

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
GHQ, SCAP

1 February 1946

Memorandum to: Mr. J. B. Keenan  
From : Carlisle W. Higgins  
Subject : Interrogation of HIROTA, Koki

In the interrogation of Koki HIROTA at Sugamo Prison on 28 January 1946 the member of our staff conducting the examination so far transgressed what I consider to be rules of fair interrogation that I feel it my duty to call to your attention some of the questions and answers, copies of which are on a sheet attached hereto.

These questions were asked and answered after the examination had continued for quite some time and apparently had produced nothing which would justify them.

Hirota was Foreign Minister 1933-6, Premier 1936-7, Foreign Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet and a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council.

General Woodcock reports: "On the whole, however, Hirota's policy was conciliatory."

Capt. Phelps conducted the examination; Lt. Col. Hornaday is the head of his group. I have discussed the examination with Lt. Col. Hornaday but not with Capt. Phelps who is scheduled to continue the examination on Monday of next week.



1 Feb. 46

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The following questions were asked by Capt. Phelps and answered by Koki HIROTA.

"Q. I know something of the Japanese feeling for their ancestors. I feel that if I ask you to take an oath to tell the whole truth, not half lies, not part truth and part untruths, in the name of your ancestors that it would mean something to you?

A. I have been taught throughout my life to believe that and in fact Confucious teaches that.

Q. If I were to require you to give me such an oath would you do so in the name of your ancestors?

A. I am not only willing to swear to that but the truth I tell you will be beyond anything I can swear for under that situation.

Q. I accept your oath.

Q. Mr. Hirota, I ask you to remember you are in a tight situation here. I want whatever information you know. I want information of probably many friends of yours but if you are to see your family again I had better get that information from you.

A. Of course I am willing to do it and I know the Japanese situation today depends upon what I say or do here.

Q. That is true.

A. (continuing) For the sake of the future of Japan and revival of Japan I believe those errors we have made in the past must be completely removed.

Q. Completely atoned for do you mean?

A. We must do everything possible so that a recurrence of the things that happened to Japan will be impossible.

Q. Mr. Hirota, I ask you to remember now as you go to lunch, it being lunch time, that black cloak which you wear would fit very well with a black cloak over your head and a noose around your neck. Think that over. Keep in mind your oath to me in the name of your ancestors. I want to ask you some very good questions this afternoon.



EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

HIROTA, -- (Former Premier)

- 7.17.40\*\* YONAI cabinet resignation; Prince KONOYE's candidacy.  
7.16.41\*\* New cabinet premier.  
10.17.41\* Ex-premier conference - new cabinet.  
11.29.41\*E Conference - war opinion.



"BRIEF"

NAME:

HIROTA, KOKI

File: 212

Age: 68

Interrogated: Yes

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COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

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OUTLINE:

Veteran Foreign Service  
Foreign Minister 1933-1936  
Premier 1936-1937  
Foreign Minister 1937-1938  
Member Cabinet Advisory Council 1940

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YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
1905 1932		Foreign Service, Member of Genyosha			Ser 14 p. 5
Sept. 1933 Mar. 9 1936		Foreign Minister			
1934 Jan	4	Announced "Three principles" to Diet, would have made China a complete Jap Colony. (say's Kwantung Army placed Japanese in power in Manchukuo)			Ser 15 p.1-5 Ser 15
1936 1937 Jan.		Prime Minister			
1936 Mar. 9		Ordered to form Cabinet in hope that satisfactory settlement of 2-26 incident would be effected Allowed Army to pick Minister of War Stated that his views were not in disagreement with Army This Cabinet adopted "Five-Year plan for Japan and Manchuria."			Ser 16 p. 9 Ser 12 P2 Ser 16 P.14 Ser 25
1936 17 May		His Cabinet passed and approved "Active Service" Policy to make War and Navy Ministers of only General's and Admiral's on active duty status			Mar.8 1946 pp 6-7
1936 Nov. 25	5A	Anti Comintern Pact signed because Army wanted closer relations with Germany			Ser 16 p 16



YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	DOCU- WITNESS MEET	INTERRO- GATION
1937 Jan. 1938 May 26		Foreign Minister (1st Kenoye Cabinet)		
1937 July	6	Advocated "Local Settlement" of China disputes (address to Diet) Did not advise Kenoye that U. S. and Gr. Britain had offered to go between China and Japan shortly after hostilities began. Went to Germany instead.	Ushiba 347	8 Mar 46 pp 11-13
1937 Sept. 5	6 A	In address to Diet said "since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we can not do otherwise than counter the mobilization by Force of Arms" and- "in the cause of righteousness, we shall deal a decisive blow."		Ser 20 p. 8
1937 Nov. 7	7	Japan refused to attend Brussell's conference because Army opposed attendance		Ser. 20 p. 12
1938 Jan. 16		Agreed to plan not to deal further with Chiang Kai-shek and to demand extermination of Shek's Government		8 Mar pp. 14-15
1938 May 26		Resigned as Foreign Minister, Retired from Gov't.		
1940 Jan. to July		Advisor to Yonai Cabinet		8 Mar p. 22
1940 Sept.	11	Proposed Tri-Partite Pact to meeting of Former Premiers		8 Mar pp. 16-17
1941		At a meeting of former Premiers, agreed upon Tojo as Prime Minister		Ser 17 p. 15
1941 Nov. 28 or 29	16	Attended meeting of former Premiers to discuss war with United States and Gr. Britain - meeting called by Tojo.		8 Mar pp. 18-21 13 Nov 45



HIROTA, HOKI

File: 212

(cont'd)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	DOCU- WITNESS MENT	INTERRO- GATION
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Considered by Araki as one who has  
great influence with the Emperor.

1943  
Aug. 30

Participated in meeting of elder statesmen  
to discuss "Grave Situation".

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14 Mar 1946

TO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT : Summary of interrogations of HIROTA, Koki  
FILE NO. : 212

Pursuant to instructions of the Committee at the 5 March meeting, the summary of salient points, both negative and positive, is set forth below for your consideration.

The most important positions held by Subject were Minister for Foreign Affairs, 14 September 1933 to 2 April 1936; Prime Minister, 9 March 1936 to 2 February 1937, and again Minister for Foreign Affairs, 4 June 1937 to 26 May 1938.

1. Subject states that to his knowledge he was chosen as Prime Minister because he was not an active member of a political party and was not closely affiliated with any army faction. He had great difficulty in forming a cabinet that was agreeable to the army and was obliged to accept as ministers five men designated by the army and to withdraw his own nominees of four men objectionable to the army. Admits consulting with the army regarding appointment to every cabinet position. (PP 1-3, Entry 12)

2. Queries regarding cabinet members, army leaders, and alleged members of nationalistic societies not productive of any information. Extensive questioning regarding a dozen or more alleged nationalistic societies indicates that subject was not active in this field. He denies membership in any society except Genyosha which he states to be non-political in character. Denies any close relationship with men reputedly key figures in nationalistic organizations. Subject denies ever receiving any suggestions or any threats from any nationalistic society. (Entry 12; Entry 14, p. 25)

3. The "HIROTA Doctrine", or "Three Principles" for adjusting the China Affair, announced to the Diet in January 1934, resulted from conferences between the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry. Admits that foreign policy is largely formulated by the military. (P. 13, Entry 14)



Summary of Interrogations of HIROTA, Koki

14 Mar 1946

4. Subject claims responsibility for getting Emperor to use the expression "regrettable occurrence or incident" in his re-script when referring to the 2.26 incident. This was most violent language ever used by the Emperor and amounted to an extremely severe reprimand of the army. (P. 53, Entry 14)
5. Defines "Three Points" substantially as follows: (1) Since it was not a "proper request" to ask China to recognize Manchoukuo it was sought to bring China and Manchoukuo closer together by means of trade arrangements. (2) It was necessary to see that Chinese agitation against Japan should cease and that communistic activities in China should be controlled. (3) There should be closer economic cooperation between China and Japan. (Pp 1, 5, Entry 15)
6. Subject admits Kwantung Army placed Japanese in power in Manchoukuo. (Entry 15, p. 2)
7. Subject expresses opinion that "almost anyone who has been active in that incident (Manchurian incident) should be responsible", but expresses himself only with respect to General HONJO and General MINAMI as individuals. (Entry 15, p. 3)
8. Subject admits hearing of manufacture of narcotics at Harbin and Mukden and although he suspected army direction, he denies any actual knowledge of narcotics traffic. (Entry 15, p. 6)
9. Admits that "conclusion could be reached" that the Manchurian incident and the three principles of dealing with China amounted to violations of the Nine Power Treaty. (Entry 15, p. 8)
10. Subject asserts his complete ignorance of any "plan" for the occurrence of the Manchurian incident since he was stationed in Holland and Russia for a period of years preceding the incident. Professes scant knowledge of any military plans or operations since he has always been in the diplomatic service. (Entry 16, p. 2)
11. Re foreign policy Subject states "Fundamentally, the foreign policy of Japan was formulated by the Foreign Minister. However, in any matter pertaining to the national defense, then, certainly, other people may have considerable influence in determining that foreign policy. In that event, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the War Minister may have a voice in it. I further believe the policy concerning the national defense was decided upon by those four individuals". Further, "But when activities of the army become tense, then often the diplomatic policy is dragged along with it and brings



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great influence upon foreign policy. Especially it is true when the above named four organizations decided upon a particular course of action. Then the Foreign Minister is rendered almost powerless." Subject also states that these four organizations virtually constitute the Supreme War Council and that their decisions become the policy of the armed forces. (Entry 16, pp 3, 4)

12. In assuming responsibility for publication of "Three Principles" subject states, "I believe that in anything pertaining to diplomacy the Minister of Foreign Affairs must assume responsibility, that being my principle", but does not "believe absolutely" that publication of the Three Points was a violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. (Entry 16, page 7)

13. High lights of subject's act of formation of his cabinet: (1) Prince KONOYE declined the post because of ill health and pressed Subject to accept the Premiership. (2) KONOYE furnished five names to Subject as acceptable appointees. (3) Army opposed several of Subject's choices, viz., YOSHIDA for Foreign Minister, OHARA for Justice Minister, SHIMOMURA for Communications. (4) Army opposed having two representatives from each of the political parties. (5) TERAUCHI recommended for War Minister as a man who could reform the army. (Entry 16, pp 9-12)

14. Subject admits issuing a statement, at the request of the army at the time of formation of his cabinet, that his views were not in disagreement with the army. (Entry 16, p. 13)

15. Subject asserts there was no particular incident during his Premiership that could be considered as a direct cause of the China incident and professes no knowledge of any plans leading to the incident. (Entry 16, p. 14)

16. Subject states that army desire for closer relationship with Germany resulted in Anti-Comintern Pact, 25 November 1936. States further that after he became Premier, 1936-37, War Minister TERAUCHI, and Foreign Minister ARITA wanted him to enter into a military pact with Germany but that he refused to consider a pact of a military nature. Explains Proviso No. 2 of Anti-Comintern Pact calling for mutual defense information as meaning only defense against Comintern propaganda. (Entry 16, pp 16-17)

17. Subject denies knowledge of any government plan to provide the Manchurian incident as an excuse for war and does not believe that there were any long range plans for aggression that contemplated eventual war with United States or Britain. (Entry 17, p. 2)



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18. Explanation of the Imperial Order of 17 May 1936 requiring War and Navy Ministers to be chosen from the active list of generals or lieutenant generals, or equivalent navy grades: The change was proposed to Subject by Minister of War TERAUCHI and Navy Minister HAGAHO on the ground that the current provision permitting appointment of retired officers had never been utilized and should be stricken as obsolete and on the further ground that such change was necessary in order to avoid a possible rise to power at a later date by officers involved in 2.26 incident. Subject states "I would like to make clear that after the Prime Minister was forced by Imperial Legislation to obtain as War Minister from the ranks of Lieutenant General or General on active service, that, should he not find suitable timber for such a ministerial position on the active list, he might then search the inactive list of such officers and by recalling them to active service, have them appointed in the ministerial position. And I believe that was done. An actual example of such a case was the case of Admiral YONAI who was in the reserves. However, when he was wanted for Navy Minister, he was placed on active duty, and appointed Minister of the Navy. However, no civilian could be appointed to either of these two positions." (Entry 17, pp 3, 4, and 9)

19. Regarding attack on Pearl Harbor, Subject states, "I still think that it is the responsibility of the Cabinet and if I were the Premier, I know I would feel that would be the responsibility of my Cabinet", and, further, that ".....I believe in matters of importance in connection with military affairs, the responsibility lies on the shoulders of both chiefs, that is, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations." With respect to the responsibility of the Emperor, Subject states, "To us it is not clear whether the circumstances surrounding that attack were such as the Emperor was aware of it." (Entry 17, p. 18)

20. Description of meeting of all former premiers on the 28th or 29th of November 1941, called by Premier TOJO. Group was told by Premier TOJO of the government plan to wage war. Later, the group had an audience with the Emperor who asked their opinions on war. Subject states he expressed his disapproval of war against America and his conviction that all matters could be settled by negotiation but that Premier TOJO maintained a view in direct conflict. (Entry 17, P. 10)



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21. With respect to the responsibility of Marcus KIDO, Subject states, "I would not say he was responsible but he was in a position so close to the Emperor, advising him in all matters of importance, and he was one of the responsible advisers to the Emperor, so that he should be considered responsible for what happened because of his office." (Entry 17, P. 10)

22. Subject states he first met TOJO when he explained the Japanese-German military alliance to a meeting of former premiers on September 1940. (Entry 17, p. 12)

23. With respect to the dispatching of troops to China in 1937 Subject states, "I have adhered to the policy of localized negotiated settlement in the locality where the trouble took place. When the army wanted to send forces to China, I told them that only on the ground of giving protection to the Japanese residents in the locality involved would it be permissible, but otherwise I would not sanction such troop movement. I have always maintained that speedy local negotiated settlement was the best solution without giving it an opportunity to spread to other sections." Admitting that the army could have gone direct to the Emperor and secured permission to send troops regardless of his attitude as Foreign Minister, Subject states that, "but, in fact, to send troops to foreign soil involves finance, and it is almost necessary for them to come through the cabinet." (Entry 17, p. 15)

24. At a meeting of former premiers, after the resignation of Prince KONOYE, Subject did not oppose the nomination of TOJO but relied upon the expressed opinion of Marcus KIDO that TOJO could handle the situation well. (Entry 17, p. 16)

25. Questioning of Subject on events surrounding the 7 July 1936 incident, and on persons commonly thought to be involved in the incident, did not elicit any information of value. Subject professes to have little knowledge of the military details or of financial operations at this time. (Entry 20, pp 1-5)

26. Subject professes little knowledge of economic plans for the development of Japan and Manchuria or of the National Mobilization Law." (Entry 20, pp 6-7)

27. Subject admits addressing the Diet, as follows, on 5 September 1937: "It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at stabilization of relations between Japan, Manchoukue, and China, for their common prosperity and well



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being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilization by force of arms."

This statement represented a policy agreed upon by the army and Foreign Office representatives. Subject admits saying in the same speech, "We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defense, as well as with the cause of righteousness, that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (referring to China) so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways. The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to fight."

When asked whether these statements amount to a declaration of war on China, Subject replied, "I certainly do think so." (Entry 20, pp 8 and 9)

26. In explaining his personal view of the war in China, Subject states that he was opposed to such a war, declared or undeclared, but, because of the way the army was handling the situation, there was nothing they could do about it. During the session of the Diet in 1938, Subject told Premier KONOYE, Navy Minister YONAI, and Army Minister SUGIYAMA that he could not discharge his duties as Foreign Minister under existing conditions and preferred to resign rather than to continue. KONOYE said he also wanted to resign because he could not carry on his duties but thought it would not be right to allow his cabinet to collapse while the Diet was in session considering the China affair. As a result, Subject decided to withhold his resignation until the end of the session. (Subject did resign 28 May 1938.) (Entry 20, P. 10)

29. Japan refused to attend Brussels Conference November 1937 because the army demanded that foreign nations not be allowed to interfere because the problem was between China and Japan. (Entry 20, p. 12)

30. Subject states that at inception of the China incident he attempted to negotiate through British Ambassador Craig, but had to abandon his effort because of strenuous objection by the army. Later, army was agreeable to Germany as an intermediary. (Entry 20, p. 12)



Summary of Interrogations of HIROTA, Koki

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31. Subject insists that statement on China policy by AMAU, Foreign Office spokesman, 17 April 1934, was unauthorized and was more severe than the official foreign policy. (Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
32. Subject admits that one of three points was that China should not call for outside help. (Pp 5, 6, Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
33. Subject specifically admitted that he accepted every person proposed by the army for a cabinet position and acceded to army objections to his own nominees for appointment. (P. 11, Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
34. If a suitable officer for War Minister cannot be found on the active list the Premier may request the Emperor to recall a retired officer to active duty in order to make him eligible for appointment. (Pp 11-13, Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
35. Subject states he resigned as Premier after difficulty with army and it seemed likely that army would submit the resignation of War Minister TERAUCHI. Further, subject wished to bring about the fall of the entire cabinet in order to cancel all measures in process in the Diet, particularly, financial measures furnishing more money to the army. (Pp 14-16, Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
36. Subject professes no knowledge at all of narcotics traffic or of Foreign Office connection with the narcotics organization. (Pp 17-19, Interrogation of 5 March 1946)
37. Keeper of the Privy Seal is perhaps the Emperor's most important adviser; is the only one who can offer unsolicited advice. Such officer must bear responsibility for decisions of Emperor on the presumption that Emperor followed his advice. (Pp 1-5, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)
38. Change requiring active service status for War and Navy Ministers 17 May 1936 was an Imperial order discussed and approved by cabinet and Privy Council. No one foresaw that it would put army in control to the extent it did. (Pp 6-7, 8 March 1946)
39. Subject denies knowledge of any plan to expand the China incident. Admits army activity could have been stopped by curtailing financial support. (P. 11, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)



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40. After army objected to dealing through England and suggested that Germany be used as an intermediary, Subject presented Japanese demands on China to German Ambassador in Tokyo, who submitted the demands to the German Ambassador in China. The demands were framed by the army and were too severe and subject did not expect success in the negotiations. At that time, Mr. Craig, British Ambassador to Japan, suggested that England and the United States be requested to mediate. Subject consulted the German Government to see if it would agree to join with England and the United States, but Germany did not accept the proposal. Hence, Subject's plan never got to the point of asking assistance from United States and England. (Pp 11-13, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

41. Subject admits participation in cabinet discussions and approval of 16 January 1938 statement refusing to deal further with Chiang Kai-shek and demanding extermination of his government. (Pp 14-15, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

42. At meeting of former premiers to discuss the Tripartite Pact, Subject proposed the pact because it put China in a more favorable position and could not possibly lead to solution of China affair. (Pp 16-17, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

43. At meeting of former premiers, November 28 or 29, Subject expressed to Emperor his disapproval of the government plan for war. Emperor asked opinions from the group but made no statement himself. Subject claims to be unfamiliar with negotiations up to that point. (Pp 18-21, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

44. Subject resigned as Foreign Minister in May 1938 because of army attempt to strip Foreign Office of power by creation of Manchurian Affairs Board and because of his inability to stop extension of the fighting. (P. 21, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

45. Subject retired from government in 1938 except for service as adviser to YONAI Cabinet January-July 1940. (P. 22, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)

46. Subject served as Chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board for one or two months in 1937 but resigned before preparation of National Mobilization Law. (P. 22, Interrogation of 8 March 1946)



14 Mar 1946

CONCLUSION

As will be seen from the foregoing summation, no great amount of evidentiary material has been developed in the interrogations of Mr. HIROTA. No new information has come to light that would warrant classifying Subject as a fomenter of aggressive action or as a prime initiator of government moves in support of Army expansionist policies. Mr. HIROTA's statement of his own good intentions is self-serving, of course, but this officer is not aware of other evidentiary material that could successfully refute his claim that he was not a co-conspirator with the Army groups in the initial planning of expansion by force of arms.

