

WLC6

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 states:

3 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our  
4 diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international  
5 communications, the following warning will be added in the  
6 middle of the daily Japanese Language shortwave news  
7 broadcast", and in which certain Japanese words were  
8 "east wind rain", "north wind cloudy", "west wind clear",  
9 if used in the broadcast meant diplomatic relations were  
10 in danger or broken, and to burn the codes.

11 Did you see that message prior to December 7th, that is,  
12 the message setting up that code system?

13 Admiral Stark: My recollection is not clear on the winds  
14 message. I undoubtedly saw it.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Now, when you saw the winds message, the  
16 question is whether this is the one message that everybody  
17 knows was received, and there is another real question as to  
18 whether any such code message was ever later sent out. I  
19 would like to be clear as to what you are referring to.

20 Admiral Stark: I probably saw this message setting up  
21 the code at the time it was received.

22 Mr. Mitchell: When you say "probably", you heard it  
23 talked about recently?

24 Admiral Stark: I heard it pretty well covered.

25 Mr. Mitchell: You cannot remember what you knew prior to



Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

WLC7

1 Witness Stark

2 December 7?

3 Admiral Stark: No, sir. We talked about it a lot since.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know prior to December 7 that any  
5 naval monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept  
6 such message?7 Admiral Stark: No, I did not know -- I did not get your  
8 question.9 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know prior to December 7, 1941  
10 that any Navy monitoring station had been alerted to try and  
11 listen in on Japanese weather broadcasts?

12 Admiral Stark: I undoubtedly knew that.

13 Mr. Mitchell: You undoubtedly knew it?

14 Admiral Stark: Yes.

15 Mr. Mitchell: If you knew that then you must have seen  
16 this message.

17 Admiral Stark: I said I assumed that I did.

18 Mr. Mitchell: When you say you undoubtedly knew it, you  
19 assume you knew it, but do you know now that you knew it then?

20 Admiral Stark: I know now.

21 Mr. Mitchell: But you cannot really support your memory  
22 before and after the 7th of December to say what you did know  
23 about this code system prior to that date?24 Admiral Stark: I am anticipating your next question which  
25 I suppose will be as to whether I knew of its implementation.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, I haven't gotten to that yet.

3 Admiral Stark: Yes.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I will in a minute.

5 Admiral Stark: When this message came in it was undoubtedly  
6 ly brought to my attention. I state I must have seen it. I  
7 do not recollect particularly the details of it.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Do you have any present recollection that  
9 you did see this code system message prior to December 7?

10 Admiral Stark: Well, that is not clear, sir. I have seen  
11 it so much since then --

12 Mr. Mitchell: It is hard to tell.

13 Admiral Stark: I assume I undoubtedly saw it at the time,  
14 but it is one of those things. My mind has not been burdened  
15 with it for over the four years in question.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Would you have the same answer with respect  
17 to the message at the top of page 155, which was on the same  
18 date and used an abbreviated system, with the Japanese words  
19 "east, north or west" instead of "east wind rain, north wind  
20 cloudy and west wind clear", which was to be used in general  
21 intelligence broadcasts. Do you remember ever seeing that  
22 prior to December 7?

23 Admiral Stark: I assume I saw it. I do not remember the  
24 details of the "Higashi" and "Kita", and the rest that went  
25 with it.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Prior to December 7, 1941, was there ever  
3 brought to your attention any copy or any information about  
4 the implementing message sent out by the Japs in a weather  
5 broadcast which used the significant words that were set up  
6 in this code?

7 Admiral Stark: No, there was not, sir. I am sure of  
8 that.

9 Mr. Mitchell: How about a message sent out under the  
10 second code system set up at the top of page 155 of Exhibit 1,  
11 which was an abbreviated system to be used in general intelli-  
12 gence broadcasts?

13 Prior to December 7, was any implementing message under  
14 that brought to your attention?

15 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Did you ever hear, prior to December 7, of  
17 any implementing message under this winds code system, or  
18 a message thought to be that, having been received and  
19 decoded in the Navy Department?

20 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: The Federal Communications station was  
22 alerted I think by the Army to try to listen in on these  
23 Japanese weather broadcasts to see what they could get, and  
24 their report shows the two messages between November 28 and  
25 December 7 that did not quite fit the exact wording of the



1 code system but came pretty close to it in regard to a  
2 possible war with Russia. Did you see those? Were they  
3 brought to your attention?

4 Admiral Stark: I do not recollect. I have heard it dis-  
5 cussed since in all its detail. I do not recollect the Russian  
6 situation at that time.

7 Mr. Mitchell: I will next call your attention to what  
8 we have been calling here the 14-part and 1 p.m. message. It  
9 appears of record here that on December 6 there was intercepted  
10 and decoded here in Washington a pilot message sent from the  
11 Jap Government to their ambassadors here stating there would  
12 come shortly a longer message containing their answer to the  
13 American Government's position, and then it appears on the  
14 evening and before midnight December 6-7, the first 13 parts  
15 of that message were translated, decoded, and made available  
16 to certain officials here, and on the next morning, the 14th  
17 part and 1 p.m. part, which directed the presentation of  
18 the message to our Secretary of State at 1 p.m. on the 7th,  
19 were translated and disseminated. When did any part of that  
20 message first come to your attention?

21 Admiral Stark: It first came to my attention Sunday  
22 forenoon when I came to the office in the Navy Department.  
23 I had no information of it prior to that time.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Nobody endeavored to reach you, that  
3 you know of, Saturday evening, about the early 13 parts?

4 Admiral Stark: Nobody reached me.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Where were you, if you know?

6 Admiral Stark: I don't know, sir. I thought I was  
7 home but if they had tried to reach me I should have been  
8 there. Also if I were not there word would have been left  
9 where I was. Also the Duty Officer was generally informed  
10 of my whereabouts. Unfortunately, Mrs. Stark has destroyed  
11 her date calendar of that time. I have tried to run down  
12 two or three blinds. There was a party given in the Navy  
13 Yard that night for Governor Edison, ex-Secretary of the Navy.  
14 I knew that I had been there on a party with him. I wrote  
15 the Commandant at that time. He said that he had completely  
16 forgotten they had given the party and his wife said she  
17 was sure I wasn't there, in any case. So that blind went by  
18 the board.

19 Mr. Mitchell: The record shows that Secretary Knox  
20 had it that night; your Chief of Naval Intelligence had it  
21 that night.

22 Admiral Stark: That is right.

23 Mr. Mitchell: And Knox called up and made an appointment  
24 with Stimson and Hull the next morning. You didn't hear  
25 anything about that?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Stark: No, sir, not a word.

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Mr. Mitchell: In the afternoon of the Saturday before, during office hours, this pilot message came in, which was the preliminary message from the Japs to their Ambassadors stating that they were going to send this message along.

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Did you see that?

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Admiral Stark: I have no recollection of having seen or heard of the pilot message. The first information that I had on the subject was Sunday forenoon.

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Mr. Mitchell: I noticed in your statement about this incident you make no mention of the hour you got in the office or the hour you first saw this 13 or 14-part message Sunday morning. Have you no recollection about the hour?

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Admiral Stark: I can only guess on that and I did guess last summer. I usually got down to the office Sunday mornings around 10:30 and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around 10:30 or 11:00 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11:00. What time it was on this particular Sunday morning I couldn't go beyond that.

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Mr. Mitchell: I believe there are some officials in



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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your Department, who have not yet been called as witnesses, whose job it was to deliver and consider messages of that type, who think you got there at 9:00 o'clock and saw a part of this message as early as that and the balance of it, the 14th part, at least by 1:30.

Would that be contrary to the fact if they should so testify?

Admiral Stark: They have told me the same thing and they are also estimating. You will have those people before you. And as regarding the 1:00 o'clock message I think you will have, probably, from one of the witnesses who kept some track of his time, the fact that he got to my office, and he can testify, about 10:40, with the 1:00 o'clock message, but I have no recollection.

Mr. Mitchell: The records show, the White House phone records show that General Marshall called you at 11:30 about it, he had written out a message to Pearl Harbor, to the Army Commander there about this 1:00 p.m. business.

Do you recall that?

Admiral Stark: That is the one thing on that morning which stands out very clearly in my memory, was General Marshall's call to me about that message. At that time I was talking over that message with Admiral Schuirmann, as to what it might mean. He pointed out, he said, we don't



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 know what the significance of it is, but it might mean  
3 something, and he said he thought it would be a good thing  
4 to inform the people in the Pacific.

5 My first reaction was that we had sent so much out  
6 that -- and as there was no deduction from the message, as to  
7 what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that  
8 it would be just as well not to send it. A few days previous,  
9 when we had a discussion whether to send out anything more,  
10 the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it  
11 might create the story of "wolf".

12 That was my first conversation with General Marshall.

13 I put the phone up and, as I recall it, I put it up  
14 and stopped, and in a matter of seconds, or certainly only  
15 a few minutes, and thought, well, it can't do any harm, there  
16 may be something unusual about it, General Marshall states  
17 he doesn't know what the significance is, but there might  
18 be something, and I turned back and picked up the phone, he  
19 had not yet sent the message, and I said, perhaps you are  
20 right, I think you had better go ahead and I would like to  
21 have you make sure that it goes to the Naval opposites where  
22 this message was going, which was throughout the commands in  
23 the broad Pacific.

24 I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time  
25 was rather short, whether or not he would get it out quickly.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell <sup>5816</sup>

2 I told him our own system under pressure was very fast.

3 And he said, no, that he was sure he could get it out quickly  
4 also. And with that I did nothing more.

5 Mr. Mitchell: What was your system?

6 Admiral Stark: Radio.

7 Mr. Mitchell: You had a powerful sending apparatus,  
8 did you?

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, very.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, if we are right in our assumptions  
11 as to the fact you had this 1:00 p.m. message in your hands  
12 an hour before Marshall did, that is at least 10:30 -- you  
13 are not willing to concede that, are you?

14 Admiral Stark: My remembrance, as I said, was 10:40.  
15 When you say "at least 10:30", I think you will find testimony  
16 to that effect by a witness, and if he states that, and I  
17 think he probably has good supporting data, I accept it, that  
18 it was delivered to my office and then after that was given,  
19 by whomever he gave it, to me.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn't  
21 spotted that message and started to send word out to Pearl  
22 Harbor that you probably wouldn't have sent anything?

23 Admiral Stark: I don't know that I would. I think that  
24 might be a fair deduction.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Now, didn't you have somebody more than



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Schuirmann in there discussing this 1:00 p.m. business?

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Admiral Stark: Well, sir --

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Mr. Mitchell: Didn't Commander Krammer --

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Mr. Gesell: I believe one witness says there were 15

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officers in there.

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Mr. Murphy: Admiral Schuirmann.

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Admiral Stark: Admiral Schuirmann. I said when Marshall

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called I was talking it over with Schuirmann.

10

Mr. Mitchell: After you got the 1:00 p.m. message wasn't

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there some discussion in your office then about it?

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Admiral Stark: There may have been. I don't recall it.

13

Mr. Mitchell: Commander Krammer --

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Admiral Stark: I can give you what I know by hearsay.

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Mr. Mitchell: I don't want that. I just want whether

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any of these officers spoke to you about it.

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Admiral Stark: I don't recollect it that morning. I

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recollect it since.

19

Mr. Mitchell: There were some younger officers that

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spotted the 1:00 p.m. business and made some suggestion about

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it being daylight at Honolulu?

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Admiral Stark: I am certain nobody mentioned Honolulu

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with reference to a daylight attack. I am positive of that.

24

Mr. Mitchell: Well, this was what we lawyers call a

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last clear chance. These people were not ready at Pearl Harbor;



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 the Jap Fleet was piling in; here was a chance to get a  
3 message to them that might have saved them; it reached your  
4 hands, we will say, at 10:40; the chance wasn't taken.

