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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ROLE OF EUROPE'S RADICAL
MUSLIMS**

by

James Palumbo
Daniel Vaniman

December 2007

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Glenn E. Robinson
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GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ROLE OF EUROPE'S RADICAL MUSLIMS

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ABSTRACT

Analyzing jihadist activity in France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain provides valuable insight into how the idea of global jihad resonates within different Muslim communities. Initial assessments explaining the differing level of jihadist activity in each country focus primarily on one foreign policy item: support or opposition to the Iraq war. However research shows a number of other critical items which also influence the level of jihadist activity. These include other foreign policy initiatives such as NATO's lead in Afghanistan involving military forces from all four countries; support of "apostate" regimes, such as France's involvement in Algeria; as well as perceived injustices against Muslims during colonial conquests. Another critical factor is the country of origin of the Muslim population. Analysis reveals that jihadist activity amongst Pakistani Muslims tends to be higher than with groups from other origins. The final critical factor measured was the domestic policies of each country. Policies which encourage integration and assimilation appear to minimize jihadist activity. Lessons learned based on the success and failure in each of these countries are critical to developing long term counter terrorism policies and eliminating European Muslims as a support element or active participants for the global jihad.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Six years after 9/11, the United States and its allies continue to struggle with terrorism. Though there is much talk of alliances, the fact is each country has taken its own counter terrorism approach. Comparing these dynamics provides valuable insight into successful and failed programs and initiatives. Given al Qaeda's focus on Europe and numerous terrorist related plans/attacks recently, this thesis addresses western European efforts and struggles battling Islamic extremism. In order to make this review manageable, four western European countries are being analyzed: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain. These were selected due to the fact each has had differing levels of internal jihadist activity, while at the same time each country has developed its own domestic and foreign policy initiatives to counter its terrorist threat. Unfortunately much analysis into explaining the differing level of jihadist activity in each country focuses on one foreign policy item: support or opposition to the Iraq war. However research shows there are a number of other items just as, if not more, influential in the level of jihadist activity.

One influential item is the different status levels European Muslims experience in each country. Examining actual and perceived social status, employment and income levels, and education provides evidence French Muslims believe they are closer to equality than their European Muslim counterparts. France has also distinguished itself in its nationalistic approach to the Muslim issue, developing a unified approach across the entire country. France is the only country which makes decisions for and handles issues from the Muslim community at the national level. In contrast, Spain, Britain, and Germany rely on local and regional governments to engage on the Muslim issue, resulting in a disjointed and unbalanced effort across the country.

The varying level of sentiment towards jihad in each country's Muslim population is another difference between the countries. For example the country of origin of the Muslim population in each country clearly is important, with Muslims from Pakistan and the Middle East being particularly active. With Great Britain having by far the most

Pakistani immigrants, it is logical the British have experienced the most jihadist activity. This is partially explained through the religiosity of Pakistani immigrants in Britain which is significantly higher than the more secular Muslims in other countries, especially the primarily Turkish population in Germany.

Foreign policy initiatives, other than the war in Iraq, also clearly play a role in at least the targeting of the surveyed countries. All four countries are involved in NATO's operations in Afghanistan and have military personnel engaged in action against al Qaeda and Taliban elements. In the eyes of al Qaeda and its supporters, this places each country as an ally of the United States. Support of "apostate" regimes is another item that motivates individuals to join the jihad, including France's involvement in Algeria, Great Britain's engagement with Pakistan, and Spain's interaction with Morocco and Algeria. Additionally all four countries remain heavily reliant on oil, making them inherent supporters of the ultimate apostate regime, Saudi Arabia. In spite of this, France and Germany have thus far avoided the violent attacks conducted against Britain and Spain.

Differing domestic strategies also influenced jihadist activity within the surveyed countries. While each country dealt with terrorism of some sort over the past 30 years, France is the only one to deal specifically with Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11. With this head start, France was better prepared to deal with the enemy, while the others struggled to determine what to do in this new environment. France was also the only country to assimilate its Muslim immigrant population. Spain and Britain utilized a multicultural approach, trying to keep Muslims isolated from the natives. This simply highlighted the differences between the two communities. Germany maintained the myth of the guest worker, doing little to integrate under a fake, self-imposed, concept that the Muslims were in country to work temporarily and would return home shortly. While France tackled the issues, the other three countries kept Muslims out of sight, pushing issues away and isolating the Muslim community from the rest of society.

The importance of this review is that identifying what has worked and failed in these four countries can begin to help develop an effective counter terrorism policy for the West. Failing to do so will result in continued dysfunctional behavior in the fight against terror.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

On August 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a Declaration of War against the United States and its allies for the alleged suffering they invoked upon Muslims worldwide. Embedded within the declaration was a call for Muslims to rise up and combat Western actions and influences:

It is no secret to you, my brothers, that the people of Islam have been afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian alliance and its supporters . . . Men of the radiant future of our umma of Muhammad, raise the banner of jihad up high against the Judeo-American alliance that has occupied the holy places of Islam . . . Cavalry of Islam, be mounted!¹

Although, early on, little international attention was paid to this declaration, bin Laden's words and fearlessness inspired a growing number of Islamic militants. Bin Laden's focus on the "far enemy" (the United States and its Western allies) was a revolutionary shift from previous militant efforts focused on the "near enemy" (local apostate regimes).² As a result of this shift in tactics, the newly proclaimed global jihad against the West became the cornerstone of al Qaeda. Since 1996, al Qaeda and its affiliates have carried out terrorist attacks targeting westerners in numerous locations, both Muslim and non-Muslim, around the world (i.e., U.S., UK, Spain, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Turkey). According to bin Laden, these attacks have been carried out in response to the foreign policies of the United States and its allies which are perceived to negatively influence the Muslim population.

Following bin Laden's declaration of jihad, a transition from attacks within developing countries to developed western countries was achieved, culminating in the

¹ *Al Islah*, "Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques," 02 September 1996.

² Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy Why Jihad Went Global*, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

attacks of September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda and its affiliates followed up this successful operation by targeting countries within Europe, specifically, Madrid and London. In Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, ten explosions on four commuter trains occurred nearly simultaneously, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,755 others.³ In London, England, on July 7, 2005, four bombs were detonated against the public transportation system killing 52 people and wounding more than 770 others.⁴ There has been speculation of al Qaeda's direct involvement in these attacks, but what has come to the forefront is many of the people involved in these attacks did not have direct ties to al Qaeda but were inspired by al Qaeda's message of jihad against the West.

Since the 2005 London attacks, there have been a number of thwarted plots which have been uncovered within various countries throughout Europe (i.e., the 2006 liquid explosives plot in the UK⁵, the 2007 plot to attack U.S. targets in Germany⁶, and the 2004 plot to blow up the Spanish National Court in Madrid⁷). Additionally, bin Laden and his top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have on many occasions called on Muslims to target countries within Europe.

These events (the attacks, thwarted plots, and messages) highlight the growing threat of terrorist attacks within Europe. However, more important is the fact these incidents were planned and carried out by homegrown terrorists—radical Muslims residing within Europe who chose to carry out attacks against the Western country providing them shelter and security. Although in some instances, like Madrid, successful and planned attacks have been carried out by a combination of homegrown and foreign jihadists, the primary concern emanates from Muslims residing within Europe choosing to support the global jihad through violence within Europe. Why have some Muslims in

3 *British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News Online*, "Madrid Train Attacks," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/default.stm> (accessed October 2007).

4 *BBC News Online*, "7 July Bombings: Overview," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/default.stm (accessed October 2007).

5 *BBC News Online*, "Airlines terror plot disrupted," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm (accessed October 2007).

6 Mark Landler, "German Police Arrest 3 in Terrorist Plot," *The New York Times*, 06 September 2006.

7 *BBC News Online*, "More 'bomb plot' arrests in Spain," 04 November 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3981061.stm> (accessed October 2007).

Europe radicalized and subsequently carried out these terrorist attacks in a jihad against the West? The goal of this research paper is to better understand the underlying motivations of these European terrorists. The findings in this thesis uncover a few critical factors important in measuring the likely success or failure of jihadist support. These include the foreign policy initiatives of the countries, counter terrorist actions, integration/assimilation policies of immigrants, national origin of the Muslim populations, and the presence of absence of counter-radicals and surrogate or competing radical organizations. Although each of these factors cannot be weighed evenly between one country and another, they do help to identify flags which may be raised to highlight potential threats to individual countries.

B. THE QUESTION

Over the past few decades, Muslim immigration to Europe created a minority population which has segments of Muslims who are angry and frustrated with their social status and standing. Additionally, although the first generation of European Muslims was drawn to Europe as a means for an improved life, the follow-on generations (second and third) have found themselves struggling between their cultural roots and their surroundings. This makes them primary targets by radicals playing on the sense of alienation within European society. French Research Director, Olivier Roy, noted: “radical imams such as Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri, who specifically address second-generation Muslims and play on their sense of alienation and uprootedness.”⁸

Because of its sizeable disenfranchised immigrant Muslim population (only a couple of generations removed from Muslim countries), the United Kingdom has fallen victim to a number of attacks and foiled plots being carried out within the country by European Muslims. By comparison, however, a number of other Western European countries also have sizeable Muslim populations but have not suffered a terrorist attack to radicals residing within the country. France has the largest Muslim population of all

⁸ Olivier Roy, “Britain: homegrown terror,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2005, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/05terror> (accessed October 2007).

Western European countries, and yet since bin Laden's declaration of jihad, the country has not been attacked. There have been numerous terror related arrests but no action. The French riots in late 2005 would appear to have been an opportunity for radicals to carry out an attack, yet no activity came to fruition. This then leads to our primary question: **Why are some Western European countries facing attacks from within and others are not?**

There are a number of possible variables to this case: the motivations of European Muslims to join the global jihad; al Qaeda's global plan vs. self interests of surrogate and ideologically inspired forces; the heterogeneity of the European Muslim population; as well as European governmental immigration policies and efforts to combat terrorism.

Although we would like to focus on each European country to get at the heart of this question, the scope of such an undertaking would be immense. In an effort to include as many variables as possible within our analysis, we have selected four varied Western European countries in this study: The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain. The selection of these countries in particular is based on their differing foreign policy initiatives, immigration policies, origins of Muslim populations, as well as a difference in the level of jihadist activity experienced thus far. The goal is to analyze the various variables and determine if one or a couple of them are more prevalent than the others, which could then be used as an analytical tool when evaluating the potential for radicalization in other European countries.

C. PURPOSE

The driving force behind this project is to understand why the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has occurred in some countries within Western Europe, while the concept of violent jihad has not taken root within other countries. The resulting data may help to identify possible policy changes to counter Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. From the perspective of the United States, understanding why the jihad is resonating with different Muslim populations in Europe may assist efforts to combat and prevent future terrorist actions. The concern for Americans regarding the European origin of terrorists was highlighted by terrorism analyst, Peter Bergen: "The most pressing threat to

Americans from Al Qaeda is not from within, but from without: its cells and affiliated groups based in Europe”⁹. Based on Bergen’s analysis, it is imperative the United States understand the dynamics of Europe’s Muslim populations and some of the possible explanations for the differing jihadist dynamics.

D. JIHAD PARTICIPATION DISPARITY

What explains the variation among Western European countries in the level of participation in jihad? A number of hypotheses abound which have been incorporated into this research. One is the differing integration policies towards immigrants which have been adopted by each of the countries. These policies range from the British attempt at multiculturalism, France’s policy of assimilation, to German and Spanish efforts at segregation. As each country has taken its own unique perspective in addressing its immigrant Muslim populations, some policies appear to have allowed for complete isolation of the Muslim communities which has led to a lack of national pride or identity within the isolated communities. Other policies have promoted inclusion in the country and helped to establish a sense of shared/common identity with many of the other citizens within the country. The feelings of detachment or inclusion can then be reflected positively or negatively against the host government and citizens. The ethnic/state background of immigrants is also believed to be a root cause where Muslims with links to different countries/groups (i.e., Pakistan and the Middle East) are more likely to engage in jihadist actions. The perception of increased radicalism emanating from Muslims of Pakistani or Middle Eastern origins is based on al Qaeda’s fight against the West. Many members within the core of al Qaeda came from countries within the Middle East. Pakistan similarly had provided a launching point for jihadis, to include Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, participating in the Soviet-Afghan War during the 1980s. Since then Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas have provided safe-haven for Taliban and al Qaeda forces fighting against the U.S. led coalition within Afghanistan. A final hypothesis is that the differing foreign policies and actions of each of the countries determine the amount of anger and hatred which can be generated against

⁹ Peter Bergen, “They Will Strike Again,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 December 2004.

them by al Qaeda and its surrogates. The United Kingdom, for example, has been a loyal supporter of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism, and as a likely result has been in the direct crosshairs of numerous successful and planned attacks. Spain is another country whose foreign policy was believed to be at the forefront of jihadist focus. The Madrid bombing in 2004 was claimed to be carried out based on Spain's participation within Iraq and was conducted in an effort to influence Spanish elections. Finally, Germany and France did not support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and have had offered no public endorsement of U.S. actions within the Middle East. This may help to explain why no attacks have been successfully carried out within either country.

E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is designed to answer the question why jihadist attacks have been successful within some countries in Western Europe and why little activity has occurred in others. In order to get at the heart of this question, this thesis is based on a comparative method of four case studies: the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and France. These countries have been selected based on the fact the United Kingdom and Spain have experienced violent jihadist attacks while Germany and France have not. In order to analyze and compare the activities within each of the countries, four broad areas have been selected: the status (social, financial, etc.) of Europe's Muslims, sentiment towards jihad by the Muslim populations, al Qaeda's ability to gain support of European Muslims, and counter-terrorism efforts and initiatives by the different governments and police agencies. Studying each of these areas in greater detail will flesh out some of the more critical variables for each section. Once these variables have been highlighted for each section, cross-cueing of the data can be conducted to determine which may provide greater weight in predicting whether or not a population is likely to support the jihad. From this data, a blueprint can be constructed which can then be used to analyze other countries within Europe to assess threat levels and concerns about jihadist activity within their borders.

II. JIHAD DEFINED

In order to understand the likely role of Europe's radical Muslims, the first issue is analyzing the concept of jihad and how it relates to Europe. There are various dimensions that must be explored in order to comprehend the meaning of jihad and to then develop a counter for those using it to foment terrorism. To do so, it is important to analyze how different groups have come to define the meaning of jihad. These groups include al Qaeda, Muslims in Europe, and non-Muslims in the West. As will be highlighted within this chapter, the various definitions alone identify the challenges posed to condemn actions and counter the rhetoric and propaganda being espoused by radical Islamists.

To frame these differing views of jihad, it is important to first have a basic definition of jihad. Jihad, in its broadest definition, means to struggle; jihad has both spiritual and a physical, warfare dimension. John Esposito, Georgetown University Professor of Religion and International Affairs, states: "Jihad as struggle pertains to the difficulty and perplexity of living a good life: struggling against the evil in oneself—to be virtuous and moral, making a serious effort to do good works and help reform society." Because of the complexity of the world, Muslims will continually go back and forth between the "lesser jihad (warfare) to the greater jihad (the spiritual struggle)."¹⁰ In the modern era, groups like Al Qaeda have called for all Muslims to rise up and engage in perpetual warfare in defense of the faith; in essence, therefore, it has made the lesser jihad a priority for Muslims around the world. The following section outlines the calls to jihad from Al Qaeda; Muslims in Europe and Muslims in the West.

A. AL QAEDA AND JIHAD

Al Qaeda clearly believes in an aggressive jihad against what it portrays as the persecuting West. The best document to highlight this is Osama bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war against the West. Bin Laden takes the framework from the Koran

¹⁰ John Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 117.

(highlighted above), and uses it to clearly structure the current situation as he sees it and the way forward. To bin Laden, Muslims have suffered from the aggression and injustice imposed by the Jewish/Christian alliance its supporters. To bin Laden, it is a clear conspiracy between the United States and its allies. This is highlighted by the West's "occupation of the land of the two Holy Places," referring to US military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. It is therefore the obligation of all Muslims to lift the iniquity that has been imposed on the Ummah by the "Zionist-Crusader alliance."

Local regimes fall within the crosshairs as well. Bin Laden highlights two actions by local regimes that eliminated their legitimacy:

(1) Suspension of the Islamic Shari'ah law and exchanging it with man made civil law. The regime entered into a bloody confrontation with the truthful Ulama and the righteous youths (we sanctify nobody; Allah sanctify Whom He pleaseth). The inability of the regime to protect the country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah-the American crusader forces- to occupy the land for the longest of years.¹¹

By supporting the infidels, the apostate regimes have effectively stripped themselves of any right to be Muslim. American troops positioned themselves in Saudi Arabia in response to Saddam Hussein's invading Kuwait. After Saddam's defeat, American troops remained on the holiest land for Islam. This infuriated the jihadists. Therefore, the apostate regimes allied with the West are enemies of Islam as well, thereby eliminating any possibility of a peaceful resolution. It is clear believers must then hit at the enemies of Islam. The question is whether to accomplish this by fighting the near enemy, the apostate regimes in the Middle East, or to focus efforts on the far enemy, the United States and the West. Bin Laden answers the question by stating, "After Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land." This is because the presence of the American military forces in Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening Islam. "To liberate their sanctities is the greatest of issues concerning all Muslims; it is the duty of every Muslim in this world."¹²

11 Osama Bin Laden, "Bin Laden's Fatwa," *Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, August 1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed February 2007).

12 Bin Laden, "Bin Laden's Fatwa."

In 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa, expanding the range of targets. It was now an obligation of Muslims, “to kill the Americans **and their allies** (emphasis added), including civilians and military, (it) is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”¹³ Jihadi activity by Muslims was justified as self defense.¹⁴ Anyone seen as supporting the American-dominated world system was now in the cross hairs.

