

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 here?

3 Admiral Leahy: That was transmitted to the Department of
4 State as it came to me.

5 Senator Ferguson: Did you make more than one protest
6 during 1941, up until Pearl Harbor date?

7 Admiral Leahy: As I remember it -- you are speaking of
8 Indo-China now?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Admiral Leahy: As I remember, the only protest --

11 Senator Ferguson: Let me straighten out about the protest.
12 You notified your own Government, our Government, that they
13 were violating the agreement and what the French had told you
14 about it; is that correct?

15 Admiral Leahy: That is correct.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you get any information back
17 from the State Department to take up with the French Government?

18 Admiral Leahy: I do not think so, Senator, because I
19 had already taken it up with the French Government immediately
20 when I got the information from them.

21 Senator Ferguson: What did you take up, what was the
22 tenure of your conversation with them? Did you tell them you
23 thought this increase would mean war, or not?

24 Admiral Leahy: No, it was not that, Senator. The tenure
25 of my conversation with the French Government in regard to

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2 Indo-China was always the same, that they should refuse offi-
3 cially and diplomatically to agree to these things.

4 Now, I doubt very much if they ever agreed to the increase
5 in the number of troops that went to Indo-China, Japanese troops,
6 but they knew it, and there wasn't any purpose in disagreeing
7 with it, there was nothing they could do about it, it was done
8 by force of arms.

9 Senator Ferguson: And it was a violation of the original
10 agreement as to the number?

11 Admiral Leahy: There is no doubt about that.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, I wanted to be a little
13 more specific than the others have been on what happened at
14 the White House on the 8th when you had lunch with the President
15 and Admiral Richardson.

16 I am going to use the direct quotes from the official
17 record. Admiral Richardson said:

18 "which I prepared in the quiet of my home, where I could
19 think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent possible."

20 The Chairman said:

21 "You may proceed, Admiral, to do that."

22 "Admiral Richardson:" -- apparently reading, and was
23 reading, from a memorandum:

24 "I took up the question of returning to the Pacific Coast
25 all of the Fleet except the Hawaiian detachment."

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Do you know whether or not that was discussed?

Admiral Leahy: I do not remember that it was discussed in that way. I have already stated, Senator, that Admiral Richardson said in my hearing that he considered it wise to bring the Fleet back to the Pacific Coast in order that it could be prepared for war if that was the purpose.

Senator Ferguson: And that, of course, would include all except the Hawaiian detachment?

Admiral Leahy: I would say that Admiral Richardson, having made these notes on the same day of the conversation, is probably much more accurate than I am.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Leahy, he does not purport to have made that memorandum on that day. He made the notes recently.

Admiral Leahy: Oh, recently.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Leahy: Well, stated another way, this was a matter in which Admiral Richardson was interested in detail. To me it was only a matter of general interest. And his recollection should be more accurate than mine.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, he says that he remembers very little of what you and the President talked about about Pearl Harbor, because that was your problem, about some housing, and you remember that, do you?

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Leahy: I remember that very well.

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes, because you were directly interested
4 in that part of the conversation.

5 Admiral Leahy: But there would be a difference, Senator.
6 I was also very much interested in the Navy, and perhaps Admiral
7 Richardson never heard of Puerto Rico, for all I know.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well now, I am reading from the official
9 record Admiral Richardson's language:

10 "The President stated that the Fleet was retained in the
11 Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on
12 the actions of Japan."

13 Are you prepared to say now that that did not take place?

14 Admiral Leahy: I cannot say that it did not take place,
15 Senator. I can only say, as I said before, that I do not re-
16 member it, but it is quite likely that that statement was made,
17 because a great many people, before I left the Navy Department,
18 had exactly that idea, that if we would send small forces to
19 various places it would be a deterrent on the Japanese.

20 I was in complete disagreement with them always.

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22 follows

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Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: You did not agree then with the
3 fact -- the idea -- that the Fleet being in Hawaii, in the
4 Hawaiian area would be a restraining influence on the action
5 of Japan?

6 Admiral Leahy: Not if it was unready for battle,
7 Senator. but I assumed that it had been made ready, and then
8 it would have been a deterrent and a very useful one.

9 Senator Ferguson: But you received your first informa-
10 tion on that particular day from Admiral Richardson that
11 it was not ready for action?

12 Admiral Leahy: That is correct.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, reading on, and giving you a
14 direct quote again from Admiral Richardson's --

15 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman cite the page?

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Page 682. Witness Richardson,
17 questions by General Mitchell:

18 "I stated that in my opinion the presence of the Fleet
19 In Hawaii might influence a civilian political government,
20 but that Japan had a military government which knew that
21 the Fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no
22 train of auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake
23 active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet
24 in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on
25 Japanese action."

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Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Are you prepared to say that that was not said at
3 that meeting?

4 Admiral Leahy: I am not prepared to say that it was
5 not said. I do not remember a statement of that kind.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall anything about the
7 Japanese being a military government rather than, as it is
8 expressed here, a civilian political government?

9 Admiral Leahy: No, sir, Senator, I do not remember
10 that but that is the kind of thing I would not remember
11 because I knew that so thoroughly, so somebody's saying it
12 would make no impression on me.

13 Senator Ferguson: That was in your mind as an exact
14 fact, that it was a military government rather than a
15 civilian political government?

16 Admiral Leahy: That is an exact statement of fact
17 according to my opinion at that time, and up until the other
18 day when it ceased being a government.

19 Senator Ferguson: And that kind of a government, a
20 military government, is much harder to negotiate with along
21 diplomatic lines than a civilian political government, isn't
22 it?

23 Admiral Leahy: I should think so unless you have
24 something with which to negotiate.

25 Senator Ferguson: You mean by that that unless you have

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a military force that you can really use.

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Admiral Leahy: Exactly what I mean.

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Senator Ferguson: That is exactly what you mean. Now, quoting Admiral Richardson further from the record, page 683, he further stated:

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"I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the Fleet returned to the Pacific Coast, the complements filled, the ships docked and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel and then stripped for war operations."

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Now, are you are prepared that that didn't take place at the meeting?

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Admiral Leahy: I am not prepared to say that it did not. I doubt very much if it went that far into detail without its impressing itself on my memory to some extent, but I should like to say that I am in complete agreement with the statement.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, quoting further Admiral Richardson, and I have very little more:

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"The President said, in effect, 'Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area has had and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.'"

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Do you recall that, or are you prepared to say that
3 that did not take place?

4 Admiral Leahy: I am not prepared to say that it did
5 not take place, and I do not recall that statement. I would
6 not be surprised to learn that it was made, because there
7 was a general impression in this country that the presence
8 of ships in Honolulu was exercising a restraining influence
9 on the Japanese.

10 Senator Ferguson: But from a military viewpoint you
11 differed with that opinion, knowing, after, at least, after
12 Admiral Richardson that it was not prepared?

13 Admiral Leahy: I would not say that I was in disagree-
14 ment with that line, Senator. I would be in disagreement
15 with the effectiveness of it, but I would not say it did not
16 exercise a restraining influence. As a matter of fact, I
17 am inclined to think it did. But it would have a much
18 more effective restraining influence if it had been prepared
19 for war.

20 Senator Ferguson: Then, Admiral, do I understand that
21 you would have anticipated that, if war was coming, that they
22 might attack the Fleet in the harbor at Pearl Harbor if war
23 was coming?

24 Admiral Leahy: I would have been afraid of that, Senator,
25 because it was possible -- it was a difficult operation for

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the Japanese, but it was a possible one, and I would have
3 been afraid of it, and, as a matter of fact, I was always
4 fearful that such a thing might happen to us, and many
5 other officers were, as well.

6 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you knew the condi-
7 tions at Pearl Harbor, the size of Pearl Harbor, and, as
8 the Admiral said this morning, the necessity of docking the
9 ships in pairs, and that that did create a hazard as far
10 as the Fleet was concerned?

11 Admiral Leahy: I was thoroughly familiar with the
12 situation in Pearl Harbor. I have been there in the Fleet
13 myself and I know exactly what it looks like and how easy
14 it is to hit from the air.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, quoting again from page 683,
16 Admiral Richardson:

17 "I said, 'Mr. President, I still do not believe it
18 and I know that our Fleet is disadvantageously disposed
19 for preparing for our initiating war operations.'"

20 Are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

21 Admiral Leahy: I am quite prepared to say that I
22 remember that Admiral Richardson told the President that
23 Honolulu was not a suitable place to prepare the Fleet for
24 war service, which is approximately the same.

25 Senator Ferguson: Approximately this statement.

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Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Leahy: I am only speaking from memory of three
3 years ago.

4 Senator Ferguson: I understand. That is why I am
5 giving the correct quotes of the Admiral.

6 On page 683 again reading:

7 "The President then said, 'I can be convinced of the
8 desirability of returning the battleships to the West Coast
9 if I can be given a good statement which will convince the
10 American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing
11 the battleships to the West Coast, we are not stepping
12 backwards.'"

13 Are you prepared to say that that did not take place
14 at that meeting?

15 Admiral Leahy: I am not prepared to say that it did not
16 take place, but I do not remember it.

17 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember any conversation about
18 stepping backward or taking the Fleet out of the Hawaiian area
19 would be a step backwards?

