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FROM Tokyo  
NO 490

Tokyo, July 9, 1946.



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Report on Liberal Party in Japan.

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The Political Adviser has the honor to enclose prepared by the Political Parties Branch, Public on, Government Section, General Headquarters, the Allied Powers, on the Liberal Party in nsive and careful analysis of the origin and ts within the Liberal Party should be of con- specially to the Division of Japanese Affairs e Division of the Department. There is cal information in the report.

894.00/7-946

Party in Japan, dated 20 June 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

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Tokyo, July 9, 1946.

NO. 490

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
AUG 2 - 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R

SUBJECT: Forwarding Report on Liberal Party in Japan.

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a report prepared by the Political Parties Branch, Public Administration Division, Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Liberal Party in Japan. This comprehensive and careful analysis of the origin and the recent developments within the Liberal Party should be of considerable interest especially to the Division of Japanese Affairs and to the Intelligence Division of the Department. There is considerable biographical information in the report.

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DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure: *att. 5*

Report on Liberal Party in Japan, dated 20 June 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

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Enclosure to despatch No. 490 dated July 9, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Forwarding report on Liberal Party in Japan."

(COPY)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

20 June 1946

LIBERAL PARTY

ORIGINS:

The initial suggestion for the formation of a Liberal Party (Jiyuto) came from ASHIDA Mitoshi, former Welfare Minister, war-time president of the Japan Times, and former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs who, while the war was still in progress, held frequent conferences at his Kamakura home with KATAYAMA Tetsu and HARA Takeshi, both now of the Social Democratic Party. Because of severe war-time restrictions imposing the one party plan, nothing came of these discussions but, after surrender, the circle widened and new men were drawn into the group. These included:

SAITO Takeo, veteran member of parliament who had achieved world-wide attention because of his opposition to militarist activity in China, and because of his consequent expulsion in 1940 from the Diet.

KAWAZAKI, Katsu, ex director of the Minseito, a former councillor for the War and Communications Ministries and former Vice Minister of Justice, a ninth term Diet member from Mie.

ICHIMOMIYA Fasajiro, former editor of Osaka Asahi, 1910-1916, managing editor of a Chinese newspaper in Peiping, ex councillor to the Home Ministry, Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Navy 1937-1939, member of the Greater East Asia Ministry, 1945, and director of the Far Eastern Common Script Association.

YOSHIDA, Shigeru, later Prime Minister and former career diplomat.

USHIZUKA Teratoro, mayor of Tokyo, 1933-1937, and former governor of Tokyo and of three other prefectures.

OKUBO Tomejiro, former police official, governor of Chiba, 1931, and of Tokyo, 1940, honorary mayor of Sofia, 1940, principal of the Tokyo Accounting School.

ARITA Hachiro, career diplomat who had served at Bangkok, Washington, Tientsin, Peiping, Berlin, Brussels and Vienna and who had been Foreign Minister under HIROTA, KONOYE, MIRANUMA and YOMAI; He was advisor to the KOISO Cabinet 1944-1945.

SHIHANAKA Yusaku, president of the Chuo Koron Publishing Company.

ANDO Masazumi, 70-year old Tokyo representative since 1920, councillor and Vice Minister of Education, 1927-1931, chief secretary of the Seiyukai and vice president of the Maiyu newspaper, an

adviser



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adviser of Iraps and of the Dai Nippon Seijikai.

HATOYAMA Ichiro, fourteen times a Diet member, an ex-Seiyukai leader, chief secretary of the TANAKA Cabinet 1927-1929, Education Minister 1931-1934, and, in 1937, Prince KONOYE's personal emissary to Europe and the United States.

MATSUHO Tsuruhei, chief secretary of the Seiyukai, parliamentary Vice Minister of Home Affairs, 1931 and YOMAI's Railroad Minister 1940, a sixth-term Diet member from Kumamoto.

The accessions may be roughly divided into three groups. SAITO, KAWASAKI and to a less degree ICHINOMIYA, were old-line parliamentarians, of fair but comparatively undistinguished record, with a reputation for liberalism and with a minimum participation in war activities.

YOSHIDA, USHIZUKA, OKUBO and ARITA were career bureaucrats who, like SHIMANAKA, had not been closely connected with any political movement prior to the war.

The third group, a Seiyukai clique, of ANDO, MATSUNO and HATOYAMA, is best characterized as a band of practical politicians looking for private advantages. HATOYAMA, and old-time associate of ASHIDA, his classmate at the Kyoto Third Higher School, was anxious to capture the party administration. To that end, he re-organized his old-time Doko-kai, a personal grouping of Diet members loyal to himself and including, in addition to ANDO and MATSUNO, HOSHIJIMA Jiro, eight-time Diet member who had been counsellor for the Railway Minister, parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice, and member of the Seijikai, and BANDO Kotaro, seven times a Minseito Diet member, a Railway Ministry councillor and a member of both Iraps and the Seijikai.

Rightly or wrongly, the HATOYAMA crowd was supposed to have close connections with financial interests. MATSUNO, allied by marriage to the MITSUI group, was rich in his own right but his campaigns had been financed, allegedly, by the House of MITSUI. HATOYAMA was said to have enjoyed very friendly relations with both MITSUI and MITSUBISHI, and, by his own confession, had received campaign expenses from them. ANDO, too, a leader of the Buddhist Young Men's Association, had also been accused of Zaibatsu tendencies. If these big business connections existed, as is highly probable, the HATOYAMA group represented MITSUI interests in contrast to the pro-MITSUBISHI interests of the later Progressives.

One more founder, entering somewhat later than the rest, proved an invaluable addition to the HATOYAMA clique. This was KONO Ichiro, former Seiyukai secretary and general secretary of the Seijikai, a long-term Diet member who had been secretary in the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, but whose clever political machinations in Seiyukai interests had been, for the most part, screened behind the activities of other figures.

KONO and HATOYAMA planned, from the very beginning to capture the Liberal Party. KONO's political skill and HATOYAMA's money and personal prestige combined to direct the young party's progress along lines most favorable to themselves.

The first



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The first developments were disappointing. KATAYAMA and HARA, two of the original founders, quit the party to form their own Social Democratic Party. SAITO, KAWASAKI and ICHINOMIYA seceded to create the Progressive Party.

HATOYAMA professed himself as unable to understand why these men had, as he said, "deserted" the Liberals, unless, he added, "they were moved by personal ambitions." "KAWASAKI," he said, "is my very good friend and SAITO is an old family friend who was often at my house when I was a boy."

It is, however, probable that HATOYAMA did not too seriously regret the departure of leaders who might prove possible rivals. He hastened to replace them by men whose names, he thought, would carry weight among a desirable section of the voting populace. Among those who accepted invitations to act as sponsors were two famous leaders, OZAKI Yukio and MINOBE Tachikichi; others were:

KIKUCHI Kan, novelist, playwright, and former staff writer for Jiji Shimbun, 1916-1920 and the Osaka Mainichi, 1920-1923, but since 1923 the proprietor and editor of the monthly Bungei Shunju. He has been councillor for the cabinet Information Bureau.

MACHIDA Shiro, long-term foreign correspondent and foreign editor of the Osaka Asahi.

KITAOKA Juitsu, Japan's chief delegate to the International Labor Organization in 1940.

KUWAKI Genyoku, honorary professor at Tokyo Imperial University and head of the Society for Ethical Studies (Eiyu Rinrei Kai).

The party changes assured the HATOYAMA faction full control. After a preliminary meeting at which HATOYAMA and MATSUNO received a free hand on organizational details, an inaugural meeting was held, 9 November, at which HATOYAMA presided and at which ANDO delivered an address setting forth the party principles. A standing committee of 15, more than half of which were HATOYAMA partisans, headed by MATSUNO and ANDO, was ratified, as was a secretariat of 13 led by KONO.

Thus, with the exception of HATOYAMA's close friend ASHIDA, and YOSHIDA, both of whom, as members of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet, preferred to remain behind the scenes, and of USHIZAKA, a vice president, all the original organizers, with the exception of the HATOYAMA crowd, were relegated to the sidelines.

#### CONNECTIONS:

The Liberal Party, accordingly, represented HATOYAMA primarily, together with whatever special interests HATOYAMA may have served.

These suspected special interests were varied. On the one hand, HATOYAMA and his group comprised the remnants of the old Seiyukai machine and, as such, looked forward to the establishment of a personal political regime. On the other hand, his connections with MITSUI, and perhaps other Zaibatsu cliques, placed his party firmly on the side of big business and conservatism.

A third



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A third influence stemmed from the bureaucracy. YOSHIDA, ASHIDA and ARITA reflected the ideas of the career officials who had been submerged under the militarist regime; the emergence of HATOYAMA gave them an opportunity to be heard. To that extent, the HATOYAMA dominance represented the reunion of the capitalist-bureaucratic alliance against which the militarists had fought so bitterly. Where the Progressive Party echoed the professional politician point of view, the HATOYAMA faction, although itself hard-boiled in its machine-politics experience, voiced the opinions of the politically minded financier and of the office-holder class.

Yet a fourth source of inspiration came from carefully masked but none the less influential quarters. This was the Palace itself, through Baron MAKINO Nobuaki, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, a Satsuma "historic personality" who has for years been active behind the scenes in the creation of Cabinets. MAKINO worked through YOSHIDA, his son-in-law, to present the point of view of Court circles.

In the last analysis, however, the real Liberal Party authority was HATOYAMA himself who, in spite of the influences working upon him, retained sufficient independence to make important decisions for himself. This personal strength, buttressed by the establishment in several sections of Japan, of HATOYAMA Supporters' Associations and Leagues for Establishing a HATOYAMA Cabinet, rendered him comparatively independent of the influences working upon him. The Liberal Party under the HATOYAMA regime was a personal political machine operating primarily to further the ambitions of HATOYAMA Ichiro.

PURGE:

Japanese Government interpretation of the 4 January Purge Directive did not hit the Liberals as hard as it hurt the Progressives, but it did disqualify many of the party leaders. Half of the party's 46 Diet members and 13 party officials, including Vice President UCHIZUKA, three secretaries, 6 General Affairs committeemen and two advisors were excluded from public office-holding. HATOYAMA's influential friends ANDO and MATSUNO, the latter slated to be the Home Minister in the event of Liberal success, came under the terms of the Directive.

HATOYAMA himself was for a time believed unaffected. Although in virtual retirement during the early stages of the totalitarian movement (as the result of certain charges that he had, while a Cabinet minister, profited unfairly from a Saghalien business deal), he had been enrolled as an IRAA advisor. HATOYAMA explained that this enrolment had been made without his knowledge and that while he had spoken at an IRAA meeting (at YOSHIDA's insistence) he had done so merely as a Diet member and not as an IRAA advisor. As soon as he learned of his appointment, he added, he resigned the post--three days after his "appointment"--because he had never approved of IRAA.

A special plenary session of party officials, recognized candidates and provincial representatives, the only such meeting ever held, met, 4 February, 1946, in Tokyo. After adopting certain minor

changes



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changes in the statement of policy and reaffirming these previously issued, the meeting discussed the HATOYAMA case and decided that he was unaffected by the purge. The Japanese Government apparently concurred because it later issued him a certificate of eligibility.

Simultaneously, though unconnected with the purge directive, Welfare Minister ASHIDA and Chief Cabinet Secretary HARAHASHI Wateru resigned from the party, in order to give the SHIDEHARA Administration the appearance of true non-partisanship and also to open the way to unrestricted attacks by the Liberals upon the Administration's policies.

THE HATOYAMA MACHINE:

These resignations and removals weakened the party by depriving it of relatively strong leaders but they enhanced HATOYAMA's personal control, and afforded him the opportunity of building himself a powerful political machine.

The Right Wing Social Democrats offered an excellent trading opportunity. To offset any popular belief that the Liberals might have been adversely affected by the purge, HATOYAMA "revealed" that prior to the Liberal Party's formation he had held conferences with KATO Kanju, HIRANO Rikino and NISHIO Suychiro of that sector of the Social Democrats and that they agreed to collaborate with him. The Social Democratic Party formally denied any such agreements and NISHIO went to the length of saying that HATOYAMA's Liberalism was anti-Socialistic, but the general impression remained that while HATOYAMA may have over-stated the situation, a germ of truth was probably hidden in his statement. There is no question of the friendliness of the Right Wing to HATOYAMA, and some observers believed that such men were really HATOYAMA agents planted in the Social Democratic ranks to prevent that party from swinging too radically to the left.

The Progressives, already badly shattered by the purge, also offered a tempting target, but few Progressives and few Social Democrats, none of them important, transferred openly to Liberal ranks. HATOYAMA and KONO, however, frankly declared that men elected on these other tickets would vote with him in the Diet.

KONO expected the Party to win only 200 seats but, by such added support, he expected the Liberals to gain an actual majority and to elect HATOYAMA prime minister.

HATOYAMA's willingness to make "deals" did not, however, extend to the Communists. His announced reasons for this opposition were, that the Communists attack the Emperor System while the Liberals are pledged to its support and, second, that the Communists "instigate riots and disorder."

On 22 February, he issued an appeal for a Conservative Front against the Communists but this, he privately admitted, was really a political gesture for publicity reasons and was not expected to produce any actual results.

Following up the advantage gained by the displacement or resignation of his most effective opponents, HATOYAMA further fortified

his



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his position by well-planned campaigning tours through regions where unrest against him had appeared. Incipient revolt in the Osaka and Toyama prefectural organizations ended with HATOYAMA victories. A tour through Kyushu, Shikoku and the Chingoku region of southern Honshu strengthened the HATOYAMA hold. At the same time that HATOYAMA made personal appearances in those sections, MATSUMO Tsuruhei (prior to his purge) operated in Yamaguchi prefecture. In some prefectures (e.g. Shizuoka) the Liberal Party was regarded as the best financed and most effective party organization.

HATOYAMA also made determined efforts to win support in the prefectures close to Tokyo. To these regions, notably Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama and Ibaragi prefectures, many well-to-do Tokyo families, of the groups that had been favorable to him in the past, had migrated as a result of the bombing of Tokyo; they comprised a small, but compact and effective, proportion of the voting population in prefectures that had not been particularly favorable to him in the past.

Purely as a political measure, designed to indicate the freedom of the Liberal Party from any responsibility for Japan's present financial and food crises, HATOYAMA and his followers consistently attacked the SHIDEHARA Cabinet and demanded its resignation on the ground that it had no positive policy for relieving "social instability," and while they insisted that unless SHIDEHARA resigned they would overthrow the Cabinet, they set no definite date by which time SHIDEHARA must take action. The whole purpose, apparently, was to enjoy free criticism without assuming any actual obligation. The attacks presented the Liberals in the best possible light as watchdogs of public welfare.

HATOYAMA's published remarks, as well as his private interviews, were designed along similar lines. While he and his party were committed to the maintenance of Japan's historic "polity" which meant the retention of the Emperor as the center of the state and as the personification of Japan itself, HATOYAMA freely said that he sought to build a new Japan where sovereign power is shared by Emperor and people, where the 'Tenno' is reduced to the position of the British king, and where the House of Peers, made up of representatives of "various stable groups" should have a veto power similar to that of the Senate, thus acting "as a conservative balance wheel to check the dictatorship of coalition groups in the lower house."

He admired the British Hyde Park system of free speech and favored individualism in research, study and personality development, but he doubted whether the "excitable and politically immature Japanese" are sufficiently endowed with the West's mental resistance "to wild, destructive doctrines." Free speech, therefore, required "reasonable safeguards against misuse."

"Freedom," he said, "is an ideal, democracy a principle and the Diet a method." We must take over political and economic freedom to serve the best interests of the country in a bloodless revolution."

#### PARTY ORGANIZATION:

The Party's by-laws were framed to guarantee HATOYAMA's power.

No



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No provisions exist for general party conventions and except for the inaugural meeting no such conventions have been held.

The by-laws provide that a party council composed of Diet members and of representatives of the branches--the number of delegates is not specified--shall elect a president for a four year term, together with 30 members of a Standing Committee, of which 20 additional members shall be appointed by the president, but, since HATOYAMA was elected at the inaugural meeting for an indefinite term of office, the by-laws did not take effect.

As president, HATOYAMA appointed an Executive Committee to "manage important party affairs" and a secretariat which "shall control the general affairs and finance of the party." In addition to the 26 members of the Standing Committee named by him, he set up such special agencies as he thought desirable. Beyond the requirement that party expenditures must be made public yearly, there was no provision for audit or for control over his actions.

Party membership is attained upon the recommendation of two members and upon the annual payment of one yen dues.

Local Branches, whose rules and actions are subject to review and to veto by Tokyo are organized under ken committees, composed of an unspecified number of delegates from gun, shi, machi and mura. Presumably the number of delegates varies with the party enrolment in each subdivision but because of the newness of the party and the incompleteness of membership statistics, the Ken committee composition is at present ill-defined.

Little or no effort is made to ascertain the wishes of party members. All decisions are reached at Tokyo, with the Branch possessing the right to object, and the individual member having merely the right to accept. Members may, if they desire, suggest policies through the Ken committees, or directly to Tokyo but in this they have no more privilege than has any other person; if Tokyo rejects the suggestion or if Tokyo follows policies disapproved by the individual, there is no machinery whereby the objector may express his feeling. In the same way, while local Branches may and do suggest candidates, only the Tokyo headquarters can give official approval to candidacies. Tokyo may however designate persons as candidates in the local districts without any action being required by the Ken committees.

#### CABINET CRISIS:

By winning 140 Diet seats at the 10 April 1946 election, the Liberals became the plurality party but since 234 votes were required for a clear majority, some form of coalition was required before a Government Party could be formed. Such a coalition could be concluded with either the Progressives or the Social Democrats, each of whom had won more than 90 seats; it might even have been possible to put together a majority by an intricate arrangement with the Co-Operatives, the Independents and minor party members.

Since, however, any Government Party would face almost insur-

mountable



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mountable difficulties centering around food, inflation and reconstruction, and since failure to solve these problems might cause serious political embarrassment, no party was willing to enter into a coalition except at an exorbitant price. The Social Democrats, for instance, insisted upon the premiership as well as upon all the key economic Cabinet posts; the Progressives also demanded recognition which the Liberals thought excessive. Even the small Co-Operative party bargained for three Cabinet positions.

After protracted negotiations, arrangements were made whereby HATOYAMA and the Progressives came to an understanding, but no sooner had this been done than SCAP intervened to declare HATOYAMA non-acceptable.

This decision was based upon the arguments already mentioned plus the fact that as Chief Secretary of the TANAKA Cabinet, 1927-1929, he had shared responsibility for the formulation and promulgation without Diet approval of amendments to the so-called Peace Preservation Law which made the law the government's chief legal instrument for the suppression of freedom. HATOYAMA had also, as Minister of Education, December 1931-March 1934, stifled freedom of speech by dismissals and arrests of teachers suspected of "leftist" leanings. He had participated in the forced dissolution of farmer-labor parties and he had recommended the trans-planting of Hitlerite anti-labor devices. Although he posed as an anti-militarist, HATOYAMA by word and deed had consistently supported Japanese aggression.

It had been expected that the Japanese Government would itself take action in the matter of barring HATOYAMA from public service, but as the Government had failed to do so it became necessary for SCAP to take action.

YOSHIDA CABINET:

HATOYAMA's ineligibility again plunged Japan into political confusion. The bargaining process was resumed and eventually 13 May 1946, Liberal Party leaders agreed to recommend the appointment of YOSHIDA Shigeru, former Foreign Minister, and one of the Party's founders, as their candidate for the Prime Ministership.

This involved complicated re-arrangements in party machinery, when YOSHIDA proved reluctant to accept. HATOYAMA's friends, if not the purged leader himself, then sounded out MATSUDAIRA Tsunee, former Minister of the Imperial Household. MATSUDAIRA, however, when invited by HATOYAMA and YOSHIDA, declined to commit himself. KATSUDA Eikichi, five-term Diet member from Osaka, who had been parliamentary councillor for the Home Office, 1932-1934, president of the Taiwan Pineapple Company, and Vice Minister for Home Affairs, 1937-1940, was then considered for the presidency, but as he had been an IRAA Advisor he declined the honor. In this situation, HATOYAMA again turned to HOSHIDA as the only available candidate. YOSHIDA talked the matter over with his father-in-law, Count MAKINO Nobuski, SHIDEHARA and MACHIDA, Chuji, purged Progressive leader. When MAKINO advised against acceptance, HATOYAMA asked further advice from ISHIGUBO Takeshiga, a SHIDEHARA lieutenant who had been trying to organize the Independents. As a result of these conferences, YOSHIDA eventually accepted the Prime Ministership, after having become, on 15 May, Chairman of the Party's Executive Committee.

The



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The decision, YOSHIDA assured HATOYAMA, was based largely upon personal considerations. "It matters little," he said, "what policies the Party may adopt, but I am a poor public speaker which makes me an unsuitable person for the position. If only I had confidence in my abilities in this respect, I should accept. Even so, the sight of your troubled countenance prevents me from declining."

On 16 May, therefore, the Emperor commanded YOSHIDA to form a Cabinet.

PROGRESSIVE COALITION:

This task, it was obvious, could only be accomplished by coalition with the Progressive Party, which HATOYAMA had once publicly said contained not a single person of Cabinet timber.

Nevertheless YOSHIDA made the attempt. First he suggested the inclusion of ISHIGURO, OKUBO, INUKAI Ken and KAWAI Yoshinari (the latter two from the Progressives) but the rank and file Liberal Party members raised a storm of protest. YAMACUCHI Kikuichiro, OISHI Rinji, ONO Hanboku and HANASHI Shingoro said that YOSHIDA ignored the professional politicians in order to favor bureaucrats and outsiders. Their protests were sufficiently strong as to cause the complete exclusion of ISHIGURO from consideration. Next YOSHIDA attempted to rely upon scholars, proposing TOHATA Seiichi as Minister of Agriculture and FUJIWARA Sakuhei as Education Minister; but again the career politicians objected. For a time it seemed as though YOSHIDA would be unable to form a Cabinet, especially when two of the men he selected were found subject to purge; but eventually a Cabinet was formed.

Objection within the Party continued, however. The appointment of HAYASHI Jiro, SHIDEHARA's cousin and friend of HATOYAMA, as Cabinet Secretary was approved, but the nomination of WADA Hiroo as Agricultural Minister against the opposition of the Liberal politicians was damned within the Party as a Socialistic and anti-Emperor choice. For such reasons the election of YOSHIDA as Party President, an action originally slated for 25 May, was indefinitely postponed.

The Party's difficulties did not end with the creation of a Cabinet nominally dominated by Liberal Party men; there still remained the harmonization of policies between the Liberals and the Progressives. This, however, was glossed over by the drafting of a program purposely couched in vague abstractions calculated to satisfy both political groups. Since the only real concession made by either participant was the withdrawal of the Progressives from a tentative stand in favor of the nationalization of the fertilizer industry, the Liberals found no difficulty in accepting the document as a statement of principles.

THE SPEAKER:

The coalition's choice of MIKI Bukichi, former president of the HOCHI Newspaper, ex-Minseito politician and a Liberal Executive Committeeman, as Speaker of the House also ran into difficulties. MIKI's former IRAPS and Seijikai affiliation made him undesirable and hence, after having been elected, MIKI was forced to resign. His replacement by HIGAI Senzo, former president of the Court of

Administrative



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Administrative Litigation kept the Speakership in Liberal hands but placed a comparatively weak parliamentarian in a position where a strong hand was deemed desirable.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

The new officials, elected as a result of the sweeping changes following the 1946 election are of somewhat different type from those who originally founded the party. Of those who inaugurated the Liberal Party only YOSHIDA, KONO, ASHIDA and OKUBO remain, YOSHIDA and ASHIDA having returned to membership after the collapse of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet. Of those who entered into membership at the time of the first re-organization, only KIKUCHI continues as a Central Executive Committeeman. All others except MIKI are new blood.

The additional Executive Committeemen are:

OISHI Rinji, sixty-nine year old newspaper man who has been active in the Horse Affairs Association.