In April 2004, Osama bin Laden offered to suspend operations against Europe if they stopped supporting the American occupation of Iraq and the war on terror. The offer was for reconciliation with Europe if troops were pulled out of Muslim countries within three months.¹⁵ When nothing changed, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, the group who claimed responsibility for the Madrid bombings, put all of Europe on warning of further attacks in July 2004 for continuing to maintain military personnel in Muslim countries. Several European states openly rejected the offer and none accepted it.¹⁶

B. JIHAD ACCORDING TO EUROPEAN MUSLIMS

The question is what does this mean to Muslims in Europe. What is their role in this jihad declared by bin Laden? If European Muslims agree with bin Laden, do they travel to the Middle East or Pakistan to fight the infidel there, or does the fight happen in Europe? Or do European Muslims support the jihad by providing key logistical support such as financing? Do only a minority of European Muslims buy into the jihad? If there is a split amongst European Muslims, how does it break down and can this be used by European governments to counter terrorism? By understanding why some support jihad and others don't, a government can develop an effective counterterrorism campaign.

13 Osama bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” *Federation of American Scientists*, 23 February 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> accessed October 2007).

14 J. T. Caruso, “Terrorist Groups: Al Qaeda International,” *Terrorism Research Center*, <http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=11> (accessed February 2007).

15 Magdi Abdelhadi, “Tape Plays to European Audience,” *BBC News Online*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3628841.stm (accessed September 2007).

16 *BBC News Online*, “Al Qaeda Letter Warns Europe,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3859587.stm> (accessed September 2007).

The Madrid and London bombings, as well as the recently failed attacks in Great Britain and Germany show Muslims willing to bring the battle to Europe. How strong is this support?

In Britain, the YouGov organization surveyed Muslims immediately following the 7/7 transportation bombings in London. The goal was to determine the level of support for jihadi activity amongst British Muslims. Results showed a definitive split amongst the population. The first question asked was whether Muslims felt the bombing attacks were justified or not. Only 6 percent believed they were justified, with 84 percent stating the attacks were on balance not justified or not justified at all. Asked whether they had sympathy for the feelings and motives of the terrorists, 24 percent stated they did while 71 percent stated they did not. Of a more general nature, Muslims were asked whether they believed a wave of terrorist attacks would be justified. Again the majority were against it, with only 6 percent feeling it would be justified and 73 percent against it.¹⁷

Another poll conducted by The Times and ITV in Britain came up with similar results. Reviewing them shows the great majority of British Muslims do not support jihadi activity in Europe (Table 1).

Table 1. British Muslims and Support of 7/7 and Suicide Bombings¹⁸

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
7/7 bombers acted according to the true principles of Islam	6%	87%
The 7/7 attacks were wrong but the cause of the bombers was right	16%	69%
Are there any circumstances under which you think that suicide bombings can ever be justified in the UK against the following types of targets?	Yes	No
Civilians	7%	89%
The military	16%	79%
The Police	10%	86%
Government buildings/workers	11%	85%

¹⁷ YouGov, "YouGov Survey Results," 15-22 July 2005, http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/TEL050101030_1.pdf (accessed July 2007).

¹⁸ *Populus*, "Muslim 7/7 Poll," 04-05 July 2006, <http://www.populus.co.uk/the-times-itv-news-muslim-77-poll-050706.html> (accessed July 2007).

Even more telling was the response to the following question in the same poll: What would your reaction be if a close member of your family chose to al Qaeda? Only 4 percent said they would feel some form of pride or acceptance and 78 percent stated they would be angry with their family member.¹⁹ These poll results show the great majority of British Muslims do not support al Qaeda or believe suicide bombings are justified.

French Muslims have in general shown a disdain for jihad as well. During the head scarf debate in 2004, two French journalists were kidnapped in Iraq. The kidnappers demanded the French government remove the head scarf ban in order to gain the journalists release. French Muslims united against the ban, with even opponents of the ban who had organized demonstrations calling for all schoolgirls to respect the new law. Muslim leaders went so far as to denounce this foreign interference in the internal affairs of France, calling the kidnappers' demands an “odious [form of] blackmail” and proclaiming “there will be no blood on my headscarf.”²⁰ Even the riots of 2005 failed to bring calls of jihad from French Muslims. Any demands and statements that did come from the rioters centered on economic injustice, claims of racism, and responding to comments by then Interior Minister Sarkozy. But there were no sustained calls for jihad or the implementation of Shari’ah, Muslim law, in France.²¹ It appears that the majority of French Muslims prefer the laws of the Republic over implementing Shari’ah law.²²

Muslim leaders in Spain have also stepped forward to fight against jihad in their country. In fact, the Islamic Conference of Spain issued a fatwa that condemned bin Laden as an “apostate” and as a “kafir” within Islam in response to the 3/11 train bombings.²³ Comments such as cleric Mohammed Kamal Mustafa’s that the 3/11

19 *Populus*, “Muslim 7/7 Poll.”

20 Jonathan Laurence, “Islam in France: A Contest Between the Wind and the Sun,” *New Europe Review*, November 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/laurence20041115.htm> (accessed July 2007).

21 Vikki Valentine, “Economic Despair, Racism Drive French Riots,” *National Public Radio*, 08 November 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5004897> (accessed July 2007).

22 Laurence, “Islam in France: A Contest Between the Wind and the Sun.”

23 Jim Guirard, “Spanish Muslims' Fatwa of “Jihad Against al Qaeda,” *TruSpeak Institute*, 13 March 2005, <http://www.freemuslims.org/news/article.php?article=495> (accessed July 2007).

terrorists were exploiting Islam to inflict harm on innocent people mirrored those of the vast majority of Spain's Muslims who condemned the attacks. This was symbolized by the Islamic Cultural Center of Madrid, the country's largest mosque, displaying a large banner that denounced terrorism and applauded tolerance and also sent memorial wreaths that were displayed at the central commemorative festivities held at the Atocha train station. These were very public displays against jihad and suggest that the majority of Muslims in Spain do not support violence in the name of the faith.²⁴

Despite this broad opposition to violent jihad by European Muslims, jihadi activity does occur in Europe. Individuals often attend radical mosques and meet others who share their feelings. These include the London Baker Street mosque; the abu Bakr mosque in Madrid; the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg; and the al-Dawah mosque in Roubaix, France. Each mosque has a history of producing jihadists prior to 9/11.²⁵ These mosques bring in large amounts of worshippers; weed out the less radical, and then the extremists begin to meet more clandestinely, often to carry out violent activities.²⁶ Prison is an effective recruiting station for jihad as well. For example, Jamal Ahmidan, a young non-practicing Muslim Moroccan living in Spain, became radicalized in a Spanish prison. After his release, he then joined the cell that perpetrated the Madrid train bombings.²⁷

Others are bringing jihad to Europe from parts of the Muslim world. This is assisted by such things as the right of British citizens to return to Britain after attending madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of requiring them to be educated in Britain in order to remain in country.²⁸ Perhaps even more important are those who have

24 Geoff Pingree and Lisa Abend, "Spanish Muslims Decry Al Qaeda," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 14 March 2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0314/p06s01-woeu.html> (accessed July 2007).

25 Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 114 and 143.

26 Daniel Fried, "Islamist Extremism in Europe." Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 05 April 2006, 6.

27 *Ibid.*, 7.

28 Irwin Stelzer, "Letter from Londonistan," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 10 No. 43, 01 August 2005, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/871kbaxp.asp> (accessed February 2007).

returned from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to their home countries, experienced and with credibility.²⁹ Since 9/11, jihadist organizations have been uncovered in Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.³⁰ Various Muslim extremist organizations have embedded themselves inside the Diaspora throughout Europe and are acquiring support from radical elements. These extremists remain exceedingly difficult to track down and exist in all four of the subject countries and include recent immigrants and long-term residents.³¹ Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna argues that Europe is particularly attractive because of its freedom of movement and active dissent within some segments of the Muslim population.³²

It is clear there are European Muslims who do see jihadi activity as a legitimate method to gain the ends they seek, however they are in the great minority. The key questions are why do some support jihad, some not, and can the reason for this difference be utilized by European governments to counter terrorism?

C. JIHAD IN THE EYES OF THE WEST

As Muslims have become more prevalent in Europe, tensions have risen. This includes a rise in xenophobia and right wing extremist groups. In fact, “Almost all Western European countries have an increasingly popular anti-Muslim platform in their societies,” says Mark LeVine, associate professor of history at the University of California, Irvine, and a Middle Eastern history specialist.³³

29 Bruce Hoffman, “Combating al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat,” Rand, 16 February 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf (accessed February 2007), 12.

30 Ibid., 72.

31 Bruce Hoffman, “Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground,” Rand, 18 July 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT263.pdf (accessed February 2007), 7.

32 Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post Madrid Face of Al-Qaeda,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2004, <http://muse.jhu.edu> (accessed February 2007), 95.

33 Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations, 13 July 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html#1> (accessed February 2007).

This attitude bears itself out in a Pew Global Attitudes Project report.³⁴ Europeans were asked if there is a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. Germans, Spanish, and British respondents overwhelmingly stated there was a conflict. The majority of the French, however, believe there isn't a conflict (Table 2). Is there a reason for the difference of opinion between the French and the other countries? If so, it could help explain the lack of jihadi violence in France compared to Spain and Great Britain. Statistical data and policy decisions will be compared in the next chapter to see if there are differences which explain the poll data.

Table 2. Conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society?³⁵

	No	Yes
Germany	26	70
Spain	36	58
France	74	26
Great Britain	35	54

In the same Pew Report, Europeans were asked which negative characteristics they associated with Muslims. Table 3 shows that a significant portion of the target populations associated fanaticism and violence with Muslims. With this question, Germany and Spain took a hard line with France and Great Britain having at least 50 percent of their population not associating violence and fanaticism with Muslims.

Table 3. Negative Characteristics Non-Muslims Associated with Muslims³⁶

	Fanatical	Violent
Germany	78	52
Spain	83	60
France	50	41
Great Britain	48	32

34 Andrew Kohut, "Europe's Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners And Muslims View Each Other," *The Pew Global Attitudes Project* (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 22 June 2006).

35 Ibid., 3.

36 Ibid., 6.

Pew also asked Europeans how concerned they were about Islamic extremism in the world (Table 4). Interestingly, the Germans and French are the most concerned. However, it is clear the majority in all four countries are at least somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism, wherever it may exist.

Table 4. How Concerned Are You About Islamic Extremism In The World?³⁷

	Total Concerned	Somewhat Concerned	Very Concerned
Germany	93%	38%	55%
France	89%	41%	48%
Great Britain	84%	34%	50%
Spain	77%	38%	39%

The most direct question in the Pew Report asked to non-Muslim Europeans regarding Muslims in their countries was, “How many Muslims in your country support Islamic extremists like al Qaeda?” The Spanish are the most suspicious, with 41 percent of Spaniards believing many or most Muslims in their country support Islamic extremist organizations. The other three countries hover at around 20 percent believing Muslims in their country aid extremists (Table 5).

Table 5. Muslims in your country support Islamic extremists like al Qaeda?³⁸

	Many Involved	Most Involved	Total
Germany	26%	15%	41%
France	14%	6%	20%
Great Britain	11%	9%	20%
Spain	14%	4%	18%

The data suggest, therefore, that most non-Muslim citizens in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Spain see a natural conflict between being a Muslim and the modern world. It is also evident many Europeans see fanaticism and violence inherent in Islam.

³⁷ Kohut, “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” 24.

³⁸ Ibid., 26.

This has led to an almost universal concern about Islamic extremism in general, and for some a belief that many Muslims in their countries support extremists. Jihad is therefore a relevant issue to many within our four target countries.

D. CONCLUSION

The question that comes out of all this material is whether it is possible to counter the desire for jihad that exists within a portion of European Muslims. Can the apparent split within the European Muslim community be used to prevent jihad? Is it possible to use this as leverage in the European Muslim community to counter Islamic extremism? As Marc Sageman has noted, mosques are just as likely to constrain activity as they are to promote it.³⁹ Can European governments work with their Muslim communities to counter terrorism? Are Europeans willing to work by, with, and through Muslim organizations to reach a solution? These questions will be answered in subsequent chapters.

³⁹ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 143.

III. STATUS OF EUROPEAN MUSLIMS

Too often analysis looks at European Muslims as a singular issue--as if it is one Europe and the Muslims are all the same. By looking deeper into the details, some unique factors may be identified. Perhaps there is something about the status of Muslims in Europe that can explain the difference in jihadist activity in France, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain. Looking at the Muslim population itself, data can be analyzed regarding the national origin of the Muslim population, social status of Muslims, the employment and income levels, and the education levels achieved to see if differences exist between the countries. If so, a connection between that difference and varied levels of jihadi activity may exist. Government policy must also be examined to determine if differing approaches to the Muslim population may lead to jihadi activity. The focus of this report will be on how each country approaches Muslim issues, civil rights, prison statistics, and assimilation and integration policy.

A. NATIONAL ORIGIN

It is tempting to just look at European Muslims as a monolith. However there are critical differences involved in the Muslim populations in each country that could explain the different levels of activity; one of these is national origin of the majority of Muslims in each country. In France, the great majority of Muslims are North Africans from Algeria and Morocco. It is similar in Spain, with Moroccans the leading Muslim population in the country. For Germany, it is primarily Turkish immigrants.⁴⁰ The populations in these countries tend to be more secular. This is especially true for the Turks, with Turkey's constitution ensuring, "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law."⁴¹ Correspondingly, Turkish immigrants have not been involved in any jihadi activity that has occurred in Germany. In Britain, the Muslim population is primarily Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi, which

⁴⁰ Daniel Fried, "Islamist Extremism in Europe," 2.

⁴¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, *Hellenic Resources Network*, http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_i.html#article_2 (accessed September 2007).

tends to be more religiously centered.⁴² This is highlighted by the uninhibited right of British Muslims to attend radical madrassas in Pakistan for education, and then return to Britain.⁴³

B. SOCIAL STATUS

Social status may also provide some insight into differences between the countries. Even without 9/11 and jihadi activity, the growth of the European Muslim population would have forced governments to begin to deal with the issue. This is largely due to the fact that while European birthrates are stagnating, Muslim birthrates are running around three times higher.⁴⁴ According to projections by the US federal government's National Intelligence Council, the continent's current Muslim population of 20 million will likely double by 2025.⁴⁵ By 2050, one in five Europeans will likely be Muslim.⁴⁶

With the ever increasing percentage of European Muslims, the next question to ask is whether they are becoming part of the society they live in or remaining distinct from it. It is possible higher levels of perceived integration could explain a lower level of jihadi activity in a country. The Pew Global Attitudes Project polled both Muslims and Europeans to determine at a very basic level how well integrated Muslims are in each country.

42 Daniel Fried, "Islamist Extremism in Europe," 2.

43 Irwin M. Stelzer, "Letter from Londonistan."


44 O. Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," *Global Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 2003) <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030301.htm> (accessed February 2007).

45 Steven Simon, "Guess Who's Coming to Europe?" *Washington Post*, 26 March 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/23/AR2006032301464.html> (accessed February 2007).

46 Esther Pan, "Europe: Integrating Islam."

Muslims were asked whether they consider themselves a citizen of their country or a Muslim first. Interestingly French Muslims are almost evenly split, while the other three countries have Muslim populations that overwhelmingly believe they are Muslim first (Figure 1).⁴⁷ Is there something the French are doing differently from the other three countries to account for the difference?

Figure 1. Nation Vs. Religion⁴⁸




A similar question was asked of the native population in each country. The same Pew poll asked whether natives believed Muslims in their country most wanted to be distinct from society or adopt national customs. Again France came in at a near split, with the other three countries overwhelmingly stating that the Muslims wanted to stay distinct from society (Figure 2).⁴⁹ This is further evidence the French are doing something different from the other countries. The French Muslim sense of being further integrated than their fellow Muslims in Germany, Spain, and Great Britain is a possible explanation for a lower level of jihadi activity in France.

⁴⁷ Jodie Allen, “Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans,” *The Pew Global Attitudes Project* (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 06 July 2006), <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/254.pdf> (accessed February 2007), 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

Figure 2. Muslim Desires⁵⁰



C. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

Employment rates and income levels for Muslims in Europe come in lower than the native populations across Europe. The question again is whether there is some difference in the statistics to explain the different activity levels.

Muslim unemployment is above the national average in all four countries. Turks in Germany have consistently had the lowest employment rate of any nationality, running over 20 percent from the late 1990s through 2001.⁵¹ France has similar results, with areas outside of Paris loaded with Muslims dealing with a 17 percent unemployment rate, nearly twice as high as the 9.4 percent national rate.⁵² In Britain, 17 percent of Muslims have never worked nor are currently long-term unemployed, compared to 3 percent for

⁵⁰ Allen, "Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans," 8.

⁵¹ Gisela Will and Stefan Ruehl, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany," *European Forum for Migration Studies*, Bamberg, Germany, 2004, 87.

⁵² Esther Pan, "Europe: Integrating Islam."

the overall population.⁵³ Unfortunately, data for the unemployment rates of Spanish Muslims was not available. However the report clearly states Muslims in Spain do in fact have a higher unemployment rate than the national average.⁵⁴ As employment rates are similar, it appears there is no link between this statistic and the different activity levels.

Looking a little deeper, income levels may provide a little more insight. The standard is to say that Muslim incomes are significantly lower than the general public and place that as a problem across the board. However looking at the statistics in a little detail will show there is a difference between each of the countries. French Muslims enjoy the highest income levels of the four groups. Twenty percent of French Muslims have an income of €29,500 or more, compared to 7 percent in Spain, 12 percent in Germany, and 13 percent in Great Britain. This trend continues down to the lowest income levels, with only Germany coming close to the Muslim income levels in France (Table 6).⁵⁵ Therefore, decidedly higher income levels for French Muslims when compared to the other three countries could explain less support for jihad in France.