If Mr. HIROTA was not a leader in the war cause, he was, nonetheless, an active follower after accomplishment of each phase of the expansion. His opposition to the Army's aggressive policies and actions seems to have been confined to polemics, for it seems reasonably certain that if his opposition had been substantial he would not have held the powerful positions of Foreign Minister and Premier from 1933 to 1938. By Subject's own admission the Army controlled the governmental action, and the public record during his terms in office, as well as his admissions upon interrogation, indicates that he accepted Army dictates despite any personal convictions to the contrary.

In view of the desire of the Committee to select defendants representative of the various aspects of war criminality, Mr. HIROTA may well be included in the first trial as being highly representative of those men who accepted and retained high public office at the price of serving as pawns for the Japanese expansionist regime. Mr. HIROTA is typical of that large group of men, admittedly not militarists themselves, who submitted to Army pressure for control of the government and by condoning each aggression and accepting the fruits thereof gave impetus to the next aggression. A classic example of furthering Army ends in Subject's case was his sponsorship, as Premier, of the Imperial Order of 17 May 1936 which required that only Generals, or Lt. Generals, and officers of equivalent Army rank in active service could be appointed as Ministers of War and Navy. It will be noted that Mr. HIROTA admits the specific responsibility of cabinet members for activities of their ministries and the over-all responsibility of the Premier for the policies and acts of his government. Finally, if Mr. SHIDENARA is to be extolled for his courage in retiring from public life in defiance of Army control, then it would seem proper to file charges against Mr. HIROTA or some other person similarly representative of the group which accepted Army domination.

/s/ ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY  
Captain, JAGD



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
GHQ, SCAP

1 February 1946

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To JBK From CWH

-2-

1 Feb. 46

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Q. That is true.

A. (continuing) For the sake of the future of Japan and revival of Japan I believe those errors we have made in the past must be completely removed.

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January 31st 1945

Memo to Mr.Higgins:

This transcript has not yet been submitted to  
Capt. Phelps or to Mr.Sano the interpreter for any possible  
changes.

D.Braun



INTERROGATION OF

HIROTA, Koki

Date and Time: 28 January, 1946. 0930 -1145 hours  
1315 -1545 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : HIROTA, Koki

Capt. Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Interrogator  
Capt. Arthur A. Sandusky  
Mr. J. K. Sano Interpreter  
Dinah Braun Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Capt. Phelps  
to Mr. Sano:

Capt. PHELPS: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will  
truly and accurately interpret and translate from  
English into Japanese and from Japanese into English  
as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. SANO: I do.

Questions by: Capt. PHELPS

(Note: A preliminary talk conducted by means of  
questions and answers was held for about an  
hour, no notes being taken as per prior request  
of interrogator).

Q. Mr. Hirota, please give me a biographical sketch of yourself?

A. If you ask me questions, I will be glad to answer.

Q. Begin with the district in which you were born?

A. I was born in Fukuoka Prefecture, February 14th in about the 11th  
year of Meiji.

Q. Would that be about 1889?

A. Yes.



HIROTA, Koki Jan 28, 1946.

Q. Were you educated there in public schools?

A. Yes, I graduated from grade school and middle school in that prefecture. Then I came to Tokyo to enter the first highschool. Upon graduating from there I entered the Imperial University at Tokyo. I majored in economic and political science. At that time these two subjects were offered in combination.

Q. About what year did you graduate?

A. To the best of my recollection it was the 38th year of the Meiji era.

Q. So that you were about 27 years of age?

A. Yes I was about 27 years of age when I graduated.

Q. Did you then enter the diplomatic apprenticeship?

A. No, I took the examinations but I failed in them. Then I accepted a position with the Governor General's office in Korea. While so employed there I refreshed the course for examination to become a diplomat and then I passed the examination.

Q. Where were you first sent as an apprentice?

A. My first assignment was at Headquarters of Foreign Affairs, for a period of less than one year. Then I was sent to Peking, China.

Q. So that you entered the diplomatic service by civil service examinations?

A. Yes, the first year I failed, and in the second attempt I was successful.

Q. You are not a graduate lawyer, is that right?

A. I would not consider myself a lawyer. I studied law.

Q. Did you attend the Imperial Diplomatic School?

A. I did not attend any schools other than what I have mentioned. Now, as far as this diplomatic school you mentioned, I don't know of the existence of any such school. However, the father of Prince Konoye at one time founded a course in Peer School which had for its object the training of diplomats.



HIROTA, Koki Jan 28, 1946.

Q. What courses were taught in that school?

A. The courses were the same as offered in other common schools.

Q. Languages?

A. I think the same subjects as are taught in ordinary schools but this particular school was attended only by members of the Peer.

Q. Did you or did you not attend?

A. No, I did not attend - not the Peers' School.

Q. After your assignment in Peking, what was your next assignment?

A. I was stationed in Peking for about two years. Then I was transferred to the Embassy in London.

Q. What was your position there?

A. I was still an assistant diplomat. I was not yet a full-fledged diplomat then.

Q. However you were beyond the apprentice class?

A. I had only been in diplomatic service for three years and was still in the lower brackets.

Q. How long did you remain in London?

A. About four years.

Q. What was your next assignment?

A. I was returned to Japan and received an appointment as Chief of the First Division of the Foreign Office.

Q. What was the topic of the First Division?

A. The First Division handled affairs of the trade situation throughout the Far Eastern countries.

Q. How long were you at that assignment?

A. I think I stayed there for four years.



HIROTA, Koki, Jan 28 1946.

Q. What was your next assignment?

A. I was next assigned as Chancellor, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy at Washington.

Q. How long were you there?

A. I was there less than two years.

Q. About how much less?

A. About two years I should say.

Q. About a year and ten months actually?

A. Maybe.

Q. Where was your next assignment?

A. I returned to Japan and was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau - I was Chief of the Section Division of the Intelligence Department. Then I became assistant to the Intelligence Section Chief of the entire Section.

Q. Covering a period of how many years?

A. My recollection is not very clear but it was not for long. Then I was made Chief of the European and American Bureau of the Foreign Office.

Q. Let us return to when you were Chief of the Section Division of the Intelligence Department. What topics were covered by your division?

A. It is rather vague - what the real line of distinction was between the first and second divisions. When it comes to that, there are three divisions and the last one handled the treasury and I even don't know I am now not so sure whether I was chief of the First Division or Second Division but I am reasonably sure I was chief of the Second Section. To the best of my recollection I think the first section covered the China Division and the second must have covered the European and American areas.

Q. What type of intelligence were they interested in giving?

A. The chief function of that division, the Intelligence Division Foreign Office, is to handle domestic public opinions, domestic opinions, and as far as covering of the intelligence is concerned, it is done by diplomatic agencies abroad.



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Q. Through their travel bureaus aboard?

A. At the time I was there it was just newly organized and I don't think the functions of my department or elsewhere were so completely defined and we did not engage on any large scale.

Q. You mean the function of the office at that time and not now?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Did you ever receive information as chief of the Section Division or of your division relative to the shipping strength of foreign countries which your section covered?

A. I do not have any specific recollection on that subject but if there was any information on that that would be handled by some other section in foreign affairs office but what I do remember is when I was at the Embassy in Washington for a period of about two years I made a study naturally of the world diplomatic conditions and I noticed the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was becoming a major issue in diplomatic circles. In America public opinion then appeared to me - even the Irish, Chinese and India people living there were for the cancellation of the treaty, although that did not represent public opinion. They held the view disfavoring the existence of such an alliance between Japan and England. The reason as I understand, advanced by these groups of people for the termination was that Japan was aiding England which was against these groups of Irish, Colonial India, and Chinese. That at least was the atmosphere surrounding their thinking. I want to make clear by these groups of people I mean those who resided in America. That is what I sensed among those who were residing in the United States.

Q. How long after the World War No.1 - that is the British, French and American War against the Germans, do you assume this particular time to be?

A. It was the time when Edward Gray, Ambassador of Great Britain was in Washington.

Q. Where were you stationed during World War #1?

A. I was in Tokyo. Toward the end of the Versaille Conference I was sent to Washington.

Q. That would be about two or three years after World War No.1?

A. I think about the time the late President Wilson made a trip back to the United States. I also felt that there was a feeling in America that



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that the World Naval Armament would be better if they were limited. Though that atmosphere was not a clear and distinct one, it was sufficient for me to feel it and I came back to Japan sensing the existence of such feeling in America. Upon my return to Japan, I advocated that Japan too must fall in line along that thought that I had found in the United States.

Q. That is, the limiting of the naval arms of each country?

A. Yes. In addition to that, not knowing much where the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would take a turn.

Q. Returning again to your job as Chief of Section Division of Intelligence, or assistant chief of the Intelligence Section. Was it not the job of that section to ascertain the distribution of economic goods such as rubber, oil, cotton, hemp, iron, steel, tin and other products?

A. No, we did not because those matters were handled by the Foreign Trade Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

Q. Returning again to that. That would be the bureau or the section within the Foreign Ministry that would most jealously cast its eyes on the Manchurian Section or other sections within the Far East or within the Pacific Area, would it not?

A. I did not come in contact with anything like that nor do I have a clear recollection of that section handling the Manchurian Affairs.

Q. However, it was through this office, was it not, that such information would be gleaned?

A. No, it did not come through this office. There were reports which came to the Foreign Ministry and were segregated and a copy of the information they secured which would be of interest to my particular division would be forwarded to me.

Q. But such intelligence information about Manchuria or China or Hawaii would be filtered to that section of the foreign office which handled that particular intelligence information, would it not?

A. Those intelligence reports would be distributed according to the nature of the section within the division. That is the reports would not come to the division directly; instead they receive the redistribution of information coming to the Ministry direct.

Q. Mr. Hirota, you were a foreign minister for roughly ten years. As foreign minister you would know what information came into that office. My question is direct. I ask you, Would not these reports be broken down and then the section chief receive such information as pertains to his particular branch?



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A. That is right.

Q. So that the Office of Foreign Minister would obtain intelligence information and somewhere within that office someone would receive these intelligence reports, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Hirota, having been born in Fukuoka you are probably a descendent of the ancient SAMURAI family, are you not?

A. As far as I know, my ancestors never were of the SAMURAI family. My grandfather was a fisherman and my father was the son of a fisherman and we have never been of the SAMURAI Family.

Q. You are not a SAMURAI yourself?

A. No, I am not. In fact I do not like the Samurai. My father served as an apprentice craftsman to a stone mason and he established a home and I was born in that home. However, because of my interest in studies and school work my younger brother was to take care of family affairs and I was sent to school.

Q. What faith have you?

A. I do not know whether I could call it a religion or not but I am a firm believer in the teachings of Confucious.

Q. Well, you have some expectation of the Hereafter?

A. On that point I must say that I have some Buddhism faith.

Q. So that you desire when you depart this world to have at least a good name for yourself on earth?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. And you desire to have your ancestors think well of you?

A. Yes.

Q. I know something of the Japanese feeling for their ancestors. I feel that if I ask you to take an oath to tell the whole truth, not half lies, not part truth and part untruths, in the name of your ancestors that it would mean something to you?

A. I have been taught throughout my life to believe that and in fact Confucious teaches that.



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- Q. If I were to require you to give me such an oath would you do so in the name of your ancestors?
- A. I am not only willing to swear to that but the truth I tell you will be beyond anything I can swear for under that situation.
- Q. I accept your oath.
- Q. Mr. Hirota, I ask you to remember you are in a tight situation here. I want whatever information you know. I want information of probably many friends of yours but if you are to see your family again I had better get that information from you.
- A. Of course I am willing to do it and I know the Japanese situation today depends upon what I say or do here.
- Q. That is true.
- A. (continuing) For the sake of the future of Japan and revival of Japan I believe those errors we have made in the past must be completely removed.
- Q. Completely atoned for do you mean?
- A. We must do everything possible so that a recurrence of the things that happened to Japan will be impossible.
- Q. Mr. Hirota, I ask you to remember now as you go to lunch, it being lunch time, that black cloak which you wear would fit very well with a black cloak over your head and a noose around your neck. Think that over. Keep in mind your oath to me in the name of your ancestors. I want to ask you some very good questions this afternoon.
- A. I will be very glad to answer any questions that I know anything about.
- Q. That is all I ask you to do.
- A. In that respect to my way of thinking, this thing must be told you in quite detail.
- Q. I will interrupt as I feel you are getting off the track.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED  
TO 1315. same date, same place,  
same appearances.



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INTERROGATION CONTINUED AFTER ADJOURNMENT FOR LUNCH.

Questions by: Capt. PHELPS.

Q. Mr. Hirota, do you know ARITA, Hachiro?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his common reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I think he is quite an honest man.

Q. Do you know KODAYASHI, Seige?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Do you know Vice Admiral SATO, Ichiro?

A. No.

Q. Do you know Baron HIRANUMA, Kiichiro?

A. Yes, I know him very well because of my affiliation with the government capacities and he also has been a privy council chairman and privy council vice-chairman.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I think he is supposed to be an honest man.

Q. What is your opinion of him?

A. I have not had much connection with him so I cannot say exactly.

Q. Do you know OTA, Kozo?

A. If I saw him perhaps I might know him but it is not anyone that I have associated with.

Q. Do you remember the Minister of Education in the SUZUKI Cabinet?

A. I think I have that recollection.

Q. Was it not OTA, Kozo?

A. Yes, I think he was.



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Q. Do you know YUKI, Toyatora?

A. I do not know him too well but he is the person of whom I spoke before.

Q. He was Minister of Finance in the TOJO Cabinet, was he not?

A. I remember him to be a Minister of Finance under the HYASHI cabinet but whether he was finance minister under TOJO, I could not tell you. Perhaps he was.

Q. What is his common reputation for truth and honesty?

A. The general reputation varies. He was a banker.

Q. For MITSUI?

A. For the Industrial Bank of Japan which is controlled by the Japanese Government. He later became president of the Bank of Japan.

Q. Do you know KIKUCHI, Takeo?

A. If I see these people I think I can identify them but I do not know them.

Q. Do you know Count OGASAWARA, Chosei (Tyesi)?

A. Yes. He is a person of whom I made casual acquaintance three or four times at the public meetings.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. This is the gentleman who knows Admiral Todo very well and he has always held very high praise for his work during his lifetime. As to honesty I could not tell you.

Q. Did Count OGASAWARA sponsor Admiral Todo?

A. He was perhaps under Admiral Todo at one time or another and after Admiral Todo passed away he had very high commendation for the work of Admiral Todo.

Q. Do you know Gen. HARA Siotani?

A. I dont know anyone by that name among generals.

Q. What position does the HARA Siotani that you know have?

A. There was one admiral by the name of HARA KAI. But I do not even know this rear admira Hara personally but I knew his older brother



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by the name of Katsuro Hara who was one of my teachers in highschool.

Q. Do you know IKEDA, Seichin?

A. Yes, I met him frequently - not so frequently but from time to time.

Q. What is his reputation for honesty and truth?

A. He is known as a person who believes in right things. He was of the House of Mitsui. He was the head man of the Mitsui house.

Q. Did you know SUZUKI, Ichuro?

A. No, I don't know him.

Q. Would you know him by reputation as being a leader of of SEIYUKAI?

A. I don't know such a name at all.

Q. Do you recall the name of SEIYUKAI at all?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. What is the SEIYUKAI?

A. That was one political party - by the name of SEIYUKAI and another opposing party by the name of KENSEIKAI.

Q. Who were members of the SEIYUKAI?

A. SEIYUKAI being one of the largest political parties they had so many members and Mr. Hara was the leading figure in that political party.