20 Admiral Leahy: I have --

21 Senator Ferguson: Or a surrender of something?

22 Admiral Leahy: I have some kind of recollection, which
23 I cannot locate at that luncheon, that there was a fear expressed
24 that moving our ships away from the Hawaiian Islands might be
25 interpreted by Japan as a withdrawal from our advance into the

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Pacific, but I do not remember where that was, it might have been in the Navy Department. I do not know whether it was at the talk with the President.

Senator Ferguson: But it could have been at the President's luncheon?

Admiral Leahy: It could have been.

Senator Ferguson: Because that was a fact as far as you know; that is, someone had related it, or stood for that proposition?

Admiral Leahy: There were people in America who had that attitude at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Reading again from page 683:

"Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war."

The sentence before that is:

"This is embarrassing." I didn't quite see how that was in here.

The Chairman: Admiral Richardson made the statement.

Mr. Murphy: That is what the Admiral said. I heard him.

Senator Ferguson: It is part of his answer then.

"This is embarrassing."

"Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war."

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place,

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 those two sentences, Admiral?

2 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 Mr. Murphy: The gentleman has asked the witness about
5 the two sentences. Certainly you are not asking about "This
6 is embarrassing".

7 Senator Ferguson: No, but I had to read that because
8 it is in the record. This is the sentence I wanted an answer
9 on:

10 "Later I asked the President if we were going to enter
11 the war."

12 Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at
13 the luncheon?

14 Admiral Leahy: Well, I am inclined to think that that
15 question was asked but whether it was made in those words or
16 not I do not know.

17 Senator Ferguson: That is the substance of what was said?

18 Admiral Leahy: I am inclined to think that was made by
19 Admiral Richardson.

20 Senator Ferguson: What did the President reply?

21 Admiral Leahy: I do not remember.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, I will give you the answer
23 Admiral Richardson gave, quoting from page 683:

24 "He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or
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Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not
3 enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines
4 he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could
5 not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued
6 and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would
7 make a mistake and we would enter the war."

8 Are you prepared to say that that did not take place
9 at the meeting?

10 Admiral Leahy: I am very much surprised to hear that
11 the President made a statement that he would or would not
12 enter the war under any conditions, because, of course, I
13 talked the war situation over with the President many times
14 and at length during the time I was Chief of Operations, and
15 the President never indicated to me that he could declare war.
16 That would be a function of other branches of the Government.
17 He might have said that he would recommend that we go to war.
18 I am surprised also to hear Richardson's recollection that
19 the President said he would not go to war if they, if the
20 Japanese invaded the Philippines.

21 From my knowledge of the President and my relations with
22 him in the matter of war for the preceding years I feel quite
23 sure that if the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, which
24 was then under our Government, the President would have
25 recommended a declaration of war.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you had conversations
3 with the President that brings you now to this answer that if
4 the Japs had invaded the Philippines he would have recommended
5 to Congress that we go to war?

6 Admiral Leahy: That is my thought from a very intimate
7 knowledge of what the President was thinking about and doing.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Admiral Leahy: I cannot believe that he would not have
10 recommended war if the Japanese had invaded our territory.

11 Mr. Mitchell: May I interrupt for a minute?

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Mr. Mitchell: I think the witness misunderstood the
14 quotation. Admiral Richardson said the President said we will
15 not go to war over the Kra Peninsula or Thailand. I think
16 the Admiral here today understood you to say "he" would not
17 go to war.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will read it again.

19 Admiral Leahy: That is quite all right, then. I have
20 no disagreement. He meant the United States.

21 Mr. Murphy: So there is no mistake, Mr. Chairman, would
22 it be permissible to have the stenographer read back the
23 exact words of the Senator from Michigan.

24 Senator Ferguson: Does General Mitchell think that I
25 said "he"?

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Mr. Mitchell: No. I say the Admiral here misunderstood.

3 Admiral Leahy: I misunderstood. I thought you said "he",
4 the President.

5 Senator Ferguson: No. I will read the language again.

6 "Later I asked the President if we were going to enter
7 the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand,
8 or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not
9 enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he
10 doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could
11 not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued
12 and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would
13 make a mistake and we would enter the war."

14 Now, do you understand the quotation?

15 Admiral Leahy: I understand it now.

16 Senator Ferguson: Are you prepared to say that that did
17 not take place?

18 Admiral Leahy: I cannot say that it did not take place
19 or that it did. I think it is not in discord with the President's
20 ideas, as I understood them, at that time.

21 Senator Ferguson: That would be in accord with what the
22 President had been thinking as far as he had expressed himself
23 on other occasions to you, at least?

24 Admiral Leahy: It would not have been in disaccord,
25 Senator. I should think it would have been in accord with his

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Keefe

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2 thoughts.

3 Senator Ferguson: Thank you. That is all.

4 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

5 The Chairman: Well, let the Chair go down the line first.

6 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

7 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

8 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Leahy, in view of the cross-examination
9 of Senator Brewster, I think it is perhaps proper to place in
10 the record at this time specific facts with respect to the
11 budget estimates for appropriations, the amounts requested by
12 the Navy Department and the appropriations actually made by
13 the Congress.

14 Now, I have before me, secured as a result of my request
15 of the Navy Department, a statement prepared by the Navy De-
16 partment, signed by E. G. Allen, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
17 Director of Budget and Reports, which is dated November 14,
18 1945. It appears that these reports cover the period covering
19 the fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive.

20 The annual appropriation act of the fiscal year 1932,
21 Admiral, shows that appropriations were requested by the Navy
22 Department in the sum of \$354,809,746.

23 That request was submitted to the Congress by the President
24 in his annual budget in the sum of \$347,794,248.

25 The Congress appropriated in that year \$358,262,123, plus

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

contract authority of \$7,700,000.

Now, Admiral, do you understand that contract authority is a vehicle adopted by the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House which authorizes the Department to which contract authority is granted the authority to go ahead and carry out plans requested even though the money is not then made immediately available; do you so understand that?

Admiral Leahy: That is my understanding of it, Mr. Keefe. Of course, that was a matter for legislative, legal decision, but that is my understanding.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I think, if I may state, as a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, that that has been my understanding of it, while the money itself is not made immediately available contract authority is granted to the agency so that expenditures may, or contracts for expenditures, may be incurred and the appropriation subsequently made to cover it.

Admiral Leahy: It is practically a promise for a future appropriation to cover that authority.

Mr. Keefe: That is right, generally speaking. I understood Admiral Richardson to say that in the preparation of the Navy budgets they always anticipated there would be some cuts by the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, perhaps. Did you so understand that when you were in charge?

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Leahy: I have often heard that statement made, Mr. Keefe. When I was charged with supervision of the budget preparations I endeavored to cut our requests for money to the lowest point that was consistent with the preparation of the Navy.

Mr. Keefe: Now, for the fiscal year 1933, the annual appropriation act, the Navy Department requested of the Bureau of the Budget \$399,139,886.

In that same year they had supplemental and deficiency appropriations requests amounting to \$10,000,000; or a total in the fiscal year 1933 of \$409,139,886.

For similar items for the regular annual appropriation plus the supplemental, the budget submitted to the Congress by the President called for an appropriation in the fiscal year 1933 of \$351,677,450.

The Congress actually appropriated for that fiscal year \$327,583,591, plus \$5,715,000 contract authority.

In the annual appropriation for the fiscal year 1934 you requested -- rather, the Navy Department requested \$352,717,786.

The President's budget submitted to the Congress requested \$308,669,562.

Congress gave to the Navy in response to the President's budgetary request \$308,669,562, plus \$8,100,000 of contract authority.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 In the annual appropriation act of 1935 the Navy requested
3 during the fiscal year 1935 \$335,410,918.

4 The President's budget cut that amount to \$303,407,649.

5 The Congress gave in response to the President's budget
6 estimate \$301,734,056, plus \$2,800,000 of contract authority.

7 In 1936 the Navy requested in its annual appropriation
8 act and in supplemental and deficiency acts during the fiscal
9 year 1936 a total of \$526,787,542.

10 The President's budget submitted to the Congress was
11 \$509,375,572.

12 The Congress appropriated \$482,600,230, plus \$6,590,000
13 of contract authority.

14 In 1937 the annual appropriation requested plus supple-
15 mental and deficiency appropriation acts for that fiscal year,
16 was \$586,932,284.

17 The President's budget cut that amount to \$551,512,599.

18 The Congress appropriated \$528,467,832, plus \$13,000,000
19 of contract authority.

20 In 1938 the annual appropriation act, plus the supplemental
21 and deficiency appropriation acts, for the fiscal year 1938,
22 amounted to \$599,035,223.

23 The President's budget reduced that amount to \$567,191,709.

24 Congress appropriated \$519,139,808, plus \$15,000,000 of
25 contract authority.

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

In the fiscal year 1939 the annual appropriation requested by the Navy plus the supplemental and deficiency request amounted to \$719,380,009.

The President's budget cut that request to \$650,246,411.