53 Zamila Bunglawala, "Aspirations and Reality: British Muslims and the Labour Market," (Budapest, Hungary: Open Society Institute, 2004)
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/eumapmuslims_20040722/british_muslims.pdf (accessed September 2007), 8.

54 Movement for Peace, Disarmament, and Liberty, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Spain," Madrid, 2004, 34.

55 Andrew Kohut, "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream," *The Pew Global Attitudes Project* (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 22 May 2007),
<http://info.detnews.com/2007/muslimamericans.pdf> (accessed October 2007), 3.

Table 6. Income Levels⁵⁶

		Muslims	General Public	Difference
France				
	€29,500 or more	20	32	-12
	€17,500-€29,499	35	41	-6
	Less than €17,500	45	27	18
Spain				
	€21,500 or more	7	26	-19
	€14,500-€21,499	20	24	-4
	Less than €14,500	73	50	23
Germany				
	€30,000 or more	12	26	-14
	€18,000-€29,999	35	39	-4
	Less than €18,000	53	35	18
Britain				
	£40,000 or more	13	23	-10
	£20,000-£39,999	26	38	-12
	Less than £20,000	61	39	22

D. EDUCATION

Education also provides some potential insight into the different activity levels. However it may be the approach that is taken that leads to a difference as opposed to the statistical data regarding educational achievement that determines whether Muslims resort to jihadi activity or not.

In all four countries, what primary school an individual goes to is based on where they live. What is occurring is similar to the pre-integration days of the United States. In France, urban segregation has resulted in school segregation, with Muslims primarily

⁵⁶ Andrew Kohut, "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream."

only going to school with other Muslims.⁵⁷ The same is also true in Spain⁵⁸ and Great Britain⁵⁹ as well. Though no nation-wide effort has been conducted in Germany, it is clear segregation exists there as well.⁶⁰

In general, the European Union noted low performance by Muslim students across all four countries. In Spain, students of North African decent consistently rank lower than natives.⁶¹ In Germany, when Turks do continue education they end up primarily in the lower vocational school types.⁶² In Great Britain, the “groups most at risk of underachieving are Bangladeshi and Pakistani” students.⁶³ In France, it is immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia that present the greatest concern.⁶⁴

A difference that does appear in education is the approach each country takes. France is the only one that pushes a singular philosophy across the entire education system; the emphasis is on the broad republican principle of universal, equal, secular, and compulsory education.⁶⁵ In France, the desire is to promote national unity and secularity through education in order for the individual to assimilate into secular society as a fully functioning citizen.⁶⁶ This push to assimilate helps individuals become a part of the French society, as opposed to seeking to destroy it. None of the other three countries take this approach, often leading disgruntled Muslims with no choice other than jihad to rectify their situation.

57 Dr. Vije Franchi, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for France,” (Paris: Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations, 2004), 41-2.

58 Will and Ruehl, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany,” 34.

59 Dr. Leon Tikly, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Great Britain,” Commission for Racial Equality, London, 2004, 21.

60 Will and Ruehl, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany,” 20.

61 Movement for Peace, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Spain,” 3.

62 Will and Ruehl, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany,” 29.

63 Tikly, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Great Britain,” 19.

64 Franchi, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for France,” 46-47.

65 Ibid., 3.

66 Ibid., 17.

E. GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION

The clearest picture on how each government approaches the Muslim issue was provided by the Analytical Report on Education completed for all four countries. The contrast is whether to deal with the issue from the national level or leave to regional and local governments to develop their own solutions. In Britain, policy is primarily handled by the regional governments of England, Scotland, and Wales.⁶⁷ Spain is similar with its regional governments taking the lead on initiatives.⁶⁸ In Germany, responsibility falls to the numerous federal and city states.⁶⁹ France is the exception. France's approach is to attack issues from the national level. This is clearly based on the republican principles at the core of the French system. The goal of French policy is to create Frenchmen, where the other countries appear to be primarily trying to resolve the specific issues at hand based on regional requirements.⁷⁰ This difference in approach could explain why more French Muslims identify with the country than the other three countries.

F. PRISON STATISTICS

Prison has been highlighted as a haven for Islamic extremism and essentially as a recruiting station for jihadists. The general belief is by placing too many Muslims in prison, a country actually increases animosity and encourages individuals to radicalize. However the results appear to be counterintuitive as the French are much more likely to imprison a Muslim than Britain or Spain.

In Great Britain, Muslims currently make up around eight percent of the prison population; an estimated two to four times their percentage of the overall population.⁷¹ Spain is almost identical, with the Muslim population hovering around 2.3 percent of the

⁶⁷ Tikly, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Great Britain."

⁶⁸ Movement for Peace, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Spain."

⁶⁹ Will and Ruehl, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany."

⁷⁰ Franchi, "Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for France."

⁷¹ Jennifer Carlile, "Islamic Radicalization Feared in Europe's Jails," *MSNBC*, 08 July 2006, http://euro-islam.info/pages/news_general_07-08-06.html (accessed October 2007).

overall population⁷² and the percentage of prisoners being Muslim at 10 percent.⁷³ Our research was unable to uncover any data on the percentage of Muslim prisoners in German jails.

France is a different story. The percentage of Muslims in France runs around seven percent.⁷⁴ Estimates for the percentage of French prisoners being Muslim run up 70 percent.⁷⁵ Are Great Britain and Spain being too lenient with their Muslim population and extremists? Perhaps the French secular and republican approach, where religion and ethnicity are irrelevant, is the most effective method for countering Islamic extremism.

G. ASSIMILATION, MULTICULTURALISM, & GUEST WORKER

A common mistake made by analysts is to assume Muslims as a whole simply don't assimilate into other cultures. The numbers above disagree, showing close to half of Muslims in France placing being French over being a Muslim. What explains the different results achieved by France from the other three surveyed countries? What can explain 81 percent of British Muslims identifying themselves as Muslim rather than British...or 69 percent in Spain or 66 percent in Germany doing the same, while only 46 percent of French Muslims identify themselves as Muslim first?⁷⁶ A possible explanation is the different approaches of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism.

Many Europeans have traditionally viewed Muslims as guest workers in their countries who would eventually go "home." This leads to Europeans viewing Muslims as

⁷² *BBC News Online*, "Muslims in Europe: Country Guide," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm#spain> (accessed September 2007).

⁷³ Renwick McLean, "Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for Radical Islam," *The New York Times*, 31 October 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/international/europe/31spain.html?ei=5090&en=782eb03049b43620&ex=1256875200&adxnnl=1&partner=rssuserland&adxnnlx=1191088071-vO7pFULr8JICZA9WHSRTHQ> (accessed September 2007).

⁷⁴ Embassy of France in the United States, "French Society," <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/social.asp> (accessed October 2007).

⁷⁵ Hadi Yahmid, "French Prisons Teeming with Muslims," *Islam On-Line*, 19 June 2005, <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2005-06/19/article04.shtml> (accessed September 2007).

⁷⁶ Jodie Allen, "Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans," 3.

“foreign,” despite many having been born in Europe.⁷⁷ This was the policy pursued by Germany and Spain, essentially hoping the problem would eventually go away. Britain preferred a policy of multiculturalism, essentially trying to keep everybody separate...Brits stay Brits and Muslims stay Muslims. Of the four countries, only France has attempted a policy of assimilation. The goal was to create Frenchmen out of their immigrants.⁷⁸

Has this different approach been 100 percent successful? No, but the statistics show the French are doing better than the other three countries. A Pew Research poll asked Muslims in each country whether they wanted to adopt the customs of that country. In France, nearly 80 percent said yes. In contrast, 53 percent said yes in Spain, 41 percent said yes in Great Britain, and only 30 percent said yes in Germany. These results are especially interesting when you consider the Muslim populations of France and Spain both overwhelmingly come from North Africa.⁷⁹ Therefore it would appear it is policy that is a prime driving factor in successfully winning over Muslims to the country they live in.

H. CONCLUSION

By analyzing empirical data regarding Muslims in each country, one can draw distinctions. It is clear each country has a particular country their Muslim population came from. Realizing this allows one to then analyze the particulars of each population, such as the increased religiosity of Pakistanis in Great Britain when compared to the more secular Turks in Germany. Perceived social status, as well as employment, income, and education statistics also highlight distinctions between the Muslim populations in Europe. Each area shows French Muslims experiencing greater integration into society

⁷⁷ Daniel Fried, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” 6.

⁷⁸ David Masci, “An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe,” *The Pew Global Attitudes Project* (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, December 2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Religion_in_public_life/Pew_religion_Muslims_Europe_1204.pdf (accessed March 2007), 7.

⁷⁹ Julie Corwin, “Europe: Study Shows France Leading in Muslim Integration,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 24 August 2006, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/08/8c29f0a2-1e7f-43f6-8341-98ba1e9e7afc.html> (accessed September 2007).

when compared to their counterparts in the other countries. This is logical as France is the only country of the four that attempted an assimilation policy with its immigrants, as opposed to the multicultural and guest worker approach of the others. The end result is French Muslims existing within society and seeking to resolve issues within the structures of said society; the other three have Muslim populations external to society that have often have no choice but to try to resolve issues outside established structures, making them more vulnerable to join the jihad.

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IV. SENTIMENT TOWARDS JIHAD

In order for global jihad to resonate within a population, a number of driving forces must be aligned for success. These forces can be broken down into two broad categories: factors internal to individual Muslims (national origin and religiosity) and the Muslim communities at large (recruitment and counter radicals). Measuring the presence or absence of these areas within a Muslim population may help to understand the likely sentiment the people may have towards jihad. This may then flesh out which groups are more apt to support the jihad elsewhere in the world, which ones may be more inclined to carry out or support attacks within their European countries, and which ones have no desire to support any notion of the global jihad. This chapter will analyze the potential driving forces of jihadist sentiment.

The first step in analyzing the possible sentiment must be to determine whether rhetoric and actions within a country are motivated by the desire to support the global jihad or if they in fact represent disenfranchised anger. The two transportation bombings within London in 2005 and the 2004 Madrid train bombings highlight attacks which were inspired by the ideology espoused by al Qaeda for a global jihad. Investigations into each of these attacks reveal radical Muslims operating within the United Kingdom and Spain which carried out the attacks in an effort to communicate their frustration and anger with the foreign policies of each country.^{80,81} On the other hand, the November 2005 civil unrest witnessed in France “had little to do with yearnings for a worldwide caliphate and much to do with domestic socioeconomic problems.”⁸² The initial distinction between jihad and disenfranchised anger is critical in the analytical process. If it is made incorrectly, the resulting data and analysis will likely be inaccurate.

80 Paul Murphy, “Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,” Intelligence and Security Committee (Crown: London, UK), May 2006.

81 Elizabeth Nash, “Madrid Bombers 'Were Inspired by Bin Laden Address',” *The Independent*, 07 November 2006, <http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article1961431.ece> (accessed October 2007).

82 Stephanie Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2006.

Terrorism analyst Marc Sageman in his book *Understanding Terror Networks*, highlighted some of the key characteristics of nearly two hundred al Qaeda members. Some of his analysis has provided a broad stroke of elements which may help understand sentiment towards jihad. According to Sageman, 73% of the members were married with many having children as well, 80% were in some way isolated from the society with which they lived in, and 68% had pre-existing links to individuals already in the jihad or were part of a group which collectively joined together.⁸³ The analysis in this chapter will build upon some of these variables to better understand the sentiment adopted or rejected by various Muslim groups within Europe.

A. INTERNAL FACTORS

There are numerous components which make up individual Muslims as well as the groups which they associate with; however, a couple of key factors which came to the forefront of the analysis are the national origins and religiosity of Muslims residing within Europe. Culture and ethnicity of the various groups also are critical factors in the sentiment towards jihad, but would require significant analysis. Studying cultural and ethnic factors of the Muslim populations in the target countries can in and of itself be an individual thesis. As a result, these two areas have been incorporated with national origin to help identify the broad identity and differences between individuals from differing ancestral backgrounds.

1. National Origin

From the perspective of national origin, the first thing to analyze is the make-up of the Muslim populations in each of the four countries and to then tie this data to the levels of jihadist activity within each country. The underlying goal is to correlate a proclivity for action to Muslims from different ancestral backgrounds. Although this process may oversimplify all of the variables at play as well as fail to provide a definitive predictor of likely jihadist sentiment, it can help to offer a component to the overall analysis of a target group.

⁸³ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 73-93.

Looking first to the United Kingdom, according to the UK's 2001 Census, there were 1.6 million Muslims legally residing within the UK. Of those the majority came from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Smaller concentrations of Muslims also immigrated from the Middle East and Northern Africa (Table 7).⁸⁴ Although jihadist sentiment is likely to only resonate amongst a small portion of the population, parallels have been drawn between jihadist action and links to Pakistan and the al Qaeda core. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued *Policy Watch #1256* in July 2007. Within the report it was identified that "British citizens of Pakistani origin have predominated in al-Qaeda linked plots."⁸⁵ Although attacks and planning have predominantly occurred from within the Pakistani community in the UK, Muslims with other origins have also been identified as active participants in the global jihad. In July 2005, British police arrested an Ethiopian terrorist cell which was planning multiple suicide bombing attacks against soft targets within London. Additionally, some of the members within this cell were also linked to individuals involved in the July 21, 2005 London bombings.⁸⁶

Jihadist activity in the UK, including attacks as well as foiled plots, has been the most numerous of all four of the countries in this study. In November 2006, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of the British domestic security service (MI5), cautioned that there were more than 200 known terror networks comprised of 1,600 individuals within the UK, and it was believed that 30 terror plots were underway.⁸⁷ Can this large number be associated with the national origin of the Muslim populations? Once again, although numerous factors account for this activity, there is a high likelihood that part of the connection is based on national origin. According to Marc Sageman, al Qaeda's

84 UK National Statistics Online, "UK Snapshot," *UK National Statistics 2001 Census*, <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/default.asp> (accessed October 2007).

85 Simon Henderson and Michael Jacobson, "Terrorist Attacks in the United Kingdom: More Faces of al-Qaeda," *Policy Watch #1256* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 02 July 2007), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2632> (accessed October 2007).

86 David Leppard & John Follain, "Third Terror Cell on Loose," *Sunday Times*, (London, July 31, 2005), <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article550037.ece> (accessed November 2007).

87 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, "MI5 tracking '30 UK terror plots'," *BBC News* 10 November 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6134516.stm (accessed October 2007).

recruits usually had to have a link to the jihad to successfully integrate into the network.⁸⁸ Although the internet is believed to help alleviate the necessary familial or friendship ties to jihad, it still does not allow individuals to train and adequately prepare for attacks. As a result, trusted relationships appear to be relied upon in order to plan and carry out jihadist actions. The August 2006 UK liquid bomb plot provides an example of many of the attacks and plots conducted targeting citizens of the UK. As a result of the arrests related to this plot, more than 24 people were taken into custody. Some of these individuals were believed to have had connections back to Pakistan. In addition Pakistani authorities arrested seven individuals in Pakistan believed to be involved in the plot.⁸⁹ Connections back to Pakistan have not been fleshed out to highlight specifically why these links are so vital to jihadist activity within the UK, but what can be deduced is that Muslims in the UK of Pakistani origin maintain direct ties back to their ancestral homeland. Whether they become radicalized upon visits to Pakistan or they become radical within the UK and then reaffirm their devotion to the jihadist ideology during travel to Pakistan is not known. What is known is that Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas are believed to be providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and a number of key al Qaeda and Taliban members. In addition, when mujahideen fighters traveled to fight the Soviets within Afghanistan, many of them traveled by way of Pakistan. It was in Pakistan where Ayman al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden began to establish the roots of al Qaeda.⁹⁰ These elements have led to a large pro-jihadist movement in Pakistan and with its influence upon Pakistani Muslims in the UK, may help to explain why the UK is the most targeted European country.

⁸⁸ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.

⁸⁹ *BBC News Online*, "Q&A: UK Aircraft 'Bomb Plot'," 15 August 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778889.stm (accessed October 2007).

⁹⁰ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

Table 7. Muslims in the UK⁹¹

Muslims in the UK: 1.6 million	
National Origin	Number
Pakistan	658,000
Bangladesh	260,000
India	160,000
Middle East/Africa	350,000
* All numbers approximate	

Spain's Muslim population is estimated at around 600,000 legal immigrants, and it is unique in that it is varied and made up of Muslims from a variety of countries within Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. According to a 2001 Census, the preponderance of Muslims originated from Morocco (approximately 21% of legal immigrants) followed by concentrations of Muslims from Algeria, Senegal, and Pakistan (Table 8).⁹² Given Spain's geographic proximity to Northern Africa and relatively easy access from Morocco via the Straits of Gibraltar, there is believed to be a large number of illegal Muslim immigrants residing within Spain as well. Some organizations have estimated upwards of 200,000 illegal immigrants living within Spain.⁹³ As is the case with most Islamic radical groups, the number of these immigrants (legal and illegal) believed to be involved in radical Islamic actions is extremely low in comparison with the total Muslim population. According to an advisor to Spain's Interior Minister, estimates of radical Islamists were as high as 1,000 in July 2005.⁹⁴ Given these numbers, however, the only major terrorist attacks which have come to the forefront within Spain are the

91 Theodore Karasik and Cheryl Benard, "Muslim Diasporas and Networks," *The Muslim World After 9/11* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 484.

92 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Population and Housing Census 2001*, (Madrid, Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001), <http://www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um?M=%2Ft20%2Fe242&O=inebase&N=&L=1> (accessed October 2007).