5 Does that sum up the situation as you see it?

6 Admiral Stark: Well, I gather from your --

7 Mr. Mitchell: You might have intervened and done something.

8 Admiral Stark: I gather from your question you are now  
9 pointing that dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn't  
10 mention Pearl Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to  
11 Pearl Harbor any more than it did the Philippines or the  
12 Netherlands East Indies.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Are you right about that? 1:00 p.m. here  
14 was dawn at Pearl Harbor and 1:00 p.m. here was in the  
15 middle of the night in the Philippines.

16 Admiral Stark: I would say that dawn at Pearl Harbor  
17 was about an hour -- that can be checked by the Naval Observa-  
18 tory -- before the time specified in the message; and as  
19 regards midnight in the Philippines, as to whether that would  
20 mean anything, that could have been an attack at night.  
21 Taranto was an attack just a few minutes after midnight.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Why not send a message to all three of  
23 those places saying something is liable to happen at 1:00 p.m.  
24 Washington time?

25 Admiral Stark: In the light of hindsight, if we had read



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 into that message that it meant an attack at that hour, and  
3 had sent it out, of course, it would have been helpful. I  
4 wish such an inference could have been drawn.

(3) 5 Mr. Mitchell: The fixing of an exact hour to deliver  
6 the diplomatic message and route out the Secretary of State  
7 on a Sunday at 1:00 p.m., wasn't it obvious that there was  
8 some special significance, having in mind the history of the  
9 Japs striking first and declaring war afterwards?

10 Admiral Stark: If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to  
11 say that so far as I know the Secretary of War didn't read  
12 that inference into it, the Secretary of State didn't read  
13 that inference into it, the Secretary of the Navy didn't  
14 read that inference into it, General Marshall and his staff  
15 didn't read that inference into it, and nobody mentioned it  
16 to me.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Are you quite right about General Marshall?  
18 The first thing he did was to spot that message and he wouldn't  
19 even allow his answer to be typed, he put it into longhand  
20 and told them to encode it without typing it.

21 Admiral Stark: May I read his dispatch?

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, we are all familiar with it.

23 Admiral Stark: I would like to read this:

24 "Just what significance the hour set may have been we  
25 do not know."



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: Of course, you didn't know.

Admiral Stark: (Reading)

"But be on the alert accordingly."

Mr. Mitchell: That means, to you, being alerted at 1:00 p.m. Washington time, doesn't it?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir; but I would like to invite attention also to the fact that we had thought that they were on the alert. I am not attempting to argue the fact, sir, that I don't think it would have been a good thing to have gotten this message out, drawn the inference and sent it. I wish we could have. We didn't.

Mr. Mitchell: You didn't know they weren't on the alert?

Admiral Stark: No, sir. On the contrary, we felt they were.

Mr. Mitchell: You don't know what time Stimson and Hull got this 1:00 p.m. message, do you, or saw it?

Admiral Stark: I think, if I may say so, Krammer can tell you that. And if Krammer says that message was delivered to my office at 10:40, I accept it.

Mr. Mitchell: It has been suggested to me that Krammer may have told you about the text of that message before delivery of the document. Do you recall that?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I think I will not ask the Admiral any



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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more questions. Do you want to go on with the committee examination or take it up at 2:00 o'clock?

The Chairman: Inasmuch as we want to have an executive session we might suspend now until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p.m., a recess was taken until 2:06 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order. The  
3 chair understands counsel wish to ask some further questions.

4 Mr. Gesell: A few additional questions, Mr. Chairman.

## TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

(resumed)

6  
7 Mr. Gesell: First, Admiral Stark, with respect to the  
8 events of the 6th and the 7th. With respect to your where-  
9 abouts on December 6th, did you have a duty officer at your  
10 home on the evening of the 6th?

11 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

12 Mr. Gesell: If someone had wanted to reach you in a  
13 hurry could they have gotten you?

14 Admiral Stark: I left word at home when I went out as  
15 to where I could be reached; also before leaving the Depart-  
16 ment the duty officer in Operations was informed if I would  
17 be out.

18 Mr. Gesell: Was it generally known that the duty offi-  
19 cer knew your whereabouts in the Navy Department?

20 Admiral Stark: I think so. Also it was a general Navy  
21 custom or at least it was a departmental custom, they would  
22 probably have called one of my aides.

23 Mr. Gesell: Was there anyone at your home on the 6th  
24 who could have taken the calls if you were absent?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes. There was always a servant avail-



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 able at the telephone.

3 Mr. Gesell: Well, did your servant, or did the duty  
4 officer at the Navy Department, or did any of your aides ever  
5 telephone that anyone had sought to reach you at any time on  
6 the 6th?

7 Admiral Stark: No.

8 Mr. Gesell: Now, with respect to the 7th, I think we  
9 want to have a little clear idea of when you got to your of-  
10 fice. Admiral Wilkinson testified that you reached your of-  
11 fice at least by 9:15 that morning because his recollection is  
12 that at 9:15 he discussed the first thirteen parts of the  
13 message with you or handed them to you. Do you recall that  
14 you were at your office that early?

15 Admiral Stark: I do not. I may have been but I do not  
16 recall just what time I got down that Sunday morning. I made  
17 a guess when I was asked at the hearing before the Naval  
18 Court of Inquiry last summer about half past ten.

19 Mr. Gesell: Your best recollection is that you got there  
20 at half past ten?

21 Admiral Stark: Well, that was about the usual time and  
22 I had no reason to think otherwise. I may have gotten in  
23 earlier.

24 Mr. Gesell: Whenever it was you got there was your first  
25 order of business the fourteen part message?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Admiral Stark: No, I do not.

3 Mr. Gesell: Did you have any conversations prior to the  
4 attack concerning those messages with Secretary Knox?

5 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that I did. I may have.  
6 I simply don't remember.

7 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, there are two or three other  
8 points, picking up some loose ends at this time, which are  
9 somewhat unrelated and I will just go right down them with  
10 you.

11 General Marshall indicated that he was not certain what  
12 the length of time was which the Navy had in mind as being  
13 the minimum necessary for it to get ready for combat in the  
14 Pacific. Did you have some date in mind and, if so, did you  
15 state your estimate of that at any time?

16 Admiral Stark: I am not sure of your question unless you  
17 mean the delay that we wanted in connection with the Philip-  
18 pines?

19 Mr. Gesell: I believe that is it, yes.

20 Admiral Stark: If that is what you refer to and I believe  
21 he testified I wanted somewhat longer.

22 Mr. Gesell: That is right.

23 Admiral Stark: And if I go a little further, I believe  
24 he testified that he thought by 10 December or something of  
25 that sort he would be ready and that I wanted that into Feb-



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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ruary.

Mr. Gesell: I was not clear about that. He was not clear how long you wanted and that is what I am trying to get now.

Admiral Stark: That is to what you refer?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Admiral Stark: I was asking for three months. I based that request on the Army air schedule which, as I recall, they anticipated completing their quota of planes out there in February or March and, of course, the Army can give you that testimony.

Mr. Gesell: And when you say you were asking for three months who were you asking for three months? To whom were you talking?

Admiral Stark: Largely Mr. Hull, in endeavoring to keep the negotiations going if possible until the Army schedule was completed.

Mr. Gesell: Did Mr. Hull keep you advised of the progress of the negotiations with the Japanese?

Admiral Stark: Mr. Hull kept me I think rather closely advised as to the progress of negotiations. It was his habit frequently, sometimes day after day, to call me up in the late afternoon and let me know if there was any progress.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, you said, I think, in your pre-



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 pared statement something to the effect that you do not recall  
3 seeing the ten point note of November 26th at or about the  
4 time that it was delivered.

5 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

6 Mr. Gesell: The evidence here shows that that note was  
7 intercepted in the regular course and was among the Japanese  
8 intercepts; in other words, the text of the note being trans-  
9 mitted by the Japanese representatives here to Tokyo.

10 Admiral Stark: That is true. I think that was on the  
11 28th.

12 Mr. Gesell: Do you think you saw it then on the 28th?

13 Admiral Stark: I could not be sure. I would like to  
14 say with regard to that ten point note, while not recollecting  
15 having seen it at that time that I had discussed in the State  
16 Department a memorandum by Mr. Morgenthau and expressed my  
17 opinion on it and confirmed it in writing. The note of the  
18 26th, the ten point note, as I recall contained nothing, or  
19 at least very little or only minor differences from the note  
20 of the Secretary of the Treasury and also did not contain any-  
21 thing which I had objected to in the other note, so in gen-  
22 eral I knew of the substance of that note but as to having  
23 seen it in its actual form when it went out or whether I saw  
24 it on the 28th I could not say.

25 Mr. Gesell: With respect to the basing of the fleet in



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Pearl Harbor we have had a great deal of discussion concerning  
3 whether or not the fleet should have been based out there in  
4 1940. Did you state any opinion or take any position as the  
5 days grew more critical in 1941 as to whether or not the fleet  
6 should be based at Pearl Harbor?

7 Admiral Stark: In my opinion when the situation was  
8 tense and critical the fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor;  
9 that is, should have been based in that area.

10 Mr. Gesell: Commencing in your opinion at about what  
11 date, Admiral Stark?

12 Admiral Stark: Well, I never tried to narrow that down.  
13 It would be purely a guess. If I may go back a little bit,  
14 I do not want that confused with the fact that when the fleet  
15 first stayed out there I pointed out and pointed out very  
16 clearly in conversations with the President the advantages  
17 from the standpoints which Admiral Richardson mentioned of  
18 the fleet's return.

19 Mr. Gesell: We are talking now about a wholly differ-  
20 ent thing.

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, I know we are.

22 Mr. Gesell: You testified that you were in agreement  
23 with Admiral Richardson on his position that he took in 1940.

24 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

25 Mr. Gesell: Now what I am asking you is what view you



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 took, if any, with respect to the basing of the fleet at Earl  
3 Harbor as the days became critical in 1941?

4 Admiral Stark: Well, the fleet was then based at Pearl  
5 Harbor. I would say that by the time Admiral Kimmel had com-  
6 mand of the fleet we had practically wiped out of our minds,  
7 or at least we no longer considered and talked about bringing  
8 the fleet back.

9 Mr. Gesell: And you have stated that it was your opinion  
10 that at least by the last quarter of 1941 the place for the  
11 fleet was in the Hawaiian waters?

12 Admiral Stark: In my opinion that was a covering posi-  
13 tion in the Pacific.

14 Mr. Gesell: Now, what information did you have in the  
15 latter part of 1941 as to the preparedness of the fleet for  
16 combat? Was it ready for war or was it not ready for war?

17 Admiral Stark: In my opinion it was. Of course, no  
18 Commander-in-Chief is ever satisfied, even those we had in  
19 Europe, they were not satisfied. I know of no one who was ever  
20 satisfied but generally speaking I have quoted from Admiral  
21 Kimmel's annual report. I did not mention that he also, - I  
22 think it was in the same letter, - he said that his shooting  
23 was good judged by any standards, which showed that the fleet  
24 was performing satisfactorily in target practice, and he also  
25 said the morale was good.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Mr. Gesell: So that it was your opinion that the fleet  
3 was ready for war at that time and was that opinion shared by  
4 other officers advising you?

5 Admiral Stark: I think so. Now, when you say "ready for  
6 war" it is subject to two interpretations there. It was ready  
7 for war in accordance with the war plans. It was not ready for  
8 an advance into the Western Pacific, which would have required  
9 a large train and which we did not have.

10 Mr. Gesell: It still had no train and was not ready for  
11 offensive action?

12 Admiral Stark: It was ready for offensive action in the  
13 way of raids as envisaged by the war plans and it had a train  
14 of certain dimensions but it did not have the great fleet of  
15 supply vessels required to take it and maintain it in the  
16 Western Pacific.