HONASHI Shingoro, president of Osaka Jiji.

OTSUKA Junnosuke, former chairman of the Shizuoka Assembly and former IRAA and Seijikai member.

UYETSUKA Tsukasa, five times a Diet member, former private secretary to the Commerce and Finance Ministries, councillor to the Finance Ministry and former South Manchuria Railway official.

HONDA Ichiro, for twelve years a Tokyo Assemblyman and twice a Diet member.

ONO Damboki, formerly of the Seiyukai and secretary of the Koyo Club, an inner circle of the House of Peers.

KATO Mutsunosuke, stockbreeder and farmer, former mayor of Omiya and member of the Seijikai.

HIRATSUKA Tsunejiro, president of the Japan-Russia Fishing Company, and a member of the Seijikai.

SHUTO Hideo, director of the Price Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

YAMAMOTO Katsuichi, professor of the Daito Bunka and member of the Patriotic Sentiment Culture Research Institute (Kokumin Seishin Bunka Kenkyujo).

BANTO Kotaro, seventh term Diet member, former Minseito member, also a member of IRAPS and the Seijikai and ex councillor to the Railways Ministry.

In addition to these active committeemen two others are rated as Advisors. These are men who were formerly committeemen but who, because of their inclusion in the Cabinet, are not now active in party councils. They are:

UYEHARA



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UYEHARA Etsujiro, Minister Without Portfolio, who has been eight times a Diet member and who is a former Vice Speaker. Dr. Uyehara, a writer and lecturer, has been a professor at Tokyo Technical College and Rikkyo and Meiji Universities.

HOSHIJIMA Jiro, eight times a Diet member, former councillor to the Railway Ministry, parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice, and a former member of the Seijikai.

In addition to these, HATOYAMA, ANDO, KUWAKI, MAKINO Ryozo, KURE, MURAYASU Shinkoro and SHIMANAKA are listed as "retired officials."

KONO Ichiro:

The real direction of the Liberal Party rested in the hands of KONO Ichiro, long-time political associate of HATOYAMA Ichiro and veteran political manipulator. A typical machine politician, he used the HATOYAMA following for the purpose of furthering his own interests if not of rehabilitating his former leader. KONO seldom appeared openly upon the political stage, preferring to manipulate men from behind the scenes, but his smooth and genial personality worked well in that function. KONO seemed to control the party absolutely; even the younger recalcitrants who opposed YOSHIDA accepted his leadership.

In the same sense that prior to the purge the Liberal Party was the personal property of HATOYAMA Ichiro it became KONO's instrument. He had not the personal control that HATOYAMA had but manipulated the organization through his genius for friendship and through his political strategy.

KONO's personal record was spotty since he urged in April 1940 that, in retaliation for the American imposition of an embargo against Japan, Japan should sever diplomatic relations with the United States. He said at that time that the Americans were secretly preparing to fight Japan and that "if we cannot cooperate with the United States in our program for a New Asia we are fully prepared for war." KONO denied that this statement was ever made by him, and also denied that he favored Japan dropping out of the Olympic Games, preferring an Axis Olympics in Berlin.

That control, however, disregarded two powerful factors, the strength of the younger element which detested KONO because of his opposition to the appointment of WADA Hiroo as Minister of Agriculture, and the resentment of the Occupation Forces over his Diet speech advocating war. Again, as in the instance of HATOYAMA both hostile groups waited for the other to act; it was not until after the formal organization of the Diet, when the Emperor was scheduled to make his speech of greeting that decision was finally reached upon his case.

Action came suddenly; as a result of the discovery of his Diet speech advocating war with the United States, KONO Ichiro was declared ineligible for Diet membership and for leadership of his party. Simultaneously, but for other reasons, MIKI Bunkichi, first choice as Speaker of the House, was also barred.

KONO'S



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KONO's disharment again threw the Liberal Party into a condition of confusion from which immediate recovery was difficult. The anti-YOSHIDA faction remained strong and a movement gathered strength for a sweeping reform within the party membership. It was not unthinkable that with the elimination of KONO and MIKI, as well as the former removal of HATOYAMA, the path might be cleared for an even closer rapprochement with the Progressive Party.

PLATFORM:

Reduced to its fundamentals, the Liberal Party platform, after making the necessary promises of adherence to the Potsdam Declaration, the eradication of militarism and the rebuilding of a new Japan, may be concentrated in four brief statements:

1. Maintenance of the national polity, establishment of a democratically responsible government, and the guarantee of freedom of learning, art, education, and religion, with the intention of "leading thought, speech, and action into the proper channels."
2. Stabilization of economics by individual initiative, strengthening of free financial activity and reconstruction of agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises.
3. Promotion of political and social virtues and the cleansing of national life.
4. Respect for human rights, elevation of the status of women, passage of extensive social legislation and the procurement of a stable standard of living.

These basic purposes are to be attained through the following program:

1. International Affairs:

Recovery of international confidence.  
Preparation to enter the UNO.  
Correction of the old, mistaken, anti-China policies.

2. Government:

Constitutional revision based upon maintenance of the national polity.  
Making the lower house of the Diet the chief governmental organ, and reformation of the House of Peers.  
Establishment of a standing committee of both houses so that the Diet may function even in recess.  
Woman suffrage, lower voting age, and "abolition of red tape" in the election law.  
Abolition of laws restricting human rights and freedom.

Note: HATOYAMA in virtually all his speeches and in interviews stressed his devotion to the Emperor system, stating that he gives it "absolute support." In speaking with a GHQ representative he declared that he believed that sovereign power rests in both Emperor and people and that they should exercise that sovereignty jointly,

with



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with the Emperor given a position like that of the British Crown; but the platform and the "Immediate Policies" of the Liberal Party are both entirely silent upon the Emperor System and upon the locus of sovereignty except insofar as "maintainance of national polity" may explain it.

There is no mention whatever of the Emperor system in a pamphlet sent out by the Party to its political speakers, nor any suggestion concerning the line to be followed upon governmental powers except a promise of the recovery of the independent function of government.

This omission may reflect internal party conflict. In contrast to HATOYAMA's absolute defense of the Emperor System, ANDO Masazuzi, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation of Political Affairs, came out with a demand that the Party favor constitutional reform "to curtail Imperial prerogatives." Soon after, the Kyoto Branch, or influential sections thereof, asked that the Party state specifically that sovereignty lay with the people. The Kyoto request was refused and, after a sharp debate in the local Branch, Kyoto accepted the HATOYAMA point of view.

3. Administration:

Destruction of bureaucracy and replacement by efficiency and character.  
Reduction both of budgets and of personnel.  
Public election of prefectural governors, with as much local autonomy as possible.

4. Anti-Inflation:

Security of food is the best defense against inflation.  
Import food and increase farm production.  
Limit total amount of currency.  
Postpone interest payment on and redemption of bonds.  
Freeze government compensation for munition companies.  
Sell government property and liquidate government holdings in commercial enterprises gradually.  
Reform pension system.  
Reform tax system to eliminate unfairnesses.

Note: There is a difference of opinion concerning the Party's stand on new loans. The statement of principles says merely that the Liberals will "return to the system of public loans." Yomiuri-Hochi, on 6 February, in reporting the adoption of this plank said that it meant floating new loans; Asahi of the same day reported that it meant the suspension of new loan flotations.

The above official summary makes no mention of a plank, reported by both papers, concerning a special tax on war profits and the levying of a "national solidarity tax" on fortunes over ¥100,000, "with allowances for war sufferers and for families of those killed in the war."

A plenary Party Council, following the adoption of the "Immediate Policies Program," added additional recommendations:

(a) A double



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7. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries:

National planning with governmental aid for farm and fishing villages.  
Development of reclaimed lands.  
Adjustment of rental fees and reduction of wheat and rice quotas.

8. Labor and Society:

Labor unions and collective bargaining: Arbitration of industrial disputes and the protection of women and children.  
Unemployment, old age, health, maternal and other social insurance legislation.  
Relief for demobilized soldiers and housing and relief for war victims.

9. Women:

Equal educational opportunities and co-education.  
Abolition of all laws discriminating against women.  
Protective agencies for the chastity of women workers.

The Party Handbook For Speakers calls attention to the fact that HATOYAMA favored women suffrage before the issuance of the MacArthur Directive. It quotes HATOYAMA's speech saying that "perhaps granting the franchise may be premature but practice makes perfect." It also cites his demands for the removal of servile conditions and for the removal of social unrest. "Women are peace lovers," HATOYAMA said.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Passed: PKR  
Noted : CLK



POLITICAL ADVISER  
JAPAN

*JK FR HA E*  
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JUL 29 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R ROUTING SLIP

Tokyo, July 9, 1946.

FROM Tokyo  
NO 491

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Progressive Party in Japan.

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Political Adviser has the honor to enclose the Political Parties Branch, Public Information Section, General Headquarters, United States Forces, on the Progressive Party and careful analysis of the origin and development of the Progressive Party within the Progressive Party should be referred to the Division of Japanese Affairs, Division of the Department. There is no intelligence in the report.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JUL 29 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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Tokyo, July 9, 1946.

NO. 491

*V* *DC/R*

*file*  
SUBJECT: Forwarding Report on Progressive Party in Japan.

*HR 740,00119 Control Japan*

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose a copy of a report prepared by the Political Parties Branch, Public Administration Division, Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Progressive Party in Japan. This comprehensive and careful analysis of the origin and the recent developments within the Progressive Party should be of considerable interest especially to the Division of Japanese Affairs and to the Intelligence Division of the Department. There is considerable biographical intelligence in the report.

894.00/7-946

*627/71*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES  
JUL 26 1946

Enclosure: *as*

Report on Progressive Party in Japan, dated 22 June 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

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Enclosure to despatch No. 491 dated July 9, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Forwarding Report on Progressive Party in Japan."

(COPY)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

22 June 1946

THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

(SHIMPO-TO)

ORIGINS:

The Progressive Party (Shimpoto) was inspired by SHIMADA Tochio, former speaker of the Diet, and by MACHIDA Chuji, Cabinet Minister under KOISO, as a merger of professional politicians formerly belonging to the former Minseito and Seiyukai parties.

Neither SHIMADA nor MACHIDA came into the open. They operated through ASHIDA Mitoshi, later SHIDEHARA's Minister of Welfare, KAWASAKI Katsumi, nine-term Diet member, parliamentary Justice Ministry councillor and Minseito director, ICHINOMIYA Fujitaro, former editor of Osaka Asahi and ex-Navy Vice Minister, and SAITO Takeo. The last named was particularly valuable as a party initiator since his expulsion from the Diet and from the Minseito because of his opposition to the China Incident had won him international recognition as an anti-militarist.

On 16 November 1945, SAITO presided at an inaugural meeting of 300 people, 273 of whom were Diet members nearly all of whom had been affiliated with the war-time Dai Nippon Seiji Kai. At this meeting the plan for forming a new party was announced and a tentative platform was proposed which stressed:

Daily ration of 3 go of rice  
Food control through independent co-operatives  
Cultivation of idle lands  
Democratization of Japan through elimination of Zaibatsu, militarists, bureaucrats and war-time profiteers.

At this inaugural meeting, SAITO proposed a central organizing committee for the purpose of choosing officers and drawing up a statement of principles. There was no contest over the ratification of these committee members since the meeting was asked merely to approve a slate prepared for it.

ASHIDA and ANDO Mazumi, both later of the Liberal Party, had been invited to attend but had declined. They had previously withdrawn from the projected Progressive Party because their proposal to have HATOYAMA Ichiro as the Chief, had been rejected by those in charge of preparing the new party organization.

This incident merely confirmed a personal feud that had already existed between SAITO and HATOYAMA. The former had originally intended to ally himself with the Liberals but because of his personal antipathy to HATOYAMA he and certain other Progressives refused to

participate



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participate in the Liberal Party formation. The attempt by HATOYAMA partisans to annex the new Progressive Party was bitterly resented. As long as HATOYAMA headed the Liberals, SAITO's group refused collaboration.

The Progressive Party membership divided roughly into two general categories.

MINSEITO CLIQUE:

MACHIDA's Minseito clique included:

MATSUMURA Kenzo, Diet member from Tottori, since 1928, secretary, parliamentary councillor and later Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and manager of the Minseito Party.

SAKURAI Hyogoro, eight times Diet Member from Ishikawa, parliamentary Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs, YONAI's Minister of Commerce and Minseito chief secretary.

TSURUMI Yosuke, twice Diet member from Iwate, railway ministry attache and unofficial Japanese envoy to the United States to "explain the China incident."

SEIYUKAI CLIQUE:

SHIMADA Toshio, former chief secretary of the Seiyukai, operated not in his own behalf but on that of NAKAJIMA Chikuhei, head of the "reformist" faction of that party. NAKAJIMA, Railways Minister under the first KONOYE Cabinet, and war-time Minister of Munitions, was a wealthy airplane manufacturer with political ambitions. His followers included:

TOGO Minoru, six-term Diet member from Kagoshima and former Vice Minister of Education and expert for the Taiwan Government.

TAROBE Shichiroku, former Vice Minister of Agriculture.

Vice Admiral YOSUME Saburo

KANEMITSU Tsuneo, Seiyukai director, seven times Diet member from Oita, a life insurance company director who had been Prime Minister ABE's Overseas Minister 1939-1940 and Welfare Minister in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, 1940-1941. He was director-general of the Great Japan Political Association and an IRAPS president.

MAEDA Yonezo, Seiyukai Secretary-General, eight-term Diet member from Tokyo, who had been INUKAI's Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1931-1932, HIROTA's Railway Minister, 1936-1937, serving in the same post under HIRANUMA, 1939, and KOISO in 1944.

PRESIDENCY:

Since it was expected that the party's campaign funds would

aggregate



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aggregate large amounts—the hostile newspaper Yomiuri-Hochi estimated ¥5,000,000—a bitter and only thinly veiled battle raged within the party over the question of leadership. In large degree, this struggle was unreal, since, in conformity to past political tradition, ostensible leadership was to rest in the hands of a distinguished but ineffective figurehead while real power was to be wielded from behind the scenes, but as victory in the sham presidential contest would indicate the relative strength of contending factions, control over the puppet was important.

HAKAJIMA and MACHIDA, therefore, considered various candidates for the empty honor of the presidency.

UGAKI GROUP:

TSURUMI, who considered himself the directing brains of the party, joined with the HAKAJIMA faction to promote the candidacy of UGAKI Kazushige, retired general and former governor of Korea, a veteran politician whose ambitions for the premiership had been blocked by Army opposition. (As War Minister UGAKI had cut the number of divisions in Korea from three to two.)

UGAKI, aged 77, enjoyed strong support. In addition to SAITO and TSURUMI, of the Minseito and TOGO, YOSUME and TAROBE of the Seiyukai he had the backing of:

NAKAIGAWA Umekichi, third term member from Ibaragi who had been Prime Minister HIRANUMA's parliamentary Vice Minister for the War Department.

KATSU Masonori, fifth term member from Fukuoka who had been a Finance Ministry attache, Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry, deputy Tokyo mayor, YONAI's Communications Minister and chief secretary of the Minseito.

TANAKA Takeo, six times Diet member from Hyogo prefecture, secretary to the Railway Ministry in 1924, former parliamentary Vice Minister for the Overseas Department, ex-minister of Transportation and manager of the Minseito party.

OGASAWARA Sankuro, Aichi, Seiyukai member of parliament, a former Bank of Chosen attache with heavy financial interests in Sumatra and Singapore.

KOGURE Sanshiro, seven times Seiyukai Diet member from Gumma, a banker and a newspaper publisher.

Many, if not all, of this group had close affiliations with the Great Japan Political Association and with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

There is no question but that UGAKI's strength was impressive but because of his past record as an army man (despite his unpopularity with army politicians) his position was felt to be endangered. A second candidate, therefore, whose backing, while powerful, was less strong than that of General UGAKI, came forward in the person

of SHIBUSAWA



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of SHIBUSAWA Kaizo, a Tokyo banker popularly supposed to enjoy close Zaibatsu connections. The son of the eminent Viscount SHIBUSAWA Kiichi, head of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, SHIBUSAWA Kaizo later became Finance Minister in the SHIDEHARA Cabinet.

SHIBUSAWA GROUP:

SHIBUSAWA's support included:

KIYOSE Ichiro, Diet member since 1920, former vice speaker of the House and president of the Tokyo Bar Association.

KUBOI Yoshimatsu, parliamentary councillor for the Navy, 1934-1936, and parliamentary Vice Minister for Home Affairs, 1945.

MATSUDA Shoichi, four times Diet member from Mie prefecture, former secretary of the New York Japanese Club, parliamentary Vice Minister for the Navy, 1939, and president of the Furukawa Mining Company.

MATSUKATA Kojiro, third-term Diet member from Kagoshima, president of the Kawasaki Dockyards and of the Kawasaki Steamship Company, as well as of a colliery.

MIYOSHI Kijiro, fifth term Tottori Diet member, newspaper publisher and hydroelectric executive.

IEDA Kokichi, fourth-term Asaka member of Parliament, and HIRANUMA's parliamentary Vice Minister of Communications.

The SHIBUSAWA group, for the most part office-holders, bureaucrats and industrialists, fell apart when OZAKI Yukio denounced SHIBUSAWA as a candidate "backed only by Zaibatsu money and by shady politicians."

KONOYE GROUP:

Its supporters then turned to Prince KONOYE Fumimaro who gained, in addition to KANEMITSU and MAEDA of the Seiyukai and the SHIBUSAWA group, the following backers:

OASA Tadao, seven times an Oita Diet member, parliamentary councillor to the Education Ministry, 1929, and chief secretary to the Minseito, 1929, as well as a TOJO assistant.

KAWASHIMA Tsuneo, five times representative from Chiba prefecture.

KATSUDA Eikichi, fifth term Osaka representative, parliamentary councillor to the Home Office, 1932-1934 and president of the Taiwan Pineapple Company.

TAKAHASHI Morihei, parliamentary Vice Minister of Agriculture in KONOYE's first Cabinet.

KONOYE,



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KONOYE, however, doubting whether he could obtain SCAP clearance, declined to become a candidate for the Progressive Party presidency. Upon his refusal Admiral NOMURA Kichizaburo was advanced as a substitute.

Minor strength developed, also, for IWATA, auditor of the Sumitomo Trust Company and for the Mitsubishi Bank, an international lawyer who had been advisor to the Cabinet in the spring of 1945 and HIGASHI-KUNI's Minister of Justice. MATSUDAIRA Tsuneo, former Minister of the Imperial Household, and MITSUCHI Chuzo, the Home Minister, were other names suggested. None of these, however, gained sufficient popularity to challenge the UGAKI candidacy.

#### MACHIDA GROUP:

UGAKI's military record, however, caused him to be excluded from any post of political importance. At this juncture, MACHIDA himself came forward, precipitating a fresh crisis, not only because of the preponderantly IRAA and IRAPS character of the men supporting him, SHIBUSAWA, KONOYE and NOMURA, but because ICHINOMIYA, SAITO and KAWASAKI, who had been among his original followers, swung over to the opposition, alleging that MACHIDA lacked energy and that he was too old to serve.

SHIBUSAWA's collapse, KONOYE's refusal and the UGAKI exclusion left MACHIDA, however, as the only available candidate. He was, accordingly, elected president on 18 December 1945.

This solution, however, merely posed fresh problems for the party managers. Tradition required that the president, MACHIDA, should be a figure-head enjoying an empty honor while the real work would be done behind the scenes, yet MACHIDA, the founder, was by no means willing to retire into obscurity. He insisted on at least equal authority with SHIBUSAWA, UGAKI, MITSUCHI and NAKAJIMA Chikuhei, the munitions manufacturer whose money was relied upon to finance the party.

#### YOUTH GROUP:

A younger group, however, headed by TSURUMI Yusuke, experienced propagandist with, it was believed, close connections with American interests, scented an opportunity to capture the party, or at least to direct its activities. TSURUMI's intention was to make himself a sort of assistant to MACHIDA and, in that capacity, as what he himself called "de facto party leader," to issue party decisions without consulting his associates. Thus TSURUMI, who also regarded himself as the brains of the party, advocated popular election of governors and other ken officials, urged the adoption of proportional representation, "a grand socialist policy through the property tax levy" and the "protection of the Emperor System under just criticism based upon rationalism." How many of these ideas were really enthusiastically supported by TSURUMI is a matter of opinion--there is no doubt but that some of them were inspired solely by the hope of winning American favorable opinion--but only the Emperor protection, and that without the criticism feature, became an official party policy.

#### THE PURGE:



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THE PURGE:

The immediate effect of the 4 January 1946 "purge directive" was to strip the party of many of its leaders. Of the 273 Diet members favorable to the Progressives, all but 23 were swept out of political life. Only three of the 15 members of the General Affairs Committee were unaffected by the purge.

MACHIDA and TSURUMI, then heading the party, dealed action in hopes of a relaxation of the terms of the directive, but a substantial section of the Progressive group, headed by TANABE Tadao, economics professor at Tokyo Imperial University, demanded immediate compliance. He was joined in this demand by NODA Takeo, NAKAMURA Umekichi, ITO Goro, KOYANACI Makie, NAGUNO Shosako, YAMAMOTO Takeo, MURAI Hachiro and 49 other party members who formed themselves into a Progressive Club within the Progressive Party for the purpose of securing liberalization of the rules.

It is noteworthy that SAITO, supposedly the Liberal leader, took no part whatever in this activity.

Six weeks after the issuance of the directive, when it was apparent that no relaxation of the terms could be expected, President MACHIDA, Chief Secretary TSURUMI and all members of the General Affairs Committee affected by the purge, handed in their resignations. SAITO, KAWASAKI Katsuzo and Mrs. YOSHIOKA Yayoi, head of the Women's Division, were the only holdover members. SAITO, accordingly, was chosen as interim head, with power to appoint new members to fill General Affairs Committee vacancies.

This Committee, appointed 20 February 1946, included the three holdovers, together with HARA Seejiro, MATSUDA Shoichi, TANAKA Mitsugu, NARUSHIMA Isami, NAKAGAWA Shigeharu, KUDO Tetsuo, INUKAI Ken, HOSHIO Hajime, NAGAI Gen, KIUCHI Kyo, MURAOKA Hanako and TAKARA Tomiko.

All those, except the hold-overs, were "new faces" and only one, TANABE, was a member of the Progressive Club.

None of these changes were ever ratified by membership nor by the prefectural chairmen. The only authority passing upon the fundamental changes was that of the new General Affairs Committee named by SAITO himself.

SAITO also named HITOTSUMATSU as chief secretary and TANABE as chairman of the political investigation committee, with YAMAMOTO Takeo as head of the Information Division.

FINANCES:

In spite of these shifts in personnel, however, it is evident that the party had been badly shaken. The party machinery which had survived from prewar days was almost completely shattered and the new faces lacked either the personality or the experience to rebuild the organization. The party seemed stunned.

Immediately after the great changes in organization, campaigning

almost



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almost entirely ceased, and SAITO announced that nothing more would be done by Tokyo headquarters than the dispatch of circulars to branch offices, issuance of official pronouncements and the direction of a few speaking tours.

Prior to the purge about ¥150,000 had been collected, of which TSURUMI contributed ¥80,000, for a total campaign fund estimated to reach eventually the ¥5,000,000 mark. A second large donation, ¥50,000 came from TANAKA Takoo, ex-minister of transport and communication.

Tokyo Mainichi, never too reliable a journal in such matters, said that MACHIDA intended to draw money from the Yamaguchi Bank, Osaka, through his Osaka and Tokyo Zaibatsu connections. Whether or not this statement is true, the fact remains that following the purge contributions slowed down to such a point that SAITO declared that his party would not spend more than ¥200,000, "the smallest sum of any of the five big parties."

One contribution of ¥100,000, to be made by OKADA Kitaro, president of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, through KOGURE, NODA and MATSUMURA, was to have been followed by MACHIDA's petitioning the Emperor to name OKADA to the House of Peers and by KOGURE and NODA's following OKADA's orders. Because arrangements were made through MACHIDA's clique, the OKADA deal was cancelled. SAITO "never heard of any OKADA contribution."