93 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2004," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2004) <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35485.htm> (accessed October 2007).

94 *El Pais*, "One Thousand Islamic Radicals Live in Spain, Says Ministry Advisor," 26 July 2005.

Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and a thwarted plot to bomb Spain's High Court in 2004. Utilizing Sageman's link theory approach, it would make sense that little activity has occurred within Spain.⁹⁵ This is based on the fact that links back to the primary organization, al Qaeda, are not as well defined given the smaller concentrations of Arab and Pakistani Muslims residing within Spain. Some of the individuals involved within the Madrid train bombing are believed to have originated from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria and were believed to have had ties with a number of terrorist organizations including al Qaeda, Salafiya Jihadija, and the Algerian Islamic Group.⁹⁶ So a larger emphasis should be placed on individuals with direct links to al Qaeda rather than the possibility that the idea of the global jihad might resonate with a group of individuals willing to unite and carry out attacks against the local population. What has been witnessed within the region is a growing number of attacks in Northern Africa following the merger of Al-Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (now referred to as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)). Given this increase in terrorist attacks, Spanish officials are convinced that Islamist terrorism is the greatest threat to the country. In April 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Spain to become part of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate, but given the small amount of activity as well as the lack of direct links between al Qaeda and the North African Muslim population, it appears that this concept has yet to be fully adopted outside of Northern Africa.⁹⁷

95 Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.

96 Jose Rodriguez, "The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its weakness Lies in its Strength," (Barcelona, Spain: University of Barcelona, Department of Sociology, December 2005), <http://www.ub.es/epp/wp/11m.PDF> (accessed October 2007), 7.

97 John Daly, "Spain Alarmed by Recent Terrorist Attacks in North Africa," *Terrorism Focus*, Volume 4, Issue 11, 24 April 2007, <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373345> (accessed October 2007).

Table 8. Muslims in Spain⁹⁸

Muslims in Spain: 600,000	
National Origins	
Morocco – aprx 21%	Nigeria
Algeria	Gambia
Senegal	36 other Middle East, SE Asian, and African countries
Pakistan	
* All numbers approximate	
** Countries listed in numerical order of total immigrants	

Germany has approximately 3.3 million Muslims (3.5% of the total population) living within the country of which over two million (70% of Muslim population) originated from Turkey. The next highest concentrations of Muslims are from Bosnia and Iran, with a small mix of Muslims coming from various Middle Eastern and North African countries (Table 9).⁹⁹ The large Turkish population and secular nature of Turkey coincides with the small levels of uncovered plots which have occurred within Germany. The lack of radical Islam within the Turkish population was emphasized in an International Crisis Group report: “Much of the Turkish minority is influenced – to an extent which divides it from Europe’s North African and South Asian Muslim populations – by the modernist Kemalist tradition, which subordinates Islam to the modernist-nationalist interests of the state.”¹⁰⁰ The small level of activity was highlighted by German authorities in July 2005 when they identified that 300 suspects (less than 1% of the population), thought to have links with international terrorism, were placed under surveillance.¹⁰¹ Additionally, no attacks have occurred within Germany

98 Karasik and Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,” 487-488.

99 Ibid., 483.

100 International Crisis Group, “Islam and Identity in Germany,” *Europe Report No. 181*, 14 March 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4693> (accessed October 2007), 1.

101 Hans-Christian Jasch, “Dialogue With Islam and Integration of Muslims in Italy and Germany,” *German Law Journal No. 4*, 01 April 2007, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=812#_ftn29 (accessed October 2007).

and the small handful of plots which have been uncovered were planned by “either German converts or dual nationals of Arab, not Turkish origin.”¹⁰² They also appear to have been targeting U.S. interests more so than German ones. A recent example is the arrests in September 2007 related to a plot to detonate bombs targeting American citizens near U.S. military bases and airports in Germany.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the activity which appears to have been coming from Germany is more along the lines of radical sympathizers (financing and recruiting) instead of individuals ready to carry out attacks in Germany. According to a Terrorism Monitor report, “[t]he few jihadi suspects apprehended so far are of Arab origin or were German converts.”¹⁰⁴ These examples lend credence to the need for established links with radical Islamists which likely are based on national origin.

Table 9. Muslims in Germany¹⁰⁵

Muslims in Germany: 3 million	
National Origin	Number
Turkey	2.04 million
Bosnia	168,000
Iran	117,000
Morocco	82,000
Afghanistan	72,000
Iraq	52,000
Pakistan	39,000
Other countries	170,000
* All numbers approximate	

102 International Crisis Group, “Islam and Identity in Germany,” 12.

103 Christian Retzlaff and Sebastian Rotella, “Plot to Kill GIs Tourists Alleged; Germany Arrests Three Suspects it Says Had Ties to an Al Qaeda Ally,” *Los Angeles Times*, 06 September 2007, A1.

104 Anouar Boukhars, “The Threat of Islamist Terrorism to Germany,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 5, Issue 7, 12 April 2007, <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373324> (accessed October 2007), 1.

105 Karasik and Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,” 483.

France, with the largest number of Muslims within Europe, is home to an estimated 5-6 million Muslims. Since France does not collect statistics on the racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds of its population, the total number is not precise, but it is an estimation by a range of analysts. The vast majority of French Muslims originated from Algeria and Morocco. France is also home to smaller groups of Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa—primarily reflecting past French colonial interests.¹⁰⁶ Although the French government has had struggles with its immigrant community in the past, it appears that the problems have been based on social, economic issues rather than the support of radical Islamic ideas. With the majority of Muslims originating from Algeria; the recent merger of the Algerian terrorist organization, GSPC (now AQIM) and al Qaeda; as well as jihadist comments directed against the French by Ayman al-Zawahiri, it would seem that France could be more susceptible to a terror attack from within; however, to date there has been little indication that the messages propagated by al Qaeda will take root within France. Although there are likely a number of factors why this has occurred, it must be noted that the national origin of France's Muslim population must be considered. To begin with, when applying Sageman's link theory to the Muslim population, the fact there is little connection back to the roots of al Qaeda (i.e., Pakistanis, Arabs, or hard core representatives trained in al Qaeda terrorist training camps), helps to identify the likely reason behind so little activity and resonance of the radical ideology. In addition, since AQIM's merger with al Qaeda did not occur as a means of physical interaction between the two organizations, it appears their ability to influence the immigrant Algerian population within France was diminished. As has been the case with other pockets of terrorists within Europe, most took root based on some form of physical interaction between the hard core radicals and the groups adopting the ideology. In the case of AQIM, the organization pledged allegiance to bin Laden and al Qaeda but there has been no reported exchange of fighters, physical terrorist training, or the experiences of the Afghanistan jihad to create the common link for the organizations to truly exchange the ideology and buy into the goals of one another.

¹⁰⁶ Paul Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," *CRS Report for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 18 November 2005), 22-23.

Table 10. Muslims in France¹⁰⁷

Muslims in France: 5-6 million	
National Origin	
	Algeria & other North African countries
	Various Arab countries
	Non-Arab countries; including Turkey
	Asia; including Pakistan & Indonesia
	Others

2. Religiosity

The second internal factor of Europe’s Muslims being analyzed in this thesis is the religiosity of the Muslim populations of each country. Religiosity as defined by Dictionary.com refers to “the quality of being religious; piety; devoutness.”¹⁰⁸ The purpose of looking at this factor is to determine if some Muslim populations view themselves as more religious, and as a result are more likely to buy into the more hard core Islamist concepts espoused by radicals. Table 11 was taken from a 2006 Pew research project to measure some of the pertinent issues to the Muslim communities of the four European countries in this study. As can be seen from this data, and which will be discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs, with the exception of Spain there appears to be a link between the religiosity of the population and the country’s level of jihadist activity.

Looking first at the UK, it is easy to draw from the data that the Muslim population is far more concerned with religious issues than any of the other three countries, and as a result this draws the link between the significantly higher amounts of jihadist activity taking place there. This is evident in the significantly higher percentage of respondents concerned about the decline of religion as well as the influence of pop culture (Table 11). Also of note, ICM Research Company conducted a poll of Muslims

¹⁰⁷ Karasik and Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,” 482.

¹⁰⁸ Dictionary.com, “Religiosity,” *Dictionary.com Unabridged* (Random House, Inc.), <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/religiosity> (accessed October 2007).

within the UK in November 2004. One of the questions identified how often the respondents conducted prayer. Since Salah (prayer) is the second pillar of Islam and the requirement is to pray five times a day, measuring the population's loyalty to this pillar can help to draw attention to the religiosity of the population. The poll data revealed that 51% polled followed the second pillar of Islam to the fullest in praying five times a day. Additionally, 76% prayed at least once a day.¹⁰⁹ Although the additional 25% did not completely follow the second pillar of Islam, given the fact they prayed at least once a day, highlights a population which does regard Islam as an important element within their daily lives.

Spain is the one country with data which does not fit the religiosity model. According to the poll data in Table 11, Spanish Muslims are the least concerned about extremism, decline of the religion, and the influence of pop culture. This could be explained by the fact that of the four countries, Spain is the least Westernized, and until recently, the government had made little effort in regulating religious locations and actions. Since the Spanish government elected to maintain greater secularism within Spanish institutions, the support of religious groups and organizations have also been impacted. As a result, the government does not provide funding for mosques or places of worship. In order to establish these religious locations, the Muslim communities have turned to foreign countries to provide assistance for funding and religious experts, or they have created informal, unmarked prayer rooms, which experts have referred to as hundreds of "garage mosques."¹¹⁰ Because of the autonomy granted to the religious establishments by the Spanish government, it is likely the Muslim population does not feel concerned about western issues and a loss of religious values, as depicted within the survey data.

¹⁰⁹ ICM Research, "Muslim Poll – November 2004," (London, UK: Creston Group, November 2004), http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2004_november_guardian_muslims_poll.pdf (accessed October 2007), 23.

¹¹⁰ Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 41.

Assessing the responses from the German Muslim population, Table 11 highlights a population which is not as concerned about westernization and declining religious values. Based on the secular values and nature of the predominant Turkish and Yugoslav Muslim populations, this data seems to accurately represent the feelings of the country. According to a Congressional Research report, “the majority of Muslims living in Germany have been seen as religious moderates. Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims have traditionally not been drawn to radical forms of Islam. Only a small percentage even belong to formal religious organizations.”¹¹¹ Once again, the small number of Muslims even identifying with a formal religious organization may be a factor in explaining why there appears to be much less radical pockets of jihadist thought and a population which does not have sentiment towards the jihad.

The French responses to the Pew poll, although slightly higher than Germany and Spain, maintain the theory that the more entrenched within Islam a population considers itself, the more likely a higher percentage of the group will be drawn to the jihadist ideology. Table 11 illustrates French Muslims are also less concerned about a declining religion and the influence of western values into religion. The smaller percentage of Muslims concerned about these issues is also reflected in two studies bringing to light the formal religious practices of French Muslims. According to the surveys an estimated 10% of the French Muslim population attends mosque on a regular basis.¹¹² Additionally, “[a]pproximately 35% consider themselves to be “practicing” the faith of Islam.”¹¹³ Both of these statistics reflect a large portion of the Muslim population which does not hold to strict Muslim traditions and as a result is less likely to be influenced by radical ideas and actions. By overlaying this data with jihadist activity within France, it is understandable why there appears to be far less sentiment towards the jihad in comparison to the other countries in this research.

111 Gallis and others, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries,” 34.

112 Pascale Combelles Siegel, “An Inside Look at France’s Mosque Surveillance Program,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol 5, Issue 16, 16 August 2007.

113 Gallis and others, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries,” 23.

Table 11. Religion vs. Western Values¹¹⁴

Muslims Concerns in:				
	UK	France	Germany	Spain
% very worried about	%	%	%	%
Unemployment	46	52	56	55
Islamic extremism	44	30	23	22
Decline of religion	45	21	18	18
Influence of pop culture	44	17	18	17
Modern roles for women	22	16	9	10

B. MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AT LARGE

Within the various European countries, activities take place within each Muslim community which may lead to greater or lesser sentiment towards the concept of jihad. Obviously if there is a greater likelihood for sentiment, then it naturally follows that there is an increased likelihood individuals or groups of individuals will attempt to carry out jihadist actions within the country. A couple of the primary activities which may determine the level of sentiment within the population include the ability of radicals to recruit and the ability of a counter radical message to thwart the spread of jihadist thought and doctrine.

1. Recruitment

Due to the freedoms and civil liberties established within the West, the ability to spread radical ideology is immense. Obviously one must be selective in the audiences they target, but when these messages are tied to a religious connotation and within a community which feels outcast from society, the number of potential recruits can be significant. French scholar, Olivier Roy, discusses these concerns at great length in his

¹¹⁴ Pew Global Attitudes, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity,” *13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 06 July 2006).

book *Globalized Islam; The Search for a New Ummah*. Roy points to a youthful, minority class within Europe which has been deculturized, and which radicals have targeted to establish an Islamic revival or “re-Islamization” in order to construct a universal religious identity.¹¹⁵ In order for Muslims to radicalize, there must be a voice or image which inspires them to carry out or support radical actions. There are numerous places where this inspiration can be drawn, but the two primary methods have stemmed within mosques and prisons.

a. Mosques

Many Muslims turn to their local mosques for religious identity as well as places of refuge. In turn they are surrounded by like-minded individuals, many of which are frustrated with alienation by the non-Muslim secular society. This creates a potential breeding ground for disenchanted Muslims to voice their anger, unite against their perceived enemy, and in some instances, to plot and carry out attacks. As a result, social networks can be created surrounding an extremist ideology which then helps to reinforce opinions and make their commitment to radicalization even stronger. Also of concern, much of the funding for the construction and maintenance of Europe’s mosques and imams originates in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, like Libya. Counter terrorism experts have identified that some of the foreign imams tend to preach more radical, extremist sermons opposing the European societies vice messages focused on assimilation.¹¹⁶ This was evident with Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical Egyptian cleric appointed as the imam of London’s Finsbury Mosque (partially financed by Saudi Arabia) in 1996. Based on al-Masri’s preaching of racial hatred and encouraging murder, he is now serving a seven year prison sentence.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam; The Search for a New Ummah*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

¹¹⁶ Alexandra Marks, “Radical Islam Finds US to be ‘Sterile Ground’,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 23 October 2006.

¹¹⁷ Stewart Tendler, “Abu Hamza Accused of Inciting Hate and Murder,” *The Times*, 20 October 2004, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article496621.ece> (accessed November 2007).




Figure 3. Primary Radical Mosques in Europe: Pre-9/11¹¹⁸

Applying the generic concerns of mosques as potential recruitment centers to more specific cases within the four countries in this study yields interesting results. As will be discussed in greater detail, all countries have taken steps to minimize the ability of mosques to influence sentiment towards jihad and serve as recruitment centers; however, some countries have been much more proactive and as a result appear to have received the benefits of their efforts. Also of note, some countries have monitored activity for a longer period of time than others and once again, this appears to have led to an improved apparatus to weed out radical elements and deal with them effectively.

Of the four countries in this study, the United Kingdom has been the slowest to take actions against mosques and imams believed to be spreading radical sentiment; however, the UK has taken progressive steps recently as in May 2007 when it deported Abdullah el-Faisal an Islamic cleric believed to have influenced the July 7, 2005

118 Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*.

bombers.¹¹⁹ Because the UK traditionally held to liberal asylum policies and immigration laws, a number of radical Muslim clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents escaped prosecution from abroad by claiming asylum within the UK. A primary example of this is Abu Hamza al-Masri who was an Egyptian citizen and was able to acquire British citizenship. He served as a former imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, and because of his sermons for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred, he is now serving a seven year prison sentence.¹²⁰ In conjunction with lax asylum laws, the UK government and policing services allowed foreign imams to preach in the mosques without concern for their language, cultural divide, and anti-Western sentiment. It wasn't until 2004 when the British government finally began to place a greater emphasis on vetting the imams which were active within the UK. At that time laws were passed which called for a basic demonstration of the English language. Additionally efforts have been pushed calling for an understanding of British culture and society.¹²¹ British officials are also now attempting to establish programs which produce homegrown imams who can provide to the needs of the Muslim community but also take into account the cultural and societal differences within the country they live. Finally, plans have also been discussed to ease the ability to deport individuals based on advocating violence and inciting hatred.¹²² Although these efforts may produce results in the future, many experts have complained these were long overdue changes to Britain's asylum laws and the Muslim community's autonomy.

Although Spain reportedly has not been impacted as greatly by radical activities and recruitment within the mosques as the UK, it is difficult to fully measure the potential influence which may have occurred. The problem stems from two areas: (1) the government's inability to identify and subsequently monitor the various mosques and informal prayer rooms, and (2) the inability of the security services to maintain order

119 Philip Johnston, "July 7 Preacher Abdullah El-Faisal Deported," *Telegraph*, 27 May 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/25/npreach125.xml> (accessed November 2007).

120 Dominic Casciani, "Profile: Abu Hamza," *BBC News Online*, 27 May 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3752517.stm (accessed October 2007).

121 Alan Travis, "Basic English Tests for Foreign Priests," *The Guardian*, 23 July 2004.

122 Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 16-20.

within some of the disadvantaged areas of the country. Because the Spanish government has attempted to maintain a policy of secularism in Spanish institutions, it has not been involved in the funding or establishment of legitimate mosques. The result has been a series of “garage mosques” which have been created and which are run by imams whose qualifications and ideologies are unknown. In 2004, the Spanish government attempted to create laws requiring informal mosques to register, but this was met with great resistance from the Muslim leadership and the plans were then abandoned. To compound matters, a number of the mosques were funded by countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia whose desired end state is likely much different than that of Spain.¹²³ Another concern about spreading sentiment through the mosques is that Spanish police have had difficulty in maintaining order in some of the more destitute areas where it is believed grassroots jihadi networks can form. One such group was created in the Spanish city of Cueta.