Q. Which Mr. Hara?

A. HARA KEI. SUZUKI, Kisaburo was the next vice president after the death of Mr. Hara. But these people I do not know too well.

Q. Did you know Baron TANAKA, Giichi, General?

A. I know his name well of course but I have never met him in person. TANAKA first became the president of SEIYUKAI and when he formed a cabinet he combined the duties of foreign minister. At that time he approached me to see if I would accept the position of foreign minister in his cabinet. But before that Premier Shidehara asked me to serve in Holland and for that reason I declined the offer from TANAKA. If you allow me to make an observation here that if you are going to investigate the conditions of Japan, it might be beneficial to know what happened during the TANAKA administration.

Q. Thank you. Do you know Gen. ARAKI, Sadao?

A. I knew him because I served with him in the same cabinet.



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Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. As an individual he is an honest man but the statements he makes run into extremes so the people misunderstand him.

Q. Who writes his speeches - who dictates them?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Was he a member of the so-called inner group of the Army?

A. I think he could be called that. At that time there was a faction in the army circles known as Kodo-Ha and he took a leading part in it. There were many factions in high military circles and it is rather difficult for me to say who belonged to which faction.

Q. What was the reputation of Gen. Tanaka?

A. I don't know about truthfulness but his reputation was as a soldier who is fond of politics.

Q. Therefore a liar?

A. I don't know him too well so I don't want to go that far.

Q. What was the reputation for truth and honesty of SUZUKI Kisaburo?

A. I don't know him well but people surrounding him say that he is the one who was even willing to give what he has to save his people surrounding him or his followers.

Q. It must be your way of saying he would give one the shirt off his back.

A. My understanding is that he is that kind of a man.

Q. What is the reputation for truth and honesty of HARA KEI?

A. HARA KEI as I knew him - I knew him when I was rather young but he took leadership in the SEIYUKAI Political Party and my understanding is he is very highly intellectual and a clever man.

Q. Do you know General NOZAKI?

A. No, I don't know him.

Q. Do you know Major General KOISO, Kuniaki?

A. No, I do not know him.



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Q. The KOISO who later became prime minister succeeding the Tojo Cabinet?

A. I say that I do not know him. I made a statement to the effect that I did not know him.

Q. Do you know his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I have the suspicion that he was a man who liked politics - that he was in the army.

Q. Then he may have been a member of the inner group?

A. No doubt he must be an influential member of it. I do not know what position he held in the inner group. We had so many generals in those days.

Q. Do you know HATS, Shunroku, General?

A. Yes, I met him once in a while because this general was attached to the Imperial Household.

Q. What was his reputation.

A. I think he was a person known to be trusted by other people.

Q. Was he connected with the Japanese expedition into China?

A. He first became a Minister of War during the YONAI cabinet. I believe he was sent as commanding general of the Chinese campaign.

Q. Do you know Admiral KATO.

A. Are you referring to the admiral still living, or the one who died?

Q. The one still living.

A. I don't know Admiral KATO but he must be a son in law of Admiral KATO who represented Japan as head delegate at the Washington Naval Armament Conference.

Q. What is his first name?

A. My knowledge of him is so limited that I do not know his first name.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I don't know.



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Q. Do you know Admiral NOMURA?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. What is his first name?

A. Kichisaburo.

Q. What is his reputation for honesty?

A. He is a very conservative general. That is my understanding.

Q. He was very friendly pro American in Washington a few days prior to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Do you know Admiral TOYODA?

A. I do not know any one by that name. Perhaps it is TOYODA, Teijiro who upon retiring from the navy perhaps was appointed as the Minister of Commerce and Industry, then later he perhaps became a foreign minister. In fact I know<sup>n</sup> that he became a foreign minister. Then later he became a Minister of War Supplies. Another TOYODA I know is a professional soldier and until lately he was the Chief of Staff of the Navy.

Q. Both are Admirals?

A. Yes. But the latter admiral I don't believe I have ever met.

Q. Do you know TOJO, Hidiki?

A. After he became the premier which bears his name, I knew him. However up to that time I never knew him.

Q. Was he a general?

A. Yes. He was a general and he was a Minister of War.

Q. What is his reputation for honesty and truth?

A. Do you mean during the war?

Q. At any time?

A. Of course his reputation during the war was such a notorious one. He was so well known as such that I don't know as to his honesty or veracity.

Q. What was the reputation for truth and honesty of TOYODA Teijiro?

A. This TOYODA Teijiro is the one I have mentioned to you a few



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minutes ago. I forgot to mention about this last, General Tojo, he was known to be a very nervous person. About TOYODO I did not have personal contact with him, and would not know his character.

Q. Have you seen General Tojo here in person?

A. No.

Q. Was Tojo, to your knowledge, a member of the inner group?

A. I heard that a younger group of officers were supporting General Tojo.

Q. That younger group of officers I believe were called the inner group?

A. I am wondering if they did not have great influence in the army.

Q. Was General Tojo, to your knowledge, a member of the KORDI KAI (Black Dragon Society)?

A. I do not know who the members of the Black Dragon Society were and I am sure I do not know whether Tojo was a member or not.

Q. Did you know TOYAMA?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Is he still living?

A. He passed away.

Q. When did he die?

A. The year before last.

Q. What was his first name?

A. Mitsuru. He was born in Fukuoka Prefecture. However he stayed in Tokyo most of his life. I stayed at my home until I graduated middle school. Then I came to Tokyo with Mr. Toyama.

Q. Did Toyama found the Black Dragon Society?

A. I cannot say for sure whether Mr. Toyama founded the Black Dragon Society but a man by the name of UCHIDA, Ryokei is known to be the founder.



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Q. Was Mr. Toyama a member of the Black Dragon Society or not?

A. Mr. Toyama was a man that as a rule did not join any such organizations and I don't know whether he was a member of the Black Dragon Society or not.

Q. Is it not true that Mr. Toyama founded the Black Ocean Society?

A. My understanding is that several men organized the GENYO-SHA. The leading founders of this GENYO-SHA were those descendents of the ones who took active part in the SAIGO TAKAMORI Incident.

Q. What was this SAIGO TAKAMORI Incident?

A. That incident is commonly understood to be a factional fight between CHOSSRU Military cliques and the SASSHU Faction and also the friction between the military personnel and civilian personnel within the government. At that time there existed a movement striving for liberalism and I believe this GENYO-SHA was one of these groups advocating more liberal ideas against the reactionary government forces.

Q. Mr. Toyama was a member of GENYO-SHA, was he not?

A. I think a man like Mr. Toyama being a senior was perhaps one of the advisors rather than a member. In Japan when we say that one is an advisor that position is that of an honorary one.

Q. You preached the funeral oration at Mr. Toyama's funeral did you not?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you attend the burial?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. MAINICHI, the newspaper says that you preached the burial sermon or gave the ritual address?

A. I did not and the one who did was TOKUTOMI. I wonder if such an article as you mention was in the paper could perhaps have been an error.

Q. Perhaps. Did you know Prince KONOYE?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?



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A. I think he is an honest man but he is a person with weak will power.

Q. Do you know that we have the memoirs and diary of Prince KONOYE?

A. I read that in the newspapers.

Q. I mean the actual diary which he kept?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Did you keep a diary or any memoirs of your services with the government?

A. No, none whatsoever.

Q. Did you make any notes?

A. Not even that. I did not keep any private records believing that whatever work I did would be recorded in the records of the foreign office.

Q. Do you know where the records of the foreign office may now be?

A. These records during the war, I do not know they kept them. I had a desire to see some of these records lately and I made inquiry for them but I was not able to secure the records.

Q. Do you know SUGIURA, Juko?

A. I know the name but I do not know him personally.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I knew him to be a very conservative scholar.

Q. Do you know KITA, Ikki?

A. I heard of his name but I never met him.

Q. Was that his real name?

A. I believe the last name KITA must be a true name but the other part, Ikki, I doubt if that is his correct name.

Q. Do you know his correct first name?

A. No.



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Q. Do you know Dr. OKAWA, Shumei?

A. I know his name only.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I understood him to be quite a scholar.

Q. Do you know GONDO?++

A. Seikei, perhaps that is his name. I knew him to be the author of two or three books. As far as knowing him is concerned, I never met him and have no acquaintance with him.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. My knowledge is to the extent of knowing that he published two or three books.

Q. What type of books?

A. I think a treatise on agricultural problems.

Q. Do you know TAKABATAKE?

A. What is his first name?

Q. I don't know it.

A. I don't know him.

Q. Did you know MINROTO, Yamoto?

A. No.

Q. Did you know SEIGIDAN?

A. No, I do not know him.

Q. Is there a political group by the name of SEIGIDAN?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Do you know NAKASHIMA, Muneichi?

A. I do not know him.



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Q. Do you know HATTA, Yoshiaki?

A. I do not know, I wonder how it is written. I mentioned one HATA who was a general a little while ago.

Q. That was HATA. This is HATTA.

A. Yes I remember him. He was Minister of Transportation - Minister of Railways as we call it.

Q. What was his reputation?

A. He is a person I am not well acquainted with.

Q. Do you know his reputation generally?

A. I don't think he enjoyed such a bad reputation as to his honesty.

Q. Do you know SADA, Kajio?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Do you know OKADA, Takuo?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Do you know YAMASHITA, Tomohito?

A. Yes I know his name.

Q. Was that General YAMASHITA?

A. Yes, that is his name.

Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He is known to be a man who did not agree with General Tojo and he was well liked by a large number of people in Japan. But at the time Singapore fell, people in Japan did not accept him with the same honor as they greeted General NOGI in the Russian war.

Q. Why was that?

A. According to what I heard in the newspapers his attitude toward the enemy forces was too severe.

Q. Did you know DOKE, Seichiro?

A. I don't know him.



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Q. You stated did you not that you knew OCHIDA, Ryohei? He is the one who founded the Black Dragon Society or reputed to have formed it?

A. I don't know who ever translated that to be the Black Dragon Society but before the Russian war there was an organization known as the Amur River Society which existed.

Q. And was that called the Black D<sub>r</sub>agon Society?

A. Now "Amur" River is Black D<sub>r</sub>agon River in the navy. Translated into English Black Dragon is a literal translation of the characters not of the original name they adapted.

Q. Was this in connection with the Amur River Society and the Kokur Kei?

A. I think it is the same thing but the translation or the origin of the name is a mis-translation.

Q. This organization was founded, was it not about 1901 in the English calendar?

A. I don't know exactly what it would be in the Occidental calendar but it was organized before the Russian war.

Q. What was Mr. Ochida's reputation for truth and honesty?

A. His reputation was varied but what I heard is that Mr. Ochida raised a fund for this organization but I do not know in detail what his activities were.

Q. Was he not considered a gangster?

A. I think that may be too severe to call him that and I question it.

Q. Is not the Black Dragon Society known for assassinating those government people or militarists who did not accede to their wishes?

A. I have not heard anything of that nature at all. I feel that the name KOKOU KAI Black D<sub>r</sub>agon Society is known excessively exaggerated as to its activities.

Q. Have you ever heard of JAYYOSHO using such methods?

A. I heard such a thing might have happened before in the early



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days but at the present I do not think there is that kind of activity.

Q. Were you ever threatened by any organization when you were in office?

A. Do you mean Kordai Kai or Genyo Sha?

Q. I mean any society.

A. There was a time before this war when a group of policemen came to guard our house on receipt of information that a group of people whose names I do not know, were attempting to attack those who were important vassals surrounding the Emperor because they were surpressing action against the United States.

Q. Did you ever hear the name by which that group of people went?

A. Perhaps it is known to the police but I have not been able to ascertain neither the name of the organization nor the people who composed it. After the surrender of Japan, as I mentioned before, at my Kugenuma residence we heard that some army and navy soldiers might attack me. Therefore I have been changing my residence from place to place to avoid any attack. This was done upon advice of the police officers which goes back to the time when I was premier. It was reported to me that the person who attempted to assassinate me was caught in Hibiya Park.

Q. Did you ever ascertain the name of that attempted assassinator?

A. No, I did not hear his name.

Q. Could that person have been from the Black Dragon Society?

A. I don't believe it was any member of the Black Dragon Society but he was considered to be from Fukushima Prefecture.

Q. Do you know KUZUO, Yoshihisa?

A. Yes, I know him.

Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. After OCHIDA died, KUZUO was generally assisting the affairs of the Black Dragon Society. He was of a quiet disposition and scholastically inclined.

Q. Do you know OBATA, Torataro?

A. I think I knew him when he was a boy. I believe later he went to Korea..



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- Q. Was this General OBATA who commanded the first Tokyo division?
- A. No, it was an entirely different man.
- Q. Did you know IKEDA, Hiroshi?
- A. I think I knew him to be a man who operated a newspaper known as Teikoku Sun Shimpo Imperial Newspaper, but I am not positive he is the man you referred to.
- Q. Did you know YOSHIDA, Masuzo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What is his reputation for honesty and truth?
- A. That is not known to me. He lives in Csaka.
- Q. Do you know KOWATAR, Shin?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know SAICHI, Iwao?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know SAKAI, Rokusuke?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know KAWAHARA, Shinichiro?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know Col. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro?
- A. I know his name.
- Q. What is his reputation as to honesty and truth?
- A. I rather surmise he was a person considered highly eccentric.
- Q. Was he a member of the inner group?
- A. I do not know what influence he had in the army but he was known as a commander of one of the group when trouble arose in the Yangtze River.
- Q. That is in China?
- A. Yes.



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Q. That would be about 1938, our calendar?

A. May be.

Q. And the bombing of the Panai and two English gun boats?

A. Yes. I remember being sent to the American and British Embassies to extend regrets and apologies.

Q. Did you not also tender payment or part payment of the boat?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. You stated he was an eccentric. Was he a communist or a radical of any sort?

A. I could not go as far as to say that but I might be able to say he was ultra nationalistic in his belief.

Q. Was he on duty in China at the time of the Locachio Bridge incident?

A. I doubt it. I don't think he was.

Q. Do you know NAKANO, Seigo?

A. Yes.

Q. He was a member of the Diet, is that true?

A. Yes. He came from Fukuoka Prefecture.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He was quite an able man because of his pen and his ability to write and ability to deliver speeches and he constantly ran counter to my idea in diplomatic relations.

Q. Did he favor war with the United States and Britain?

A. I could not tell whether he was or not but judging from speeches he made the conclusion cannot be otherwise. One incident, one noticeable incident of that was when NAKANO went over to my native prefecture Fukuoka and criticized the part I took in apologizing for the Panai incident.

Q. Did you know Prof. KATO, Genchi?

A. I heard of his name as being a professor in some university but I don't know him.



HIROTA, Koki, January 28th

Q. Did you know KIKUCHI, Toyasaburo?

A. I don't know him but I wonder whether he is the man who served as Vice-Minister of education. I know him by name only.

Q. I believe you stated you know TAKAHASHI, Kamekichi?

A. I know him by name only.

Q. Did he not head the Department of Economic Research?

A. My understanding is that he must have some private research organization for the economic situation in Japan.

Q. Do you recall whether this was in connection with the so-called Far Eastern Affairs in Manchuria incident?

A. That I could not tell you distinctly because I think I was out of the country.

Q. Do you know FUJII, Yoshihisa?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Do you know OGATA, Taketora?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I believe he is an honest man.

Q. Do you know GOTO, Fumio?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his reputation for honesty and truth?

A. I cannot help but think he held a good reputation. He held minister's position several times.

Q. Do you know OKABE, Nagakage?

A. Yes. He was on the staff of foreign ministry. He was a diplomat.

Q. Was he an honest man?

A. I have not heard any bad reputation about him.



HIROTA, Koki, January 28th

Q. Did you know YOSHIDA, Shigeru?

A. Yes. He must be the present foreign minister. I know him very well.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. My believe is there is nothing against him. I know him ever since we took examinations for the diplomatic service. I even felt I would sponsor him for Minister of Foreign Affairs of my cabinet. However the military opposed that recommendation. Thereupon I asked him to go to England as ambassador with the desire that through this appointment he could work for the better relationship between the two countries and as I mentioned before this identical YOSHIDA brought the message to me urging me to become the premier at one time.

Q. Do you know OSHIMA, Tatsujiro?

A. I don't remember him.

Q. Do you know MATSUMOTO, Gaku?

A. Yes I know him. He was the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture.

Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I have not heard anything bad about him.

Q. Did you appoint him as the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you know KOZAKA, Masayasu?

A. No.

Q. Did you know SAKAI, Tadamasa?

A. Yes, I knew him. I met him at the House of Peers occasionally.

Q. Was he a communist?

A. No he is not a communist.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He was vice-president of the House of Peers and I thought he was a good man.



HIROTA, Koki. January 28th

Q. Do you know HASHIMOTO, Seinousuka?

A. Yes. He was also a member of the House of Peers and I met him occasionally.

Q. What was his reputation?

A. I don't know because I have not had very close personal contacts with him.

Q. Did you know MACHIDA, Totsujiro?

A. I knew him by name only.

Q. Do you know his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. That I could not tell you.

Q. Do you know YUZAWA, Michio?

A. These last three were all members of the House of Peers and my acquaintance with them is in just about the same degree.