The lack of funds compelled the party to cancel at least a projected plan to allot from ¥1,000 to ¥5,000 to each recognized candidate (Yomiuri-Hochi had put the figure at ¥10,000.)

The financial set-back was temporary. In mid-March, more activities became noticeable, in the form of street posters, and on 23 March, Jiji Press reported that the Progressive Party had a campaign fund of ¥839,322. This report indicated a four-fold increase in party funds within a ten day period.

#### POLICIES:

SAITO had a reputation as a liberal, but his attitude toward solutions for Japan's current problems did not indicate any definite ideas for either liberalization or reform. Following the purge, the party had a magnificent opportunity to stand for political regeneration, but, instead, it kept silent. The old MACHIDA-TSURUMI program was retained without modification.

Women voters, going to the polls for the first time, would cast at least half the votes in the election, but SAITO did not think it necessary to make any special appeal to this huge body of new voters. Relying upon his conviction that women are naturally conservative and thus, if they voted independently, they would support either the Progressives or the Liberals, and believing, as did most Japanese observers that the women would merely duplicate the votes of their men, he had neither a program of legislation to be enacted in their behalf nor any special slogans to attract their interest.

Because SAITO expected his chief strength to lie among middle-

class



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class city and rural voters, with little support to be found among artisans, factory workers or small farmers, he saw no need to implement his vague planks on farm or labor problems. The Progressive Party relied rather upon inertia than upon convincing argument in appealing for votes.

PARTY REFORMATION:

Failure of Japanese voters in the 1946 election to choose a party with a clear majority produced a Cabinet deadlock. The Liberals with 142 Diet seats shortly after the election needed at least 92 more votes to form a Government, and, since these could be picked up by an alliance with either the Social Democrats or the Progressives, while any other coalition would require at least a four-party agreement, a six-weeks delay resulted while politicians pulled wires and sought to arrange political deals.

In these movements the Progressives played an important role. Immediately following the resignation of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet on 22 April, Baron SHIDEHARA Kinjuro became head of the Progressive Party, a movement popularly interpreted to indicate his desire to enter a new Cabinet in which the Progressives would have large representation.

The immediate result was a series of internal readjustments arising out of the struggle for party control. It early became evident that SAITO personally had little strength or little force and that his replacement as party director would in no way affect the party policy. It also became clear that the real direction of the Progressive Party had fallen into the hands of INUKAI who, as SHIDEHARA's protege and as heir to the "youth" movement formerly headed by TSURUMI, had gained full control of party machinery. When, therefore, the YOSHIDA Cabinet came into existence with SAITO, HITOTSUMATSU and KAWAI as members, INUKAI found little difficulty in carrying a motion to elect all three men to the posts of party advisors. This removed them from active participation in party affairs and gave INUKAI virtually complete control.

OPPORTUNISM:

The Progressive Party began as a frankly tentative organization, formed for the express purpose of mobilizing the past loyalties of Seiyukai and Minseito followers and for holding together the surviving Diet members of those parties. To a degree greater than those of other contemporary Japanese political groups its history has been opportunist.

This policy was evident from the very beginning. Most of the founders sought a name implying a flavor of democracy. Their first suggestion was People's Party (Minhonto) but since this name carried a connotation that the people were the true basis of the state the title was rejected. The name Progressive (Shimpoto) was accepted because it sounded Occidental and democratic without conveying any commitment as to the locus of sovereignty.

The party's insincerity of principle showed itself clearly in the Cabinet crisis. Following the 10 April election, the SHIDEHARA

Cabinet



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Cabinet resigned, but since no party owned a clear majority of Diet seats, political readjustments were necessary. The Progressives with 95 Diet members frankly shopped around seeking the best price for their support. When, at one juncture, it seemed likely that the Progressives would be an opposition party, three of the top leaders, SAITO Takeo, HITOYSUMATSU Sadakichi and INUKAI Ken, called on Baron SHIDEHARA to protest his acceptance of a new Cabinet post under the Liberals. SHIDEHARA at that time was nominal president of the Progressives and his action in joining the projected Cabinet seemed to the leaders a contravention of their purposes. His action, they said showed that he had only a slight conception of the function of a political party and that he was indifferent to the danger of bureaucracy. Yet, five days later, SAITO and HITOTSUMATSU themselves joined SHIDEHARA as Ministers without Portfolio in the same Cabinet which they had denounced. At the same time a third party leader, KAWAI Yoshinari, former Vice Minister of Agriculture and former vice mayor of Tokyo, became Minister of Welfare.

Indeed SAITO, at the very time that he was criticising SHIDEHARA for co-operating with the Liberals, announced that the time was ripe for a Liberal-Progressive alliance because, as he said, there was no real difference in "party character" between the two organizations. This remark, it was later officially explained, was "misunderstood."

NEW OFFICIALS:

TANAKA Manitsu, new Chief secretary of the party to succeed HITOTSUMATSU, is a veteran Diet member, having been chosen ten times as a Minseito representative. He has been parliamentary Vice Minister for Agriculture.

To replace the advisors as committee members, SHIDEHARA, acting through INUKAI and probably at the latter's instigation, named three new men; at the same time he availed himself of his privilege as president to add additional members. The present General Affairs Committee, therefore, under the chairmanship of INUKAI consists of:

MIYAZAWA Saikichi, former Nagano assemblyman, village chief and vice chairman of the Village Chiefs Association, an executive committeeman of the Nagano Agricultural Association. He is a former member of the Seiyukai.

HIBINO Minpei, vice chairman of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee, a Diet member since 1931, a four-term prefectural assemblyman, a village chief and an agricultural association executive.

HORIKAWA Kyohei, former Minseito prefectural assemblyman, director of a control society and former member of the Dai Nippon Seijikai.

KUDO Tetsuo, 76-year old Minseito member who has served for six terms in the Diet.

HARA Fujiro, seventy year old lawyer and former procurator and judge, was a Diet member for 8 terms, and, 1936, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Justice. He is a former

IRAPS



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IRAPS and Seijikai member, but his service in these organizations was nominal only. HARA was a student at Paris and Grenoble.

MATSUDA Shoichi, five times Minseito Diet member from Mie, who was affiliated with the Minseito, IRAPS and Seijikai.

TANAKA Mitsugi, third-term Diet member and former IRAPS secretary and Seijikai member. TANAKA was purged in June 1946.

SHIBATA Hyoichiro, member of the House of Peers and secretary of the Seijikai who was advisor to his local IRAA.

KOBAYASHI Kanae, a lawyer and third-term Diet member, formerly of the Seiyukai.

TSUCHIKURA Muneaki, four times a Diet member and formerly of the Seiyukai.

INUKAI Ken, fifth term Diet member, formerly a Seiyukai member.

HAKAGAWA Shigeharu, eight times Minseito Diet member, town head and IRAA advisor, is one of the more influential shipping leaders in Akita prefecture.

NAGAI Gen, lawyer, third term Minseito member, advisor of IRAA, director of IRAPS and a Seijikai member.

NARUSHIMA Isamu, a Minseito farmer, formerly of IRAA and IRAPS.

YOSHIOKA Yayoi, president of Tokyo Women's Medical College.

MURAOKA Hanako, graduate of the Anglo-Japanese Higher School.

KIUCHI Kyo, elementary school principal and former member of the IRAA Central Control Board.

KIMORA Tomiko, "an irregular city official."

An important characteristic of the new General Affairs Committee, supposedly representative of the "youth" movement sponsored by TSURUMI and INUKAI, is the overwhelming representation given to the former Minseito and Seiyukai politicians and to the former members of the Dai Nippon Seijikai, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association Political Society. The conservative nature of such individuals goes far toward negating the statement by the Progressive Party leaders that they represent a new and "stream-lined" policy and that their party favors liberalism and reform.

INUKAI Ken:

Whether it is true, as its opponents allege, that the Progressives reflect the wishes of such Zaibatsu as the Mitsubishi interests which have, in the past, been supposed to have close connections with Baron SHIDEHARA is a matter difficult to determine. INUKAI is, however,

frank



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frank to admit that he regards SHIDEHARA as "a second father" to whom he will always apply for advice; he also professes to be extremely anxious to further the purposes which his father, the assassinated INUKAI Tsuyoshi, supported. Since the elder INUKAI was, with OZAKI Yukio, regarded as a "twin God of the Constitution," INUKAI Ken feels that he, too, should be active in securing for Japan a modernized and democratized basic law.

INUKAI's ambition and his form hold upon Progressive Party machinery probably prevented the dissolution of the party following its disruption by the purge. At a time when it seemed probably that, save for the personal opposition of SAITO toward HATOYAMA Ichiro, the Progressives and Liberals would merge, it was INUKAI and SAITO who were chiefly responsible for its continuance. With SAITO's "promotion" to an advisorship and his subsequent withdrawal from such active direction as he held prior to the formation of the Yoshida Cabinet, INUKAI has come to wield almost complete power over the party.

personally, INUKAI is scarcely a person who inspires great confidence concerning his personal devotion toward democratic principles. He gives the impression that he is too anxious to please, too ready to accept advice given him by others (though without carrying such advice into execution) and too smooth in method. His past history as Communications Ministry Councillor, 1937-1939, and as magazine editor, 1918-1931, has not been brilliant, but it has been unusual, in that, as private secretary to his father, INUKAI Tsuyoshi, he participated in secret conferences with CHIANG Kai Shek looking forward to the return of Manchuria to China. This resulted in the murder of the elder INUKAI and in the arrest of the son.

Against this, however, may be balanced his choice of old-time politicians as his committee associates and his tolerance of men with IRAPS and Seijikai affiliations. He himself, however, was never a member of these organizations.

In 1940 he was aide to the Japanese Ambassador at Nanking and was named a delegate to conclude a peace treaty with the puppet government but, "because of differences of opinion," he resigned after one day's service. In April 1941 he was offered, but declined, an advisorship to the Nanking Government. From November 1945 until January 1946, INUKAI was parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. INUKAI insists that he has always insisted upon withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and for a repudiation of any Japanese territorial or financial claims on China.

The history of the Progressive Party is, for some time to come, likely to be the history of INUKAI himself.

#### MEMBERSHIP:

The party has little or no formal membership. Theoretically, machinery exists whereby applicants fill out blanks stating their desire to join the party but, except for the declaration of name, age, occupation, and public office held (which indicates the type of applicant anticipated) there is no further information. Two sponsors sign the blank. By mid-March 1946, only 400 applicants had filled out blanks, but of this number Tokyo possessed the names and addresses of only 77.

Membership



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Membership is not, however, essential for acceptance as a candidate. In Akita-ken, but one member was known to central headquarters but there were five approved candidates for the Diet, none of whom was a party member. In Osaka, where SAITO claimed that the party was strong, there were nine candidates for office, but only two members.

Candidates are recognized by the central headquarters after being nominated by the branches but if the local candidate refuses to accept Tokyo dictation, he is free to break away without fear of serious reprisal. Recognition carries with it no material support, hence there is nothing to hold a candidate loyal if someone else offers better inducement.

#### BRANCHES:

Nothing is specified in the Rules and By-Laws concerning the nature of functions of local Branches, except that they shall be established in each Do, To, Fu and Ken. Up until election day, 1946, only 46 such branches had been established and only half of these were what the party leaders described as "strong." In each case they were set up by 20 to 30 people (not all of whom were dues paying members) who chose spokesmen empowered to conduct all Branch activities. The Tokyo city organization was completed late in December by a group of 37 individuals. There are no gun or other small locality groups.

Branch organizations receive no aid from central Headquarters and, theoretically, they are free to disregard, apparently with impunity, all policies to which they may object. In the event of serious conflict of policy, however, Tokyo reserves the right to veto local action, and, although it has no power to enforce that veto except by withdrawal of recognition, such veto is evidently effective. The local Branch does not consider itself independent of the central Headquarters nor does it often presume to intrude its advice or to initiate policy upon the central officers.

#### PARTY ORGANIZATION:

Neither the Rules nor the By-Laws of the Progressive Party reveal truly democratic principles. The party is a Tokyo dictatorship, ruled from central Headquarters without any consultation with the voters nor even with the restricted group of so-called "party members" who are the local committeemen. Insofar as the party possesses principles, other than the attainment of office, the platform is drawn up in Tokyo.

Theoretically, a Party Council, summoned yearly and on such other occasions "as may seem necessary," constitutes the controlling agency. Composed of an indefinite number of Headquarters' officials, Diet members belonging to the party and not more than five delegates from each branch, it is too unwieldy a body to act independently and it is, therefore, authorized to delegate its authority to a president which presumably it chooses.

In actual fact, the Party Council has never been fully convened although, at the close of December 1945, a group of 20 delegates (representing an even smaller number of branches) met at Tokyo to

confer



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confer with the Diet members and with the office bureaucrats to confirm the selection of MACHIDA Chuji as president. When, however, as a result of the purge, MACHIDA gave up the post and was replaced, temporarily, by SAITO Takeo as interim chief, the Party Council was not called into session, nor did it meet to ratify the selection of Baron SHIDEHARA Kinjuro as president to succeed SAITO.

The president, theoretically elected for a four-year term, is assisted by a General Affairs Committee "of several members," chosen by the Council for one-year terms, but, as the By-Laws state, "when there are insufficient members or when anything happens to any of them," the president may himself name new members. He also appoints a secretary-general "who shall, under the direction of the president, conduct party business." Thus the president is, in theory, a one-man master of the party, while the secretary-general, in the event that the president is a figurehead, is the actual controller.

This development apparently presages a change in party machinery since, according to the By-Laws the president holds a position superior to that of the chairman of the General Affairs Committee while the secretary-general, as the presidential deputy would also seem to outrank the committee head. Yet, to those familiar with actual Progressive Party practice, it is obvious that at the moment the real authority is vested, properly or by common consent, in the hands of INUKAI and that TANAKA is subordinate. The situation is typical of the confusion reigning in Progressive Party circles and of the fact that neither democracy nor legality of party authority is taken very seriously at the party's Headquarters.

#### PLATFORM:

The statement of principles, drawn up by TSURUMI, the party's most experienced propagandist, with the assistance of OTA Masataka, former IRAA director, has never been ratified by any general action or the party members. It is possible that it may have been considered by the 20 delegate ken committee meeting held in December but the party leaders are vague upon the matter. There has been no meeting of the Party Council to approve the platform but the General Affairs Committee has approved the draft.

The platform features defense of the Imperial institution, a Diet with enhanced powers and "controlled economy within the system of private ownership."

Sovereignty exists in the Emperor but is exercised through the people.

Stablization of economic livelihood by free economic activity.  
Advancement of national economy through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture.

(In explanation of this plank, TSURUMI attacked "false concepts of free economy which permit economic exploitation.")

Higher political, moral and social standards.

Respect for human rights, the improvement of women's standing and the establishment of basic security and happiness.

Protection of the national constitution and the establishment of  
responsible



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responsible parliamentary government based on true democracy.

Cultivation of individual character based on co-operation and self-government, respecting the individual's freedom.

Promotion of active production and fair supply through an "independent work-for-all system" and the balancing of power among the industries.

Reformation of the judicial system.

To implement the above planks, the Progressives advocate:

Emergency legislation against starvation, inflation, unemployment and war-suffering.

Repatriation of Japanese still overseas.

Increase of the purchase price of rice to ¥500 per koku, together with the importation of food.

Elimination of war controls.

Certain suggestions, advanced by TSURUMI were unofficially accepted but never became a definite part of the platform:

Prohibition of political contributions by unions.

Opposition to Communists, Social Democrats and Liberals.  
(Anti-Communist opposition was, however, confirmed.)

NAKAJIMA Chikuhei and NAGATA Tadao, members of the General Affairs Committee also proposed nationalization of coal mines.

After the general election of 10 April 1946, when the various political parties were under severe press criticism for their alleged conservatism, the Progressive spokesman allowed the impression to go forth that a new and "stream-lined" platform would be published, containing more liberal platform planks than had hitherto been published. Two weeks later, as announcement was made that agreement had been reached to include nationalization of fertilizer as a feature of the Progressive creed--this, presumably, as a bait for farmer support--but Progressive leaders proved reluctant to announce other features of the revised statement of principles.

Soon thereafter, the Progressives and the Liberals completed a deal whereby the Progressives threw their support to the Cabinet headed by YOSHIDA Shigeru, and representatives of each party met to draw up a common statement of principles. When, at the close of May, this agreement was concluded, nationalization of fertilizer went by the board. Indeed, the joint statement of the two parties, issued on 29 May, stated specifically the Progressive-Liberal opposition to "the nationalization of fertilizer as proposed by the Social Democratic Party."

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The shift in policy is typical of the Progressive Party's opportunism and of its failure to hold firm to specific principles.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Passed: PKR  
Noted ; CLK





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, July 24, 1946.

UNRESTRICTED

No. 519

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SUBJECT: Studies of Certain Japanese Political Parties.

1946 AUG

RECORDS BRANCH



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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward copies of two studies prepared by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes, Political Parties Branch, Public Administration Division, Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Social Democratic Party (Shakaito) and the Cooperative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), dated June 29 and July 15, 1946, respectively. In addition to outlining the origin, organization, and the various platforms of the two parties in question, these studies discuss at some length the party leaders and other party personalities, their present alignments, and the part they played in the spring elections.

894.00/7-2446 CS/HH

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Report dated June 29, 1946, on Social Democratic Party.
2. Copy of Report dated July 15, 1946, on Cooperative Democratic Party.

Original and hectograph to the Department.

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JWBurnett:ajb

MAR - 7 1947

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 519, dated July 24, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Studies of Certain Japanese Political Parties."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

29 June 1946

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(SHAKAITO)

SOURCES:

The following study of the origin, development, aims and personnel of the Social Democratic Party has been prepared on the basis of the published statements, platforms, and officially approved press releases issued by Tokyo party headquarters, checked by analyses of the speeches of accredited leaders and by interviews with the party's high officials.

PARTY STRENGTH:

In the Diet elections of April 1946, the Social Democratic Party polled 8,988,000 votes, electing 92 candidates out of a total of 332 seats contested by the party. This indicates that the party won a Diet seat for each 96,645 votes cast, a rate lower than the average of 113,100 votes per seat in all Japanese election districts.

NAME:

The Japanese name Shakai-to means Socialist, or Social Party, but the official translation preferred by party leaders is Social Democratic Party.

THEORY:

The Social Democratic Party has as its slogan "Democratic Politics and Socialist economy."

A loosely organized combination of politicians of divergent views, the party acts as a bridge between extremist Leftists and cautious conservatives.

More topflight leaders belong to the Social Democratic Party than to any other. Inside the party they sometimes quarrel so bitterly that observers constantly anticipate an outright break, but, contrary to expectations, the rival leaders have held together firmly.

FORMATION:

Basically, the Social Democratic Party is a Socialist group made up of former members of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto), the Labor Party (Nodoto), and the Proletarian Party (Musanto), all of which were

disbanded



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disbanded before the war through police opposition.

Roughly speaking, these three sources explain the origins of the Left Wing, the Center, and the Right Wing factions of the present Social Democratic Party. Labor Party men, together with former Communists (who may or may not be "disguised Communists") constitute a Left Wing; former Social Mass members are on the right while a middle-of-the-road group is comprised of more conservative laborites and proletarians. The general statement must, however, not be taken as an absolute guide, since exceptions are plentiful on both the leftist and the Rightist sections.

These terms, moreover, are misleading since the Leftists are not necessarily Communists and the Rightists have no reactionary tendencies.

Within a week after surrender, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, leftist opponent of Imperial rule, and HIRANO Rikizo, an Emperor supporter, both of the Social Mass Party, summoned proletarian leaders to a preliminary meeting at which merger plans were discussed.

Difficulties appeared at the start. The proposed party divided on three important issues:

1. Emperor: Several important Leftists desired to abolish the Emperor System, while the Right Wing group was generally committed to its preservation under conditions limiting the Imperial power.

2. Co-Operation: Generally speaking, the Left Wing asked for a more or less formal union of all democratic groups in a common struggle against what they termed Fascist tendencies; the Right Wing saw little danger of Fascism and preferred independent political action for the common goal of democracy.

3. Leadership: ADE Isoe, 83-year old Waseda University professor of economics and long-time head of politico-labor movements, was preferred but he excused himself on account of age. KAGAWA Toyohiko and TAKANO Iwasaburo were second choices but neither was willing to stand in the forefront. Certain former labor party members, notably KONO Mitsu, KAWAKAMI Jotaro, MIYAKE Masaichi and FUHADA Chu, Tokyo Chamber of Commerce chief and Prince KONOYE's president of the Legislative Bureau, 1937-1939, favored Count ARIMA Rainei, former head of the IRAA Co-Operative Division but this was bitterly opposed by KATO Kanju, SUZUKI Mosaburo and others who condemned ARIMA for his supposedly nationalistic views. When the party chiefs rejected ARIMA's candidacy, MIYAKE and FUNADA quit the Social Democrats and helped in the founding of the Co-Operative Party (Kyodoto).

KATO then proposed Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika, a step that caused KATO to be accused of lacking political principles, but TOKUGAWA also was rejected. Although the Marquis did not leave the Social Democratic Party he too threw his support to the Co-Operatives.

Professor OYAMA Ikuo, former Waseda Professor, head of the Farmer-Labor Party (Ronoto) and currently attached to Northwestern University, was also a presidential suggestion, as was KATAYAMA Tetsu, present chief secretary, MATSUOKA Komakichi, old-time labor leader, and NISHIO

Suyehiro,



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Suyehiro, ex-vice president of the Japan Trade Union Federation and of the Steel Workers Union.

The multiplicity of candidates was by-passed by the expedient of naming no one as president but, instead, appointing KATAYAMA as chief secretary and NISHIO as head of the Central Executive Committee. These were victories for the Right Wing faction which also controlled a two-thirds majority of the Executive Committee.

Under these agreements the party held an inaugural ceremony, 2 November 1945, under the slogan, "Capitalism or Socialism." The 150 proletarian and labor leaders who founded the party included 17 Diet members.

KATAYAMA TETSU:

The party is headed by KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, a lawyer with a long experience as political organizer of radical labor groups. KATAYAMA has held official posts, usually secretary-ships, in ABE Isco's Proletarian Party (1925), the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto-1926), the Farmers' Union (from which he resigned when there was danger of its becoming reactionary), and the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) which he represented in the Diet. The Social Mass Party, however, dropped him from its rolls when he voted to retain SAITO Takeo in the Diet. KATAYAMA headed the General Federation of Farmers' Unions from 1926 until its dissolution in 1940. He then attempted to form a National Labor Party (Kokumin Kinroto) but was prevented by the police from doing so.

KATAYAMA worked in co-operation with HOSHIJIMA Jiro (Liberal, and now Minister of Commerce and Industry) to establish the Central Legal Information Bureau and he was legal adviser for several students accused of radicalism. He has served in the Diet since 1930, with the exception of the war period when he was defeated in the TOJO election of 1942.

A close adviser is MATSUMOTO Jichiro, treasurer of the party, who has been a contractor for buildings and public works and who is also a former Social Mass Party member. MATSUMOTO, however, is much better known as the Suiheisha leader. He, too, was a projector of the National Labor Party but later became an adviser to the IRAA and the IRAPS. MATSUMOTO was purged by the Japanese Government but was later reinstated.

LEFT WING:

The Left Wing (Saiyoku) aims at transforming the Social Democratic Party from its present status of "a lower middle class conservative group", which ARAHATA Kanson, a Left Wing chief, calls "pinch-hitters for the imperialistic bourgeoisie", into a militant proletarian organization. It would purge the extreme Right Wing of KONO, KAWAKAMI, MATSUOKA and others and, while favoring the coalition of the Social Democrats with other anti-reactionary elements (by which they mean the Communists), oppose co-operation between their party and the Liberals and the Progressives.

