die in the Sahara. "We assume that at least two times as many people probably die on their way to the Mediterranean Sea as in the sea itself," said the UN Refugee Agency's Special Envoy for the Mediterranean and Libya, Vincent Cochetel, in 2019.

It is migration control measures that are responsible for detours that have raised the risk of death for travel-

lers across the Sahara, says the initiative Alarm Phone Sahara, which supports migrants in distress in the desert. These measures have been introduced in northern Africa at the behest of European countries. Niger, at the centre of the migration routes, has in recent years received more than 1 billion euros as well as development projects from the European Union. The EU is building up a new police force, the Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières, with the aim of preventing people from Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, from heading off into the Sahara towards Europe. The European border protection agency Frontex has a presence in Senegal to cut off the sea routes to the Canary Islands. In Libya, it is supporting the government to rebuild the so-called "coast guard", which between 2016 and February 2022 captured around 100,000 people on the Mediterranean and brought them back to torture chambers in Libya.


None of this fits in with the plans that the African Union has for its continent: complete freedom of movement from Cairo to Cape Town, along the same lines as the European Union. But while the Schengen zone is supposed to remain an area of free movement, the EU is making sure that the freedom of movement in Africa is restricted. It is turning its neighbours, both near and far, into auxiliary police. The long arm of European border control is confronting transit migrants thousands of kilometres away from its own jurisdiction, using measures such as internment camps, deterrent "awareness campaigns", forgery-proof passports and military assistance. Countries deep in the Sahara and in the Middle East are today cooperation partners of Europe's "migration management".

Turkey is also an important element in Europe's migration defences. Under the EU-Turkey deal of 2016, Turkey committed itself to stopping the movement of refugees in the Aegean and to taking back anyone who nevertheless made it to Greece. A reminder: Turkey has taken in more refugees than any other country in the world – almost 4 million, including some 3.6 million Syrians.

The European Union wants them to stay there. To ensure this, Turkey has received around 6 billion euros from the EU. The result has been a humanitarian catastrophe on the Greek islands. The people who arrive there cannot be deported back to Turkey, but at the same time the Greek government refuses to allow them to come to the



The border service Frontex has a budget that is growing faster than that of any other agency in the European Union



mainland, instead interning them on the islands. For Germany and the rest of the EU, though, the deal has been a success. After all, fewer “irregular migrants” have been arriving in Greece. In 2016, it was 177,000; between January and July 2022, it was just 4,200.


Apart from that, Frontex has achieved quasi-sovereign powers in some southeastern transit states. Since 2018, the border agency there – outside the territory of the European Union itself – has been allowed to conduct patrols and deportations. The first agreement to this effect was concluded with Albania; Montenegro and Serbia signed up later. Similar agreements with North Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are currently being negotiated.

For the agency, such cooperation with the migrants’ countries of origin and transit is a “key element of successful migration management”, wrote the then-director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri. The relocation of European border controls to places far away from the Schengen zone is one of the agency’s future projects. In total, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, as Frontex has been officially called for several years, has been granted 11 billion euros to spend between 2021 and 2027. It is the fastest-growing of all EU agencies. For the same

By 2027 the European Union plans to boost the number of Frontex staff by another 50 percent

Frontex has knotted together a dense web of political, police and intelligence agencies, and has woven the EU’s development assistance into the same fabric

period, the EU plans to spend around 7 million euros on projects “against irregular migration and its causes”. The old budget was too inflexible for “challenges such as the migration and refugee crisis in 2015”, explained Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the European Commission. The budget plans were an “honest response to the realities of our time”. —



PUNISHING THE VICTIMS AND THOSE WHO HELP THEM

Human trafficking, espionage or even terrorism – these are among the accusations made by the justice system against refugees who enter a country without authorization, and against the activists who help them to do so.

Punishing rescuers and humanitarian aid workers is an important part of the policy of deterrence. Reports by human rights organizations about such procedures have been on the increase since around 2017. Victims are turned into perpetrators in order to deter others. This is in direct contravention of the human rights obligations of states and maritime law, such as the requirement to provide assistance in emergencies at sea.

Maritime rescue in particular has been criminalized over the last five years. The authorities confiscate private rescue ships because of alleged, often contrived, technical defects, or they prevent the ships from launching out to sea. The result: fewer ships in operation, fewer rescues and witnesses, and more deaths.

In Italy alone, the justice system has opened at least 18 criminal investigations against the captains and operational leaders of 11 rescue vessels. The accusations have included smuggling, disobeying the orders of marine authorities and illegal waste disposal. None of these investigations has yet led to a conviction. A plane and 15 rescue ships have been seized, some of them repeatedly. The European Court of Justice decided in August 2022 that Italy's seizure of rescue ships for overcrowding was illegal.

The Spanish, German and Dutch authorities have either blocked ships or cooperated with the seizures in other countries. Migrants themselves, forced to steer boats in the Aegean, the central and western Mediterranean and, more recently, the English Channel, are regularly prosecuted for smuggling. But the courts insist that their actions are not illegal.

In Greece, two maritime rescuers who had been arrested for smuggling in 2016 were acquitted. Nonetheless, a new investigation was launched immediately afterwards, this time against around 30 members of Emergency Response Centre International, a non-governmental organization, for membership in a criminal organization, as well as for smuggling, espionage, money laundering and forgery. By 2022, the case was still pending. If they are

found guilty, the defendants face decades of imprisonment.

The Maltese authorities have prosecuted a captain for his alleged disobedience of orders and the false registration of his vessel, and have impounded four ships and an aircraft. Also in Malta, a group of young refugees known as the “El Hiblu 3” (named after the tanker that rescued them) have been charged with terrorism. In Italy, prosecutors brought charges against the crew of the rescue ship *Iuventa*. And on the Greek island of Samos, the father of a child who drowned while trying to escape had to stand trial for alleged smuggling. The defendants in these proceedings are often threatened with many years behind bars.


Many actual smugglers have drawn a lesson from this: they no longer steer the refugee boats themselves. The threatened punishment makes doing so far too risky. Instead, they send off the refugees by boat alone. If these boats get into distress at sea, passengers risk drowning if they do nothing, yet face prosecution if they take the helm into their own hands.

Volunteers, meanwhile, can now be punished for bringing people to safety in Europe, or even for giving them food, clothing or care. This criminalization policy is made possible by the so-called Facilitators Package, a set of rules issued by the European Union in 2002, which requires member states to outlaw people smuggling. The problem with this is that intention to make a profit, which is a required condition for people smuggling according to United Nations protocol, is merely regarded as optional under European Union law. Prosecutors and judges can now treat refugees or helpers as if they were running a mafia-like business even if they have not attempted to profit from the border crossing. Those who help for humanitarian reasons can also be punished. Lawyers speak of “solidarity crimes”.

For years, this situation has been criticized fiercely. In December 2020, the European Commission responded with a guideline to clarify that sea rescue should not be criminalized in line with international law – but only if private rescue ships follow the instructions of the authorities. In the central Mediterranean, this means that after receiving a radio message from the Italian or Maltese rescue coordination centre, the rescuers are required to hand over the people they have rescued to the Libyan coast guard. But Libya is not a safe country for refugees. Many have fled imprisonment, slavery and torture there.

FALLEN BY THE WAYSIDE

Deaths and missing migrants, 2014 to September 2022, by year and migration route, number of individuals



The mayors of the border bottlenecks of Calais in France (where migrants hope to cross the Channel to England) and Ventimiglia in Italy (close to the French border) use by-laws to ban the distribution of food, destroy camps and dismantle showers. In France, at least, citizens' initiatives in the Roya valley and Briançon in the Alps have persuaded the national authorities to apply an exemption. This means that in the mountains,

Without the rescue ships provided by organizations and private individuals in the Mediterranean, the number of victims in that region would be much higher

those who assist in the illegal stay or transit of people without documents are exempted from legal prosecution – even though helping them to enter the country is still criminalized. —

MAPS AND APPS

The more georeferenced knowledge that institutions produce about migration, the more important it becomes to understand the power of maps, cartographic thinking and the representation of space that they convey.

Maps of migration flows are neither neutral illustrations nor accurate representations of reality. Since colonial times, those in power have used maps to represent and extend their control and sovereignty over territory and to legitimize their political goals. Cartographic representations of migration and refugees are guided by specific interests. State agencies count migrants as they cross borders and make them visible in map form. In the political debate, such depictions help enforce measures to control and manage migration.

Unlike text or a table, maps depict border crossings and migration in graphical form. Arrows, border lines, and origin and destination countries shaded in different

colours enable cartographers to communicate a supposedly clear message. They want as few dotted lines and hatched areas as possible that might point to disputed, hard-to-explain situations, grey areas or even unknown conditions on the ground.


The visual appeal of maps causes them to be read as real and true, and they tend not to be questioned in the same way as text is. This suggestive power is tempting for political cartography. The European border management agency Frontex, for example, publishes regular “risk analyses”, depicting irregular migration visually and cartographically. It employs enormous arrowheads, fed by lines from many different countries. These arrows may be bigger than entire EU member states, and sometimes even cover them.

European border controllers – including both Frontex and the Greek coast guard – use technological advances in border infrastructure to monitor Europe’s external Schengen borders remotely, comprehensively and in real time. It can be assumed that they use maps of the exact boundaries in the Aegean to prevent people from fleeing across the sea. The practice of so-called pushbacks – the pushing back of boats to the precise boundaries of their own territorial waters – has increased markedly in recent years. Such actions are illegal because people have a legal right to apply for asylum in the European Union if they cross its external border.

Civil society groups have been using maps for many years, for purposes such as showing the number of casualties on the refugee routes across the Mediterranean. Relatively new is the use of digital maps and apps by migrants themselves to counter official obstacles. Smartphones are indispensable for migrants, not only to keep in contact with family and friends, but also to navigate their way along dangerous routes through foreign countries and deserts to the coast and then across the sea. Communication takes place mostly via apps that draw on geographical data and maps.



One example of the use of such digital map applications is the Alarmphone network. This organization operates a sea rescue hotline in the Mediterranean and a search service in the Sahara. Its phone number is widely known among refugees. The Alarmphone activists use calls from satellite phones or smartphones to determine the coordinates of people in distress at sea. Armed with

The use of the Mercator projection is an example of how geopolitical power relations are perpetuated by maps



ARROWS LOOK LIKE LINES OF ATTACK

Failed and deficient cartographic presentations



*Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency

the exact location, they call on the responsible authorities to fulfil their duty to rescue people at sea.

The knowledge thus generated about the locations of distress calls, illegal pushbacks and successful rescue operations can be mapped afterwards, and can assist in the critical observation and documentation of official practices. Forensic Architecture, an agency that investigates human rights violations, presents cartographic evidence of surveillance zones in the Mediterranean, with satellite images, simulations of winds and currents, and statements from survivors. It has used such evidence to show why more than 60 migrants were left to die in 2011 when their boat drifted without fuel for a fortnight, even though its location was known to the Italian, Maltese and NATO authorities. Forensic Architecture's documentation of this incident reached a wide public audience and

With some political maps, the means and ends are immediately obvious. With others, problems become apparent only after a closer look

was used in several court cases.