Q. Do you know TOMITA, Inosuke?

A. My recollection is not very clear but I think I knew him about ten years ago.

Q. What was TOMITA at that time?

A. I don't know.

Q. You do not remember his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. No.

Q. Did you know ABE, Tonizo?

A. I believe he is a good man.

Q. Is he an admiral?

A. No, he is non-military.

Q. Do you know Gen. ABE, Nobuyuki?

A. Yes, I knew him well because I had occasion to be with him when I had occasion to confer with the military leaders.



HIROTA, Koki, January 28th

- Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?
- A. He was considered to be rather reserved and was made a premier.
- Q. He was retired from the Army, was he not?
- A. Yes he was. I believe he retired after the February 26th incident.
- Q. Did you know KOZAKA, Masayasu?
- A. That name is unknown to me.
- Q. Did you know Maj. Gen. NAGATA, Tetsugan?
- A. I do not know him. Of course I heard his name but I do not know him. I think he was assassinated. He was superintendent of military education and a war minister.
- Q. When was he assassinated.
- A. Previous to the Feb. 26th incident. I don't remember when but perhaps a couple months before the incident took place.
- Q. Did you know FUJII, Masanobu?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you know Vice Admiral HASEGAWA, Kyoshi?
- A. Yes, I knew him when he served as vice-minister of the navy.
- Q. What is his first name?
- A. Kiyoshi. He later became the governor of Formosa.
- Q. What was his reputation for truth and honesty?
- A. Judging from his appointment as governor of Formosa, he must have been a good man.
- Q. He resented, did he not, the Washington Naval Arms Limitations Conference?
- A. I could not say anything about this but I knew he was the naval attache at Washington Embassy.
- Q. While you were at the Embassy?
- A. Yes.



HIROTA, Koki. January 28th

A. (continued) At the time I was in Washington the naval attaches were HASEGAWA and one other man who died after becoming Admiral. I cannot think of his name just now but perhaps later on I will think of it.

Q. Do you know DOIHARA, Kenji?

A. I know his name.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I never had any personal contact with him. I really don't know.

Q. Do you know him as the Lawrence of Manchuria?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Did not this man set up a Special Service Organization for Japan?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Was he probably a member of the inner circle?

A. No doubt he must have been one of the members in the circle - however what I heard about him was that he was rather gentle in disposition.

Q. Do you see him often here in the prison?

A. When I was taken to the dining room this noon for the first time I met him. I do not know his face very well but I suppose he is the one I met this noon.

Q. Did he ask you if you were being interrogated?

A. The only time I met him was when I went for my food - I think I actually met him.

Q. Remember your oath to your ancestors. Did he ask you whether you were being interrogated?

A. My recollection is that there might be someone who did ask me if I were being interrogated here but I could not tell you whether it was DOIHARA that asked me that question.

Q. Did anyone this noon as you went for your food advise you as to what answers to give during this interrogation?

A. No.



HIROTA, Koki, January 28th

Q. Did you talk with Gen. DOIHARA at all when you went for food?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Do you know USHIO, Shigeneostela?

A. I know one by the name of USHIO, Keinosuke. I know one by that name. He was minister of Home Affairs in my cabinet. He at present is serving as premier council.

Q. What is his reputation?

A. A very good man.

Q. Do you know BABA, Eiichi?

A. Yes, I talked to you about him this morning.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He was made finance minister for my cabinet because I did not think he was a bad man. But he maintained views on economic matters which are quite different from those of TAHAHASHI as I said before.

Q. Did you know TERAUCHI, Hisaichi?

A. Yes, he was minister of war in my cabinet.

Q. What is his rank?

A. General.

Q. What is his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. He came recommended to us as one who had no affiliation with any of the military factions. This gentleman never was assigned to the war office or to staff headquarters in Tokyo. He always served in outside areas and was known to enjoy a reputation of neutral in inner army affairs. He was considered to be the man to become war minister to settle the February 26th incident and also to reform the war ministry affairs.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.



HIROTA, Koki, 28 January 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, J. K. SANO, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of twenty-nine (29) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

---

J. K. SANO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of January, 1946.

---

Calhoun W.J. Phelps  
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, DINAH BRAUN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief."

---

DINAH BRAUN

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, Calhoun W.J. Phelps, Captain, ASN \_\_\_\_\_, certify that on the 31st day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me HIROTA, Koki, and according to J.K.SANO, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo,  
January 31, 1946.

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Calhoun W.J. Phelps, Captain



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Opening Statement by Mr. Kamaoka.

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\* Exhibit 3232, an excerpt from the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun of 15 October 1932 described a newspaper interview with HIROTA, the then Ambassador to Moscow when he arrived in Tokyo from his post. HIROTA stated in the interview that Japan's despatch of troops to Manchuria after the outbreak of the Incident there temporarily shocked Russia, who concentrated military strength on the Soviet Manchurian Boundary. At that time Russia had serious financial and other difficulties. There seemed to be a rumor in Japan that Russia was at the bottom of the recent Manchuli Incident. This was an instance which a great nation should be ashamed of. It was the Soviet policy to make previous arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This was reflected in her apparent intention to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan and Manchukuo.

When former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA called at Moscow, Karakhan and Litvinov advanced a proposal for concluding a similar pact, and later declared the same intention.

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HIROTA stated that he believed Ambassador Troyanovsky had undertaken negotiations in Tokyo on this problem. \* There were apprehensions in some quarters that even if Russia concluded such a pact, she would still attempt aggression in ideological warfare, but there was no need of such apprehensions. Italy had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia but no trouble had arisen although in Italy Red propaganda was strictly prohibited. In Germany the existence of Communists was officially admitted, yet that did not end disputes with Russia. In HIROTA's opinion, Japan might conclude the same pact. It was meaningless for Russia to conclude a non-aggression pact with Manchukuo. The other party to the pact ought to be Japan. The Soviet had given de facto recognition to Manchukuo and not only desired a Manchukuan Consul in Manchukuo but also suggested that the Japanese Ambassador hold Manchukuan consulship concurrently. Russia would formally recognize Manchukuo if it benefitted her and negotiations for formal recognition would be pushed forward after consular exchange. \* Delimitation of the Soviet-Manchurian boundary had not yet become a subject of discussion.

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(Translation)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

S W O R N    D E P O S I T I O N

Deponent: YONAI, Mitsumasa  
Domicile: 1545 Fujimidai, Meguroku, Tokyo.

Having duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I was in the office of the Premier from January 16, 1940, to July 22 of the same year. Mr. HIROTA, Koki, was State-Councillor in my Cabinet while it lasted. One day during that period, we had a talk exclusively between ourselves, when I was informed of his opinions about the fundamental principles of Japan's foreign policy. At that time, an alliance with Germany and Italy was being advocated by some of the Japanese.

Mr. HIROTA stated, on that occasion, to the effect that the safer course for Japan's foreign policy was to keep contact with Britain and the United States, and that the Cabinet should make the conciliatory attitude clear as soon as possible. He pointed out the danger that Japan might be involved in the war if she concluded an alliance with Germany and Italy and professed that he was absolutely against the conclusion of the proposed Tri-Partite Pact.

The State-Councillors, however, had no competency to participate in the decision of the Government and, accordingly, were not responsible for it. I listened to the above opinions of Mr. HIROTA as an instructive information.



On this 11th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) YONAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)

Sworn and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) YONAI, Mitsumasa (Seal)



(Translation)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

APAKI, Sadao, et al.

A F F I D A V I T

Deponent: ARITA, Hachiro.  
Date of birth: September 21, 1884.  
Domicile: 991 Yoyogi Nishihara, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) Being appointed as diplomat eleve on December 28, 1909, I held post in the Japanese Foreign Office. I was appointed Foreign Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet on April 2, 1936, and resigned on February 2, 1937. After that, I assumed the office of Foreign Minister successively in the KONOYE and the HIRANUMA Cabinets during the period from October, 1938, to August, 1939, and in the YONAI Cabinet from January, 1940, to July of the same year.

(2) Early in August, 1937, at my summer villa on Lake Yamanaka, Yamanashi Prefecture, I received a telegram from Foreign Minister HIROTA to the effect that he wished to see me promptly. I went up to Tokyo immediately, and called at the official residence of the Foreign Minister.

Mr. HIROTA spoke about his hard application in working out remedial measures for the collision between the Japanese and Chinese forces at Marco Polo Bridge, and then revealed his opinion as follows:

"It is necessary to attain an amicable settlement of the present case as quickly as possible, but, unfortunately, our efforts thus far have not obtained the expected results yet. Moreover, it is hardly possible now to seize proper chances for an amicable settlement of the case, since the direct liaison with the leaders of the Nationalist Government under CHIANG, Kai-shek, has been lost owing to their withdrawal to Nanking. Nevertheless, it is our earnest desire that negotiations be opened in some way or other in order to bring the matter to a prompt settlement. Hereupon, I cannot but hope that such a person as you, who have a career of ex-Foreign Minister, would go to Shanghai and stay there for the present. Shanghai is an international city, where gather the leaders of the various parties in China, including the Kwomintang of CHIANG, Kai-shek, and it is believed that they also desire for a peaceful settlement of the matter. In view of these facts, I expect that they may possibly approach you with a view to peaceful settlement, and open the way for negotiations. This I expect from the bottom of my heart."



Speaking in this way, he requested me to follow his thought and visit Shanghai without any specific mission, to stay there for the present. I sympathized with him in that awkward predicament, and actually recognized more or less significance in his proposal. Nevertheless, I wondered if my visit to Shanghai would be opportune, in consideration of the situation in and out of the country. I considered it would be regrettable if my visit there might produce a result against our objective, and told him my thought, asking him to wait until the following day for my answer of acceptance or refusal. I requested, further, that he also should reconsider if the time was opportune or not.

(3) When I met Mr. HIROTA on the following day; he had not given up the hope and zeal of the preceding day, and earnestly persuaded me to go to Shanghai. I was moved by his zeal. As to the point of time, I had more or less misgivings about it still. I thought, however, it was not proper that I, out of office, should hold fast to my own opinion. Since Mr. HIROTA, who was actually in the office of Foreign Minister, maintained it so persistently, I should have obeyed his observation and judgment. And, thus, I accepted his offer.

(4) I immediately set about selecting proper persons to take with me and arranging for my travel to Shanghai. At the same time, I considered it necessary to ascertain the intention of the Ministers of War and the Navy in connection with the peace terms which was said to have been decided among the superior heads of the Government, and, one day, met the Minister of the Navy who was an old acquaintance of mine. Though I do not remember the particulars about the peace terms exactly, the Minister of the Navy affirmed all of them. Especially, I remember it clearly that he positively affirmed the term of "no reparation", and expressed to me his firm resolution to carry it through.

(5) Everything in arrangement was ready, and I was about to start for Shanghai, when, one day late in August, I was asked by Mr. HIROTA to postpone my departure for a while. I purposely avoided to inquire into his reasons, but I felt it unpleasant to stay in Tokyo in an indefinite status, since I had made up my mind to go to Shanghai and completed all necessary arrangements. I, thereupon, proposed to start on the arranged day for a tour of inspection through North Manchuria and North China, as I had had an earnest desire to know the recent situation in these areas. In case the circumstances in Tokyo were changed and the obstacle to my visit to Shanghai was removed, the Foreign Minister could order me by wire to go directly to Shanghai. Mr. HIROTA agreed to it.

(6) Thereupon, I left Tokyo on August 28 for North Manchuria, and then visited Peking and Tientsin to inspect the state of affairs there. The awaited notice from the Foreign Minister, however, was not received after all. I returned to Japan on board the Nekka Maru, leaving Dairen on September 21.



On this 21st day of August, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)



(Translation)

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

S W O R N    D E P O S I T I O N

Deponent: ARITA, Hachiro.

Date of birth: September 21, 1884.

Domicile: 911 Yoyogi Nishigahara-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) I was appointed as an eleve-consul on December 28, 1909, remaining in the service of the Foreign Office till I assumed the office of Foreign Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet on April 2, 1936, and resigning from the office on February 2, 1937. Later, I was Foreign Minister in the KONOYE and HIRANUMA Cabinets from October 1938 to August 1939, and Foreign Minister in the YONAI Cabinet from January 1940 to July of the same year.

(2) Mr. HIROTA was appointed State Councillor in the YONAI Cabinet. The system of the State Councillors had been established in the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet. The succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet retained the system, with the State Councillors remaining in their office, but, when the YONAI Cabinet was formed, three or four of them whose opinions were apparently not in an agreement with the policy of the new Cabinet tendered their resignation. Mr. MATSUOKA, Yosuke, was among those who resigned. His appointment as State Councillor was considered to be due to the estimation of his knowledge and experiences in diplomacy, and Premier YONAI asked for my advice in choosing the man to succeed Mr. MATSUOKA in his office. I recommended Mr. HIROTA, who was considered to be of opinions contrary to those of Mr. MATSUOKA, and he



was appointed State Councillor in March, 1940. I recommended him because I was well aware of the fact that he was a man of sound diplomatic opinions and that he was against the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(3) The YONAI Cabinet resigned en masse in July, 1940, and the Second KONOYE Cabinet was formed. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Tripartite Pact was concluded shortly after that.

I used to call on Mr. HIROTA to exchange views with reference to diplomatic problems. One day after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, I called on him as usual and had a talk on various subjects. On that occasion, Mr. HIROTA reiterated his opinion against the Tripartite Pact. He said he could not quite understand from what necessity the Pact in question had been concluded. The most important thing of the time should have been the termination of the China Affair. The said Pact would surely cause grave reaction on the part of the United States and Britain. China, of course, would not lose any chance to take advantage of this state of affairs, and the settlement of the China Affair would naturally become all the more difficult. He further pointed out that Japan had so far been able to keep its economy going through friendly intercourse with Britain and the United States, and that, in case Japan fell in strained relations with Britain and the United States, its future economic development could never be expected. He then turned to the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and pointed out the possibility of an undesirable change of the Soviet attitudes. He also expressed his deep anxiety about the disadvantageous effect which the conclusion of the Pact might have upon Japan's international standpoint.

On the same occasion Mr. HIROTA told me that when the Cabinet called a meeting of the senior statesmen who had once held the portfolio of Premier to make a report before them of the Tripartite Pact immediately after the signing of the said Pact, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, according to Mr. HIROTA, was the principal speaker and explained the Pact article by article,



together with circumstances in which the Pact was concluded, for about two hours. Mr. HIROTA told me that he put several questions to the above effect. Mr. MATSUOKA, however, only answered that it was a matter of opinions, and no convincing replies were obtained.

Of several meetings which I had with Mr. HIROTA, I remember one which took place on April 16, 1941, when he revealed his feelings that the course of the foreign policy of the Cabinet seemed very dangerous, and deplored the fact that he was really anxious about the future of Japan.

(4) As the Army gained in its political influence after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, military men came to talk frequently about the so-called "general intention" of the Army. At the same time, a word "suishinryoku" (driving power) was used far and wide, frequently appearing in newspapers and magazines. And this "driving power", invisible and intangible, meddled in Japan's external and internal affairs, making various demands. The Government of the time was too weak to make headway against it. Such was the feeling common to those of the intellectual class who were more or less concerned in the affairs of state. In the meantime, some of the military men even came to act against the Government policy. It was not quite easy, however, for the Government to take proper and effectual measures to suppress them.

In consideration of such circumstances, the opinion gradually gained in influence that it would be more desirable to choose the Premier from among the generals on the active list, or on the retired list, who could exercise strong control over the Army. It was so hoped because they expected that the military might become the more prudent in their behaviours and the control over the reckless actions of some military officers might get the more effectual as a result of that. Mr. HIROTA also set forth the similar opinion in our frequent meetings.



On this 9th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)



Hirota

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Paper # 1290

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

MOTION OF HIROTA, KOKI, FOR AN ORDER TO PROFOUND  
CERTAIN INTERROGATORIES TO THE HONORABLE SIR ROBERT  
CRAIGIE, FORMER AMBASSADOR OF GREAT BRITAIN TO JAPAN,  
BY CABLE

Now comes the defendant Hirota, Koki, by his attorneys named below, and moves this Honorable Tribunal for an Order allowing certain interrogatories attached hereto to be propounded to the Honorable Sir Robert Craigie, former Ambassador of Great Britain to Japan between the years 1937-1942, by cable through the Office of the Prosecutors for the United Kingdom and to take the answers of said witness to said interrogatories by cable, transmitting a copy of said questions and answers to counsel for said defendant. In this connection counsel represent to this Honorable Tribunal the following:

In July 1947 counsel for the defendant sent to Sir Robert Craigie in London certain excerpts taken from his book entitled "Behind the Japanese Mask" and requested him to incorporate said excerpts or the substance thereof in an affidavit for use on behalf of said defendant. Several weeks ago counsel received a wire from Sir Robert Craigie stating that affidavits were not being put in but that he would be glad to answer any interrogatories submitted by mail or cable on behalf of Hirota, Hiranuma and Shigemitsu. Counsel are advised through additional information that the British Foreign Office has taken the line that affidavits will not be put in by personnel still engaged in the work of the Foreign Office and that the procedure adopted at the Nurnberg trial will be followed in this instance; that is to say, testimony will be put in only through interrogatories. As two months



have already elapsed in the effort to secure the testimony of Sir Robert Craigie and very little time is left within which to secure his testimony, counsel wish to adopt the suggestion of Sir Robert Craigie and submit the attached interrogatories by cable and to allow the answers to be also recorded by cable, all through the Office of the Prosecutors for the United Kingdom or such other means as the Tribunal may direct.

WHEREFORE the defendant prays that this Honorable Tribunal will enter an Order allowing the attached interrogatories to be propounded to Sir Robert Craigie by cable through such channels as the Tribunal may direct and to permit the answers to be recorded in the same manner with the provision that a copy thereof be transmitted to counsel immediately upon receipt thereof.