17 Mr. Gesell: Now, what about this despatch that the  
18 President sent concerning the placing of three reconnaissance  
19 or patrol vessels in the China Sea, in the South China Sea  
20 waters? We have in evidence the despatch, which I believe you  
21 were the issuing officer of, which was sent at the direction  
22 of the President asking that three patrol vessels be put out  
23 there. Do you remember that?

24 Admiral Stark: Very well.

25 Mr. Gesell: Before we discuss the circumstances I want



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 to get one thing clear in my mind. Was that ever done? Were  
3 those vessels put out there or weren't they?

4 Admiral Stark: They were not. The ship Isabel I think  
5 got out there just about the time the attack broke, was out a  
6 few hours and came back. That, to my recollection, Admiral  
7 Hart told me. The other vessels were not sent out.

8 Mr. Gesell: Now, did the President give the direction  
9 for the sending of that despatch to you personally?

10 Admiral Stark: He did.

11 Mr. Gesell: Will you state to the committee what dis-  
12 cussion you had with him at that time, please, sir?

13 Admiral Stark: Well, if I may read the despatch, I think  
14 the despatch speaks for itself as to why it was.

15 Mr. Gesell: We have the despatch in mind I think, Ad-  
16 miral. I don't mind your reading it as part of your answer,  
17 but what I am anxious to have in addition to that is any con-  
18 versation you may have had with President Roosevelt concerning  
19 the surrounding circumstances.

20 Admiral Stark: Well, of course, at that time I was dis-  
21 cussing with the President, as we were discussing in the De-  
22 partment, what might happen; that is, as to where this ex-  
23 pedition going south was likely to hit. His thought was the  
24 Kra Peninsula. I was in complete agreement with that. The  
25 P hilippines was a possibility and the other places which have



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 been mentioned, the East Indies, and just where it would go  
3 we did not know and these three small vessels were to assist  
4 in that determination.

5 Mr. Gesell: I think we have fairly well in mind the  
6 points where the vessels were.

7 Admiral Stark: Well, if you have fairly well in mind the  
8 points where the vessels were you will see where the President  
9 put them they were well placed to get information either  
10 positive or negative and it was for that reason and for the  
11 reasons as stated in the despatch, to get information, that he  
12 directed that be done; and I would like to state and just take  
13 out of the dispatch what the reasons were.

14 He says "to form a defensive information patrol; to ac-  
15 complish a purpose which is to observe and report by radio  
16 Japanese movements in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam",  
17 and then he himself designated where those vessels were to be  
18 placed and they were well placed for the purposes for which  
19 he wanted them.

20 Mr. Gesell: Well, did he indicate to you in any way why  
21 he wanted the information, other than the general desire to  
22 have information concerning Japanese movements?

23 Admiral Stark: No, that is all. We were all after in-  
24 formation. We were scouting by air, and I simply think that  
25 he thought that was additional precautions. He was intensely



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 interested in every move at that time, as we all were.

3 Mr. Gesell: Now, you attended these various war council  
4 meetings which were held immediately preceding these warning  
5 messages, did you not, with General Marshall and the Secre-  
6 taries of War and Navy and President Roosevelt?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall President Roosevelt stating  
9 at one of those meetings that he thought it was possible that  
10 there would be a surprise attack before the following Monday?

11 Admiral Stark: I think he stated "as early as the fol-  
12 lowing Monday." Yes, I recall that.

13 Mr. Gesell: You heard General Marshall's testimony con-  
14 cerning those meetings, did you not?

15 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer again?  
16 I had difficulty in hearing the Admiral.

17 Admiral Stark: I said yes, sir, I recall it. I think  
18 that he stated "possibly as early as next Monday." I have  
19 forgotten just exactly what his exact words were, but that is  
20 my impression.

21 Mr. Keefe: When did that occur?

22 Admiral Keefe: That was the Monday after the 25th, I  
23 believe it was at that time.

24 Mr. Gesell: I believe we computed that on a calendar  
25 which was furnished us, which is in evidence and I think it



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 showed December 1 as the Monday.

3 You heard General Marshall testify concerning those meet-  
4 ings, did you?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes.

6 Mr. Gesell: Did you hear or read Secretary Hull's testi-  
7 mony concerning those meetings?

8 Admiral Stark: I am not sure that I did.

9 Mr. Gesell: Well, have you anything to add to what  
10 General Marshall said concerning what took place at those  
11 meetings? Have you a more detailed recollection of the dis-  
12 cussions?

13 Admiral Stark: No, nothing more than I mentioned in the  
14 postscript of my letter to Admiral Kimmel which was mentioned  
15 this morning. We went over the situation and we looked at the  
16 charts and were wondering when they were going to strike and  
17 where.

18 Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion of Hawaii in those  
19 meetings as a possible point where they would strike?

20 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that there was.

21 Mr. Gesell: You participated in the drafting and pre-  
22 paration of the joint memorandum signed by yourself and Gen-  
23 eral Marshall to the President of November 27th, did you not?

24 Admiral Stark: Well, General Marshall and I were re-  
25 sponsible for it.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Mr. Gesell: Right.

3 Admiral Stark: That was formed up by the two War Plans  
4 Divisions.

5 Mr. Gesell: Can you tell us under what circumstances  
6 that was written? It is still a little vague on the record  
7 why that particular memorandum was written.

8 Admiral Stark: Primarily we wanted to gain time. I  
9 was extremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We  
10 stood together on that. We had going out in December, - and  
11 again the Army could give you perhaps more accurate informa-  
12 tion,- but as I recall twenty odd thousand troops and that  
13 meant a lot in the Philippines. The air program as I recall  
14 involved about six hundred planes, Army. It meant a good deal  
15 to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine Scouts were  
16 being trained.

17 I might mention a point which I think has not been  
18 brought out before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his  
19 mines in the Philippines for protecting Manila Bay, it was  
20 either June or July. At that time I considered the situation  
21 such that we had better get that job done and not be suddenly  
22 confronted with it. But the primary reason for that was to  
23 gain time and that is what the memorandum sought to stress.

24 Mr. Gesell: In other words, what you were doing was  
25 stressing how much you could tolerate in the way of activity



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 by Japan before you felt some action had to be taken by this  
3 country?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Gesell: Can you tell us when that memorandum was  
6 delivered to the President? I notice it is typed on the sta-  
7 tionery of the Navy Department. It is dated November 27th.  
8 General Marshall did not get back until late that night and  
9 did not get to his office until the morning of the 28th. Now,  
10 he has identified his signature on the message as being his  
11 own signature, so with that before us the question of when the  
12 memorandum was delivered to the White House is now before us  
13 and I wondered if you could help us on that.

14 Admiral Stark: I am sorry I cannot. We have gone over  
15 the dates, I have personally, and tried to recall that four  
16 year ago picture, particularly of the 25th, 26th and 27th, with  
17 regard to the Chiang Kai-shek note, with regard to the Joint  
18 Board meeting of the 26th, with regard to just when Mr. Hull  
19 first informed us. I believe he has testified that he came to  
20 that conclusion on the 25th or the 28th. He mentioned the Army  
21 and Navy taking over.

22 In my statement I said that he informed me on the 27th  
23 and, as I stated, that statement was completely written before  
24 hearings here started and I may be wrong on that. I may have  
25 gotten it from him on the 26th. I was in very close touch with



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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him and whether or not when he called me greatly perturbed about the Chiang Kai-shek note he told me at that time he was going to throw it over, or whether he did later on the 27th, whether he called me on the 25th or the 26th I do not know. Now, Marshall left the Joint Board meeting on the 26th and whether he signed it on the 28th or not, I do not know.

Now, to come back to the White House part of that question, we have done our best to try and find that out, but we have been unable to. We do know that it was in the White House, we have ascertained that, but just when the President got it I do not know.

WARD & PAUL, ATTORNEYS AT LAW  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, one other question closely re-  
3 lated to that perhaps has to do with this question of overt  
4 act.

5 You testified this morning that the Navy message of  
6 November 27 did not contain any direction that Japan should  
7 commit the first overt act. However, we have in evidence here  
8 a dispatch sent by you under date of November 28 transmitting  
9 an Army message, but in addition to reciting the text of  
10 the Army message it has some additional Navy direction in it,  
11 and included in that direction is a direction concerning the  
12 overt act in these terms "Undertake no offensive action  
13 until Japan has committed an overt act". That indicates that  
14 sometime between your message of the 27th and your message  
15 of the 28th this idea of an overt act came forward.

16 Your dispatch was not sent to Admiral Kimmel except  
17 for his information?

18 Admiral Stark: That is right.

19 Mr. Gesell: It was sent to the West Coast Department,  
20 but I wondered if that in any way refreshed your mind as to  
21 the conferences and discussions on this question of the overt  
22 act.

23 Admiral Stark: At this time I could not say positively  
24 as to just why we put that in. I do know, for example, that  
25 we used to worry somewhat about the location of the Japs



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 around our Naval Ammunition Depot, for example, up in  
3 Puget Sound. The same was true in Los Angeles harbor. It  
4 may possibly have been if they had gotten this message they  
5 may have corraled some of the people who were close by, some  
6 that they had suspected. It was only the continental districts,  
7 as I recall it, that were covered in that dispatch.

8 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

9 Admiral Stark: Who were ordered not to make an overt  
10 act. The Army had issued a similar warning to those people,  
11 and it may have been to go along with that.

12 I could not answer the question definitely, but I know  
13 it is there.

14 Now as far as going along with the Army, that might not  
15 necessarily hold, because we did not go along with them in  
16 the Hawaiian Islands, and again it might hold because their  
17 problem in the Hawaiian Islands was quite different from ours.  
18 With the large Japanese population we were thinking more  
19 in terms of the high seas.

20 Mr. Gesell: You attended the meeting at Argentia, the  
21 Atlantic Conference Meeting, did you not?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gesell: Did you at that time, or at any other  
24 time prior to December 7, receive any information or advice  
25 to the effect that the United States Government had undertaken



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gesell  
Mr. Mitchell

2 to declare war against Japan in the event Great Britain was  
3 attacked in the Pacific?

4 Admiral Stark: Never.

5 Mr. Gesell: I think that completes the questions I have.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Just one that I would like to ask you,  
7 Admiral.

8 This morning you spoke about the fact that the Navy  
9 Department was not volunteering any help to you in preparation  
10 for your testimony. I understand you did not mean that the  
11 Navy was delinquent in any way.

12 Admiral Stark: I qualified that later. I thought it  
13 was possible that an inference might have been drawn that  
14 the Navy Department might have been withholding something from  
15 me.

16 Mr. Mitchell: What you meant was that they were not  
17 volunteering aid to you but they were giving you everything  
18 that you asked for.

19 Admiral Stark: That is correct, they were giving me  
20 everything that I asked for, and helping me out wherever they  
21 could, or they detailed people to help me, Lieutenant  
22 Commander Richmond was detailed to help me, and Lieutenant  
23 Johnson, and in general the Department has been cooperative  
24 in giving me help where I have asked for it. But in attempting  
25 to prepare myself for this investigation, I have done it



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell  
The Chairman

2 largely on my own memory as to what I wanted to bring out.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Have you had any difficulty or lack of  
4 cooperation in the office of the counsel of the committee  
5 in giving you everything that you wanted?

6 Admiral Stark: No, sir, everything has been fine, and  
7 I might say it has been all right with the Navy Department.

8 The Chairman: Admiral, the Pacific Fleet was sent out  
9 to the Hawaiian area early in 1940, was it?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 The Chairman: Ostensibly on maneuvers, is that true?

12 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir.