These examples illustrate the vastly different goals that can be pursued via cartographic representations and digital apps in the field of international migration. There is a political dimension to so-called technical means such as the implementation of new digital technology in border controls and the geodata-based surveillance of the Mediterranean. The spread of smartphones, mobile internet and open-source mapping software makes it possible for migrants to find their way through the border architecture, and for civil society to look over the shoulders of the surveillance authorities. —

VISA

FREEDOM FOR THE WELL-HEELED

Border-free travel is, officially at least, taken for granted within the European Union. The right passport also makes it possible to wander the globe at will. If you do not have such a passport, you quickly discover that your freedom of movement depends on the thickness of your wallet.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants every person the right to move freely within a state. Everyone also has the right to leave a country, including their own. So a globally recognized human right exists to move within one's own country, as well as to emigrate and return freely. Such a right is not respected everywhere: China and Tunisia, for example, restrict it.


But what does not exist is the unrestricted right to enter another country. National states increasingly control access to their territory by granting or denying visas. Huge inequalities in this regard exist across the globe. In 2022, German passport holders only needed to apply for a visa to enter 37 out of 199 countries. At the other end of the scale is Afghanistan, where citizens are only allowed into 27 other countries without a visa. The Taliban's seizure of power in summer 2021 did nothing to change this. Not a single country removed its visa requirements for Afghans in order to make it easier for them to flee.

The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily made it harder to get a visa. In 2022, someone applying to enter a Western country often had to demonstrate that they had been vaccinated against the virus using a Western vaccine. The Russian and Chinese vaccines, which were far more widely used in the global South, were not acceptable for a visa application to the European Union, among other regions.

The Henley Passport Index 2022, which measures the significance of citizenship for freedom of movement, puts Germany level with Spain, and after Japan, Singapore and South Korea, in the top 5 of 199 nations and territories. Germans thus enjoy some of the greatest freedom of movement in the world. Conversely, visa-free entry into Germany is possible only for citizens of the other 26 members of the European Union, the 5 candidate countries, and 67 further states, including important political and economic partners such as Japan, the UK and the USA. Citizens of the other 105 countries must undergo an often time-consuming and expensive application process, even if they only want to make a quick visit to Germany.

For this, applicants must lay bare their private lives, submit information about third parties and answer a

Tens of thousands of wealthy individuals have taken advantage of seemingly innocuous economic growth measures to buy their way into the EU



string of questions: “How much money is in your bank account? What do you want to do in Germany? Who is your employer there? Who invited you? Where will you live? Who will bear the costs of your stay?” Ultimately, the consulates are primarily interested in whether the applicant will leave the country again when their visa expires.

If the authorities do not believe that the applicant is willing to return, they will reject the application. The visa department has a great deal of discretion here: there are no binding criteria. That leaves room for arbitrary discrimination and corruption. Between 2008 and 2010, visas were issued in exchange for bribes in German embassies in Africa, South America and Eastern Europe. In 2018, it emerged that embassy workers in Lebanon had sold quick appointments to applicants who wanted to skip the very long queue for an interview.

In 2019 – before the COVID-19 pandemic – German consulates issued 2.28 million visas. Some 268,000 applications were rejected, making the rejection rate around 16 percent. The negative decisions were very unevenly distributed. In Boston, USA, the rejection rate was 0.26 percent. In Ankara, Turkey, it was 23 percent. In Lagos, Nigeria, 48 percent of all visa applications were thrown out.

For many, the costs of an application alone present an insurmountable hurdle. If you have applied for a German visa because you want to study there, you must currently pay €10,332 euros into a blocked account, from which you can withdraw money only in Germany. This money is intended to support you for at least a year. In view of the wage rates in many countries in Africa and the Middle East, this is an almost impossible sum for many would-be students. The rule removes the option to finance their stay in Germany by working there.

So-called golden passports and golden visas serve as the most dramatic examples of how the thickness of one’s wallet determines one’s freedom of movement. They go to foreigners who have invested a certain amount of money in the destination country. In Europe alone, 14 countries offer passports or permanent visas to those who make six-figure investments. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Latvia and Spain halted such programmes, which previously had been popular among wealthy Russians.

Germany has similar rules, though these are not classified as golden visas. Since 2004, you can get an investor visa if you invest a large sum in your own business in Germany that is securely financed and viable. At first, a sum of 250,000 euros was enough; now a substantial advantage for the location of the business is also expected. If the project secures a livelihood, the prospect of an indefinite residence permit beckons after three years. —


EU citizens face different rules when travelling abroad. Travellers arriving in the EU fall into two groups: those who have the right passport, and those who do not

PASSPORT, PLEASE

Travel freedom through citizenship and passport, 2022


How many countries can citizens of these countries travel to without applying for a visa first?

- 151 to 193
- 101 to 150
- 51 to 100
- 27 to 50



Under which conditions can EU citizens enter these countries?


- free, no visa required
- visa on arrival
- online document* in advance
- advance visa in passport
- different rules for different EU states



*including eVisa, ESTA, eTA

Under which conditions are people from these countries allowed to enter the EU?

- without visa, with ETIAS visa*
- with visa



*European Travel Information and Authorization System, unified EU travel permit as of 2023

small states not shown

UNDOCUMENTED

NO PAPERS, NO PERMIT, NO BENEFITS, NOBODY

The right piece of paper, with the right stamps on it, opens the door to all kinds of benefits: a decent job, somewhere to live, medical care when you fall ill, freedom from the constant fear of being deported. Without the magic document, you are a nobody.

A migrant is “undocumented” if officialdom does not recognize their stay in the country where they live. Undocumented migrants include a broad range of people, such as those whose residence permits for work, study or family reunion have expired or those protected by asylum laws. Some are children who were born to parents who have migrated, but who have themselves never moved anywhere.

Others lose their residence permit when they reach the age of 18, when the permit they had been granted based on their rights as children expires. This may happen to both unaccompanied minors and children who live with their families. In France, children do not need a residence permit, but after their 18th birthday they may find themselves undocumented.

There are no reliable recent estimates for the number of undocumented people who live in the European Union. The most comprehensive study to date was published in 2009 by the European Migration Network. This found that in 2008, the EU was home to between 1.9 and 3.8 million undocumented migrants.

More up-to-date figures exist for individual countries. In Spain in 2019, around 147,000 children and youths between 0 and 19 years of age were without papers. Of those, around 84,000, or 57 percent, were under 10 years old. In the United Kingdom, then still part of the European Union, there were an estimated 674,000 migrants without papers, including 215,000 children. Around 106,000 undocumented people had been born in the UK. Across the Atlantic, an estimated 11 million migrants in the United States lacked documentation.

Living without a regular residence status exposes people to exclusion and the loss of rights. They cannot plan their lives, nor can they get reliable health care. They are not allowed to work legally and have at best limited access to basic services. The consequences are insecure housing, abuse and exploitation in the workplace, poverty, social isolation and fear. Their access to health

insurance is often either difficult or impossible. Many fear they will be deported if they visit a doctor. So they avoid such visits, and may get vital treatment too late or not at all. Many are refused treatment for chronic medical or psychological problems – a violation of their human right to health.

In the world of work, people without the right documents are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Employers frequently take advantage of their precarious residence status by paying them less than the minimum wage, requiring them to work overly long hours, refusing them holidays or granting too few days off. Sometimes their wages are not paid, or not paid in full. The workers do not dare to file a complaint for fear of being deported.

All this has serious consequences for the physical and psychological health of those affected. Growing up without papers may cause long-term harm in the development of children. It may affect their education, housing situation and family dynamics, and result in a fear of the police and the immigration authorities. Children are excluded from important events in the transition to adulthood, such as graduating from school, having an official wedding or earning money to provide for their family. All this may damage young people’s sense of identity and belonging at a crucial phase in their development.


A solution is “regularization” – the term used for the process by which authorities grant someone permission to stay in a country. Migrants without papers can try to apply for a residence permit. But such permits are not granted everywhere: many of the reasons that people migrate are not regarded as a valid basis for regularization.

The regularization may be done via permanent mechanisms, through which someone can file an application at any time, or through programmes in which they have a limited time to apply. Such programmes can simplify access to a regular residence permit. In recent years, Colombia, Ireland and Sweden, among others, have implemented such an approach. Italy, Portugal and Thailand have regularized the status of employees without documentation in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.

The pandemic exacerbated the situation of undocumented migrants. When it started, the incomes of many such migrants who were working in service industries immediately fell because they could not carry on their jobs. At the same time, they could not get state support such as

A SENSE OF SECURITY

Regularization in Switzerland in 2017/18 – survey of migrants with and without a recently issued residence permit in the Swiss canton of Geneva about their material, social and health situation



Respondents: 235 without documents, 202 recently regularized.
 Questions on persons per room and household income: 231 without documents, 195 regularized, 175 born in Switzerland

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unemployment benefits because of their status as irregular residents. Their precarious housing situations made it hard for them to maintain the social distancing required to prevent infection by the virus. Many quickly used up their savings and were forced onto informal forms of support, such as private food parcels.

European Union law permits member states to regularize undocumented residents at any time. Many have done so in the last 25 years. Between 1996 and 2008, 24

Regularization improves the living situation of migrants, who previously did their best to stay under the radar of the authorities

of the 27 member states regularized the residence status of up to 6 million people. But millions more remain. For them, criminalization, prohibitions on entry and residence, and deportation remain everyday features of national policies. —

DEPORTATIONS

STOP AND GO

When a refugee arrives in the European Union, they are confronted by a complicated system of asylum rules which are interpreted in different ways by the authorities. An “obligation to leave” does not necessarily mean they must pack their bags, but it can bring years of uncertainty about their future.

When the European Commission presented its asylum and migration pact in 2020, it wanted to put the European Union’s migration and especially its asylum policy on a new footing. One of the most important elements was the return of asylum seekers whose applications had been rejected. An “EU Return Coordinator” was to be established. Member states that did not want to accept refugees were to provide alternative forms of assistance, said the Commission. It even came up with the mechanism of “return sponsorships” between member states.

In Germany, “enforcement of the obligation to leave the federal territory” – meaning deportation – became an important domestic policy issue after the arrival of many refugees in 2014/15. Someone who did not receive protection through an asylum procedure would have to leave Germany, or would be deported. That seems clear enough. But reality is much more complex.

The difficulties start in deciding who is in need of protection and who is not. Personal statements made during the asylum procedure have to be checked for credibility. Assessments often differ as to the situation in an applicant’s place of origin. Complicated legal rules are sometimes applied in different ways, and there are frequent reports of biased or insufficiently qualified staff at the


Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the agency responsible.


