

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. 38

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Gun positions - Central Two Area (b) Time Over Target(s) 0915-0935 (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target None (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Clear except for terrain (e) Visibility 20
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type glide Bomb Sight Used IR-2
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run 2 and 1 Spacing 0 Altitude of Bomb Release 2500
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed _____ Probably Destroyed _____ Damaged _____

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Gun positions		4 TBM-3 VC-88	8 - 500# G.P. 24 - 5" H.H. rockets 60 rounds .50 cal. 30 rounds .30 cal.	6 bombs 24 rockets	Extent unknown, destruction reported
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

Gun positions were reported in target area 200 C D and H. Twenty-four rockets and at least 6 bombs plus strafing hit in the area designated. None of the pilots could observe the positions which were well hidden in rough terrain and extent of damage is unknown. The air coordinator in charge of the strike, in a better position to observe, reported over the air that destruction had resulted.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " " " Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " " " Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Four TBM-3 of VC-88, piloted by Lt. E. L. KEMPF, Lt(jg) D. C. WHITE, and Ens. J. J. CRIMMINS and Ens. H. B. WOOD, joined with eight torpedo bombers from VC-77 and VC-85 to make a bombing and rocket attack plus strafing on gun positions reported in target areas 200 C D and E in central Iwo Jima. The terrain was rough and corrugated and no positions were seen by the pilots or aircrewmembers. The area specified was saturated, however, by the attacks. The four TBMs of VC-88 made three runs from south to north, commenced at 6000 feet altitude in a forty degree glide. Bombs were released at 2500 feet. Very little time was allotted for the attack and no specific instructions were issued as to type of run to be made. Each pilot varied his attack. Each made two attacks; one dropped one bomb on each run, the other three dropping bombs in salvo. Two pilots fired rockets and dropped a bomb on the same run. No damage could be seen but the air coordinator reported that the strike had resulted in destruction without commenting on the amount of the damage.

As usual, most of the time spent in the target area was used up in orbiting near the target area, awaiting the call for a strike. When called, the strike is made hastily, just prior to returning to base.

It is believed that a more accurate attack would be made if the pilots were better informed as to the character and position of the aiming points. It has been noticed that trained observers and spotters are able to locate and describe important enemy positions but, as a rule the pilots actually attacking positions know only the area in which the positions are located. If the air coordinator carried a trained observer who could assist him in spotting exact positions, thereby making it possible for the air coordinator to point out or describe more specifically these positions to the pilots making the attack, these pilots would be able to deliver a more destructive attack and be better qualified to observe and judge the results of their attacks. Too often, in the rush of a called strike pilots are selecting aiming points on the bases of the explosions caused by pilots preceding them, with but scant information as to the nature of the positions and installations in the area.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

The rockets of one TBM-3 failed to fire. The exact cause was not determined.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

SIGNATURE

H. D. SCHWAB, Lt. USNR, AGIO, VC-88

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

H. L. KIRBY, Lt. USNR, Commanding

RANK AND DUTY

1 March 1945

DATE