The chief Left Wing leaders are:

KATO Kanju, long-time labor leader who led the Tokyo Transport  
Workers



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Workers Union and the Japan Council of Trade Unions (created November 1934 and dissolved by the police in 1937). He helped form the Labor Party in 1936, and the Proletarian Party in 1937. A Diet member since 1932, he is married to the former Baroness ISHIMOTO.

ARAHATA Katsuso (Kanson), a former Communist who prides himself on having been jailed seven times for anti-militarism, and one time member of OYAMA's Ronoto, was long an ardent supporter of the United Front and as such an uncompromising opponent of the Social Democratic Right Wing (he demanded the expulsion from the party of KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro). As organizer of the Japan Labor Union Federation (Rodo Kumiai Sodomei) and of the Kanto Metal Workers' Union, which is said to include 5,000 members, he is credited with strong influence over at least 20,000 unionists. Within the party he founded the Doshi-sha, or Brotherhood Group, which sought a more aggressive Leftist policy, and he opposed vigorously all alliances with the "bourgeois Liberals." Nevertheless, after Communists led an anti-SHIDEHARA demonstration breaking a pledge previously made to the Social Democrats ARAHATA protested the action. For this he was severely criticized by the Communist newspaper Akahata.

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, another former Communist, and editor of Minshu Shimbun, is the most vocal United Front advocate. On at least three occasions he issued a supposedly non-partisan call for an all-democratic union. He heads a committee of 19 Leftist publicists and educators, pledged to work for the establishment of such a Front.

ONO Shunichi, former Minshu Shimbun editor, who resigned that post 19 January, also advocates the Democratic Front. He has protested the party decision to support the Emperor System.

SUZUKI Mosaburo, active in the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and a former Proletarian Party secretary-general, is yet another Democratic Front pleader. He is in the curious position of being called both pro-Communist and pro-conservative. He is generally credited with being a KATO follower.

SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, labor organizer of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and former Proletarian Party leader, who was jailed for anti-militaristic activity in 1928 and again, for a year, in 1937, favors democracy although, at the time the party was organized he confessed that he was not quite sure what democracy meant. He believes in the reduction of the Emperor to a position similar to that of the British King.

MIZUTAMI Chosaburo, former Farmer-Labor and Social Mass member favors transfer of sovereignty from the Emperor to the people. An associate of OYAMA Ikuo, and a Democratic Front advocate he has been official party spokesman. He has been a Diet member five times.

RIGHT WING:



RIGHT WING:

The conservative leaders of the Right Wing (Uyoku) are far more influential within the party than are the radicals. Some of them, perhaps, entered the party originally by arrangement with HATOYAMA Ichiro as his agents within the Social Democratic movement just as some of the Leftists were once described as "disguised Communists", but it is much more accurate to describe them now as old-line members of the former Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto). The three elder statesmen, ABE Isoo, KAGAWA Toyohiko and KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, belong to this faction.

In addition, the Right Wing includes:

NISHIO Suyehiro, an iron worker in his youth who became president of the Osaka branch of the Japan Federation of Labor (Nippon Rodo Sodomei) and of the Kansai Labor League. Twice delegate to the Geneva Trade Union Congress, 1923 and 1928, and former vice-president of the Tokyo Steel Workers Federation, he has been a member of parliament since 1930. Expelled from the Social Mass Party, 1938, for failure to follow its militarist leaders, he has been under constant attack because of alleged, but thus far unproven, charges of complicity in the activities of SASAKAWA Roichi, of the old Kokusai Taishuto, in favor of the 8th Day Society (Hachinichi-kai). He is also alleged to have been a member of the dissolved Zenkoku Kinroshi Domei. Said by the Communists to have been a friend of FUJI Yoshio, a supposed Fascist, it is also charged that he was sent by air to China during the war for the increase of morale among the troops.

HIRANO Rikiso, publisher and former chairman of Kyodo and Rengo News Agencies, a Waseda graduate of 1922 and an agrarian leader since that year, has been member of the Diet from Yamanashi-ken since 1936. Former head of the Japan Farmers' Union and general secretary of the Japan Masses Party (Taishuto), as well as central executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) he is said to have used his influence to promote the interests of the ultra-nationalistic Imperial Way Association (Kodo-kai) formed in 1933 to encourage militarism among veteran servicemen's associations. HIRANO explains, however, that two organizations of the same name were in existence and that his Kodo-kai was so anti-militaristic that it was dissolved by TOJO's government. HIRANO, a close friend of MATSUOKA Komakichi, hoped for a Cabinet in which MATSUOKA would be premier and he would be **Minister of Agriculture.**

MATSUOKA Komakichi, labor leader since his factory working days, 1914, and former president of the General Union of Workers, has been a labor delegate to the International Labor Organization. Campaigning on a slogan "Free labor from the tyranny of capitalism", he was, nevertheless, appointed committeeman for the Ex-Servicemen's Protective Association and councillor for the National Spirit Mobilization Movement.

MATSUOKA's



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MATSUOKA's campaign slogan in the 1942 election was "to further the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

HARA Hyonosuke, a lawyer, and active supporter of the National Industrial Service Movement, by which all labor unions were to be amalgamated into one governmentally-sponsored organization.

YONEKUBO Mitsutsuko, ex-branch chief of the IRAA and chief director of the Great Japan Ocean League (Dai Nippon Kaiyo Rommei), a former member of the Diet.

Mrs. YAMAZAKI Michiko, now known as FUJIWARA Michiko, who ran for the Diet in 1946 as a replacement for her husband, YAMAZAKI Kenji, war-time governor of Borneo. Mrs. YAMAZAKI instituted suit for divorce just prior to election when her husband returned with a Borneo wife and two illegitimate children.

CENTER GROUP:

Between the extreme wings is a third group, most of them former Ronoto members, who lean to the right but who prefer to be officially included with a centrist group. Some of them, as former IRAA officials were barred from office-holding by the 4 January 1946 directive; others are under constant criticism by leftist organs.

SUGIYAMA Motojiro, retired committeeman, who has been a Farmer-Labor, Mass Party, IRAA, IRAPS and headquarters member of the Sojikai. A co-operative leader and a dentist, he was also active in the Fatherland Defense Association.

HOMIZO Katsu, also a former committeeman, and, like SUGIYAMA a former Diet member, who had been a Social Mass Party member and active in the Farmland Reform League (Nochi Seido Kai-kaku Domei).

KONO Mitsu, a lawyer who had been an executive committeeman for the Farmer-Labor and Social Mass Parties, and a member of the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Society (Dai Nippon Sangyo Hokokukai). In 1941 he published "The Politics of National Defence" in which he implied that totalitarian Shintoism was the basic principle of the Japanese state; he praised the exploits of sailors in small submarines who attacked Pearl Harbor. An ex-editor of Asahi, and Diet member since 1937, he was a member of the Diet Examination Committee of IRAA. He is also said to have carried out certain missions for the Navy.

TAHARA Haruji, graduate of Denver University and of the University of Missouri School of Journalism, and former Asahi writer, now head of the Fisherman's Union, has represented Fukuoka since 1937. He has been a member of Asia Reconstruction Society (Koa Sohombu) and of the Greater Japan Asia Reconstruction League (Dai Nippon Koa Domei). As a Navy attache,

"with



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"with the assimilated rank of admiral", he was sent to New Guinea on a special mission.

KAWAKAMI Jotaro, ex manager for IRAA, and former professor of St. Paul's University, a former executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party, served three terms as a Hyogo Diet representative.

ASANUMA Inejiro, former committeeman for the Japan Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, is a former vice chairman of the Tokyo Assembly and twice member of Parliament.

KURODA Hisao, one of the few centrists with Leftist leanings, has been active in the Proletarian, Social Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, and twice a member of Parliament.

MIYAKE Shoichi, formerly of the IRAA and of the Patriotic society, Doshikai, is a member of the Society for the National Protection (Cokoku Boshikai).

SUNAGA Ko, a farmer and weaver, and former member of Parliament, has been active in the Farmer-Labor, Social Mass, Labor Mass and Japan Mass Parties, and has also served as an officer of the Japan Farmers' Association (Nomin Kai Kumiai Jimbi In).

#### DEMOCRATIC FRONT:

✓ Much of the Party's internal difficulties arise from the troublesome question of how to co-operate with other parties. Left Wing strategy centered about the possibilities of an anti-reactionary alliance. As first projected, it was called a United Front, later modified into the Peoples' Front or Democratic Front, but, whatever the name, implying a common attitude to be taken against undemocratic (really anti-Communistic) or pro-capitalistic movements.

The Democratic Front idea was more tactical in nature than sincere in purpose but because it was put forward as a "liberal" and "democratic" movement for the prevention of reaction it gained much sympathy among progressive members of the community. The history of its development is, to a large degree, the story of Communist effort at infiltration into the Social Democratic Party.

As early as 19 October 1945, SHIGA Yoshio, Communist leader newly released from Fuchu Penitentiary, suggested to the organizers of the Social Democratic Party that they unite with the Communist Party for the promotion of democracy. The offer was promptly rejected as premature, by MIZUTANI Chuji, SUZUKI Mosaburo and HIRANO Rikiso because the Social Democrats, on the one hand, had not yet organized while the Communists had yet to announce

a program.



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a program.

The refusal was repeated by the Central Executive Committee, 4 December, on the ground that the Communists opposed the Emperor while the Social Democrats, as the committee said, believed "the power of the state to be vested in the sovereign."

The United Front invitation was declined, for a third time, 27 December, because the Central Executive Committee held that each party should produce its own program for the solution of the food problem.

Again, 15 January 1946, the Central Executive Committee refused a United Front because, except for generalities, "the Communists kept their principles secret." Moreover, according to MIZUTANI, when on a former occasion, about 1926, the Communists had proposed collaboration with the Farmer-Labor Party, they used unfair methods to gain exclusive control. In spite of the sincerity now professed by the Communists, MIZUTANI said, "The time is not ripe for blood brotherhood."

Privately the Right Wing leaders resented what they termed the effrontery of the Communists, a minor party in point of membership, in proposing amalgamation on equal terms with a party several times larger than themselves. They considered the repeated invitations of the Communists as purely strategic efforts to attract attention and to brand the Social Democrats as "Conservative" for not joining in a "common front against reaction."

Bitter intra-party battles marked each of the refusals. On each occasion, ARAHATA violently attacked the Central Executive Committee as "dominated by reaction". YAMAKAWA published, in Minshu, an appeal for unity, and when the appeal failed to attract favorable publicity he repeated it to a press interview. KITADA Ichiro and YAMAHAMA Rideo supported YAMAKAWA's plea.

Indeed, at a rally honoring NOSAKA, KATAYAMA Tetsu, party secretary-general, went so far as to pledge the Social Democratic Party to a common front, but he added that since political matters were still in chaos it would be wiser to postpone decisions until after elections. This was the official party policy, intended to placate the Left while supporting the Right Wing's opposition to Communist alliances.

Generally speaking the collaborationist faction is composed of the Left Wing leaders, plus MATSUOKA, KURODA, YONEKUBO and MORITO Tatsuo, head of the Chara Research Institute. The outstanding opponents are NISHIO, HIRANO, KONO, ASANUMA, TAHARA and SUNAGA. Both groups claim to have the support of KATAYAMA.

Most of the local Branches support the Central Executive Committee's decisions but two of them, Aomori and Gifu, in each of which prefectures the Social Democratic Party is weak, raised objections. Both called for a United Front and each protested at the official party position concerning the Emperor. Aomori asked for a plebiscite on the Tenno System while Gifu called for outright abolition. The stand of these two Branches was particularly unusual in that both Gifu and Aomori are especially strong conservative constituencies.

Kyoto



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Kyoto Leftists also proposed a coalition with the Communists but while this call drew extensive newspaper attention it appeared, upon close examination, to be a comparatively unimportant maneuver "by disguised Communists" to swing the party into the radical orbit.

Probably Yamanashi, a strongly conservative area, more truly represented the general party attitude when the Branch announced that it would expel all members participating in a United Front. No such expulsions proved necessary.

KYUKOKU MINSHU REMNEI:

True to the Party's promise that after election day the creation of a common anti-reactionary "front" would be considered, the Standing Executive Committee set up, in mid-May, a special committee to study the situation. This group, headed by MORITO Tatsuo and including OSAWA Hisaaki, NAKAHARA Kenji and ITO Ushiro, proposed the creation of a Democratic League for National Salvation (Kyukoku Minshu Remnei) which had, for its dual aim, (1) Solution of the food problem through socialistic policies and (2) "Establishment through a constructive bloodless revolution of a democratic government with a democratic structure."

Although no one objected to the dual overall program, there was a violent difference over methods to be employed for its realization.

The first problem concerned the admission of Communists. Since the original proposal for such a front had stemmed from Communist sources and since the greatest pressure for such a group had been communist inspired, much of the League's expected value would have been sacrificed by Communist exclusion.

Nevertheless, KATO Kanju, usually counted as a Leftist, astonished his colleagues by asserting that the Communists had been insincere in their advocacy of such a league---for this, he was blasted by Akahata, the Communist newspaper---while AKAMATSU Isamu (Aichi), a Right Winger, charged that the only reason the Communists made the proposal was to advertise Communism and to split the Social Democratic Party. Such representatives as KOMO Mitsu, NIIZUMA Itoko (Hokkaido), ITO Ushiro (Fukuoka), MUTO Unijiro (Gumma), SAKAKIBARA Chiyo (Fukushima) and YAMAZAKI Tsunokichi (Aichi) agreed.

Others, such as MASAKI Kiyoshi (Hokkaido), TANAKA Shogetsu (Fukuoka) and OSAWA Kyumei (Aomori) insisted that the Communists be included. The Communists, incidentally, were dumb-founded to discover that one of their ardent supporters was TANAKA, a priest.

A second problem revolved about the question as to where and how the League should operate.

Right Wing spokesmen favored a working agreement among Diet members only, an arrangement which, by giving allies to the 95 Social Democratic representatives would greatly strengthen the minority position in the House. This would, in effect, submerge the 5 Communists into a democratic alliance and would rob them of much of their independence. Left

Wingers,



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Wingers, therefore, proposed the widening of the League into a broad agency including labor unions, farm organizations, cultural associations, discussion groups and other special councils.

A further complication appeared in the question as to how far such widened associations should operate. The conservatives disapproved the entire theory of expanded agencies and stood firm against them but they suggested that in the event they were over-ruled decisions should be made by majority vote of all members; the Leftists insisted on one vote for each group, regardless of its size. Since it was generally believed that Communists had set up a large number of tiny councils, each supposedly independent, such a program would afford the Communists a very effective voice.

The crux of the dispute was the question as to whether there should be extra-Diet supervision over legislation, especially one that would afford the Communists a greater control than their five Diet seats would justify.

Yet a third discussion centered about the League's programs. The narrow dual aim originally suggested seemed incomplete to Communists who desired to include the Emperor System, the replacement of the Diet by a Soviet system and other revolutionary ideas. The Social Democratic acceptance of the League had envisaged only the endorsement of a vague policy of democratization which would carry no ideological significance.

Long and heated discussion lasting more than a month threshed out these, and other problems, in great detail; it was not until mid-June that the Social Democratic Party eventually adopted the League program on a limited scale, with both a Diet group and an outside group--each to be governed by majority vote. The League idea, therefore, while highly acceptable to the conservative Right Wing faction, repudiated the aims sought by its Communistic originators.

#### LIBERAL DEAL:

Post-election developments lent color to a prediction made in January by HATOYAMA Ichiro, Liberal leader, that a coalition agreement would be made between Liberals and Social Democrats. According to the HATOYAMA story, a secret agreement had been completed between himself and certain Social Democratic leaders, probably NISHIO and KONO, for an interparty alliance. Amplifications of the story, not made public by HATOYAMA, were that, in the event of electoral success, SUGIYAMA would be Agricultural Minister, and either NISHIO or MATSUOKA Welfare Minister.

The story was promptly denied by other Social Democratic leaders. KATAYAMA, in a formal statement endorsed by his party, declared that the Social Democrats had "never thought or hoped" for co-operation with the Liberals. NISHIO, denying a report that he, MIZUTANI and HIRANO had dined with HATOYAMA and had demanded "Cabinet positions relating to public welfare", said that the Social Democrats could not co-operate with HATOYAMA because the latter's "liberalism" was "contradictory to Socialism."

If,



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If, however, such a deal was ever made, the terms were purely an independent arrangement made by HATOYAMA personally since with the passage of HATOYAMA from the political scene, the close alliance between his branch of the Liberal Party and the Right Wing of the Social Democrats completely ended. Had HATOYAMA continued in public life the two parties would probably have drawn closer to each other, with perhaps a later merger of conservative elements into one party, but after his purging the Social Democrats became entirely an opposition party without agreements save on a common emergency food solution program.

#### CABINET CRISIS:

Immediately after election, when it was evident that no party commanded a clear majority, the Social Democrats seriously discussed the possibility of coalescence with the Liberals; but the Social Democratic Left Wing protested bitterly, alleging that the conservative Socialists were betraying the Party principles.

Simultaneously the Progressives invited coalition, offering, if the Social Democrats agreed to a coalition, to give the latter party the Commerce, Agriculture and Welfare Ministries. The offer was made by INUKAI Ken, chief political manipulator of the Progressive Party.

Had the Progressives been more generous, such a coalition might well have eventuated, but the Progressives, anxious perhaps to hold out other posts as bait for the Co-Operatives, declined to widen their offer. MIZUTANI, therefore, unconditionally rejected the Progressive offer and announced that "Social Democrats will never co-operate with Progressives, nor with any other party that is not pledged to support our policies."

This attitude reflected the Social Democratic insistence upon principles, but it also had a more practical basis in that the leaders realized the tactical advantage of remaining in the opposition. At a time when imminent crises seemed impossible of quick solution, the party that headed the government must bear the blame if food supplies could not be increased and if reconstruction plans were difficult of fulfilment. An opposition party, on the other hand, might win support by voicing insistent demands for reforms for which it need not assume responsibility. The degree to which these two factors—principles and expediency—operated to color individual views varied according to the personality of executive committee members.

Nevertheless, at the same time that pride in Socialistic ideas contended with fear of failure, a certain degree of ambition also operated. Although well aware that immediate problems were incapable of solution, the lure of office appealed to certain politicians. NISHIO, HIRANO and TAHARA, the more conservative leaders, conjured up, with the assistance of MIZUTANI, KATO, SUZUKI and NOMIZO, a plan whereby the Social Democrats would collaborate with the Liberals provided certain exorbitant terms were met. These terms included the awarding to the Social Democrats of the Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Welfare and Transport posts in addition

to accepting



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to accepting KATAYAMA as prime minister.

Such a demand stunned the Liberals who, despite their 142 Diet seats would thus have been reduced to the status of a minority party, but it is typical of the strange state of Japanese politics that the exorbitant demand was actually considered. But, as if this in itself was not enough, the Liberals went further by proposing that the arrangement be broadened into a four-party arrangement which would give recognition to the Co-Operatives and the Communists.

The suggestion collapsed. The Liberals, who needed only some 95 votes to form a majority, applied to the Progressives and made an alliance whereby Liberals and Progressives shared office on approximately equal terms. The Social Democrats, thus in the minority position where they had really always wished to be, did not regret the failure too much.

#### ORGANIZATION:

The party is undemocratically organized. Individual membership is decided upon a basis of applications submitted by those desiring to join on condition that they "adhere to party rules and pay the ¥4 annual party dues." They may not withdraw without submitting cause and must then surrender their membership cards. No provision exists for the expression of individual ideas, not even in the constitutional provisions concerning membership in branch organizations.

Party rules provide that a General Assembly shall be convoked yearly or by special call of one-third the Branches. This General Assembly, representing the Branches and chosen by them as they may desire, elects the secretary, treasurer and chairman of the Executive Committee, together with "several central committeemen."

Three committees are the actual party controllers. The Central Committee, described as the party's "deciding organ", is composed of headquarters officials and of an unspecified number of members elected by the General Assembly. An inner circle, the Central Executive Committee, is called the "executive organ", but a still smaller group, the Standing Central Executive Committee of the highest officials, "can over-ride the Central Executive Committee in cases where immediate action is necessary." Its head, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, "shall control all party affairs."

The chairman of the Central Executive Committee is NISHIO Suyehiro, and the secretary-general NATAYAMA Tetsu. These men, therefore, are the controlling party officials.

#### BRANCHES:

Fifty party members or more residing in any town or prefecture may form a Branch, provided their application receives headquarters approval, but other Branches may be formed whenever the Central Executive Committee chairman thinks such an establishment desirable. All names and addresses of party members, together with all contracts and other important documents must be forwarded to Party Headquarters for approval.

The purpose



The purpose of such Branches is "to resolve to materialize the party's general principles, policies and purposes." All discussions, as well as all decisions, made in Branches must be reported for approval to Headquarters.

In addition to officially recognized Branches, other groups, called Supporting Groups, "whose political contentions shall not be in discord with our party platform", may be affiliated. Neither Supporting Groups nor Branches have any authority except that the latter may send delegates to the General Assembly. There is no provision, whatever, regulating the manner in which delegates may be sent nor the basis upon which they are apportioned among the Branches.

CANDIDATES:

Candidates may be suggested by local Branches but are not officially recognized until Tokyo Headquarters have approved them. Branch recommendation is not, however, essential. In the April 1946 campaign, Tochigi-ken protested the imposition upon them of what it termed "parachute candidates" (rakkasan koho) nominated directly by Party Headquarters without local consent. (These men were KIMIJIMA Sadakichi, former prefectural governor, and TAKASE Dan, who was accused by his local Branch of having sent false telegrams to Tokyo alleging that he was the unanimous Branch choice. TAKASE was elected).

Support given to candidates by Tokyo consists chiefly of such prestige as the Party name bears, together with the assistance of "name" speakers sent out in his behalf. Candidates pay ¥200 for the privilege of running but receive in return only supplies of placards, bulletins, pamphlets and the right to use the official Party slogans.

PLATFORM:

The Social Democratic platform is noteworthy both for what it says and for what it omits to say. Drawn up by expert public opinion manipulators, it seeks to satisfy everyone without antagonizing either the Right or the Left Wing.

Thus, while the founders of the Party, in their organizational call, announced themselves as favoring "preservation of the Imperial Lineage", neither the platform itself nor the official statement submitted to the Home Office mentions the Imperial System or the dynasty. While the organizers specifically favored legalization of "scientific birth control", the redistribution of population between town and country, the postponement of interest on and the redemption of principal of war loans, and the imposition of heavy progressive taxation to recover war profits, none of these are included in the official platform as reported to the police.

On the other hand, the party went beyond original intentions by stressing plans for autonomous producers', merchants' and consumers' co-operatives, the abolition of the Privy Council and the confiscation, for public uses, of idle lands, unused mansions and crown estates and military grounds.

The essential features of the Social Democratic Party as reflected

both



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both in its platform and in approved public statements include the following:

GOVERNMENT:

Democratization of the Constitution.  
A two-House legislature, with the Upper House chosen by regional and occupational representation.  
Votes for all citizen over 18 years of age, on the system of proportional representation.  
Popular election of governors, mayors, and town and village headmen.  
Abolition of the nobility, the Elder Statesmen and the Privy Council.

LABOR:

Joint employer-workmen co-operation in management.  
Minimum wage laws.  
48 hour work week.  
Establishment of a Labor Ministry.

AGRICULTURE:

Establishment of large-scale farming, with mechanization and wider use of draft animals.  
Increase of ceiling price of rice to be paid to farmers.  
National control over feeds, fertilizers and tools.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION:

Unemployment, health and old-age insurance.  
Priority in employment for veterans.  
Relief of unemployment through reconstruction, housing and reclamation projects.  
Democratization of the radio system and wider distribution of radio sets.  
Increase of grain ration to 3 go daily.

WOMEN:

Equality of men and women in customs, institutions and laws.  
Prohibition of prostitution.

CULTURE:

Creation of a new Japanese civilization.  
Free, universal education on all levels.  
Adoption of the metric system.  
Adoption of Esperanto as a universal language.