All this means that asylum seekers from the same country are sometimes treated in very different ways. In Bulgaria in 2020, only 1 percent of applicants from Afghanistan were recognized as refugees. In Italy, the figure was 93 percent. Differences exist even within countries. That same year in Germany, one regional branch of the Office for Migration and Refugees granted protection status to 87.5 percent of migrants from Afghanistan. Another branch granted only 31.7 of applications. The national average was 62 percent.

The courts correct around one-third of all asylum decisions on appeal because of deficiencies in content or erroneous assessments. Even if a rejected asylum application is confirmed by the courts, the applicants often cannot leave voluntarily or simply be deported. In mid-2021, 290,000 people in Germany were subject to an enforceable obligation to leave the country. But some 60,000 of these came from either Iraq or Afghanistan, where civil war is raging. Few people if any can be deported there because of the unsafe conditions – though some charter flights have been arranged to Afghanistan from time to time for political reasons.

The terminology can be hard to understand. An “obligation to leave” does not necessarily mean that the person involved has to pack their bags. The same “obligation” applies to the around 240,000 people in Germany who are classified as “tolerated”. This status may be granted to those who cannot be deported for medical or humani-

Asylum decisions vary hugely within the EU. The success of an application often depends on the country in which the application is made





tarian reasons, or because they have an ongoing asylum follow-up procedure, family ties, or a job or apprenticeship. For those affected, a deportation almost always means the use of force and the destruction of their plans and dreams. How many of these “tolerated” individuals should not, or may not, be deported is not recorded. In political discussions, the number of people who are obliged to leave is often compared with the actual number of deportations or departures.

On top of that, unlike deportations, voluntary departures are not all recorded. Until recently, the figures covered only those “voluntary departures” sponsored by the federal government. But many of those affected leave without informing the authorities. Checks repeatedly reveal that perhaps more than half of those who are apparently obliged to leave and who lack the “tolerated” status no longer live in Germany – or are no longer obliged to leave.

In 2019 – before the COVID-19 pandemic – Germany deported around 22,000 people to their country of origin. In 2021, the figure was just under 12,000. Almost 3,000 people were transferred to the European Union country through which they had entered the Union. An important player in such deportations is the EU’s frontier protection agency, Frontex. It organizes deportation charter flights, of which there were 163 in 2021 from Germany. In 2020,

A failed asylum application does not have to mean imminent deportation. Reasons for a “toleration” include war in one’s home country, illness and family ties

Germany held over 3,000 people in deportation detention – a serious infringement on their civil liberties. Belgium, a much smaller country, held 7,100 people in 2017; in Greece in 2018 it was 31,000. In 2017, France detained 46,800 people in readiness for deportation.

In 2020, for the first time, 19 EU member states – not including Germany – provided more precise information on the return of persons who were obliged to leave to their country of origin. On average there were roughly as many voluntary as enforced repatriations. But there were large differences from one country to another. Hungary, Denmark and Italy relied on deportations for more than 90 percent of the repatriations. In Liechtenstein, Latvia and Estonia, the numbers were reversed: over 90 percent of the departures were voluntary. The majority of these, however, were not “voluntary” in the literal sense of the word, but were enforced after an official instruction to leave the country. Many travellers wanted to avoid being deported as this can have traumatic consequences, and would result in a ban on re-entering the European Union for many years. —

SWAYING WITH THE WIND

The most obvious characteristic of far-right parties in Europe is not their ideology, but their opportunism. They latch onto controversial issues, take divisive stands that they think will be popular, and turn the needy into targets. They are against immigration from the Middle East and Africa, but are happy to welcome Europeans from Ukraine.

At the start of 2020, groups of refugees from Afghanistan, Syria and Somalia desperately tried to get across the Turkish–Greek border barriers on the River Evros. Many were stopped, apprehended, turned away, mistreated and sent back. The Turkish president Erdoğan had previously given them hope of entering the European Union, but did not hesitate to exploit their suffering for his own ends.

The special thing about those few weeks was the presence on the Greek side of the river of guests from many countries in Europe, all wanting lend their support to the border forces of army and police. The guests were right-wing extremists who themselves wanted to scour the countryside for refugees. They included members of the European Parliament: Jordan Bardella and Jérôme Rivière, both from the Rassemblement National (National Rally), the party of the French rightist Marine Le Pen, and Dries van Langenhove and Tom Vandendriessche, from the extreme-right Vlaams Belang party in Belgium. From


Germany and Austria came adherents of the identitarian movement, such as Martin Sellner from Vienna. Panagiotis Kalakikos, the conservative mayor of Soufli, a small Greek town near the border, welcomed the self-proclaimed ‘defenders of the European identity’ to his town hall.

Change of location: March 2022 on the eastern border of Poland. Hundreds of thousands of war refugees from Ukraine are crossing the external border of the European Union, fleeing Russian bombs and tanks. The extreme rightists have again come in from all over Europe. But this time they have a different agenda. Louis Aliot, mayor of the southern French city of Perpignan and former partner of Marine Le Pen, arrives by bus. He wants to pick up some refugees and take them back to his city. The Italian Matteo Salvini has also come to eastern Poland. The former interior minister from the far-right Lega party wants to demonstrate his solidarity with the refugees, but he gets a reception rather different from the one he expected. Wojciech Bakun, the right-wing conservative mayor of the border town of Przemyśl, publicly hands him a T-shirt expressing support for Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin-friendly politician wore the same shirt during a visit to Moscow – sacrilege for PiS, the Polish nationalist party, to whom Putin is the very epitome of the enemy.

The far-right politicians were in Poland because they wanted to make people forget that they had supported Putin’s regime until just a short time previously. The far right has always shown a certain flexibility in its position towards immigration and the fight against it. Its basic idea is to construct a chief enemy against which society can unite across all social divisions. What this looks like in practice can be adapted according to the particular situation.

For the far right in Eastern Europe, the Roma or Jews were long seen as the main threat. In western Europe, it was the Muslims. Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of Marine and her predecessor as president of the National Front (the previous name of the Rassemblement National), questioned this publicly. “If Christian Ivorians” – citizens of the Ivory Coast – “arrive here, is that better than if Muslims immigrate?” he asked. But since his daughter took over the party reins, she has largely focused on presenting immigration as negative because it creates an alleged Islamic threat.


Right-wing populist and extremist parties now account for almost 10 percent of the seats in the European Parliament



RISE OF THE POPULISTS

Most recent election results of parties with nationalistic and anti-immigrant programmes in national elections in EU member states since 2019, in percent

- up to 10 percent
- up to 20 percent
- up to 30 percent
- over 30 percent



Austria (AT) 2019: Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 16.2%
Belgium (BE) 2019: New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 16.0%. Vlaams Belang (VB) 12.0%
Bulgaria (BG) 2022: Revival 10.2%. Bulgarian Rise 4.6%. Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO) 0.8%. Ataka 0.5%
Croatia (HR) 2020: Homeland Movement (DP) 10.9%
Cyprus (CY) 2021: National Popular Front (ELAM) 6.8%
Czechia (CZ) 2021: Civic Democratic Party (ODS): part of electoral alliance, no separate results. Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) 9.6%. various right-wing parties 9.0%
Denmark (DK) 2019: Danish People's Party (DF) 8.7%. Stram Kurs 1.8%

Estonia (EE) 2019: Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) 17.8%
Finland (FI) 2019: Finns Party (PS) 17.5%
France (FR) 2022: National Rally (RN) 18.7%
Germany (DE) 2021: Alternative for Germany (AfD) 10.3%. small right-wing parties 1.6%
Greece (GR) 2019: Greek Solution (EL) 3.7%. Golden Dawn (XA) 2.9%
Hungary (HU) 2022: Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance/Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) 52.5%. Jobbik: part of electoral alliance, no separate results. Our Homeland Movement (MHM) 5.7%
Ireland (IE) 2020: Aontú 1.9%
Italy (IT) 2022: Brothers of Italy (Fdi) 26.0%. Lega 8.8%. Forza Italia (FI) 8.1%

Latvia (LT) 2022: National Alliance (NA) 9.3%. Sovereign Power (SV) 3.2%. For Each and Every One (KuK) 3.7%. Latvia First (LPPV) 6.0%
Lithuania (LI) 2020: Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) 4.8%
Luxembourg (LU) 2018: Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) 8.6%
Malta (MT) 2022: People's Party (PP) 0.5%
Netherlands (NL) 2021: Reformed Political Party 2.1%. JA21 2.4%. Party for Freedom (PVV) 10.8%. Forum for Democracy (FVD) 5.0%
Poland (PL) 2019: Law and Justice (PiS), United Poland (PS) 43.6%. Confederation 6.8%
Portugal (PT) 2022: CDS-People's Party (CDS-PP) 1.6%. Enough! (CH) 7.2%

Romania (RO) 2020: Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) 9.1%
Slovakia (SK) 2020: Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 6.2%. Slovak National Party (SNP) 3.2%. Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK) 3.9%. Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) 7.9%. We Are Family (SR) 8.2%. Homeland 2.9%
Slovenia (SI) 2022: Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) 23.5%. Slovenian National Party (SNS) 1.5%
Spain (ES) 2019: Vox 15.1%
Sweden (SE) 2022: Sweden Democrats (SD) 20.5%. Alternative for Sweden (AfS) 0.3%
United Kingdom (GB) 2019: Brexit Party 2.0%. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 0.8%

The discourse on Islam is also proving to be malleable. Sometimes it is about adaptation: those Muslims who work honestly and don't cause trouble are welcome. In France, for example, this viewpoint is in the colonial tradition of a post-hoc idealized coexistence in the French colony of Algeria, which in reality had a pronounced system of superiority and subordination. Marine Le Pen and her followers take another position. They claim that Muslims as a whole are inherently unable to live in Europe peacefully and without problems.

Another line of discourse in the far right welcomes radical political Islam because it stands for a battle for identity similar to the one fought by rightist parties themselves. This viewpoint looks favourably upon all supposed cultural identities and the characteristics that they claim as their own – as long as those identities do not get mixed up. During the 1998 football World Cup, which was held in France, Jean-Marie Le Pen sat in the VIP box of

The boundaries between conservative, right-wing populist and far-right parties are fluid. Racism is something that they often have in common

the Iranian embassy. His daughter Marine is reluctant to accept such homage, but nonetheless considers Iran as a potentially positive negotiating partner or ally.

Because the far right is concerned with identification and emotional attachment, not with ideological accuracy, it shows itself to be versatile. It can flip back and forth between all three types of arguments. That is because its ideology, its politics and discourse are not an objective reaction to objective problems, but a projection of what suits it at the time. Such opportunism can be useful if the far right can win elections together with the mainstream right and wants to form governments in different constellations (as in Italy) or to influence them (as in Sweden). —

WORK

A REMEDY FOR THE SHORTAGE OF SKILLED LABOUR

Many people are prepared to change their place of residence in order to start a new job. Those who are flexible in where they live find it easier to find suitable employment. Expanding globalization means mobility is no longer constrained by national borders.