The group’s origins stem from meetings in a small mosque called Darkawaia that was dominated by a radical imam . . . At the time of the raids, the area was practically considered a conflict zone by local police and residents . . . In the months preceding the December 12 operation, the local police had resigned from patrolling the neighborhood due to various threats.¹²⁴

With the combination of unregulated mosques and poor policing, it is clear Spain had a positive environment for radical recruitment through mosques and will most likely continue to be problematic over time.

Until 9/11 Germany had made many of the same mistakes as the other European countries: asylum laws were extremely liberal, Muslim religious leaders were imported from other countries (many did not speak the language and held hostile views of the West), and privacy protections/freedom of religious expression prevented monitoring of activities within the mosques.¹²⁵ This resulted in a number of radical sympathizers emanating from Germany but very few even considered carrying out attacks within the country. Instead people like the members of the 9/11 Hamburg cell, used Germany as a

123 Gallis and others, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries,” 41-42.

124 Javier Jordan and Robert Wesley, “The Threat of Grassroots Jihadi Networks: A Case Study from Cueta, Spain,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 5, Issue 3, 15 February 2007.

125 Gallis and others, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries,” 36.

launching point for activities elsewhere in the world. Today, the small amount of reported activity appears to mirror that of pre-9/11. Most reported arrests have been related to individuals recruited to carry out activities within Iraq. In 2001, the German government took steps to counter their previously lax anti-terrorism laws. Authorities were now free to monitor mosques and laws have been considered to force imams to preach in German vice their native tongue. Additionally, anti-terrorism laws have limited the protection previously given to Muslim extremists.¹²⁶

France has been the most proactive of the four countries to mitigate the spread of jihadist sentiment in its mosques. Most likely this is because it was dealing with an Islamic terrorist problem much earlier than the other countries. As a result, the French were forced to address Islamic extremists within the country and therefore got a step up. Similar to what the other countries, France initially allowed foreign Muslim religious leaders to preach and lead the Muslim community. Many did not speak the language, did not understand the culture, and were very anti-Western. Messages were radical and opposed the French ideal of assimilation. Since the 1960s France dealt with Algerian, Basque, and Corsican terrorists, but it wasn't until the bombing of the Paris subway in 1995 by Algerian militants that the government incorporated more stringent anti-terrorism policies.¹²⁷ In the mid-90s the French intelligence service began monitoring mosques, religious leaders, and the sermons. This program was very effective, providing authorities the ability to identify and focus on problematic areas of the country. In 2006 the intelligence service estimated that 80 of the 1,685 mosques and places of worship were of concern.¹²⁸ By reducing the number of mosques, the French intelligence services are then more able to focus greater resources on the key locations. France has also set out to ensure imams are trained in French and represent the secular viewpoint espoused by the government; laws have been created to punish hate speech; and laws have been established to combat anti-Semitic violence and other hate crimes.¹²⁹

126 Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 36.

127 Ibid., 27-33.

128 Siegel, "An Inside Look at France's Mosque Surveillance Program."

129 Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 31.

b. Prisons

The European prison system is an area which until recently was not of great concern to many European governments. Once reports began surfacing which indicated individuals were being influenced by extremist ideology within prison, the governments have begun to take this threat more seriously. The “‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid and Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras, the Spaniard who supplied the explosives used in the 2004 Madrid bombings – both of whom converted while incarcerated” are examples of successful recruitment within the prison systems.¹³⁰

Crime has a tendency to be higher in economically deprived areas within a country; as a result, prison populations are made up largely of individuals coming from impoverished areas and many bring with them the baggage of feeling alienated. These people then are prime targets to radicalize against the government and the more secular, European societies. In France for example, “Muslims account for an estimated 50 percent of France’s prison population, with some jails on the outskirts of Paris hitting 80 percent.”¹³¹ Even though Muslims represent a large portion of these prison populations, there have been very few trained imams or Muslim chaplains to provide religious guidance and understanding. Prisoners then filled this role and provided guidance. The concern has been that a select few prisoners can influence the larger Muslim population through their interpretations and sermons. Since prisoners are cut off from the outside, it becomes even more difficult to refute any radical ideology which may be preached.

Applying the concerns of radicalization within prison to the four countries is difficult as prison system data is relatively sparse. Other than Reid and Trashorras, there has been little reporting regarding individuals who have been influenced by radical Islamists within prison and then going on to participate in the global jihad. A few explanations for this may be: (1) those individuals which the jihad resonates with, are still in prison; (2) upon release, prisoners supporting the jihad have left to combat the West in other parts of the world; or (3) studying radical Islam was unique to the prison

¹³⁰ Jennifer Carlile, “Islamic Radicalization Feared in Europe’s Jails.”

¹³¹ Ibid.

environment and once released, the networks and religious leadership did not exist to the level necessary to motivate jihadist action. Regardless of which explanation fits for each country, what is important is that all four countries have identified the concern for the spread of radical thought and interpretations of Islam. This has resulted in increased efforts to incorporate religious leaders more consistent with European values as well as an increased surveillance of the activities within the prison system. The possibility obviously exists that individuals or a small group of individuals may slip through the cracks, be released from prison, and carry out an attack within Europe; however, other than a couple of minor examples, it appears the prison system has not proven to be as fertile a ground for recruiting jihadists and creating sentiment towards jihad which is fully adopted by Muslim prisoners.

2. Counter Radicals

The second area regarding sentiment within Muslims communities is the presence and ability of counter radicals to generate a different message to deter jihadist activity. In order to marginalize Islamic radicals within Europe, moderate Muslims must have a louder voice within their communities. Tariq Ramadan, a moderate, “urges European Muslims not to shun societies in which they live but to embrace them and play as full a role as possible in their development.”¹³² By doing this, Ramadan believes Muslim integration into society is more likely and will play a bigger role in determining the direction of the country and its people. This newly empowered feeling would then reduce the allure of attacking the European society by its Muslims. Key moderate voices are likely to come from the elders, imams, and Muslim leaders.

The four countries in this study have had varied results attempting to leverage a counter radical following. One of the primary challenges is collaborating with particular groups within the Muslim community but at the same time, not giving the appearance that the government is involved in the process. When this occurs, often times the Muslim

¹³² Peter Ford, “A Radical Idea: How Muslims can be European, Too,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 31 October 2006.

population is not as receptive to the efforts given their mistrust of the government. One promising point regarding moderates is that a 2006 Pew Poll found:

Consistent with these concerns, majorities or pluralities of Muslims in Britain (58%), France (56%), and Germany (49%) believe there is a struggle in their country between moderates and Islamic fundamentalists. Again, Spanish Muslims differ from their European counterparts, with a majority (65%) saying they do not see such a struggle. In all four European countries – and especially in France – those who do see a struggle heavily side with moderates.¹³³

Taking this data and applying it to efforts made by each of the countries in this study will help to bring to light the potential impact incorporating the moderate voice into the community may have.

The United Kingdom's efforts to build relations with moderates have been proactive, but creating a united group has been difficult given the wide range of national origins and cultures of the different Muslim groups within the UK. In 2005, the British government established seven working groups comprised of Muslim leaders and experts to tackle some of the concerns and problems within and against the Muslim community. There have been a number of skeptics to this program who have pointed out that those moderates within the UK willing to work with the government have been co-opted and some of the individuals involved are not as moderate as the government would like to believe.¹³⁴ An ICM poll conducted within the UK Muslim community prior to the establishment of the working groups should have shed some light for the government and the challenges it would face. According to the poll, 45% of the respondents stated they felt the Muslim Council of Britain did not reflect their own views. Additionally, 49% felt the religious leaders did not represent their views either.¹³⁵ The official website of the Muslim Council of Britain states that the organization's primary aims and objectives are:

133 Pew Global Attitudes, "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity," 12.

134 Glenn Frankel, "Muslim Leaders in Britain Pledge Solidarity Despite Divisions," *Washington Post*, 20 July 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/19/AR2005071901818.html> (accessed October 2007), A14.

135 ICM Research, "Muslim Poll – November 2004," 21-22.

i To promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK. **ii** To encourage and strengthen all existing efforts being made for the benefit of the Muslim community. **iii** To work for a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society. **iv** To establish a position for the Muslim community within British society that is fair and based on due rights. **v** To work for the eradication of disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims. **vi** To foster better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole.¹³⁶

Given the poll data of the Muslim community, it does not appear that the Muslim Council of Britain is achieving its' desired objectives. Since an organization within the Muslim community is having problems creating a single, uniting voice, it is unlikely the British government will have any greater success working publicly with members of the Muslim community.

Spain's efforts with moderates have fared about as well as the UK's have. A primary problem for Spain is that the government has for the most part been very hands off in its dealings with the Muslim community. Little effort was made to integrate Muslims and Spain has relied upon two Islamic organizations, the Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities and the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain, to assist in bridging the divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.¹³⁷ These efforts have proven difficult given the unstructured religious practices which exist within Spain. Going back to the government's inactivity within developing mosques and religious leadership, Muslim groupings have been scattered throughout Spain. This makes creating representation for the differing groups difficult since many are not registered, are varied in their beliefs and motivations, and locations are difficult to pinpoint. Also creating difficulty for establishing moderate representation is the results from the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes survey which revealed 65% of the Muslims polled did not even feel there was a struggle between moderates and Islamic fundamentalists in Spain.¹³⁸ When a

¹³⁶ Muslim Council of Britain, "Aims and Objectives," <http://www.mcb.org.uk/aim.php> (accessed October 2007).

¹³⁷ Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 41-42.

¹³⁸ Pew Global Attitudes, "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity," 12.

problem cannot even be identified, it is not as likely people are going to see a need to buy into moderate voices. This disunity could prove difficult in the future.

Germany is the one country already with a largely religious moderate population based on the large percentage of Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims. Because the bulk of the population is of a similar origin, Germany has had more success incorporating organizations which represent the Muslim population and interact as a go-between for the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. The primary organization established to represent Germany's Turkish population is the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB), founded in 1984. A primary concern for this organization is that it serves as an instrument of the Turkish state to prevent opposition to the Turkish diaspora. This obviously creates conflict with the other Muslim communities within Germany, but it does serve as a voice to reach the Turkish population.¹³⁹ Table 12 identifies some of the primary Muslim organizations within Germany and their sizes. As seen, there are some other very key focal points which the German government can leverage to combat sentiment for the global jihad. The success at incorporating these organizations into the government's efforts may be beneficial to reduce action. In addition to recognizing and working with some of these primary Muslim organizations, the German government also made efforts to reduce potential activity by what were deemed more radical organizations. The German Interior Ministry banned a number of organizations it believed were involved in terrorism, to include, "the DHKP-C, Dev Sol, Hizb-ut Tahrir, the PKK, and organizations connected with HAMAS."¹⁴⁰ In banning these organizations, the German government believes sentiment favoring the jihad is less likely to take hold within the country.

¹³⁹ International Crisis Group, "Islam and Identity in Germany," 2.

¹⁴⁰ Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), "Germany: 2006 Overview - Patterns of Global Terrorism", *MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB)*, 10 September 2007, <http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=GM&year=2006> (accessed October 2007).

Table 12. German Muslim Federations and Affiliates (2006)¹⁴¹

German Muslim Federations and Affiliates			
	Member organizations	Members	Cultural centers / Prayer spaces
DITIB	300	110,000-150,000	780-880
ZMD	18	12,000-20,000	400
VIKZ	300	21,000-100,000	200-300
IR	32	140,000	700
IGMG	16	26,500	400-600
IGD		600	30-40
AABF	90	25,000	n/a

France is once again progressive in its efforts to work with the Muslim community. Although there are around 1,600 different Muslim associations and mosques within France, the French government worked with the Muslim community to establish the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM) in 2003. The CFCM's role is not to represent all Muslims in France; instead it serves as a forum between the French government and the Muslim population. It allows for broad representation across the various Muslim communities through an electoral system where two thirds of the officials within the CFCM are elected by the French Muslims and the other one third is appointed by Muslim organizations and mosques.¹⁴² Although more radical Muslims within France have not participated in the CFCM, it appears to have helped deter sentiment towards the jihad. In 2003, the French Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, noted that after the creation of the CFCM, violence within Muslim suburbs had been reduced.

¹⁴¹ International Crisis Group, "Islam and Identity in Germany," 9-10.

¹⁴² Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 28.

C. CONCLUSION

Measuring the sentiment Muslim populations have towards the jihad is based on internal factors as well as the ability of the jihadist message to spread. From an internal perspective, Marc Sageman's link theory approach to terrorist networks provides vital insight into the likelihood of attacks occurring. Analysis has highlighted that groups with direct ties to the al Qaeda core have been involved in a significantly larger number of the successful and planned attacks within Europe. These ties have proven to focus upon national origin, most specifically Pakistani and Middle Eastern. Additionally, some North African groups involved in training and support of al Qaeda while it operated terrorist training camps in Afghanistan have also maintained a greater level of devotion and support of the ideology.

In order for the jihadist message to spread and resonate there must reside an ability to recruit as well as an absence or lack of a counter radical message. Recruitment has occurred in a myriad of locations, but mosques appear to have yielded the best results to date. A primary problem has been governmental actions to minimize the ability mosques have to influence jihadist sentiment. Progressive steps to train homegrown religious leaders, deport radical sympathizers, and monitor mosques and religious leaders has yielded much greater results than passive actions allowing foreign imams to preach in the local mosques with little to no surveillance. From a counter radical perspective, those countries which were able to establish Muslim associations which serve as a conduit between the government and Muslim communities have done a much better job of reducing tensions and alleviating problems which may flare up between the government and the Muslim populations.

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V. AL QAEDA IDEOLOGY AND RESONANCE

Looking at al Qaeda and its desires for global jihad, the first thing to take into account is the organization's ultimate objective. As stated by bin Laden himself, al Qaeda desires to "provoke and bait" the United States and its western allies into bleeding wars" creating significant economic hardship, forcing Western influence out of the Islamic world. Al Qaeda can then focus on destroying its "near enemies" (apostate regimes) within the Islamic world and subsequently establish an Islamic caliphate ruled by Shari'ah law.¹⁴³ In order to achieve these objectives, especially within Europe, the organization builds upon the concept of operating as an ideology rather than an entity. With this operational concept the organization hopes to provide direction and inspiration from the core al Qaeda leadership which then filters down to operational components of al Qaeda as well as other groups linked with or inspired by its messages. FBI Director Robert Mueller highlighted three tiers within the al Qaeda ideological construct: 1) at the top is the traditional organization; 2) in the middle is small hybrid groups operating as al Qaeda franchises; 3) the final layer is homegrown, self-radicalized extremists with no formal affiliation to al Qaeda but oftentimes inspired by the messages of violence.¹⁴⁴ The organization's ability to gain support and provide direction to these various entities establishes the likelihood of jihadist actions within various regions around the world.

Overlaying this idea onto Western European countries, it is apparent Al Qaeda's message must resonate with European Muslims in order for the global jihad to have opportunities for success within Europe. Two critical factors in gaining European Muslim support are tying messages and actions to the foreign policy issues (both past and present) of target countries and utilizing/competing with other Islamic groups operating within Europe. Both of these areas will be examined in greater detail in the pages to follow.

¹⁴³ Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86304/bruce-riedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁴⁴ Robert Mueller, "Executive Speech to Council of Foreign Relations", New York, 28 September 2007, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller092807.htm> (accessed November 2007).

Although al Qaeda primarily focuses on surrogates to support its' operations, its' global reach cannot be overlooked. A 2004 Taylor and Francis Group report indicated, “[p]ermanent or semi-permanent Al-Qaeda organizations have been found in 76 nations in five continents, and Al-Qaeda cells composed of nationals or resident immigrants have been broken up in Western countries such as Spain, England, France, Holland, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, all home to Islamic communities.”¹⁴⁵ This is concerning as al Qaeda terrorists have been able to blend into the Muslim communities in an attempt to expand their support base as well as to establish financial connections with the West. Also since the war in Afghanistan began in late 2001, al Qaeda’s leadership has been fragmented from its active cells. In order for the leadership to provide direction and control, al Qaeda now relies more upon the media to spread its’ messages. To date, it appears the organization has been successful in this method; as a result, al Qaeda has attracted European Muslims sympathetic to its fight and unable to attend the terrorist training camps which once existed within Afghanistan.

A. FOREIGN POLICY

In his 1996 Declaration of War against the United States and its Western allies, Osama bin Laden states that the foreign policies of the West against Muslims across the globe are at the heart of the conflict. Bin Laden based his proclamation upon perceived oppression and injustices (both current and past) caused by the West.¹⁴⁶ The primary foreign policy issue used in attempts to galvanize European Muslims is the involvement of European countries in the war against terror, proclaiming it is in fact a war against Islam. According to a 2005 CRS report, “[t]hey [European Muslims] tend to view the ‘war on terrorism’ as a war on Islam, and perceive an unjust double standard at work in the foreign policies of many European governments, especially those that supported the U.S.-led war in Iraq.”¹⁴⁷ With Iraq and direct support to the United States at the forefront

¹⁴⁵ Javier Jordan, “Al-Qaeda and Western Islam,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1, Spring 2004, 3.

¹⁴⁶ *Al-Islah* “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.”

¹⁴⁷ Kristin Archick, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 29 July 2005, 3.

of the foreign policy issues, al Qaeda has been able to gain support within some countries much easier than others. As analyzed below, the United Kingdom and Spain are two striking examples of foreign policy being paramount in jihadist actions against those countries; while Germany and France prove to be a bit murkier, however with an intertwining of colonial and peripheral actions, these countries are brought into the fore regarding their foreign policy issues but create questions regarding the priority placed on foreign policies as drivers of jihadist action.