*Tadashi Hanai*

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Hanai, Tadashi  
Japanese Counsel

*George Yamaguchi*

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George Yamaguchi  
Pro hac vice  
American Counsel

NOTICE

TO: The Chief of Prosecution Counsel and the  
International Prosecution Staff:

Please take notice that the foregoing Motion will be put down for hearing at such time as the Secretary of the Tribunal shall designate. Service of a copy of the foregoing Motion and Notice of Hearing admitted this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1947.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Paper # 1290

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

INTERROGATORIES TO BE PROPOUNDED TO THE HONORABLE SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE BY CABLE. THE ANSWERS ARE TO BE RECORDED BY CABLE. THE ADDRESS OF SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE, (1) c/o UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LANSDOWNE HOUSE, BERKELEY SQUARE, LONDON W-1, ENGLAND, OR (2) FOSSINGWORTH MANOR, NEAR UCKFIELD, SUSSEX, ENGLAND.

Questions to be propounded on behalf of the Honorable Hirota, Koki:

QUESTION NO. 1: Please state your name, address and period of service as Ambassador of Great Britain to Japan.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 2: Please state in reasonable detail your official and private acquaintance with Hirota, Koki, during your service as Ambassador in Japan.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 3: While Mr. Hirota occupied the office of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister did he ever advise you with respect to the attitude of the Japanese Government toward relations with Great Britain and all other foreign countries?

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 4: During your service in Japan did you ever observe or obtain reliable information with respect to the exertions on the part of Mr. Hirota tending to arrest extreme views entertained in some quarters in Japan?

ANSWER:



QUESTION NO. 5: Please state whether complaints of the British and American Governments were given prompt attention by the Foreign Office during the tenure of Mr. Hirota in the Foreign Office.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 6: Please state briefly the position Mr. Hirota took upon the accidental shelling of the LADYBIRD and the wounding in China of Sir Hughe.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 7: Did you ever observe any activity on the part of Mr. Hirota or the Japanese Foreign Office tending to show that either Mr. Hirota or the Foreign Office was engaged in a common plan or conspiracy to bring about the Lu-Kow-Chiao Incident of July 7, 1937, or otherwise that Mr. Hirota was personally engaged in any common plan or conspiracy to dominate the world or East Asia or any race or people living in any part of the world?

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 8: Please state, if you know, the basic reasons which influenced Japan not to accept the Brussels invitation.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 9: Please state in reasonable detail the efforts of Mr. Hirota to work out peace with China immediately following the Lu-Kow-Chiao Incident of July 7, 1937; the part played therein by yourself and other diplomatic representatives in Japan and elsewhere.

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 10: Did Mr. Hirota have any connection with the negotiations for or conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

ANSWER:



QUESTION NO. 11: Do you have any information with respect to Mr. Hirota's position as a private citizen in regard to the Tri-Partite Pact?

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 12: Based upon your official and personal contacts with Mr. Hirota, are you in a position to state whether or not Mr. Hirota exerted his best efforts to avoid friction with Great Britain and the United States and whether or not he sought to maintain the peace?

ANSWER:

QUESTION NO. 13: Please state any additional facts which came to your attention which you feel would be useful to the Tribunal in determining the guilt or innocence of Mr. Hirota with respect to charges pending against him before the above-named Tribunal.

ANSWER:



Chronological Statement of Evidence introduced

during the Defence

on the Defendant Koki HIROTA.

A. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Ambassador to the USSR: Oct 15th 1930 - Novr. 19th, 1932.

Exh. 2671 (page 23,218): in which Witness KASAHARA admitted in Cross-examination that if circumstances demanded, it would be essential in the war to draw the countries adjacent to the Soviet into the war and Japan's C.I.C. should be located with attention to strategic view point. Witness did not believe that HIROTA as Ambassador shared his views. HIROTA may have said to Major General HARADA that the seizure of the Soviet Far East and Siberia rather than defence against Communism was the main task of war with the Soviet, but witness felt HIROTA must have had some motive other than this in mind in saying such a thing, since they were not his formal ideas. (March 1931).

Exh. 693 (page 23,244): Witness KASAHARA admitted in Cross-examination that he recorded the words that HIROTA transmitted to the Chief of the General Staff that it is necessary for Japan to have a strong policy against Russia being ready for war at any time. Its principal purpose is not defence against Communism but the conquest of Eastern Siberia. (1931).

Witness KASAHARA stated in re-direct examination (page 23,262) that with respect to the report on the conversation with HIROTA he did not make this to the General Staff.

B. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister: Sept. 14th, 1933 - April 2nd 1936.

Witness KONDO stated (p. 26,688) that he knew as early as September 1934, that OKADA and HIROTA had declared that the Washington Treaty was going to be abrogated even if the other nations agreed to Japan's proposal.

Witness KONDO denied (p. 26,703) the above statement saying he had made an error and that OKADA and HIROTA did not say any such thing.

Affidavit of ENOMOTO (p. 26,782 et seq) contains a description of the London Naval Conference attended by Japan in 1934 and 1935. Both Conferences ended in failure and witness gives reasons for disagreement between powers.

Exh. 2434 (p. 19,728): Speech by Foreign Minister HIROTA in the Diet, 21 January 1936 concerning Japan - Manchukuo co-operation.

C. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Prime Minister : March 9th 1936 - Feb. 2nd 1937.

Exh. 704 (p.23,008): Decision of the Premier, Foreign, War and Navy Ministers, 7 April, 1936, stated there will be an establishment of two committees for dealing with matters of border lines and frontiers between Manchukuo and the Soviet and Mongolia.

Exh. 484 (p. 22,480): Japanese-German Pact comprising the pact against the Communist International and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet. At the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council HIROTA is referred to as giving his views on the position of the Soviet Union. Novr. 20th 1936.



D. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister:  
June 4th 1937 - May 29th 1938.

Witness OKADA (p. 18,325) denied the validity of Exh. 841 with covering Memorandum from ARIYAMA to HIROTA. (June 23rd 1937).

Exh. 2497 (p.20,816): Address by HIROTA in the Diet on 17 July 1937.

Exh. 2496 (p.20,805): Talk by Foreign Office spokesman on 20 July 1937 concerning the Chinese answer to the Japanese note of 17 July.

Witness TANAKA stated (p. 20,698) that a Five Minister Conference was held on 20 July 1937, on the policy towards North China. HIROTA attended in his capacity as Foreign Minister.

Exh. 2495 (p.20,803): Comment of the Foreign Office, July 1937, with reference to the Chinese reply of 19 July.

Exh. 2497 (p. 20,816): Speech by HIROTA on 27 July 1937, in which he publicly urged the Soviet to co-operate for avoiding border disputes.

Exh. 2503 (p.20,873): Statement of HIROTA to the Press - 2 September 1937.

Exh. 2502 (p. 20,868): Address of HIROTA in the Diet on 5 September, 1937.

Exh. 2531 (p. 21,390): Reply by Japan to Grew regarding the bombing of Nanking 30 September, 1937, stating that as Nanking is the central base of military operations, it was unavoidable that military establishments in and around Nanking be bombed.

Witness KAWABE in Cross-Examination (p. 22,034) stated he did not know how many Cabinet Members discussed the terms whereby China should be compelled to recognise Manchukuo, at the Meeting on 1 October 1937, but he did know that the General Staff participated in the general study. HIROTA was present at this meeting.

Witness HIDAKA (p. 21,453): stated in Direct Examination that at the end of January 1938 he made an oral report to Foreign Minister HIROTA on the conditions in Nanking.

Exh. 2527 (p.21,367): Note from Foreign Minister HIROTA to Craigie dated 14 December 1937, expressing Japan's regret at the incidents of the 12th involving the bombardment of British Men-of-War and giving assurances of steps taken by Japan to investigate the matter and prevent a recurrence.

Witness KAWABE in Cross-Examination (p.22,054) said the Imperial Conference held on 11 January 1938, was not held because of divergence of views between Government and General Staff. He had never heard that the detailed terms decided by the Conference were withheld by HIROTA and never submitted to China.

Witness HIDAKA (p. 21,453) stated in Direct Examination that at the end of January 1938, he made an oral report to Foreign Minister HIROTA on the conditions in Nanking.

KAGESA stated (p. 24,042) that the Five-Minister Conference at which it was decided to send him to Shanghai, took place in March 1938. HIROTA was Foreign Minister at this time.



Revised

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PROSECUTION

ON THE DEFENDANT

Koki HIROTA

This defendant held the following offices between the following dates;

- Oct. 15th 1930 - Nov. 19th 1932 - Ambassador to U.S.S.R.
- Sept. 14th 1933 - April 2nd 1936 - Foreign Minister.
- March 9th 1936 - Feb. 2nd 1937 - Prime Minister.
- June 4th 1937 - May 29th 1938 - Foreign Minister.
- June 10th 1937 - Oct. 25th 1937 - President of Planning Board.

The evidence against him in chronological order is as follows:

- Exhibit 108 (page 706) Biography of HIROTA
- Exhibit 102 (page 685) List of officeholders in the Imperial Japanese Government.

A. Evidence relating to events during the period he was Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Oct. 15th 1930 - Nov. 19th 1932.

- Exhibit 1104 (page 10,068) Stimson's Affidavit deals with Japanese aggression in Manchuria and consequent breach of numerous treaties and promises.
- Exhibit 744 (page 7714) Litvinov's Diary extract. His offer of non-aggression pact to Yoshizawa and Hirota December 1931.
- Exhibit 692 (page 7447) Conversation between HIROTA and Harada in 1931 re Armament for possible war with Russia.
- ~~Exhibit 774 (page 7822) Affidavit of TADA Aritomo and Yoshizawa, Dec 1931 re USAP non-aggression negotiations. HIROTA attended meeting and expressed surprise in Russian affair.~~
- Exhibit 225 (page 2830) Cabinet decision made on 12 Aug 1932 when HIROTA was Foreign Minister concerning aviation rights in Manchuria. In view of development of Manchuria and with future idea of acquiring aviation rights in China proper, the operation of these rights is considered essential.
- Exhibit 745 (page 7719) Jap reply to Russian non-aggression suggestion "untimely". Delivered by Uchida.

B. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister Sept. 14th 1933 - April 2nd 1936.

- Exhibit 1105 (page 10,089) This is an affidavit of JOSEPH CLARK GREW Ambassador to Japan from June 1932 until Dec. 7, 1941. HIROTA was Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 1933 until April 1936 and is mentioned by name in this affidavit.
- Exhibit 1106 (page 10,111) This is testimony of CORDELL HULL before Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. HIROTA was Foreign Minister from September 1933 until April 1936 and is mentioned by name regarding the note to HULL on difficulties existing between Japan and the United States and his assurance during April 1934 that Japan had no intention of seeking special privileges in China.



- ~~Exhibit 716~~ (page 7720) ~~Excerpt from Japanese reply to AMAU statement~~
- ~~Exhibit 717~~ (page 7720) ~~Japanese reply to AMAU statement~~
- Exhibit 384 (page 4733) Order of Manchukuo Government for establishment of laboratories and factories for narcotics at Harbin, Mukden and Chengteh Oct. 25th 1933.
- Exhibit 234 (page 2933) 22 Dec. 1933: Cabinet decision concerning the preparations for enforcing a monarchy in Manchukuo.
- Exhibit 174 (page 1806) Note from HIROTA, Foreign Minister, 21 Feb. 1934, assuring Cordell Hull that Japan's problems with U.S. could all be solved amicably.
- Exhibit 437A (page 5015) Excerpt from Manchukuo Government Bulletin of March 1st 1934 gives full information re organic law of Manchukuo.
- Exhibit 236 (page 2939) 20 March 1934: Cabinet decision on 'Summary of Jap-Manchurian Economical Admin. Policy.
- Exhibit 703 (page 7516) March 1934: Plan for strengthening Army in North Manchuria for operations against USSR sanctioned by Emperor.
- Exhibit 378 (page 4699) April 1, 1934: Report from U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai gives information on Japanese loans to encourage poppy growing in Jehol.
- BALLANTINE, in his affidavit (page 10,720) stated that HIROTA sent a note to HULL stating his belief that no question existed between United States and Japan which could not be settled by amicable means. Nevertheless, on 17 April 1934, the Foreign Office issued the AMAU Statement in which Japan made clear its purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictates and to permit other countries to have relations with China, only if Japan so allowed.
- Exhibit 935 (page 9389) This is an unofficial statement from the Japanese Foreign Office dated April 17, 1934, known as the AMAU Statement at the time when HIROTA was Foreign Minister. In this statement Japan's reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations were given and Japan's mission and special responsibilities for preserving peace in East Asia were emphasised. Only China could share this responsibility with Japan and therefore the unification of China was greatly desired. In striving for this Japan would oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of any other country to resist Japan. Complications arising from technical or financial assistance to China after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents were set forth as well as Japan's opposition to these projects.
- BALLANTINE stated (page 11,056) that he had HIROTA's explanatory and pacific statements to Grew in mind when he made the part of his affidavit about the AMAU statement of April 17th 1934.
- Exhibit 936 (page 9393) This is a telegram from GREW to HULL (April 25th 1934) regarding the AMAU Statement and the interview that Grew had with HIROTA who wished to clarify the statement. HIROTA denied that Japan sought special privilege in China or wished to create difficulties in trade of other countries.
- Exhibit 937 (page 9395) This is a memorandum by HULL of May 19th 1934 when the Japanese Ambassador called on him and read a telegram from HIROTA, Foreign Minister. This was a re-statement of the statement made in London in April. The importance of solving matter in a friendly way was stressed by Mr. Hull.



The formula about Japan's special interest in the Far East was discussed and the Ambassador denied that this contained an ultimate motive of an Overlordship of the Orient. On being questioned as to the real reasons why Japan left the League of Nations, the Ambassador became evasive.

- Exhibit 965 (page 9481) Memorandum from Grew to HIROTA of 31 Aug. 1934 states that the apparent plan for monopolizing of oil in Manchuria leads to the conclusion that Japan is setting up a monopoly of oil there, which would be against the 'open door' principle. These plans are being formulated under Japanese guidance, therefore the U.S. is approaching Japan, bearing in mind Japan-Manchurian relations and treaties and assurances concerning 'open door' policy in Manchuria.
- Exhibit 373 (page 4670) Oct. 20, 1934: Asst. Sec. to U.S. Treasury Dept. sent letter to the Commissioner of Customs re its survey of the opium situation in China.
- Exhibit 748 (page 7739) Oct. 23rd 1934: Official statement of USSR Consulate General at Harbin to N. Manchurian special agent of Japanese Foreign Office. This referred to repeated requests regarding violations in Chinese Eastern Railway area resulting in arrest of Soviet nationals.
- Exhibit 405 (page 4820) Nov. 9, 1934: U.S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai, reported negotiation of huge transaction between Japan, Formosan Government and Amoy Combine for opium.
- Exhibit 939 (page 9406) This is a memorandum from the American Embassy in Japan to Foreign Minister HIROTA, Nov. 30, 1934, regarding the memo of Nov. 5th. This stated that control of the oil industry in Manchuria was not within the knowledge of Japan.
- BALLANTINE testified (page 10,721) that on 29 December 1934 while HIROTA was Foreign Minister, Japan gave notice of its withdrawal from the Washington Naval Treaty of 6 February 1922.
- Exhibit 749 (page 7742) On Dec. 15, 1934, the Vice-President of the Chinese Eastern Railway wrote to President Li-Shao-Gen protesting against illegal seizure of railway quarters and buildings by Japanese, which hampered normal functioning of railway.
- Exhibit 58 (page 9199) With regard to the decision of the Privy Council in 1934 to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty and the draft instructions to SAITO, it appeared that HIROTA desired to delay the formal notice until after the adjournment of the present London conversations to avoid the charge that Japan disrupted them.
- Exhibit 451 (page 5112) Official organization of Manchurian Affairs Board. Imperial Ordinance Dec. 26, 1934.
- Exhibit 942 (page 9416) Dec. 29th 1934: Official Japanese notification of termination of Washington Naval Treaty.
- Exhibit 213 (page 2708) Extract from Summary of Japanese War Crimes in China 31-37 refers to negotiations Chinese attempted with HIROTA in 1935 concerning Japanese violation of TANGU TRUCE by illegal flights over China.
- Exhibit 443A (page 5042) Excerpt from "Official Manchukuo Government Bulletin from January to March 1935" relating to the negotiations concluded by HIROTA in the Purchase Agreement by Manchukuo from the USSR of the North Manchurian Railway (China Eastern Railway from the Soviet Union).
- Exhibit 941 (page 9413) This shows oral statement by the American Ambassador GREW to Foreign Minister HIROTA on April 16, 1935, regarding the creation of an oil monopoly in Manchuria and the part played by Japan. This



would have a bad effect on public opinion in the U.S.