Today, immigrants make up over 10 percent of the populations of the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a club of wealthy countries. In 2020, between 14 and 16 percent of the populations of the USA, the United Kingdom and Germany had been born abroad. In Sweden, Israel and Canada, it was around 20 percent, in Australia and Switzerland about one-third, and in Luxembourg half the population. This proportion has risen significantly in almost all OECD countries since 2000. Luxembourg and Iceland have seen the biggest increases, at between 8 and 9 percent.

International migrants made up almost 5 percent of the global labour force in 2019, according to an estimate by the International Labour Organization. Reasons for their moving included higher employment chances, greater work opportunities, greater economic strength and higher incomes. The migrants form a valuable source

of labour in those destination countries.

Many developed countries have been undergoing a demographic transformation for many years. In 2021, the average age of people in the European Union was 44.1 years, five years older than in 2001. Older people are retiring and leaving the labour market faster than young people are joining it. As the labour force potential – the number of people of working age – sinks, a scarcity of workers is created. Immigration can counter this trend, increasing the number of people of working age.

Crises such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, which placed a huge burden on the healthcare system, reveal the role that migrant workers already play. Immigrants are overrepresented in many vital professions, such as the service sector, nursing, and the delivery of letters and parcels. In 2018, 22.9 percent of all employees in Germany were either themselves immigrants or had immigrant parents. Among those working in elder care, the proportion was 36.6 percent.

Current estimates show that countries without high levels of immigration will soon face major problems due to


To compensate for the falling numbers of economically active people in Germany, 50,000 migrants would have to join the labour market each year up to 2040

EVERYONE HAS A JOB TO DO

Consequences of the demographic transition for the labour market in Germany, forecast to 2040, working population, forecast of Federal Statistical Office, 2020

decline in workforce, million persons

- 2019 to 2030
- 2019 to 2040



*theoretical value. Differences due to rounding

There will still be a shortfall of 3.1 million people in the labour force in 20 years, even if the number of migrants joining it rises moderately from the current figure of 147,000 to 221,000 a year, and the workforce participation of the population climbs by 1.8 million (+1.1 million women, or 79 percent of women of working age, and +0.8 million men, or 87 percent of men of working age). Unemployment will fall by 2040; most residual unemployment will be because of unsuitable qualifications.

a shortage of skilled workers. France, for example, would have to accept a net immigration of around 120,000 people each year to keep its labour force potential the same – even as the number of pensioners continues to rise.

Despite the large benefits of immigration to the overall economy, right-wing parties that want to restrict it have been gaining votes in many countries. Common arguments against immigration include concerns that migrants take away jobs from the rest of the population, or only want to claim social benefits. Some also worry that migrants willing to work for lower pay will depress wage rates. But empirically, there have been no significant effects on wages, and only minor effects on employment can be detected.

Labour migration also has an effect on the migrants' countries of origin. There is often talk of "brain drain": when well-educated workers emigrate, this creates economic disadvantages for their country of origin. But emigration does not necessarily have a negative effect on such countries. This is partly because of remittances: the money that the migrants send back home to support their relatives. Such remittances can make up a substantial proportion of a country's overall economic performance.

For the migrants, labour migration is not without obstacles. Most countries have laws that facilitate immigration by highly qualified individuals, but these workers still have to fulfil all kinds of requirements in order to get a residence permit that allows them to take up employment. Most member states of the European Union offer third-country nationals who hold a university degree the possibility to enter with a so-called "blue card". However, applicants need a concrete job offer, and their salary must be above a certain level.

The shortage of skilled workers has led to discussions in several developed countries about the possibility of simplifying immigration procedures. Within the European Union, for example, the establishment of a "talent pool" is under consideration, which would bring workers from third countries in contact with potential employers in the European Union. Germany's Skilled Workers Immigration Act, which came into force in March 2020, aims to ease the entry of skilled workers from countries outside the Union. Before this, people from third countries were permitted to take up employment only if no applicants were available in Germany or other European Union states. This so-called priority check has now been removed. It remains to be seen whether such attempts to ease access to the labour market will be successful. However, current trends indicate that labour migration will play an even larger role in the future. —

In the next 40 years, countries in Europe may well compete for the remaining mobile workers, as well as for migrants from Asia and Africa


EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION TO 2060

Increases and decreases in population in Europe, forecast by the Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2022

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resident population


- 0 to 50 percent, constant or increase
- 1 to -19 percent, decline
- 20 to -40 percent, strong decline
- 51 percent, very strong decline
- no data



The working-age population – the number of employed plus unemployed – is expected to fall in almost all countries in Europe in relation to the number of residents. An oversupply of jobs and rising demand for workers is predicted. Higher wages and better working conditions are feasible.

working-age population

- 0 to 20 percent, constant or increase
- 1 to -19 percent, decline
- 20 to -39 percent, strong decline
- 40 to -66 percent, very strong decline
- no data



AL: Albania, AT: Austria, BA: Bosnia and Herzegovina, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, BY: Belarus, CH: Switzerland, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czechia, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, GR: Greece, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, ME: Montenegro, MD: Moldova, MK: North Macedonia, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, RS: Serbia, RU: Russia, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, TR: Turkey, UA: Ukraine, XK: Kosovo

PARTICIPATION

THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

Despite a long history of immigration, Germany still puts up high barriers to political participation for people who do not hold a German passport. That leaves migrants and other non-citizens seriously underrepresented at all political levels compared to their share of the population.

At the end of the Second World War, people of non-German origin who were stranded in Germany were already excluded from the political decision-making process. A law passed in 1951 gave people who had been forced to migrate during the Nazi and post-war periods, as well as non-German war refugees who

remained in the young Federal Republic, a new legal and residence title: “homeless foreign national”. Most of these people came from Eastern and southeastern Europe.


Legally, they were treated the same as German citizens in many areas, and they were granted an unlimited permit to stay in Germany. But unlike German refugees and displaced persons, they were not allowed to vote in elections at any level – federal, state or local – even though many could not return to their home countries for political or personal reasons, and they wanted to settle in Germany for the long term. Nor were they allowed to form their own political parties to lobby for their interests.

The first rights of co-determination and direct votes for foreign nationals emerged in factories, where from 1955 on millions of so-called *Gastarbeiter* (“guest workers”) were recruited with the intention that they be integrated into German society for a short period only. These workers were given the right to vote in works council elections. Towards the end of the 1960s, protests by migrants for better labour rights increased. The protesters organized themselves across nationalities to press for such causes as equal treatment of foreigners regarding child benefits. In 1972, the German parliament granted foreign workers the right to vote and run in elections to works councils.

As migrants began to stay longer and longer in Germany, interest groups for immigrants formed at the local level. Welfare organizations, churches and trades unions played an increasingly important role in representing the interests of migrants to local authorities, politicians and the public. Since the 1970s, advisory boards for foreigners, migrants and integration have represented the interests of migrants.


The first of these advisory boards were set up in Nuremberg and Munich at the beginning of the 1970s. Since the 1990s, more and more such boards have been elected directly by foreign residents. Naturalized citizens and people with multiple citizenships can also vote. The advisory boards and similar bodies offer the migrants an opportunity to have their say in relevant aspects of city policymaking. While they have only an advisory function,

In parliament, the SSW, The Left and the Social Democrats have the largest proportions of representatives with a migration background, the CDU/CSU the smallest



LOW SCORES FOR THE BIGGEST COUNTRIES

Political participation of immigrants according to Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, score



the networks created enable contacts between the migrant community and local politicians and administrators.

It was only in 1992 that political participation by foreigners had a chance to improve. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the right of citizens of the European Union to vote in elections and run for office. Since then, EU citizens have been permitted to take part in elections at the local level, and to run as candidates. Immigrants from within the EU who do not have German citizenship can participate in elections for their local city councils and mayors after just three months of residence. Citizens of other countries, however, still do not have the right to vote for political representatives, even after decades of residing, working and paying taxes in an area.

So-called third-country nationals still only have the right to vote for the membership of advisory boards on migration and integration. Along with the migrants' own associations, these boards are important actors in articulating the interests of the growing numbers of immigrants in Germany. But they are not an alternative to legal equality between foreigners and German citizens in political representation.

These laws exclude a significant proportion of the population from any form of democratic participation through elections. Because integration takes place


Employees with a migration background are underrepresented by 50 percent – though that is still better than in the German parliament

In large parts of Europe, the participation of many migrants in civil society, local politics and public life is still not a matter of course

where people actually live, numerous migrant interest as well as the Left and Green parties have for decades called for long-term non-EU residents to be granted the right to vote in local elections. An easier naturalization process, the acceptance of multiple citizenship, and the introduction of the right to vote in local elections regardless of citizenship would open up new opportunities for everyone who lives in Germany to take part in the country's democracy. —

COMMITMENT TO COLLEAGUES

Proportion of works council members with migration background compared to all employees with such a background, firms with a works council in Germany, 2015, in percent



more recent data not published

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REMITTANCES

MONEY FOR THE FOLKS BACK HOME

One of the reasons that people migrate to another country is so they can earn money to send back home to their families. The small amounts sent by millions of migrants add up to huge totals, and can make a big difference to the recipient countries.

When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in 2020, economists were sure that the economic collapse would also mean a drop in the payments that migrants made to their home countries. For 2020 the World Bank predicted these payments would fall by almost 20 percent, or more than 100 billion dollars less than in 2019. Migrants, most of whom work in the service sector, were especially hard-hit by the economic consequences of the pandemic. But against expectations, remittances to low- and middle-income countries actually

rose – by 0.8 percent in 2020, and by 8.6 percent in 2021. The amount of the money sent to Latin America and the Caribbean shot up by 25.3 percent in that year.


This was an important source of support for the migrants' countries of origin during a difficult period for their economies. The transfers that migrants make to their families and friends can be an effective means to combat poverty. Those who send the money have greater labour productivity than those who receive it. The recipients benefit because they can buy more.

Remittances play a particularly important role in countries that have a large diaspora. The money can significantly increase the income of poorer households, which sometimes use it to invest in small enterprises. In the recipient countries, seed capital to start a new business is frequently hard to come by. Migrants who live abroad can play an important role both by providing such capital, and – often more importantly – by acting as mentors, thus contributing to local economic development. The consumption and investment stimulated by remittances is subject to tax, and therefore strengthens the official budgets in the recipient countries. The governments can spend the money on things like education, health services or infrastructure.

The importance of remittances has risen in recent decades. According to the World Bank, they have more than tripled since 2000. By the end of 2021, remittances to low- and middle-income countries had amounted to around 605 billion dollars, about three times the level of official development assistance and investment in securities, and about the same as direct investment. The figure for 2022 could well reach 630 billion dollars because of private remittances to Ukraine. Only registered transfers are recorded; informal transfers could amount to similar sums.