13 The Chairman: Well, of course the Government had spent  
14 a large sum of money in blasting through the land to get into  
15 what is now Pearl Harbor, with a view of making it a suitable  
16 base for the Fleet over the years.

17 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

18 The Chairman: Now apparently the Fleet was kept out  
19 there longer than Admiral Richardson either knew or thought  
20 that it would be kept, and he kept prodding you to find out  
21 why it was kept out there, and in the letter he wrote you  
22 prior to his visit to Washington in October 1940, and in  
23 many of these letters, he wanted to know why he was out there,  
24 why the Fleet was out there, and in a good many of your letters,  
25 at least one or two of them, you wrote back that you did not



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

1  
2 know why it was out there, that you wished you did know why  
3 it was out there.

4 How long did that lack of information on your part as  
5 to what the Navy was doing out there remain?

6 Admiral Stark: I think I might say, Mr. Chairman, if  
7 I may suggest to you, where you stated I said I did not know  
8 why they were out there, I did not know how long they were  
9 going to remain there. The reason for their being there,  
10 which I wrote Admiral Richardson, was that their presence  
11 there might act as a deterrent against Japanese aggression  
12 in the Pacific.

13 When they went out there I thought they were coming back,  
14 and Admiral Richardson did, and I might say so far as I know  
15 the President had no other thought when those maneuvers began.

16 But when it came time for them to come back, in view of  
17 the conditions in the Pacific it was decided to keep them  
18 there for a while. We did not know how long.

19 The Chairman: I might have misquoted you, because I  
20 am referring to your letters from memory. I do not have them  
21 before me. I overlooked bringing them down this morning.  
22 I remember in one or two of your letters you stated you did  
23 not know how long they were to be kept there, and I got the  
24 impression you stated also in your early correspondence with  
25 Admiral Richardson that you did not know why they were being



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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kept there.

If I am mistaken about that I want to be corrected.

Admiral Stark: Here is a letter in which I reply to Admiral Richardson, and I quote:

"Why are you in the Hawaiian area?" Answer: This was my answer, "You are there because the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."

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Questions by: The Chairman

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1 Witness Stark

2 The Chairman: What was the date of that letter?

3 Admiral Stark: 27 May.

4 The Chairman: Obviously, Admiral Richardson was not  
5 convinced of the wisdom of your course, because when he came  
6 back here in October he and the President evidently engaged  
7 in a very earnest argument as to the wisdom of the policy of  
8 keeping the Navy out there as a deterrent. Were you present  
9 at any of the conferences between the President and Admiral  
10 Richardson?

11 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I was not. Admiral Richardson  
12 went over himself.

13 The Chairman: Did Admiral Richardson talk with you about  
14 his conference with the President?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, he gave me, as I recall, a short  
16 memorandum on the subject of the discussion, so that I would  
17 have it.

18 The Chairman: That was in October. By that time, had  
19 you reached an agreement with the attitude of the President,  
20 the Secretary of State and others, to keep the Fleet in the  
21 Hawaiian area or Pearl Harbor was a wise course, as a possible  
22 deterrent against Japan?

23 Admiral Stark: It was one of those things which at that  
24 time, as I recall, was carrying along because, if I also  
25 recall correctly -- and I will check this, and if it is not



WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 correct I will ask for a change in the record -- as I recall  
3 at one time we had about come to the conclusion we might bring  
4 the Fleet back in the fall or for Christmas in that year, I am  
5 not certain, and that later we decided not to do it but to keep  
6 it there, and after that time, about the last of 1940, it just  
7 became a fixed policy to retain the Fleet there.

8 The Chairman: Inasmuch as the Fleet was out there, no  
9 matter what the purpose for which it was originally sent, to  
10 have withdrawn it back to the Pacific Coast had possibilities of  
11 misinterpretation on the part of Japan and on the part of our  
12 own people, did it not?

13 Admiral Stark: It might have. . . Also sending it back again  
14 might have been more difficult. I testified this morning I  
15 thought that was the place for the Fleet when things were tense  
16 might also have its disadvantages.

17 The Chairman: That was my next question. If it had never  
18 been sent to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had not remained  
19 out there, if it had remained on the Pacific Coast where Admiral  
20 Richardson testified there were better facilities for reaction  
21 and training, and one thing and another, it did not have any-  
22 thing to do with the safety of the Fleet, but if it had been kept  
23 on the Pacific Coast until things became tense and then sent  
24 to the Pearl Harbor region or the Hawaiian area, what would  
25 have been the effect of such a movement as that at the time



WLC3

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 when things did become critical?

3 Admiral Stark: Of course, no one knows, but it might have  
4 been difficult diplomatically to do it. It might have been  
5 interpreted by the Japs as a move for our getting ready for  
6 war out there in the Pacific, and it might possibly have  
7 precipitated something.

8 The Chairman: Of course, everybody understood, I suppose,  
9 including the Japanese, that the Hawaiian Islands were American  
10 territory and Pearl Harbor was an American base and we had a  
11 right to send our Fleet out there whenever we saw fit.

12 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

13 The Chairman: Without giving an explanation.

14 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

15 The Chairman: In view of the critical situation as it  
16 developed and tenseness of relations between the two countries,  
17 to have kept the fleet back at the Pacific Coast and then have  
18 sent it out there in the midst of one of these tense situations  
19 you think might have given rise to the feeling that it was a  
20 threat against Japan and therefore, in a sense, might have  
21 been a sort of moral overt act?

22 Admiral Stark: It might have been, yes, sir. I might say,  
23 Mr. Chairman, that when we first decided not to bring the Fleet  
24 back -- and I was talking to the President about the advantages,  
25 from a materiel and personnel standpoint of bringing it back,



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WLC4

1 Witness Stark Questions by: The Chairman  
2 balanced against the political reasons, I can remember just  
3 as though it happened seconds ago the silence -- I was with  
4 the President alone -- and the tense thought that he gave  
5 to it then for a few minutes, and he finally looked up and he  
6 said -- and you may have heard him say the same thing --  
7 "Well, I hardly know, but," he said, "when I am in doubt and  
8 I am not sure just what is best, I am inclined to sit tight,"  
9 and he said, "I think we better do that for the present."  
10 That continued.

11 The Chairman: That was with reference to keeping the  
12 fleet out there?

13 Admiral Stark: That was with reference to keeping it  
14 out or bringing it back, yes, sir.

15 The Chairman: Do you recall, as a naval officer, that  
16 a similar situation existed in the Far East back in 1932 follow-  
17 ing the Shanghai incident, I believe, when the American fleet  
18 was kept out there in those Pacific waters, following the  
19 Japanese attack upon China, or following her invasion of  
20 Manchuria, and following the Shanghai affair, that the fleet  
21 was out there and was kept there, according to Secretary  
22 Stimson, who was at that time Secretary of State, for a  
23 similar purpose, that it would have its moral effect upon  
24 Japan. Do you recall anything about that?

25 Admiral Stark: I do not recall the fleet, as we usually

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1 Witness Stark Questions by: The Chairman  
2 refer to the fleet, being out there at that time. We had an  
3 Asiatic Squadron.

4 The Chairman: It may not have been a full fleet, but it  
5 was a detachment of the Navy.

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and it may have been kept in  
7 Chinese waters at that time rather than possibly used for a  
8 cruise south in the wintertime, or something of that sort.

9 The Chairman: Now, you referred this morning to a couple  
10 of letters or dispatches that you sent to Admiral Kimmel  
11 between the 24th and 27th of November, with reference to the  
12 sending of certain airplanes from Hawaii to Midway and Wake.

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

14 The Chairman: I did not get very clearly in my mind  
15 whether they were sent.

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, they were sent.

17 The Chairman: Were they the planes that were on the  
18 LEXINGTON that was supposed to be headed west while the  
19 ENTERPRISE was headed east from the Philippines?

20 Admiral Stark: No. There were two detachments of Marine  
21 fighters, I believe, that were sent. One carrier took some  
22 to Wake and one to Midway. The dates of the sailing of those  
23 carriers were fixed by Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific  
24 dates for it. We knew of one of the sailings, which was in  
25 answer to another dispatch of ours, and as to the other we were



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 not informed.

3 I would like to state in that connection, if I may, I do  
4 not know whether or not there has been the impression created  
5 in the committee that by doing that the defenses in that area  
6 were decreased. Pearl Harbor was mentioned. If you look at  
7 the map you will find, of course, that Midway is -- I have for-  
8 gotten -- 1,000 or 1,200 miles farther westward, and Wake is  
9 still farther. That was a general area of defense. Anything  
10 we could find in those areas, from scouting or otherwise, lent  
11 itself just that much to the defense of Oahu. So it was  
12 strengthening the general island position there. That was  
13 particularly true with regard to the patrol squadrons, of  
14 which I think one squadron was sent to Wake, and two to Midway.  
15 It enlarged the scouting area. It might have decreased it  
16 temporarily in a concentrated way around Oahu, but as against  
17 that there was the getting of information, or the possibility  
18 of getting it, farther west, and also of defending those car-  
19 riers.

20 Incidentally, originally General Marshall asked us to  
21 watch for and to give them any warning we could, because we  
22 were ferrying planes to the Philippines via those two outposts.

23 The Chairman: With regard to the purpose for sending them  
24 to Wake and Midway, in view of what happened it may have been  
25 better if they had all been there?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 Admiral Stark: We would have lost fewer of them, yes, sir.

3 The Chairman: The fewer ships and planes were at Pearl  
4 Harbor, the fewer we would have lost?

5 Admiral Stark: That would have been incidental to what  
6 happened.

7 The Chairman: It would have been incidental to what hap-  
8 pened, but still it would have probably happened.

9 Now, in regard to the overt act, of course it was in view  
10 of the fact that both you and General Marshall, as heads of  
11 the Army and Navy, were seeking to gain time and to postpone  
12 any conflict as long as possible, it was perfectly consistent  
13 with that attitude not to commit an overt act on the part of  
14 the United States and not precipitate a war which you were  
15 seeking to avoid or postpone as long as possible, would it not?

16 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: Regardless of the omission of this phrase  
18 in your telegram in regard to an overt act, were the commanders  
19 in the field, in the Pacific area, Panama, and on the Pacific  
20 Coast and the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, sufficiently aware  
21 of that general attitude of our Government so that they knew it?

22 Admiral Stark: I think so.

23 The Chairman: Without having it especially called to their  
24 attention in a message on any particular date?

25 Admiral Stark: I think so. They all knew we wanted to







1 Witness Stark Questions by: The Chairman  
2 first paragraph of your message, what the movement of the  
3 Japanese naval and military forces was?

4 Admiral Stark: The movement of which we had knowledge  
5 was the movement south, the amphibious movement.

6 The Chairman: You knew at the time you sent this message  
7 of the 24th of November that they were moving south?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: With a considerable naval and military force?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 The Chairman: And then you say, "An aggressive movement  
12 is indicated in any direction." That would include the whole  
13 360 degrees of the circle, would it?

14 Admiral Stark: It included the broad Pacific.

15 The Chairman: Well, it included any direction from Tokyo?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: Which would mean anywhere they could come?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman: That might be an offensive movement against  
20 us?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. My thought was it covered widely  
22 a movement against us anywhere.

23 The Chairman: Yes. Now, you go on to state, "The Chief  
24 of Staff has sent this dispatch and requests action addressees",  
25 and so forth. This dispatch of yours of November 24 does not







1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 aggressive movement in any direction?

3 Admiral Stark: I consider the message of the 27th much  
4 stronger. I never had heard of the words "war warning" in  
5 any message before anywhere, at anytime.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: This may be speculative, but if you had not seen fit to send the message of the 27th and had relied on the message of the 24th, would you have regarded the terms of that message of the 24th sufficient to require that the Naval Forces in Pearl Harbor and in the Hawaiian area be constantly on the alert for any movement in any direction?