The United Kingdom, a steadfast supporter of the United States with over 10,000 troops deployed to Iraq¹⁴⁸ and Afghanistan¹⁴⁹ is naturally the primary European target of al Qaeda and its sympathizers. Based on the focus of foreign policy issues, the UK would appear to provide al Qaeda with a vast potential of recruits to its ideology. According to a 2004 ICM research poll, nearly 70% of Muslims polled within the UK felt the war on terrorism is a war against Islam.¹⁵⁰ Marrying this data with successful and foiled attacks within the UK, it would appear groups within the British Muslim population are disillusioned with the government and its foreign policy actions abroad. In addition to concerns over British actions in Iraq, al Qaeda sympathizers believe British foreign policy establishes a double standard by preaching the tenets of democracy while simultaneously practicing or tolerating oppression of the ummah.¹⁵¹ This only increases the negative perceptions of the British and likely helps to fuel recruitment of jihadists within the UK. Lastly, with regard to the UK, al Qaeda is able to emphasize the colonial conquests of the British. During its colonial expansion, Britain controlled a large number of territories around the world; most significant to al Qaeda and its jihadists were the conquests of large portions of the Middle East, South Asia, and a smaller presence within Northern Africa (see figure 4). This colonial control and influence has proven to be yet

148 Global Security.Org, "Iraq Coalition Troops, Non-U.S. Forces in Iraq," *Global Security.Org*, February 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm (accessed November 2007).

149 *BBC News Online*, "UK Troops Take Over Afghan Duties," 01 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4961368.stm (accessed November 2007).

150 ICM Research, "Muslim Poll – March 2004," 5.

151 Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 11-12.

another rallying point for al Qaeda in its drive to garner support against the UK. According to American Middle East professor, Juan Cole,

From al-Qaeda's point of view, the political unity of the Muslim world was deliberately destroyed by a one-two punch. First, Western colonial powers invaded Muslim lands and detached them from the Ottoman Empire or other Muslim states.¹⁵²




Figure 4. Anachronous Map of British Colonies¹⁵³

Spain is another European country which helps to emphasize bin Laden's claim that foreign policies are the target of the global jihad. The Madrid train bombings in March 2004 reportedly were based on Spanish military presence in Iraq and were timed to coincide with general elections within Spain. The belief by jihadists was that the attacks would lead to diminished support and subsequent fall of the conservative party followed by troop withdrawal from Iraq. As it turned out, this was exactly what transpired. Terrorist statements confirmed this was the goal of the Madrid train bombing. Abu Dujana al Afghani, the "military spokesman for Al Qaeda in Europe" stated the Madrid attacks were "a response to the crimes that you have caused in the world, and

¹⁵² Juan Cole, "Bin Laden's Vision Becoming Reality," *AntiWar.com*, 13 September 2004, <http://www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=3560> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁵³ *Wikipedia*, "British Empire," March 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empire (accessed November 2007).

specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁵⁴ Following the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, police have continued to make Islamic terror related arrests within Spain. This leads one to believe that the foreign policy related to troops in Iraq was one of a number of issues which al Qaeda and the jihadists have created to establish support within Spain. Some additional factors may include the fact there are 700 Spanish troops supporting the NATO mission in the war on terror within Afghanistan as well as a myriad of internal counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at reducing jihadist actions within the country.¹⁵⁵ A final battle cry which has been used by al Qaeda has been Spain’s historical location. This is based on a “historical battle against Spain with the aim of reoccupying Andalus, the areas of southern Spain that were conquered by the Muslim armies during the Islamic expansion following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.”¹⁵⁶ Given al Qaeda’s proclivity towards playing on historical events, Andalus offers ample opportunity to gather support in the battle against the West.

Germany is a European country which did not support the war in Iraq and had little in the way of colonial conquests within the Middle East, South Asia, and Northern Africa. As a result, this may help to explain why there is apparently significantly less jihadist activity occurring within the country. The primary policies which appear to have been triggers for planned attacks within Germany were based on its direct support to the United States. This support includes the basing of U.S. forces within Germany which are then deployed into various countries within the South Asian and Middle Eastern region; the deployment of 3,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the war on terror; and its operation of a military base on the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border.¹⁵⁷ What appears to have not been played upon by jihadists, and runs counter to the foreign policy theory, is that Germany was also involved in counter terror operations off the Horn of Africa as

154 Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (London: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, 2006), 330.

155 Javier Jordan & Robert Wesley, “After 3/11: The Evolution of Jihadist Networks in Spain,” *Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 1*, 12 January 2006.

156 Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” 332.

157 Cerwyn Moore, “Uzbek Terror Networks: Germany, Jamaat, and the IJU,” *Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 21*, 08 November 2007.

well as providing equipment and training to Iraqi military and police in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁵⁸ Having not capitalized on these aspects in gathering greater support for the global jihad clouds the issue of foreign policies as a primary catalyst for jihadist actions.

France, like Germany, did not support the war in Iraq and often takes a position counter to U.S. foreign policy efforts; yet France found itself within the crosshairs of al Qaeda in late 2006. At that time, while declaring a merger with the Algerian terrorist organization al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ayman al-Zawahiri identified France as a primary target in the global jihad. He focused on three key components of French policy: assistance to U.S. operations in Afghanistan; support of UN Resolution 1701 on Lebanon; and promoting secularism which he portrayed as negatively impacting true Muslims.¹⁵⁹ Excluding operations within Afghanistan, it appears tying foreign policy into the equation was desirable by both al Qaeda and AQIM. From al Qaeda's perspective, it helped to franchise and spread the ideology while at the same time providing AQIM with increased legitimacy and likely financial and logistical support for its more regional actions. In addition to the foreign policy issues highlighted above, both al Zawahiri and AQIM's leader, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, have focused their efforts on anti-colonial rhetoric. Wadud states French colonial actions in Algeria have been "replete with crimes and injustices, domination and tyranny, genocide and murder, exile and eviction."¹⁶⁰ Like Germany, however, once again, it appears al Qaeda has not fully focused on the supposed foreign policy link it adheres to in targeting European countries. In this instance, France serves as a member of Coalition Task Force (CTF) 150 which conducts naval patrols between Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa, attempting to interdict the movement of terrorists.¹⁶¹ Given these operations are conducted not only in support of operations within Afghanistan but also Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and that they are carried out with countries as notable as the United

158 MIPT, "Germany: 2006 Overview - Patterns of Global Terrorism."

159 Pascale Combelles Siegel, "AQIM Renews its Threats Against France," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol 4, Issue 26, 07 August 2007.

160 Ibid.

161 MIPT, "France: 2006 Overview - Patterns of Global Terrorism", *MIPT TKB*, 10 September 2007, <http://www.tkb.org/MorePatterns.jsp?countryCd=GM&year=2006> (accessed October 2007).

States and the United Kingdom, it would appear this would be a primary point of contention for al Qaeda and its surrogates; however, released statements and direction to al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have not alluded to these actions. This once again indicates although foreign policy issues have been important drivers in jihadist sentiment in some countries, it appears they have been much murkier within others.

B. SURROGATE AND COMPETING GROUPS

The presence of various Islamic groups (radical and otherwise) operating within Europe has the potential to infringe upon al Qaeda's ability to attract and gain the support of local Muslim populations. There are various surrogate organizations which have accepted the beliefs of al Qaeda, (i.e., Ansar al Islam, AQIM, and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, among others). With these organizations the al Qaeda core provides an ideological vision and in some instances may even offer some general guidance for action and planning; however, for the most part these surrogate organizations are concerned about regional issues, made up primarily of a collection of local extremists with local agendas. These agendas may coincide with those of al Qaeda, but in general they operate under the same principle that terror against the West is a necessity to achieve their desired objectives. With this construct, al Qaeda can play upon the violence. A second group discussed in chapter IV is counter radicals which offer a different viewpoint than that of radical elements within the communities. The strengths and weaknesses of this group have been highlighted, but they once again can play upon al Qaeda's ability to influence local European Muslim populations into radical action. One element not yet discussed is that of groups competing with al Qaeda. As will be analyzed, many of these groups operate along a fine line between radical and moderate actions. They primarily serve to provide direction and clarity to Muslims but have the potential to mold and shape minds into radical action. The groups most prevalent within Europe and to be discussed include: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

1. Surrogate Organizations

Al Qaeda and its push for global jihad realizes that it is not large enough, nor capable of carrying out this feat on its own. As a result, the organization relies on surrogate groups to adopt its ideology, listen to its messages, and to support its goals. Obviously some groups are tied more closely to al Qaeda than others. The organization has been able to garner direct support through an exchange of goods and services with other organizations worldwide. Turning the focus to Europe, al Qaeda employs a number of groups in this manner; however there are a handful which actively operate across multiple countries within Europe and pose a significant threat to the continent. Although these groups have varied backgrounds and goals, they all are united against a common enemy, the West, as well as through the ideology which they adopted, that being Salafist Jihadism. The Salafi jihad is characterized as a religious revival movement desiring to reestablish an Islamic Caliphate. What sets the Salafists apart from other fundamentalists is that they advocate the use of violent jihad against foreign non-Muslim governments in an attempt to satisfy their desired end state. Al Qaeda as the vanguard of this movement has helped to collaborate operations and to install the initial connections within the network.¹⁶² The Salafist groups operating within Europe have three main objectives for their operations: support and justification for terror, rejection of integration, and the creation of an Islamic State in Europe.¹⁶³ With an understanding of their goals and interconnectivity, it is now important to look at each of the main groups in a little more detail.

¹⁶² Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 1.

¹⁶³ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, "Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 3, September 2006.

a. *Takfir Wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)*

Formed in Egypt in the 1970s, Takfir is now one of the most fundamentalist and feared active terrorist groups. Although the group operating within Europe is not believed to be directly linked with the original Egyptian organization, it has taken the same name and ideology. The group appears to be unstructured with no clear leadership. Some view it as a “web incorporating scattered groups of militants, separated by geography, connected only by radical ideology.”¹⁶⁴ Since this group has been linked to extremely violent acts of terror, a primary concern is the techniques it employs to infiltrate societies. Incorporating elements of subterfuge, group members often times adopt the westernized lifestyle and languages of the European countries within which they reside. Through the adoption of non-Islamic appearances and principles, members can then more easily infiltrate into society and are then more likely to be able to move and operate freely, avoiding surveillance of counter-terrorist operations. Takfir justifies the use of these non-Islamic practices in that the ends justify the means.¹⁶⁵

Over the past few years Takfir has been linked to a couple of highly publicized incidents within Europe. The group has been connected to the 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Additionally it is believed that the group had connections to the 3/11 Madrid train bombings and was plotting an attack against a Spanish Court of Law in the same year.¹⁶⁶

164 Philip Johnston, “Alert Over Islamic Terrorists Who Tried to Kill Bin Laden,” *The Telegraph*, 02 January 2005, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/02/01/ntakf01.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/02/01/ixhome.html> (accessed November 2007).

165 Bruce Livesy, “The Salafist Movement,” *PBS Frontline*, January 2005, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html> (accessed November 2007).

166 Ibid.

b. *Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam)*

Ansar, formed in 2001 in the Kurdish north of Iraq, desires to establish an Islamic caliphate in the area referred to as Kurdistan. Following the kickoff of OIF in 2003, the group refocused its efforts and its primary goal now is to drive out the coalition presence within Iraq and then to establish an Islamic state in all of Iraq.¹⁶⁷

Over the past few years Ansar al-Islam has established an extensive network within Europe. Although, to date, no direct attacks within Europe have been attributed to the group, it is believed that Ansar has used its operatives and connections within Europe to facilitate the assistance of the jihad within Iraq. Arrests and investigations have pointed to a network which provides two-way traffic for mujahideen recruits between Iraq and the European continent. This has established fears that eventually Europe will be transformed into an operational jihad as well.¹⁶⁸

Primary activities of the group within Europe indicate that it is focused on providing logistical support for the Iraqi Jihad. The group has used crime to gain finances, recruit and funnel fighters, and plan attacks. However, arrests within Germany have identified plots by the group to bring direct action into Europe. German counter-terrorist forces uncovered plots to conduct an assassination attempt of former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi on a visit to Berlin, as well as plans to attack a NATO summit meeting.¹⁶⁹ Although these actions were thwarted, it points to the group's desire to expand its operations outside of Iraq.

¹⁶⁷ MIPT, "Ansar Al-Islam," *MIPT TKB*, March 2007, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3501> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁶⁸ Stephen Ulph, "Ansar Al-Islam Expanding in Europe," *Terrorism Focus* 2, 20 January 2005.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

c. *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)*

AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), is an Algerian Salafist group established in 1996, splintering from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The primary disagreement was based on the GIA's belief that civilians constituted legitimate targets. As a result the AQIM was established with a goal of overthrowing the Algerian government and establishing an Islamic state.¹⁷⁰ Since its inception, AQIM success against the Algerian government declined, which may be part of the reason the organization began looking at other areas to carry out operations. By expanding into Europe, it is likely AQIM not only gained more international notoriety, but it also established international networks and funding for a larger goal. In 2003 several AQIM leaders acknowledged the group's shift toward support of the global jihad as they pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and its objectives. Although it has taken a few years, it appears al Qaeda has begun to see the importance of AQIM's networks within Europe. In September 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri identified the merger of the two groups and called for attacks against the U.S., France, and other allies.

Over the past couple of years, a number of terror cells and plots linked directly to AQIM have been uncovered within Europe. Although no specific attacks have been linked to AQIM as of yet, the organization has been active in Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain. "Some of the high profile operations planned included a plot to blow up the U.S. Embassies in Paris and Rome, and attacks on the Christmas market in Strasbourg, France and the G-8 summit in Genoa."¹⁷¹

170 Sara Daly, "The Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat: A Dossier," *Terrorism Monitor* 3, no. 5, 11 March 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=411&issue_id=3258&article_id=2369399 (accessed November 2007).

171 Anthony Keats, "In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)," *CDI Terrorism Project*, 14 January 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/gspc.cfm> (accessed November 2007).

d. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

The GICM, established in the late 1990s, was created with the goal of establishing an Islamic State in Morocco. Since its inception, the group has also proclaimed support for al-Qaeda's jihad against the West. A number of individuals connected to al-Qaeda and its terrorist training camps in Afghanistan established the group, explaining the devoted support proclaimed for al-Qaeda. GICM members also are believed to interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe.¹⁷²

The GICM is believed to have operatives in numerous European countries, to include: UK, Denmark, Belgium, Spain and France. The group was involved in planning the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, which killed 30 people. It is also one of the primary groups connected to the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings.¹⁷³

e. Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade

This is a group's actual existence is questionable, but requires mention given some of its claims regarding attacks. The group was first mentioned in 2003 and has released numerous statements from Spain and the UK. A number of these statements are likely false, but there is possible credence in others. For example they claimed responsibility for the 2003 northeastern U.S. blackouts, Jakarta bombings, and 2004 Madrid Train Bombing. It is unlikely the group was involved in any of these actions as other causes or perpetrators have been identified. On the other hand the group has laid claim to a few attacks within Iraq, which may or may not be likely. Regardless of the group's role in any of these proclamations, it is likely a collection of individuals within Europe providing ideological visions and promoting al-Qaeda's European operations.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Global Security.Org, "Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)," *Global Security.Org*, July 2005, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/gicm.htm> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁷³ Benjamin Keating, "In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group (GICM)," *CDI Terrorism Project*, 21 May 2004, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2227&from_page=../index.cfm (accessed November 2007).

¹⁷⁴ MIPT, "Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigade," *MIPT TKB*, March 2007, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3903> (accessed November 2007).

2. Competing Organizations

a. *Hizb Ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation)*

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded in Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem in 1953 in an effort to remove western control of the Islamic world in order to then transform the entire ummah into a single caliphate operating under Sharia law. The organization is believed to have tens of thousands of supporters operating across the globe. Unlike al Qaeda's surrogate groups operating within Europe, HT has attempted to achieve its objectives through nonviolent means even though some of the group's rhetoric has been radical in nature.

In order to achieve its goal of a global caliphate, HT develops its support through three stages: "First they convert new members. Secondly they establish a network of secret cells, and finally, they try to infiltrate the government to work to legalize their party and its aims."¹⁷⁵ The group has been successful in establishing the first two stages of its methodology, but the final stage has yet to materialize in any of the countries which HT operates within.

Although HT has proclaimed achievement of its objectives should be done peacefully, its rhetoric has been radical. Concerning the employment of suicide bombers in Israel, group members have supported these actions as legitimate acts of martyrdom.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, HT members have "called for a jihad against the U.S., its allies, and moderate Muslim states." The purpose of the jihad is "to find and kill the Kufar (non-believers)," in fact rejecting the Islamic notion of Greater Jihad against one's own as a sin."¹⁷⁷ As a result of its radical rhetoric, Germany banned the organization in 2003 stating the group was promoting extremism and anti-Semitism. The group also

¹⁷⁵ Hizb ut-Tahrir.org, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir," <http://www.hizb-uttahrir.org/index.php/EN/def> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁷⁶ *BBC News Online*, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir," 27 August 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/3182271.stm> (accessed November 2007).

¹⁷⁷ Ariel Cohen, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia," (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 30 May 2003), <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm#pgfId-1028441> (accessed November 2007).

came under scrutiny within the United Kingdom in 2004 for spreading anti-Semitic propaganda. Even though the group has been accused of attempting to spread messages of hate and violence, it has yet to be linked to any overt actions supporting or carrying out of violent attacks or terrorism.

Given HT's stated policy of nonviolent methods to establish the caliphate, it has also come under scrutiny from more radical organizations linked to al Qaeda. Members of the GICM stated that HT's methods of nonviolence to achieve its objectives are weak and accused it of being moderate rather than strictly religious.¹⁷⁸ This likely eliminates a significant number of HT members from becoming more radical and desiring to seek out al Qaeda and other like-minded organizations since these statements highlight disunity between the two mentalities and therefore indicate a lack of networks connecting the groups.