Following publication of the platform, authorized statements by responsible party leaders added other planks extending or clarifying the official statement of aims and purposes.

Thus, in late November, the party, through MIZUTANI, approved the public ownership of steel, coal and other essential industries such as electricity and fertilizer, together with the nationalization of banks, trust companies and insurance firms.

Later,



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Later, MIZUTANI favored confiscation of all rice hoarded by farmers, and also suggested an increase in the property levy to 70 or 80 percent, together with a rise in the exemption level. MIZUTANI also advocated a reduction in the size of farms, cutting down the permitted holdings to three acres, even in the Hokkaido, with but one acre in Shikoku where it is possible to reap two crops per year.

Discussion of plans for a new Constitution afforded the Social Democrats an opportunity to revise and to extend their platform principles. The Party's Constitutional draft, as published on 23 February made the following suggestions:

EMPEROR:

The Emperor System should continue with the Throne enjoying reduced prerogatives. The Emperor, a politically irresponsible symbol, was to bestow honors and represent the state in foreign affairs. He was to have no other special powers and was expressly denied a veto.

Sovereignty was to rest in the state as a national cooperative body, and the Emperor was to be regarded as part of the state.

DIET:

Approves the succession and establishes regency.  
Passes laws (a bill twice approved by Lower House (popularly elected by proportional representation) becomes a law without approval of Upper House (vocational representatives)).  
Approves all treaties and passes budget.  
Exercises all supreme powers not held by Emperor.  
Sits constantly but may be dissolved by popular referendum.

DIET PRESIDENTS:

Name prime minister for Imperial approval.

CABINET:

Suggests amnesties to the Emperor.  
On advice of Presidents of both houses, names Supreme Court and Procurator General.  
Appoints all other judges.  
Administers laws.  
Hires and discharges government officials.

PRIME MINISTER:

Appoints the Cabinet, which is then responsible to the Diet.

POPULAR RIGHTS:



POPULAR RIGHTS:

In addition to the rights already demanded in the party platform etc., the Social Democrats asked that the Constitution include a clause limiting the rights of private ownership to purposes connected with public welfare, justice and fairness. Freedom of speech, press, publication, religion, communication, etc., was again stressed.

OTHER PROPOSALS:

Prior to the opening of the regular session of the Diet, in June 1946, the Standing Executive Committee presented to the YOSHIDA Cabinet a six-point Emergency Food Program for whose realization the Party pledged unwavering support. The plan comprised:

1. Government control over all farm lands, granting to farmers "the right to cultivate" and invalidating all land transactions since surrender which deprived farmers of their land.
2. Increased fertilizer production, with possible nationalization of the industry.
3. Revision of the food delivery system, developing a new price structure and exposing all hoarded food.
4. Reorganization and improvement of rationing.
5. Stabilization of the rice price at 500 yen per koku of five bushels.
6. Establishment of a government-operated salt works.

A supplementary recommendation, handed to the Agriculture, Finance, Transportation, Home and Education Ministries for transmission to the Cabinet, included government control of farm tools and farm necessities, (in addition to fertilizers), the suspension of luxury restaurants for a four months period, the prohibition of hoarding fishing tackle, and the increase of school vacations in order to provide more farm labor.

This was the platform upon which the Social Democrats announced their willingness to co-operate with the Administration in the solution of the food crisis.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Passed: PKR  
Noted : CLK



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 519, dated July 24, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the Subject "Studies of Certain Japanese Political Parties."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

15 July 1946

CO-OPERATIVE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(KYODO MINSHUTO)

ORIGINS:

The Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a centrist organization with roots among prewar officialdom, was formed in late December 1945 by 27 Diet members and heads of national co-operative societies. Many of its members are landlords and chiefs of nationwide agricultural agencies, with a sprinkling of lawyers, insurance executives and old-line politicians.

The party supports the Imperial Throne as the essential feature of the Japanese governmental system and differs from its parent parties, the Progressive and Social Democrats, by favoring popular, rather than state, control of production, distribution and exchange. It supports small and medium sized business in preference to large industry and, theoretically, as its name implies, prefers co-operative methods based upon private mutual agreements to either monopolistic or individualistic solutions. Practically it has become a party of professional conservatives. It opposes Communism and socialism and has, accordingly, been inaccurately called Fascist or reactionary, but it is sufficiently liberal to demand popular elections of both national and ken officials, adding to its platform a recommendation, unique among Japanese political parties, for the recall of unsatisfactory officials.

The Co-Operative Party, as it was called prior to May 1946, was begun by SENGOKU Torataro, 73 year old Ibaraki dairy farmer, Agriculture Minister for Prince HIGASHI KUNI, and director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, whose experience as president of national sales federations had convinced him of the value of co-operative methods. Associated with him was KURASAWA Torizo, former Diet member and IRAPS councillor, who, because of his extensive dairy interests is popularly known as the Hokkaido Butter King. His Snow Brand butter is known throughout Japan.

In conformity with Japanese political etiquette both SENGOKU and KURASAWA should have remained in the background, acting publically only as advisers to the party. Two reasons, however, militated against this: the fact that KURASAWA had active ambitions that called for public recognition and the additional circumstance that a rift early developed between the two founders. SENGOKU wanted an aggressive party with progressive social views; KURASAWA desired to harness the existing machinery of the

Agricultural



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Agricultural Associations, which during war time had been supervised closely by the Ministry of Agriculture.

SENGOKU lost out in this conflict, but KURASAWA's path did not thereby become easier. In the place of the progressive SENGOKU, a new element appeared in the person of FUJIYAMA Aiichiro, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, who was ambitious not only to link the rising party with the agricultural bureaucracy but also to attract the urban economic groups. FUJIYAMA expected to become Minister of Commerce.

FUJIYAMA operated through FUNADA Naka, chief director of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, deputy mayor of Tokyo, 1925, parliamentary councillor to the Foreign Office, 1937 and president of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau under Prince KONOYE, 1937-1939. FUNADA, formerly of the Seiyukai, and of the IRAA central committee, had been a Diet member since 1930. His idea, like that of FUJIYAMA, was that a purely agrarian base was too small for the erection of a nation-wide party and that only through the addition of industrial and commercial interests could the party become powerful.

Both the agrarian and the urban factions agreed, however, that the party should be primarily a centrist party, leaning somewhat to the right, and committed to the maintenance of the Imperial System. Each agreed, also, that the machinery of the Agricultural Associations was too effective an agency of regimentation to be discarded. In the Hokkaido, for instance, both groups used the co-operative farming, fishing and dairying co-operatives as a means of instructing members in the choice of Diet candidates.

Village chiefs, usually also high officials in local co-operatives, or of various agricultural or stock-raising associations, recommended to their constituents the proper persons for whom votes were to be cast. According to KAGAWA Kanekichi, himself a Diet member, adviser to the Agricultural Association, provincial assemblyman and president of the Horse Sales Association, "Villagers were expected to vote for the candidates thus named."

The success of such methods showed itself in the 10 April 1946 election when the agricultural-co-operative machine elected seven Diet members and would, according to KAGAWA, have elected all 11 had there been more time for organising the political machine.

The KURASAWA clique, is headed by KITA Katsutaro, former Diet member and large landowner. Because of his dynamic aggressiveness, KITA, formerly of IRAPS and Seijikai, is known as the Boar. The popularity of his clique is evidenced by the fact that 5 of the 7 successful Co-Operative candidates are allied to the KURASAWA-KITA forces.

SENGOKU also now belongs to this faction and has convinced it of the necessity of accepting more liberal organizational methods. KITA, for instance, much dislikes the policy whereby headmen, either of the co-operatives or of the villages, dictate the choice of candidates; he prefers a method whereby party members (those subscribing five yen yearly) shall choose delegates to a party convention which will select candidates. He is not so firmly wedded to this idea that he would oppose the American

primary



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primary system, but he feels that the convention method is more efficient for Japan in the present state of political development. KITA also objects to the present policy by which party headquarters at Tokyo possess the right to veto local candidates or to impose candidates upon a local district.

Other early members of the Co-Operative Party, all of whom had wartime and prewar records of government experience, included:

YOSHIUE Shosuke, member of the Diet from Chiba and chief of the arts and literature section of Chuo Shimbun, an IRAA director.

WIKAWA Paul Tadao, Finance Ministry attache since 1917, secretary to Japanese finance missions to China, Russia and the United States, former director of customs at Moji, financial commissioner in New York and managing director of the Central Bank of Co-Operative Societies, who was Prince KONOYE's confidential envoy to Washington, 1941, and later advisor to Admiral NOMURA's peace-preservation mission. WIKAWA entered the House of Peers in June 1946.

KIMURA Torataro, a young landlord of one of the largest Gumma estates who, against his father's intention and the wishes of his relatives, distributed his lands among his tenant farmers. A former member of the Diet, he felt himself to be disqualified from further service because he had served as a member of a Japanese youth delegation to visit the Hitler Youth Movement in Germany.

NAKATANI Tokeo, former Wakayama Diet member. An excitable and easily angered individual whose jealousies and quick tempers are credited with having destroyed the party in Wakayama.

YOSHIDA Tadashi, managing director of the Tokyo Co-Operative Unions and director of a silk-exporting Co-Operative.

In addition to the founders and to the 27 Diet members (most of them Progressive Party men from agricultural districts), Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika, KAGAWA Toyohiko and Count ARIMA Rainai were friendly to the new party. KAGAWA never actually joined, though he has consistently acted as advisor, and ARIMA, of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested before he could take any active part in the party's work, but TOKUGAWA, after conflicting reports as to whether he was, or was not, a party member is currently regarded, June 1946, as a member in good standing.

In some degree, it is apparent, the Co-Operative Party is an outgrowth of a somewhat mysterious group, the National Policy Research Institute (Kokusaku Kenkyukai), begun prior to the war as an investigation society. This group, which has been described as "almost a secret organization" existing for the purpose of "advising the army, and to a less extent, the government on policy", was a KONOYE sponsored agency. Originally it was liberal but later came under the influence of General UGAKI

Kasushigo



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Kasushigo. According to WIKAWA, its original sponsors then resigned, WIKAWA himself going to Washington on a secret KONOYE mission. At the conclusion of the war, WIKAWA and his colleagues reorganized the remnants of the Institute, or those members who were believed to be free of war guilt, as the nucleus of a political party.

Two weeks after the Co-Operative Party's formation, the 4 January 1946 "Purge Directive" removed from public life all members of the Executive Committee except WIKAWA and all Diet members except KITA. Although the original party sponsors continued to suggest policy from behind the scenes, thus assuring party continuity, an entirely new group of officials was required.

It is, however, evident that the forces which inspired the Co-Operative Party at its birth did not cease to operate following the purge. At the end of February, when at the initiative of local farm co-operatives national committeemen, Diet candidates and a few local representatives held a general meeting to choose a new central executive committee, new men, of a type similar to the old, were selected. In addition to WIKAWA and KITA Katsutarō, the following made up the new committee:

FUNADA Kyoso, brother of FUNADA Naka, and professor at Keijo Imperial University, whom WIKAWA says represents the Chamber of Commerce.

MIYARE Ichiro, former managing director of the Japan Agricultural Co-Operative Association.

MIYAGI Koji, managing director of the Co-Operative Fire Insurance Company.

YAMAMOTO Sanshiko, former Diet member, and former Minseito official, publisher of Kaiso magazine.

OKU Muneo, a director of the Working Women's Club.

At the same time that the new central executive committee was formed, the party announced that it had admitted the Ishikawa-ken Civic Party (Kominto) to full membership. Seven hundred mayors, village headmen, presidents of agricultural societies, credit associations, chiefs of control associations and factory managers were thus, according to the Civic Party's formal statement, added to the Co-Operative strength. If this official statement is correct, it indicates the type of adherents most desired by the Co-Operative leaders. WIKAWA, the most vocal member of the party, is insistent that the Co-Operative group applies strict tests to all persons seeking membership. Because of the firm stand taken by the KITA brothers for agrarianism, only those applicants who are proved supporters of the farm co-operative principle were at first accepted; for this reason, he states, most applicants were refused admission.

Concurrently with the absorption of the Civic Party, the Co-Operatives announced that they would contest 150 Diet seats, with the full expectation of electing at least 100 members.

PLATFORM:



PLATFORM:

The major principles of the Co-Operative Party platform may be summarized in three general statements:

1. Preservation of the Imperial Lineage, unbroken, with the Emperor possessing a veto power, similar to that of the President of the United States, in cases where the Diet fails to represent the popular will.
2. Establishment of a democratic form of government, under a democratic constitution, where the Diet representing the people's will, leads the nation in close co-operation between Emperor and people.
3. Re-organization of industry, economic life and culture according to the principles of co-operation in which all the people live in mutual reliance and assistance in all phases of their lives. The key words should be service, autonomy and fraternity.

POLICIES:

In order to achieve these general goals, the Co-Operative Party advocates the following basic policies:

GOVERNMENTAL:

Democratic parliamentarianism, with an upper house chosen along lines of vocational representation.

Abolition of the Privy Council, bureaucracy and Imperial Household Ministry.

Abolition of the peerage and all other social distinctions.

Popular election of local governors, with the right to recall officials after they have been elected.

An independent judiciary and a reformed police system.

Election by proportional representation.

ECONOMIC:

Destruction of capitalism and other feudal institutions.

Opposition to Bolshevism of industry but recognition of the right of Communism to exist.

Opposition of nationalization of industry, except for telephones, telegraphs and railways.

INFLATION:

Cut government subsidies and cease payment of compensation to munitions makers.

Postpone, or cancel payment of principal and interest on war bonds.

Establish



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Establish a fair price system.

Establish progressive property and war-profits taxes.

Restore the coal and fertilizer industries as basic reconstruction for the rehabilitation of other activity.

UNEMPLOYMENT:

Establish a broad program of engineering, reclamation and reforestation in order to provide work for the unemployed.

Open unoccupied mansions and other vacant buildings as housing for war-sufferers and for the homeless.

FOOD:

Provision of three go of rice, or its equivalent, as a regular ration.

Co-operative agriculture and fishing, with mutual agreements between consumers and distributors co-operatives.

Reclamation of waste land.

Radical land reforms.

Opposition to compulsion in the fulfilment of rice deliveries, but administration through neighborhood food communities.

Increase of price paid to farmers, rice to be paid for at ¥500 and wheat at ¥350 per koka.

Capital of farm villages to be re-invested in fertilizer, farm tools and similar agricultural necessities.

SOCIAL:

Free, universal education that will respect truth and the rights of the individual.

Redistribution of population between towns and rural regions.

Scientific birth control.

FINANCES:

✓ The Co-Operative Party funds have been drawn almost entirely from the pockets of the original founders. Of the ¥259,000 campaign fund, only ¥9000 came from outside sources, the balance coming from ¥50,000 contributions made by KUROSAWA, FUNADA, WIKAWA, YOSHIDA and YAMAMOTO. Each of the officially recognized candidates was required to post ¥300 as a partial subsidization of election expenses and a program has been developed of assessing each of the 608,000 individuals claimed as party members a ¥10 annual membership fee.

Much



Much of the original sum subscribed was paid out for printed matter, although ¥49,000 was spent for "inaugurating provincial chapters" and ¥22,000 for "entertainment." Salaries required ¥4000 and office expenses a slightly larger sum. "Investigation", however, called for but ¥2250.

ELECTION:

The claimed Party membership of 608,000 individuals affiliated with the party--a total more than twelve times larger than that claimed by any other political group in Japan--comes closer to representing the actual votes cast on election day than do the figures submitted by other parties. If anything, these Co-Operative figures are under-stated rather than exaggerated. In the two Hokkaido districts, for example, the Kyodo-to declared itself to have 100,000 members but cast 309,000 ballots; in Nara the party claimed 15,000 but gathered 38,000 votes, while in Kagoshima the party estimated a membership so small as not to be worth reporting but polled 122,000 votes. Nagano prefecture, however, is an exception; in that district 100,000 claimed membership yielded only 70,000 votes.

On election day the Co-Operatives elected seventeen Diet members, headed by KITA Katsutaro, YAMAMOTO Sanchiko and FUNADA Kyosi were the only other successful committee members.

On a basis of these successes, the Co-Operatives later broadened their claims, insisting that some 48% of the Japanese population was affiliated with the party because they subscribed to its principles.

Because of his absence from the Diet WIKAWA, spokesman of the party since the purge, then retired from the party leadership in favor of YAMAMOTO. WIKAWA, however, remained in the party inner circles as secretary-general.

Since the election the party claimed an influence far beyond its numerical Diet strength. Within two weeks of the election, the Kyodo-to demanded a voice in the building of the new cabinet. "In accordance with democratic principles," it urged a four-party coalition by Liberals, Social Democrats, Communists and Co-Operatives for an immediate solution of the food crisis and declared that any compromise to be effective must be made along Co-Operative Party lines, "to the left of the Liberals and to the right of the Social Democrats."

It did not, however, confine itself to paper declarations. Even before it became evident that the confused political situation would result in a long prolonged Cabinet deadlock, the Co-Operative Party sought alliances with minor parties and with various independent Diet members.

Here, however, they ran into difficulties. A sharp split occurred between those who, like YAMAMOTO and WIKAWA, sought to broaden the base by admitting urban representatives and those like the KITA brothers who insisted that the party should maintain a primarily agrarian nature. Both groups agreed, however, that belief in co-operative activity should be fundamental party policy. Neither side desired a final vote upon the issue, however, and so a compromise was reached whereby individual

applicants



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applicants for membership might be admitted after strict investigation of their Co-Operative principles. This opened the way for wholesale admissions.

No questions were raised, therefore, concerning certain Diet members who sought inclusion. Heads of prefectural agricultural associations were admitted without question, although some of these, admittedly, had cooperated during war-time with the militarist regime. The Hyuga Democratic Party of Miyazaki-ken, a group of four representatives supposedly controlled by General UGAKI Kazushige, and containing an ex-Seiyukai secretary, a prefectural official, a brewer and a former teacher, joined at once. The Japan Agricultural Party (Nippon Nohonto) and the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto) with a newspaper publisher and a Hiroshima city councilman, a former IRAPS official, gained admission. By 2 May it was freely predicted that the Co-Operative strength would soon reach 70 seats. WIKAWA announced that numbers of men supposedly allied with the Japan Democratic Party, the Shinko Club and other small parties, as well as several nominal Independents would also join the Co-Operative group.

This program, however, ran into opposition because of the internal quarrels between agrarians and urbanites. The former Department of Agriculture bureaucratic leaders, together with Agricultural Association managers, resented the intrusion of city delegates, asserting that these were not truly representative of the co-operative spirit.

The split widened when, in mid-May, negotiation was in progress for absorption of the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a small Hiroshima faction consisting of two Diet members chosen on that ticket together with a third, nominally independent, who had also been supported by the Co-Operative Democrats. This party, numerically insignificant but important because it reflected the interests of the politically-minded General UGAKI, was purely agricultural and was therefore acceptable to the agrarians, but it was supposed also to represent special political influences opposed to the co-operative idea. To many Co-Operative members it seemed that the absorption of the little Co-Operative Democratic bloc spelled the intrusion into the party of professional politicians who had failed in their attempt to control the Progressive Party councils.

Nevertheless, the merger was accomplished, on terms which have never been clearly stated. On 23 May, the name of the party was officially changed to the Co-Operative Democratic Party (Kyodo Minshuto), a strange phenomenon in view of the relative size of the new entrants, but one which WIKAWA officially declared indicated the party's desire to demonstrate its democratic base. It is apparent, however, that this democratization is more in membership than in theory.

Almost simultaneously the Co-Operative Democracy announced the absorption of certain other minor party men who, for one reason or another, had been unhappy in their former affiliations.

This policy stirred considerable dissention. The KITA agrarians, for instance, objected to enrolling unattached politicians who sought

entry



entry merely for selfish advantage; calling such men "binjoshugisha", or opportunists, they protested that the party would thereby become just another conservative group varying little from the standard reactionary pattern.

YAMAMOTO, on the other hand, scented an opportunity for greater power. Using his wealth as a means for attracting experienced Diet members into the Co-Operative ranks, he lent money lavishly and gave expensive parties that enhanced his popularity.

Since, moreover, as party president he possessed the right to admit members almost at will, to name committeemen and even to appoint deputy chairmen, there was little opportunity for the agrarians to prevent the padding of the rolls in which YAMAMOTO proceeded to engage.

YAMAMOTO invited MIKI Takeo (Tokushima), director of the Metallurgy Industrial Company (Yakin Kogyo Kaisha) and former councillor to the Munitions Ministry. MIKI, a former Diet member, was one of those whom the "new faces" controlling the Democratic Club declared unacceptable to that organization. TANNO Minoru (Miyage), chosen as an Independent but later a Democratic Club member, also shifted his alliance, a week prior to being questioned by the police because of alleged election law violations. MOTO (Tokiso (Hiroshima), also a Democrat, joined his Co-Operative Democratic colleagues from that province; he had been claimed by the Progressives. WIKAWA and YAMAMOTO also recommended the admission of TANAKA Isaji (Kyoto) a NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO supporter, but on this they were over-ruled.

This reversal disclosed a deep-rooted objection both on the part of the agrarians and of the more devoted believers in the co-operative principle toward diluting party theory by the inclusion of professional politicians, but the YAMAMOTO money and the supposed needs of the party in gaining the aid of experienced political managers over-ruled opposition.

These membership additions coincided with a decision on the part of Co-Operative managers to oppose the Liberal-Progressive coalition in which, only a few days earlier, WIKAWA had been considering a Cabinet position. Co-Operative Democracy, WIKAWA explained, could not participate in any government representing reactionary influences or allied with the old SHIDEHARA regime.

Realignment of membership brought with it a shift in party management. WIKAWA and YAMAMOTO retained their key positions but several new men were added to the executive committee. Several of these represented concessions that had been deemed necessary in order to raise the Diet membership to the 46 seats claimed by the middle of June.

The Co-Operative Democratic Party then relegated its former leaders to a 25-man Central Committee which, as WIKAWA explained, is an honorary group with only nominal powers." Most of the members of the Managing Committee appear here also, but in addition, the KITA brothers, KAGAWA Kenkichi, MIYAGE, MIYABE, KOBAYASHI and NIKAIDO Susumu were enrolled in this relatively powerless section. It is noteworthy that while the Managing Committee contains but one Hokkaido and one Kyushu member there are no less than three representatives from the politically

important



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important Kanto; the Central Committee, on the other hand, gives the Hokkaido seven members and Kyushu four while Tokyo and the rest of the Kanto are not represented.

The reorganization brought professional politicians into the lime-light. HAYASHI Heima, old-line manipulator whose knowledge of parliamentary procedure was essential, became vice-chairman and party whip. KASAI Giuji, veteran politician whom the "new faces" of the Democratic Party had expelled from membership, joined as constitutional expert. OMIYA Gosaburo, originally elected from Hiroshima as an original Co-Operative Democrat, took his place as WIKAWA's assistant. In the event that YAMAMOTO was purged from public life and was succeeded by WIKAWA, OMIYA was to assume a more important role; if WIKAWA were not selected as YAMAMOTO's successor, KASAI expected to take the party headship.

The changes represented a shift from co-operative theory to the practical application of political machine rule.

To accentuate the shift in emphasis, a new Managing Committee, a 10 member executive group, replaced the former leaders. WIKAWA, FUNADA Kyoso, the Chamber of Commerce representative, and Mrs. OKU remained, but KITA disappeared into the relatively innocuous vice presidency, while MIYABE and MIYAGE of the original philosophic co-operative clique, retired from active management. KOBAYASHI Genzan, another of the pre-election leaders, retired to become the Party's auditor.

To replace the four discarded managers, seven new men were admitted to the Managing Committee. Four represented agricultural interests, two were teachers, through whom it was hoped to attract the other teachers of the Shinko Club, while the seventh was an automobile executive. The new committeemen were:

KINOSHITA Sakae, president of the Shinko Union Automobile Club and of the Hyogo Prefectural Automobile Charcoal Company.