Admiral Stark: Well, it showed the possibility and to that extent -- and again I may say it is difficult to get away from hindsight --

The Chairman: I know.

Admiral Stark: But my feeling is that if I had received a message that the Japs might make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, I would say, well, we better look out and be ready for it.

The Chairman: That is the purpose you had in sending this message of the 24th?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir; but we made a much more positive message on the 27th, because on the 24th we stated that favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful; there was left a loophole there that there still might be a change, through negotiations, to obtain a settlement in the Pacific. We closed that loophole in the message of the 27th.

But even so I think the message of the 24th showed the imminence of trouble anywhere.



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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2           The Chairman: In your message of the 24th you say  
3 that the Japs are liable "to make an aggressive movement in  
4 any direction"; and after saying in the 27th message that "this  
5 message is to be considered a war warning", you say "negotia-  
6 tions with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions  
7 in the Pacific have ceased. An aggressive movement by Japan  
8 is expected within the next few days."

9           In that language you did not say "in any direction".

10          Admiral Stark: No, sir, I did not.

11          The Chairman: Did you intend for that to implement  
12 your message of the 24th or did you intend to withdraw the  
13 suggestion that they might make an aggressive movement in any  
14 direction?

15          Admiral Stark: No, we did not intend to withdraw it,  
16 and I think the two messages tie up together. Probably it  
17 might have been better if we had put it in. I put it in  
18 personally in the message of the 24th and I do not recall  
19 discussing it with the message of the 27th.

20          The Chairman: Is it regarded in Naval circles as  
21 logically following a warning given to a commanding officer  
22 anywhere that a nation is liable to make an aggressive movement  
23 against us, is the mere sending of such a message to an  
24 officer of that kind within any possible area of attack re-  
25 garded in Naval circles as a warning that they should be



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 on the alert?

3 Admiral Stark: I thought so at the time.

4 The Chairman: Wouldn't that be the rule in any Navy?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I think so.

6 The Chairman: And any commanding officer in a responsible  
7 position, like Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch,  
8 or any other commanding officer, would know what that meant  
9 if he received such a message?

10 Admiral Stark: I think so, yes, sir. It is something  
11 that doesn't happen very often.

12 The Chairman: Now, when you used the words in your  
13 message of the 24th, in the middle paragraph "the number and  
14 equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval  
15 task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either  
16 the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo",  
17 did you mean or intend that to be interpreted as in any way  
18 modifying your message of the 24th that an aggressive move-  
19 ment might be in any direction?

20 Admiral Stark: No, we did not.

21 The Chairman: If I understand you, your purpose in  
22 sending this message was to emphasize the greater possibility,  
23 in your mind, of an attack on the Philippines or Thai or  
24 the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, than elsewhere,  
25 particularly even the Hawaiian Islands?



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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Admiral Stark: Our purpose was the imminence of war, that so far as looking toward stabilization of peace in the Pacific negotiations were through, and then we gave the information we had, and the only direct information we had, of what the Japanese were doing, that is, that the information we had indicated that southern movement.

I think it should be read in connection with the message of the 24th.

The Chairman: You knew that that movement was in progress?

Admiral Stark: We had definite information of that and we gave that information.

The Chairman: You didn't know what else was to be done or was in process of being done by the Japs?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

The Chairman: You didn't know anything about the 6 carriers that had sneaked out from the Island north of Japan and were going through this unfrequented lane?

Admiral Stark: We had no information on that, sir.

The Chairman: So that obviously this moving of this big contingent of ships and men down through the China Sea toward the south was for the purpose of deceiving you and everybody else with respect to their immediate action against Pearl Harbor, by the sending of this force of 6 airplane carriers and the 300-some odd planes; is that your interpretation



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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Admiral Stark: I don't think it was deceit. That was a carefully planned campaign, that expedition south.

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The Chairman: Well, they didn't go to pains to conceal that?

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Admiral Stark: They couldn't very well..

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The Chairman: No, but they didn't go to any pains to conceal it, but rather ostentatiously let it be know that they were heading that way, while at the same time sending this other force to the north to make the attack on Pearl Harbor if the situation justified it when they got there; is that not correct?

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Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, that may have been in their thoughts.

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The Chairman: The truth is that they just outsmarted everybody, didn't they?

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Admiral Stark: Well, they certainly concealed their intentions so far as we were concerned of any definite indication of any attack on Pearl Harbor.

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The Chairman: That is not an unusual situation when an assassin intends to attack someone, he knows what he is going to do, but the other fellow does not.

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Admiral Stark: We play that in our war games.

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The Chairman: That is a part of the war games, not to let the other fellow know what you are going to do?

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

2 Admiral Stark: That is true.

3 The Chairman: And a nation planning a sudden surprise  
4 attack has the advantage over the nation that may be thinking  
5 one may occur but doesn't know where or when it will occur,  
6 any more than a man going along a highway knows that a man  
7 is concealed in the corner of a fence and is going to shoot  
8 him. He may have his pockets full of guns but unless he knows  
9 the man is there he won't have them ready. Is that a fair  
10 simile?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: Did you have your suspicions aroused  
13 by the fact that this task force, or this force of airplane  
14 carriers, was missing, that for several days there was no  
15 report about them, or did that come to your attention?

16 Admiral Stark: I don't recall any suspicion directly  
17 bearing on that. We, in locating the Japanese Fleet, you  
18 might put certain ships on what you might call a pinpoint.  
19 You would know where they are. In other cases you would  
20 get them in an area by your cuts from them and radio intelli-  
21 gence. If they went to a navy yard, just as when our ships  
22 go to a navy yard, their radios are bottled up, the shore  
23 station may do it for you, and there are people down the  
24 line who will testify more directly on just how they evaluated  
25 that information, but the ship going into a home port, for



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 example, you might not hear from her for awhile, and they  
3 might assume that she was still there until they did hear from  
4 her again.

5 And, of course, at this particular time they had changed  
6 call signs. I remember that feature of it very well. And  
7 it takes time to pick up and identify again.

8 But as to whether or not we discussed at that particular  
9 time these 6 carriers I have no remembrance of it. I do have  
10 a distinct remembrance of our request of the Army to take a  
11 look at the Marshalls and the Carolines and their fitting  
12 up two planes to do that for us about that time, and which  
13 I recall not in connection, perhaps, with these 6 carriers,  
14 but with two other carriers that we had rumors were in there.  
15 We wanted to get anything we could of anything in the eastern  
16 Marshalls or further to the westward. And that reconnaissance,  
17 due to bad weather, and other things, was held up, we didn't  
18 get it. It wouldn't have been helpful, except as negative  
19 information.

20 The Chairman: Did the Japs have better facilities for  
21 locating our ships than we had for locating theirs?

22 Admiral Stark: Well, we had, I would say, very little,  
23 if any, but there again the people in Naval Intelligence might  
24 give you something on that, of locating ships in Japanese  
25 ports. That is, telling us what was in Tokyo Bay, or elsewhere,



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 out there. But in Hawaii, in the Canal, in the Los Angeles  
3 area, in San Francisco area, in the Puget Sound area, the  
4 Japanese we felt were reporting regularly with regard to our  
5 movements.

6 In one or two places I think we got ahold of their  
7 people who were doing that reporting. I am not too clear on  
8 that.

9 The Chairman: Probably they had a more universal spy  
10 system than we did?

11 Admiral Stark: They had an enormous spy system.

12 The Chairman: In view of your message to Admiral Kimmel  
13 of the 24th and the 27th, and General Marshall's dispatch  
14 to General Short of the same date, that is, the 27th, which  
15 he instructed him to convey to Admiral Kimmel, what was the  
16 duty of the naval commander there during the days following  
17 the receipt of that message on the 27th?

18 Admiral Stark: Well, my thought was, we assumed that  
19 there would be a conference between the senior Army and Navy  
20 commanders there, that a conference would occur, and that  
21 they would implement their plans against surprise, and in  
22 the protection of the Island of Oahu, particularly of the  
23 Fleet, Pearl Harbor, for what ships were kept there, and the  
24 alerting of ships at sea, with the fact that Japan was ex-  
25 pected to attack and the officers in charge of the ships at



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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sea, of course, would be very much on the alert against surprise anywhere.

The Chairman: Did that alertness include day and night?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: In view of these instructions contained in the Army and Navy dispatches to Pearl Harbor, was it or was it not in compliance with or in violation of them not to have any reconnaissance, say on the 6th day of December, the day before the attack. The evidence shows there was no reconnaissance of any kind on that day. I am speaking now of the 6th.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. We had assumed when we sent out dispatch that reconnaissance would be started and kept up.

The Chairman: That is from the 27th or the 24th?

Admiral Stark: Well, I would say from the 27th in any case.

The Chairman: 27th.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Do you know whether it was kept up from the 27th until the attack?

Admiral Stark: I don't know just what they did at that time. Marshall's dispatch particularly directed reconnaissance. Ours directed the deployment. And just what action was taken there I don't know.



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: Deployment means the arrangement of whatever forces there are, the grouping or separation or movement in such a way as to facilitate the greatest possible defense in the event of an attack?

Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Well, you didn't answer my question as to whether if there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th that that would be considered as being in violation of the orders or in compliance.

Admiral Stark: I would say it would be not carrying them out.

The Chairman: That is a very diplomatic way to answer my question. It was not in compliance with the instructions.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: It was not?

Admiral Stark: It was not.

The Chairman: In other words, they did not obey the instructions that were received?

Admiral Stark: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The Chairman: That is, if they had no reconnaissance at all on that day, that was in disobedience?

Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Now, do you agree with -- first, did you hear Admiral Turner's testimony in which he said that if



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 they had been properly alerted, with the material and with  
3 the men they had, and the forces they had, if they had been  
4 alerted on the day of the attack, that the damage done to  
5 us might have been considerably lessened and the damage done  
6 to the Japanese might have been considerably increased and  
7 thereby lessening the success of the raid -- what is your view  
8 on that?

9 Admiral Stark: I agree with that. That is, of course,  
10 on the assumption they might have scouted for that Japanese  
11 attack and might have missed it. But there was a chance of  
12 their getting it. And if they had located it, if the radar  
13 station which did pick it up, if that had been reported, there  
14 was a chance of the Army fighters being in the air, and other  
15 measures which could have been taken with anti-aircraft  
16 batteries which, I think, unquestionably would have con-  
17 siderably lessened the damage which the Japs inflicted.

18 The Chairman: It is conceivable the planes might have  
19 gone up and missed the Japanese planes, but if they didn't  
20 go up they were sure to miss them.

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

22 The Chairman: It made it easy for the Japanese planes?

23 Admiral Stark: That is correct. If they had used  
24 everything they had they still might have missed that flight,  
25 depending on where they made their estimate as to where the



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman

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Japanese might come in.

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The Chairman: You mean if they had gone out it would have been possible to have gone out on a reconnaissance and not discovered the approaching Japanese airplanes?

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Admiral Stark: That is correct.

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The Chairman: Now, whose duty was it, whose obligation or responsibility was it to decide whether this Fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor at that particular time, or at any other particular time?

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Admiral Stark: That was the Commander in Chief Pacific.

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The Chairman: That was Admiral Richardson's responsibility when he was Commander of that Fleet and it became Admiral Kimmel's after he took charge?

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Admiral Stark: That is right.

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The Chairman: And the frequency of the visits of the Fleet to Pearl Harbor and the length of its stay was altogether then within the control of the Commanding Officer out there?

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Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

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The Chairman: And were there any general instructions from Washington about that, or was that left entirely to the Commanding Officer?

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Admiral Stark: That was left to the Senior Officer there. There may have been a general understanding of the fact on the so-called employment schedule that ships periodically have



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Chairman  
The Vice Chairman

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certain periods assigned for repairs, but generally speaking, which I believe you refer to, the Fleet going in or out, except for vessels that might be sent to the navy yard, or might be repairing there on a periodic overhaul, that was up to the Commander in Chief there.