Since the organization operates through a network of underground cells, it is a concern to western governments. Closely associated with this is political opportunity theory which "argues that a group could become violent if it faces an environment which offers political opportunities."¹⁷⁹ As the group grows stronger and develops more resources, it has the potential to push for a greater role within some European communities and given its radical rhetoric, some members could feel empowered to carry out radical attacks in support of the overarching objectives.

b. *Tablighi Jamaat (Proselytizing Group)*

The Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic missionary and fundamentalist revival movement established in British India in the late 1920s. The group's membership spans more than 150 countries around the world. The primary aims of the movement are to preach a return to purist Islamic values and recruit other Muslim men to propagate the

178 Abdelhak Najib and Karim Serraj, "Said Chedadi and Sheik Najib, the Missing Link of May 16?" *La Gazette Du Maroc*, 29 October 2003, http://translate.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lagazettedumaroc.com%2Farticles.php%3Fid_artl%3D3532%26n%3D339%26r%3D2%26sr%3D715&langpair=fr%7Cen&hl=en&ie=UTF8 (accessed November 2007).

179 Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 324.

faith through grassroots journeys, preaching to Muslims and visiting Muslim homes door to door. Since the members encourage other Muslims to join the spiritual journeys, any Muslim can join with no strict membership rules.¹⁸⁰

Since 9/11, the group has come under considerable examination from a number of western countries. Although the group does not overtly promote violent activity nor is it involved in any political actions, it does appear to serve as a conduit for radicals to establish connections and to gain access to countries under the guise of missionary work. Since the group has few restrictions upon membership and the fact it does not conduct any type of background investigations into its members, it does offer an opportunity for radicals to penetrate the organization. A couple of notable names which began their fundamentalist ideology through the Tablighi Jamaat include the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, as well as the American Taliban John Walker Lindh. Although it does not appear the Tablighi Jamaat inspired these individuals to become radicalized, it did provide them with the fundamentalist concepts and networks required to radicalize their beliefs. Although many people have a benign view of radical actions or support by the Tablighi, a number of terror suspects are being held based on links to the Tablighi Jamaat. Within Europe, the primary concern about the Tablighi is that it serves as an intermediary between radical organizations and individuals seeking to support terror. Given that a number of missions for Tablighi members involve travel and journeys through Pakistan, it is also increasingly more likely that European members of the organization will come in contact with radical individuals or groups which may promote the networks to facilitate support and potential attacks within Europe.

c. Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, was established in response to British occupation of Egypt and the penetration of Western values into Arab society. It desired to replace Western law with Sharia and to establish an Islamic Caliphate lawfully through opposition to violence and adoption of political actions.

¹⁸⁰ Alex Alexiev, "Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions," *The Middle East Quarterly*, Volume XII, Number 1, Fall 2007, <http://www.meforum.org/article/686> (accessed November 2007).

Since that time, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread to more than 70 countries, providing a myriad of services to Muslim communities. Through the establishment of charitable organizations, the Brotherhood has created a wide network of social, religious, health, and educational systems. The organization's numerous businesses can then be utilized to employ local members, sympathizers, as well as a means of generating income.¹⁸¹

Two competing theories have been generated regarding the Muslim Brotherhood's actions and desires. One states that the organization is fundamentalist in nature (calling for the adoption of Sharia and the Caliphate) and is not involved in the support of terrorism. The second theory follows that the organization is not only fundamentalist, but it is also actively engaged in terrorist activity. Although some modern radical ideologues (i.e., Sayyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ramzi Yousef) have Islamic Fundamentalist formative ties back to the Muslim Brotherhood, they did not fully radicalize until splitting off from the organization.¹⁸²

The roots of the Muslim Brotherhood within Europe began to develop in the early 1950s when thousands of Muslims emigrated from the Middle East to avoid repression and in response to employment opportunities. Similar to Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat Tablighi, the organization's actions within Europe appear to be based on a desire to spread its fundamentalist beliefs without incorporating violence in order to achieve those objectives. According to the group's head of the European Fatwa Council, Sheikh Yusuf-al Qaradawi, "[w]ith Allah's will, Islam shall return to Europe, and Europeans shall convert to Islam. They will then be able to propagate Islam to the world. I affirm that this time, the conquest will not be done by the sword but by proselytism and ideology."¹⁸³ Supporting this statement are the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has attempted to "organize[sic] Muslims into visible and active communities, with institutions and establishment figures, while promoting publicly

181 Gary M. Servold, "The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Radicalism," *Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures* (Maxwell AFB, AL: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, July 2003), Chapter 3.

182 Gary M. Servold, "The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Radicalism," Chapter 3.

183 Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, "Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi and Other Sheikhs Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome," *MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, no. 447*, 06 December 2002, <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP44702> (accessed November 2007).

visible education and social services.”¹⁸⁴ The Brotherhood can focus the European Muslim communities on internal matters leading to an ability to integrate into the inner workings of the country without actually assimilating. By doing this, the Brotherhood then establishes the lead role in providing the social support and services needed by the community. This then has the capability for the Brotherhood to have greater influence on community actions and direction.

The Muslim Brotherhood is yet another organization competing with al Qaeda and like-minded radical groups for the support of European Muslims. The primary concern currently regarding the Muslim Brotherhood is that its fundamentalist preaching influences some of the group’s followers to become increasingly more radicalized and then to leave the organization in order to join more radical elements. Also concerning, is given the organization’s large size and geographical reach, individuals desiring more radical interpretations have networks in place to locate and connect with other radical organizations.

C. CONCLUSION

In order for al Qaeda to spread its ideology, it must ensure the organization’s message resonates with the target audience. Two factors are central to establishing support: negatively portraying a country’s foreign policy and the ability to interact and compete with other organizations. Al Qaeda’s main thrust on foreign policy is to create the perception that the United States and its allies are in a battle against Islam as opposed to terrorism. This quickly stirred up violence against the UK, helped generate attacks against Spain, and may be part of the reason there has been limited activity against Germany and France. Al Qaeda’s ability to utilize or compete with other Islamic groups operating in Europe also factors into its ability to generate its message. Numerous groups, having accepted the ideology of al Qaeda, serve as surrogate organizations, following the ideology and utilizing general guidance to carry out their actions. To date, most organizations which have been successful in carrying out attacks within Europe have served in some form or another as a surrogate to al Qaeda (whether directly linked

¹⁸⁴ Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for the New Ummah*, 276.

or having only adopted the ideology). There are also a number of other Islamic groups (radical and otherwise) operating within Europe which walk a thin line between radical and moderate actions. The ability of these groups to operate in Europe impacts the ability of al Qaeda to gain supporters for its message.

VI. EUROPEAN COUNTER-TERRORISM (CT) EFFORTS

Each of the target countries has dealt with terrorism in its past. The policies developed were influenced by the type of terrorist organization they were dealing with at the time, leading to a different approach for each country. Likewise, each country has dealt with their Muslim population in their own unique way. By analyzing the differences, the goal is to identify if there is a link between these differences and the divergent results for the current fight against terrorism. For example, did one country already face a threat similar to that faced by jihadists after 9/11. Or did the country deal with a primarily internal terrorist element, leading counter terrorism policy to have to adjust to a mix of internal and external elements.

A. HISTORICAL EFFORTS IN EACH COUNTRY

All four of the sample countries have had to deal with terrorism prior to 9/11. By evaluating the policies implemented, it may be possible to determine why there is a differing level of success in countering Islamic terrorism today.

1. Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army

Great Britain primarily faced a separatist movement in Northern Ireland led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The British government's initial approach was to criminalize terrorism, dismissing the IRA as an insignificant, evil, and marginalized minority supported by an insignificant, alienated public voting for them. The thought was that the British could simply arrest the terrorists and the problem would go away.¹⁸⁵ However the continued success of Sinn Fein, the IRA's political arm, forced the British government to analyze why people were voting for them.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Cynthia R. Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 133.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 130.

This analysis showed Catholics in Northern Ireland were split over the most effective tactics to gain the desired political end: Militarists believed violence was the only solution; paramilitarists pushed for equal levels of armed struggle and political engagement; and electoralists believed the best method is to work through the democratic process.¹⁸⁷ In Northern Ireland, the SDLP represented Catholics that had some investment into the national economy, making them more likely to work with existing political institutions.¹⁸⁸ The British government also identified IRA demands that they could implement, slowly increasing paramilitarist and politico confidence in the British government. This also increased the influence of the paramilitarists and politics within the IRA by slowly eliminating the militarist's justification that the only way to gain political objectives was through violence.¹⁸⁹ Slowly but surely, London was able to co-opt the IRA and Sinn Fein into legitimate political activity as both the terrorist group and the government realized they were better off if the minority group participated in politics.¹⁹⁰

2. Spain and ETA

Spain's experience is very similar to Great Britain. Spain faced a separatist movement as well, this one originating in the Basque region of the country. The Basque community was split as well over the way forward with militarists, paramilitarists, and electoralists each pushing their own agenda.¹⁹¹ For the Basques, the PNV represented those that had enough economic and political ties to Spain to desire some form of compromise.¹⁹² Spain also identified ETA demands that they could implement, showing engagement was the method for gaining change instead of violence.¹⁹³ This eventually

¹⁸⁷ Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, 160-163.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 124.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 176.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 207.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 160-163.

¹⁹² Ibid., 124.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 176.

led to the majority of Basques marginalizing ETA and those that supported violence.¹⁹⁴ Though there are some lessons learned for CT from both Spain and Great Britain, the question is can initiatives successfully used against separatist movements be applied to Islamists who want to destroy the existing government?

3. Germany and Homegrown Terrorists

Germany's primary CT effort was focused on home grown left- and right-wing extremist organizations. Other forms of terrorism were essentially ignored as they didn't have nearly as dramatic of an impact as native terrorist organizations like the Red Army Faction (RAF). However as the RAF increased its logistical links to other international terrorist groups and foreign governments, the German began to deepen and broaden police cooperation in Europe and beyond.¹⁹⁵ In response, Germany favored international and European approaches to terrorism vice purely national ones. This included formal agreements with other countries and pushing to create Europol to facilitate cross border policing. Internally, the Germans passed laws to prevent terrorist activity as opposed to simply responding to it, making the mere suspicion of supporting a criminal organization a crime. In the end, German policy was very effective in eliminating an RAF organization that in reality only had 10-20 dedicated members and only a few hundred supporters.¹⁹⁶ Using the same question as above, can this experience be used by Germany to effectively counter Islamic terrorism?

4. France and Islamic Terrorism

France experienced a dramatic transition in its approach to CT. In the 1980s and 90s, France was considered a haven for international terrorists. The groups were across the spectrum: there were home grown leftists (Action Directe); Basque, Brittan, and

¹⁹⁴ Irvin, *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, 207.

¹⁹⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, <http://www.aicgs.org/documents/katzenstein.pdf> (accessed August 2007), 5.

¹⁹⁶ John Pike, "Red Army Faction," *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/raf.htm> (accessed April 2007).

Corsican separatists; and sanctuary for Middle Eastern and other international terrorists. With regard to the international terrorists, the French policy was to provide sanctuary in order to maintain neutrality and avoid being targeted themselves.¹⁹⁷ In 1986, a series of terrorist attacks forced the French government to confront the issue. As a filler to buy time to strengthen police and legal methods to counter terrorism, the French government developing an accommodation strategy with state sponsors of terrorism such as Syria and Iran.¹⁹⁸

During this time, France dramatically improved the focus of its CT efforts. To increase coordination, France removed the seven different police services that belonged to four cabinet ministries and directed the justice and interior ministries to work together as the sole agencies for CT. In response, the justice department created a well staffed, centralized court in Paris dedicated to prosecuting terrorists and supporting the needs of the interior ministry's officers.¹⁹⁹

With this new apparatus in place, the French moved to a policy of prevention. This was deemed politically necessary as the potential impact of the Algerian civil war increased with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) naming France as the "mother of all sinners." France's interior ministry then went on the offensive. In November 1994, the French successfully dismembered the Chalabi network that supported Algerian revolutionaries. In June 1995, 131 supporters of GIA and other Algerian terrorist groups were arrested. France also targeted terrorist logistics networks, seeing them as the soft belly of terrorism. In the end, the effective partnership between terrorism dedicated magistrates in the judicial ministry and the Direction du Surveillance Territoire (DST), the internal French intelligence agency, proved to be very effective in countering the Islamic terrorist threat of the 1990s.²⁰⁰ It is clear this capability carried through to 9/11 and France hit the ground running in dealing with this new version of Islamic terrorism.

197 Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, "The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism," Brookings Institution, 01 March 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/shapiro20030301.pdf> (accessed August 2007), 68-70.

198 Ibid., 74-75.

199 Ibid., 75-77.

200 Ibid., 79-83.

5. Conclusion

The question asked about each country was whether their experience with terrorism prior to 9/11 prepared them to deal with this new threat. Though each country had experience dealing with terrorism, it is clear the French had a capability that was already capable of dealing with Islamic terrorism the other three countries did not have on 9/11. The primary reason France is in the crosshairs of jihadists has not changed: primarily involvement in Algerian internal affairs. Therefore, the threat hasn't changed dramatically for France.

B. COUNTER TERRORISM INITIATIVES SINCE 9/11

Following the attacks of 9/11, each of the four countries developed initiatives to deal with this new threat to their security. The approach again is to see if there are any significant differences between these approaches that would explain the different levels of terrorist activity.

1. Germany

Germany quickly identified the fact that it was not positioned to deal with a dynamic enemy that operated outside of the RAF paradigm. The need to improve was accentuated by the fact a key cell for the 9/11 attacks was based in Hamburg. This required a thorough reengineering of CT organizations and the powers provided to them to fight terrorism. Organizational changes included the creation of the Joint Counter Terrorism Center in order to consolidate the efforts of multiple offices responsible for CT.²⁰¹ The government also granted security organizations increased access to telephone, banking, employment and university records of individuals.²⁰²

²⁰¹ German Embassy, "Fact Sheet: Fight Against International Terrorism – Prevention & Stability," http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/archives/background/anti_terror_factsheet.pdf (accessed August 2007), 2.

²⁰² Katzenstein, "Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11," 9.

Legal changes included passing laws to increase surveillance of Islamic organizations within the country; this resulted in identifying and banning three organizations found to support terrorism.²⁰³ This was made possible by a constitutional change that now allows the banning of religious groups that advocate terrorism. Individuals who belong to or assist terrorist groups abroad are now tracked and prosecuted by the government.²⁰⁴ The German government also has increased power short of prosecution as well. A new Residence Law (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*) tightens the provisions for expulsion and deportation of foreigners who practice “hate preaching” against other groups.²⁰⁵

2. France

As mentioned earlier, France was better positioned to meet the threat of Islamic terrorism. However the government did fine tune its policy and make some changes post 9/11.²⁰⁶ For example, statutory provisions seeking to prevent money laundering were extended to the fight against financing of terrorism. France also authorized the use of undercover officers and listening devices to monitor the activity of terrorists.²⁰⁷ The judiciary department increased the power of their specialized anti-terrorist “super judges,” making them as much an investigator as a judge. They are able to hold suspected terrorists for four days without charging them; lawyers are forbidden from visiting with those held the first three days of custody; and the judges can be jury as well with the ability to ask for a non-jury trial because of potential threats to jurors by terrorists. France also thoroughly investigates all French Muslim nationals who have spent any time in Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁰⁸

203 German Embassy, “Fact Sheet: Fight Against International Terrorism – Prevention & Stability,” 3.

204 Katzenstein, “Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11,” 8-9.

205 Jack Straw, “Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries,” Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, http://www.terrorisme.net/pdf/2005_terrorlaws.pdf (accessed August 2007), 12.

206 Olivier Guitta, “The French Counter-Terrorism Model,” *Front Page Magazine*, 08 September 2005, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID={B17C35CA-50E5-4969-8AE8-BFF16C824BCD}> (accessed August 2007).

207 Straw, “Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries,” 10.

208 Guitta, “The French Counter-Terrorism Model.”

3. Spain

Spain failed to make any significant changes in its approach to terrorism until the 3/11 Madrid train bombings in 2004. This included allowing arrest and prosecution of individuals for conspiring to commit acts of terror and financing terrorism. Similar to France, Spain also centralized all terrorism cases at the National High Court (*Audiencia Nacional*). The court's staff is highly experienced in dealing with terrorist cases. Specific terrorism related penalties added to the Criminal Code include 8 to 14 years for promoting or directing armed gangs or terrorist organization; 6 to 12 years for membership in an armed gang or terrorist organization; 20 to 30 years for terrorist murder; and a maximum prison sentence of 40 years for a person convicted of two or more terrorist offences.²⁰⁹

4. Great Britain

Similar to Spain, Great Britain failed to truly understand the seriousness of the Islamic terrorism threat prior to the July 2005 transit attacks. Efforts were primarily focused on arresting individuals, with over 1,000 individuals detained on terrorism charges since 9/11. Since the 2005 transit attacks, Great Britain has attempted to tone down the radical mosques with restrictions such as making "the glorification of terrorism" a criminal offense.²¹⁰ The most proactive measure was initiated in February of this year with British officials meeting with their Pakistani counterparts to discuss a joint counter terrorist plan. The interesting point is that Great Britain appeared to be a little late in taking this initiative, as 22 other countries had already completed similar agreements with Pakistan.²¹¹

209 Straw, "Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries," 25-26.

210 Jytte Klausen, "British Counter-Terrorism After the July 2005 Attacks: Adapting Community-Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism," United States Institute of Peace, February 2007, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0205_terrorism.html (accessed August 2007).