YONEKURA Tatsuya, agricultural engineer for Nogano prefecture and chief of an agricultural school. He had been a local councillor for the Niigata IRAPS.

TAKEYAMA Yutaro, former engineer for the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry and a section chief of the National Agricultural Association.

AZUMA Takashi, managing director of the Hokkaido Agricultural Association and a prefectural engineer, also a former IRAPS advisor.

ASO Shozo, village headman and sub-chief of Toyama Agricultural Association, who had been elected on the Agricultural Society ticket.

HIRAKAWA Atsuo, a Hiroshima Independent who has been a primary school and normal school teacher.

KAJIMA



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KAJIMA Toru, sub-chief of the Japan Education Society, who was elected from Miyasaki prefecture by the efforts of a concerted teacher movement and who came into the Co-Operative Party after having participated in both the Daido Club and the Shinko Club movements.

KAJIMA's case is worthy of special notice. His election has been contested on the ground that the Great Japan Educational Association undertook a systematic campaign to elect a number of teachers to the Diet and that the machine methods thus said to have been employed were particularly noticeable in Miyazaki prefecture. KAJIMA was supposedly the chief of this pressure group activity; his presence in the Co-Operative Party is, therefore, a matter of some interest. KAJIMA was not formally a member of the Hyugu Democratic Party which chose four members of the Diet, all of whom swung over to the Co-Operatives but his presence on the Co-Operative Executive Committee is the only recognition accorded to the five Miyazaki members who affiliated themselves with the party. Similarly HIRAKAWA's membership on the Executive Committee, who was not an official candidate of the Co-Operative Democratic Party is the only nomination given to representatives of Hiroshima ken who joined the party.

Neither man pretends any exhaustive knowledge of Co-Operative theory. KAJIMA represents the most flagrant instance of proselytizing by Co-Operative managers. Never a member of any co-operative society, he became interested in the movement, he says, only after election when he learned that his former associates of the Independent and Shinko Club affiliations would be able to accomplish little under Diet regulations.

A teacher for two years and a principal for 18 years more, he was pushed, he says, into politics against both his consent and his knowledge; he claims not to know what was discussed at the meeting of 70 teachers of Miyazaki prefecture to whom he made the opening address, nor was he aware until the campaign was well under way that he was their candidate. As President of the Miyazaki Prefecture Educational Society he feels it only natural that the teachers should have supported him actively in the campaign and that some of the students should have worked in his interests but he first heard of election law abuses from the newspapers and only then when a friend told him of the matter. Even after the police and the newspapers had expressed an interest in the political machine methods employed, he did not think the charge sufficiently serious to warrant his attention.

Now that he has been elected to the Diet, and in spite of his utter ignorance of Co-Operative principles has been a member of the Executive Committee, he intends to retire from teaching and to live permanently in Tokyo as manager of a lumber business. Nominally he will be Miyazaki Prefecture manager, but that will not require his residence in the ken.

HIRAKAWA, who unlike KAJIMA, is a puppet for other forces, is equally frank about his lack of information concerning co-operative theory. KASAI and MIKI joined the party because it afforded them wider scope for their experience.

Not all the Diet members are convinced believers in Co-Operative principles. HAYASHI Heima, for instance, a ceramics manufacturer who

leased



leased ten acres of land for a farming and forestry project, is an old-time Diet member, now in his sixth term, who joined the Co-Operative Party because he thinks that a firm Rightist Party is essential to the national stability. As a thorough-going conservative, he deplors the Socialistic spirit with which the entire party, as he sees it, is permeated--though he accompanies this statement by a declaration that the rank and file of the party is 80% opposed to Socialism.

HAYASHI, incidentally, ran for office as a recommended candidate of the Progressive Party. He explains his present affiliation by declaring that although he knew that he was being recommended by the Progressives he did not have time, during the campaign, to raise objections to the Progressive endorsement.

UDA Kunie (Kagoshima) elected on the Agricultural Party ticket, joined the Co-Operatives at the request of his friend, MOTONO Kensuko. UDA is not affiliated with any co-operative organization and, prior to election, knew nothing of the movement, but, as editor of the Shimbun Domei news agency, he has always been interested in politics. Nine years ago, in fact, he ran for the Diet as an Independent, with Churitsu support, but failed. Unlike HAYASHI he joined the Co-Operatives because the party stands definitely for anti-Socialistic ends. Of his former affiliation, the Agricultural Party, UDA says that, while party president, he never knew how large its membership really was. Such matters, he explains, were in the province of the party treasurer who filled out a formal report to be sent to the Home Ministry. UDA signed the report but without having read it; he was not told, nor did he ask, what it contained.

UDA was one of those accused by the Communists of militarist tendencies, but he denies absolutely that he ever had militaristic connections. His news agency, he says, and his magazine, East Asia, did not, he declares, further the interests of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This defence is similar to the explanation offered by YAMAMOTO himself when the latter was accused of having published anti-democratic propaganda. YAMAMOTO declared that his magazine, Kaiso, had been definitely liberal, that it had printed undemocratic articles only under pressure and that he had not approved the contents of his periodical.

Similarly NIKAIDO Susumu, (Kagoshima), who also came under Communist attack, defends himself by saying that while he had been named a civilian adviser to the Front Line Propaganda Unit, under the supervision of the Naval General Staff, he was never a member of that staff, nor had he ever gone, as was charged, to Rabaul to conduct propaganda activities. It was impossible, NIKAIDO says, to have gone there because the Allies controlled both sea and air.

#### RIGHTIST THEORY:

Whether as a result of disappointment at failure to be included in the pro-Government coalition or because of ideological differences, the Co-Operative Party took a firm stand in opposition to the YOSHIDA

administration.



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administration. The Cabinet, according to an official press release from Co-Operative headquarters, is "bureaucratic and capitalistic."

Analysis of the Diet members allied with the Co-Operative Democratic Party indicates its strongly conservative nature. Sixteen of the original members are large-scale farmers whose holdings, by Japanese standards, are large while five of them are board members or chiefs of prefectural agricultural societies. The presence of two lawyers, three doctors, three publishers and a university professor evidence the party's intellectual basis while the absence of labor leaders, of small shopkeepers and of urban representatives reflect the party's specialized interests.

Accessions to the party's pre-coalition ranks came chiefly from Kyushu and from the Hokkaido with a sprinkling of members from the Kansai but almost none from the big cities nor from central or northern Honshu.

This localization has given rise to a general belief that the Co-Operative Party aims at the protection of landlordism and large land holdings. It is undoubtedly premature, if not entirely incorrect, to brand the party, as some radical groups have done, as "Fascist" or to state, as did KIKUTA Kasuo in the May 1946 edition of Genron Magazine, that Co-Operatives "camouflage themselves as democrats in order to maintain imperialism and feudalism" but they are undoubtedly conservative by preference.

#### EVALUATION:

The Co-Operative Democratic Party is largely an agrarian party representing the larger landowners, some of whom are absentee holders, rather than the tenant-farmers or the farm laborers. It is a conservative group supporting traditional Japanese ideas while cloaking those ideas in modernized terminology.

Superficially its program is progressive and, in the rare cases where the phraseology is not purposely vague, follows the line of pre-war Japanese Socialism. Its opposition to capitalism and to bureaucracy, its advocacy of progressive property and war-profits taxation, its insistence upon "radical land reforms", all give an appearance of radicalism.

It must be remembered, however, that these phrases and, specifically, the opposition to bureaucracy and capitalism, were the stock in trade of prewar totalitarian theorists and that the Co-Operative Democratic spokesmen are doing little more than reviving the slogans of those who sought to discredit the peace time industrialist group and their administrative allies. In using these slogans the Co-Operatives are not defending the militarist clique but they are using the same methods to attack the same interests that the militarists attacked in seeking to set up a totalitarian system.

The Co-Operatives follow the time-worn propagandist pattern of using Western terminology to describe their purely Japanese purposes.

Advocacy



Advocacy of an Imperial veto "similar to that of the President of the United States" in cases where the Diet "fails to represent the popular will" is a thin veil to mask the theory that in the event of a conflict between Emperor and popular representatives, the Emperor himself is the best judge of what people really wish. Such a veto is a negation of the subsequent clause stating that "the Diet represents the people's will." If the Co-Operatives really believed that the Diet actually represents the people then there would be no need for a veto "in cases where the Diet fails to represent the people's will."

Constant insistence upon the word "co-operation" is an instance of how western words are consistently used to veneer Oriental ideas. "Co-Operation between Emperor and people" is a traditional phrase used by Japanese totalitarian spokesmen to justify "restoration to the Emperor" of power supposedly filched from him by politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists. It was a common slogan of the "Showa Restorationists", of anti-liberals and of militarists. Where the word means anything at all, as in the phrase "where all the people live in mutual reliance and assistance in all phases of their lives on a basis of service, autonomy and fraternity", it implies subordination of the people to Imperial Control. It has never in the past implied subjection of the Emperor, or compromise by the Emperor, to popular opinion, nor are there indications in Co-Operative theory that it now implies any such subjection or compromise.

The key-word "Co-Operation", which such spokesmen as WIKAWA consistently use to describe the party's cure for economic and social difficulties is intended to inspire connotations of the Danish systems by which small landowners and small entrepreneurs successfully compete with big business for the mutual advantage of producer and consumer to the disadvantage of unnecessary middlemen. In actuality, it is the same phrase used by Japanese totalitarians to justify the unification of the nation under Imperial supervision. Little is said to betray the fact that in Japan, co-operatives were officially inspired, governmentally aided and officially controlled by administrators named by the Tokyo government.

Since after the downfall of the political parties in the 1930 decade, it was the entrenched civil service and the business interests that resisted most earnestly against the encroachment of the totalitarians and the militarists the "bureaucrats" and "capitalists" were always cited by the propagandists as the evil forces of Japan. It is interesting, therefore, that these same bureaucrats, other than those of the Agriculture Ministry, remain the bugbear of the Co-Operatives also and that the party solution, the setting up of national co-operative organizations, is in essence the same solution proposed by the prewar totalitarians.

In this connection, the close association of such Co-Operative leaders as WIKAWA, KITA Katsutaro, MIYABE and MIYAGE with officially tolerated co-operative industrial and agricultural associations is worthy of note. Not only were virtually all the sponsors of the party men with war-time records of friendly relations with totalitarian groups, but, following the purge that banned all but one of the original executive committee and all the former diet members except KITA the new officials were also men of previous official or semi-official connections. None, except YAMAMOTO have been active in liberal or democratic activities,

and YAMAMOTO



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and YAMAMOTO admits that he himself compromised with his militaristic opponents by permitting the publication of militaristic articles. For this reason he was purged by the Japanese in June 1946.

While, therefore, it is unfair to brand the Co-Operative Party as reactionary or as anti-democratic, it is nevertheless probable that, despite its protestations of progressivism, the Co-Operative Party as now constituted represents the right wing of Japanese political thought. In this connection may be cited the fact that the Co-Operative stand upon the matter of the Emperor System is the most conservative of all the major political parties and that the Co-Operative leaders are among the few who specifically proclaim, as an official party doctrine, their positive opposition to Communism. Other parties, such as the Liberals and the Progressives, privately express unwillingness to participate in any anti-Communist movement, but only the Co-Operatives include the statement as part of their party principles.

A minor characteristic of the Co-Operative Party leaders, notably WIKAWA himself, is an unfortunate addiction to over-statement of claims. Again and again, the Co-Operative Party, in announcing its plans, has exaggerated its influence and its prospects, giving rise to the assumption that the leaders themselves have been misled concerning their importance, as when WIKAWA announced as a certainty that his party had been promised three Cabinet seats, including his own as Finance Minister, when, as a matter of fact, the party then possessed but seventeen Diet seats. The over-statements tend to weaken in some degree the cogency of other claims made on behalf of the party.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

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ATTACHES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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FROM Tokyo

NO 529

Tokyo, August 1, 1946.

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an Communist Party.

Political Adviser has the honor to refer No. 293, March 8, 1946, on the subject "The Communist Party in Japan." There is a report of July 24, 1946, by Mr. Harry Emerson Wildes of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Far East, titled "Communist Party."

Recent developments in Communist Party matters has made it impracticable to refer to the contents of this well-written report. The report contains geographical material concerning the Japanese Communist Party and critically analyzes the party's activities, its problems as the farm program, labor, youth, "mass meetings, and violence. An analysis of party discipline, party funds, the Young People's section of the party, the party's draft constitution.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF FOREIGN SERVICES  
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Enclosure: *cut m*

Study of "Communist Party"  
July 24, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, August 1, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 529

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SUBJECT: Study of the Japan Communist Party.

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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 293, March 8, 1946, on the subject "Outline of Procedure of the Communist Party in Japan." There is enclosed a study dated July 24, 1946, by Mr. Harry Emerson Wildes of the Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, entitled "Communist Party."

The press of more urgent matters has made it impracticable to prepare the usual summary of this well-written report. The report contains all available biographical material concerning the Japan Communist Party's leaders and critically analyzes the party's approach to such important problems as the farm program, labor, the so-called "United Front," mass meetings, and violence. An examination is also made of party discipline, party funds, the Young Communist League, the women's section of the party, the party's platform, and the Communist Party's draft constitution.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
REPORTING SERVICES

Enclosure: *cut m*

Study of "Communist Party"  
July 24, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure to despatch No. 529 dated August 1, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Study of the Japan Communist Party."

(COPY)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

24 July 1946

COMMUNIST PARTY

(KYOSANTO)

FORMATION:

At the suggestion of visiting Chinese and Russian Communists, a few Japanese radicals, on July 15, 1922, founded a small but vigorous Japan Communist Party (Nippon Kyosanto).

These men, including the veteran KATAYAMA Sen, ARAHATA Katsumo (now with the Social Democrats) and KONDO Eizo, head of the Japanese War Sufferers' Union, built a new party on the remnants of earlier radical movements that had been crushed by police and militarist activity. The Communist Party did not, during the 1920 - and most of the 1930 decade, number more than 100 active members, but its influence was so strong and the police were so fearful of its activities, that, during 1932-1934 alone, no fewer than 70,000 suspected Communists were arrested and no less than 7,000 were jailed. It is, of course, obvious that many of these individuals were detained and punished for other than proved Communist activities.

Some of them, however, particularly SHIGA Yoshio, TOKUDA Kyuichi, SANO Oaku, NABEYAMA Sadakichi and MITAMURA Shiro, were active Communists propagandists. These names are important, since the first two, SHIGA and TOKUDA are active contemporary leaders and members of the Diet, while the latter three, SANO, NABEYAMA and MITAMURA who recanted their beliefs under police pressure while in jail, are today regarded as "traitors to the Working Classes."

From the very beginning the Japan Communist Party moved both openly and underground. Publically their activities attracted slight attention from others than the nervous Thought Police; secretly their activities permeated movements that were ostensible labor dominated, culturally important or non-partisan. Thus, the small Communist nucleus, operating in "cells" of five men each, influenced the Japan Discussion Association (Zenkoku Hyogi Kai) and the Farmer-Labor Party headed by OYAMA Ikuo, Waseda professor who is currently attached to Northwestern University.

Immediately after the release from prison, in October 1945, of SHIGA, TOKUDA and other Communists who had been seventeen years in jail, the Communist movement which had operated secretly during the war under instructions written in Moscow by WATANABE Masanosuke and FUKUMOTO Kazuo, emerged into activity. SHIGA called at GHQ to suggest that SCAP use Communist Party facilities to make its wishes known to the Japanese people; it was his idea that the Communists should be accepted as the mouthpiece of the Occupation. This

suggestion,



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suggestion, of course, could not be accepted, and the Communists then proceeded to summon a general Congress of party members to meet in Tokyo in December 1945.

This meeting, the fourth national party convention, followed an inaugural meeting held at Tokyo in 1922, at which SAKAI Toshihiko presided; a second at Tachikawa and a third, under the chairmanship of WATANABE Masanosuke, held at Coshiki Hot Springs prior to the war. The official description of the Tokyo Congress as "the Fourth General Convention" was intended to demonstrate the Party's continuity. At the time of the Party's general meeting the membership was officially announced as 1183 dues-payers.

No attempt was made at this Fourth Convention to formulate a definite party platform; instead a series of vaguely abstract theses were proclaimed as patterns upon which the Party would mold its ideas. These "theses" closely paralleled the general instructions written in Moscow by WATANABE and FUKUMOTO. It was, however, apparent that the purposely clouded language of the declaration veiled a demand for immediate abolition of the Emperor System, a purging of the Imperial Household, the militarists, Zaibatsu and large landowners and the use of force if necessary to attain these ends.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE:

A tentative leadership was also set up, including a 7-man Central Committee to direct Party affairs. These were:

1. TOKUDA Kyuichi, secretary-general, who was, with SHIGA, a survivor of the original 1922 founders. TOKUDA, an Okinawa-born lawyer, had been converted to radicalism at 16, by reading of the "martyred" KOTOKU Danjiro, and he had been arrested at 18 for radical speech-making. A lawyer who had lived in Russia (1921-1922) he was again arrested in 1923 and thereafter returned to Russia where he served as Japanese Communist delegate. On returning to Japan 1928, he was again imprisoned and, after a third Moscow visit, was jailed from 28 February 1928 until October 1945. He had been an unsuccessful Diet candidate for the Farmer-Labor Party.

2. SHIGA Yoshio was a 45 year old graduate of the Moscow Eastern Labor University, and of the Imperial University, who served one year, 1925-1926, in the Shimonoseki Heavy Artillery Regiment. A newspaperman who had worked on the Communist organ "Marxism" and on the "Musansha Shimbun" ("Proletarian Newspaper"), he had been, in 1927, chief of the Party's Political Bureau and had been jailed from 1928 to 1945.

3. NAKAMADA Satomi, a former metal worker

4. MIYAMOTO Kenji, a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University who is vaguely described as "author."

5. KAMIYAMA Shigoo, another author.

6. KUROKI Shigenori

7. KIM Ton Kai, "an author, education unknown" who represented the Korean Communists living in Japan.

This



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This information, drawn, in the cases of the last five from official records supplies to the Home Ministry, is typical of the lack of candidness with which from the beginning the Communists have conducted their operation. Although the official regulations provide that full details be provided of the lives, education, occupations and previous activities of all Party officers, the Communist Party avoids giving detailed statements and confines itself to vagueness.

As intellectual background for these Central Committee members, the Party announced that it was supported by a special Kyoto Imperial University group, consisting of:

SUEKAWA Hiroshi, professor of civil law

TAKIGAWA Koshin, former professor of commercial law

SASAKI Seichi, former professor of constitutional law

These intellectuals, however, hold no formal Party position.

SHIGA LINE:

In its early reorganization stages the Communist Party made little progress. SHIGA, TOKUDA and others of the so-called "Prison Group" alienated many loyal Japanese by insisting that the Emperor, "that guy in the palace," was a criminal who should be tried for war-guilt and that "that guy's brat" should never succeed to the throne. A second cause for public dissatisfaction stemmed from the belief, expressed by SHIGA himself, that the Party by branding opponents as "Fascists" and as "Zaibatsu," would stoop to blackmail. There were rumors also, though denied by KUROKI and other Communists, that the Party purposely agitated food riots and other disturbances and that money and advice flowed in from Russia.

The general public belief that the Communists stood for Russia, for libel, for sedition and for violence militated against Communism. By the end of December the Party had grown to but 2000 members.

Nevertheless by constant speeches, publicity releases and other newsmaking activities the Party kept itself foremost in the public eye. A press, generally friendly because of the presence of many Communist sympathizers among the newspapermen and because the Communists leaders were colorful and exciting news-sources, fanned public interest in Communist policies. Yomiuri-Hochi, Minpo and the Mainichi were consistently friendly, while Kyodo and Jiji, the news-agencies supplying virtually every Japanese journal with political information, frequently "slanted" their items along Communist lines.

Thus, while the party remained comparatively minor in size, it seemed to gain an influence far in excess of its real strength. Overseas newspapers, drawing their information chiefly from the Japanese news sources, tended to overemphasize the true importance of the Communist movement.

NOSAKA Sanzo:

The return from Communist China, in January 1946, of NOSAKA

Sanzo,



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Sanzo, Keio University graduate who had spent a life-time in the radical and labor movements, changed the picture. NOSAKA, a one-time protege of SUZUKI Bunji, former conservative labor leader, and of Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister at whose invitation NOSAKA had once joined the British Labor Party, only to desert it for the Communist movement, introduced moderation and "gradualism" into the Japanese Communist Party.

NOSAKA pointed out that conditions in Japan differed from those experienced by Russia in 1917. As a consequence of surrender, militarism and imperialism had been eliminated and Communism had been recognized as a legal movement. Under such circumstances, NOSAKA said, the use of force had not only become illegal but unnecessary, while socialism could be produced through the instrumentality of a democratic peoples' government acting through parliament.

Whether this philosophy is in line with authoritarian Communist thought is beside the point; the fact as it concerns Japan is that NOSAKA's revised line, calculated to make Communism "beloved by the people," smoothed out a number of difficulties previously faced.

Simultaneously, NOSAKA furthered a policy, already urged by SHIGA, of a "United Front" of all democratic elements against the forces of reaction. These forces were never clearly identified but the general impression which both SHIGA and NOSAKA intended to convey was that unless the liberal and freedom-loving groups united in a common effort conservatives would plunge Japan into the worst excesses of reaction and feudalism, if not into militarism and Zaibatsu control.

The change from the SHIGA-TOKUDA line to the NOSAKA policy did not cause much public comment. Unlike the Social Democrats and the Liberals, the Communists quarrelled behind closed doors. In this, of course, they were aided by their press and radio allies who publicized the disharmony of rival parties while minimizing Communist disputes. All that the general public was permitted to know was that a revised platform was under consideration and that it would be released for publication at the Fifth Congress of the Party to be held in late February 1946.

As part of NOSAKA's desire that the Communists should be "beloved," the new policy declared that the first aim was not to realize Communism in Japan but was merely to attain Socialism. He denied that Communists had ever advocated the abolition of private property but assured the public that Communists recognized the privileges of small owners. The new plan suspended the theory of direct aggressive proletarian revolution in favor of parliamentary action through non-violence; it also soft-pedalled the Party's persistent opposition to the Emperor System although the abolition of that system remained the first item upon the program.

The success of the NOSAKA line in attracting supporters is shown by the fact that enrollment jumped, by June 1946, to more than 20,000 members. The circulation of Akahata, now a thrice-a-week paper, rose to 300,000.

#### 1946 ELECTION:

In the 10 April 1946 general election the Communist Party, by  
polling



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polling more than 1,900,000 votes elected 5 Diet members. These were TOKUDA, SHIGA and NOSAKA, together with TAKAKURA Teru and Miss KARASAWA Toshiko, the latter a labor organizer from the Hokkaido. In June, as a result of the disqualification through purge of KONO Ichiro, Liberal Party secretary-general, a sixth Communist, NAKANISHI Inosuke, was added.

Party elation at winning its first seats in the Japanese Diet was diluted by dissatisfaction that greater success had not been attained. At first the Party explained that vast numbers of voters had been disfranchized, but when careful investigation revealed that less than one percent of the electorate had lost their vote and these largely because of their own negligence, a second "explanation" was put forward--that the election had come too soon. This, however, was countered by the fact that the election, instead of being rushed, had actually been postponed from January to April.

The Communists then admitted that their failure to appreciate the tenacity with which Japanese supported the Emperor System had been the main reason for their inability to win more seats.

New methods, designed to further Communist influence through domination under the guise of democratization, of local government, agricultural associations, food supply agencies and similar groups, were then studied.

#### OFFICIALS:

Little biographical information is available concerning the Party's Central Executive Committee which was chosen at the Fifth General Congress. In addition to TOKUDA, SHIGA, NAKAMADA, MIYAMOTO, KAMIYAMA, KIM AND NOSAKA, who had been tentatively selected either by the December meeting or, as in the case of NOSAKA, unofficially by the Committee itself after his return from China, twelve other committeemen were named.