The Congress appropriated \$623,526,194, plus \$15,000,000 of contract authority.

In 1940 the annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriations requested by the Navy amounted to \$1,077,377,889.

The President's budget cut that budget request of the Navy to \$976,430,769.

Congress appropriated \$943,375,249, plus \$22,450,000 contract authority.

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Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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2 In 1941, the fiscal year 1941, the requests of the
3 Navy, annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency
4 appropriation requests amounted to \$5,236,629,902.00. The
5 President's budget cut those requests as submitted to the
6 Congress to \$3,561,405,919.00. The Congress appropriated
7 for the fiscal year 1941 \$3,549,383,345.00, plus \$946,098,112
8 of contract authority.

9 Now, I have totaled, Admiral, the figures beginning
10 with the fiscal year 1934 from this statement prepared by
11 the Navy Department and the total asked by the Navy Depart-
12 ment for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, amounts
13 to \$9,434,271,533.00. The amount submitted to the Congress
14 in response to those requests by the President in his annual
15 budget and supplemental budget estimates was \$7,428,240,190.00.
16 The Congress appropriated in the same period \$7,256,89,276.00
17 plus \$1,029,038,112.00, or a total of \$8,285,934,388.00.

18 The estimates indicate that in the period from the
19 fiscal year 1934 to 1941, inclusive, the Budget cut the
20 Navy's requests for appropriations \$2,006,031,343.00 and the
21 Congress exceeded the Budget estimates in making appropri-
22 ations and contract authorizations in the same period
23 \$857,694,198.00.

24 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

25 Mr. Keefe: I yield.

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Murphy: I am just wondering if the gentleman is going to have the witness swear to the testimony. It seems to me if it is relevant, and I believe it is, that there ought to be some way to bring it out so that it might be thoroughly examined. Certainly, we do not want to examine the gentleman from Wisconsin. If it is relevant and important I am wondering if this is the way to approach it.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have the figures right here and they have been submitted to counsel also, may I say, and I think counsel has the figures and the figures which I am quoting are accurately those which have been submitted by the Navy Department. Is that not true?

Mr. Mitchell: I assume you have got a document directed from the Navy as to the Navy budget.

Mr. Keefe: I have no objection to submitting the letter from the Navy Department and other figures which I have before me.

The Chairman: The chair does not raise any question as to the accuracy of the figures. The regular way in which it should be presented, however, would be to present an official copy of the naval budget and the President's budget and the appropriation Acts of Congress for these various years, which would be official documents.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I say that that can be

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Questions by Mr. Keefe

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2 done. That would require a tremendous amount of work be-
3 cause of the tremendous number of supplemental estimates that
4 were submitted during many of these years. I have before
5 me not only the estimates submitted by the Navy Department
6 but I also have those from the Bureau of the Budget itself.

7 The Chairman: The chair would like to ask the Congressman
8 this question: In your total tabulation of the amount asked
9 by the Navy for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive,
10 that includes only appropriations. Does that include any
11 authority or any contract authority, or is that the dollars
12 and cents figure?

13 Mr. Keefe: That includes the actual money appropria-
14 tions, plus contract authority and I so designated it.

15 The Chairman: I don't think the Congressman understood
16 my question. In the Budget estimate requests of the Navy
17 do they request an appropriation in money or do they add to
18 that, from your tabulation, also the amount they wish in
19 contract authority?

20 Mr. Keefe: If I understand you correctly --

21 The Chairman: In other words, does the recommendation
22 of the Navy include only appropriations asked for in money,
23 or does it include also contract authority?

24 Mr. Keefe: The figures which have been submitted to
25 me by the Navy Department do not include any submission of

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Questions by Mr. Keefe

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2 contract authority or any requests for contract authority.

3 The Chairman: So that the contract authority then
4 is a figure that was put into the appropriation bills by
5 the Congress itself?

6 Mr. Keefe: That is right.

7 The Chairman: And is not included in the Navy estim-
8 ate, and not included in the President's budget, is that
9 true?

10 Mr. Keefe: That is true.

11 The Chairman: So that your last figure there which
12 shows that the Congress for the total period exceeded the
13 requests of the budget by some eight hundred million dol-
14 lars includes contract authorizations put in the bill by
15 Congress, which in your last year were more than a billion
16 dollars, is that correct?

17 Mr. Keefe: No, that is not true. The contract authori-
18 zations in the last year, in the fiscal year 1941, was 797
19 million in round figures.

20 The Chairman: What would be the total amount of com-
21 parative appropriations for those years --

22 Mr. Keefe: I gave those figures.

23 The Chairman: (Continuing) -- if you eliminated the
24 contract authority which increased in 1941 and 1940 as the
25 situation developed?

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, the situation is perfectly clear, Mr.
3 Chairman and you are as familiar with that situation as I
4 am and I am quite well aware of the fact, as a member of the
5 Appropriations Committee of the House, that very frequently
6 any department such as the Navy or the Army may ask for a
7 direct appropriation of money and the House or the Senate,
8 as the case may be, might take the position, "You cannot
9 spend that money in this fiscal year as money. We will give
10 you so much money, but we will give you authority to go
11 ahead and carry on your program and buy the material or the
12 ships or whatever you want and we will appropriate the money
13 for you when you need it," and that is the vehicle that has
14 been adopted by both the House and Senate Appropriations
15 Committee. When they give contract authority it is as good
16 as an appropriation because it is an authority to the agency
17 to whom it is extending the power to go ahead and expend the
18 money.

19 The Chairman: The chair is making no question about
20 that policy but the point that the chair wanted to clarify
21 was that the excess to which you referred is made up in part
22 of contract authority as well as appropriations.

23 Mr. Keefe: There isn't any question about that at all.
24 The actual appropriations of money that were made during
25 that period by the Congress were \$7,256,896,276.00 and the

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe:

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2 contract authority extended to them in that same period
3 was \$1,029,000,000.00.

4 The Chairman: And that contract authority if carried
5 out to the full would be included in a subsequent year's
6 appropriation, in a subsequent fiscal year's appropriation?

7 Mr. Keefe: It might be.

8 The Chairman: In other words, if contracts were entered
9 into according to the authority given, naturally the cost
10 of those contracts would be presented and paid for in the
11 subsequent fiscal year's appropriations.

12 Mr. Keefe: May I say this, Mr. Chairman. The question
13 is the Navy comes in and says, "We want so many ships, we
14 want so many airplanes, we want so much ammunition, we want
15 so many guns," and so on and so forth, "and we have requested
16 an appropriation for that amount.

17 Now, when they come before the House or Senate commit-
18 tees that committee may find that it is all right for them
19 to have the ships that they asked for or the guns or what
20 not, or the ammunition, but they won't be able to spend the
21 money in that fiscal year, so they give them contract author-
22 ity to go ahead, which is just as good as money, with the
23 assurances that it will be provided. That is the fact of the
24 matter.

25 The Chairman: The chair is sure that all members of the

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Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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committee are familiar with the practice and there is nothing in it that is subject to criticism. It is a practice that Congress indulges in by giving authority to the Navy and the Army and other departments, if they see fit, to make contracts for things to be supplied in the future.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, that is right.

The Chairman: But the actual payment for those things come in a later period.

Mr. Keefe: That is right, but the Congress has committed itself, Mr. Chairman. When it gives contract authority it has committed itself to so much money towards that.

The Chairman: There is no question about that.

Mr. Keefe: Then I am rather surprised the chairman would raise that question.

The Chairman: The chair was trying to differentiate between the net amount of appropriations and the amount of contract authority, that is all the chair was seeking to do.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the gentleman has finished.

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, if the committee has finished with the Admiral I would like to have him excused. I have kept him here on a false alarm twice and he is a busy man.

The Chairman: Are there any more questions?

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: I would like to ask in view of this colloquy that has taken place, Admiral Leahy, you have heard the statement that I have made with respect to the manner in which these appropriations have been made in the past at the request of the Navy and these contract authorizations. You have heard my statement, have you not?

Admiral Leahy: I have heard it, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Do you consider that it is substantially correct?

Admiral Leahy: Of course, with regard to the figures I have no knowledge. In regard to the procedure, it is quite correct. When I was in charge of the business of getting money for the Navy we found it impracticable to spend in a fiscal year all of the money that was asked for and the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee would give contract authorization for so much of the business as they felt should not be financed within that fiscal year.

Mr. Keefe: Well, that contract authority would permit you to let the contract --

Admiral Leahy: That is quite correct.

Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- for the construction of the ships and what not and go on with your program, as it were?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: The program that you asked for, isn't that

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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true?

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Admiral Leahy: That is true.

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Mr. Keefe: Although the actual money that you asked to pay for that work might not be needed until the next fiscal year?

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Admiral Leahy: It could not be obtained until the next fiscal year except by deficiency appropriation.

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Mr. Keefe: So that when the authority was given you to enter into these contracts you were in effect assured that you could go ahead with your program to that extent?

12

Admiral Leahy: That is correct, Congressman Keefe.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me in order that there not be any question, that I would like to ask if the counsel, or I will offer in evidence this document, if there is any question about it, the report from the Navy at this point as to these appropriations, so that it may appear in the record. I have read it in the record, if there is any question about it.