- Exhibit 850 (page 8417) HIROTA attended the Privy Council meeting of 3 July 1935 held to discuss the conclusion of Joint Economic Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo - Plan was unanimously agreed upon. (Note: The Court was erroneously informed by the Prosecution (page 8,418) that HIRANUMA was the only one of the accused present at this meeting.) Statements by HIROTA were read (pages 8427,8429).
- Exhibit 445 (page 5055) July 15, 1935: Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission Agreement was signed.
- Exhibit 851 (page 8433) Liebert testified that on July 17, 1935, an agreement regarding the Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo was reached.
- Exhibit 134 (page 1018) As Minister for Foreign Affairs, HIROTA signed the ordinance of the Youth School Military Drilling Course 9 Aug. 1935.
- Exhibit 136 (page 1019) August 13, 1935: Inspection regulations for military training at youth schools.
- Exhibit 938 (page 9403) Sept. 25, 1935: Statement by HULL re autonomy movement in North China and U.S.A. attitude thereto.
- Exhibit 197 (page 2283) Oct. 2, 1935: Two cables from WAKASUGI, Secretary General to Japanese Embassy Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA regarding rumours of establishment of independent state out of Province of North China, and progress of Japanese Forces Mongolian policy.
- Exhibit 1307 (page 11,768) Official announcement of the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 31 October 1935, stated that the Japanese-Netherlands Treaty of 1933 had been ratified and a Permanent Conciliation Commission composed of five members was set up under Article 12 of the Treaty. This Commission was to be a permanent organization, binding until 12 August 1940 and for a further remaining five years if not denounced six months prior to that date. Japan informed the Netherlands of the abrogation of the Treaty on 12 January 1940.
- Liebert testified (page 8436) that in November 1935 the Yen Bloc was established to include Manchukuo. Manchukuo currency was cut off its silver basis and established at par with the yen.
- Exhibit 192 (page 2702) "Preparatory Committee for Autonomy in the War Zone" organized on Nov. 24, 1935. This followed Japanese attempts to change the political structure of N. China and set up an autonomy.
- Exhibit 192 (page 2702) Nov. 25th, 1935. Japanese established Japanese dominated and controlled Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council in the demilitarized zone established by the Tangu Truce. The Council proclaimed independence of the National Government.
- Exhibit 211 (page 2704) Dec. 18, 1935: General Sung Cheh Yuan was appointed Chairman of Hopei-Chahar Political Council established for administration of North China.
- Exhibit 2226 (page 15,977) Statement issued by HIROTA on the withdrawal of the Japanese delegates from the London Naval Conference, 16 January 1936.
- Exhibit 215 (page 2719) HIROTA as Foreign Minister sent "Gist of plans for dealing with North China", 13 Jan. 1936, to Japanese Ambassador to China - Plans were drawn up in Foreign Ministry which dealt with self-government of N. China, cooperation with Japan, etc.



- Exhibit 945 (page 9421) Jan. 15, 1936: Japanese give notice of withdrawal from London Conference on naval armaments.  
(Note: HIROTA became Prime Minister on March 9th 1936 and thereafter ceased to be Foreign Minister on April 2nd 1936.)
- C. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Prime Minister, March 9, 1936 - February 2, 1937.
- Exhibit 753 (page 7755) Russian report on Japanese Provocative Actions in the area of Lake Khasan 21 March 1936.
- Exhibit 704 (page 7523) Decision of the Premier, Foreign, War and Navy Ministers, 7 April 1936, stated that North China must be made a special anti-Communist and pro-Japanese zone and that eventually all China must be made pro-Japanese and anti-Soviet.
- Exhibit 406 (page 4824) April 20, 1936: U.S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai, issued report on cheap sale of Persian opium in Foochow, Fukien Autonomy Council is about to materialize, supported by Japanese consulates in Amoy and Swatow. This Council's financial resources will be obtained from smuggling and drug traffic.
- Exhibit 212B (page 2705) Cable from Japanese Ambassador to China concerning plan to found Mongolian State 7 May 1936.
- Exhibit 391 (page 4780) May 9, 1936: U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai reports that following Manchurian Incident heroin manufacture was taken over by the Japanese. Peasants were forced to grow poppies and opium and heroin production increased three or four times.
- Exhibit 93 (page 506) Imperial Ordinance No. 63 of May 18, 1936, restored the old rule that War and Navy Ministers and Vice-Ministers must be generals and admirals in active service.
- Liebert testified (page 8358) that on May 29, 1936, the Automobile Industry Control Law was enacted. Its object was firmly to establish the industry in order to adjust the national defence.
- Exhibit 392 (page 4784) June 8, 1936, U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported the establishment of the narcotization policy of the six Hsiens of North Chahar, the setting up of distribution points in shops and stores and the transporting of the drugs from North Chahar to Kalgran and West Charhar.
- Exhibit 237 (page 2944) June 10, 1936: Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo giving Japanese in Manchuria equal rights with Manchurians.
- Exhibit 948 (page 9427) June 12, 1936: Memorandum by Hull stating U.S.A. had impression Japan was seeking economic domination, first of East Asia, then of other places.
- Exhibit 977 (page 9542) Basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministries June 30, 1936, includes "a consistent policy of overseas expansion". Considered same day by conference of Premier, Army, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers (Exhibit 978). At end Premier said he had no objection.
- Exhibit 978 (page 9548) Conference of 30 June 1936, attended by Premier HIROTA entitled "Matters Pertaining to the Outline of State Policy". Policy consists of a steady footing of Japan on Eastern Continent and development of South Seas by diplomatic measures and national defense. (See Exhibit 977).



- Exhibit 410 (page 4830) July 10, 1936: Report by U.S. Treasury Attache in Shanghai re illegal activities by Formosans in Amoy, Formosan Trade Union had been established under the Japanese Consulate to safeguard smugglers and with a business department devoted solely to the buying and selling of opium.
- Exhibit 979 (page 9549) Fundamental of our national policy signed by Prime Minister HIROTA and others, of 11 August 1936. This policy relates to the eradication of USSR menace, preparations against U.S. and Great Britain, and expansion in South Seas.
- Exhibit 217 (page 2728) Excerpt from Foreign Ministry file Important Decisions re International and National Policies. The second administrative policy towards North China - determined by the Ministries concerned, 11 Aug. 1936.
- Exhibit 216 (page 2720) HIROTA as Prime Minister was responsible for, and made, the decision on 'Basic Principle of National Policy, 7 Aug. 1936'. Principles were:- security of Japanese Empire by diplomacy and military preparations, eradication of Soviet menace and preparations against Britain and U.S.
- Exhibit 751 (page 7750) Excerpt from Russian report on provocative actions of the Japanese in the Lake Hanka area October and November 1936.
- Exhibit 484 (page 5957) Japanese-German Pact comprising the pact against Communist International and secret attached pact against the Soviet. At the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council HIROTA is referred to as giving his views on the position of the Soviet Union, Nov. 20, 1936.
- Exhibit 479 (page 5931) Investigation Report on conclusion of Japan-German Anti-Comintern Pact, 20 November 1936, states that the government had planned coordination with Germany since Spring of 1936.
- Exhibit 36 (page 5934) The Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded 25 November 1936 when HIROTA was Prime Minister.  
Biography: HIROTA was decorated for his services in Anti-Comintern Pact, 2 November 1938.
- Exhibit 485 (page 5967) Report of Privy Council attended by HIROTA as Prime Minister on 25 November 1936, discussing relations with USSR in view of Anti-Comintern Pact and proposed USSR-Japanese Fishery Treaty.
- Exhibit 480 (page 5936) Secret annexe to Anti-Comintern Pact 25 Nov. 1936.
- Exhibit 2208A, B, & C. (pages <sup>15794; 15796</sup> 15,790) Three excerpts from "Details Regarding Movements of Rightists Bodies in connection with Change of Government" (relevant against HIROTA) 20 Jan. 1937.
- Exhibit 909A (page 9158A) Privy Council re special appointment of Admin. officials of the South Seas Govt. 20 Jan. 1937.

NOTE: HIROTA ceased to be Prime Minister Feb. 2, 1937.

D. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister, June 4, 1937 - May 29, 1938.

- Exhibit 672 (page 7336) Telegram from Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army to Vice War Minister (Umezu) and Vice-Chief of General Staff, 9 June 1937. "From



the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking Regime to get rid of the menace at our back. . . . As for Japan's policy towards China as stated in the telegram from Shanghai and Nanking, we of the Kwantung Army are entirely of the same opinion."

- Exhibit 58 (page 9230) On June 18, 1937, Ambassador Grew telegraphed to Mr. HULL regarding an aide-memoire from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this it states that Japan has no intention of embarking upon the building of a naval force which would menace other countries so long as third powers adhere to the principle of maintaining the minimum force required for strictly defensive needs. Japan would not subscribe to qualitative limitation in gun caliber for capital ships unless there was a simultaneous restriction in quality.
- Exhibit 946 (page 9422) Excerpt of telegram from Ambassador Grew to the U.S. Secretary of State, 18 June 1937. States that Japanese Government will not agree to merely qualitative naval armament limitation, but insist on quantitative limitation.
- Exhibit 841 (page 8261) Outline of the Five Year Plan for the Production of War Materials, 23 June 1937.
- Witness BALLANTINE (page 10,733) stated that in July 1937 Japan, taking advantage of a minor incident in China, invaded that country on a large scale, spreading the incident and taking over large areas. 3316; 3427 & 3430;)
- Exhibit 198, 248, 254 (pages 2318; July 7, 1937: The Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
- Ching testified (page 2416) that on July 10, 1937, a preliminary agreement was reached to cease hostilities.
- Ching testified (page 2455) that on July 11, 1937, the Konoye Cabinet passed a resolution to send more troops to Marco Polo Bridge area and push forward. Fighting was thus resumed.
- Ching testified (page 2331) that on July 14, 1937, war broke out on an intensified scale and the Japanese shelled Wan-Ping.
- Exhibit 2227 (page 15,980) Draft by the Army of a 5 year Plan, submitted to HIROTA on 13 July 1937 (similar to Exhibit 842). 1937.
- Note: Ex. 842 (page 8264) Essentials of 5 Yr. Program of Essential Industries, 29 May/ Ching testified (page 2332) that on July 26, 1937, the Japanese sent an ultimatum to the Chinese requesting withdrawal from Peiping Area in 24 hours.
- Exhibit 486A (page 5975) July 28th, 1937: Telegram from German Foreign Ministry to German Embassy in Tokyo complained that Japan's aggression in China is contrary to Anti-Comintern Pact and is forcing China into the arms of Russia.
- Exhibit 438 (page 5018) August 3, 1937: Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo for the creation of the Manchurian Development Company signed.
- Exhibit 950 (page 9435) Memorandum of GREW on Aug. 10, 1937, stating that he had offered his help to Minister HIROTA in the present situation. He had been authorized to say this as a definite offer of good offices. The possibilities of arranging a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations was put forward.
- Liebert testified (page 8513) that on Aug. 10, 1937, the Gold Reserve Revaluation Law was passed.



Liebert testified (page 8322) that on August 12, 1937, the Iron Manufacturing Industry Law was passed.

- Exhibit 951 (page 9437) Aug. 13, 1937: Japanese Embassy in Washington stated its agreement with principle contained in Cordell Hull's statement of July 16, and called for full recognition and practical consideration of circumstances in the Far East.
- Exhibit 58 (page 3305) Official U.S. book "Foreign Relations of the U.S.-Japan 1931-1941" quotes on page 387 First Report adopted by League of Nations Assembly, Oct. 6th, 1937. Aug. 13, 1937: Attack was opened on Shanghai.
- Exhibits 270, 2235 (pages 3610; 16,069, 16078 & 16,082) Gist of talk by SATO, Kenryo, giving details of HIROTA's negotiations in August 1937 - Dec. 1937 for settlement of China Incident, including demands made on Chinese in draft treaty.
- Exhibit 988 (page 9568) American Govt. protest re bombing of non-military objectives Sept. 1, 1937.
- Exhibit 58 (page 3303) Official U.S. book "Foreign Relations of the U.S. - Japan 1931-1941" quotes on page 387 First Report adopted by League of Nations Assembly, Oct. 6, 1937, giving details of Foreign Minister HIROTA's speech to the Diet on 5 Sept. 1937, trying to justify Japan's attack on Shanghai on 9 Aug. 1937 and placing blame on Chinese.
- Exhibit 58 (page 3310) Same book as above gives "Conclusions" on page 393 of book.
- Exhibit 955 (page 9456) Message, Grew to HIROTA, 17 Sept. 1937, concerning Japanese attacks upon American nationals. He quotes in particular the bombing of an American Missionary Hospital at Waichow, Kwantung Province.
- Liebert testified (page 8324) that the Iron Manufacturing Industries Law Enforcement Ordinance of Sept. 20, 1937, provided for special rates of subsidies for certain iron products.
- Exhibit 265 (Page 3539) Letter from HIROTA to British Ambassador, Tokyo, 21 Sept. 1937, concerning the wounding of British Ambassador to China.
- Exhibit 956 (page 9458) Message from GREW to HIROTA, 22 Sept. 1937, complaining of request for withdrawal of American Nationals from Nanking. States that in view of repeated Japanese assurances that non-military and non-combatants will not be bombed America cannot believe that this suggestion arises from possibility that Nanking area will be bombed.
- Exhibit 957 (page 9460 Sept. 25, 1937: American objection to the killing of two thousand non-combatants in the recent bombings of Canton.
- Exhibit 958 (page 9461) Resolution adopted by the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Sept. 27, 1937, condemning the bombing of civilians by the Japanese.
- Exhibit 962 (page 9474) First report adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on Oct. 6, 1937, condemning Japan's actions as being in breach of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928.
- Exhibit 954A (page 9444) Announcement by the Foreign Ministry, Oct. 20, 1937, stating that on Oct. 21, 1937, Belgian Ambassador called on Foreign Minister HIROTA and handed him a Note Verbale. In accordance with a request from Great Britain, approved by U.S., Belgium proposed Signatory states of Nine Power Treaty convene at Brussels Oct. 30 and examine means of ending conflict.
- Exhibit 239 (page 2960) Cabinet decision outlining the establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo (22 Oct. 1937).
- Exhibit 954B (page 9446) Reply of Japanese Government dated October 27, 1937, to Note Verbale of Belgian Ambassador. This set forth the reason why Japan declined to attend the meeting, stating why in her opinion the action in China lay outside the Nine Power Treaty.



- Exhibit 384 (page 4732) Oct. 27, 1937. Report by U.S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai re Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration.
- Exhibit 492 (page 6033) HIROTA attended Privy Council meeting on conclusion of Protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany - Protocol was approved by Privy Council.
- Exhibit 944 (page 9418) Message from GREW to Foreign Minister HIROTA, Dec. 1, 1937, in which he referred to reports that on Nov. 1, 1937, a treaty was signed by Japan, ending Japan's extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, and that, on account of this a manifesto was issued regarding rights of foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. The question of treaties with China regarding rights of U.S. nationals in Manchuria was raised.
- Exhibit 260 (page 3486) Official report of Personnel Affairs Section on China Affair, 1 Dec. 1937, published by Foreign Ministry. Document again places responsibility for outbreak on Chinese and sets out emergency measures (such as closing of Consulates) to be performed.
- Wilson testified (page 2533) that on Dec. 12, 1937, all resistance having ceased, the Japanese attacked Nanking. He also gave evidence of atrocities there.
- Exhibit 263 (page 3517) Sinking of American refugee ship "PANAY" on the Yangtze River, Dec. 12th 1937.
- Exhibit 954-C (page 9451) Note delivered by Sir Robert Craigie to the Foreign Minister HIROTA on Dec. 16, 1937, in which he addressed the Minister on the question of attacks made by Japanese air and land forces on British warships and shipping, at Wuhu and near Nanking, Dec. 12th, 1937. Punishment was the only efficacious method to prevent such outrages but previous assurances stating that these incidents would not recur had not been put into effect on previous occasions. Therefore the steps taken by Japan to prevent repetition have failed and Britain asked Japan what steps she would take to see that occurrences of this nature would stop.
- Liebert testified (page 8472) that on Dec. 20th, 1937, the Manchukuo Imperial Ordinance No. 460 was promulgated. Its purpose was development and control of heavy industry in Manchuria.
- Exhibit 483 (page 5956) Statement on the Anti-Comintern Pact. Issued by Bureau of Information, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1937.
- Exhibit 329 (page 4592) German report on Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937.
- Exhibit 310 (page 4484) Statement re Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937.
- Exhibit 311 (page 4485) " " " " " " " "
- 312 (page 4488) " " " " " " " "
- 313 (page 4491) " " " " " " " "
- 315 (page 4495) " " " " " " " "
- 316 (page 4495) " " " " " " " "
- 317 (page 4498) " " " " " " " "
- 318 (page 4499) " " " " " " " "
- 319 (page 4500) " " " " " " " "
- 320 (page 4501) " " " " " " " "



- Exhibit 321 (page 4504) Statement re Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937.
- Exhibit 322 (page 4506) " " " " " " "
- Exhibit 204 (page 2527) Statement re Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937.
- 205 (page 2556) " " " " " " "
- 206 (page 2599) " " " " " " "
- 208 (page 2608) " " " " " " "
- 323 (page 4508) " " " " " " "
- Witness BATES (page 2661) when cross-examined gave evidence of reports and conversations between Grew and Japanese officials including HIROTA concerning opium distribution.
- Exhibit 2228 (page 15,982) Instruction by HIROTA as Foreign Minister in 1938 with respect to special treatment for Germany in North China. Germany and Italy are to be given special consideration from the political point of view and Germany's interests are to be fully respected and given preference over a third country.
- Admiral RICHARDSON stated (page 11,184) that after Japan was no longer bound by the Naval Treaty of 1922, GREW exchanged notes with HIROTA proposing a reciprocal exchange of information on Naval construction. These proposals were rejected by HIROTA.
- 1938.
- Exhibit 328 (page 4558.) Jan. 1938: Telegram to American Embassy shown to YOSHIZAWA re Nanking situation who stated matter had been laid before the Cabinet.
- Exhibit 486D (page 5994) Jan. 5, 1938: Telegram from Ambassador Dirksen to German Foreign Office showing other military aggression was threatened by Japan at this time.
- Exhibit 486F (page 5993) Telegram Dirksen to Berlin Jan. 10, 1938, "Upon the question whether request for clarification from Chinese Government would not be admissible, HIROTA answered that the military insists upon immediate and clear answer."
- Exhibit 486D (page 5990) Memo by Von Neurath Jan. 10, 1938. Togo stated to him that unless the Chinese accept the Japanese terms, Japan will fight to the end.
- Exhibit 486C (page 5987) Telegram from Dirksen to Berlin Jan. 14, 1938, "Hirota was very angry at the meaningless Chinese declaration . . . and remarked that the Chinese had all the necessary bases in order to say yes or no . . . It was China who was beaten . . . I reminded the Foreign Minister that . . . all further communications from him to me had been forwarded, at his wish, to the Chinese Government only in a very indefinite form."
- Exhibit 486D (Page 5989) Telegram from Hankow to Berlin, January 11, 1938, "The Japanese seem now to be altering for the second time their statements which were issued through us . . . Transmission of such altered statements is considered here as a dirty trick which the Japanese are playing on us and we are losing face with the Chinese through this."
- Exhibit 2260 (page 16,223) Kido Diary Excerpt, Jan. 14, 1938. Discussion between HIROTA and the German Ambassador re decision to have nothing to do with the Chinese Government.
- Exhibit 268 (page 3563) Statement of government concerning the China Incident, 16 January 1938.