As a proportion of global economic output, the value of remittances has doubled since 2000, to 0.8 percent – an impressive figure. For comparison, agriculture contributes 4 percent of the world's economic output.

Mexico is an example of a country where remittances are a major source of income. In 2021, remittances to Mexico totalled 54 billion US dollars, almost 4 percent of the




It all adds up: in 2022, remittances by migrants to their countries of origin totalled around 630 billion US dollars

MILLIONS SEND BILLIONS

Remittances as share of gross domestic product, in percent, and the 10 most important recipient countries by world region, 2021



● remittances by emigrants to their countries of origin, billion US dollars



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country's economic output. Most of the money came from emigrants residing in the USA. Along with Mexico, China and the Philippines are the biggest recipients of remittances. This money is a vital mechanism by which such countries can benefit from people who live elsewhere, and often serves as a very important source of foreign exchange. The governments of countries with large diasporas are therefore eager to encourage this inflow.

The use of such transfers for consumption and investment is well-known. Sometimes they are also used to fund public goods, such as through public-private partnerships between members of the diaspora and institutions in their home countries. One example of this is the programme Tres Por Uno in the Mexican state of Zacatecas. For every dollar donated by the diaspora associations, the federal, state and local governments each contribute another dollar – hence the name of the programme. The money is placed into a fund that is used for investments in local development. The locals and the emigrants who have donated money decide jointly how to use the money. In 2017, this programme was able to spend the equivalent of over 2.5 million US dollars.

Remittances are vital for survival in crisis-hit Lebanon, some Pacific island nations, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Why were these transfers so much more stable during the COVID-19 emergency than the experts had predicted? For one, the economy in the USA recovered more quickly than expected, while emerging and developing countries were particularly hard hit. Migrants living in the USA appear to have made special efforts in 2020 to send money to their friends and families to tide them over during the uncertain period many were experiencing. Secondly, there is evidence that many immigrants dipped into their savings to support their families abroad. Thirdly, the economic situation of many immigrants into the USA indeed worsened, as did their health situation: most minority groups suffered higher rates of illness and death than the US average. But many found ways to stay employed, be it by switching jobs or professions or by working overtime, until 2021, when the recovery in the US labour market also reached the migrants and remittances shot up by one-quarter. —

WOMEN

FEMALE MOBILITY

Migration studies often treat movements by women as a secondary phenomenon, assuming that they are subject to the migration decisions of their male partners. Yet women have long made their own decisions about migration, and a growing number do so today. Skilled migration by women is still rare, but may become more common in the future.

In his seminal 1885 work *The Laws of Migration*, the Anglo-German geographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein attempted to identify regularities in the migration patterns evident in his day. In doing so, he laid the basis for modern migration research, including the distinction between “push” and “pull” factors. Less well-known is his assumption that more women than men migrate. His open attitude to female migration stands in contrast to later theories.

These theories often assume that migration decisions are made by households or couples, and are ultimately determined by the advantages for the person who earns the most. The woman is usually the economically weaker party, so her migration behaviour is tied to that of her male partner. Fortunately, the theoretical viewpoints have become broader over time to reflect the many factors that influence migration by women, including gender roles and migration policy frameworks.

How conditions influence the employment behaviour of women migrants is clearly shown by the recruitment

agreements made in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. These were designed to satisfy the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the booming heavy industries of western and northern European countries. Men made up the majority of the millions of migrants, but many women were also recruited for positions such as assembly line work. The employment rates of women among these early groups of migrants were high; in some countries, they even exceeded the rates for native women.

Overall, roughly half of migrants to EU countries have been women, but the percentage has varied by destination country and time period. For example, males were overrepresented during the big influx of humanitarian migrants in 2015–16. In subsequent years, the female–male ratio became more balanced, as more women entered on the legal basis of family reunification.


Today, large differences exist in the employment rates of migrant women, depending on the context and the countries of origin and destination. There is often little difference between the employment rates of native women and the growing number of female migrants from European Union member states who can migrate freely between countries for work, study or other reasons. But women from outside the European Union have relatively lower employment rates in almost all parts of the EU, and especially in northwestern Europe. The discrepancy

If migrant women were to be paid the same as local men for the same work, far fewer would fall into the category of “working poor”

THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY

Hypothetical question: How many fewer low-paid workers* would there be among migrant women if women were paid the same as men? Selected countries, in percent

Share of low-paid women migrants with and without “unexplained” part of migrant pay gap



* less than two-thirds of the median hourly wage

The difference in pay received by many migrant women compared to men consists of two components: “explained” and “unexplained” pay gaps. The “explained” gender pay gap results from women having lower levels of training, lower hourly wages due to part-time work, jobs in a low-wage sector, or a lack of promotion to the same level as men, for example because childcare has interrupted their career. The “unexplained” gender pay gap results from women being paid less than men simply because they are women. If this form of discrimination did not exist, many women would earn so much more that they would no longer be classified as low-paid.

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in southern Europe is generally smaller, with migrant women generally working in unskilled or semi-skilled positions in the service sector, including domestic work and childcare.

Why is it that in most European countries, women migrants from outside the European Union are less likely to be employed than native women? The answer to this question lies in the migration policy framework and – closely related to that – the demographic behaviour of some of these women. For women from outside the European Union, family reunification is one of the main ways to migrate to Europe. In the case of “marriage migration”, the couple gets married after one partner (usually the man) has migrated, while the other partner (usually the woman) remains in their home country. Migration and marriage are therefore often closely related in the lives of international migrants, both men and women. Moreover, the fertility rate (the number of births per woman) of international migrant women peaks shortly after they move to a new country. The close linking of marriage, migration and the birth of the first child can be a barrier to the long-term integration of women in the labour market in the destination countries. Numerous additional, institutionally related factors also affect the employment status of migrant women. In extreme cases (as in Germany before 2005), migrants were actually not permitted to work in the years immediately after their arrival if they had immigrated through a family reunion.





Low educational levels, non-transferable qualifications, a lack of work experience, language barriers, traditional gender roles and discrimination are closely interwoven. These also influence the employment behaviour of migrant women, and are hard to separate from demographic behaviours. Regardless, social and political challenges arise when the employment rates of women migrants significantly lag behind those of other women. As many European countries develop into “dual-earner” societies, families that depend on a single earner for their income are increasingly threatened by poverty.

The future offers great potential for the employment of women migrants in European countries that are faced with demographic ageing and a general shortage of skilled labour. In recent years, these countries have promoted the international migration of skilled workers to fill vacancies in professions such as information technology and engineering. Such professions tend to be dominated by men. The rising demand for workers in other sectors may open new employment opportunities for women migrants in general, as well as new ways for women from outside the European Union to migrate to the EU on their own. —

Many women in northern Europe go to work; fewer do so in the south. Migrant women are less likely to be employed than those born locally

UP NORTH, DOWN SOUTH

Proportion of employed women by migration status, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2019, in percent



AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CH: Switzerland, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czechia, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: United Kingdom, GR: Greece, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IS: Iceland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, ME: Montenegro, MK: North Macedonia, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, RS: Serbia, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, TR: Turkey

CARE WORK

SENIOR SERVICE

Western Europe's elder facilities and its home care system are already chronically short-staffed. Without migrants from poorer countries, they would collapse completely. The migrants have to balance their need to earn money against the personal costs of leaving their own children and elderly parents behind.

The average life expectancy in many European countries is rising. That has given rise to a chronic shortage of care providers for elderly people. The shortage is also related to changes in family structures and employment patterns. In 2009, the employment rate for women in the European Union in the 20–64 age group was 61 percent. By 2021 it had risen to 68 percent, with rates in Eastern European countries often well above this. Working women are no longer in the position to care for children or the elderly as much as they used to, and men often play little part in care work. Public forms of social

care, such as childcare centres and care homes for the elderly, are therefore on the rise.


Policies in most EU member states aim to provide individualized care, which includes care in the home environment. They make possible a mix of formal services and informal, private care. The political goal is to make care provision cost-efficient. That leads to growing pressure on caregivers and their salaries. In particular, the introduction of individual care budgets in social insurance – or “cash for care” – has led to the privatization of care, for which a huge market has sprung up.

For women in a difficult economic situation, especially those who are single mothers or are over 50, the chronic shortage of care workers for older people makes this profession a potential path to financial security. This is especially true if they are willing to migrate to find a job in the field. Within and outside the European Union, such women can now fairly easily find work in care homes or as live-in carers: workers who stay in the same house as their clients.


Exact figures do not exist. But an estimated 1 million migrant women, mainly from EU member states in central and southeastern Europe, work in care services. Most are employed in Italy, Germany or Austria. Germany alone, according to one large-scale placement service, has up to 300,000 live-in carers from Eastern Europe, most of them from Poland. In 2021, the German Federal Labour Court ruled that care workers are also entitled to minimum wage for the hours when they are on call. That means that Polish live-in carers in Germany can expect to be paid at least 1,450 euros a month. By Polish standards, that is quite good pay. But the carers have little time for themselves because they have to be on hand around the clock.

Chains of care have emerged. While Czech women emigrate to Germany or Austria to work as carers, women migrants, mainly from Ukraine, are increasingly coming to the Czech Republic to take over home care work for the elderly there. The minimum wage in the Czech Republic in 2022 was about 620 euros a month, nearly three times higher than that of Ukraine. All along the line, care workers are migrating in search of higher pay.

It is not just people from Central and Eastern Europe who are on the move. Care workers are also coming to France from that country's former colonies in the Magh-



Hundreds of thousands of women care for elderly and sick people in Germany – while also attending to the needs of their own families back home



reb region of North Africa. Latin Americans are moving to Spain, and Georgians are heading to Greece.

There is also a trend for care mobility in the opposite direction. Increasingly more elderly German citizens are opting to be cared for in the areas just across the Czech or Polish border, where it is considerably cheaper than in Germany. Sometimes Ukrainian or Moldovan caregivers replace the Czechs who commute to work in Germany.

Care-related migration also affects the families of the caregivers. Many migrant care workers with small children find the commuting and the separation from their families very difficult emotionally. Their own children often grow up with their grandparents. Women between the ages of 40 and 50 are faced with the challenge of reconciling the needs of their own household, their children, perhaps the care of older relatives, and their work in a foreign country. Migrating care workers often try to take care of their own families in advance, before their departure – by pre-cooking their meals or doing laundry, for example – in order to make up for their absence. In this way, care-related migration not only creates a gap in the local labour market for elderly care in the migrants' country of origin; it also hinders the unpaid care of family members – a task that often falls to women.