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The Chairman: The chair understood counsel had some document, too, on that subject. If you are mistaken about it he can clarify it.

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Mr. Mitchell: This comparison between department requests, budget allowances and appropriations was requested from the War and Navy departments at the suggestion of Mr.

1 Witness Leahy:

2 Keefe and I assume it is in just the form he wanted it and
3 the document itself is undoubtedly sufficiently authenticated
4 to be offered here as an exhibit.

5 The only question I have about the figures, - I don't
6 suppose it is any of my business, - is whether or not there
7 may not be a duplication, because where there is a contract
8 authority and in the very next year the appropriation, the
9 same figures to pay the bills come in and if you use the
10 authority in one year and the appropriation in another you
11 might have a duplication.

12 Now, suppose we check it and you can offer the exhibit that
13 way and we will find out whether you need any more figures.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, I haven't any objection to doing that.
15 I personally understand what you are talking about, but as to
16 the comparison between what the Navy asks and what the budget
17 gives and what the Congress gives, that is carried forward
18 year from year, year after year.

19 Mr. Mitchell: You have the document. I will offer it
20 as exhibit 12, as a report from the Navy. Have you the Army
21 figures, too?

22 Mr. Keefe: Well, I have those, too. Those little notes
23 on the bottom of the page are my notes.

24 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Just a moment. If the counsel have the

Witness Leahy:

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2 same document or similar documents from the War Department it
3 might be well to put them in together.

4 Mr. Keefe: Well, I have it.

5 Mr. Mitchell: I don't know that I have it for the Army.

6 The Chairman: Well, if there is any occasion to check it
7 and see whether there is any duplication, it can be done and
8 the figures corrected later.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I find that the Army and Navy have
10 not yet sent us a copy of these documents. This is dated
11 November 14th and I have not received it, but let us offer it
12 and we can check it later.

13 Mr. Keefe: Well, here is the one from the War Department
14 right here. You can see there is the letter and here is the
15 enclosure, except that penciled memoranda of mine on there,
16 Mr. Mitchell. I did not know you were going to offer these.
17 I thought you would offer yours.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Well, we haven't any.

19 Mr. Keefe: But you may have my copy. Let me have my
20 letters back. Do you want those? Those are simply the let-
21 ters of transmittal.

22 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they go
23 in with the exhibit.

24 Mr. Keefe: Yes, you can put the letters of transmittal
25 right in with them.

Witness Leahy:

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The Chairman: Minus the personal notations.

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Mr. Mitchell: In pencil.

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The Chairman: In pencil, all right.

4

Mr. Mitchell: We will offer in evidence as exhibit 12

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the letter from the Navy Department to Congressman Keefe

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dated November 14, 1945, together with the enclosure which

7

is a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations

8

for the years 1932 to 1941, inclusive and a similar letter

9

from the War Department to Mr. Keefe dated November 7, 1945

10

and an enclosure detailing the appropriations for the War

11

Department Military Establishments for the fiscal years 1932

12

through 1941, inclusive.

13

Mr. Keefe: Except the penciled memoranda at the bottom.

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Mr. Mitchell: It is understood that the penciled nota-

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tions on these exhibits are not offered.

16

The Chairman: All right. Are they marked as exhibit

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No. 12?

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Mr. Mitchell: 12.

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The Chairman: Both as exhibit 12?

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Mr. Mitchell: It is one exhibit.

21

The Chairman: That goes into the record.

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Mr. Keefe: Do I understand that the figures which are

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on this exhibit which has been offered will be copied in the

24

record?

25

Witness Leahy:

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2 The Chairman: That is my understanding.

3 Mr. Keefe: Do we so understand it?

4 The Chairman: It will be printed as a part of the hear-
5 ing at this point.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That is right. The reporter will put
7 the schedules right in his daily transcript, if you like.

8 The Chairman: Yes. All right.

9 THE DOCUMENT ABOVE REFERRED TO WAS MARKED EXHIBIT
10 NO. 12, and is as follows, to-wit:

11 - - -

12 "Address Reply to
13 Executive Office of the Secretary
14 NAVY DEPARTMENT
15 And Refer to WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
16 EXOS:OBR/G-Tn

17 14 November 1945

18 Hon. Frank B. Keefe,
19 House of Representatives,
20 Washington, D. C.

21 My dear Mr. Keefe:

22 I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates
23 and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to
24 be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of
25 the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration
between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying

1 Witness Leahy:

2 the records of the years in question, and the figures appear-
3 ing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau
4 of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular
5 Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, in-
6 formation concerning deficiency and supplemental estimates
7 requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases
8 and required extended search through the files for the years
9 in question.

10 Sincerely yours,

11 E. G. ALLEN,
12 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
13 Director of Budget and Reports.

14 (Enclosure.)
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Insert
Navy
budget

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON D C

APPROPRIATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT
FISCAL YEARS 1932 to 1941, INCLUSIVE

Fiscal Year	Appropriations Requested by the Navy Department	Budget Estimate of Appropriations Submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract Authority
1932 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	\$ 354,809,746	\$ 347,794,248	\$ 358,262,123	\$ 7,700,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	<u>354,809,746</u>	<u>347,794,248</u>	<u>358,262,123</u>	<u>7,700,000</u>
1933 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	399,139,886	341,677,450	317,583,591	5,715,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	0
Total.....	<u>409,139,886</u>	<u>351,677,450</u>	<u>327,583,591</u>	<u>5,715,000</u>
1934 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	<u>352,717,786</u>	<u>308,669,562</u>	<u>308,669,562</u>	<u>8,100,000</u>
1935 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	318,324,414	286,332,392	284,658,799	2,800,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	17,086,504	17,075,257	17,075,257	0
Total.....	<u>335,410,918</u>	<u>303,407,649</u>	<u>301,734,056</u>	<u>2,800,000</u>
1936 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	502,855,817	485,443,847	458,684,379	6,590,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	23,931,725	23,931,725	23,915,851	0
Total.....	<u>526,787,542</u>	<u>509,375,572</u>	<u>482,600,230</u>	<u>6,590,000</u>

Fiscal Year	Appropriations Requested by the Navy Department	Budget Estimate of Appropriations Submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract Authority
1937 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	\$ 585,010,984	\$ 549,591,299	\$ 526,546,532	\$ 13,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	<u>1,921,300</u>	<u>1,921,300</u>	<u>1,921,300</u>	<u>0</u>
Total.....	586,932,284	551,512,599	528,467,832	13,000,000
1938 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	594,269,223	562,425,709	516,253,808	15,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	<u>4,766,000</u>	<u>4,766,000</u>	<u>2,881,000</u>	<u>0</u>
Total.....	599,035,223	567,191,709	519,139,808	15,000,000
1939 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	629,665,104	564,406,461	546,866,494	15,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	<u>89,714,905</u>	<u>85,839,950</u>	<u>76,659,700</u>	<u>0</u>
Total.....	719,380,009	650,246,411	623,526,194	15,000,000
1940 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	788,775,549	790,342,453	773,049,151	20,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	<u>288,602,340</u>	<u>186,088,316</u>	<u>170,326,098</u>	<u>2,450,000</u>
Total.....	1,077,377,889	976,430,769	943,375,249	22,450,000
1941 -				
Annual Appropriation Act.....	1,384,442,202	1,337,311,577	1,274,171,138	148,741,612
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	<u>3,852,187,700</u>	<u>2,224,094,342</u>	<u>2,275,212,207</u>	<u>797,356,500</u>
Total.....	5,236,629,902	3,561,405,919	3,549,383,345	946,098,112

Total asked - \$9,434,271,533 7,428,240,190 7,256,896,276 1,029,038,112
1934 - 1941 inclusive
Budget cut requests 2,006,031,343.
Congress wanted budget 3,857,694,198
by -
Total 8,285,934,388

"WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1945

Honorable Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Keefe:

Attached is a statement which contains for the War Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and contract authorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 19th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.

Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, in Manila some time in November, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War.

Incl.

Stmt."