As in the case of the seven previously selected, six of whom are officially described only as "author," and only one of whom, NAKAMADA, has apparently ever had experience as an actual manual laborer, the twelve new individuals are, if their Party biographies are to be credited, entirely colorless. Five are described as "authors," and 3 as having "no occupation." A farmer, a coal miner, an "artisan" and a "finishing worker" comprise the other four. Four of the new men have had no education known to the Party leaders whose responsibility it was to compile biographies and one other did not finish elementary school. Only NOSAKA, TOKUDA and HASEGAWA Hiroshi have enjoyed any portion of a college education.

The twelve new committeemen are:

ITO Kenichi, an "artisan who did not finish elementary school." ITO is the Communist who created a stir when in a campaign speech he referred to the Emperor as "that guy in the palace," to the Empress as "that guy's wife" and to the Crown Prince as "that guy's brat." Charges of lose majeste were about to be brought against him for his freedom of utterance but the charges were never preferred.

ITO



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ITO Ritsu, the Party's farm expert, an author who completed only part of his high school course.

HASEGAWA Hiroshi, formerly a student, but not a graduate, of Tokyo Imperial University.

KASUGA Shoichi, formerly a student at an electrical school.

KASUGA Shojiro.

KONNO Yojire, formerly a student at Yamagata High School,

NISHIZAWA Ryuji, an author, who once studied at the Second High School.

MATSUZAKI Kumaji, a finishing worker.

UCHINO Takechiyo, farmer.

MIZUTANI Takashi, coal miner, formerly of the Fukuoka School.

KARAHARA Korchito, Author.

OKADA Bunkichi, author with an elementary school education.

In addition to the lack of training and to the lack of practical experience of these committeemen, a striking feature is their comparative youthfulness. ITO, the farm expert, is only 23 years old; four others are in their thirties, eleven in their forties, while TOKUDA and NOSAKA, the eldest members, are 50 and 54 years old respectively. Few other major parties have central committeemen younger than their sixties; none give high responsibilities to men as young as ITO. This Communist emphasis on youth develops, of course, from the fact that the Party has no deep roots in the past; it may perhaps also be explained by the fact that Communist and other radical leaders of the past fell foul of police persecution and were eliminated from the political scene.

Some of those committeemen, perhaps, are more ornamental than essential. When the full central executive committee organized after their selection, the key posts were distributed to the small inner circle of older and more experienced leaders. TOKUDA, for example, became Chief Secretary, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat and Chief Organizer and Instructor. SHIGA, of the 'Politburo' and the Secretariat, took over the editorship of "Akahata," the party organ, and NOSAKA, of the 'Politburo' and the Secretariat, became Chief of Propaganda and Chief of the Investigation Section. Other 'Politburo' members included MIYAMOTO and KIM, together with KUROKI Shigenori, TOKUDA's predecessor as chief secretary. KUROKI died, however, of a heart attack, so he did not last long as an inner circle member.

#### FARM PROBLEM:

The Communist Party, an urban group anxious to broaden its base by appealing also to farmers, views the agrarian problem as an

outgrowth



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outgrowth of semi-feudalism supported by the Tenno System.

The Communists regard themselves as the only truly democratic party; all others, they say, support the existing regime--the Progressives and Liberals as absentee landlords, the Co-operatives as a landlord-sponsored group, and the Social Democrats as well-to-do farmers and highly paid skilled workers who profit by exploitation of the masses. ITO Ritsu, the Party's agrarian spokesman, says that the present agrarian system is the basis for the Tenno System and the cause both of Japan's low industrial wages and of the aggressive nature of Japanese capitalism.

Communist expansion among farmers is difficult because farm organizations are at present largely dominated by Social Democratic influences. The Japan Farmers' Union (Nomin Kumiai), organized in December 1945 with some 500,000 farm families (one-tenth of the Japanese total) is officered by Right Wing Social Democrats. TOKUDA and SHIGA, however, who have attempted to construct local "cells" for Communist infiltration, claim that perhaps 40% of the membership, approximately 200,000 farm families, are "Communist-minded."

Communists also oppose the central governing body of Farmers' Unions, The Farmers' Association Council (Nichi No), although they work within this also for greater "democratization" of its purposes.

The Communist Party program, as officially laid down in the Fifth Party Congress, February 1946, is marked by generalities rather than by definite detail. It envisages that all decisions shall be made by "democratic farmers," although without defining the term--and that land income shall be re-invested only in farming, by which, apparently, it seeks to prevent parasitic landlordism. It urges that land rents be restricted to 10% of the average crop of the past five years and that such amounts be paid, if in rice, at the official price of the grain, as now paid to the producer.

The Communists propose to "establish the right of cultivation" and to prohibit the "taking away of lands by landlords." They stand for confiscation of lands owned by the Imperial family, shrines, peers, idle landowners and large landowners and the redistribution of such lands "by a democratic government." No compensation is to be given to "huge landowners" but there will be "compulsory purchase" of lands owned by small holders.

Decisions as to whether any individual property is large or small will depend upon local conditions and upon the "character of the landowner" as decided by a "peasants' committee," a distinction that may well give rise to discrimination and to injustice. All such decisions, however, are subject to review by "the Popular Government."

The Communists also propose to confiscate idle fields and forests and to bring them under state cultivation with irrigation, mechanization and reclamation at government expense. How this can be combined with the Communist program of distributing newly cleared lands to peasants and how mechanization can work profitably on Japanese farms which are usually smaller than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres per holder is difficult to understand, nor does the Communist manifesto endeavor to explain the difficulty.

The



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The Communist farm program states specifically that it is opposed to "overburdening taxation placed upon peasants" but it remains vague about what it means by fair taxation. The farm planks, apparently, are drawn rather with the idea of attracting agrarian support than with any idea of scientific accuracy or meaning.

Not only does the Communist farm program lack precision; it also lacks sincerity. After having talked at great length of the need for a United Front against reaction, the Communists failed to co-operate with democratic forces within the farmers' associations. The Farmers' Union, in June 1946, officially protested that the Communists "often deceived the Union, causing dissention in the Front." According to the Farmers' Union, which, it must be remembered, is dominated by Social Democrats, the Communist members sought to force the Union to accept Communistic principles. "They call objectors to their policies reactionary; they threaten exposures, and they break friendship and faith with our Union." The official Union statement adds, conservatively, "Such a situation produces misunderstanding."

This objection, voiced by farm delegates from Hiroshima, Saitama, Aichi, and Yamanashi prefectures, produced a return charge from ITO Ritsu that the Union was itself insincere. "The Japan Farmers' Union," he said, "contains war criminals." ITO named specifically NISHIO Suyehiro and HIRANO Rikizo of the Social Democrats as those who were attempting to compel the Union to follow Social Democratic lines.

LABOR:

The Communists, as might have been expected, lay great stress upon the labor movement. Although the Party's formal program ranks labor sixth in order of interest (following the establishment of a republic, democracy, farm and food reforms, punishment of war criminals and price stabilization) and even then mentions specifically only a seven-hour day, a minimum wage and "a complete factory law," it is nevertheless true that the Party is primarily a labor-minded group.

NCIO  
Its interests, however, lie less in reform than in the spread of Communist theory. The general strategy was to seek control over unions as a means for inculcating doctrine. To that end they sought to win control by welding into a single union, under Communist influence, all the various Japanese labor unions.

This ambition encountered serious difficulty because of the complexity of the Japanese labor union system. The labor movement, for all the favorable publicity it had received and despite the general impression of its widespread influence was in reality comparatively weak. Although unionization had spread rapidly, labor had succumbed to the prevalent Japanese tendency toward over-organization. While no less than 7357 unions had been formed within eight months, the total membership was but 2,651,552, an average of only 365 members per union. Overall numbers were impressive but Fukuoka unions averaged but 65 members while Tokyo, supposedly the most thoroughly organized city in Japan, had but 30 members for each union.

These unions, many of which were little more than bookkeeping entries, were further complicated by their clustering into larger groups. Of these, there were three general types: The independent, or company unions, like that of the Seikoshi Glock Company or the Kameari

Branch



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Branch of the Hichachi Industries; the Nippon Rodo Sodomei (Japan Federation of Labor) an American type craft union federation supported by the Social Democrats; and the group of CIO-model unions which Communists hoped to influence.

This third group, represented by the Kanto Council Labor Union (Kanto Rodo Kyogi Kai), the National Union of Coal Miners, the Government Railway Workers, the Newspaper and Radio Workers and the Communication workers, offered a forum for Communist influence. By no means all the members were Party adherents; while some 700,000 or 800,000 members were enrolled within such unions, and were promptly claimed by TOKUDA as "Communist-minded," no more than 5,000 at most were actual Communist members. (Simultaneously of the 200,000 farmers of the Nomin Linkai only about 1000 were Communist members.) Nevertheless the Communists as well-disciplined, vociferous and active propagandists ascertained a strength in excess of their true numbers.

ITO Keichi and KASUGA Shoichi, of the Communist Central Committee were co-organizers of the Japan CIO (Zenkoku Sangyobatsu Rodo Kumiai Kaigi); they, and HAKAWADA Satomi, Communist labor specialist, worked enthusiastically for the One Big Union idea. They believed themselves particularly strong in the metal and mining industries, especially in the Hokkaido and in Kyushu, where coal miners were said to be strongly favorable to the Communist theories.

#### UNITED FRONT:

Little real success was attained in the agitation for a United Front. This campaign, while waged with seeming heat and while stirring considerable political agitation, never had deep economic or philosophical foundations. Aimed at shadows rather than at any actual enemy, and moved by opportunistic rather than by genuinely democratic motives, the movement lacked reality.

The real motive, both of those who urged the Front, and of those who opposed it, was to cause embarrassment. Communists believed that the more conventional Socialists of the Social Democratic Party were torn by dissent and that their party would fall apart if a vigorous assault were made upon it. Thus they urged upon their Left Wing allies within the SDP a vague alliance consisting of little more than democratic platitudes and of abstract generalities professing hatred of reaction. In this way, Communists believed, they would win a foothold within the Social Democratic ranks and so propagate ideas, perhaps in time to detach the Left Wing and to weld it with the Communist movement.

The Right Wing, by far the more numerous of the Social Democratic factions, desiring political reformation rather than revolution, disliked Communists but feared to antagonize them lest the party be split asunder. Because, however, the Communists had a compact and vigorous organization, even though small, the Right Wingers manoeuvred to annex the Communists to their own party. By a United Front, it was believed, the Communists might be absorbed into the larger mass of the Social Democrats and thus be outvoted by sheer weight of numbers.

Each side recognized the motives inspiring the other. For this reason the Communists staunchly opposed the Social Democrat plan of voting by individuals and proposed instead that any voting to be done in a United Front be registered by organizations, each group to

possess



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possess one vote. By their control over many small groups, this device would guarantee Communist ascendancy. At the same time the Communists sought to broaden the Front--and to enlarge their own influence--by including in the proposed organization such agencies as labor unions, cultural societies, and other outside groups. This would, of course, vastly enhance the Communist influence and would, they thought, give them complete control of any United Front movement that might arise. This suggestion, however, was so sharply countered by the Right Wing Social Democrats that it failed of acceptance.

By this time the Communists, feeling that the term United Front had been worn so thin that it no longer carried force, deliberately changed the name, on NOSAKA's advice, and began to speak of the Common Front, or the Democratic Front. There was, however, no difference in content or in motive of the new Common, or People's or Democratic Front, although to some people, it was apparent, the new name implied a subtle change in ideology.

For once, as an unusual event in Communist strategy, the Communists advocates found themselves outguessed by Social Democratic planners. When it became evident that few but the Left Wingers would join a Communist sponsored movement, and that the Democratic Front was doomed to failure, such leaders as NISHIO, HIRANO and KONO Mitsu proposed to take over the Democratic Front idea and to further it as their own. To this end, they sponsored a movement purely within the Diet and operating on a limited program that was broad in principle, but vague in detail, on which all anti-administration Diet members would unite. This "Democratic League for National Salvation," a purely Right Wing venture, then offered the Communists an opportunity to join, under the one-Diet-member-one-vote principle, and when (as they had anticipated) the Communists scorned the proposal, the Right Wingers talked vociferously of Communist insincerity.

The Communists, completely taken aback by Social Democratic strategy, attempted to recapture the fervor of the Democratic Front idea by organizing an Association for Promoting the Democratic Front (Minshusensen Sokushinkai) which rallied the Communist sponsored organizations into a common unity, but which failed to capture popular imagination.

It was evident that the idea of a United Front had lost its reason for existence and that no valuable purpose would be served through its continuance. Not only had it failed to materialize but the projectors of the idea had not succeeded in establishing any common basis of opposition upon which anti-administration parties might stand.

#### MASS MEETINGS AND VIOLENCE:

Although NOSAKA and other Communist leaders consistently deny that the Party sponsors violence in method, a few unfortunate results of meetings held under Communist Party auspices or with Party co-operation occasionally give rise to general suspicion that certain party members are not averse to the use of force as a political argument.

In April 1946, just prior to election, TOKUDA, for instance, addressed a "Down With the SHIDEHARA Cabinet Meeting" at which he charged that SHIDEHARA had admitted that his administration was "a

congregation



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congregation of robbers, thieves, swindlers and usurpers." The meeting closed with a march, led by NOSAKA and TOKUDA, toward the Prime Minister's official residence, where a riot occurred at which 8 policemen were hurt, three being knocked unconscious, before the mob was dispersed by American military police. This breach of the peace was protested by no less a Communist sympathizer than ARAHATA Kanson who charged that his erstwhile Communist friends had violated an agreement not to use violence and to confine their speeches to certain topics previously agreed upon.

Other meetings, held on May Day 1946 and at a special "Food May Day" three weeks later, also ended in sporadic outbursts of violence. It is only fair to add that neither of these meetings was solely Communist in origin, but that they were more trade-unionist and Social Democratic in character, and that the speech-making was free from inflammatory language; but the general public, rightly or wrongly, identified the outbursts with Communist sympathizers. Similarly, the issuance from GHQ of a directive banning violence and condemning unruly mass-meetings was generally believed to apply to Communist meetings, and the fact that the only organized opposition to the directive stemmed from Communist sympathizers seemed to many to confirm the suspicion.

#### PARTY DISCIPLINE:

Communist Party organization follows the same hierarchical pattern common to all Japanese political groups, with such additional controls as may be imposed by international Party discipline.

More than other Japanese parties, the Communists are reluctant to disclose details of organization. This has double roots—first the long tradition of persecution suffered at the hands of prewar secret police which has given to the Communists a deep-seated fear of having their internal affairs made too public, and secondly the general policy, perhaps steaming from the same underground history in other lands, that Communist activity should be kept hidden from the outer world.

In this reluctance, to be sure, the Communists follow a preferred Japanese course. Throughout all its history of intercourse with foreigners, Japanese have endeavored to keep their thoughts and their motives hidden from the outer world; the Communists, in withholding as much information as they are able to retain for themselves, are merely acting in accordance with Japanese as well as Party tradition.

For such reasons, the Home Office in seeking to collect authentic data about the parties, finds its chief difficulties with the Communists. In spite of the clear provisions of Japanese laws and Imperial ordinances, the Communists delayed in reporting organizational details for so long a period that at one time the Home Office seriously debated whether the Party was amenable to the laws demanding suppression of groups that did not observe the regulations. In response to a Home Office demand that the Party supply proper information the Party Secretariat returned the brusque reply that it would answer such a questionnaire only if a responsible Home Office official appeared at headquarters to give adequate reason why he required the data. If, the secretariat added, the information was requested by SCAP, the Occupation officers would "know where to find us."

SHIGA



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SHIGA expressed the belief, in which NOSAKA later concurred, that disclosure of information regarding membership, for instance, was desired by the Home Office chiefly for the purpose of controlling the radical movement and that the Home Ministry looked upon registration requirements as an entering wedge for what he called "a second Peace Preservation Law."

PARTY FUNDS:

Such information as is available that the Party's income ranges from 100,000 yen to 200,000 yen monthly, of which 40% to 70% comes from "donations" from unspecified sources. Such "donations," according to hostile critics, cover remittances from Russia, via Korea or Saghalien; but intensive research by Occupation authorities or by Japanese investigators fails to produce evidence to justify such an explanation.

About 50,000 yen monthly is derived from the sale of Party publications, such as the five-daily Akahata or the monthly magazine Zenei. A smaller amount, perhaps 10,000 yen monthly, comes from party dues, assessed at the rate of one-tenth of one percent of each member's monthly income.

A special feature of Party finance, particularly important in the case of a group whose directing body is composed of so many "authors," is that all royalties drawn from publication of political articles go directly into Party funds.

As a corollary of this requirement, Party committeemen and other headquarters employees are placed upon a salary schedule, at a flat rate of 200 yen monthly. As this sum is admittedly too small for living purposes, additional allowances are provided--50 yen as "commodity purchasing allowances," 30 yen for travelling, and 50 yen for each dependent, but no one officially draws more than 500 yen a month. TOKUDA and NOSAKA, and perhaps others of the inner circle, admittedly receive, however, "occasional gifts," from party sympathizers which, according to the Party's chief secretary, "they are allowed to keep for themselves."

YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE:

In November 1945, a Young Communist League (Seinen Kyosan Renmei) was projected, under Party auspices, to operate with a 50,000 yen fund for the triple purpose of educating youth along Communist lines, broadening Party influence and training future leaders.

The League was conceived as a group which was explicitly to follow Party leadership and was definitely a Party agency, but the fiction was upheld that the YCL was primarily for cultivating literary, sports, and dramatic interests. As a means for cloaking its Communistic trends, the YCL projectors carefully refrained from emphasizing either the Emperor System or the question of establishing a peoples' republic.

Operating through a secretary-general and a central committee eventually responsible to a national congress, the YCL set up Branches in 25 prefectures and attempted, through infiltration of its members into key positions with liberal youth organizations, trade unions

and



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and "under certain circumstances, of reactionary organizations," to direct the policies of such groups.

The YCL itself upheld seven main objectives:

Opposition to imperialism, militarism and war.

United Front of all democratic youth.

Votes for all men and women over 18 years old.

Jobs for repatriated service men.

Abolition of semi-feudalistic employment systems, with equal pay for equal work.

Self-government and pupil participation in school administration, with academic freedom.

Co-education and equal opportunity.

Democracy and academic freedom, together with such slogans as anti-imperialism, united front, anti-feudalism and equal opportunity should be considered not only on their true face value but also in the light of the special significance given to such terms in the Communist vocabulary.

#### WOMEN'S SECTION:

A special Women's Political Section, headed by NAKI Yu, 24-year old former college girl, and IWAMOTO Akiko, high school graduate, urges that women be freed from feudalistic subordination through the establishment of equal rights for women and through the provision of higher education for girls.

The movement, however, has little real support among Japanese women; during the Fifth General Congress, when women's problems were discussed at a special session, males among the 600 people in the audience outnumbered women by about twelve to one. Whether the apparent lack of interest among women in Communist doctrines is due to their innate conservatism or to the probability that more women than men resent the Communists attacks upon the Emperor System is a matter for conjecture. The fact remains that the Communist movement is largely male.

Neither woman leader is forceful or imaginative; apparently they wield but slight influence except insofar as they express the ideas of the men leaders. Articles ostensibly written by Miss NAKI or Miss IWAMOTO are popularly believed to have been "ghosted" by SHIGA or by some other man leader of the party.

The leaders are, of course, sincere, but they are politically inexperienced and, in spite of their Communistic convictions, they are affected by the traditional Japanese feeling that women should be well-disciplined and restrained. Miss NAKI who left the Japan Women's College after only one year because (she says) she resented the "reactionary teaching" there, was sufficiently unconventional, while

working



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working for the Nakajima Aircraft Factory during the war, to be imprisoned for her radical beliefs; she emerged from jail, August 1945, to join the Communist Party.

PLATFORM:

The Communist Party platform as expressed in the formal Declaration of the Fifth Congress lists the aims that "we, the Japanese Communists, wish to realize."

1. Abolition of the Tenno System as a feudalistic-despotic-military-police-political structure. The future of the Imperial Family is to be decided by a referendum "after the establishment of a Popular Republican Government." The present Emperor should be tried as a war criminal.
2. Establishment of a Popular Republican Government, based upon the sovereignty of the people. This takes the form of a democratic, one-chamber Diet, elected by all people over 18 years old, with all Government representatives and members of local committees "who have the right to exercise power," also popularly elected. The right of recall is stated.
3. Deduction of land rents and "the prohibition of the taking away of lands by landowners and establishment of the right of cultivation." Imperial lands, and those owned by shrines, peers, idle landlords and proprietors of huge estates should be confiscated for distribution to the peasants; the estates of smaller landholders should be purchased, at rates to be specially established.
4. Nationalization of the property of war criminals and dissolution of finance capital. "Intensification of control of big capital by the Popular Government and management of industries through establishment of 'managing councils' in which the workers participate."
5. "Unification of banking institutions and their management by the Popular Republican Government, with freezing of funds of landowners and capitalists in order to prevent their wasteful expenditure and cornering of goods for dealing in black markets; thereby to eradicate the cause of inflation and stabilize the price system." Administration of economic affairs is to be entrusted largely to "people's councils based on the combination of trade unions, peasants' unions, and citizens' foodstuff control committee." Apparently this growth of peoples' councils is to originate and to develop independently of government, for "when this system has attained a nationwide development" the peoples' councils will be absorbed into the administrative structure of the government.
6. Minimum wage at a rate sufficiently high "to stabilize the peoples' living. Equal pay for equal work. A seven hour day, with not more than one-hour overtime. Protection of working women and children, with a complete factory law, the institution of social insurance (including unemployment and endowment insurance) and management of food rationing and that of daily necessities by the trade unions.
7. Liberation of women from feudal subjection. Reformation

of



Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch No. 529  
August 1, 1946 - Page No. 15

of the neighborhood association organization which imposes heavy burdens upon women. Democratic education and freedom from "feudalistic interference."

Much of this Declaration, it is obvious, is left purposely vague in order to allow the Party the most complete freedom of action. Little of it, except for its emphasis upon abolition of the Tenno System, would not be agreed upon by members of more conservative parties. The Social Democrats, for instance, are more specific in their reform program, while even the Liberals are more specific about what they hope to accomplish in social legislation, culture, and trade union recognition. The Communist Party Declaration is more a statement of views than a working program.

It is also clear that the Declaration does not contain the full intention of the Party leaders but is rather a manifesto intended to allay the fears held by most Japanese that the Communists are a body of dangerous radicals who seek to overthrow the basis of existing Japanese society.

Post-election Communist activity bears out the belief that the NOSAKA line for making the Party "beloved by the people" is still being followed. In the Diet meetings, the Party members, contrary to expectation, have been outstanding for their calm behavior and for their freedom from the loud outbursts that have been common among Social Democratic, Liberal and Progressive members. The Diet speeches made by SHIGA, NOSAKA and TOKUDA have been restrained and, as a rule, more eloquent than those of more conventional members. Out-of-doors meetings, although less frequent than prior to the MacArthur directive warning against mob violence, have been dignified and orderly.

It is evident that the Communist Party is seeking to build a reputation as a party of effective force applied in a lawful and even conventional fashion. It is also evident, however, that unless the Communist Party holds private convictions at sharp variance from the published aims, its program is not as revolutionary, nor even as advanced, as that of certain of its rivals.

Since, from the known history of the Party and of its leaders' principles, it is certain that the Communists are not merely mild reformists professing little more than diluted fabianism, it is probable that the Party is not sincerely setting forth its real intentions in complete detail and that its published aims are far milder than its true objectives.

The Party, admittedly, builds for the future. Its success in winning five Diet seats at the April 1946 election was looked upon merely as the first step in a far-ranging program of indoctrination that would in time provide it with a much larger Diet group, if not an absolute majority, of seats. If such a campaign of education is to be carried out, the NOSAKA policy of moderation and under-statement has been deliberately chosen to lull the suspicions of the Japanese electorate.