Both the Ukrainian care workers in the Czech Republic and the Czech care workers in Germany often regard their work in home care as a temporary solution until they have managed to acquire professional and language qualifications. They hope these will make it possible for them

Just one aspect of the care problem: for every person over 64, Europe now has two workers. Twenty years ago, there were three workers per retiree

When female unemployment rates in western Slovakia fell, more care workers migrated from the poorer east of the country to fill vacancies in Austria

to get a job in an assisted living facility or in a home care service. These have less precarious working conditions and offer better pay.

Politicians and the media often present the labour market for elderly care in the European Union as a model that benefits everyone. Senior citizens get good care, and the care workers earn much more money than they could back home. But the work is often poorly paid, and the caregivers – who are mainly women – are left on round-the-clock duty with clients who are often very needy. For this model to truly benefit all involved, such working conditions definitely need to be improved. —



FARMING

BITTER HARVEST

Picking fruit and harvesting vegetables is labour-intensive and costly. But consumers want cheap produce. The solution: hire labourers from countries where the wages are even lower than in the European farming sector.

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, seasonal migrant farm labourers – often called “harvest workers” by the media – were in the public eye. Closed borders put a spotlight on the key role of temporary foreign migrants in the farming industry. This was true in Germany as well as in the United Kingdom, Canada, the USA and South Africa – countries in which a large part of farm work is done by migrant workers.

In Germany, almost 300,000 foreign seasonal labourers work in agriculture every year. They account for around 95 percent of the seasonal workforce in the sector. The large majority are European Union citizens, who enjoy the free movement of workers within the Union and do not need any special permits to take on seasonal employment. The situation is different in Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain, where most of the seasonal farm work is done by people from outside the European Union: so-called third-country nationals. Many of these workers live in the EU without residence papers, so are forced to rely on this source of income. Others, such as Moroccan strawberry pickers in Spain, enter on a temporary basis under bilateral agreements for seasonal workers.

Since 2014, a European Union directive has provided for such bilateral agreements. Germany signed a recruitment agreement with Georgia in 2020, and another with Moldova in 2021. But before the Russian invasion, the largest group of third-country seasonal workers came from Ukraine. Prior to 2014, citizens of third countries were permitted to perform seasonal work in Germany only as students doing an internship. Such workers also came mainly from Ukraine.


Seasonal migrant work has a long history in German agriculture. By the end of the 19th century, German agriculture was having to cope with a rural exodus resulting from industrialization. It turned to Polish migrant workers – then known as “Sachsengänger” (“those who go to Saxony”). There developed a system of temporary work permits, with compulsory departure from Germany between the harvest seasons. With an interruption during the First World War, this existed through the end of the Weimar Republic (1933). During the Second World War, a system of forced labour developed that extended into agriculture. In 1944, a million Polish forced labourers were toiling on German farms.

After the war and during the Cold War, the seasonal migrants from the East largely disappeared, but in 1991 the flow resumed. At that time, a regulation was created to permit three months of employment in Germany. By 1996, over 200,000 Polish harvest workers received work


Short- and long-term trends ranging from mechanization and expected yields to the labour market situation determine the demand for seasonal farm labour

STEM-CUTTING, FRUIT-PICKING, BACK-BREAKING

Short-term employees in German farming and their nationalities, number of individuals



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permits. Since Poland's entry into the European Union in 2004, the numbers of seasonal workers from Poland has been declining, and Romania has replaced Poland as the main labour source. In 2011, some 93.4 percent of all such work permits were issued to Romanians.

The majority of seasonal agricultural workers are now employed via a short-term contract arrangement that does not require social security contributions. The workers do not earn a right to a pension, and they do not have full health coverage. Agricultural businesses are motivated to keep the wage costs of labour-intensive harvest work low, so such workers are particularly at risk of falling victim to wage fraud – especially the undercutting of the minimum wage – or being denied basic protections.

Germany does not have enough nationals who are willing to do this physically demanding work for low wages. So the work is taken on by people who, because of the wage gap between Germany and their home countries, are willing to earn money for a short time during the harvest season and then leave Germany again. That cushions the peaks of labour demand during the harvest season, but keeps the social reproduction costs, such as health insurance and pension liabilities, in the migrants' home countries.

Following in the footsteps of the Poles, people from Romania are now increasingly less willing to do this precarious kind of work. The same is happening in other countries. In Georgia in 2021, the pilot year of the recruit-

It is especially those countries that produce a lot of agricultural exports that need help from outside throughout the farming year

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had a major effect on the countries of origin of seasonal workers. It had less of an effect on their destinations

ment agreement with Germany, a debate broke out about the poor working conditions in Germany. At the same time, the farm sectors in several countries are competing for regular seasonal workers, especially after having to scramble to secure their harvests during the pandemic. That puts more pressure on the entire system of seasonal labour migration. To keep costs down, the search for seasonal workers is moving to other countries where the wage gaps are wider, and the pool of potential recruits therefore larger. —



MAKING PEOPLE FEEL WELCOME

It is cities where most migrants end up, and it is local administrations that must deal with their everyday needs such as housing, healthcare and schooling. At the same time, migrants can reinvigorate towns and cities by providing labour and generating demand. An increasing number of city administrations see the benefits of migration and are campaigning for kinder policies.

Cities are increasingly taking an active role in migration policy, going beyond their area of authority in local politics. They have economic reasons for doing so, but the decision also stems from a more humanistic attitude in urban civil society than that held by most governments.

When the Italian government started blocking maritime rescues in the Mediterranean in 2018, mayors of Italian cities and towns opened their harbours to those who had been rescued – against the will of right-wing politician Matteo Salvini, the interior minister at the time. It was not just urban areas such as Palermo that joined this movement; villages did so as well. Domenico Lucano, mayor of the commune of Riace in Calabria, became well known. From 2011 on, he provided hundreds of migrants with abandoned houses in his commune. In 2021, after a

trial regarded by many as politically motivated, he was sentenced to more than 13 years in prison for fraud, embezzlement, forgery and abuse of office.


When the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, several mayors in Europe publicly campaigned for the admission of Afghan human rights activists and staff who had worked for Western organizations. With the worsening humanitarian situation on the Greek islands, more than half of all cities in the Netherlands took part in the campaign #500kinderen (“500 children”) to take in unaccompanied refugee children.

Palermo is a city that associates people’s rights with their freedom, not with their blood, said the city’s then-mayor Leoluca Orlando. In 2021 he welcomed his counterparts to a Conference of Cities for a Welcoming Europe. He had already set a good example: with the Charter of Palermo, his city had “put in black and white” that international mobility is an “inalienable right”, he said. That made a statement against the right-wing government that was then in power in Italy.


For cities, the influx of people from different parts of the world can often mean gains in innovation and in their labour force. That is especially true if the city organizes the migration so the new arrivals are fully involved in shaping their new surroundings – a vital consideration in the support of Ukrainians who are fleeing the invasion of their country.

More than half the world’s population now lives in urban areas. The urbanization process is strongly influenced by national and international migrants. Two of every three migrants worldwide move to an urban area, and the proportion is increasing. Cities are places where programmes to welcome, include and integrate people are developed and implemented, and where experience is gained on how to bring together people with different lifestyles and needs.

Porto Alegre in southern Brazil is an example of a city that has successfully engaged in the integration of migrants. One of the ways they have achieved this is by introducing a participatory budget in which new arrivals and low-income residents can contribute to decisions on investments. In the seven years after its 1989 implementation, the percentage of inhabitants with access to sewerage doubled from 46 percent to 95 percent, and road construction, especially in the favelas (slums), increased



Migration and urban life go together. Towns and cities have more to offer economically, socially and politically, making it easier to find your feet and become accepted



fivefold. Both these trends greatly benefited migrants from the poor north of Brazil who lived in the outskirts of the city. Residents from the poorest 12 percent of the population made up one-third of the participants in the citywide assembly in 1995. In 2015, 15,000 residents took part in the “orçamento participativo”, or participatory budget process.

In recent years, cities have increasingly come together in alliances and networks. In June 2021, 33 European municipalities founded the International Alliance of Safe Harbour Cities. In Germany, the Cities Safe Harbours Alliance was formed in 2019, initiated by the civil society movement Seebrücke (“sea bridge”) and the cities of Berlin and Potsdam. Over 100 local governments in this alliance are now campaigning for the right to decide on the acceptance of additional people without federal interference – something that current legislation does not permit them to do. In 2018 in France, the Network ANVITA was formed, mobilizing 48 local governments and regions for

People’s perceptions of their own cities can be very subjective. But the survey findings can still show useful comparisons

“unconditional admission”. The Dutch city of Tilburg has tailored a separate inclusion programme to the needs of new arrivals. The city tries to ensure that people who have received a positive asylum decision are able to remain in Tilburg, and are not relocated elsewhere. That preserves the social networks that they have built up while waiting for their asylum papers.

People who have not yet received asylum or who are in a country without a permit are in a particularly precarious position. Here, too, some cities are taking action to ensure their basic needs are met, such as access to health care, education and housing. Such initiatives show that municipalities and local governments still lack the legal authority they need in migration policy issues. —

GETTING ORGANIZED

TOGETHER WE ARE STRONG

Unskilled migrant workers in Europe are often forced to accept the only work they can find – picking fruit and harvesting vegetables – for ultra-low wages. By getting organized, they can combat illegal exploitation by unscrupulous employers.

The merciless price competition in markets for agricultural products takes place mostly on the backs of farm workers. The number of such workers in the European Union is declining overall, but the share of seasonal workers from abroad is rising. Of those who come from within the EU, most are from countries with low wage levels, such as Romania and Bulgaria. Agricultural workers from outside the EU come mainly from North and sub-Saharan Africa. Many of them lack a work or residency permit, and are provided with no information about their rights. As a result, they are often exploited and are paid at far below the minimum wage.

Germany and especially France grow large areas of cereals for use in industry or as fodder. These require relatively little labour. Spain and Italy, by contrast, produce more than one-third of the vegetables and almost half the fruit in the European Union, and the harvesting and processing of these crops is significantly more labour-intensive. These two countries have therefore

long drawn on the services of migrants. It is here that the exploitation of such workers is particularly marked, especially since the introduction of intensive cultivation in greenhouses, which considerably extends the growing season.


For a long time, migrant agricultural workers were left alone to assert their rights, with little support from the traditional unions. But the rural workers' union, Sindicato de Obreros del Campo (SOC), founded in the 1970s, is different. This is an activist organization in Andalucía, southern Spain, that uses tactics such as strikes, demonstrations and boycott campaigns. Especially since the pogrom-like violence in the municipality of El Ejido in 2000, in which a mob chased after Moroccan farm workers, it has started taking "direct action". It uses blockades, marches and land occupations, or the "confiscation" of food and exercise books from supermarkets for distribution to poor families, to draw attention to high unemployment and the resulting impoverishment.