The Chairman: I believe that is all.

Congressman Cooper.

(4)

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Stark, how long have you been in the Navy, please, sir?

Admiral Stark: I have been in the Navy a little over 46 years.

The Vice Chairman: When did you enter the Academy?

Admiral Stark: I entered the Academy in October 1899.

The Vice Chairman: From what State?

Admiral Stark: From Pennsylvania.

The Vice Chairman: And during what period of time did you serve as the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Stark: From August 1939 to March 1942.

The Vice Chairman: Did your period of service as Chief of Naval Operations compare with the usual length of time that an officer served in that capacity?

Admiral Stark: The appointment as a rule is for four years. It sometimes happened that an officer's term was up before his four years -- I mean, he retired before his four



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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years was up. I did not serve out the full term of four years.

The Vice Chairman: Have you at any time during your long period of service in the Navy been stationed at Hawaii?

Admiral Stark: Not stationed there, no, sir. I have been there with the Fleet but I have never been stationed there.

The Vice Chairman: You never were in command there?

Admiral Stark: Never in command there, no, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Did you consider war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral Stark: Ultimately I considered it inevitable. Do you want me to enlarge on that?

The Vice Chairman: I would like you to be as specific as you can, sir, whether you ever considered war with Japan as inevitable.

Admiral Stark: I did, and, to come down to a specific term, I considered it inevitable the latter part of November. Mr. Hull had been working continuously, he had not given up hope, and as long as there was negotiations there was some hope. I couldn't say that it was inevitable until we had come practically to the final clinch. I considered it possible. I went on the basis, in everything I did, on the assumption that it was going to happen. It was the only safe, sane, sensible course to take and my record here, what I had to say before Congress and in everything I did, bears that out.



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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But we might have reached an agreement in late 1941. I couldn't say we wouldn't until we knew that that agreement was practically unattainable. The chances grew more and more slender.

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The Vice Chairman: I can understand that, but I am trying to ascertain as to whether you in your own mind ever reached the point that you considered war with Japan as inevitable.

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Admiral Stark: Well, I did at that time.

The Vice Chairman: When was that?

Admiral Stark: That was in late November.

The Vice Chairman: 1941?

Admiral Stark: 1941; but I stated in some of my letters that I considered that we were heading straight for this war long earlier.

The Vice Chairman: When did you reach the conclusion that we were heading straight for war with Japan? About what time? I don't mean the hour or minute or day. About what time?

Admiral Stark: I am thinking over the whole picture. When Japan jointed the Axis, which I believe was in September of 1940, there certainly was a distinct danger sign flying there. I thought -- I didn't see how we could avoid sooner or later, the way things were shaping up, getting in this



Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 world conflict that put Japan on the other side of the fence  
3 from us. I have forgotten just the dates of my letters, but I  
4 continually stressed the fact I didn't see how we could avoid  
5 it, either by being forced into it or getting into it. I  
6 stated in a letter of November 7 -- I made wrong estimates  
7 at other times -- I happened to hit it then -- that I didn't  
8 see how it could last, didn't see how we could avoid it more  
9 than another month.

10 I pointed out that there were two irreconcilable forces  
11 and one side couldn't live with the set-up. I also always  
12 thought that the China incident, so-called, was a stumbling  
13 block we could not get around until either Japan backed or  
14 we backed, and, as I wrote Admiral Kimmel, or Admiral Hart,  
15 I have forgotten which, I didn't think there would be any  
16 change here. I felt we were heading for it at least a year  
17 before we got into it.

18 As to the inevitability of it, by just saying, here, Mr.  
19 Hull, you might as well stop, don't try any more, of course  
20 we were playing for time, it was in the fall of 1941, it  
21 just looked like we couldn't keep out or from being attacked  
22 much longer.

23 Shefner  
24 follows  
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Shefner  
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Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Vice Chairman: Well, I can well understand, of course. You have made it quite clear that you wanted and the President wanted and General Marshall wanted and all responsible officials of the government wanted to stay out of war if possible.

Admiral Stark: We were extremely anxious to avoid a two-front war.

The Vice Chairman: And I can well understand that, we all shared that view, but what I was trying to get at, you, the head of the United States Navy, holding that responsible position, whether you reached the conclusion in your own mind that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral Stark: Well, I believed we were going to get in it many, many months before we did.

The Vice Chairman: But you say that in November 1941 that you reached the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.

Admiral Stark: That is the time when we thought so and it is when we said it definitely.

The Vice Chairman: Well, Admiral Turner was your Chief of War Plans, wasn't he?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: He has testified here that he reached the conclusion about June or July 1941 that war with Japan







1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 very well happen some day, but as to that particular time, -  
3 and I previously testified that I did not want anything that I  
4 might say to be construed as otherwise than the fact that  
5 at that time I was not expecting an attack on Pearl Harbor.

6 The Vice Chairman: Even though you saw the fourteen part  
7 message and the so-called pilot message and the one o'clock  
8 message you still did not think an attack would be made on  
9 Pearl Harbor at the time it was made?

10 Admiral Stark: I was thinking of the situation so far  
11 as actual action was concerned further to the westward. On  
12 the other hand, I recognized the possibility clearly that they  
13 might hit there or elsewhere and on that possibility I had  
14 sent a message which I had thought would convey to them that  
15 possibility and that they would be on guard against it and I  
16 wrote to that effect also, about being on guard.

17 The Vice Chairman: And that was your message of November  
18 24, 1941?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: Now, what was the purpose of that  
21 message?

22 Admiral Stark: The message of the 27th and the 24th?

23 The Vice Chairman: Well, first take the message of  
24 November 24, 1941.

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.



1     W itness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2             The Vice Chairman: What was the purpose of that message?

3             Admiral Stark: The purpose of the message of the 24th?

4             The Vice Chairman: Of the 24th.

5             Admiral Stark: Was to show the situation regarding the  
6 negotiations, about which we had corresponded so much. We  
7 were not getting anywhere. It looked like a breakdown. The  
8 breakdown had not yet actually occurred. Also we had the  
9 definite information of the movement south, which looked like  
10 Japan was going to strike somewhere to the southward. Whether  
11 it might hit the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or Borneo,  
12 I think the despatch covered it. I will check it.

13             The Vice Chairman: Those points are mentioned in the  
14 November 27th message but they are not mentioned in the Novem-  
15 ber 24th message.

16             Admiral Stark: Well, the message of November 24th states:  
17 "Naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a  
18 surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an  
19 attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility." And that  
20 message was meant to show the critical situation then exist-  
21 ing.

22             The Vice Chairman: Well, did you intend the message of  
23 November 24, 1941 to Admiral Kimmel as a war warning message?

24             Admiral Stark: Well, I think if I had gotten it I would  
25 have considered that it was a war warning.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: And that was your intention in  
3 sending it then?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: All right.

6 Admiral Stark: In the critical situation that something  
7 might break.

8 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, your message of November  
9 27th, also sent out to Admiral Kimmel as well as Admiral  
10 Hart, was certainly intended as a war warning message because  
11 it so states in the opening expression in the message, doesn't  
12 it?

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. It is stronger.

14 The Vice Chairman: Now, in these two messages, Admiral,  
15 the one of November 24th, in which it is stated, "Indicate  
16 in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any  
17 direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam  
18 is possible", and in the message of November 27, 1941, among  
19 other things it states, "The number and equipment of Japanese  
20 troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates  
21 an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai  
22 or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

23 Now, in neither of those messages is any direct refer-  
24 ence made to Hawaii, is there?

25 Admiral Stark: No, sir, there is not.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: And all of the points mentioned in  
3 both of these messages are not within the area coming within  
4 the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, are they?

5 Admiral Stark: That is correct. We in those despatches  
6 gave the information we had. In my opinion an attack elsewhere  
7 was not precluded by the fact that we had no tangible evidence  
8 of an attack elsewhere. It was for that reason that, take  
9 the message of the 24th, it was not only sent to the Commander-  
10 in-Chief of the Asiatic Force and the Pacific; it also went to  
11 the Canal and to the Commandant of the 11th, 12th and 13th  
12 Districts, which are on the West Coast.

13 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, the message of November  
14 27, 1941 also includes this language:

15 "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment pre-  
16 paratory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46."

17 That would be a direct order to the commander of the  
18 Pacific Fleet, wouldn't it?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: And I believe, as you stated to the  
21 Chairman in response to his question, at least that part of the  
22 order was not complied with by the Commander, was it?

23 Admiral Stark: So far as the use; I said, so far as I  
24 knew with regard to the use of patrol planes he had not complied  
25 with it.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Well, do you know of anything he did  
3 to comply with that part of the order?

4 Admiral Stark: I do not know what orders he had given  
5 to his two task forces which were sent out. I do not know what  
6 order he had given to his submarines. He may have given ord-  
7 ers there. I do not know just what additional orders he may  
8 have given to his ships in Pearl Harbor with regard to anti-  
9 aircraft batteries, and so forth.

10 The Vice Chairman: Well, the fact that practically all  
11 of his fleet was caught in the harbor six days after this  
12 message was sent to him would not indicate that he moved many  
13 of them out, would it?

14 Admiral Stark: Well, he had a considerable portion out  
15 in the two task forces.

16 The Vice Chairman: How many battleships did he have out?

17 Admiral Stark: I think he had no battleships out.

18 The Vice Chairman: How many cruisers did he have out?

19 Admiral Stark: The ships attached to the Pacific Fleet  
20 that were at sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor  
21 on the date of the attack, - this is information from the  
22 Office of Naval Intelligence -- there was one battleship not  
23 there, which was on the West Coast, the Colorado, under re-  
24 pair. His three carriers were not in Pearl Harbor. He had  
25 10 of his heavy cruisers that were out, 10 out of 12 if I re-











1 Witness Stark

2 "STATISTICAL SECTION  
3 DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

4 NOV 6 1945

5 CONFIDENTIAL

6 NAMES OF MAJOR VESSELS IN PACIFIC OCEAN ON DECEMBER 7,  
7 1941

8 I. Ships Sunk or Put Out of Commission at Pearl Harbor.

	<u>Date Stricken or Returned to Duty</u>
10	BB ARIZONA Stricken 12/1/42.
11	BB OKLAHOMA Stricken 11/22/44.
12	BB PENNSYLVANIA Available for sea 1/28/43.
13	BB NEVADA Ready for sea 12/12/42.
14	BB TENNESSEE Repaired and converted 5/10/43.
15	BB CALIFORNIA Repaired and converted 1/15/44.
16	BB MARYLAND Repairs completed 2/21/42.
17	BB WEST VIRGINIA Repaired and converted 7/1/44.
18	CL HELENA Ready for sea 7/14/42.
19	CL HONOLULU Ready for sea 3/16/42.
20	GL RALEIGH Ready for sea 6/-/42.
21	DD CASSIN Repairs completed 2/19/44.
22	DD DOWNS Repairs completed 12/1/43.
23	DD SHAW Repairs completed 7/13/42.
24	CM OGLALA Ready for sea 12/7/42.
25	AG UTAH Stricken 11/13/44.