Insert
Army
budget

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Navy
budget
photo
stats

APPROPRIATIONS, WAR DEPARTMENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1932 THROUGH 1941

Fiscal Year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract Authorizations	Appropriations	Contract Authorizations	Appropriations	Contract Authorizations
1932 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	\$347,856,137	\$3,000,000	\$339,725,859	\$3,000,000	\$335,475,965	\$3,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	3,448,157	0	3,444,951	0	4,291,679	0
Total.....	351,304,294	3,000,000	343,170,810	3,000,000	339,767,644	3,000,000
1933 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	316,079,255	0	301,030,642	0	289,500,024	0
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	15,164,468	0	15,164,468	0	15,461,468	0
Total.....	331,243,723	0	316,195,110	0	304,961,492	0
1934 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	320,884,513	0	277,730,841	3,000,000	277,050,381	3,000,000
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	16,000	0	16,000	0	16,000	0
Total.....	320,900,513	0	277,746,841	3,000,000	277,066,381	3,000,000
1935 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	279,913,374	0	260,624,208	3,000,000	255,526,147	3,000,000
Second and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	25,357,947	0	25,335,947	0	25,335,947	0
Total.....	305,271,321	0	285,960,155	3,000,000	280,862,094	3,000,000
1936 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	346,723,362	0	317,459,277	0	341,348,204	7,686,753
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	14,627,792	0	14,340,000	0	14,190,000	0
Total.....	361,351,154	0	331,799,277	0	355,538,204	7,686,753
1937 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	458,193,897	0	375,025,510	8,000,000	383,104,859	10,669,786
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	8,829,018	0	8,040,000	0	5,140,000	3,000,000
Total.....	467,022,915	0	383,065,510	8,000,000	388,244,859	13,669,786
1938 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	456,608,221	0	416,486,461	10,462,000	415,263,154	21,887,394
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	11,596,630	0	9,546,875	0	2,721,875	0
Total.....	468,204,851	0	426,033,336	10,462,000	417,985,029	21,887,394
1939 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	510,733,043		459,688,835	19,126,894	459,401,254	34,045,394
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	73,269,087	46,801,000	72,399,287	46,801,000	71,600,743	46,801,000
Total.....	584,002,130	46,801,000	532,088,122	65,927,894	531,001,997	80,846,394
1940 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	548,628,698	22,275,000	526,305,868	20,700,000	508,789,824	40,205,988
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	373,941,532	74,497,500	369,439,392	78,997,500	342,828,786	78,997,500
Total.....	922,570,230	96,772,500	895,745,260	99,697,500	851,618,610	119,203,488
1941 -						
Annual Appropriation Act.....	1,484,495,482	59,100,000	1,412,107,511	279,010,136	1,433,303,715	323,229,636
Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriation Acts.....	7,211,422,529	4,857,959,752	6,626,443,207	4,749,992,958	7,047,290,692	4,683,360,015
Total.....	8,695,918,011	4,917,059,752	8,038,550,718	5,029,003,094	8,480,594,407	5,006,589,651
Total, 1932 - 1941.....	12,807,789,142	5,063,633,252	11,830,355,139	5,222,090,488	12,227,640,717	5,258,883,466
deduct 1932 - 1934 =	12,125,241,125	5,060,633,252	11,170,989,219	5,218,090,488	11,522,911,581	5,255,883,466

Total asked by Army 1932-1941 = \$17,185,894,377

Total granted by Budget 16,390,079,707 or a cut of \$795,814,670

" " " Congress 16,828,795,047 or 438,715,340 above budget

Office of the Budget Officer
for the War Department
1 November 1945

fws
Army
Budget
photostats

Witness Leahy:

Questions by The Chairman

The Chairman: Any further questions of Admiral Leahy?

Admiral, the chairman would like to ask you just one question. When you were testifying about the agreement between the Vichy French government and the Japanese government with respect to certain troops going into Indo-China, did I understand you to say that that was done under pressure of the Government government against the Vichy French government?

Admiral Leahy: At the time that was brought up to the French government Marshal Petain sent for me and told me about it and told me that the pressure from the German invaders of France in behalf of the Japanese was so heavy that he could not refuse to allow the Japanese into Indo-China in the small number that they asked for and under an agreement that they would withdraw when they had accomplished their purpose.

The Chairman: Do you know whether under the same pressure later they were unable to prevent other numbers from going in in violation of the agreement?

Admiral Leahy: I do not see how they could have prevented other numbers going in, Senator, because they had very few troops in Indo-China and they were outnumbered by the Japanese.

The Chairman: At that time the Vichy government was

Witness Leahy:

Questions by The Chairman

1
2 pretty generally understood to be under pressure constantly
3 from the German government?

4 Admiral Leahy: I am sure it was constantly under pres-
5 sure for whatever the Germans thought they needed to help
6 them with the war.

7 The Chairman: Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

8 Mr. Mitchell: None.

9 The Chairman: Well, the committee thanks you, Admiral,
10 for your testimony and for your cooperation and regrets that
11 you were held so long before you could go on the stand.

12 Admiral Leahy: Thank you very much, Senator. I am very
13 pleased indeed to contribute any little thing I had to this
14 very difficult investigation you have and my short detention
15 here was no trouble whatever, sir.

16 The Chairman: Anything further now, Mr. Counsel?

17 Mr. Mitchell: I have some documents that ought to go
18 into the record at this point.

19 The Chairman: Well, all right, we will receive them.

20 Mr. Mitchell: First I would like to read into the record
21 extracts from a letter dated January 25, 1941, dated at
22 Pearl Harbor, from the Commander-in-Chief of the United
23 States Fleet, - that was Admiral Richardson, - to the Chief
24 of Naval Operations in Washington. It follows along this
25 investigation about the air conditions, the air defense con-

1 ditions at Pearl Harbor. (Reading):

2 "1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-
3 Chief, U.S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of
4 Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy
5 Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage
6 of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of
7 the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situa-
8 tion.

9 "2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of
10 urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of
11 the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor
12 should take priority over the preparation of plans for
13 Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received,
14 this will be done.

15 "3. The new situation, as visualized by the Com-
16 mander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of
17 Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive
18 effort of the United States is to be exerted in the At-
19 lantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a 'waiting
20 attitude' will be taken in the Pacific, pending a deter-
21 mination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war
22 or commits an overt act against United States' interests
23 or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be pri-
24 marily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to
25 damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be

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1 **created.**

2 **"4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is**
3 **deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, cer-**
4 **tain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the**
5 **U.S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:**

6 **"(a) The United States is at war with Germany**
7 **and Italy.**

8 **"(b) War with Japan is imminent.**

9 **"(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached**
10 **to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers**
11 **and types of these units are at present un-**
12 **known.**

13 **"(d) At least three German raiders are in the Paci-**
14 **fic.**

15 **"(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these**
16 **attacks may take any form -- even to attacks**
17 **by Japanese ships flying German or Italian**
18 **flags or by submarines, under a doubtful pre-**
19 **sumption that they may be considered German**
20 **or Italian.**

21 **"(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against**
22 **shipping, outlying possessions or naval un-**
23 **its. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or at-**
24 **tempts to block the channel, are possible.**

25 **"(g) Local sabotage is possible.**

1 "5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet
2 in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where
3 deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks
4 will be included.

5 Waiting Attitude

6 "(1). Take full security measures for the protection
7 of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

8 "In the performance of this task, the Fleet is
9 severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked
10 deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and
11 equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be
12 set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order
13 that certain measures listed below may be more clearly
14 understood.

15 "At present, the following measures, among others,
16 will be required to accomplish the above task:

17 "(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, re-
18 enforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

19 "(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Hono-
20 lulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army
21 planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

22 "(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of
23 Army bombers and pursuit p lanes; supplemented by avail-
24 able Navy or Marine planes.

25 "(d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries

1 of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

2 "(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness
3 for distant service.

4 "(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth
5 Naval District.

6 "This task will require augmentation of District
7 forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable
8 vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become avail-
9 able to the Commandant."

10 (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) I will omit. They
11 relate to operations away from Pearl Harbor. (Continuing
12 Reading):

13 "6. It will, of course, be realized that the effeo-
14 tiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecu-
15 ted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after
16 the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier
17 is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the
18 LEXINGTON class should be selected, due to difficulties of
19 handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need
20 for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

21 "7. In connection with the execution of the fore-
22 going tasks, and with particular reference to the early ini-
23 tiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that
24 the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the
25 Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose

1 a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes.
2 Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for
3 personnel as well as an opportunity for maintenance and up-
4 keep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet
5 guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready
6 for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men
7 and material cannot but result in impaired readiness for
8 active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies
9 affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

10 "(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns avail-
11 able for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating con-
12 stant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.

13 "(b) The small number and obsolescent condition
14 of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness
15 of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet
16 planes for local patrols.

17 "(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for
18 the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of
19 Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to
20 this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the
21 availability of important vessels, but also results in
22 the forced employment of ships whose more valuable
23 characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature
24 of their tasks. This is particularly true where de-
25 stroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore

1 patrol and local escort. These duties could better be
2 performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and
3 converted escort vessels.

4 "(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

5 "8. It is considered imperative that immediate
6 measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies
7 enumerated above. It is further believed that these
8 measures should take priority over the needs of continental
9 districts, the training program, and material aid to Great
10 Britain.

11 "9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian
12 reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103(a)(5) of W.P.L.
13 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order
14 that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S.
15 Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

16 "10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration
17 with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
18 Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as
19 well as my own, views.

20 J. O. RICHARDSON

21 Copy to:

22 Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel."

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2 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, do I understand that
3 is a letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval
4 Operations here in Washington?

5 Mr. Mitchell: That is right, dated January 25, 1941.
6 It is already in the volume that the committee has. We
7 are occasionally pulling out the documents and putting them
8 in the record, so it connects up the story.