The foundation of the more broadly based workers' union, Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SAT), and its merger with the SOC in 2007 spread this approach to other links in the food production chain, such as processing


Most migrant organizations offer a range of advice, education, social and cultural activities and support for their members

REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS THIN ON THE GROUND

Geographical distribution and sponsorship of 130 nationally and 31 regionally active migrant organizations from all EU member states, 2021, in percent



differences due to rounding



plants. The most recent success of this workers' movement was when the Social Court upheld a complaint by the works council of Eurosol, a local exporter of fruit and vegetables. In the future, the company must grant holidays and breaks to its temporary workers. The ruling is the result of a year-long struggle by SOC-SAT, with whose support the Eurosol workers won the right for a works council in 2018.

In southern Italy, many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa work in the fields under exploitative conditions that are akin to slavery. The country is the third-largest producer of citrus in the Mediterranean region, and one of the world's leaders in tomato production. Illegal employment in farming has been growing for years in Italy, and currently accounts for an estimated one in five of all workers in the sector. This type of employment, or "semi-legal" work with formal contracts but many infringements of labour law, involves 10-hour workdays for a wage of just 20–30 euros – half of the legal minimum.

Workers without a proper employment contract cannot rent a flat or receive basic social services. Many of the undocumented workers live in ghettos: tent cities or dilapidated buildings, often without running water, toilets, waste disposal or electricity, far from towns and medical care. Even if they have a contract, there may be problems with their payslips, the correct reporting of the days

So-called caravans of migrants still set off from Central America in an attempt to reach – and cross – the US border

worked, or compliance with working conditions. The mafia also profits from this exploitation: it recruits workers illegally through the "caporalato", or gangmaster, system. This involves employing labourers mostly on a daily basis; the workers must then pay deductions to the intermediary for things like transport to their place of work. Various legislative initiatives aim to put a stop to this criminal system, but a lack of effective controls is one of the factors hindering change.

In this difficult situation, the grassroots trade union Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) focuses on the ability of the mainly immigrant workers to get themselves organized. That means first and foremost creating awareness about trade union and social rights. The USB activists have established a trade union centre in the former ghetto in the Apulian town of Foggia, and in 2017 held a series of meetings to organize the first "ghetto strike". This achieved the renouncement of threats to evict residents, and the establishment of regular water deliveries. The USB regards grassroots organizing as the key to fighting an agricultural system that is based on exploitation and ghettoization. —

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

WIN-WIN-LOSE

Migration is often a win-win-win situation. It benefits everyone: the migrants themselves, the destination country and the country of origin. But massive emigration can turn the country of origin into a big loser, especially if large numbers of young people turn their backs on it. The situation is particularly difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Something like half of Bosnia's population lives abroad. Many young Bosnians believe their country has done nothing for them and that they must go somewhere else to find a better life for themselves and their families. This sense of dissatisfaction is so deeply ingrained that not even higher wages can change it. There is no hope of accession to the European Union, so most poorly qualified workers from the western Balkans (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) hope to get away from their post-socialist misery by emigrating.

When Germany adopted the so-called Western Balkan Regulation in 2015, which eased access to the German labour market for workers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnians began to emigrate in droves. Whenever they can, they rely on links to migrants from the so-called "first wave" – "guest workers" who emigrated in the 1960s and 70s – or the "second wave" – refugees from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. A further factor has been the Skilled


Workers Immigration Act, introduced by Germany in March 2020. This facilitates the immigration to Germany of skilled workers from outside the European Union.

Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered greatly during the war from 1992 to 1995. Over 100,000 people were killed, the economy collapsed, and the situation destroyed any glimmer of hope. Twenty years later, in 2015, people in Bosnia still had no faith in the future and again started to consider migrating as a way to escape.

One reason was that war continues to shape the country. The Dayton agreement, mediated by the USA in 1995, was flawed, and was largely forced on Bosnia. Many conflicts continued to simmer. Two cantons, more or less the same size, were created: one for Serbs and the other for Muslims and Croats. The Dayton agreement still weighs heavily on their political, economic and social relationships today.

"Dayton", as the system is called for short, indeed brought peace on paper, but it failed to bring a good life. The administration and power sharing are complicated, and urgently needed reforms are prevented. The dominant political parties have been strengthened and have become the main actors in the distribution of benefits. In the economically weaker areas of Bosnia, party membership – whether official or unofficial – has become

The states of the western Balkans suffer especially from brain drain – the emigration of well-educated citizens who see no future for themselves in their home country



increasingly important. Those who want to rise socially are dependent on the parties. Only those who are close to the ethnonationalist political elites of Dayton have had access to jobs, privileges and power, while almost everyone else has been left out. Over years, the central Bosnian state, which was weak at first, has built up state institutions under pressure from its Western partners. But the mainly Russian-backed Republika Srpska, in particular, believes that the central government in Sarajevo has illegally taken powers away from it.

Although there was no overt conflict to fuel emigration, people again began to think about emigrating, mainly to Germany, to seek a more stable life, if only for their children. The third migration wave was also made possible because after 2011, Germany started to experience staffing shortages in health and other sectors. The market has since determined who is allowed into the country. In many instances, a recognized professional qualification and an employment contract are necessary to work in Germany.

But the emigrants also head to other countries. Around half of all Bosnians, or almost 1.7 million people, have left their homeland. The largest numbers of those born in Bosnia now live in Croatia (400,000 people) and Serbia (336,000), followed by Germany (204,000) and Austria (97,000). Their departure, and the lack of anyone to take care of the diaspora, mean that Bosnia is losing its most important resource: its people. The demographic consequences of emigration at such a scale are grim.





At first glance, Bosnia appears to be doing well. The unemployment rate naturally falls if people without jobs leave the country, and the number of university places or doctors per capita rises. But countries that are the sources of large-scale emigration look better in the statistics than is actually the case. Without enough children, many schools will have to close – and in many places in north-western Bosnia, this has already happened. The next to be affected by the decline are the secondary schools and universities, and then businesses and industries. The pension system will bleed to death.

The government will have to deal with the consequences of the migration. It will have to handle the losses that have been incurred because Bosnia has paid for the training of young people who have gone off to work in the German labour market, without Germany having to contribute anything. The new government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to find strategies to bring people and money back into the country. That will require a debate about the future and a responsible government. Neither exists at the moment. Bosnia has run out of both people and time. —

While unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina has halved since 2006, money from abroad is still a source of security for many

NOT A LOT OF HOPE

Demographic and economic trends affected by migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, selected



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WELCOME FOR SOME, REJECTION FOR OTHERS

Poland has been rightly praised for taking in large numbers of war refugees from neighbouring Ukraine. But the behaviour of the Polish government towards refugees from other places has often been despicable.

For many years, the ruling conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland refused to accept any refugees at all. Instead, it organized anti-refugee campaigns. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, however, Poland has offered sanctuary to millions of people from its neighbouring country.

For years before the war, Poland had allowed large numbers of Ukrainians into the country as workers. Between 2018 and 2020, the government issued around 1.2 million work visas for third-country nationals. That amounted to between one-third to one-half of all the visas issued in the European Union in this period. In other words, Poland alone let the same number of foreigners into the country to work as all 26 other EU member states put together. By far the largest number of visas went to Ukrainians. They were to replace the local workers who had left Poland for better-paid jobs in western Europe and the United Kingdom.

Today, the Ukraine crisis is having enormous effects on the Polish employment market. Ukrainian men – workers on whom the Polish construction and transport industries rely – have left Poland. Some 230,000 have returned to Ukraine to defend their homeland against the Russian government. The Polish media have been full of stories about companies that suddenly lost their staff.

Their place has now been taken by women – many of them with children. The Polish economy needs workers in trade and services. But will it be in a position to absorb so many refugees? Will the underfunded Polish education system be able to integrate so many pupils? Will the health system be able to care for so many patients? And will the Polish police be able to protect the refugees from sex traffickers and other criminals? The past six years of state corruption by the conservative-nationalist government do not give rise to much optimism.

In 2015, when thousands of people from the Middle East came to Germany via the Balkan route, Jarosław Kaczyński, the head of PiS, launched an abhorrent campaign against the refugees. He warned that the new arriv-

als could bring parasites and bacteria into the country, and claimed that the refugees were potential terrorists. There was an election campaign in Poland at the time, and the PiS campaign against the refugees was a big part of it. The outgoing government of the liberal Civic Platform had already stated it would take 7,000 refugees from camps in Greece and Italy in order to relieve the pressure on these countries. But the PiS won the election and did not keep the promises made by its predecessor, so no refugees from the Middle East were taken in. The number of attacks on people with dark skin also rose sharply.

But the economy performed well, growing by around 4 percent a year in the years after the PiS came to power. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, many firms who responded to an official survey identified a shortage of workers as an obstacle to development. In the construction sector, one in three firms reported problems in finding staff.

The government quietly opened the door to immigrants from Asia. Not from the Middle East, but from Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In the autumn of 2018, the doors of the the Polish consulate in New Delhi were practically always open. Several consulates could scarcely keep up with the number of visas to be issued. Thousands of people applied for visas to work in Poland. In 2017, some 7,000 work permits were granted to people from Asia – the same figure as the number of refugees that Poland was to have accepted. In the first half of 2018 the number rose to 9,000; in 2019 it was almost 16,000.


The pandemic put a stop to this trend, but only for a time. Workers are still coming to Poland from Asia because they are needed in the agricultural and service sectors. The PiS government pretended, and continues to pretend, that these workers do not exist. People from Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Philippines are treated as “guests” in Poland. They are not integrated into society, nor are they protected from exploitation and other scams. The government shows no interest in improving their living conditions.

The 7,000 people that Poland should have accepted in 2015 could easily have been distributed among Catholic parishes. The Polish population would have gotten used to the arrival of refugees. Infrastructure would have been created, and personnel would have been trained. But it was not only the intransigent stance of the PiS on the issue of resettlement in Europe that darkened Poland’s karma. It was what happened, and what is still happening,

ON THE MOVE

Immigration and emigration in Poland

Work permits issued in the EU, Polish share by justification, numbers, 2021




Persons attempting to enter across the border with Belarus, 2021 and 2022


39,100 refugees from August to December 2021, 24 deaths confirmed for all of 2021

7,800 attempted crossings from January to August 2022

Migration balance of Poland with EU accession in 2004, thousand registrations/deregistrations




Number of refugees*, total population and residents per refugee, 2021, Poland and Germany compared




* refugees, asylum seekers, other persons under protection of UNHCR

Polish nationals abroad, top 5 destinations, 2021



People fleeing to Poland from the war in Ukraine, transit across the Polish-Ukrainian border, to September 2022



differences due to rounding

on the border with Belarus.

The Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko tried to take revenge against European Union sanctions by sending migrants from Iraq and Kurdistan into Poland. The PiS took brutal action against the arrivals, many of whom were victims of war. Families with children were abandoned in the forest. Refugees were beaten, their phones destroyed. The Belorussians did the same. Some people wandered around in the border area for weeks.