1 Witness Stark

2 AV CURTIS Ready for sea 12/15/41.

3 AR VESTAL Ready for sea 12/17/41.

4 TOTAL - 18

5 - - -

6 II. Ships at Pearl Harbor But Unhurt in the Attack

7 CA NEW ORLEANS DD REID

8 CA SAN FRANCISCO DD CASE  
DD CUMINGS

9 CL PHOENIX DD TUCKER

10 CL ST LOUIS DD SELFRIDGE

11 CL DETROIT DD BLUE

12 DD HELM

13 DD PHELPS DDHENLEY

14 DD DEWEY DD BAGLEY

15 DD HULL DD MUGFORD

16 DD McDONOUGH DD RALPH TALEOT

17 DD WORDEN DD JARVIS

18 DD FARRAGUT DD PATTERSON

19 DD DALE DD ALLEN

20 DD ALWIN DD CHEW

21 DD MONAGHAM DD SCHLEY

22 DD CONYNGHAM DD WARD

23 III. Ships Attached to Pacific Fleet But at Sea or

24 Located at Bases Other than Pearl Harbor.

25



1	BB COLORADO	DD CRAVEN
2		DD GRIDLEY
3	CV ENTERPRISE	DD McCALL
4	CV LEXINGTON	DD DUNLAP
5	CV SARATOGA	DD BENHAM
6		DD FANNING
7	CA NORTHAMPTON	DD ELLET
8	CA CHESTER	DD PORTER
9	CA SALT LAKE CITY	DD DRAYTON
10	CA CHICAGO	DD FLUSSER
11	CA PORTLAND	DD LAMSON
12	CA ASTORIA	DD MAHAN
13	CA MINNEAPOLIS	DD CLARK
14	CA INDIANAPOLIS	DD CUSHING
15	CA LOUISVILLE	DD PERKINS
16	CA PENSACOLA	DD PRESTON
17		DD SMITH
18	CL CONCORD	DD RATHBURNE
19	CL RICHMOND	DD DENT
20	CL TRENTON	DD TALBOT
21		DD WATERS
22	DD BALCH	DD LITCHFIELD
23	DD MAURY	
24		- - -
25		



NUMBERS OF VESSELS IN PACIFIC FLEET ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

2	3	Sunk or Put Out of Commission at Pearl Harbor	Unhurt in the Attack on Pearl Harbor	At Sea or Located at Bases Other than Pearl Harbor
4	BB	8	-	1
5	CV	-	-	3
6	CA	-	2	10
7	CL	3	3	3
8	DD	3	27	24
9	SS	-	5	17
10	CM	1	-	-
11	DM	-	8	-
12	DMS	-	4	9
13	AM	-	6	3
14	AD	-	2	-
15	AVD	-	3	2
16	AVP	-	2	3
17	AV	1	1	1
18	ASR	-	1	1
19	AS	-	1	1
20	AG	1	2	-
21	AR	1	1	-
22	AO	-	2	9
23	Misc	-	8	10
24				
25	TOTAL	18	78	97







1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. George

2 much less?

3 Admiral Stark: I think so, yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: All right. I thank you.

5 The Chairman: Senator George.

6 Senator George: Admiral, in talking about war being  
7 inevitable with Japan I gather that you mean to say that we  
8 were moving towards war and you felt that a conflict would  
9 actually come at some time?

10 Admiral Stark: I felt so.

11 Senator George: But you did not necessarily think that a  
12 conflict was imminent until late in 1941, that is, in October  
13 or November of 1941?

14 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir.

15 Senator George: You did not see, I believe you testified  
16 this morning, the intercepted Japanese message of September  
17 24th, the one referring to Pearl Harbor and the location of  
18 ships, the tie-up at docks, and so forth, in Pearl Harbor of  
19 the Fleet. I believe it is contained in exhibit 2 at page 12.

20 Admiral Stark: I have no recollection of ever having  
21 seen that despatch until I saw it recently.

22 Senator George: Well, Admiral, that despatch is more than  
23 a mere ordinary message or despatch dealing with the movement  
24 of ships, isn't it?

25 Admiral Stark: It is, yes, sir.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Senator George: Decidedly so.

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

4 Senator George: Now, did you ever hear that message of  
5 September discussed by anyone in your department or division?

6 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I did not.

7 Senator George: So far as you know Admiral Ingersoll  
8 did not know anything of it or did not see it?

9 Admiral Stark: Admiral Ingersoll has told me that he did  
10 not see it.

11 Senator George: Well, I mean of your knowledge prior to  
12 December 7th?

13 Admiral Stark: No, I have no recollection of ever hav-  
14 ing seen that message or of any conversation or reference with  
15 regard to it before December 7th and I also stated that it  
16 might be that my memory is faulty there, but I have no recol-  
17 lection of it whatsoever.

18 Senator George: Did you testify this morning that you  
19 did not see the one o'clock message, I believe it is desig-  
20 nated as the one o'clock message of December 7th, the one  
21 directing the delivery of the fourteen part message to the  
22 Secretary of State at one o'clock, until about 10:40 or some-  
23 thing like that?

24 Admiral Stark: Until somewhere around. I would say not  
25 before 10:40 and I am basing that on what I have since heard.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. George

2 My own recollection is not clear. I believe Captain Kramer  
3 will be able to give a rather definite time on that, which I  
4 will accept if he does.

5 Senator George: You did say that you did recollect the  
6 discussion of the one o'clock message or intercept when you  
7 were called by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. It is the only clear --

9 Senator George: It is the only really outstanding recol-  
10 lection that you have of it?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, it is, because thinking the whole  
12 thing over afterwards that message is the only thing of that  
13 morning that stands out like a beacon light.

14 Senator George: Well, now, so far as you know no infor-  
15 mation reached Admiral Kimmel about that one o'clock message  
16 until after the attack?

17 Admiral Stark: I think that is correct. I know it is,  
18 yes, sir.

19 Senator George: You did not make an effort to send,  
20 except direct a request that Admiral Kimmel be notified in  
21 the Marshall message?

22 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir.

23 Senator George: But you did not know that the Marshall  
24 message, the Chief of Staff's message, had not gone through?

25 Admiral Stark: No, I did not.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. George

2 Senator George: You did not, however, take any steps to  
3 send directly to Admiral Kimmel a notice of that one o'clock  
4 message?

5 Admiral Stark: No, I did not parallel it.

6 Senator George: You did not parallel it.

7 Admiral Stark: And that is the thought I have often had  
8 since, that if I had paralleled it it might have gone through.  
9 I let it go the way it was. That is, Marshall stated that he  
10 would get it through. I offered to get it through but I did  
11 not. I had no reason to believe that he would not get it  
12 through just as quickly.

13 Senator George: Admiral, there was a time, as you have  
14 testified about and others, other officers in the Army and  
15 Navy, when the possibility and strong, maybe, probability of  
16 an air attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy  
17 circles, that is in 1940 and up during some early months even  
18 of 1941 and in your correspondence with the commander of the  
19 Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility of an air attack?

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

21 Senator George: And then there did seem to come a time  
22 when there was a lapse of interest in that point down here in  
23 Washington, isn't that true?

24 Admiral Stark: I wouldn't say there was a lapse of in-  
25 terest. We initially pointed out what we thought was necessary



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. George

2 and we took steps to correct the deficiencies as far as we  
3 could and my conversations with Marshall on that continued,  
4 not only with regard to radar and things for which the Army  
5 was responsible, but also craft and anti-aircraft weapons.  
6 We continued to talk about that and the war plans covered  
7 what we had to give them and which were made available sub-  
8 stantially as the war plans stated.

9 We had received and O.K.'d what we thought was a very  
10 splendid arrangement out there for meeting the situation and  
11 from then on, except to follow up on materiel, there was no  
12 particular mention, as I recall, about the continued danger.  
13 We had set it forth. We did not talk particularly about  
14 other types of attack which might occur, but I think you are  
15 right in stating that. I do not recall of it having been  
16 specifically mentioned. I will look through the record and  
17 see if I can find anything.

18 Shef--  
19 Shack  
20 fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

21  
22  
23  
24  
25



SHAK(10)  
FWS  
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5890  
Questions by: Senator George

1 Witness Stark

2 Senator George: I did not mean that you had lost all  
3 interest in the possibility of an air attack, but I have been  
4 unable to escape the conclusion that little emphasis was placed  
5 upon the possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor late in  
6 the year 1941. That is what I meant to say. Of course, you  
7 did not have adequate preparation at any of the outlying posts,  
8 especially you did not consider that you had all of the prepara-  
9 tion that you needed at Pearl Harbor to repel an air attack or  
10 a combined attack?

11 Admiral Stark: That is true. I think I might say,  
12 Senator George, what we said earlier in the year still stood.

13 Senator George: I understand that. I understand you  
14 now to say that we are to take it that that still stood, that  
15 nothing happened to change that or no changes had been made  
16 and you were relying upon the plans as they had been developed.

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

18 Senator George: And the conversations as they had gone  
19 on during the previous months.

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

21 Senator George: And you were making an effort to strengthen  
22 your defenses at Pearl Harbor.

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and we also had word about their  
24 carrying on their weekly drills, and so forth.

25 Senator George: I believe you have agreed, Admiral,

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



WLC 2

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Senator George  
 2 and I recall also General Marshall's agreement, that while we  
 3 did not have as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired,  
 4 as we expected to build up, that if the two services, that is,  
 5 the Army and Navy, had been fully alerted during the week  
 6 preceding December 7 the attack might have been diverted or  
 7 might have been so broken up as to have saved the losses to the  
 8 Navy in men as well as materiel, or substantial injury at that  
 9 time.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Senator George: Now, I just want to ask you a few  
 12 questions about what seems to me to be the two important  
 13 messages that you have sent out, that is the message of November  
 14 24 -- that did go to Admiral Kimmel?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Senator George: And then the message of November 27 also  
 17 went to Admiral Kimmel?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Senator George: Then, there was a message of November 28  
 20 in which you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to  
 21 the Commanders of the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral  
 22 Kimmel?

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

24 Senator George: That reached him?

25 Admiral Stark: That went to him, as I recall, for informa-

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WLC 2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

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3 did not have as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired,  
4 as we expected to build up, that if the two services, that is,  
5 the Army and Navy, had been fully alerted during the week  
6 preceding December 7 the attack might have been diverted or  
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8 Navy in men as well as materiel, or substantial injury at that  
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12 questions about what seems to me to be the two important  
13 messages that you have sent out, that is the message of November  
14 24 -- that did go to Admiral Kimmel?

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17 went to Admiral Kimmel?

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20 in which you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to  
21 the Commanders of the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral  
22 Kimmel?

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24 Senator George: That reached him?

25 Admiral Stark: That went to him, as I recall, for informa-

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Questions by: Senator George

Witness Stark

WLC3

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2

tion. The other two were for action.

3

Senator George: That went to "INFO". That means

4

"information"?

5

Admiral Stark: "Information", yes, sir.

6

Senator George: That did not go to him as a command

7

message, or an action message?

8

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

9

Senator George: There was subjoined to the quoted Army message a further statement which he was, of course, assumed or presumed to recognize and follow, was he not?

10

11

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

12

Senator George: And that cautioned against offensive

13

action until Japan had committed an overt act?

14

Admiral Stark: That part of it for action was to the

15

two naval coastal frontiers on the West Coast. It was sent

16

to Admiral Kimmel for information.

17

Senator George: I see. The whole of it was in the

18

nature of information, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

19

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I might mention, Senator

20

George, in that connection that the two action addressees

21

in the dispatch automatically came under Admiral Kimmel in

22

case of war, as shown in WPL-46, so we wanted Admiral Kimmel

23

to know what we had told the naval coastal frontiers.

24

Senator George: I see. They automatically came under

25



WLC4

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 his control in the case of war?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

4 Senator George: Do you know what time Admiral Kimmel  
5 received that message?

6 Admiral Stark: Of the 28th?

7 Senator George: Yes, sir.

8 Admiral Stark: I do not know, sir. We obtained from  
9 Naval Communications the fact that that message was sent out  
10 at half past two on the morning of the 29th. That would mean  
11 Hawaiian time half past two. He probably got that in the  
12 late afternoon or early evening on the 28th.13 Senator George: Could you give us the time of receipt by  
14 Admiral Kimmel of the November 27 message, or at least the date  
15 of the receipt?16 Admiral Stark: Well, we obtained the information from  
17 Communications that that message went out, Greenwich Time 2801  
18 -- or, rather, 0106 in the morning of the 28th. You take 10  
19 hours and a half off from that and he probably got that the  
20 afternoon of the 27th.21 Senator George: Admiral, have you before you the several  
22 messages regarding codes and the destruction of codes?23 Admiral Stark: I think they are in this file. I remember  
24 them.