9 Mr. Chairman, I have next, if you want to sit and listen
10 to it tonight, the defense plans having to do with Pearl
11 Harbor. They cover a wide field beyond that, and we had
12 prepared extracts from that volume which has reference
13 particularly to the air defense. It is true, as one of
14 the members said the other day, this book of extracts of
15 defense plans does not cover a great many operations that
16 go far afield from Pearl Harbor. We think it ought to be
17 brought into the record at this point, and I will preface
18 that statement by calling the attention of the committee to
19 the fact that, as the result of Admiral Stark's letter of
20 November 22, to Richardson asking him to look into the
21 air defense system, Richardson went back to Honolulu and
22 did that work in December.

23 It resulted in the report which has been read in already.
24 That inspired the letter from Secretary Knox to Stimson
25 which started in motion the set of revisions of plans, field

1
2 orders, and so forth, that dealt with air defense at Pearl
3 Harbor.

4 We have two purposes in bringing that in:

5 One is to show the extent to which the possibility of
6 an attack at Pearl Harbor was in the year 1941, in the minds
7 of people here in Washington, and people at Honolulu, and
8 the other purpose is to show, in as brief form as we can,
9 the respective functions that have been assigned to the Army
10 and Navy forces in Pearl Harbor in connection with air attack.

11 The Chairman: This document you have here in your
12 hand, the document you have referred to, is the one which
13 you want to place in the record?

14 Mr. Mitchell: I do not want to place it all in. The
15 committee has it, but there are certain paragraphs of it
16 that I would like to read into the record.

17 I would say the original plans are here that cover
18 everything. General Gerow was War Plans Officer of the
19 General Staff at that time, and I found out he is the most
20 appropriate witness to explain the plans to the committee
21 as you may require. With the understanding he will be here
22 shortly to authenticate these plans and explain them further,
23 and on the assumption he is going to do so, I propose next
24 to place in the record at this stage certain extracts that
25 I think bring out the air defense plans there as they were

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2

worked out locally and in Washington.

3

4

The Chairman: If it is agreeable to the committee, we might hear that now.

5

6

Mr. Mitchell: It will take you more than ten minutes, I am sorry to say.

7

The Chairman: We might sit a little longer than that.

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Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, in connection with that I think it might be very well to have the extract of which he speaks, but I think also there should be available as exhibits, the complete plans. While the extracts that he presents to the committee relate to the defense of Pearl Harbor, the functions of the Navy went very much afield. I think for an accurate appraisal of the relative responsibilities of the Navy and Army, it may be very relevant to know what the Navy was supposed to do in the event of a war, which might have a very definite bearing on the appraisal of the whole situation.

Mr. Mitchell: Senator, here is the original material from which these extracts were obtained. Now, would you like to have these duplicated in the same way, or do you just want to examine them?

Senator Brewster: Are those the only copies which you have?

Mr. Mitchell: They have not been asked to reproduce

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1
2 them. It might be possible we could get one or two other
3 copies.

4 Senator Brewster: I think one copy is all that is
5 necessary as an exhibit in the case.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I have them here for that purpose,
7 and I was planning to have General Gerow offer them generally
8 and tell you what they are. We have not gone to the trouble
9 and expense of copying this mass of stuff.

10 Senator Brewster: Will you find out if they will allow
11 us to keep it?

12 Mr. Mitchell: I am keeping it now so you will have
13 access to it, if you want to borrow it. I planned, as I say,
14 to have the General authenticate them.

15 The Chairman: Let us go ahead with the reading of these
16 extracts.

17 Mr. Mitchell: I will do the best I can.

18 The Chairman: Would it be feasible, gentlemen, to have
19 these extracts printed in the record without reading them?

20 Mr. Mitchell: I do not see why not. If the committee
21 does not want to hear me read them, I will hand these to the
22 reporter, and ask him to transcribe into the daily transcript
23 the sections I have marked in pencil, that have particular rela-
24 tion to our air defenses.

25 The Chairman: Each member of the committee has the

1

2

document itself?

3

Mr. Mitchell: Exactly.

4

The Chairman: Each member of the committee has the

5

transcript daily.

6

If it is agreeable to the committee to have these extracts printed in the daily transcript of the record, it would be available to us on tomorrow, as well as the documents from which the extracts were taken.

7

8

9

10

Mr. Mitchell: I am glad to be relieved.

11

Senator Lucas: That will give the committee an opportunity to study these over tomorrow, if they desire, and if they want to explore further any extract that you have here, it may go into the record.

12

13

14

15

The Chairman: If there is no objection, that will be done.

16

17

(The extracts referred to are as follows:)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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EXTRACTS FROM
JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE

(1938)

* * *

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - ORANGE, All Navy Plans - ORANGE, all Joint Plans - ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

* * *

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that:-

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.
2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.
3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

* * *

1 2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.

2 b. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier.

3 (1) Boundaries.

4 The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU
5 and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the
6 defense of OAHU.

7 ***

8 (3) Missions.

9 (a) Joint Mission.

10 To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base,
11 and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

12 (b) Mission for the Army.

13 To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and
14 air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the
15 Naval forces.

16 (c) Mission for the Navy.

17 To patrol the coastal zone and to control and
18 protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.

19 ***

20 EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RAINBOW NO. 1*
21 (* Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy
22 14 August 1939, verbally by the President 14 October 1939;
revised by the Joint Board 10 April 1940.)

23 HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL
24 AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

24 Joint Decisions:

25 a. Boundaries:

1 The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such
2 adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu

3 b. Category of Defense:

4 Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V,
5 "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935".

6 c. Army Task:

7 To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air
8 forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval
9 forces.

10 d. Navy Task:

11 To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and
12 protect shipping therein; to support the Army Forces.

13 ***

14 f. Joint Plan to be Prepared: - Joint Coastal Frontier
15 Defense Plan.

16 ***

17 EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC

18 WAR PLAN--RAINBOW NO. 5*

19 *Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and
20 by the Secretary of War, 2 June 1941.

21 ***

22 The Pacific Area.

23 ***

24 33. Army Tasks.

25 ***

1 d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal
2 Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in
3 categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

4 ***

5 35. Navy Tasks.

6 ***

7 h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal
8 Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense
9 prescribed in paragraph 47.

10 ***

11 Hawaiian Coastal Frontier-----Category D

12 ***

13 "e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in
14 coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual
15 cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph a b."

16 ***

17 "36A. Hawaiian Coastal frontier.

18 "a. Boundaries.

19 The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu,
20 and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of
21 Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from
22 all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands
23 and Kingman Reef.

24 "b. Commanders.

25 Army. - The Commanding General, Hawaiian

Department

1 Navy. - The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,
 2 who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal
 3 frontier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local
 4 defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and
 5 strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army."

6 ***

7 EXTRACTS FROM

8 WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5*

9 *Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.

10 ***

11 30. HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

12 a. Extent.

13 OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are
 14 required for the defense of OAHU.

15 b. Category of Defense: D (as defined Section III,
 16 Chapter V, J.A.A. & N., 1935).

17 c. Missions.

18 (1) Joint - Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval
 19 base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

20 (2) Army - Hold OAHU against attacks by land,
 21 sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support
 22 Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the
 23 Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communica-
 24 tions by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce
 25 located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

1 (3) Navy - Patrol the Coastal Zone: control
2 and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

3 ***

4 EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1940

5 ***

6 BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

7 1. a. Missions.

8 (1) Joint Mission: To hold Oahu as a main outlying
9 naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal
10 Zone.

11 (2) Mission for the Army: To hold Oahu against attacks
12 by sea, land and air forces and against hostile sympathizers;
13 and to support the naval forces.

14 (3) Mission for the Navy: To patrol the Coastal Zone
15 and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army
16 forces. (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Orange).

17 b. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D"
18 defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department,
19 assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major
20 attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of
21 seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a
22 general reserve. (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

23 ***

24 d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of
25 attack listed below is the War Department Assignment of Category

1 "D" to this Department.

2 (1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area

3 in the order of probability are:

4 (a) Submarine - torpedo and mine.

5 (b) Sabotage.

6 (c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking
7 channels, by mines, or by air or surface
8 craft.

9 (d) Air raids, carrier based.

10 (e) Surface ship raids.

11 (f) Major combined attack in the absence of
12 the U. S. Fleet.

13 ***

14 5. a. Basis for Planning.

15 (1) Missions and Conditions.

16 (a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon
17 the following conditions:

18 The currently assigned category of defense will be Category
19 D (see par. 1 b.)

20 The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy
21 forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic
22 War Plan Orange (see par. 1 a.)

23 (b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

24 ***

25 (2) That the most probable form of attack is

1 a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by
2 ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

3 ***

4 b. Conclusion.

5 To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet
6 an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined to the next
7 paragraph.

8 c Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions
9 assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

10 (1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval,
11 antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with
12 the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and
13 utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively
14 accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must
15 be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander
16 decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite
17 missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as
18 follows:

19 (a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:

20 The beach and land defense of Oahu, (For
21 details, see paragraph 6).

22 The beach and land defense is based upon the principle
23 of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of
24 forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet
25 external and internal attacks.

1 (b) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian

2 Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:

3 The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of
4 Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the
5 beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6).