Workers with useful skills and Ukrainians in need are welcomed in Poland. Asylum seekers from other countries are not

Now Poland faces the challenge of taking in millions of Ukrainians. Their numbers could still rise. It would have been much easier today if the PiS had not based its election victory in 2015 on the betrayal of refugees. Karma is now taking its revenge on Poland. —

GREECE

THE BIRTHPLACE OF DEMOCRACY – AND HOME OF PUSHBACKS

Greece's geographical position and membership in the European Union has made it a stopover point for many refugees from Asia and Africa who are headed for western Europe. The Greek government tries to stop them from coming into the country, and makes life hard for those who are already there.


Greece is one of the most important transit countries for people who are seeking refuge in Europe. But for many, the country turns out to be a dead end or even a place of imprisonment. Refugees who are not allowed to leave the country suffer from a great deal of legal uncertainty, social exclusion, homelessness, unemployment and economic distress. Allegations are made repeatedly of mistreatment, torture and the use of excessive force.

Greece's asylum and migration policies have become more restrictive since the right-wing government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis took office in mid-2019. A regulation introduced at the end of 2021 makes it all but impossible for many refugees even to apply for asylum. Previously, asylum seekers had to contact the asylum authorities via Skype as the first step of their application. It took up to 14 months just to arrange an appointment. Then, on November 22, 2021, the Greek ministry responsible for migration abolished the Skype system without informing the aid organizations in the country. Asylum seekers on the mainland have since been able to register at one single location – the reception centre in Fylakio, on the border with Turkey. But for many of those seeking protection, this is difficult or impossible to reach. A new model of closed camps operating on Aegean islands such as Samos, Leros and Kos, as well as on the mainland, undermines the rights of the internees to such basic necessities as education and health.


A report by Médecins Sans Frontières, a medical charity, describes the consequences of life in such reception and identification centres – better known as “hotspots” – on the physical and mental health of young people. Two-thirds of the patients treated by the staff of the charity on Chios, Lesbos and Samos in 2019 and 2020 were children. The youngest patient with suicidal thoughts was just six years old. Among the children with mental health problems that the staff treated on Lesbos during this period, one in three had a sleep or developmental disorder, and one in four had a generalized anxiety disorder.

Not all the refugees live in a camp. A significant number are homeless, including many single women, unaccompanied minors, mothers with small children, pregnant women, elderly people and other vulnerable persons. Hundreds of officially recognized refugees are forced to seek shelter in abandoned buildings or live for long periods in public squares and streets, thereby putting their health and safety at great risk. In some cases, according to an investigation by the Greek Council for Refugees and other NGOs, those who have already survived sexual violence are again subject to sexual attacks.

Meanwhile, the Greek authorities are very brutal in



Up to 2021, the Greek authorities did all they could to delay every asylum application. Since 2022, their strategy has switched to quick rejections



their so-called “pushbacks”, the deportations of people seeking protection. The Norwegian organization Aegean Boat Report says that there were at least 629 pushbacks in the Aegean in 2021, involving a total of 15,803 people. Human Rights Watch reports that the Greek police arrest people at the Greek–Turkish land border on the River Evros, and force some back across the border half-naked after robbing them of their mobile phones and other belongings.

The research NGO Lighthouse Reports collected videos of a total of 635 migrant pushbacks carried out since March 2020 in the Aegean by masked Greek border guards. In one such event, more than 25 refugees tried to reach the coast of the island of Kos. They were stopped by the Greek coast guard, pushed away with a pole, and later thrown into the water. The group was later apprehended by the Turkish coast guard.

The chaotic situation on the islands has increased xenophobic and racist sentiments among a large part of a Greek population already burdened by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has been compounded by indignation towards the Turkish president Erdoğan, who has used border openings on the Turkish side as a way to exert pressure on the European Union. In a survey in early 2020, a majority of respondents in the Greek islands in

The Balkan route, along which many new arrivals travelled further into Europe in 2015, has been closed. Many refugees now find themselves interned in camps

the eastern Aegean said they saw refugees as a “danger to the country”. In January 2020, a general strike took place on the Greek islands in protest against the overcrowded hotspot camps. A month later, violence broke out: NGO workers were attacked, protests were organized against refugees, and right-wing extremists from across the European Union mingled with the locals on Lesbos “in defence of Europe”.

In February 2022, after Russia had attacked Ukraine, Notis Mitarakis, the migration minister, described fleeing Ukrainians as “the real refugees” on Greek television. As in many parts of the European Union, Ukrainian refugees are greeted with compassion and sympathy in Greece. According to the minister, some 76,000 Ukrainian refugees had arrived in Greece by August 2022. Many have since travelled on to other countries in the European Union, or have returned to their home country. But some 20,000 have applied for a protection programme in Greece which gives them a temporary visa and work permit. Only half that number of people have arrived in transit via Turkey from other countries during the same period. —

A PLURAL SOCIETY

A modern society is dependent on immigration. Germany has become a new home for millions of people from all over the world. While the road for the new arrivals has sometimes been rocky, the vast majority have integrated well. They have changed German society in many ways, mostly for the better.

Migration has long had a major impact on Germany. Some 22.3 million of the country's 83.2 million inhabitants have what is officially referred to as a "migration background": they themselves or one or both of their parents were not born as German citizens. In western Germany, the proportion of people with such a personal history is three times higher than in the east; almost 95 percent of the people with a migration background live in former West Germany or in Berlin.

Since 1945, far in excess of 25 million people have moved into the territory of what is now the Federal Republic of Germany on a permanent basis. Of those, 11.9 million arrived between 1945 and 1950 from Germany's former eastern territories in Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Two-


thirds of them, or 7.9 million people, came to West Germany, and 4 million to the much smaller and less populous East Germany. Between 1950 and 2020, some 2.8 million ethnic Germans arrived, mainly from Kazakhstan, Russia, Romania and Poland; prior to 1990, almost all of them came to West Germany. Add to that the 2.7 million people who moved to the West from the Soviet occupation zone and what would later become East Germany before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

The economic upswing after the end of the Second World War and the introduction of conscription in 1956 gave rise to labour shortages in several sectors of the economy. Fearing downward pressure on wages, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions were resistant to opening the country's borders, but at the insistence of employers, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) overruled them. The first Italians arrived after an agreement with the Italian government on 20 December 1955. This day was a turning point in the history of Germany. It was the birth of the country as a plural society.

Between then and 1973, there followed a further 14 million "guest workers", or *Gastarbeiter*, from Spain, Greece, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and especially Turkey. Eleven million returned home, but three million stayed, contrary to the plans of the CDU. Many brought in their spouses and children, while others started their own families in their new home.

The face of Germany has changed radically as a result: romantic relationships, the appearance of cities and people, schools, social stratification, food habits, everyday habits, religious life, language, literature. The crime statistics have changed as well. The presence of millions of mostly young men who have immigrated since 1955 has led to a rise in violent crimes – offences more often committed by younger males than by older people.


Western Germany has undergone a more dramatic transformation than former East Germany. The difference between the two parts of the country could hardly be greater. While West Germany's borders saw constant comings and goings from the 1950s on, East Germany admitted only a small number of contract workers from Vietnam, Mozambique, Cuba and Angola. In 1989, they numbered just 94,000 people, and after 1990 many had to leave the country. A right to asylum like in West Germany did not exist in the East, though East Germany did accept



It can take up to four generations before people with a migration background are able to finally climb out of the "working poor" category

OFFERS OF EMPLOYMENT

Foreigners in West and East Germany 1989 and in united Germany 2021 by country of origin, absolute numbers and proportion of the population in percent



several thousand people fleeing persecution in countries such as Greece and Chile.

Even in West Germany, though, relatively few asylum seekers arrived between 1949 and 1987. That changed at the end of the 1980s. Between then and 2022, around 4.7 million people have applied for asylum in Germany as a whole. While the proportion of applications that are accepted has been rising, it has become increasingly more difficult for asylum seekers to make it to Germany in the first place.

The social and legal situation of many migrants has improved in recent decades, in part because of reforms in citizenship laws. There remain, however, large and sometimes widening social inequalities between migrants and Germans with no migration background. Part of the story

Before 1989, many foreigners in both East and West Germany had come to work. Today it is because of the EU's freedom of movement, or to seek asylum

of migration is the sad fact that racist-inspired violence has killed more than 200 people since 1980.

Despite all this, over the last 70 years migration has been a net success. Many millions of people from all over the world have found a future in Germany, have settled and built their livelihoods there, and have had children and grandchildren. Many have climbed up the social ladder thanks to good educational qualifications and support programmes. They are an increasingly important voice in politics, culture and the media, and help shape both the present and future of German society. —

AUTHORS AND SOURCES FOR DATA AND GRAPHICS

All online links were accessed in October 2022.
See page 2 for the websites where you
can download a clickable PDF of this atlas.

10-11 HISTORY: CROSSING BORDERS, BREAKING BOUNDARIES by Jochen Oltmer

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
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www.antifascist-europe.org



Moving Cities – Another migration policy is possible

Over 700 European cities and municipalities are actively supporting a solidarity-based migration policy. Have a look into how cities are trying to change the regressive policies of the nation states and the EU, and how they – with the help of civil society – are working to improve their local migration policies. This platform is also available in German, Italian, Greek, Polish, French and Spanish.

www.moving-cities.eu



The Dissenter – Rosa Luxemburg

Socialist, economist, independent woman, poetic correspondent and passionate lover of nature. Rosa Luxemburg was many things – and even more was projected onto her after she was murdered. With this website, the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung introduces the woman to whose legacy it is committed: Which decisions led to her becoming a socialist revolutionary? Luxemburg's political positions emerged in the same way, as she felt forced to live: "unsystematically". The collection of materials presents letters, articles, videos, and audio recordings by and about Rosa Luxemburg. Also available in German, French, Spanish and Greek.

www.rosaluxemburg.org/en






L!NX – The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation's digital learning platform

L!NX is the new digital education platform with interactive, multimedia and short formats for self-learners and multipliers in search of fundamental content – with a critical eye and from a left perspective. The content ranges from globalisation and trade, history and culture, economy and labour, migration, anti-racism and anti-fascism to organising, climate justice and food sovereignty. Also available in German.

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The idea that neighbouring countries should open their borders to refugees is a good and sensible one.

from: **UKRAINE – THE RESULTS OF WAR**, page 17

The future offers great potential for women migrants in countries that are faced with demographic ageing and a shortage of skilled labour.

from: **WOMEN – FEMALE MOBILITY**, page 43

Sometimes Ukrainian or Moldovan caregivers replace the Czechs who commute to work in Germany.

from: **CARE WORK – SENIOR SERVICE**, page 44

In Europe alone, 14 countries offer passports or permanent visas to those who make six-figure investments.

from: **VISA – FREEDOM FOR THE WELL-HEELED**, page 29