25 Senator George: Beginning, I believe, December 2nd or







WLC6

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 but the message does contain certain information.

3 Senator George: The message does contain certain informa-  
4 tional matter?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

6 Senator George: It contains, for instance, this statement,  
7 the factual statement that the negotiations with Japan had  
8 broken down, had ceased, and that Japan is expected "within the  
9 next few days, to commence an aggressive move," or to make an  
10 aggressive move, and then reference is made to the size of  
11 the Japanese forces that were being mobilized or put in action,  
12 and then this statement is made, "an amphibious expedition  
13 against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly  
14 Borneo" is specifically pointed out. That is by way of informa-  
15 tion, is it?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Senator George: By way of information of what was in the  
18 minds here, in Washington, that you thought?

19 Admiral Stark: They gave them what we had.

20 Senator George: What you had?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

22 Senator George: In other words, that statement is based  
23 on the evaluation you made of all of the information that you  
24 received or that you had?

25 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

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WLC7

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

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2

Senator George: Then you come to the action --

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Admiral Stark: I might state with regard to that, about all the information we had with regard to the rest of the Japanese Fleet, any information that we had concerning that was also known to the commanders in the chief in the Pacific, because they were the ones that sent us information on that.

In other words, the stations could cut in and locate and evaluate the information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet, that information which blowed into the Department came from Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart. So any other information that was available, that would have been available to us, they already had.

Senator George: Admiral, the enumeration of the possible points of attack with no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor was calculated, was it not, to weaken the warning message, so far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

Admiral Stark: I can only say with regard to that, that that did not occur to me, and, so far as I know, did not occur to anyone else. We gave the war warning. It was sent to the two commanders in chief for action with a directive, and what information we had and what indications we had we sent along as information. Now, the reaction that it had in the minds of the commanders in chief is something to which they can testify. I can only state that we thought we had given them

onsmg



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 an unequivocal war warning to be on the alert against any  
3 possibility. Whether what we sent was sufficient or insufficient  
4 is something I would say for the committee to decide. We thought  
5 it was, and we intended to convey that.

6 Senator George: Your message of November 24 had definitely  
7 stated that action in any direction might be anticipated.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 Senator George: Might be expected.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Senator George: But in this message there is, of course,  
12 no mention of Pearl Harbor, and there isn't any message, in  
13 late November at least or early in December, that did specifically  
14 refer to Pearl Harbor, and the enumeration of possible points  
15 of attack which omitted Pearl Harbor might, will you not say,  
16 tend to weaken the force of the warning to a commander of a  
17 fleet who was at Pearl Harbor?

18 Admiral Stark: I can only say we did not think so at the  
19 time. In the light of hindsight it may have.

20 Senator George: Now, the very concluding sentence in this  
21 war message is: "Continental District Guam - Samoa directed to  
22 take appropriate measures against sabotage." Isn't that also  
23 calculated to indicate a complete all-out defense or reconnais-  
24 sance was meant to be undertaken by Admiral Kimmel, or might  
25 have led him to believe that he was not to take an all-out



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 reconnaissance?

3 Admiral Stark: I do not think so.

4 Senator George: You did not think so?

5 Admiral Stark: No, I did not. If I had thought so I would  
6 have worded the message or caused it to be worded differently.  
7 About the only thing that Guam could do was to take action  
8 against sabotage. We knew that Guam could not hold out.  
9 And about the only thing the continental district could do was  
10 to take action against sabotage.

11 Senator George: I am not asserting, Admiral, that these  
12 points that I am pointing out in this message were calculated  
13 in fact to weaken the effect of this warning message, so far  
14 as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was  
15 concerned, but I am asking you as an experienced officer in the  
16 Navy if the enumeration of certain points of possible attack  
17 with no reference to Pearl Harbor and with the reference that  
18 is contained here to Guam, Samoa, continental districts, and  
19 so forth, might not have the effect of leaving the Commander  
20 of the Pacific Fleet in some doubt as to what action he should  
21 take to defend his position?

22 Admiral Stark: I can only say we did not think so. I can  
23 also agree with you now that it might have, particularly in  
24 the light of hindsight. However, we did not think so. In  
25 mentioning those places we simply indicated the information we



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 had. It was not necessary for us to tell Admiral Kimmel to  
3 be prepared against sabotage or destruction of codes, for  
4 example, which we also mentioned for Guam, because he would  
5 automatically take care of that, although we did, so far as  
6 the outlying islands were concerned, authorize it. We, in  
7 sending that message to him for action -- not for information  
8 but for action -- had thought it would activate his command,  
9 and we gave him the only information we had. If we had had  
10 any indication of an air attack from the movement of ships we  
11 would have given it. We had nothing. But the absent of that  
12 information, in my opinion, did not preclude the possibility  
13 of an attack.

14 Senator George: Admiral, I believe that you said earlier  
15 in your testimony that you regarded the Fleet reasonably secure  
16 at Pearl Harbor. Did you state that?

17 Admiral Stark: Reasonably secure?

18 Senator George: Yes.

19 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

20 Senator George: Based at Pearl Harbor.

21 Admiral Stark: I do not recall having stated that they  
22 were reasonably secure. I stated that I would not have hesitated  
23 to put the Fleet there. The Fleet, even though it was a danger-  
24 ous position or not a dangerous position, it was the furthest  
25 point westward that we could approach at that time.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 I pointed that out shortly after Pearl Harbor in a meeting  
3 of Senators in which I was called about the position of the  
4 Fleet and the danger to the West Coast, and the question  
5 about bringing the fleet back to the West Coast, and they  
6 were very much perturbed that the attack might come on the  
7 West Coast. I remember the meeting very well. General Marshall  
8 was called before it. I pointed out the place of the Fleet  
9 was as far west as we could put it, and we would continue to  
10 push it back until it accomplished its purpose of defeating  
11 Japan. But I would not state that the Fleet was secure there,  
12 in view of the possibility of an attack. The Fleet was never  
13 secure in the possibility of war, unless it was back in the  
14 Navy Yards somewhere on the home coast.

15 Senator George: It was reasonably secure against submarine  
16 attack?

17 Admiral Stark: Against submarine attack in port quite  
18 secure, yes, sir.

19 Senator George: That comes down to this last and final  
20 question, Admiral. What proportion of the Fleet in the  
21 Pacific, that is, our entire naval forces in the Pacific,  
22 were concentrated at Pearl Harbor the first week in December,  
23 or late November and early December? What proportion of the  
24 entire naval forces in the Pacific area was concentrated there  
25 or based there?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 Admiral Stark: Was based in Pearl Harbor?

3 Senator George: Yes, at Pearl Harbor. I am not asking  
4 what specific ships were there at that time, but what proportion  
5 of our entire naval strength was there.

6 Admiral Stark: Of our entire naval strength?

7 Senator George: Yes, in the Pacific.

8 Admiral Stark: In the Pacific?

9 Senator George: Yes.

10 Admiral Stark: I could work that out as a percentage. I  
11 might state Admiral Hart at that time had two cruisers, and 13  
12 destroyers -- if that is not correct, I would have to refresh my  
13 memory on it -- 28 submarines, 28 or 29 patrol planes.

14 The Chairman: While you are looking that up I might say  
15 to one or two of the members of the committee who were absent  
16 Monday, the committee formally agreed to sit to 4:30 in the  
17 afternoon until Congress reassembles.

18 Admiral Stark: Senator George, I want to make sure I have  
19 got the question right.

20 Senator George: Yes.

21 Admiral Stark: You do not mean the percentage of the whole  
22 Navy?

23 Senator George: No.

24 Admiral Stark: But the percentage of the ships that were  
25 in the Pacific?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator George

2 Senator George: In the Pacific area.

3 Admiral Stark: The percentage that were in the Hawaiian  
4 area?

5 Senator George: Yes, sir. Now, Admiral, I do not care  
6 to have you go to the trouble of making an accurate statement,  
7 or a mathematically accurate statement, but just about the  
8 proportion of the strength.

9 Admiral Stark: Of course, he had the very great proportion.

10 Senator George: Well, Admiral, you may put it in the record  
11 if you wish to. I will be very glad to have you do so.

12 Admiral Stark: All right, sir. I can give it to you from  
13 memory -- I thought I had it here -- which would be fairly  
14 accurate, but I think it would be better to give you a detailed  
15 statement. For example, there were 13 heavy cruisers in the  
16 Pacific of which the Pacific Fleet had 12 and Hart had 1. There  
17 were 45 new submarines in the Pacific of which -- well, I may  
18 be 2 or 3 out. It is just as well, I think, to give you this  
19 accurately. There were no battleships in the western Pacific.

20 Senator George: No battleships?

21 Admiral Stark: No battleships out there. There were 13  
22 destroyers. In the southeast Pacific, there were 2 destroyers.  
23 I will give you the table in the morning.

24 Senator George: If you do that will be sufficient for  
25 my purposes.



Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Witness Stark

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Mr. Mitchell: How do you make the comparison?

By so many destroyers in the Atlantic and so many destroyers in the Pacific, so many battleships figuring the weight in metal, or how would you give the relative strength of the Fleet?



LaCharity (1)pm  
follows  
Shack  
AL-1

5904

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Admiral Stark: I have a table which has just that on  
3 it. I thought I had it with me. I think it shows it fairly  
4 accurately.

5 Mr. Mitchell: You can present it then in the morning  
6 and we will put it in the record.

7 Senator George: Yes.

8 Admiral Stark: When you come to strength it is a very  
9 difficult thing. Until we reinforced the Atlantic, for  
10 example, by three battleships, we had on paper three battle-  
11 ships in the Atlantic. They were battleships. Any aged  
12 cruiser in clear weather could take its range on them, outside  
13 of those three battleships' guns, and pound them to pieces,  
14 because they were old.

15 When you get into the strength and penetrative effect  
16 of 12, 14, 16-inch guns, and so forth, it would be a pretty  
17 tough problem, and if any such evaluation as that were wanted  
18 I suggest the Navy Department, but I will give you the number  
19 of ships.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Along this line I wonder if the Admiral  
21 will give the figures so as to show the number and type of  
22 ships in the Asiatic Fleet and the number and type in the  
23 Pacific Fleet, and in giving the strength of the Pacific  
24 Fleet if you would indicate how much was in Pearl Harbor and  
25 how much was out of Pearl Harbor on December 7 it would be

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



LaCharity (1)pm  
follows  
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5904

Witness Stark

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
Senator George

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very interesting to me.

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For instance, there were two task forces at sea, as you remember, under Admiral Halsey, and another Admiral whose name I don't remember -- Admiral Newton. Then there was one battleship, I think, on the Pacific Coast in drydock or for overhauling.

8

Admiral Stark: That is correct; the COLORADO.

9

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Mr. Gearhart: So if we could have the figures reflecting not only the number of ships in the Pacific but where they were it would be very illuminating.

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Admiral Stark: It is very easy to obtain. As a matter of fact, I think it is in the exhibits now. But I have one of my own and I will fix it up from the data furnished me by the Department and a table which I think will make it very plain.

17

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19

Mr. Gearhart: In making this present request I don't want to interfere with the requests made by the Senator from Georgia.

20

21

22

Senator George: No, no, no.

The Chairman: I think they are practically identical anyway.

23

24

25

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Senator George: I merely wish to get a rough view of the relative strength.