211 German Press Agency, "British Officials Hold Counter-Terrorism Talks in Pakistan," *The Raw Story*, 01 February 2007, http://rawstory.com/news/2007/British_officials_hold_counter_terr_02012007.html (accessed August 2007).

5. Conclusion

Because France was already dealing with Islamic terrorism, it merely had to fine tune its procedures to the new threat. Germany appears to have hit the ground running immediately after 9/11 in response to the Hamburg Cell, possibly explaining the lack of successful terrorist activity in Germany. It is clear both Spain and Great Britain were late in implementing serious counter terrorism efforts until each country suffered a direct attack. The changes made since then could explain the lack of successful efforts since.

C. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MUSLIM ASSIMILATION INTO GREATER SOCIETY

Each country has attempted to some extent to assimilate their Muslim populations into the greater society. Some of these efforts have been symbolic, with no real intention of achieving success. Others have been legitimate efforts to bring the Muslim population into the fold. The question is whether there is a connection between legitimate efforts that have enjoyed some success and a lower level of jihadi activity. By comparing the assimilation efforts of each country, a pattern may be exposed.

1. Great Britain

The biggest change by the British has been a swing from counterintelligence efforts against specific groups and individuals deemed a threat, to a policy of prevention. Government officials at all levels now often consult with Muslim community representatives prior to taking action. This includes partnering with mosque groups in order to provide religious “re-education” to prison inmates and to young people deemed likely to hold extremist sympathies. The police force has seen some changes as well. Almost 300 Muslims have joined the London Metropolitan police force, with an additional 3,000 Muslims added across the country nationally. In addition, another 6,000 community officers are to be added to provide an effective link between Muslim communities and the government agencies responsible for them.²¹² The problem is these

²¹² Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism After the July 2005 Attacks: Adapting Community-Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism.”

initiatives continue to maintain the distinct communities of native British and immigrant Muslims as opposed to a policy that seeks to assimilate the Muslim population into the greater society.

2. France

France has struggled with assimilation as well. The 2005 riots made it clear that French law enforcement had only a limited ability to control the escalating crisis, as it had few established contacts within the Muslim communities. Part of the reason was Nikolas Sarkozy, as Interior Minister, had dismantled the neighborhood policing infrastructure equated to a beat cop. This is endemic of a pattern within the Ministry of Interior that is responsible for internal security and integration of Muslims. Security concerns almost always win out over integration initiatives. Change is often slow, especially when you consider there are no French Muslim Members of Parliament.²¹³

Issues continue in the work place as well. Jean-François Amadiou of the Observatoire des Discriminations, a think tank that studies discrimination in the workplace, found that a job applicant whose name sounded Moroccan was six times less likely to get an interview than the one whose name sounded Franco-French. Even when the government has set up agencies to fight this, little has happened. The Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Égalité, a government agency set up in 2005 to punish employers who show bias in the workplace, received about 800 complaints but forwarded fewer than two dozen to the courts.²¹⁴ Part of the problem is that French law forbids collecting information based on ethnicity, making it difficult to determine if progress is being made. This makes such initiatives as affirmative action illegal in France.²¹⁵

²¹³ Moushumi Khan, "Muslims in France: French or Muslim, What Is the Choice?" Institute For Social Policy And Understanding, May 2007, http://www.ispu.us/files/PDFs/French_Muslim_Policy_Brief_-_Moushumi.pdf (accessed September 2007), 1-5.

²¹⁴ Giry, "France and Its Muslims."

²¹⁵ Khan, "Muslims in France: French or Muslim, What Is the Choice?" 8.

In spite of this, France has stepped forward and achieved some significant results in regards to assimilation. According to Moushumi Khan of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, the 2005 riots made it clear that the “youths identified themselves as French and were protesting that the French republican principle of equality was not being applied to them (*italics author’s*.)” To further contact between Muslims and the government, Sarkozy led the formation of the Islamic Council in France, bringing together the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), the National Federation of Muslims in France (FNMF), and the Paris Mosque.²¹⁶ Though this initiative has come in for criticism, as Dalil Boubakeur, the current president of the Muslim Council, is often criticized for never having lived in an immigrant suburb or rarely visiting one.²¹⁷ Other initiatives include creating an independent body to combat discrimination that was implemented in January 2005.²¹⁸

A series of poll data also highlights some success in regards to assimilation in France. A 1994 study by the historian and anthropologist Emmanuel Todd showed 20 to 30 percent of women of Algerian descent under the age of 35 living in France had married a French man. This is one of the highest rates of intermarriage for Muslims in Europe. In another poll conducted by the French institute CSA in 2004, more than 90 percent of Muslims said that gender equality and other French republican values were important to them. In the same poll, 68 percent of Muslims stated they favor the separation of church and state. According to another CSA poll in 2005, French Muslim voters opposed the proposed European Union constitution at almost exactly the same level as did the rest of France. Finally, even the general French population seeks at least some level of greater assimilation, with 50 percent stating the country needed more immigrants in Parliament.²¹⁹

216 Khan, “Muslims in France: French or Muslim, What Is the Choice?”3-5.

217 Katrin Bennhold, “Muslim, French - And Proud To Be Both,” *International Herald Tribune*, 16 March 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/15/news/islam.php> (accessed September 2007).

218 Kimberly Hamilton, “The Challenge of French Diversity,” Migration Policy Institute, November 2004, <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=266> (accessed September 2007).

219 Giry, “France and Its Muslims.”

3. Germany

Germany is still dealing with the impact of the myth of the guest worker. Lina Ganamah of the Arab Women's Forum in Berlin stated,

Germans are only just beginning to realize that many of the Muslims who came here as 'temporary' guest workers have put down roots and are here to stay. For too long, Germany denied that it was an immigration destination with no proper integration programs in place.

A first step was a May 2, 2007 conference on Islam in Berlin, bringing together Islamic organizations and the German government to meet and exchange ideas.²²⁰

Germany has attempted some initiatives. Germany's Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schaueble, proposed training for imams that could "strengthen those who can live with the European rule of law, universal rights and the achievements of the Enlightenment."²²¹ The government also made language courses mandatory for new immigrants beginning on January 1, 2005.²²² Germany has also made it easier for certain professionals, scientists, and other highly skilled workers to enter the country and provided them an opportunity to gain immediate permanent residency.²²³

However it is clear Germany is still falling short. To this day, many Germans still identify their nationality in ethnic and cultural terms and do not consider those without German ancestry as German. This is due to in part because the German federal government has taken few nation-wide initiatives, leaving it to cities and towns to deal with integration. When national politicians do speak up on the issue, their comments are usually more harmful than helpful. Werner Schiffauer, professor of ethnology at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder, states, "The problem is the idea that the immigrants are the 'other' and integration is 'their' problem. Politicians have been reinforcing the 'us'

220 Amel al-Ariqi, "Muslims in Germany: Obstacles Prevent Integration," *Yemen Times*, 21-23 May 2007, <http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1052&p=report&a=2> (accessed September 2007).

221 *BBC News Online*, "Germany Pushes Muslim Integration," 12 January 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6256357.stm> (accessed September 2007).

222 Charles Hawley, "How Germany Has Failed Its Immigrants," *Spiegel Online International*, 21 December 2004, from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,333899,00.html> (accessed August 2007).

223 Gallis and others, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," 35.

versus 'them' rhetoric. It shows that the Germans don't accept immigrants as part of their society. The dichotomy is still there.” In the end, Muslim integration into German society has been minimal.²²⁴

4. Spain

Spain is trying to transition from mostly countering terrorism to a policy of assimilation. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero continues to increase resources devoted to fighting jihadi terrorism. At the same time, he has put more stress on assimilating Muslims into Spanish society, rather than viewing them as possible security threats. This includes legalizing nearly 700,000 illegal immigrants currently working in Spain. The government is also trying to take advantage of the resentment most Spanish Muslim leaders have for Saudi efforts to promote its ultraconservative Wahhabi Islam in Spain. The problem for the government is how to provide the funds requested to train Spanish-born imams while still meeting the desire for the government to maintain secularism. Though a small step, the Spanish government has created a foundation to help minority religions integrate into Spanish society. With a modest initial budget of \$3.5 million, the foundation is looking to fund Spanish language instruction for imams.²²⁵ It is clear Spain desires to move forward with assimilation. It is just a matter of whether the necessary resources will be committed to make assimilation happen.

D. CONCLUSION

It has been assumed that foreign policy is the main reason for the differing levels of terrorism in Europe. However, there are enough differences in counter terrorism and assimilation policy to warrant further assessment. France successfully dealt with Islamic terrorism long before 9/11 where the other three countries did not experience it until then. Germany was the first of the other three countries to attack Islamic terrorism, with Spain and Great Britain not getting fully on-board until after successful attacks against them. Germany's quick response following 9/11 put it in a better position to counter Islamic

²²⁴ Gallis and others, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries,” 32-35.

²²⁵ Ibid., 38-42.

terrorism than Britain and Spain. Finally, the French have always been committed to some form of assimilation, unlike their counterparts. This has resulted in much more of the French Muslim population considering themselves French than the other sampled countries. This is especially telling when it is noted that France is the number one enemy of AIG because of the French foreign policy objectives in Algeria. The results therefore show that CT efforts are as important, if not more so, than foreign policy.

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VII. CONCLUSION

More than a decade has passed since Osama bin Laden initially proclaimed war against the United States and its allies. Over that timeframe numerous violent acts have been carried out by bin Laden's al Qaeda and other organizations sympathizing with his organization's ideology and messages opposed to the West. What once began as attacks against western interests within developing countries, has evolved into barbaric acts within the borders of some of the world's most developed and advanced countries in the world (i.e., the United States, Great Britain, and Spain). Given Europe's closer proximity to the Middle East, its large immigrant Muslim populations, and perceived deficiencies in controlling cross-border traffic, bin Laden and al Qaeda have focused on western Europe as a means to impair not only Europe, but more importantly to cripple the United States economically, hoping to eventually force the U.S. and its allies out of the Middle East and Muslim lands.

Since al Qaeda took a unique interest in targeting many western European countries, the question has been raised as to why some countries have suffered violent attacks while others have not. On the surface, this appears an easy question according to many terrorism experts: violence in Western Europe is directly correlated to the foreign policy issues of the individual countries. More specifically it is argued that those countries directly involved in the Iraq war are the ones falling in the direct crosshairs of al Qaeda inspired violence. Brushing aside this initial argument and digging a little deeper, it appears there are a number of other critical factors (social status levels, national origin, ability to generate support, domestic policies for immigration, and counter terrorism initiatives) at play as well. In some cases these are just as integral, if not more so, than the Iraqi foreign policy debate. The one constant with these varying critical factors is that the importance of each is different for each of the countries in this study.

In order to make this review manageable, four western European countries have been analyzed: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain. These were selected due to the fact each has had differing levels of internal jihadist activity, while at the same time

each country has developed its own domestic and foreign policy initiatives to counter its terrorist threat. Comparing the dynamics of the critical factors in each country provides valuable insight into determining why there are differing levels of violence between each country within Europe. Although this data can not be overlaid directly onto all countries within Europe, it can help to identify potential problem areas for other countries and may highlight efforts which have proven successful in mitigating jihadist sentiment and action.

Dissecting and analyzing the status levels of the Muslim populations in each country is important since oftentimes European Muslims are viewed as a monolith—portraying the area as one Europe with one mass of identical Muslims. On the contrary, Europe’s Muslims are quite distinct and varied not only between each country but also within each country. Based on this, it appears there are some critical factors which may tie the status levels within each country to the varying levels of jihadist activity within France, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain. Looking at the Muslim population itself, data can be analyzed regarding the national origin of the Muslim population, social status of Muslims, the employment and income levels, and the education levels achieved. This body of data has brought one primary concept to the forefront: French Muslims appear to set themselves apart drastically from the Muslims within each of the other target countries. In fact, statistics and reporting indicates Muslims in France feel a closer sense of equality within France than the other Muslim populations do in Europe to their host country. Part of this may be explained through French governmental efforts both in its immigration policy of assimilation as well as efforts to handle Muslim concerns at the national level, creating a unified and predictable approach, vice conducting a piecemeal approach at the regional levels. These actions have set France apart from Britain, Spain, and Germany which have attempted disjointed efforts in interacting with their Muslim populations. This inability to satisfactorily appease Muslim concerns and provide some sense of movement towards equality has created hardships within the Muslim communities, distrust of the government, and established a potential target audience for jihadists.

Sentiment towards jihad has been varied amongst the Muslim populations within each European country. Measuring that sentiment is based on internal factors as well as the ability of the jihadist message to spread. From an internal perspective, Marc Sageman's link theory approach to terrorist networks provides vital insight into the likelihood of attacks occurring. Analysis has highlighted that groups with direct ties to the al Qaeda core have been involved in a significantly larger number of the successful and planned attacks within Europe. These ties have proven to focus upon national origin. Many of the attacks have been carried out and planned by jihadists with Pakistani and Middle Eastern backgrounds, both of which have direct ties to al Qaeda's core. Additionally, some North African groups were involved in training and support of al Qaeda during its tenure of terrorist training in Afghanistan. The results of this theory help to account for the successful attacks which occurred within the UK and Spain, and may help to explain why Germany and France have not witnessed the violence firsthand since large segments of their populations originated from more secular countries as well as without the direct ties to al Qaeda's core.

In order for al Qaeda to spread its ideology, it must ensure the organization's message resonates with the target audience. Two factors are central in establishing support: negatively portraying a country's foreign policy and the ability to interact and compete with other organizations. As stated previously, the Iraq war is not the only foreign policy initiative which has provoked Muslims to take up jihad. A more generic call for jihad has been to turn the war on terror into a perception of a war against Islam. As a result, any country involved in the war on terror can then be identified as an enemy of the jihadists. This was witnessed against France, when Ayman al-Zawahiri united with AQIM in 2006 and proclaimed France a primary target of al Qaeda actions. Additionally, al Qaeda has tied actions (both present and colonial) of European countries with "apostate" regimes in Muslim lands into the notion of jihad. This stems from the actions of France in Algeria, Great Britain in Pakistan, and Spain in Morocco and Algeria. In spite of these proclamations for jihad, France and Germany have thus far avoided the Islamic terrorism experienced by Britain and Spain.

Recruitment has occurred in a myriad of locations, with mosques yielding the best results. Governmental efforts to engage Muslim communities and minimize the influence mosques can have toward jihadist sentiment have helped to determine levels of jihadist action. France has taken progressive steps to train homegrown religious leaders, deport radical sympathizers, and monitor mosques and religious leaders. These efforts appear to be successful thus far. The UK and Spain did not (until recently) take an aggressive stance within their Muslim communities against the spread of radical ideology, allowing foreign imams to preach in the local mosques with little to no surveillance. Their inaction in the past likely helped the flow of support towards the jihadist ideology.

From a counter radical perspective, it appears establishing legitimate Muslim associations which provide Muslims a go-between with the government has proven useful in reducing tensions and alleviating problems which arise within the Muslim community. France and Germany are two examples of countries with key Muslim associations, the CFCM and DITIB respectively, which have helped to bridge the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. Once again, Britain and Spain have either not been able to interact with Muslim organizations viewed as legitimate representatives of the Muslim populations or have avoided contact all together.

The domestic strategy of each country is the final factor included in this study. Domestic strategies on two levels, immigration policies and countering terrorism, have played a role in jihadist actions. Immigration policies selected by each country have determined how Muslim populations fit into the greater society. Within France, Muslims were assimilated into the country. As a result, religious and ethnic differences were set aside in an effort to see all citizens as equals. Additionally, as tough issues arose or concerns were raised from within the Muslim community, French governmental officials attempted to tackle the issues rather than brushing them aside. The multicultural approach adopted by Spain and Britain led to isolating Muslims from the greater societies and a led to feelings of alienation, magnifying the differences between the communities. Germany on the other hand, held onto a myth of the guest worker, where Muslims were not integrated into society under the notion that they would be returning to their home countries once their jobs were completed.

Looking at each country over the past few decades, it is readily apparent each has faced terrorism of some sort. The form of terror and groups which projected it has helped to shape counter terror efforts today. France, once again at the forefront, is the only country to have actually dealt with Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11. Because of the actions of the GIA, an Algerian terrorist organization, in the mid 1990s, France got a ten year head start on contending with this unique threat; therefore, once Europe became threatened France only needed to fine tune its operations to maintain a positive effect. On the other hand, Great Britain, Spain, and Germany struggled trying to determine how to handle the new environment and fitting the threat into other domestic policies, namely governmental interaction with Muslim communities. Likely due to its largely secular Muslim population and guest worker policy, Germany was the first of the other three countries to take progressive steps contending with Islamic terrorism. Additionally, German officials took pro-active measures once it was discovered the country was not immune to radical Islam as the 9/11 Hamburg cell operated and plotted within the confines of German borders. Spain and Great Britain were late entrants establishing progressive steps to combat Islamic extremism within each country. It wasn't until each suffered vicious attacks that domestic counter terrorism policies were radically changed. With both countries as late entrants into countering domestic terror threats, it will likely require greater time and effort to minimize the risks within each country.

The critical takeaway from the analysis in this body of work is there are a number of vital factors which play a role in determining jihadist actions within each country. Although some analysts would like to pinpoint one factor as the most dominant, the reality is that no golden bullet exists. The factors highlighted here can be overlaid onto other countries and then each analyzed to help determine which bears the most weight within each country. The resulting data can then be used to begin developing effective counter terrorism policies based on examining what has been successful and what has failed in the four target countries in this study. Looking at these lessons learned and recognizing each Muslim community as unique and varied will go a long way in ensuring the correct counter terrorism strategy is selected and employed. Failing to do so will likely result in a continued dysfunctional fight against terrorism.

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