- Exhibit 486G (page 5999) January 17, 1938. Cable from Dirksen to German Foreign Ministry criticising Japanese for breaking off negotiations with China and conversation between him and HIROTA on this subject.
- Exhibit 486B (page 5997) Telegram from Dirksen to German Foreign Minister stating that HIROTA handed him note of termination of Chinese-Japanese negotiations for transmittal to HANKOW. This stated that on basis of China's perfunctory answer Japan assumed that China did not intend to accept the proposals. HIROTA wished to publish Germany's mediation in affair. January 16, 1938.
- (page 5999) Telegram Dirksen to Reichminister of 17 January 1938, expressing regret at Japanese impatience in China.
- Exhibit 770 (page 7871) Telegram, dated Jan. 17, 1938, from Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to Vice-Minister of War discloses existence of secret air route between Japan and Germany.
- Exhibit 972G (Page 9521) Address made by Foreign Minister HIROTA to the Diet, 22 Jan. 1938, concerning the China situation, Japan's peaceful intentions and the lamentable position of the Nationalist Government.
- Exhibit 463 (pages 5311-5315) Programme for direction of Central China Administration was decided on Jan. 27, 1938.
- Exhibit 486-I (page 6016) Report of Jan. 28, 1938, shows Japan's determination to conduct a long China war. Remarks by Ambassador Togo re co-operation with Japan by Germany in the new China.
- Exhibit 968 (page 9493) Communication from GREW to HIROTA, 31 Jan. 1938, concerning recent revision of customs rates on certain articles in trade in N. China by Peiping provisional government. U.S. considers the Chinese Government as the only one entitled to do this and points out the illegal assumption of authority of the Peiping Provisional Government. Since Japan is responsible for the creation of this regime, U.S. addresses her representations to Japan when the acts of this regime affect the interests of foreign governments. U.S. could not accept Japan's implied disclaimer of responsibility with regard to individual policy in Manchuria. The question of creating a monopoly and infringing treaty rights was set forth.
- Exhibit 58 (page 9232) On Feb. 3, 1938, Mr. HULL telegraphed to Ambassador Grew regarding reports that Japan was building or contemplating building ships exceeding the limits of the London Naval Treaty of 1936. Identical notes regarding this matter were delivered to HIROTA by the U.S., British and French Ambassadors. It was then pointed out that Japan had not subscribed to the Treaty. Japan was requested to give an assurance that she would not before Jan. 1, 1943, and without informing the U.S., build or acquire any vessel not conforming to the limits laid down by treaty. If Japan engaged in constructing outside treaty limits there should be discussion of some future limitation to be completed by May 1, 1944.
- Exhibit 969 (page 9496) Message from GREW to HIROTA, 4 Feb. 1938, concerning utter disregard by Japanese military for U.S. property in China.
- Exhibit 58 On Feb. 12, 1938 (page 9236) HIROTA acknowledged to Grew receipt of his communication of Feb. 5th. In this communication Japan reiterated her argument about the impossibility of obtaining equitable disarmament by a measure of qualitative limitations without quantitative limitation. Japan, therefore felt unable to give information regarding construction of vessels and felt unable to comply with the request of the U.S. on this matter.



- Exhibit 388 (page 4757) Peiping Government rescinded anti-opium laws and released offenders Feb. 24, 1938.
- Liebert testified (page 8274) that in March 1938, first step was taken to organise power industry on a completely totalitarian basis.
- Liebert testified (page 8380) that the Aircraft Manufacturing Law was promulgated in March 1938.
- Exhibit 382 (page 4861) Iranian opium purchases agreement and between the Mitsubishi Trading Company and Mitsui Bussan Kaisha concluded through Foreign Ministry March 14, 1938.
- Exhibit 971 (page 9503) Aide Memoire from GREW to Japanese Foreign Minister, 26 March 1938, concerning Japanese occupation of American properties in Shanghai and the looting and destruction which have taken place.
- Exhibit 463 (page 5296) March 28, 1938; Japanese-sponsored Restoration Government of the Republic of China formally established.
- Exhibit 266 (page 3543) Propagandist statement about the China Affair entitled "the Japanese Spirit" published by Ministry of Education in Tokyo Gazette March-April 1938.
- Liebert testified (page 8436) that in March 1938 the Yen bloc was enlarged to include all Japanese dominated territory.
- Exhibit 970 (page 9501) Aide Memoire from American Minister in Japan to HIROTA, 4 April 1938, stated that although Nanking has been occupied for three months, U.S. nationals are still prevented from returning to the City by Japanese military.
- Exhibit 2216 (page 15,832) It was stated in ARAKI's interrogation that troops could not be sent overseas without the consent of, inter alia, the Foreign Minister. This was confirmed by Minami on page 19,921.
- Liebert testified (page 8395) that the National General Mobilisation Law of May 1938 was the basic legislation for the complete mobilisation of all facilities for war economy not otherwise provided.
- Exhibit 84 (pages 513,684) National General Mobilisation Law of May 1938.
- Exhibit 997 (page 9607) Telegram from GREW to HULL of 18 May 1938 refers to HIROTA's statement that American apprehensions regarding Japanese designs on the Philippines and South Seas are regrettable and the result of rumors and that he would be pleased to dispel them by entering into conversations with the U.S.
- Exhibit 862A (page 8789) Excerpt from Japan Advertiser of May 19, 1938, explains that Japan needs national defence policy because she is surrounded by potential enemies.
- NOTE: HIROTA ceased to be Foreign Minister May 29, 1938.
- Exhibit 973 (page 9534) Statement of Ambassador GREW to KONOYE on 3 Oct. 1938 in which he refers to many conferences he has had with HIROTA concerning the protection of U.S. interests in China, during which definite assurances have been given but that the violation of U.S. rights and interests has persisted.
- Exhibit 532 (page 6240) Extract from KIDO Diary, July 5, 1940: HIROTA attended meeting to choose new Premier and advocated a military man.



- Exhibit 1117 (page 10,166) Extract from KIDO Diary, 17 July 1941, Conference of elder statesmen to consider successor to second Konoye Cabinet "HIROTA laid stress upon the re-inforcement of GHQ and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of GHQ in the Palace."
- Exhibit 1154 (page 10,291) In an extract from KIDO's Diary of October 17, 1941, it states that HIROTA was present at a conference of Senior Statesmen and when KIDO proposed TOJO as Premier and War Minister on military service, HIROTA approved.
- Exhibit 1196 (page 10,452) KIDO's Diary of November 29, 1941, states that a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held to consult on the present political situation and HIROTA was mentioned as having been present. HIROTA advocated a solution by diplomatic negotiations.
- Exhibit 1158-A (page 10,513) Interrogation of TOJO, March 11, 1946, citing the members present at the Conference of Senior Statesmen convened by the Emperor on Nov. 30 or December 1, 1941. TOJO explained that war was inevitable. The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers, the President of the Planning Board and the Premier met with the Senior Statesmen in the evening and explained the situation and afterwards TOJO and the former Premiers including HIROTA met with the Emperor, who heard each man's opinion.
- Exhibit 1277 (page 11,372) KIDO's Diary of 17 July 1944, refers to a Senior Statesman's Council to discuss the re-organization of the present Cabinet. HIROTA stated he would not join the cabinet if he were asked.
- Exhibit 1278 (page 11,377) KIDO's Diary of 18 July 1944 refers to a Senior Statesmen's meeting to discuss appointment of a new premier and cabinet. HIROTA attended this meeting.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

8 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. F. S. Tavenner, Jr.  
Acting Chief of Counsel

FROM: David Nelson Sutton

SUBJECT: Chronological Statements of Prosecution's Evidence

I hand you herewith a copy of the Chronological Statement  
of the Prosecution's Evidence as to each of the seven following  
defendants:

DOIHARA, Kenji  
HATA, Shanroku  
HIRANUMA  
HIROTA, Koki  
ITAGAKI, Seishiro  
MUTO, Akira  
TOGO, Shigenori

DAVID NELSON SUTTON



7/11/44

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PROSECUTION  
ON THE DEFENDANT  
Koki HIROTA

9/16  
own copy w/  
the English

This defendant held the following offices  
between the following dates:  
Oct. 15th 1930 - Nov. 19th 1932 - Ambassador to U.S.S.R.  
Sept. 14th 1933 - April 2nd 1936 - Foreign Minister  
March 9th 1936 - Feb. 2. 1937 - Prime Minister  
June 4th 1937 - May 29th 1938 - Foreign Minister

The evidence against him in chronological  
order is as follows:

Exhibit 108

(page 706) Biography of HIROTA

Exhibit 102

(page 685) List of officeholders in the Imperial  
Japanese Government.

A

A. Evidence relating to events during the period  
he was Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. Oct. 15th  
1930 - Nov. 19th 1932

Exhibit 693

(Page 7447) Witness Kasahara admitted in cross-  
examination that he recorded the words that HIROTA  
transmitted to the Chief of the General Staff that it  
is necessary for Japan to have a strong policy against  
Russia being ready for war at any time. Its principal  
purpose is not defense against communism but the  
conquest of eastern Siberia.

Exhibit 1104

(Page 1006) Stimson's Affidavit deals with Japanese  
aggression in Manchuria and consequent breach of  
numerous treaties and promises.



A and B

Exhibit 744 (Page 7714) Litvinov's Diary extract. His offer of non-aggression pact to Yoshizawa and Hirota December 1931.

Exhibit 692 (Page 7447) Conversation between HIROTA and Harada in 1931 re Armament for possible war with Russia.

Exhibit 774: (Page 7882) Record of Talk Litvinov and Yoshizawa, 31 Dec 1931 re USSR non-aggression negotiations. HIROTA attended meeting and expressed surprise at Russian offer.

Exhibit 225 (Page 2830) Cabinet decision made on 12 Aug 1932 when HIROTA was Foreign Minister concerning aviation rights in Manchuria. In view of development of Manchuria and with future idea of acquiring aviation rights in China proper, the operation of these rights is considered essential.

Exhibit 745 (Page 7719) Jap reply to Russian non-aggression suggestion "untimely". Delivered by Uchida.

B

B. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister Sept. 14th 1933, April 2nd 1936.

Exhibit 1105 (Page 10,089) This is an affidavit of JOSEPH CLARK GREW Ambassador to Japan from June 1932 until Dec. 7, 1941. HIROTA was Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 1933 until April 1936 and is mentioned by name in this affidavit.

Exhibit 1106 (Page 10,109) This is testimony of CORDELL HULL before Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. HIROTA was Foreign Minister from September 1933 until April 1936 and is



B

mentioned by name regarding the note to HULL on difficulties existing between Japan, United States and during April 1934 the Foreign Office gave out the "hand off China Policy".

- Exhibit 746 (Page 7720) Russian reply to Japanese rejection of suggestion of non-aggression pact January 4, 1933.
- Exhibit 747 (Page 7727) Japanese reply to Exhibit 746.
- Exhibit 384 (Page 4733) Order of Manchukuo Government for establishment of laboratories and factories for narcotics at Harbin, Mukden and Chengteh Oct 25th 1933.
- Exhibit 234 (Page 2933) HIROTA was foreign Minister 22 Dec 1933, when Cabinet decision was made concerning the preparations for enforcing a monarchy in Manchukuo.
- Exhibit 174 (Page 1802) Note from HIROTA, Foreign Minister, 21 Feb. 1934 assuring Cordell Hull that Japan's problems with U.S. could all be solved amicably.
- Exhibit 437A (Page 5015) Excerpt from Manchukuo Government Bulletin of March 1st 1934 gives full information re organic law of Manchukuo.
- Exhibit 236 (Page 2939) HIROTA was Foreign Minister on 20 March 1934 when Cabinet decision was made on 'Summary of Jap-Manchurian Economical Admin. Policy.
- Exhibit 703 (Page 7516) March 1934. Plan for strengthening Army in North Manchuria for operations against USSR sanctioned by Emperor.



B

Exhibit 378

(Page 4699) April 1, 1934. Report from U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai gives information on Japanese loans to encourage poppy growing in Jehol.

Exhibit

BALLANTINE, in his affidavit (Page 10721) stated that HIROTA sent a note to HULL stating his belief that no question existed between United States and Japan which could not be settled by amicable means. Nevertheless, on 17 April 1934, the Foreign Office issued the AMAU Statement in which Japan made clear its purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictates and to permit other countries to have relations with China, only if Japan allowed.

Exhibit 935

(Page 9389) This is an unofficial statement from the Japanese Foreign Office dated April 17, 1934, known as the AMAO Statement at the time when HIROTA was Foreign Minister. In this statement Japan's reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations were given and Japan's mission and special responsibilities of preserving peace in East Asia were emphasized. Only China could share this responsibility with Japan and therefore the unification of China was greatly desired. In striving for this Japan would oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of any other country to resist Japan. Complication arising from technical or financial assistance to China after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents were set forth as well as Japan's opposition to these projects.



B

Exhibit 936 (Page 9393) This is a telegram from GREW to HULL regarding the AMAO Statement and the interview that Grew had with HIROTA who wished to clarify the statement. HIROTA denied that Japan sought special privilege in China or wished to create difficulties in trade of other countries.

Exhibit 937 (Page 9395) This is a memorandum of HULL of May 19, 1934 when the Japanese Ambassador called on him and read a telegram from HIROTA, Foreign Minister. This was a re-statement of the statement made in London in April. The importance of solving matter in a friendly way was stressed by Mr. Hull.

The formula about Japan's special interest in the Far East were discussed and the Ambassador denied that this contained an ultimate motive of an Overlordship of the Orient. On being questioned as to the real reasons why Japan left the League of Nations, the Ambassador became evasive.

Exhibit 965 (Page 9481) Memorandum from Grew to HIROTA of 31 Aug 1934 states that the apparent plan for monopolizing of oil in Manchuria gives conclusion that Japan is setting up monopoly of oil there which would be against the 'open door' principle. These plans are being formulated under Japanese guidance, therefore the U. S. is approaching Japan, bearing in mind Japan-Manchurian relations and treaties and assurances concerning 'open door' policy in Manchuria.

Exhibit 373 (Page 4670) Oct 20, 1934. Asst Sec. to U. S. Treasury Dept. sent letter to the Commissioner of Customs re its survey of the opium situation in China.



B

Exhibit 748

(Page 7739) Oct. 23rd 1934. Official statement of USSR Consulate General at Harbin to N. Manchurian special agent of Japanese Foreign Office re repeated requests regarding violations in Chinese Eastern Railway area resulting in arrest of Soviet nationals.

Exhibit 405

(Page 4820) Nov. 9, 1934 U. S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai reported negotiation of huge transaction between Japan, Formosan Government and Amoy Combine for opium.

Exhibit 939

(Page 9406) This is a memorandum from the American Embassy in Japan to Foreign Minister HIROTA, Nov. 30, 1934, regarding the memo of Nov 5th concerning control of the oil industry in Manchuria not being within the knowledge of Japan. The following are additional references to the Defendant HIROTA.

Exhibit

(Page 10721) Ballantine testified on 29 December 1934 while HIROTA was Foreign Minister, Japan gave notice of its withdrawal from the Washington Naval Treaty of 6 February 1922.

Exhibit 749

(Page 7742) On Dec. 15, 1934, Vice-President of Chinese Eastern Railway wrote to President Li-Shao-Gen protesting against illegal seizure of railway quarters and buildings by Japanese, which hampered normal functioning of railway.

Exhibit 58

(Page 9199) With regard to the decision of the Privy Council in 1934 to abrogate the Washington Navy Treaty and draft instructions to SAITO, it appeared that HIROTA desired to delay the formal notice until after the adjournment of the present London conversations to avoid the charge that Japan disrupted them. HIROTA was Foreign Minister at that time.



B

- Exhibit 451 (Page 5112) Official organization of Manchurian Affairs Board. Imperial Ordinance Dec. 26, 1934.
- Exhibit 942 (Page 9416) Dec. 29th 1934, Official Japanese notification of termination of Washington Naval Treaty.
- Exhibit 231 (Page 2708) Extract from Summary of Japanese War Crimes in China 31-37 refers to negotiations Chinese attempted with HIROTA in 1935 concerning Japanese violation of TANGU TRUCE by illegal flights over China.
- Exhibit 443A (Page 5042) Exerrpt from "Manchukuo Government Bulletin of January to March 1945" relating to the negotiations concluded by HIROTA, then Foreign Minister in the Purchase Agreement by Manchukuo from the USSR of the North Manchurian Railway (China Eastern Railway from the Soviet Union).
- Exhibit 941 (Page 9413) This shows oral statement by the American Ambassador GREW to Foreign Minister HIROTA on April 16, 1935 regarding the creation of an oil monopoly in Manchuria and the part played by Japan. This would have a bad effect on public opinion in the U. S.
- Exhibit 850 (Page 8417) HIROTA attended this Privy Council meeting of 3 July 1935 held to discuss the conclusion of Joint Economic Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo - Plan was unanimously agreed upon.
- Exhibit 445 (Page 5055) July 15, 1935. Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission Agreement was signed.
- Exhibit (Page 8433) Liebert testified that on July 17, 1935 an agreement regarding the Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo was reached.