DRAFT CONSTITUTION:

In July 1946, the Party presented its minimum requirements for



Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch No. 529  
August 1, 1946 - Page No. 16

a constitutional draft "aimed at the realization of democratic revolution based upon the abolition of the vestiges of economic and political feudalism."

The plan, while admittedly only a preliminary outline, is vague and general and does not cover the wide range of guarantees embodied in the Government proposal. It lacks concreteness and does not define its terms. Social and economic provisions are particularly indefinite. Its provisions include:

1. A republican government with all sovereignty resting in the people and with all government based on the Diet and on provincial assemblies. Voting to be by proportional representation by all persons above 18 years of age. The right of recall shall be provided.
2. Abolition of "parasitic landlordism and dissolution of the Zaibatsu," with important industrial and financial organs operated "for the good of the people."
3. "The people shall obey only the national law and their own consciences and shall not be forced to obey any specific authority or individual."
4. Freedom of "the democratic press," assembly, association, and speech; "freedom to strike and to demonstrate."
5. Freedom of religion, privacy of communication and inviolability of home and person.
6. Abolition of capital punishment; humanitarian social re-education of criminals; compensation "for those acquitted by the courts."
7. Guarantee of earned property and personal property but limitations, on "considerations of public welfare" of the means of production and the possession of large fortunes.
8. Equality of all people.
9. Monogamous marriage and abolition of the family-headship system.
10. Guarantee of the right to work, to rest, to receive education and to be sheltered; social insurance.
11. Public trials, conducted under the jury system, before judges recommended by the Diet or by provincial assemblies and elected, by the people, for not more than 5 years. The chief public prosecutor shall be appointed by the Diet and he shall appoint other prosecutors. Police chiefs shall be locally elected.
12. The Constitution shall never be amended in such a way as to abandon republicanism or to revive any system of privilege.
13. The



Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch No. 529  
August 1, 1946 - Page No. 17

13. The Diet is to choose a 25 man Supreme Executive Committee, with power to convoke and to dissolve the Diet, to confirm nominations and dismissals made while the Diet is not in session, to exercise the right of pardon, to ratify treaties, appoint and dismiss Japanese diplomatic agents and to receive envoys. The SEC head is to represent the Japanese Peoples' Republic.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Passed: PER  
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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

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Restricted

Tokyo, August 6, 1946

No. 543

*File*

SUBJECT: Report by Dr. Wildes - "Political Parties".

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward a study prepared by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes of the Government Section of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the subject "Political Parties 1-15 July 1946".

It is hoped that these reports will be prepared regularly and if they are every effort will be made to forward them periodically to the Department. The report is summarized on the first page.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AUG 23 1946  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
REPORTING SERVICES

Enclosure: *att. 1-15*

Report by Dr. H. E. Wildes-  
"Political Parties 1-15  
July 1946".

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Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 543 dated August 6, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, "Report by Dr. Wildes - 'Political Parties'".

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, POLITICAL PARTIES BRANCH

SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES 1-15 July 1946

SUMMARY:

1. The chaotic political condition which resulted prior to the April 1946 election in the birth of approximately 1000 political parties and which sent representatives of 31 separate parties and ~~of~~ more than half a hundred Independents to the Diet is now assuming clarity. The formation of a new centrist bargaining body, tentatively called the New Party, will condense party membership within the Diet to five major groups.

2. Party activity in the first half of July has been chiefly concerned with discussion in caucus of the provisions of a new Constitution. Since all major parties and virtually all Independents are committed to its passage, the Constitution will pass the lower house of the Diet in substantially the same form in which it has been drafted, but certain clauses may be modified. Proposed changes, however, will assure greater rather than less democracy. Presentation by INUKAI Ken, Chairman of the Progressive Party General Affairs Committee, of a "private draft" of Constitutional changes shows a wholesome trend toward independent thinking.

The Communists have submitted a tentative Constitutional outline which varies from the Government's proposed Draft Constitution principally in its insistence upon a "People's Republic." In other respects the Communist suggestions are less specific and less comprehensive than the Government proposal. The Communists, also, are less detailed upon provisions for social legislation and for democratic government.

3. Political party management which in Japan has always been closely centralized is being slowly liberalized. Members of the Social Democratic and of the Liberal Parties have submitted informal programs for granting more freedom to local branches. Interest in the same subject has also been shown by certain Progressives. Simultaneously, however, the Social Democrats formally tightened party controls by disciplining a member who deviated from the official "line" adopted by the party caucus.

4. After



-2-

4. After long discussion the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee finally decided, 15 July, to reject Communist participation in a united "democratic front." This decision was ratified, 17 July, by the Party's Diet membership.

PARTY STRENGTH:

Recent alignments in Diet membership have changed to some degree the relative strength of political parties. This has come about largely through the absorption into larger parties of 38 small party members and of the more than 70 Independents who were chosen in the April 1946 elections. Steps toward the formation of another Diet bargaining group, comprised of members of the Japan Democratic Party Preparatory Club, the Shinko Club and the Independent Club, were taken on 9 July when 31 Diet members formed a new group, tentatively named the New Party. This is expected to enroll 45 members, rigidly excluding all applicants who are suspected of "leftist views."

If the New Party eventuates as anticipated the Diet line-up will be as follows:

Liberals	142
Progressives	102
Social Democrats	95
New Party	45
Co-operative Democrats	45
Independents	31
Communists	6
Total	<u>466</u>

In this situation the Independents will comprise a few Diet members who hold left-wing ideas, although none of them can be classed as Communists or as "fellow travellers," together with a compact group of professional politicians, headed by NARAHASHI Wateru, TANAKA Isanji and KASAI Jiuji, whose personal ambitions are generally believed to be more important than their political convictions. OZAKI Yukio, the sage of Japanese politics, although an advisor of the Liberal Party, is also enrolled among the non-partisans.

CONSTITUTION REVISION:

Since all major political parties, and virtually all Independents are committed to the passage of the Government's proposed Draft Constitution, and since only the Communists, with but 6 votes, are utterly opposed, passage in the lower house is guaranteed, but arguments have developed both in party caucus and within the 72 man Diet Constitutional Committee concerning certain clauses.

These arguments



-3-

These arguments turn upon the interpretation of specific words inserted into the Japanese text. Complaints have been made that unnamed "Japanese bureaucrats" have purposely so framed the language of the text as to give the document a more conservative tinge and to place enabling legislation passed during the interval between the Imperial promulgation of the charter and its coming into force on a par with the actual Constitution itself. Discussion also arises concerning the locus of sovereignty.

Social Democrats in caucus have insisted upon stripping the Emperor of the right to convoke and to dismiss the Diet, to promulgate legislation already approved by the Diet and to proclaim treaties signed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Diet.

The Co-Operative Democratic Party stood alone in its demand that the Emperor be granted a veto "similar to that of the American president." There is little confidence that their proposal will be accepted.

Certain Liberal and Progressive members profess themselves as unconvinced that the Draft Constitution vests sovereignty squarely in the people; others wish to replace the present wording by other Japanese words that will weaken the democratic tendencies of the document. There is little belief that either group will prove strong enough to persuade the party caucuses to make the proposed changes.

#### COMMUNIST TENTATIVE DRAFT:

The Communists have placed themselves on record as stating that Japan is not yet ready to consider the adoption of a new basic law; they have not, however, won a single supporter, other than their own party members to this belief.

Realising that the Constitution will be considered, and in all probability passed by more than the necessary two-thirds vote, the Communists have drafted and published a proposed outline for a new Constitution which is couched in vague terms and which differs from the Government Draft Constitution by calling for a Peoples' Republic, under a uni-cameral legislature elected by all Japanese above the age of eighteen.

#### INUKAI PROPOSALS:

On 12 July, INUKAI Ken, chairman of the Progressive Party General Affairs Committee, offered to his party caucus a "private draft" representing, as he said, his personal views upon the problem of the Constitution. He favors a uni-cameral Diet, demands the inclusion of liberal economic clauses and objects to referring to the Emperor as "sovereign"--he prefers the term "symbol".

Because INUKAI is actually de facto party leader,  
although



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although his political sponsor, Baron SHIDEHARA, is party president, and because it is known that the two men conferred at length before the submission of the INUKAI draft, this proposal may indicate an impending shift in Progressive policies. Since INUKAI is also leader of a compact group of first-term Diet members, his views are also taken as indicative of the ideas of younger elements among the progressive ranks. Taken in connection with the ferment already known to exist within Liberal Party members, it is possible that the INUKAI proposals are the initial step in a movement toward liberalism.

In any case, the INUKAI proposals, while not yet accepted by the Progressive Party membership, are encouraging signs of democratization of political thought since INUKAI's action was wholly spontaneous and was in no way inspired by foreign pressure or by outside influences; it demonstrates an independence of thought unusual in Japanese political thinking.

INUKAI's proposals, however, must not be construed as in any way radical. While he demands greater freedom for the individual and while he insists upon a laissez-faire economy, he privately professes concern over the supposed inability of the Japanese people to govern themselves. For this reason, he is not enthusiastic over suggestions for the reform of Diet rules in the interests of more democratic government.

#### PARTY MANAGEMENT:

Political parties in Japan have always been controlled by oligarchies; local party members have enjoyed few rights in party management. Candidates have been subject to approval by Tokyo headquarters and, at times, recommended candidates have been imposed from Tokyo upon local branches.

Ten Diet members of the Liberal Party, however, all but one of them first-termers, voluntarily applied to GHQ for a discussion of means whereby American political parties are directed and controlled; they especially desired to know how policies are made and how nominations of candidates are secured.

These politicians, some of whom in spite of their inexperience, hold important posts within the party, were especially interested in the independence of party groups and in the systems whereby local leaders are selected.

Such interest must not be considered as proof that the Liberal Party actually intends to modify its rules, although private conversation with many of them indicate a wide support for such changes; it does, however, show

that a



-5-

that a substantial group of younger politicians is seriously considering the need for decentralization of control.

Since the ten visitors represent the nucleus of the Liberal Party groups opposed to continuance of the HATOYAMA-KONO influences within the Liberal Party and since, as they declared, the "new faces" within the Liberal group number about one hundred of the Liberal members of the Diet, the visit of the young members is taken as an indication of the political unrest existing within the Liberal membership.

Certain of these leaders, together with such influential politicians as KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general and acting chief of the Social Democratic Party, and INUKAI Ken, de facto leader of the Progressives, are already engaged in drafting plans for the extension of party self-government for prefectural branches. It is considered doubtful whether such plans can be matured prior to the annual party meetings which are scheduled for this autumn but both KATAYAMA and INUKAI predict that the general party conventions will seriously consider these plans for party democratization.

KATAYAMA Tetsu has also expressed a determination to favor reforms that will make the Diet less a futile debating society and more an instrument of effective law-making. Together with INUKAI Ken, he is a member of an 18 man special Diet group (6 Liberals, 4 Progressives and 4 Social Democrats) currently surveying means for liberalizing Diet rules.

#### OSAWA CASE:

Party discipline has not, of course, been abandoned. When OSAWA Hisaki, left-wing Social Democrat from Aomori, supported a Communist motion to postpone consideration of the Government's proposed Draft Constitution, he was punished for violation of the party's caucus rules.

OSAWA was relieved of his post as a member of the party's liaison committee and was refused the right to speak formally on behalf of the party. First press reports added that he had been denied the right to appear in the Diet but both OSAWA and the party executives deny that such was the case.

The OSAWA punishment, it was apparent, was not merely for his action in supporting postponement of the Constitution question but was also the result of continued insubordination to party rules. His removal from the liaison committee is felt to be within the party rights and while he is no longer empowered to speak on behalf of the party he retains all the rights possessed by any other member of the Diet.

DEMOCRATIC



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DEMOCRATIC FRONT:

The long-continued discussion within Social Democratic ranks upon the question of a common "front" against reaction was concluded at a special meeting of the complete Central Executive Committee, 15 July, when it was decided to reject Communist collaboration in such a "front".

The anti-reactionary movement will, however, be continued, under Social Democratic auspices, with the inclusion of such groups as the Suiheisha, or Water Level Association, representing the depressed Eta class, and of certain trades unions. Noteworthy among the unions thus included are the Railway Transport Union and the Union of Communications Employees, formerly classified as under strong left-wing or even Communist influence.

The decision of the Central Executive Committee was submitted to the full party membership of the Diet at a special meeting on 17 July.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AUG 12 1946 DIRECTOR Department of State

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Dated August 10, 1946

Rec'd 4:33 p.m., 11th.

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No paraphrase necessary.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS AUG 12 1946 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Reference Department's 430, August 6, 5 p.m.

Your assumption in 6th sentence is correct. Hill-drung's statement in support of SCAP much appreciated.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

Restricted

Tokyo, August 10, 1946

No. 546

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SUBJECT: Report Prepared by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes on the subject "INUKAI Ken".

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
REPORTING SERVICES  
AUG 23 1946

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward report prepared by the Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander to the Allied Powers, on the subject "INUKAI Ken", fifty year old Progressive Party Chief." This report, prepared by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes, is a thorough and careful study of Mr. Inukai and should be of value to the Department.

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 546 dated August 6, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, "Report Prepared by Dr. Harry Emerson Wildes on the subject of INUKAI KEN"

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Public Administration Division  
Political Parties Branch

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: INUKAI KEN

"A political party headquarters should be a monastery - a place where character is built."

So says INUKAI Ken, fifty-year old Progressive Party chief, son of a martyred prime minister, spokesman for and political heir of Baron SHIDEHARA Kijuro (whom he expects to be the next prime minister) and himself a receptive candidate to follow SHIDEHARA as head of the Japanese Government.

From almost anyone else such a statement might seem the mouthings of a stuffed-shirt hypocrite but while INUKAI is wholly capable of talking solely for the record, he is probably sincere in saying that his political manoeuvrings are at least partially guided by philosophic considerations.

INUKAI, balked in his desire to spend his life in the study of Greek philosophy, still feels that politics and economics and all such material considerations are of secondary concern and that the development of spirituality is paramount.

All Japanese politicians thus declare themselves, but INUKAI apparently believes these sentiments.

This frail figure with deep-set eyes and flaring ears is not a man of animation or initiative. As he speaks, scarcely opening his small mouth to let his carefully phrased syllables emerge, his long thin fingers lie quietly upon his lap. He moves with measured dignity; he takes no chances physically nor intellectually. This is neither the result of calculated foresight nor the outcome of timorousness but springs rather from lack of true vitality.

Always passive, seldom an originator, INUKAI walks within the shadow of a greater figure. Formerly the guiding spirit was his father, the late INUKAI Tauyoshi, who long was a defender of constitutional and parliamentary theories. Few more inspiring figures could have been found in Meiji and Taisho Japan for, although there are those who say that by accepting his headship of the Seiyukai the elder INUKAI compromised his liberal principles, the fact remains that for at least two decades INUKAI Tauyoshi was, with OZAKI Yukio, the chief bulwark of Japanese democracy. Even if the charges were true that, in the 1930 decade the elder INUKAI succumbed to reactionary pressure, it cannot be denied that he was murdered by the Army for his staunch opposition to militaristic rule.

INUKAI Tauyoshi wholly dominated his son. Because the elder man was, during the period of Ken's attendance at Tokyo Imperial University, passing through a period of despondency, the boy's studies were shifted from politics to literature and philosophy.

"These



-2-

"These are noble studies," said Tauyoshi. "Keep away from politics for political life does not breed gentlemen."

Again at his father's suggestion, Ken spent but little time in the class-room. "Teachers do not know their subjects," the embittered old man complained. "Do your own research work. Haunt the libraries." The obedient Ken, therefore, fled into the stacks to read the Greek philosophers and, at his father's urging, tried in vain to reconcile their teachings with those of Zen Buddhism and Shinto ethical ideas. He has not yet found the key to Greco-Japanese understanding but he professes that he is still seeking it.

These were the times, as INUKAI recalls, when Japanese dared dream. Intellectually the wind blew from Moscow and the college atmosphere was heavy with the fumes of Marx and Lenin. INUKAI Ken was not the type, nor was his father, to succumb to Communism and hence the boy stood aloof from the revolutionary movements so popular at the university but, on the other hand, his feeling of loyalty to the Emperor weakened. This was not surprising; his father, as an intimate of the great Meiji, was unimpressed by the weak Taisho and Ken reflected his father's views.

"How could any thinking student worship the mentally ailing Taisho as a god?", he now asks.

Rather, however, than join such liberal movements as Dr. YOSHINO Sakuzo's New Man Society, INUKAI sought refuge in the library. Turning to literature and to the humanism so popular among western intellectuals in the decade following first World War, INUKAI read the novels, poems and essays published in the famous SHIRAKABA Magazine; he wrote some articles, smooth and pleasing in style but undistinguished in content. The very name, "Shirakaba", taken from the name of the white birch tree that grows high up on the mountains, intrigued him; it seemed to symbolize, to INUKAI as well as to many other dilettante youth, the purity and aspiration, the hope and the peace they sought.

Through SHIRAKABA, also, he came in contact with Tolstoyan principles--with pacifism, in which he never seriously believed, and with vegetarianism, with which, for a few months, he experimented as a humanitarian idea.

The elder INUKAI's marital adventures colored the son's career. Tauyoshi's second wife, apparently, was not too well disposed toward a college boy without strong convictions of his own; perhaps she felt that her hold upon the aging statesman was threatened by the dependence of her son. Whatever the reason may have been she launched a campaign of slight irritations and of oversights that much annoyed the boy and that caused worry to the father. Tauyoshi, therefore, urged his son to cut away from such step-mother influences by marrying and setting up a home; he even picked the girl for Ken to marry.

This was NAGAYO Nakako, youngest sister of Baron NAGAYO Tatsukishi, sister also of Mrs. SAITO Hiroshi whose husband was ambassador to the United States.

The choice was wise; Nakako was, and is, a quiet, conventional woman whose education did not extend beyond the high school level, but whose even temperament and religious bent well suited that of the literary philosopher. The marriage produced two children, one a daughter, who edits Catholic publications and with whom INUKAI Ken holds constant conversation on ethical and spiritual matters, the other, a son, now in preparatory school, who also shows a strong religious bent, but who,

INUKAI



-3-

INUKAI hopes, will become the family's third prime minister.

By expressing such a hope, INUKAI betrays his confidence that he himself will eventually succeed to the post his father held.

A strong emotional shock, springing from his father's experience in China, released Ken from the ivory tower and made him a figure in national politics. This came in 1928 when, at the time of SUN Yat-sen's state funeral at Nanking, he and his father were invited as the guests of the Chinese Government. Ken had but a passing interest in China, but when he saw the deference in which the Chinese held his father, when, in particular he saw CHIANG Kai-shek step forward to meet the special train and to help his father alight, Ken's heart overflowed with gratitude; from that time forward, Ken was the friend of Chinese rehabilitation.

This is Ken's own explanation; the fact is also true that INUKAI Tauyoshi was deeply interested in building better understanding between Japan and China--it was one of the reasons why the militarists murdered him--and that Ken echoed his father's ideas. But whether the sudden interest in China's welfare was Ken's idea or that of his father, it marks the emergence upon the national political stage of the philosophic dilettante.

"I told my father that I was resolved to become a statesman and to devote my life to interpreting the two countries to each other. He was very happy."

In the following year INUKAI ran for the Diet, as Seiyukai candidate from the Tokyo district. Tauyoshi, meanwhile, had succeeded General TANAKA as party head. Following the successful election campaign, in which Ken profited by his father's official position, he became secretary to his father, then prime minister, and remained in that capacity until the time when Tauyoshi was assassinated. Ken insists that the murder was due to the fact that he and his father planned to return Manchuria to China.

Deprived then of his father's constant counsel, Ken marked time in his political career. Transferring his candidacy to the Okayama district, he continued in the Diet but spoke little and he took but little active part. Friends explained this as due to the stunned condition in which he had been sunk by the murder of his father; the explanation may also lie, at least in part, to the absence of a strong and virile sponsor.

Gradually, however, this lack was remedied by the adoption of Baron SHIDEHARA Kojiro, also a friend of China and a close friend of his father, as INUKAI's political advisor. Increasingly INUKAI has come under SHIDEHARA's influence.

Five years after his father's death, INUKAI became parliamentary councillor of the Ministry of Communications, a post he held from June 1937 until February 1940. He resigned the post because he was named a member of the suite of the Japanese Ambassador to the puppet Nanking government, as well as an unofficial, and he adds unpaid, staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In June 1940, he was appointed a Japanese delegate for the negotiation of a peace treaty with China.

The nominations pleased him, not only because they offered, or

seemed



-4-

seemed to offer, an opportunity for interpreting Japan to China and for explaining Chinese views to his fellow countrymen but because they carried on the work for which his father had labored. His elation, however, was short-lived; "because of a difference of opinion with the Japanese Government on its China policy," INUKAI resigned the day following the opening of the peace conference.

Because of similar differences of opinion he refused to accept an appointment as economic adviser to the Nanking Government.

Second only to the influence of his father, and in recent years of Baron SHIDEHARA, in INUKAI's life has been the effect of his Greco-Buddhist studies. These had failed to flower during his college career, nor had they been visible to any appreciable degree during the period when, as editor of his beloved SHIRAKARA, he had written his thirty novelettes, but with the opening of the China Incident, and later with the beginning of war against the West, INUKAI's attention returned to his philosophic days.

The first impression was of keen disappointment. Buddhist priests, for all their talking about righteousness, failed to take firm action to oppose militarist excesses; they gave no help to the poor, nor did they rush to China's aid. But on the other hand, Catholic missionaries, both native-born and foreign, sacrificed themselves for the well-being of their parishioners.

"They gave their overcoats to help the poor," says INUKAI wonderingly.

In all likelihood this rising interest in Catholicism is traceable to the religious nature of the self-effacing Nakako, as well as to his feeling that Catholic missionaries were fulfilling the teachings of the Greeks, but INUKAI does not mention her influence. If it exists, and if it has been important in his development, it is because Mrs. INUKAI has cleverly subordinated herself to her ambitious but unpushful husband.

Rising perhaps out of his inner insecurity, for INUKAI realizes that his progress has been attained through his dependence upon others, is an almost pathetic eagerness to please. His manner is that of a fawning satellite who cherishes everyone's opinion above that of his own; he agrees that what would be, in a more guileful person, a suspicious alacrity with every one with whom he speaks. His own remarks are studded with the phrase "frankly speaking" and "to tell the truth."

First impressions of INUKAI Ken almost invariably are less friendly than they by rights should be because these deferences inevitably seem to betray an insincerity of purpose, if not a deliberate attempt to mislead his listener. INUKAI, however, is not moved by guile, but by the desire to convince his listener of the truth as INUKAI sees the truth.

It is for this reason, also, that he has made a special point of cultivating new members of the Diet. Naturally, his greatest success in this effort has been among the "freshmen" members of his party, who look up to him as leader in much the same way as he himself looked up to his father and as he still regards SHIDEHARA, but some of the first-term Independents and members of the SHINSEI CLUB, as well as a scattered few Liberals are also included within the INUKAI circle.

This alignment may conceivably result in the formation of an INUKAI bloc, perhaps even of a special INUKAI party that cuts across established

party



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party lines, but if this eventuates it will not constitute a threat to older parties but will merely register the strength of conservative representation.

INUKAI's strength is, at present, the SHIDEHARA representation but in the main it is today, and in all probability will continue to be, the voice of his father, the murdered INUKAI Tanyoshi, echoing in Japanese affairs. That influence, happily, is in the main a democratic influence, although perhaps a conservatively phrased one, and it works for good neighborly relations with China and with the West.

The one fear to be entertained, perhaps, is that with SHIDEHARA's eventual passing some less friendly influence may capture INUKAI's imagination. His closest friends today, as far as politicians are concerned, outside SHIDEHARA, are NISHIO Suyehiro and ASHIDA Hitoshi, right-wing social democrat and liberal respectively, and those, should SHIDEHARA die or withdraw himself from politics, would almost certainly become his political advisors.

But always, no matter who may become the power behind the INUKAI leadership, the memory of INUKAI Tanyoshi will always be of paramount importance.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES



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