6 (c) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian

7 Air Force:

8 In carrying out the air defense, he may
9 conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction
10 with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or
11 temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander
12 as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and
13 will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

14 ***

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HEADQUARTERS
 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
 Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.,
 11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

and

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION 1

DIRECTIVES

1. RESPONSIBILITY. This joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. BASIS. This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, pages 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.
3. METHOD OF COORDINATION. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this

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1 method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy
2 operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of
3 command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army
4 and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b .

5 4. PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES. The Assistant Chief of
6 Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
7 and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
8 are designated as planning representatives respectively for the
9 Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par.
10 40 a . page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

11 5. JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. A Local Joint Planning
12 Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff,
13 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such
14 other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Com-
15 manding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant,
16 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action
17 of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee
18 shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordina-
19 tion in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint
20 Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member
21 thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-
22 committees as from time to time may be necessary.

23
24
25

1 13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the
2 respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation,
3 Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth
4 Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

5 14. TASKS.

6 a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying
7 naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal
8 Zone.

9 b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by
10 sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers;
11 to support the naval forces.

12 c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to
13 control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

14 15. FORCES.

15 a. ARMY FORCES.

16 The present garrison augmented by personnel and
17 facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from
18 Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and
19 Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

20 b. NAVAL FORCES.

21 Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth
22 Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be
23 obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the
24 Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

25 c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

* * *

17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D.C.A., in cooperation with the Naval

1 Inshore Patrol (see par. 18: a.), and an aerial observation
2 system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service
3 for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

4 g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offen-
5 sive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

6 h. Provide personnel for and Army communication
7 facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph
8 18. e.

9 i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land
10 communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph
11 loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions)
12 to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intel-
13 ligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy
14 will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The
15 Joint Board, 1940".

16 j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to
17 normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both
18 to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy
19 aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

20 k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

21 l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers
22 in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

23 m. Army measures to assure effective supervision,
24 control, and censorship over communication systems which will
25 conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

1 * * *
 2 18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
 3 shall provide for:

- 4 a. An inshore patrol.
 5 b. An offshore patrol.
 6 c. An escort force.
 7 d. An attack force.

- 8 * * *
 9 i. Distant reconnaissance.
 10 j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

11 * * *
 12 l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for
 13 in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure
 14 prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

15 * * *
 16 n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, includ-
 17 ing counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dis-
 18 semination of hostile information.

19 * * *
 20 (3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where
 21 facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work pos-
 22 sible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them
 23 so that M-Day operation will be possible.

24 * * *
 25 21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain

1 effective until notice in writing by either party of its
 2 renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in
 3 part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department.
 4 This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the
 5 Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute
 6 Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

7 (Signed) WALTER C. SHORT

(Signed) C. C. BLOCH

8 WALTER C. SHORT

C. C. BLOCH

9 Lieut. General, U. S. Army,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

10 Commanding,

Commandant,

11 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

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1 HEADQUARTERS,
2 14th NAVAL DISTRICT,
3 PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

J O I N T

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

and

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

1939

28 March 1941

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI * JOINT AGREEMENTS.

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR
BASE.

I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

1 II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2 2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
3 ment and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of
4 the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile
5 raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action,
6 each commander will take such preliminary steps as are neces-
7 sary to make available without delay to the other commander
8 such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the cir-
9 cumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be con-
10 ducted in accordance with the following plans:

11 a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will
12 be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The De-
13 partment Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength
14 to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the
15 tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment air-
16 planes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable.
17 This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated
18 attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it
19 will revert to Army control.

20 b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate
21 vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command
22 of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine
23 the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions.
24 With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the
25 number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be

1 the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to
2 the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of
3 the required alert status until, due to a change in the tacti-
4 cal situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Offi-
5 cer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy
6 control.

7 c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance
8 patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made
9 available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control
10 of the naval commander directing the search operations.

11 d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit pro-
12 tection is requested for the protection of friendly surface
13 ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the
14 tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

15 III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

16 * * *

17 5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning
18 Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence
19 Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will dissemi-
20 nate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and
21 hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limita-
22 tions of the AAIS are such that the interval between receipt
23 of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very
24 short. Radio broadcasts from the AAIS will be transmitted
25 on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or move-

1 ments of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured
2 through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the
3 Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

4 6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service,
5 provision will be made for transmission of information on the
6 location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special
7 wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of
8 Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evalu-
9 ation of available information and transmit them to their
10 respective organizations. Information relating to the
11 presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu
12 which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted
13 without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information
14 Center.

15 7. The several joint communications systems listed in
16 paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Ser-
17 vice, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment)
18 will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods,
19 joint exercises which involve these communications systems,
20 and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Command-
21 ing General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense
22 Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equip-
23 ment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in
24 joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable.
25 Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed

1 equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles
2 through their own supply channels.

3 IV. JOINT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MEASURES.

4 8. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.

5 During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat,
6 and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian
7 Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant
8 Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy
9 aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases
10 thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure
11 prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modi-
12 fied except when a departure therefrom is essential due to
13 combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an
14 emergency.

15 * * *

16 11. Aircraft Warning Service.

17 The Army will expedite the installation and plac-
18 ing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the
19 period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the
20 Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will
21 endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be
22 practicable.

23 * * *

24 APPROVED: 2 April 1941.

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(Signed) C. C. BLOCH
C. C. BLOCH
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

COMMANDANT

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

(Signed) WALTER C. SHORT
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,

COMMANDING,

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

March 31, 1941.

1
2 Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force,

3 Commander Patrol Wing TWO,

4 Naval Air Station,

5 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General

Hawaiian Air Force,

Fort Shafter, T. H.

6
7 Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in
8 the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet
9 Units in the Hawaiian area.

10 1. Summary of the Situation.

- 11 (a) Relations between the United States and Orange
12 are strained, uncertain and varying.
- 13 (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile
14 actions by a declaration of war.
- 15 (c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships
16 and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent
17 effective offensive action by our forces in
18 the Western Pacific for a long period.
- 19 (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly
20 at sea in the operating areas organized to
21 take prompt offensive action against any
22 surface or submarine force which initiates
23 hostile action.
- 24 (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines
25 and/or an Orange fast raiding force might

1 arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior
2 warning from our intelligence service.

3 II. Survey of opposing Strengths.

4 (a) Orange might send into this area one or
5 more submarines and/or one or more fast
6 raiding forces composed of carriers sup-
7 ported by fast cruisers. For such action
8 she is known to have eight carriers, seven
9 of which are reported to be capable of
10 25 knots or over and four of which are
11 rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the
12 carriers are converted capital ships,
13 armoured and armed with 10-8" guns each
14 and reported to have heavy AA batteries.
15 Two others are small (7000 treaty tons)
16 and limited to 25 knots. Exact information
17 on numbers and characteristics of the
18 aircraft carried by these ships is not
19 available. However the best estimate at
20 present available is that the small carriers
21 can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and
22 the large ones about 60. Probably the best
23 assumption is that carrier complements are
24 normally about equally divided between
25 fighter and bomber types. Lacking any

11. Survey of opposing strengths. (continued)

1 information as to range and armament of
2 planes we must assume that they are at
3 least the equal of our similar types.
4 There probably exist at least 12 eight
5 inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun
6 fast modern cruisers which would be suitable
7 supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939)
8 shows over forty submarines which are easily
9 capable of projection into this area. An
10 Orange surface raiding force would be far
11 removed from their base and would almost
12 surely be inferior in gun power to our
13 surface forces operating at sea in the
14 Hawaiian area.

15 (b) The most difficult situation for us to
16 meet would be when several of the above
17 elements were present and closely coord-
18 inated their actions. The shore-based air
19 force available to us in a constantly
20 varying quantity which is being periodically
21 augmented by reinforcements from the mainland
22 and which also varies as fleet units are
23 shifted. Under existing conditions about
24 one-half of the planes present can be
25 maintained in a condition of material

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II. Survey of opposing strengths. (continued)

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readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support substained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general,

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1 can perform functions that accord with
2 their type.

3 III. Possible enemy action.

4 (a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

5 1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in
6 the operating area.

7 2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships
8 and installations in Pearl Harbor.

9 3. A combination of these two.

10 (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous
11 form of attack on OAHU would be an air
12 attack. It is believed that at present
13 such an attack would most likely be
14 launched from one or more carriers which
15 would probably approach inside of three
16 hundred miles.

17 (c) A single attack might or might not indicate
18 the presence of more submarines or more
19 planes awaiting to attack after defending
20 aircraft have been drawn away by the
21 original thrust.

22 (d) Any single submarine attack might indicate
23 the presence of a considerable undiscovered
24 surface force probably composed of fast
25 ships accompanied by a carrier.