B

- Exhibit 134 (Page 1018) As Minister for Foreign Affairs, HIROTA signed the ordinance of the Youth School Military Drilling Course 9 Aug. 1935 (Page 2705).
- Exhibit 136 (Page 1019) August 13, 1935. Inspection regulations for military training at youth schools.
- Exhibit 938 (Page 9403) Sept. 25, 1935. Statement by HULL re autonomy movement in North China and U. S. A. attitude thereto. Liebert testified (Page 8436) that on Nov. 1st, 1935, the Yen bloc was established. Manchukuo currency was cut off its silver basis and established at par with the yen.
- Exhibit 197 (Page 2283) Two cables from WAKASUGI, Secretary General to Japanese Embassy Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA regarding rumours of establishment of independent state out of Province of North China, and progress of Japanese Forces Mongolian Policy.
- Exhibit 1307 (Page 11,768) Official announcement of the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 31 October 1935, stated that the Japanese-Netherlands Treaty of 1933 had been ratified and a Permanent Conciliation Commission composed of five members was set up under Article 12 of the Treaty. This Commission was to be a permanent organization, binding until 12 August 1940 and for a further remaining five years if not denounced six months prior to that date. Japan informed the Netherlands of the abrogation of the Treaty on 12 January 1940. At the time of the ratification of the treaty HIROTA was Foreign Minister.
- Exhibit Liebert testified (page 8436) that in March 1938 the Yen Bloc was enlarged to include all Japanese dominated territory.



B

- Exhibit 192 (Page 2702) "Preparatory Committee for Autonomy in the War Zone" organized on Nov. 24, 1935. This followed Japanese attempts to change the political structure of N. China and set up an autonomy.
- Exhibit 211 (Page 2702) Nov. 25th, 1935. Japanese established Japanese dominated and controlled Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council in the demilitarized zone established by the Tangu Truce. The Council proclaimed independence of the National Government.
- Exhibit 211 (Page 2704) Dec. 18, 1935, General Sung Cheh Yuan was appointed Chairman of Hopei-Chahar Political Council established for administration of North China.
- Exhibit (Page 11,056) Witness BALLANTINE stated that he had his meeting with HIROTA in 1936 in mind when he made his affidavit.
- Exhibit 2226 (Page 15,977) Statement issued by HIROTA on the withdrawal of the Japanese delegates from the London Naval Conference, 16 January 1936.
- Exhibit 215 (Page 2719) ~~HIROTA as Foreign Minister~~ sent "Gist of plans for dealing with North China," 13 Jan 1936 to Japanese Ambassador to China - Plans were drawn up in Foreign Ministry which dealt with self-government of N. China, cooperation with Japan, etc.
- Exhibit 945 (Page 9421) Jan 15, 1936. Japanese give notice of withdrawal from London Conference on naval armaments  
C. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Prime Minister March 9, 1936 - Feb. 2, 1937.



- Exhibit 753. Russian report on Japanese Provocative Actions in the area of Lake Khasan 21 March 1936.
- Exhibit 704 (Page 7523) Decision of the Premier, Foreign, War and Navy Ministers, 7 April 1936 stated there will be an establishment of two committees for dealing with matters of border lines and frontiers between Manchukuo and the Soviet and Mongolia. Ref. HIROTA was Premier.
- Exhibit 406 (Page 4824) April 20, 1936. U. S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai, issued report on cheap sale of Persian opium in Foochow, Fukien Autonomy Council is about to materialize, supported by Japanese consulates in Amoy and Swatow. This Council's financial resources will be obtained from smuggling and drug traffic.
- Exhibit 212B (Page 2705) HIROTA receipt of cable from Japanese Ambassador to China concerning plan to found Mongolian State 7 May 1936.
- Exhibit 391 (Page 4780) May 9, 1936, U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai reports that following Manchurian Incident heroin manufacture was taken over by a Japanese. Peasants were forced to grow poppies and opium and heroin production increased three or four times.
- Exhibit 93 (Page 684) Imperial Ordinance No. 63 of May 18, 1936 restored the old rule that War and Navy Ministers and Vice-Ministers must be generals and admirals in active service.
- Exhibit (Page 8358) Liebert testified that on May 29, 1936 the automobile Industry Control Law was enacted so as firmly to establish the industry in order to adjust the national defence.



- Exhibit 392 (Page 4784) June 8, 1936, U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported the establishment of the narcotization policy of the six Hsiens of North Chahar, the setting up of distribution points in shops and stores and the transporting of the drugs from North Chahar to Kalgran and West Charhar.
- Exhibit 237 (Page 2944) June 10, 1936, Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo giving Japanese in Manchuria equal rights with Manchurians.
- Exhibit 948 (Page 9427) June 12, 1936. Memorandum by Hull stating U. S. A. had impression Japan was seeking economic domination, first of East Asia, then of other places.
- Exhibit 977 (Page 9542) Basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministries June 30, 1936 includes "a consistent policy of overseas expansion". Considered same day by conference of Premier, Army, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers (Exhibit 978). At end Premier said he had no objection.
- Exhibit 978 (Page 9548) Conference of 30 June 1936, attended by HIROTA entitled "Matters Pertaining to the Outline of State Policy." Policy consists of a steady footing of Japan on Eastern Continent and development of South Seas by diplomatic measures and national defense (See Exh. 977).
- Exhibit 410 (Page 4830) July 10, 1936. Report by U. S. Treasury Attache in Shanghai re illegal activities by Formosans in Amoy, Formosan Trade Union had been established under the Japanese Consulate to safeguard smugglers and with a business department devoted solely to the buying and selling of opium.



- Exhibit 979 (Page 9549) Fundamental of our national policy signed by Prime Minister HIROTA and others, of 11 August 1936. This policy relates to the eradication of USSR menace, preparations against U. S. and Great Britain, and expansion in South Seas.
- Exhibit 217 (Page 2728) Excerpt from Foreign Ministry file Important Decisions re International and National Policies. The second administrative policy towards North China - determined by the Ministries concerned, 11 Aug 1936.
- Exhibit 216 (Page 2720) HIROTA as Prime Minister was responsible for, and made the, decision on 'Basic Principle of National Policy, 7 Aug. 1936' - Principles were, security of Japanese Empire by diplomacy and military preparations, eradication of Soviet menace and preparations against Britain and U. S.
- Exhibit 751 (Page 7750) Excerpt from Russian report on provocative actions of the Japanese in the Lake Hanka area October and November 1936.
- Exhibit 484 (Page 5957) Japanese-German Pact comprising the pact against Communist International and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet. At the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council HIROTA referred to as giving his views on the position of the Soviet Union. Nov. 20, 1936.
- Exhibit 479 (Page 5931) Investigation Report on conclusion of Japan-German Anti-Comintern Pact, 20 November 1936, states that the government had planned coordination with Germany since Spring of 1936--HIROTA was Premier at this time.



( and D

- Exhibit 921 (Page 513) The Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded 25 November 1936 when HIROTA was Prime Minister. Biography: HIROTA was decorated for his services in Anti-Comintern Pact, 2 November 1938.
- Exhibit 485 (Page 5967) Report of Privy Council attended by HIROTA as Prime Minister on 25 November 1936, discussing relations with USSR in view of Anti-Comintern Pact and proposed USSR-Japanese Fishery Treaty.
- Exhibit 480 (Page 5936) Secret annexe to Anti-Comintern Pact 25 Nov. 1936.
- Exhibit 2208A, B, & C. (Page 15,790) Three excerpts from "Details Regarding Movements of Rightists Bodies in connection with Change of Government" (relevant against HIROTA) 20 Jan 1937.
- Exhibit 909A (Page 9158) Privy Council re special appointment of Admin. officials of the South Seas Govt 20 Jan. 1937. HIROTA Prime Minister.
- Exhibit 218 (Page 3745) The Third Administrative Policy towards North China, Feb. 20, 1937. Note: HIROTA ceased to be Prime Minister Feb. 2, 1937.
- Exhibit 219 (Page 2748) Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File. "Important Decisions re International & National Policies Plans for Guiding North China. Decided by the Foreign, Finance, War & Naval Ministers 16 April 1937.
- D. Evidence relating to events whilst he was Foreign Minister. June 4, 1937 - May 29, 1938.
- Exhibit 672 (Page 7336) Telegram from Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army to Vice War Minister (Umezu) and Vice-Chief of General Staff 9 June 1937. "From the point of view



D

of military preparations against Soviet Russia, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking Regime to get rid of the menace at our back. . . . As for Japan's policy towards China as stated in the telegram from Shanghai and Nanking, we of the Kwantung Army are entirely of the same opinion."

Exhibit 58

(Page 9231) On June 18, 1937, Ambassador Grew telegraphed to Mr. HULL regarding an aide-memoire from the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was at that time HIROTA. In this it states that Japan has no intention of embarking upon the building of a naval force which would menace other countries so long as third powers adhere to the principle of maintaining the minimum force required for strictly defensive needs. Japan would not subscribe to qualitative limitation in gun caliber for capital ships unless there was a simultaneous restriction in quality.

Exhibit 946

(Page 9422) Excerpt of telegram from Ambassador Grew to the U. S. Secretary of State 18 June 1937. States that Japanese Government will not agree to merely qualitative naval armament limitation, but insist on quantitative limitation.

Exhibit 841

(Page 8261) Outline of the Five Year Plan for the Production of War Materials 23 June 1937.

Exhibit

(Page 10,733) Witness BALLANTINE stated that in July 1937, while HIROTA was Foreign Minister, Japan taking advantage of a minor incident in China, invaded that country on a large scale, spreading the incident and taking over large areas.



D

Exhibit 198, 248, 254 (Page 2318) July 7, 1937. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Exhibit (Page 2416) Ching testified that on July 10, 1937, a preliminary agreement was reached to cease hostilities.

Exhibit (Page 2455) Ching testified that on July 11, 1937 the Konoye Cabinet passed a resolution to send more troops to Marco Polo Bridge area and push forward. Fighting was thus resumed.

Exhibit (Page 2331) Ching testified that on July 14, 1937, war broke out on an intensified scale and the Japanese shelled Wan-Ping.

Exhibit 2227 (Page 15,980) Draft by the Army of a 5 year Plan, submitted to HIROTA on 13 July 1937 (similar to Exh. 842).

Exhibit (Page 2332) Ching testified that on July 26, 1937, the Japanese sent an ultimatum to the Chinese requesting withdrawal from Peiping Area in 24 hours.

Exhibit 486A (Page 5975) July 28th, 1937, Telegram from German Foreign Ministry to German Embassy in Tokyo complained that Japan's aggression in China is contrary to Anti-Comintern Pact and is forcing China into the arms of Russia.

Exhibit 438 (Page 5018) August 3, 1937. Agreement of creation of Manchurian Development Company signed.

Exhibit (Page 3303) Extract from Lytton Report giving details of Foreign Minister HIROTA speech to the Diet on 9 Aug 1937 trying to justify Japan's attack on Shanghai and placing blame on Chinese.



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- Exhibit 950 (Page 9435) Memorandum of GREW on Aug 10, 1937, stating that he had offered his help to the Minister HIROTA in the present situation. He had been authorized to say this as a definite offer of good offices. The possibilities of arranging a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations was put forward.
- Exhibit (Page 8513) Liebert testified that on Aug. 10, 1937, the Gold Reserve Revaluation Law was passed.
- Exhibit (Page 8322) Liebert testified that on August 12, 1937, the Iron Manufacturing Industry Law was passed.
- Exhibit 951 (Page 9437) Aug. 13, 1937. Japanese Embassy in Washington stated its agreement with principle contained in Cordell Hull's statement of July 16, and called for full recognition and practical consideration of circumstances in the Far East.
- Exhibit 57 (Page 3305) Aug. 13, 1937. Attack was opened on Shanghai.
- Exhibit 270 (Page 3605) Gist of talk by SATO, Kenryo giving details of HIROTA's negotiations in August 1937 - Dec 37 for settlement of China Inc. Demands made on Chinese in draft treaty.
- Exhibit 988 (Page 9568) American Govt. protest re bombing of non-military objectives Sept. 1, 1937.
- 1307A (Page 11,768) Foreign Ministry announcement of establishment of permanent conciliation commission between Japan and the Netherlands 31 Oct. 1935.
- 909A (Page 9,158) Notes of Privy Council regarding special appointment of administrative officials of South Seas Govt 20 Jan. 1937.



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- Exhibit 954A (Page 9444) Announcement by the Foreign Ministry, Oct 20, 1937, stating that on Oct 21, Belgian Ambassador called on Foreign Minister HIROTA and handed him a Note Verbale. In accordance with request of Great Britain and approved by U. S., Belgium proposed Signatory states of Nine Power Treaty convene at Brussels Oct 30 and examine means of ending conflict.
- Exhibit 239 (Page 2960) HIROTA was Foreign Minister and President of Planning Board at time of Cabinet decision outlining the establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo (22 Oct 1937).
- Exhibit 954B (Page 9446) Reply of Japanese Government date October 27, 1937 to Note Verbale of Belgian Ambassador. This set forth the reason why Japan declined to attend the meeting stating why in her opinion the action in China lay outside the Nine Power Treaty. HIROTA was Foreign Minister at that time.
- Exhibit 384 (Page 4732) Oct 27, 1937. Report by U. S. Treasury Attache, Shanghai re Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration.
- Exhibit 492 (Page 7981) HIROTA attended Privy Council meeting on conclusion of Protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany - Protocol was approved by Privy Council.
- Exhibit 944 (Page 9418) Message from GREW to Foreign Minister HIROTA, Dec. 1, 1937, in which he referred to reports that on Nov 1, a treaty was signed by Japan ending Japan's extraterritorial rights in Manchuria and that on account of this<sup>a</sup> manifesto was issued regarding rights of foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. The question of treaties with China regarding rights of U. S. nationals in Manchuria was raised.



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- Exhibit 55 (Page 9456) Message, Grew to HIROTA, 17 Sep 1937, concerning Japanese attacks upon American nationals, quotes in particular the bombing of an American Missionary Hospital at Waichow, Kwantung Province.
- Exhibit (Page 8324) Liebert testified that the Iron Manufacturing Industries Law Enforcement Ordinance of Sept 20, 1937, provided for special rates of subsidies for certain iron products.
- Exhibit 852 (Page 3538) Letter from HIROTA, Foreign Minister to British Ambassador Tokyo, 21 Sep. 1937, concerning the wounding of British Ambassador to China.
- Exhibit 956 (Page 9458) Message from GREW to HIROTA 22 Sep. 1937, complaining of request for withdrawal of American Nationals from Nanking and that in view of repeated Japanese assurances that non-military and non-combatants will not be bombed American cannot believe that this suggestion arises from possibility that Nanking area will be bombed.
- Exhibit 957 (Page 9460) Sept. 25, 1937. American objection to the killing of two thousand non-combatants in the recent bombings of Canton.
- Exhibit 958 (Page 9461) Resolution adopted by the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Sept. 27, 1937 condemning the bombing of civilians by the Japanese.
- Exhibit 962 (Page 9474) First report adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on Oct. 6, 1937, condemning Japan's actions as being in breach of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928.



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Exhibit 260 (Page 3486) Official report of Personnel Affairs Section on China Affair, 1 Dec 1937, published by Foreign Ministry. At this time HIROTA was Foreign Minister - Document again places responsibility for outbreak on Chinese and sets out emergency measures, such as closing of Consulates, to be performed.

Exhibit (Page 2533) Wilson testified that on Dec 12, 1937 all resistance having ceased, the Japanese attacked Nanking.

Exhibit 263 (Page 3517) HIROTA was Foreign Minister at time of sinking of American refugee ship "PANAY" on the Yangtze River.

Exhibit 954-C (Page 9451) Note delivered by Sir Robert Craigie to the Foreign Minister HIROTA on Dec 16, 1937, in which he addressed the Minister on the question of attacks made on Japanese air - land force on British warships and shipping, at Wuhu and near Nanking, Dec. 12th. Outrage punishment was the only efficacious method to prevent such outrages but previous assurances stating that these incidents would not recur had not been put into effect on previous occasions. Therefore the steps taken by Japan to prevent repetition have failed and Britain asked Japan what steps she would take to see that occurrences of this nature would stop.

Exhibit (Page 8472) Liebert testified that on Dec. 20th, 1937, the Manchukuo Imperial Ordinance No. 460 was promulgated. Its purpose was development and control of heavy industry in Manchuria.

Exhibit 483 (Page 5956) Statement on the Anti-Comintern Pact. Issued by Bureau of Information, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1937.



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Exhibit 329 (Page 4592) German report on Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937.

- Exhibit 310 (Page 4483) Statement re Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937
- 311 (Page 4485) " " " " "
- 312 (Page 4488) " " " " "
- 313 (Page 4491) " " " " "
- 315 (Page 4495) " " " " "
- 316 (Page 4495) " " " " "
- 317 (Page 4498) " " " " "
- 318 (Page 4499) " " " " "
- 319 (Page 4500) " " " " "
- 320 (Page 4501) " " " " "
- 321 (Page 4504) " " " " "
- 322 (Page 4506) " " " " "

- Exhibit 204 (Page 2527) <sup>ment</sup> State/ of Rape of Nanking, Dec. 1937
- 205 (Page 2556) " " " " "
- 206 (Page 2599) " " " " "
- 208 (Page 2608) " " " " "
- 977 (Page 9542) " " " " "

Exhibit ( (Page 2661) Witness BATES when cross-examined gave evidence of reports and conversations with HIROTA and others concerning opium distribution.

Exhibit 2228 (Page 15,982) Instruction by HIROTA as Foreign Minister in 1938 with respect to treatment of Germany in North China. Germany and Italy are to be given special consideration from the political point of view and Germany's interests are to be fully respected and given preference over a third country.