1 III. Possible enemy action. (continued)

2 (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high prob-
3 ability that it could be delivered as a
4 complete surprise in spite of any patrols
5 we might be using and that it might find
6 us in a condition of readiness under which
7 pursuit would be slow to start, also it
8 might be successful as a diversion to draw
9 attention away from a second attacking force.
10 The major disadvantage would be that we could
11 have all day to find and attack the carrier.
12 A dusk attack would have the advantage that
13 the carrier could use the night for escape
14 and might not be located the next day near
15 enough for us to make a successful air attack.
16 The disadvantage would be that it would spend
17 the day of the attack approaching the islands
18 and might be observed. Under the existing
19 conditions this might not be a serious disad-
20 vantage for until an overt act has been com-
21 mitted we probably will take no offensive
22 action and the only thing that would be lost
23 would be complete surprise. Midday attacks
24 have all the disadvantages and none of the
25 advantages of the above. After hostilities

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III. Possible enemy action. (continued)

have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks would be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

- (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.
- (b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more

1 IV. Action open to us: (continued)

2 than one group is present.

- 3 2. Immediate arming and preparation of the
-
- 4 maximum possible bombing force and its
-
- 5 dispatch for attack when information
-
- 6 is available.

7 (c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in
8 addition to (b) above:

- 9 1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft
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- 10 suitable for aerial combat to intercept
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- 11 the attackers.
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1 IV. Action open to us:

2 (c) Continued.

- 3 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as
4 either carrier or long range shore based air-
5 craft.
6 3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow
7 carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

8 (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in
9 the operating area in addition to (b) above:

- 10 1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition
11 of immediate readiness to counter a possible air
12 raid until search proves that none is imminent.
13 2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to
14 relieve planes in the air over the attack area.
15 3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two
16 hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack
17 at one hour before daylight of next succeeding
18 daylight period.

19 (e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our
20 forces until an attack is known to be imminent or
21 has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack
22 develops time will probably be vital and our
23 actions must start with a minimum of delay. It
24 therefore appears that task forces should be organ-
25 ized now, missions assigned, conditions of readi-

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ness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all

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1 prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

2 (a) Establish a task organization as follows by
3 the issue of a joint air operation plan:

- 4 1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval
5 Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol
6 Wing TWO))

7 The following units in accordance with
8 current conditions of readiness:

9 Patrol squadrons.

10 Shore-based VO - VS units.

11 Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

12 Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned
13 to the air combat group.

14 Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

15 Army bombardment squadrons.

16 Army reconnaissance squadrons.

17 Navy Utility Squadrons.

- 18 2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian
19 Air Force)

20 The following units in accordance with
21 current conditions of readiness:

22 Army pursuit squadrons.

23 Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

24 Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

25 One division of shore-based carrier

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VS planes. (Primarily for trail-
ing aircraft)

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(b) Assign missions to the above groups as
follows:

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1 V. Decisions:

2 (b) Continued.

- 3 1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and
4 track all hostile surface units in position to
5 take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hos-
6 tile ships by air attack. Priority of targets:
7 (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If
8 choice of location is presented priority should
9 be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack
10 (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel
11 interception.
- 12 2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile
13 aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking
14 aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes
15 to carrier and report location to commander search
16 and attack group. As a secondary mission support
17 search and attack group upon request.
- 18 (c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required
19 action under this plan when:
20 (a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.
21 (b) Information is received from any source that
22 indicates an attack is probable.
23 (c) Information is received that an attack has
24 been made on fleet units.
25

1 V. Decisions: (continued)

2 (d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this
3 plan as follows:

4 Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a
5 combination of a letter and number from the tables
6 below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in
7 a condition of material readiness for its assigned
8 task and the number indicating the degree of readi-
9 ness prescribed for that part.

10 MATERIAL READINESS

- 11 A. All assigned operating aircraft available and
12 ready for a task.
- 13 B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type
14 available and ready for a task.
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1 V. Decisions:

2 (d) Continued.

3 MATERIAL READINESS

- 4 A. All assigned operating aircraft available and
5 ready for a task.
- 6 B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type
7 available and ready for a task.
- 8 C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each
9 functional type available and ready for a task.
- 10 D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each
11 functional type available and ready for a task.
- 12 E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none
13 ready for the purposes of this plan.

14 DEGREE OF READINESS

- 15 1. For pursuit and VF types - four minutes. Types
16 other than fighters - fifteen minutes.
- 17 2. All types - 30 minutes.
- 18 3. All types - one hour.
- 19 4. All types - two hours.
- 20 5. All types - four hours.

21 The armament and fuel load for each type under the
22 above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the
23 tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and
24 will be prescribed therein.
25

1 V. Decisions:

2 (e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of
3 readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all
4 times prescribed by the Senior officers present of
5 the Army and Navy as a result of all information
6 currently available to them. In using the above
7 conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1
8 requires a preparation period of reduced operations
9 and can be maintained for only a short time as it
10 is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2
11 require watch and watch for all personnel and per-
12 sonnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly
13 if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1,
14 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training
15 work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained
16 without unduly curtailing normal training work.

17 * * * *

18
19 (Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER,
20 P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
21 Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

(Signed) F. L. MARTIN
F. L. MARTIN,
22 Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding Hawaiian
Air Force

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STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 November 1941

SECTION I - GENERAL

* * *

10. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.-a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

* * *

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

* * *

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

* * *

SECTION II - ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below.

14. ALERT NO. 1.-a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

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1 b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and
2 Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties
3 at their present stations, pending further orders.

4 c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal
5 training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

6 d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

7 (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including
8 sabotage, in its assigned sector.

9 (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with
10 motor transportation sufficient to transport it, pre-
11 pared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

12 (3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation
13 and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned
14 Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not
15 protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

16 * * *

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18 15. ALERT NO. 2.-a. This alert is applicable to a con-
19 dition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks
20 from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to
21 defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

22 b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and
23 G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All
24 other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue
25 with their normal schedule.

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1
2 e. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal
training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

* * *

3
4 (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft
5 defense positions, except that railway batteries will
6 remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

7 (2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Inter-
8 ceptor Command for operational control.

* * *

9
10 f. THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE WILL:

11 (1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of
12 readiness as directed by this headquarters. See para-
13 graph 17.

14 (2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft
15 to the Interceptor Command.

16 (3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on
17 outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on
18 fields.

19 (4) Disperse bombers with crews.

20 (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

* * *

21
22 (8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

23 (a) Release to Navy for operational control
24 all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber
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1 commander will report to the Commander of Patrol
2 Wing TWO.

3 (b) Receive all available shore based
4 Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate
5 condition of readiness and release them to the Inter-
6 ceptor Command for operational control.

7 * * *

8 (1) The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

9 (1) Insure occupation of all battle stations
10 by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to
11 the Interceptor Command.

12 (2) Insure that joint Army - Navy communications
13 are in readiness for immediate employment.

14 (j) The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

15 Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit
16 aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and
17 Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and
18 attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-
19 aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

20 (1) Arrival and departure of all friendly
21 aircraft.

22 (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of
23 Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
24

25 * * *

1 16. ALERT NO. 3.-a. This alert requires the occupation
2 of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense
3 of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

4 * * *

5 f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

- 6 (1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
7 (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
8 (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
9 (4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by
10 air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

11 * * *

- 12 (8) Disperse bombers with crews.
13 (9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to
14 bunkers.

15 * * *

16 1. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and con-
17 trol the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery
18 (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the
19 aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide
20 for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under
21 military control to include:

22 (1) Arrival and departure of all friendly
23 aircraft.

24 (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of
25

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1 Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

2 (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all
3 interested agencies.

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SECTION IIICONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. MATERIAL READINESS.-

A - All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B - One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C - Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D - Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E - All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.-

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1 - For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes.

Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

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- 2 - All types: 30 Minutes.
- 3 - All types: One hour.
- 4 - All types: Two hours.
- 5 - All types: Four hours.

* * *

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OPERATIONS ORDERSHAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

PART VI - FIELD ORDER NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)

FIELD ORDERS)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

NO. INS)

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

* * *

(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.

b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:

(1) By the Pacific Fleet:-

(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.

(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.

(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit

1 to locate and destroy hostile submarines.

2 (d) The organization of four air defense groups
3 for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of
4 all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

5 (2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval
6 District and attached units):-

7 (a) Establishment of an inshore patrol con-
8 sisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl
9 Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily
10 mine sweeping operations.

11 (b) The organization of an air striking force
12 consisting of Patrol Wing TWO, attached Fleet aircraft, and
13 attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search
14 for and attack hostile surface ships.

15 * * *

16 2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units
17 placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate
18 to defend OAHU from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile
19 naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent
20 acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support
21 naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval
22 vessels.

23 * * *

24 c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with
25 fleet aircraft, will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft,

1 will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof,
2 will conduct operations as follows:

3 (1) Offensive Action. Conduct air operations
4 against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance
5 aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed
6 under the tactical control of the Navy.

7 * * *

8 (3) Reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance essential
9 to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement,
10 where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing inform-
11 ation of hostile fleet movements.

12 * * *

13 (5) Conditions of Readiness. Aircraft and crews
14 thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness
15 directed by this headquarters.

16 (6) Hostile Air Attack. Air operations directed
17 above will be instituted without further orders from this
18 headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readi-
19 ness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack
20 upon OAHU or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters.
21 All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and
22 this headquarters advised of action taken.

23 * * *

24 (2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be
25 taken under fire except under the following conditions: