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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

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November 28, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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TESTIMONY OF:

GREW, Joseph Clark (resumed)

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E X H I B I T S

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

## S. Con. Res. 27

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Wednesday, November 28, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
 Joint Committee on the Investigation  
 of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
 Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
 Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
 Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
 Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
 Gerhard A. Gesell, July M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
 of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Yesterday when the examination of Secretary Hull was suspended, the chair announced that the committee would excuse him for two or three days, to enable him to rest a little. Before we recessed yesterday afternoon, he sent word that he wanted to return this morning, but on account of the weather it is not thought advisable to bring Secretary Hull out, and therefore the committee is glad to excuse him for today, and until such time as it is convenient for him to return.

Therefore, Mr. Grew may return to the stand.

Senator Ferguson :

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, I think we were on the last sentence in the November 3rd message. You had just read that to the committee. I would rather you look at the original, rather than the paraphrased version.

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is there a correction on the original?

Mr. Grew: I see no correction.

Oh, yes. Apparently the text must have been garbled in transcribing, Senator; so there appear to be two corrections. Shall I mention those?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Yes, that is what I wanted to have  
3 you do. I wanted to know if you could tell us how it was  
4 when you sent it.

5 Mr. Grew: I think it was probably sent as it now  
6 appears corrected:

7 "Japan's resort to measures which might make war with  
8 the United States inevitable. May come with dramatic and  
9 dangerous suddenness."

10 So far as I recollect that was the way the telegram  
11 was sent.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, you put in your book  
13 at page 470, you headed it "National Hari Kiri Not Only  
14 Possible But Probable."

15 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: So, when you wrote the message on  
17 November 3, you felt -- that was how you were feeling, that  
18 Japan would "do or die," as you expressed it?

19 Mr. Grew: I thought that that danger, that risk very  
20 definitely existed.

21 Senator Ferguson: And you end your quotation in your  
22 book, your paragraph, by saying "that important telegram  
23 is on the record for all time."

24 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, what did you mean by that?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Mr. Grew: Well, I wanted to have my views and posi-  
3 tion perfectly clear. That is what that means.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you want to indicate that you  
5 had conveyed to our Government and the State Department that  
6 war may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness?

7 Mr. Grew: Did I what, sir?

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you want to convey that?

9 Mr. Grew: Yes; very definitely.

10 Senator Ferguson: You felt that you were conveying  
11 that by the message?

12 Mr. Grew: I felt that I was conveying that thought.

13 Senator Ferguson: You felt at that particular time,  
14 when you sent the message, that war was near, did you?

15 Mr. Grew: I felt that there was the risk and the  
16 danger of war. As I have already said, I never gave up hope  
17 up to the last minute.

18 Senator Ferguson: I realize you had the hope, but  
19 you felt the risk was great at that time.

20 Mr. Grew: I felt that the risk and danger of war was  
21 very great and increasing.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you hear the statement of Mr.  
23 Welles when he changed his opinion from, I think it was,  
24 1,000 to a million?

25 Mr. Grew: Well --

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Were you increasing --

3 The Chairman: Let the witness finish his answer.

4 Mr. Grew: Yes, I heard that statement of Mr. Welles.

5 I have never tried to use percentages of risk because it  
6 was an imponderable question. I merely stated, and felt the  
7 danger of the risk of war was very great at that time.

8 Senator Ferguson: In relation to the note of the  
9 17th of August, I don't know whether I put the direct ques-  
10 tion to you, but I want to put it now; did you ever have any  
11 knowledge as to whether or not Great Britain gave any paral-  
12 lel notice or action similar, or along the same line as that  
13 note of August 17?

14 Mr. Grew: I have no recollection to that effect,  
15 Senator. I have asked the officers in the Department to  
16 look that up, go into the files, and they have promised to  
17 do it. I don't know whether they have yet found anything  
18 or not. I think they will find nothing.

19 Senator Ferguson: The Ambassador was Mr. Craigie.

20 Mr. Grew: Sir Robert Craigie.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you recall any conversations  
22 with Craigie about parallel actions, or parallel notices.

23 Mr. Grew: I recall no definite conversation to that  
24 effect.

25 Senator Ferguson: That article in the New York Times

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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on August 13, 1941 that you read yesterday, doesn't refresh your memory?

Mr. Grew: No. Senator, as I recollect that article stated definitely that this statement in the New York Times

--

Senator Ferguson: Would you care to see it?

Mr. Grew (continuing): -- was a report of what was being said in political circles in general. I don't think that that report was ascribed to any individual.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, in relation to the Konoye Government, there is one other question I wanted to ask you. I think you said yesterday, did you not, that if there was a failure of the President and Konoye to meet you felt that the Cabinet would fall and there would be a new dictatorship Cabinet; is that correct?

Mr. Grew: I did and I so reported.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Now, did you also gather from that that the Japanese, that is, the Government, would be convinced that the United States was stalling for time and that war might be counted upon at any time; was that connected with the Konoye-President meeting?

Mr. Grew: During that particular Konoye administration I did not feel that war was likely to break out at any moment; no, sir, not at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Did you think it would take some time after the Konoye Government fell before that would crystallize?

Mr. Grew: You mean before war should break out?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, before war would crystallize.

Mr. Grew: That was a matter which we could only guess about. After the Tojo Government came in, Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister, said that they were going to continue the conversations and try to come to an agreement with the United

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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States and the conversations did continue, but, frankly, I felt that the possibility of coming to an agreement, between the United States and Japan, after the Tojo Government had come into power had very much decreased.

Shefner follows.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Shefner  
fls LaChap  
10:15

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, did you know at any time  
3 that we had in mind that if Japan went across a certain  
4 line -- let me get that line; exhibit 15, I think.

5 Mr. Keefe: I think it is exhibit 17, Senator.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you have the November 5th let-  
7 ter? Counsel, please get me the November 5th letter of  
8 General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

9 Mr. Gesell: The 27th, isn't that the one you want,  
10 Senator, November 27th, the joint memo of November 27th?

11 Senator Ferguson: I think it is probably in this one.

12 (Reading)

13 "After consultation with each other, United  
14 States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the  
15 Far East agreed that joint military counteraction  
16 against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan  
17 attacks or directly threatens the territory or man-  
18 dated territory of the United States, the British Com-  
19 monwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the  
20 Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or  
21 south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or  
22 the Loyalty Islands."

23 Mr. Grew: So far as I can recollect, Senator, I was  
24 not informed of that fact.

25 Senator Ferguson: You had no knowledge along that line

## Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1 Witness Grew:

2 at all?

3 Mr. Grew: So far as I can recollect I had no knowledge  
4 along that line at all.

5 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar, Mr. Grew, about  
6 the time or prior to the time you wrote your telegram or  
7 November the 3rd of the editorials that were appearing in the  
8 New York Tribune and also the New York Times? They appeared  
9 in September; that is, as to what our government's opinion  
10 was on the Japanese question in relation to the fact that the  
11 economic pressure would have results.

12 Mr. Grew: No, Senator. Those leading editorials were  
13 often sent to me by our pouch, by mail. They arrived in  
14 Japan anywhere from three weeks to a month later. It may have  
15 been possible that on certain occasions an editorial or the  
16 substance of an editorial may have been cabled me but, frank-  
17 ly, I have no recollection of such messages.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, you sent your telegram of the  
19 third and you considered that a very important message to our  
20 government.

21 Was there anything then existing as far as you were con-  
22 cerned that caused you to send that, "that our government  
23 may not be thinking along the same lines", and that you did  
24 it as a warning?

25 Mr. Grew: No, sir. I recollect no such thought. My

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1

2 position was purely objective. I was trying to report the  
3 situation as I saw it from that point of view at that time.

4 Senator Ferguson: What is the significance, Mr. Grew,  
5 of your message that "the Cabinet has made up its mind and  
6 told the Emperor"?

7 Mr. Grew: What message is that?

8 Senator Ferguson: I think it is in the November 3rd. It  
9 is in one of your messages and I am quite sure it is in the  
10 November 3rd message. Do you remember the fact that they  
11 had told the Emperor?

12 Mr. Grew: I would like to refresh my memory on that  
13 passage if I may.

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

15 Mr. Grew: Can you tell me in what section of the tele-  
16 gram that appears?

17 Mr. Murphy: It is a most indefinite question.

18 Senator Ferguson: It is the part that the Cabinet had  
19 made up its mind and had told the Emperor. I may be para-  
20 phrasing the language.

21 Mr. Grew: I do not find that passage, Senator.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that fact, Mr. Grew?

23 Mr. Grew: That I reported that the Cabinet had made a --

24 Senator Ferguson: No, that the Cabinet did make up its  
25 mind and told the Emperor what it was going to do.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Mr. Grew: Well, you mean that I have reported that  
3 statement?

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes, in effect.

5 Mr. Grew: I would like to have that.

6 Senator Ferguson: No, I will try and find it later  
7 for you, Mr. Grew.

8 Mr. Grew: I do not recollect reporting that fact.

9 Senator Ferguson: I tried to keep the Foreign Rela-  
10 tions memo after my information but I do not have it on that  
11 one.

12 Mr. Grew: Of course, I could not possibly have known  
13 what the Cabinet had decided, so if I stated that it must  
14 have been merely opinion.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know whether or not you  
16 ever had that knowledge that the Cabinet had made up its  
17 mind? I am talking about the Tojo cabinet.

18 Mr. Grew: Had made up its mind to go to war?

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, what it was going to do?

20 Mr. Grew: No, sir. It was practically impossible to  
21 ascertain what went on in Cabinet meetings. There were al-  
22 ways a great many rumors in the press, a great many rumors  
23 flying around town, but to get at the actual facts of the  
24 procedure of any Cabinet meeting was practically impossible.

25 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, I think you gave in your

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 testimony earlier the fact that Japan might strike without a  
3 declaration of war and you had in mind what they did in 1904  
4 at Port Arthur.

5 Mr. Grew: I did, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Would you say the last paragraph of  
7 your November message conveyed the same idea?

8 Mr. Grew: I think that idea is conveyed more definite-  
9 ly in my telegram of October 17th.

10 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, we will go to your  
11 telegram of November 17th.

12 Mr. Grew: Or November the 17th, that is right.

13 Senator Ferguson: November the 17th, and will you give  
14 the part of the telegram that you think contains that on  
15 November the 17th?

16 Mr. Grew: Will you find that for me?

17 Senator Ferguson: I think you may find it on 743.

18 Mr. Grew: I said in that telegram:

19 "In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden  
20 military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at pre-  
21 sent involved in the China conflict I am taking into  
22 account as a probability that the Japanese would ex-  
23 ploit all available tactical advantages, including  
24 those of initiative and surprise."

25 I think that is the passage that you have in mind.

Witness Grew:

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: So you think that that more nearly  
3 conveys the idea that they may strike without a declaration  
4 of war?

5 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

6 Senator Ferguson: And you had in mind what they had  
7 done at Port Arthur?

8 Mr. Grew: I think that word "surprise" comprises that  
9 thought.

10 Senator Ferguson: And you conveyed that to our govern-  
11 ment on the 17th of November?

12 Mr. Grew: I did, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Do you think that that strengthened  
14 your former message of November the 3rd?

15 Mr. Grew: I think it supplemented it.

16 Senator Ferguson: Supplemented it. You felt that you  
17 were conveying this knowledge that you had to the government  
18 in as direct language as you could?

19 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, on page 485 of Foreign Rela-  
21 tions, 2, I think the statement is made that:

22 "I said in that case I feared that everything was  
23 over and that I would soon be leaving Japan."

24 Mr. Grew: You said in "Foreign Relations". Isn't that  
25 in my book?

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: I think it is in your book maybe.

3 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, 485.

4 Senator Ferguson: That was page 485 of your book.

5 (Reading)

6 "I said that in that case I feared that everything  
7 was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan. Soon  
8 afterward, however, the press announced that the conver-  
9 sations would be continued. But my friend seemed  
10 crushed."

11 Will you give us an explanation of that remark? That  
12 was made on December the 1st, 1941.

13 Mr. Grew: Yes. Well, if it had been true under the  
14 circumstances then obtaining that the Cabinet had decided to  
15 break off the conversations completely, I would have thought  
16 at that time that the situation was hopeless. As a matter  
17 of fact, my friend was wrong because the Cabinet decided,  
18 at least ostensibly, to carry on the conversations further.

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, I notice in your book,  
20 the same page -- do you have your book before you?

21 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I have.

22 Senator Ferguson: In capital letters and quotation on  
23 the same page, at the bottom of the page, before "December  
24 5, 1941":

25 "WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO US."

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1

2 Do you see that?

2

3 Mr. Grew: Yes, Senator.

3

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4 Senator Ferguson: "Washington has delivered an ulti-  
5 matum to us."

5

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6 Mr. Grew: I think it is a little misleading, perhaps,  
7 to take that sentence out of its context. I was discussing  
8 the whole telegram here.

7

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9 Senator Ferguson: I am not taking it out of its con-  
10 text. I am asking if you see it. I am trying to call it  
11 to your attention.

10

11

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12 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I have it before me.

12

13

13 Senator Ferguson: And it is in capital letters?

13

14

14 Mr. Grew: Not in capital letters in my book.

14

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15 Senator Ferguson: The heading; I am talking about the  
16 heading. I am trying to convey to you the heading.

16

17

17 Mr. Grew: Oh, well, that is in quotation marks, that  
18 heading.

18

19

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I said it was in quotation  
20 marks.

20

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21 Mr. Grew: The headings were put in there purely arbi-  
22 trarily.

22

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23 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

23

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24 Mr. Grew: They were not necessarily put in there to  
25 emphasize or to supplement the text.

25

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, I am trying to get you now to  
3 look at what I am looking at.

4 Mr. Grew: I see it.

5 Senator Ferguson: And then I will ask you some ques-  
6 tions.

7 Mr. Grew: Yes.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now, the word "ultimatum" is used in  
9 that quotation. Will you tell us why you used the word  
10 "ultimatum" in the quotation?

11 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

12 The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to the Congressman  
13 from Pennsylvania?

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I yield.

15 Mr. Murphy: Isn't it a fact that the gentleman who  
16 wrote the book is quoting the Japanese spokesman's feeling  
17 that it was an ultimatum?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19 Mr. Murphy: Someone who was not familiar with the mes-  
20 sage of the 26th?

21 Senator Ferguson: The word "East" means the Japanese.  
22 This is the Japanese speaking. Isn't that correct, Mr.  
23 Grew?

24 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

25 Senator Ferguson: It was not an American at all.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: That is correct, that was a Japanese who was  
3 speaking and it was reflecting his point of view.

4 I think it is very important, in this connection, Sen-  
5 ator, to have this whole passage put on the record.

6 Senator Ferguson: I want you to read the whole passage  
7 now. Will you read it?

8 Mr. Grew: I will do so. (Reading)

9 "December 5, 1941.

10 "Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a  
11 letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in touch  
12 with Government circles here. This letter reads in  
13 part as follows: 'The situation is very regrettable.  
14 You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings.  
15 Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my  
16 mind. I have had conversations with friends and after  
17 examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion  
18 that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual con-  
19 tents of the American document of November 26" -- and  
20 I think that that passage should be emphasized -- "that  
21 Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is  
22 the regrettable psychology of our people \* \* \*".  
23 That is the pertinent part of that passage, Senator.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes, all right.

25 Now, as I understand it, without any knowledge -- we

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 are talking now about the Japanese -- without any knowledge  
3 on their part they were treating the instrument, the note of  
4 November 26th of the United States to the Japanese, as an  
5 ultimatum.

6 Mr. Grew: Yes. I can tell you why, Senator.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, I mean that is what you were  
8 conveying.

9 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell us why, in your  
11 opinion, the Japanese were in Japan treating it as an ulti-  
12 matum?

13 Mr. Grew: The Japanese military government were clear-  
14 ly putting out the impression that that document was an ulti-  
15 matum. It suited the military to do so.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that at the same time  
17 that the note was delivered that the Ambassador here, the  
18 Japanese Ambassador, was treating the note to the same ef-  
19 fect?

20 Mr. Grew: I assume that --

21 Senator Ferguson: In other words, in Foreign Relations,  
22 766, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to  
23 be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end.

24 Will you look at page 766?

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. That is in that long conversation  
beginning on page 756?

Witness Grew:

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Grew: The statement that you refer to is on some other page.

Senator Ferguson: What page is it on?

Mr. Grew: I will have to look.

Senator Ferguson: It is on page 766 . (Reading)

"Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi."

It is on page 766, at the top. It starts, "Mr. Kurusu." It was written by Joseph W. Ballantine.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Mr. Grew: You say that is at the top of page 756?

2  
3 Senator Ferguson: No, 766.

4 Mr. Grew: I beg your pardon. All right.

5 "Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to  
6 their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to  
7 meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested  
8 in a modus vivendi."

9 Senator Ferguson: Now were you familiar with the fact  
10 that here they were also treating, in effect, the note of the  
11 26th as an ultimatum? I am talking about "they" as meaning  
12 the Japanese.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

15 Mr. Murphy: In the book of the gentleman who is the  
16 witness he refers to "certain people in Japan", but the  
17 gentleman does not pretend to say who they were.

18 Mr. Grew: Senator, all I can say to that is the records  
19 of most of the conversations which took place in Washington  
20 between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State  
21 were telegraphed to me in Tokyo. Sometimes they were slow  
22 in coming, sometimes they were delayed for several days, and  
23 sometimes they were so garbled in transmission that I had to  
24 ask for repeats. They were very often delayed. I do not  
25 know whether this particular record was sent me or not. I will

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 have to check up on that.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever convey to the State  
4 Department that at least some of the people in Japan were  
5 treating the note of the 26th as an ultimatum?

6 Mr. Grew: I find, Senator, in a telegram which I sent  
7 to the Secretary of State on December 5, that I repeated the  
8 pertinent part of that conversation with that prominent Japanese  
9 which I have just mentioned.

10 Senator Ferguson: Would you tell me what it is from that  
11 telegram?

12 Mr. Grew: Would you like me to read the whole telegram?

13 Senator Ferguson: Just that part, unless you want to read  
14 it all.

15 Mr. Grew: I think it would be well to read the whole  
16 thing for the record.

17 "Secretary of State (rush)

18 "1895, December 5, 5:00 p.m.

19 "Strictly confidential for the Secretary and Under  
20 Secretary only.

21 "You will no doubt be aware that the American pro-  
22 posal" -- that refers to the memorandum of November 26 --  
23 "is being represented here to the press and to the public  
24 as a mere restatement of 'fanciful principles which ignore  
25 the realities of the situation', and that no intimation

AL-3

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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whatever has been given out that the proposal, if implemented, would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security -- political as well as economic -- which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said" -- presumably to whom we have talked -- there must be a mistake there -- "The response of most Japanese to whom we have" --

Mr. Mitchell: Shown.

Mr. Grew: I think this is the meaning:

"The response of most Japanese to whom we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

"It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly  
2 reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably  
3 complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed  
4 might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility  
5 of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even  
6 greater risks of the elimination of that possibility  
7 if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befogged  
8 by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that  
9 you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the  
10 proposal as soon as possible after consultation with  
11 the Japanese Government, but even without the latter's  
12 assent if that should not be forthcoming, publication  
13 to be accompanied by a statement substantially along  
14 the lines of the thought expressed in paragraph two  
15 of my 1874, December 1, 8:00 p.m.

16  
17 "A prominent Japanese in close touch with govern-  
18 ment circles wrote to me in handwriting yesterday  
19 inter alia:

20 "The situation is most deplorable. I may under-  
21 stand how you feel and you know how I feel. Allow me  
22 to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind.  
23 After speaking with friends and studying their frame  
24 of mind I come to conclude that they feel without having  
25 the knowledge of the true nature of your document of the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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26th November as if we received an ultimatum from Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people" -- I think that is "our" people. I think he is referring to his own people there and I think it is garbled -- "Under such unfortunate psychology of our people the only way left us, I think, that your Government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of discussion for the modus vivendi with a view of arriving at final settlement on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write you.' I believe" -- this is my statement -- "this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here."

Senator Ferguson: Now, Mr. Grew, do you know how many messages you sent to Washington between the 27th, which would be our 26th, and the 7th? I think the book shows two. Is that all you sent?

Mr. Grew: I think I undoubtedly sent more than that.

Senator Ferguson: Would you look it up for the committee and see whether you sent any more than that, so that the committee might have all that you sent?

Mr. Grew: There were certain telegrams which I sent to the Secretary of State subsequent to the commencement of war.

Senator Ferguson: I am just talking about up to and including the 7th.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Mr. Grew: I will look. I will have the files examined  
3 and see.

4 Senator Ferguson: Just to try and refresh your memory  
5 as to what was going on in Japan I will ask you if they have  
6 a paper known as Asahi?

7 Mr. Grew: Yes.

8 Senator Ferguson: How do you pronounce it?

9 Mr. Grew: Asahi.

10 Senator Ferguson: Under the December 1st dateline the  
11 newspaper Asahi, in a dispatch from Washington, asserted that  
12 the closing of the Japanese Consulate in the United States was  
13 imminent, and from the New York Times of December 5, 1941, I  
14 am quoting:

15 "Tokyo, Friday, December 5. Tokyo was struck by  
16 a bombshell, in the words of the newspaper Asahi today,  
17 with the revelation of the substance of the Japanese-  
18 American negotiation by President Roosevelt and Secretary  
19 of State Hull."

20 Then, "Domei, Japanese news agency, said last night  
21 'It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipu-  
22 lations of the American document'".

23 Were you familiar with those quotes?

24 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I never saw those messages, but I  
25 might say that everything that went out over the newspaper

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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agency Domei was carefully controlled by the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson: I am assuming that in the question.

Mr. Grew: In effect the Japanese Government owns it.

So anything that went out is simply what the Japanese Govern-  
ment wanted to have passed on to the public.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, our State Department  
should have been taking that kind of a message as the Government  
speaking rather than the people?

Mr. Grew: Very definitely. There was not any question  
about that.

Hook  
follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, the last question in  
3 the Navy report was this:

4 "Can you remember any information received from our  
5 State Department as to the probability of the United States  
6 coming into armed conflict with the Japanese if Japan was  
7 at war with the British in the Pacific?"

8 Here is your answer, on page 1068 of the Navy report:

9 "I could not answer that, sir, without exploration."

10 Do you recall that question and that answer?

11 Mr. Grew: I do not happen to recall that particular  
12 question, no, sir. That hearing took place long ago.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I will read the question again  
14 to you, because I would like to have it answered.

15 "Can you remember any information" --

16 The Chairman: The Secretary was about to make a further  
17 answer.

18 Mr. Grew: No, sir. Thank you, I think not, Mr.  
19 Chairman. I will listen to the statement.

20 The Chairman: All right, go ahead.

21 Senator Ferguson: "Can you remember any information  
22 received from our State Department as to the probability of  
23 the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese  
24 if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific?"

25 Mr. Grew: I recollect no such statement.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Do you remember the answer that you gave there, "I could not answer that, sir, without exploration." What would that mean?

Mr. Grew: That would mean I would wish to examine the official files of the State Department to see whether anything had been sent to me on that subject. I do not think it was, but I do not like to give a categorical answer in a case of that kind without exploration.

Senator Ferguson: Will you make such exploration so we will get the benefit of that?

Mr. Grew: I will, Senator. I want to be sure that the various points which you asked me to explore will be taken down.

Senator Ferguson: I assume that counsel will give you that. I do not want you to have to rely on your own memory either.

Mr. Grew, were there any confidential or secret communications from the State Department of our policy towards Japan that were not published by the State Department? Do you know of any now?

Mr. Grew: Senator, as I said the other day, there is a very large amount of material which passed between the State Department and the Embassy at Tokyo, and vice versa, during those years. If all that material had been published

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 it would probably take a dozen or more volumes. I know  
3 of a great deal of material which was not published, but I  
4 cannot say that that material would have been pertinent to  
5 this investigation.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any of it that would  
7 be pertinent?

8 Mr. Grew: No, sir, offhand I do not.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, if you think of some after you  
10 leave the witness stand, will you convey that information  
11 to the committee, so you may return with it so that we may  
12 all have the facts?

13 Mr. Grew: You wish me to think the matter over and see  
14 if I can remember anything which might be helpful to the com-  
15 mittee?

16 Senator Ferguson: After you leave the stand. You  
17 do not have to do it now.

18 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I will do that.

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, when you destroyed --  
20 does the Chairman want to put something on the record?

21 The Chairman: No, I do not. If I do want to put some-  
22 thing on I will do it. I was just talking to my colleague  
23 here.

24 I did not mean to interrupt the Senator. Go ahead.

25 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, do you remember when you

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 destroyed the code in the Embassy at Toyko?

3 Mr. Grew: We, as I recollect it, Senator, destroyed  
4 some of our codes a few days before Pearl Harbor, but we  
5 kept certain codes for use up to the last moment, which were  
6 destroyed actually after we had learned that war had broken  
7 out.

8 Senator Ferguson: What codes did the Embassy destroy  
9 prior to Pearl Harbor?

10 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, just a moment. Are we going  
11 to reveal the American code?

12 The Chairman: The Chairman is not able to answer that  
13 question.

14 Senator Ferguson: I did not understand the Congressman.

15 Mr. Murphy: The question is does the gentleman now  
16 want the Ambassador to go into the discussion of the codes  
17 that America was using in its diplomatic relations?

18 Senator Ferguson: No.

19 Mr. Murphy: Does he want him to name which ones we  
20 were using?

21 Senator Ferguson: No.

22 Mr. Grew: I could not do it anyway.

23 Senator Ferguson: Will the reporter read the question  
24 please?

25 (The question was read by the reporter.)

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: I am wondering if the gentleman wants to press that? We have codes that we are using all over the world, and I do not suppose we have changed them. I am wondering if you want to spread on the record for the world the kind of codes we were using during the war?

Mr. Grew: I could not possibly answer that question in any case. I could not recollect. As a matter of fact I had very little directly to do with the handling of the codes, and in any case, I would not know which codes were kept and which were destroyed.

Senator Ferguson: But some were destroyed prior to December 7, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: That is my belief. I think there is some reference to that in the record. I would have to look it up.

Senator Ferguson: There is reference to it. I am not bringing out anything new, except I wanted your knowledge on it.

Mr. Grew: I am afraid I cannot enlighten you on that. I did not know very much about it at the time.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, do you recall any messages to you or to the Embassy that you were to destroy codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Grew: I do not recall a message having been received to that effect. I shall have to look that up,

Witness Crew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator.

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Mr. Gesell: May I interpose, Senator?

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

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Mr. Gesell: In Exhibit 18, under date of November 27, is a message to the Ambassador from Secretary Hull, which, in the last portion, while not mentioning codes specifically, appears to look toward the destruction of codes at that time.

9

Senator Ferguson: May I see the instrument?

10

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

11

Senator George: What is the date of it?

12

Mr. Gesell: November 27, Senator.

13

Mr. Grew: Is that published?

14

Mr. Gesell: That is one of the exhibits in this case.

15

Mr. Grew: But not published in Foreign Relations?

16

Mr. Gesell: I do not think so.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Will you just show the instrument to Mr. Grew?

(The document was handed to Mr. Grew.)

Senator Ferguson: Will you read it, Mr. Grew, and give us your interpretation of it?

Mr. Grew: I have read the telegram, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Will you read it into the record?

Mr. Grew: Yes, if you wish.

"Washington, November 27, 1941.

"793 Confidential for the Ambassador.

"In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26th for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definitive opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not be lost sight of.

"The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 various problems which may as a consequence arise in  
3 connection with our Foreign Service establishments  
4 in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations  
5 might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and  
6 consular representation from Japan, it would seem to  
7 us that, without any intention of being alarmist or  
8 of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this  
9 question should be brought to your attention so that  
10 you may have it well in mind in case it should become  
11 necessary for the Department to consult you in regard  
12 to the making of arrangements for the packing of official  
13 and personal effects and the expeditious handling of  
14 other matters which would be involved in the closing  
15 of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired  
16 that all phases of the matter be considered confidential  
17 that that discussion of it be kept to a minimum."

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you receive that telegram, Mr.

19 Grew?

20 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, undoubtedly I must have received it.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did that convey to you the idea that  
22 you were to dispose of some codes?

23 Mr. Grew: Not necessarily. This is the sort of telegram  
24 that any government, out of mere precaution, would send to its  
25 representatives abroad, as a purely preparatory message, to

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 guard against possible contingencies that might arise but would  
3 not necessarily arise.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you or did you not have the codes  
5 destroyed as the result of that telegram?

6 Mr. Grew: That, Senator, I cannot answer definitely.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, will you look up and see  
8 whether or not you received any telegram from which you obtained  
9 the information that you were to or that you did destroy any  
10 codes?

11 Mr. Grew: I will.

12 Senator Ferguson: And then will you get us that information?

13 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now you had a naval attache at the  
15 Embassy?

16 Mr. Grew: We did.

17 Senator Ferguson: What was his name?

18 Mr. Grew: His name was Comander Smith-Hutton.

19 The Chairman: Smith what?

20 Mr. Grew: Smith-Hutton, S-m-i-t-h-H-u-t-t-o-n.

21 Senator Ferguson: If he received a message to destroy  
22 his code it would come through your Embassy, or would it be  
23 directly to him?

24 Mr. Grew: It may have come either way. It might have  
25 come to me or it might have come directly to him, I don't know.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any messages to the naval  
attache to destroy codes?

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Mr. Grew: No, sir, I do not.

5

Senator Ferguson: Prior to the attack.

6

Mr. Grew: I do not.

7

Senator Ferguson: Who was the Army attache in the Embassy?

8

Mr. Grew: The Military Attache was Colonel -- it has  
gone out of my head at the moment. We had so many different  
attaches from time to time, that I would like to check up on it.

9

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Senator Ferguson: Does counsel know so he can help Mr.

11

Grew?

12

Mr. Grew: It was Lieutenant Colonel Harry I. Creswell.

13

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Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any messages -- was he  
a Lieutenant?

15

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Mr. Grew: No, sir.

17

The Chairman: Lieutenant Colonel, he said.

18

Mr. Grew: He was Lieutenant Colonel at that time.

19

Senator Ferguson: Do you remember any messages to the  
Lieutenant Colonel to destroy any codes at that time?

20

21

Mr. Grew: I do not recollect it, sir.

22

Senator Ferguson: Now going to the President's message  
to the Emperor, what time did you get it, Mr. Grew?

23

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Mr. Grew: I received the message in final form, after  
being decoded, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 7,

25

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Japanese time.

3 Senator Ferguson: What time would that be in Washington  
4 and what date?

5 Mr. Grew: That would be 14 hours later. I understand  
6 that the message was sent from Washington at 9:00 p.m. on the  
7 6th. I think the records show that.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Mr. Grew: The records show it reached the Japanese Tokyo  
10 postoffice at 12 noon on the 7th. In other words, it arrived  
11 in just 15 hours. There was 14 hours difference in time, and  
12 allowing for one hour in transmission.

13 Senator Ferguson: So it took one hour to transmit it?

14 Mr. Grew: It took approximately one hour to transmit it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Mr. Grew: The telegram was stamped "12 noon" and the  
17 telegram was delivered to me at the Embassy at 10:30 p.m. that  
18 day. It was held up all that time.

19 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for that delay if  
20 somebody did not know the contents of that instrument?

21 Mr. Grew: If somebody did not know the nature of it?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23 Mr. Grew: Well, my guess would be when that message came  
24 it was probably turned over to certain authorities of the  
25 Japanese Government, who could have readily decoded it, because

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 It was in what we called our non-confidential code at that  
3 time, the gray code which was perfectly open to anybody, and  
4 my guess would be that the military authorities did not want  
5 this message to get to the Emperor at that time. That was  
6 always my belief.

7 Senator Ferguson: It was held 15 hours by the Japanese  
8 before it was delivered to you?

9 Mr. Grew: It was held from noon to 10:30 that evening.

10 Senator Ferguson: That night?

11 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: You had some reasons then for believ-  
13 ing that the military authorities were holding it up so that  
14 it would not possibly reach the Emperor?

15 Mr. Grew: Very definitely, because, as a rule, the  
16 Japanese were expeditious in getting the telegrams through.

17 Senator Ferguson: That is the explanation you want to  
18 convey?

19 Mr. Grew: That would be my opinion, my guess. I cannot  
20 prove it.

21 Senator Ferguson: Does that indicate that they knew our  
22 code, or do you think it would come from the fact that the  
23 President here made a press release that he was sending a  
24 note to the Emperor?

25 Mr. Grew: I think that must have been taken in conjunction

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 with the other. Undoubtedly the Japanese had picked up the  
3 radio messages, which I picked up myself. I picked that up  
4 in the early evening, that the President had sent the message  
5 to the Emperor, I picked that up from Station KGI in San  
6 Francisco, which went all over Japan.

7 So the military authorities must have known that such a  
8 message was coming and they must have been on the lookout for  
9 it.

10 Senator Ferguson: So it would not be due to the fact  
11 that they were decoding the message because they did not  
12 know what was in the message, they could get it from the  
13 President's announcement here?

14 Mr. Grew: The President did not give the text at that  
15 time, did he?

16 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

17 The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to the Congressman  
18 from Pennsylvania?

19 Mr. Murphy: I would like to say I understand that it  
20 was only a press release, that the message had been sent, and  
21 when the President sent the message he said he wanted it sent  
22 in the gray code, so it could be easily uncovered, and he did  
23 not care whether it was uncovered before the Emperor got it.  
24 That is in evidence.

25 Senator Ferguson: I remember this "Dear Cordell" note.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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I remember the note, "Shoot this to Grew".

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Mr. Grew: The President evidently did not mind if it was picked up.

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Senator Ferguson: Yes. When you got the message 15 hours later and it was 10 something at night, you took it immediately, as I understand it, to Tojo.

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D. D. NOTWITHDRAWN JUV &amp; CRAY

Mr. Grew: To Togo, the Foreign Minister, not the Prime Minister, but the Foreign Minister Togo. I had made a provisional appointment as soon as I received the note over the radio that this was coming, and then as soon as I received Mr. Hull's brief message, which was labelled "Triple Priority" and which did come to me -- I do not know whether that was held up or not -- saying this message was on its way, I promptly telephoned the message to the Foreign Minister and made an appointment around midnight.

Senator Ferguson: You did not go into the contents of the note?

Mr. Grew: Of the President's message?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Grew: I did not know the contents until the document had been decoded.

Senator Ferguson: I mean after you received it you did not discuss its contents with the Minister that you were delivering it to?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Mr. Grew: I did not. He asked to see it. I handed it  
3 to him to read, and he did read it. Then I asked that I be  
4 accorded an audience with the Emperor in order that I could  
5 present that message to him personally. The Foreign Minister  
6 quibbled on that. He said he would like to study it first.  
7 I said, "That is a very urgent matter and I now ask for an  
8 audience at the earliest possible moment." So he finally  
9 said, "I will present your request to the Emperor." That is  
10 all.

11 Senator Ferguson: That was what hour?

12 Mr. Grew: That was about a quarter past midnight, about  
13 12:15 a.m.

14 Senator Ferguson: What time would that be in Washington?

15 Mr. Grew: Fourteen hours later. That, in Washington,  
16 would have been about 10:00 a.m.

17 Senator Ferguson: That would be 10:00 o'clock Sunday  
18 morning?

19 Mr. Grew: Ten o'clock Sunday morning, December 7.

20 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, did you give your diary to  
21 the State Department when they checked your manuscript for your  
22 book?

23 Mr. Grew: No, sir, I did not.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you have the parts that the State  
25 Department deleted from your book?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: I had them at the time, yes.

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Senator Ferguson: Do you have them now?

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Mr. Grew: A good many of them were deleted by me myself, because when I prepared the original manuscript it is always easier to prepare too much rather than too little material, and many passages were already marked "cut" before they were handed to the State Department at all. I do not have that manuscript now. I sent it to my publishers at the time, nearly two years ago now, and I suppose it has been destroyed.

Senator Ferguson: You do not have anything then that would give us what was cut out or deleted by the State Department?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I could not.

Senator Brewster: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: In connection with the matter of the diaries, you read into the record yesterday the letter, the reply which you sent in response to my request. I can appreciate the personal aspects of the matter. I certainly would have no desire to embarrass you. On the other hand, I think you will also recognize that there perhaps has never been a matter that is of more profound national concern. While I can recognize your position, your desire to cooperate, which you have demonstrated, your own conviction that you have made

Questions by: Senator Brewster

Witness Grew

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available everything that should be of possible interest and concern, that statement is made in your book with the addition of the phrase that there were things which it would not be proper for you to publish at that time.

On page X you speak of this. You say "Many of the items in the original possess no permanent historic value. Others overlap. Still others cannot properly be published now." Which, I take it, is a fairly frank recognition on your part that there was material there which would be of public interest, and important, but which, owing to the exigencies of the war it would not be proper to make available at that time.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 Of course I think the rule, as far as court procedure  
3 is concerned, is entirely well established, that documents  
4 or diaries which are used for refreshing one's memory, or  
5 informing one's self are available for examination.

6 I at the same time recognize all the other aspects  
7 involved, and that this is not a court proceeding, although  
8 it is perhaps more important, and it has perhaps more import-  
9 ant aspects.

10 So I wondered, Mr. Grew, whether or not, you might feel  
11 justified, and properly so on your part, if you should permit  
12 our counsel, Attorney William Mitchell, in whom we all, I am  
13 sure, have confidence, as to his discretion, intelligence,  
14 and integrity, at least to make such examination as might  
15 seem warranted, to be sure that his judgment entirely coincided  
16 with yours as to the public or private character of any items  
17 that might be involved.

18 That is simply and solely in the interest of doing  
19 complete justice to probably one of the most important matters  
20 with which certainly Congress has ever had to deal.

21 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

22 Senator Brewster: I would like to have Mr. Grew's  
23 comment on this now.

24 Mr. Grew: I fully appreciate that position, Senator.  
25 In making the comment in my book that certain material "could

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 not be published now," I had in mind at least some of the  
3 documents which have been presented to this committee, quite  
4 apart from the publications of the Department of State.

5 Senator Brewster: Yes.

6 Mr. Grew: One telegram came up today with regard to  
7 our codes. That is the sort of thing that would not have  
8 been proper to publish at the time my book came out. I  
9 do not even know whether I had a record of that or not,  
10 but that is the sort of thing I had in mind.

11 Now, as I say, my diary was a private, personal docu-  
12 ment. I used it as a sort of sketchbook to get my ideas  
13 in order. It was a sort of scribbling from day to day, and  
14 many of the passages in it were incorrect, and could be mis-  
15 leading.

16 After ironing them out, and after checking up and trying  
17 to confirm the information which had come in to me, to elabor-  
18 ate my own thoughts on the situation at the time, that material  
19 then took shape in my official report to the Government, and  
20 all those official reports are on record, are on file and  
21 are available to the committee.

22 I would like, if I may, once again, to read one little  
23 passage from my book, a very brief passage, on page 348. I  
24 will read this again. It is already in the record, but I  
25 will read it to you, to explain a little more clearly my

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 attitude about this. This was written on November 1, 1940.

3 "In the light of fast-moving developments, I scarcely  
4 dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many  
5 inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort of  
6 day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts  
7 and our information, some of it reliable and some of it  
8 wholly unreliable, at any given moment -- the moment of  
9 writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling  
10 in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is  
11 going on behind the scenes, simply because many of our  
12 reliable contacts are no longer available and also because,  
13 even behind the scenes, the right hand often doesn't know  
14 what the left hand is doing."

15 That indicates my diary was not the sort of material  
16 which ought to be used as a criterion of anything. It was  
17 full of inconsistencies, full of inaccuracies, and for that  
18 reason alone, apart from its private and personal character,  
19 I would feel very reluctant to make any of it public.

20 Senator Brewster: That was not my question. My  
21 question was whether or not, in view of the tremendous public  
22 concern which is manifest in this situation, in order to  
23 obviate any possible personal question of purely personal  
24 adjustment, where both the wisdom and correctness of your  
25 official acts and that of others is necessarily under

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 scrutiny, and where, as you have indicated, you have used  
3 this diary as a basis for refreshing your own recollection  
4 and determination as to any public questions that were  
5 involved, that the counsel for this committee, in whom  
6 everyone has confidence, should be permitted to make such  
7 an examination, in order that he might, at any rate, form  
8 his own judgment as to whether it concurs with yours.

9 That would at least be some measure of reassurance  
10 to the people of this country that no individual, as the  
11 chairman of the committee has said in presenting the resolu-  
12 tion in this case, he emphasized very greatly that the public  
13 interest was so transcendent that no individual, high or  
14 low, living or dead, could possibly hope to be exempt from  
15 the proper scrutiny which this resolution was designed to  
16 give.

17 In view of questions which have been raised regarding  
18 possible limitations of members of the committee in any  
19 impartial consideration, I make this suggestion on that ac-  
20 count, with the sole hope of serving the great public interest  
21 that is involved.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

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The Chairman: Yes. The chair recognizes Mr. Mitchell.

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Mr. Mitchell: Since this hearing commenced, I have taken the position with every department of government that any papers that came into my hands, and that are entrusted to me, would be open to every member of the committee and to the full committee. I have stood on that from the start and I don't want to make any restrictions now. I think that I will have to take the position with Mr. Grew and the committee that if he, Mr. Grew, turns anything over to me to look at, I shall not withhold it from the committee members or the committee itself.

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I furthermore feel an embarrassment about being put in the position of passing judgment on the materiality of Mr. Grew's material now, after one member of the committee has examined him for over five hours. My judgment as to what is pertinent and material and the judgment of some members of the committee might radically differ.

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2 it may be examined by counsel and the court, and introduced.  
3 Whether or not Mr. Grew has a right to withhold a private  
4 memorandum which he doesn't want to turn loose is a legal  
5 question that I haven't considered. I don't know what action  
6 the committee would be able to take if Mr. Grew stands on  
7 his position. You might have to bring a lawsuit against  
8 him, or a subpoena to compel him to produce it, and if he  
9 asserted his rights, then you would have a case in court for  
10 the next year or two to decide whether he had a right to  
11 withhold it or not.

12 That is all I can say about that.

13 The Chairman: Does Mr. Grew wish to make any statement  
14 about that?

15 The question whether the committee would under any cir-  
16 cumstances feel called upon to issue a subpoena to Mr. Grew  
17 to bring his diary in before the committee on the theory  
18 that he had or had not testified by refreshing his own recol-  
19 lection from it as to all the pertinent facts in regard to  
20 this inquiry, that is a matter which I don't think the com-  
21 mittee could pass on here under snap judgment and might have  
22 to consider before any action would be taken.

23 In the meantime the chair feels that Mr. Grew's examina-  
24 tion should not be suspended or held up, while the committee  
25 might enter into a discussion on that subject.

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2 So, Senator Ferguson, you may proceed. Is that all  
3 you wanted, Senator Brewster? Is there anything further on  
4 that, Senator Brewster?

5 Senator Brewster: Well, I quite appreciate, of course,  
6 what the Chairman says and I certainly have no desire to  
7 embarrass Mr. Grew or compel him here publicly to discuss  
8 further the various aspects of this situation. I am quite  
9 willing to let the matter rest here at the present time.

10 I should like to consider it further myself and I am  
11 sure that probably the members of the committee would like  
12 to consider also all aspects involved.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

14 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson has this time.

15 Senator Ferguson: I will yield.

16 Mr. Murphy: I wonder if there was any document, of any  
17 nature, exchanged between Mr. Grew and the State Department,  
18 from the State Department to Mr. Grew, or from Mr. Grew to  
19 the State Department, official document that is not available.  
20 It is my understanding that everyone of them are available.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I might add to that that they are all  
22 available and we have gone over scores and scores of them  
23 and exercised a judgment as to what was material or not.

24 We have also had laid out all the exchanges which we  
25 don't think are material, and if any member of the committee

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 wants to exercise his independent judgment on that, we will  
3 have all of the documents exchanged between them made avail-  
4 able at once. There are hundreds of them. Relating to  
5 visas and passports, and all sorts of things. But everyone  
6 of them has been laid out so that any member of the committee  
7 who wants to see them, any official exchange between Mr.  
8 Grew and the State Department that we haven't thought worth-  
9 while to produce, it is available.

10 As Mr. Gesell said yesterday, we only went back to  
11 January 1, 1941. Now, if you want us to go back of that,  
12 way back into 1940, why, that can be done.

13 The Chairman: All right.

14 Senator Ferguson.

15 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, I --

16 Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to  
17 make my own attitude about this whole matter abundantly  
18 clear. I have tried to do so heretofore. It is as was  
19 expressed in my letter to Mr. Mitchell with regard to Mr.  
20 Brewster's request, in which I said I wished to do every-  
21 thing in my power to support and further the important work  
22 of this committee. I felt all of the pertinent facts  
23 should be brought out and laid before the American people. I  
24 believed that nothing of a pertinent nature should be concealed.  
25 And I think -- I hope -- I have shown, in my testimony, that

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 I am not trying to conceal anything. I am trying to give  
3 every possible piece of information which will be helpful  
4 to this committee.

5 I also said in my letter that I had gone through the  
6 last several months in my diary before Pearl Harbor very  
7 carefully to see if I could find anything that might be  
8 pertinent to this hearing and, frankly, I found nothing.

9 That is my position, Mr. Chairman.

10 The Chairman: All right. Senator Ferguson.

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, you do feel, however, that  
12 your position does place in you the determination as to what  
13 is material or not material to this inquiry?

14 Mr. Grew: Senator, as I have said constantly, after  
15 all, the controlling factor in all of these matters is the  
16 official correspondence. The official correspondence,  
17 everything that passed between the Department of State and  
18 myself is on the record here on file, and, as Mr. Mitchell  
19 said, available to the committee.

20 Now, the material on which those official reports  
21 were based, I don't think would be helpful to the committee.

22 Senator Ferguson: But it does place in you, in your  
23 solely, that determination, the attitude that you take; isn't  
24 that true?

25 Mr. Grew: That is a question of interpretation, possibly

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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legal interpretation, and I don't believe I would want to try to answer; the question as to whether any man has a right to retain his personal and private documents, that is a legal matter I couldn't answer.

Senator Ferguson: I have just a few more questions.

Was it your custom to make over-all reports to the Secretary of State or the President, for instance, when you returned in 1939 to the United States to make a report to the President?

Mr. Grew: Well, of course, Senator, whenever I came back on leave of absence from my post, I saw the President and had a talk with him and saw the Secretary of State and had a talk with him, and naturally in those talks I painted the picture as I saw it at that time. I did not, I am afraid, keep records of those talks. When I came back I was in Washington only a short time and kept no records of those talks.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not the Secretary of State kept records of those talks?

Mr. Grew: That I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Would counsel inquire if he did?

Mr. Grew, it was customary then to make over-all reports when you finally returned after the war had started? I think you returned -- in what year?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: I returned on August 25, 1942.

Senator Ferguson: Did you report to Mr. Hull at that time?

Mr. Grew: Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson: Did you report in writing?

Mr. Grew: Everything had been written pretty well up to date.

Senator Ferguson: That isn't quite my question.

Mr. Grew: No, I don't recollect having submitted at that time any report in writing.

Senator Ferguson: Will you think about that? That could be an important report.

Mr. Grew: I can answer that question now. I did not submit, I did not file any report, any written report.

Senator Ferguson: Did you make any report, did you have a report? You say you didn't file it. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Grew: Well, I -- what was the question, what did I mean by a report?

Senator Ferguson: You said that you didn't file it, and that brought to my mind "what did you mean by you didn't file it." Did you have one, and not give it to him, or what do you mean by that?

Mr. Grew: I had notes, of course, which I had taken

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 down which appeared in my diary, and I used those notes,  
3 of course, in any talks with the Secretary.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you have those notes now?

5 Mr. Grew: I have not.

6 Senator Ferguson: Where are those notes?

7 Mr. Grew: They have been destroyed long ago.

8 Senator Ferguson: They have been destroyed?

9 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: You made a report then in 1942  
11 to the Secretary from notes that you had?

12 Mr. Grew: Notes to refresh my memory.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes, to refresh your recollection.

14 Mr. Grew: But all of that material, as a matter of fact,  
15 is all here, in these books, all of it; the whole story is  
16 complete.

17 Senator Ferguson: You had at that time original notes  
18 that you used to refresh your memory to report to the Secre-  
19 tary?

20 Mr. Grew: Yes, I had taken notes down from time to  
21 time.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you suggest that you wanted to  
23 make such a final report in writing?

24 Mr. Grew: Of course, I did not.

25 Senator Ferguson: That would be an important report,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 would it not?

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4 Mr. Grew: No, sir, not necessarily, because all of  
5 the records, everything that I had to report up to the last  
6 minute, was contained in the official communications in the  
7 Department of State.

8

9 Senator Ferguson: Then there is no way the committee  
10 could get what was in those particular notes that you had  
11 to refresh your memory; those have been destroyed?

12

13 Mr. Grew: They have been destroyed.

14

15 Senator Ferguson: Did you speak to Mr. Hull about  
16 giving him a memorandum rather than just an oral statement?

17

18 Mr. Grew: I talked it over with him and I discussed  
19 some of the notes that I had taken and the whole thing was  
20 completely on the record. That was the whole story.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHERS

Senator Ferguson: Then it was not his desire to have you report in writing or not report in writing, he didn't express himself either way?

Mr. Grew: After I had expressed my views about the situation no request was made for a written report because all the facts were already on file in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Ambassador Grew I would ask the privilege of making a short statement in order to make certain requests of counsel.

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, there is in evidence before the committee as part of Exhibit 18 a document which contains a draft of a message from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister dated November 24, 1941. This draft message was prepared by Mr. Hull. It contains a description of the so-called modus vivendi proposal for Japan.

The draft message is accompanied by a memorandum for the President signed by Mr. Hull which states:

"If you approve of this draft telegram I shall arrange to have it forwarded."

The same document contains the notation, "O.K., see addition. F.D.R."

Witness Grew

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And it also contains an addition to the draft message of Mr. Hull suggested by the President.

It appears that that draft telegram prepared by Mr. Hull describing the modus vivendi proposal as approved by the President and with the President's additional paragraph added was actually sent to the British Prime Minister.

We also have in evidence a message from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State dated November 26, 1941 which bears the title "Most secret. For the President from the former Naval Person." This message from Mr. Churchill acknowledges the President's message about Japan, presumably his description of the modus vivendi proposals, and raises the question whether Chaing Kai Shek was not "having a very thin diet".

It appears from the evidence that the modus vivendi proposal was thereafter discarded by the Secretary of State and the so-called Ten-Point Note of November 26 was handed to the Japanese Government.

It seems entirely probable to me that the President of the United States having described at some length the modus vivendi proposal to the British Prime Minister in a personal message and having received Mr. Churchill's views thereon, would also have described the American note of November 26 which was actually handed to the Japanese representatives and to the British Prime Minister.

Witness Grew

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2 Moreover it seems equally probable that the President  
3 of the United States would acknowledge the British Prime  
4 Minister's message as contained in the telegram of Ambassador  
5 Winant to the State Department of November 26.

6 No such acknowledgement of the British Prime Minister's  
7 message of November 26 by the President has been introduced  
8 before us. Nor do we have in evidence any message from the  
9 President to the British Prime Minister describing the American  
10 note of November 26 in the same manner in which we describe  
11 the modus vivendi proposal in an earlier message.

12 Again on November 30 we have in evidence before us a  
13 communication to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant  
14 containing a message from the British Prime Minister to the  
15 President of the United States outlining what Mr. Churchill  
16 described as "an important method remaining unused to avert  
17 war between Japan and our two countries".

18 It seems to me most probably that the President forwarded  
19 some reply to Mr. Churchill's message of November 30.

20 It now clearly appears from the evidence before us that  
21 the British Prime Minister and the President of the United  
22 States communicated messages directly to each other.

23 It is also obvious that we have no complete file of such  
24 communications before us.

25 We have no evidence or statement from counsel that the

Witness Grew

1  
2 messages from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt and the messages  
3 from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill which have been introduced  
4 in evidence constitute the only communications between those  
5 two parties in this critical period of American-Japanese rela-  
6 tionships.

7 Consequently I feel obliged to make the following requests  
8 of counsel:

9 1. Will counsel produce from the files of the State  
10 Department all communications from Mr. Winant, Ambassador to  
11 Great Britain, to the State Department, and from the State  
12 Department to Mr. Winant, for the period from November 24,  
13 1941 and including December 7, 1941, together with a certifi-  
14 cate from the custodian of such files in the State Department  
15 that the communications presented to the committee constitute  
16 all the communications from the State Department to Mr. Winant  
17 or from Mr. Winant to the State Department for the period  
18 specified.

19 I observe that the British Prime Minister in communica-  
20 ting with the President described himself as the "former  
21 Naval person." This description and the Prime Minister's  
22 previous affiliation with the Admiralty suggests the probabili-  
23 ty that the President may have communicated with the British  
24 Prime Minister through the medium of the communications  
25 system of the Navy Department or the War Department, and that

## Witness Grew

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2 the British Prime Minister may have also communicated  
3 with the President through the medium of the British Admiralty  
4 and the Navy Department.

5 Consequently, I feel obliged to make the following  
6 request of counsel in order that we may be certain of all  
7 the facts:

8 Will counsel produce from the files of the War or Navy  
9 Department all communications from the President of the  
10 United States to the British Prime Minister, or to any inter-  
11 mediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British  
12 Admiralty for the period from November 24, 1941 to and in-  
13 cluding December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from  
14 the custodian of such files, if any exists, and I do not  
15 know or say they do exist, in the War and Navy Departments,  
16 that the files presented to the committee contain all of the  
17 communications from the President to Mr. Churchill, or from  
18 Mr. Churchill to the President transmitted via the War or  
19 Navy Departments communications system, as the case may be  
20 for the period from November 24 up to and including December  
21 7, 1941.

22 If either Department informs counsel that there are  
23 no such files in existence in such department, will counsel  
24 produce for the committee a certificate to that effect from  
25 the custodian of the files in either the War or Navy Department?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

**Witness Grew**

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2 Now, will counsel also produce all records and copies  
3 of communications to and from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill  
4 for the period from November 24, 1941 to December 7, 1941,  
5 which exists among the papers in the custody of the Roose-  
6 velt Estate, together with a certificate from the custodian  
7 of such papers that they constitute all such papers relating  
8 to the period specified in his or her custody or possession.

9 We are now examining important officials of the State  
10 Department dealing with the critical phase of the Japanese-  
11 American negotiations in the year 1941. We have affirmative  
12 evidence before us of direct communications from the British  
13 Prime Minister to the President and from the President to  
14 the British Prime Minister.

15 The communications which we have before us indicate, to  
16 me at least, the likelihood of their being other communica-  
17 tions not only in reply to certain of the communications which  
18 we now have before us but on the same general topics covered  
19 by such communications.

20 Now, knowing this situation, I do not see how this  
21 committee or counsel can completely and adequately discharge  
22 their respective obligations without presenting the complete  
23 file from whatever source, War, Navy or State Department,  
24 or the personal files of Mr. Roosevelt, of all communications  
25 between him and the British Prime Minister for the period of

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

1  
2 November 24 to December 7, 1941.

3 Senator Ferguson: Will the Congressman yield?

4 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

5 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Mitchell, could you give us  
6 information on the request that was made for all the Admiralty  
7 messages, as to whether or not we have, as a committee, re-  
8 ceived all the Admiralty messages that I requested many weeks  
9 ago?

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes --

11 The Chairman: The chair thinks counsel should answer  
12 first the request propounded by the Congressman from Wiscon-  
13 sin.

14 Senator Ferguson: I thought this might answer that  
15 one question about the Admiralty.

16 Mr. Mitchell: It is included.

17 Mr. Congressman, would you mind letting us have a  
18 copy of that memorandum?

19 Mr. Keefe: I will be very happy to. Pass it over to  
20 him, Mr. Murphy.

21 Mr. Mitchell: So we will be able to work on it.

22 Mr. Keefe: Just hand it over.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Thank you.

24 I might say, without going into detail, that many of  
25 these things have been under examination and investigation to

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2 determine what there is. We would have to go over this  
3 memorandum carefully and see what we have done and see  
4 what more you would like to have us do. For instance, the  
5 White House records, we weren't going to rely on any certi-  
6 ficate from Miss Tully. She was listed as a witness, and  
7 she would explain everything asked for. I mention that  
8 as one of the things involved. But you may be assured,  
9 Mr. Congressman, that we will do our very best, after we  
10 have studied this memorandum, to report to you what we  
11 have done and what we can do.

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1       Witness Grew:

2               Mr. Mitchell: Now, as far as Senator Ferguson's re-  
3 quest is concerned, his request put in I think two or three  
4 weeks ago, my memory is that he asked for all communica-  
5 tions that passed between the British Admiralty and the Navy De-  
6 partment during the years 1940 and 1941.

7               We submitted --

8               Senator Ferguson: That related to the Far East.

9               Mr. Mitchell: Oh, no. The request did not say what  
10 it related to. It said all of them, on the theory, I think  
11 that, -- I was not to be the judge as to whether they were  
12 material or not, -- probably he wanted about all of them.

13               We made that request to the Navy Department. Their  
14 report, first orally to me, was that during those years while  
15 the battle of the Atlantic was going on and we were involved  
16 in the escorting and naval work on the Atlantic, thousands  
17 of messages passed between the Admiralty and the Navy Depart-  
18 ment.

19               They also told me that the communications to and from  
20 the Admiralty to the Navy Department were not all kept in one  
21 file. They were put in different files, according to the sub-  
22 ject to which they related. That to comply with the member's  
23 request would require the investigation of files including  
24 over 375,000 papers and they said it would take eleven men I  
25 have forgotten how long, some extraordinary time to do it.

Witness Grew:

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2 Realizing what that meant I asked the Navy if they would  
3 please at least start with December 7, 1941 and work back-  
4 wards for a month or two and dig out everything they could  
5 and I reported that orally to the Senator, I think, at the  
6 time.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Mitchell, have you got all those  
8 that they have already dug out?

9 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, we have all those that they dug out  
10 but it is only for a limited time and I would say this: If  
11 the Senator would only be willing to tell the Navy what sub-  
12 ject matter he is interested in they may be able to locate  
13 it in one of these 375,000 papers much easier than it is with  
14 the information we have.

15 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire? If  
16 counsel will give me what he already has I will be glad to  
17 point it out. I have not received them and I haven't any  
18 word that they received them. I haven't seen any except what  
19 you have placed here on the table.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Neither have I. One of my assistants re-  
21 ports that material of that kind came in two or three days  
22 ago and I haven't, honestly, had a chance to look at it.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, then you do not want to crisi-  
24 cize the member of the committee for not giving you the in-  
25 formation when he has not even seen it.

1 Witness Grew:

2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I suggested that if you would be  
3 willing to state what subject matter these messages relate  
4 to which you are interested in it would greatly facilitate  
5 the work of the Navy and they might go much farther back than  
6 they have done.

7 Senator Ferguson: Could I see now what you have?

8 Mr. Mitchell: You can see it as soon as we recess. I  
9 haven't it in the room.

10 Senator Ferguson: That is what I have in mind. Then  
11 I will give you definite information as to what I desire.

12 Mr. Mitchell: That will help.

13 Senator Ferguson: That will clear the matter up.

14 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, do I understand now that  
15 the Navy at the present time is investigating 375,000 mes-  
16 sages?

17 Mr. Mitchell: No. When I found that problem confront-  
18 ing them I said we won't do it. We will start with December  
19 7, 1941 and work backwards a month or two or three and get  
20 out some of this material and when you give it to us I will  
21 show it to the Senator and see if that is the sort of thing  
22 he wants. So it was finally impossible to do it as original-  
23 ly requested, but I am not criticizing the Senator. I am  
24 just answering his question and stating what the situation is.

25 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to the

1 Witness Grew:

2 distinguished counsel that the request which I have made is  
3 very specific. It does not cover 375,000 telegrams. It is  
4 very specific as to the type and character of information re-  
5 quested and very limited as to time.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That is the way we like to have them.  
7 This covers November 24th to December 7th and it is not an  
8 impossible proposition.

9 Mr. Keefe: In making that request I had in mind the  
10 fact that there must have been innumerable communications  
11 between the Admiralty and our Navy and War departments and  
12 I am only asking for my purposes the specific information  
13 contained in that written request.

14 Senator Lucas: May I ask if the Congressman from Wis-  
15 consin will yield?

16 The Chairman: Congressman, will you yield to the Sen-  
17 ator from Illinois?

18 Mr. Keefe: I am very happy to yield. I have not taken  
19 much time, but I will yield to the Senator from Illinois.

20 Senator Lucas: I am not going to take much time, only  
21 to congratulate you in what you have done here in asking  
22 counsel for express information which they can get, which  
23 they can go into in a hurry and obtain the information.

24 The Chairman: All right. Proceed with your examination  
25 of Mr. Grew.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

3 Now, Mr. Grew, I have listened carefully to your testi-  
4 mony and the rather extended cross examination and my pur-  
5 pose in asking the few questions that I shall ask is to try  
6 and clarify some questions that have arisen in my mind and to  
7 get them into some sort of chronological order if possible.

8 Now, as I understand the situation, you reported to  
9 the State Department as our Ambassador in Japan beginning  
10 shortly after your arrival there, giving your impressions  
11 from time to time of the state of mind of the Japanese peo-  
12 ple and your observations and you made them rather full and  
13 complete; and during the period of time from 1932 on there  
14 developed, as I gathered from your testimony, a gradual dis-  
15 integration, just gradual disintegration, with little spurts  
16 up and then spurts down diplomatically in the relationship  
17 between the United States and Japan.

18 I gathered from your testimony that there were in Japan  
19 some elements that were inclined to be bellicose and war-  
20 minded and obsessed with their powers of greatness and ex-  
21 pansion and aggression and that there were other groups that  
22 were fighting for peace. Is that correct?

23 Mr. Grew: That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

24 Mr. Keefe: And you reported to the State Department from  
25 time to time what you observed with reference to the activi-

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 ties of these various groups?

3 The Chairman: You had better make your answers orally  
4 so that they get into the record, instead of nodding your head,  
5 Mr. Ambassador. The stenographer does not get your nod.

6 Mr. Grew: That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

7 Mr. Keefe: And you observed the development of this  
8 Japanese war-minded spirit and the determination to expand  
9 as it developed in the years from 1934, 1935, 1936, on up  
10 to the final outbreak of war?

11 Mr. Grew: I did, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: And you tried to impress upon the State De-  
13 partment in those messages your conception as to the Japan-  
14 ese state of mind as it existed over those years, did you  
15 not?

16 Mr. Grew: That, obviously, was my duty, Mr. Congress-  
17 man, and I tried to carry it out continuously during those  
18 years.

19 Mr. Keefe: And in line with that attitude on your part  
20 I was greatly interested in the report which you made to the  
21 Secretary of State on February 26, 1941 which transmitted  
22 to the Secretary of State a memorandum by the counsellor of  
23 the Embassy in Japan, Mr. Dooman, which had your full and  
24 complete approval. That is correct?

25 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: The message of transmittal appears on page  
3 137 of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations of the United States,  
4 and then follows on pages 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 and 143  
5 the report of Mr. Dooman's conversations with Mr. Ohashi.  
6 You recall that, Mr. Grew?

7 Mr. Grew: I do, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: And then follows a memorandum from you to  
9 the Secretary of State advising of the conversation which  
10 you had on February 26th Tokyo time with Matsuoka in which  
11 you told him that you concurred entirely in the statement  
12 that Mr. Dooman had made to Ohashi on February 14th. Do you  
13 recall that?

14 Mr. Grew: I do recall that. That is correct.

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, in this report of the Counsellor  
16 of the Embassy dated February 14, 1941 he goes into great  
17 detail in setting forth the conversations which he had with  
18 Mr. Ohashi who was the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of  
19 Japan, and you are very familiar with that report?

20 Mr. Grew: Yes.

21 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Dooman, it appears from the report, had  
22 been on furlough to the United States in the fall of 1940  
23 and had, as he said, and I quote from it. (Reading)

24 "Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just re-  
25 turned from leave in the United States and that he sup-

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 posed I had received a number of interesting impressions  
3 in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the  
4 United States coincided with one of the most signifi-  
5 cant and important periods in the history of our country,  
6 and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him  
7 briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home.  
8 Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that  
9 day and that I could stay as long as I wished."

10 And then follows the statement to Mr. Ohashi by Mr.  
11 Dooman of his observations gleaned from his trips around the  
12 country during the fall of 1940 which, by the way, was an  
13 election year and he refers to it in this statement and it  
14 finally ended up by his general statement to Mr. Ohashi that  
15 in the event that Japan continued the course that it was fol-  
16 lowing it would inevitably be considered that it might lead  
17 to a diplomatic rupture and then Mr. Ohashi took the floor,  
18 do you recall?

19 The report says on page 140 of Volume 2 of Foreign  
20 Relations:

21 "Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into  
22 an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent  
23 years. He started by describing conditions in Japan  
24 during the middle 20's" --

25 and going on for two or three pages here setting forth the

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Japanese attitude.

3 Now, does that statement of Mr. Ohashi -- I will not  
4 take the time to read it into the record because it is now  
5 in evidence -- in your judgment, Mr. Grew, fairly express the  
6 Japanese attitude as you understood it?

7 Mr. Grew: Mr. Congressman, I haven't read this record  
8 of that conversation for a long time and while my recollec-  
9 tion is that it was a fair presentation, I do not want to  
10 answer that question categorically without studying it. I  
11 believe it was, as I recollect it, a fair presentation of  
12 the Japanese position.

13 Mr. Keefe: Well, in view of your transmitting it to  
14 the State Department and your approval of the whole message I  
15 assume that it could safely be said that except for any omis-  
16 sions that might properly have been included it is a fair  
17 statement of at least the position of Mr. Ohashi as reflect-  
18 ing what the Japanese attitude was during the years from 1920  
19 on down.

20 Mr. Grew: It is a fair statement.

21 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, it appears that the Lease-Lend  
22 Act was approved by the President on March 11, 1941 and that  
23 on June 6, 1941 an Act was approved for taking over foreign  
24 ships lying idle in United States ports. Do you recall that?

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. That was in connection with one

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 freezing of Japanese assets.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well, the freezing of Japanese assets did  
4 not come until July 25, 1941.

5 Mr. Grew: That is right.

6 Mr. Keefe: That came later.

7 Mr. Grew: Well, I do not remember the exact dates.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, I have a memorandum. I have a paper  
9 showing these chronological dates.

10 Mr. Grew: Yes.

11 Mr. Keefe: The freezing of Japanese assets took place  
12 on July 25, 1941. Now, when did the Konoye Cabinet fall?  
13 I just want to get that correctly.

14 Mr. Grew: As I recollect it, it fell on October 16th.  
15 I can look that up very quickly if you wish.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, my recollection is I think you are  
17 correct.

18 Mr. Grew: I think it is October 16th.

19 Mr. Keefe: It was along about coincident with the pro-  
20 posal to reopen the Burma Road on the 17th of October, wasn't  
21 it?

22 Mr. Grew: That is right.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now, on August 1st, 1941 President Roosevelt  
24 banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall  
25 that?

1 Witness Grew:

2 Mr. Grew: I did not hear your statement, Congressman.

3 Mr. Roosevelt passed what, the aviation what?

4 Mr. Keefe: Read it, please.

5 (Whereupon the reporter read the question as fol-  
6 lows: "Now, on August 1st, 1941 President Roosevelt  
7 banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you  
8 recall that?")

9 Mr. Grew: Oh, yes, I recollect it perfectly.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, these were intended to be sort of  
11 economic sanctions or pressures applied to Japan in hopes that  
12 they would be effective in implementing the diplomatic con-  
13 versations that were going on, isn't that true?

14 Mr. Grew: They were. Those steps were taken with the  
15 thought that it would lead Japan to such a position that the  
16 more intelligent and liberal minded statesmen might possibly  
17 come into a position where they would control.

18 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

19 Mr. Grew: That is a fact, yes.

20 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, it was intended to implement  
21 our general diplomatic attitude?

22 Mr. Grew: That is true.

23 Mr. Keefe: That is true, is it not?

24 Mr. Grew: That is true.

25 Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact the imposition of

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 these trade embargoes and the other economic sanctions that  
3 were imposed against Japan did not in any sense deter the  
4 war lords of Japan in their purposes and policies, did it?

5 Mr. Grew: They did not in the long run, in the end, no.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, can you point to any specific  
7 indication of any action on the part of Japan that indicated  
8 a change in their continued policy made an brought about as  
9 a result of the application of these economic sanctions?

10 Mr. Grew: Yes, Mr. Congressman, I think I touched on  
11 that yesterday. I think that is contained, the story is con-  
12 tained in my telegram of September 29, 1941 in which I said  
13 that this economic situation in which Japan found herself  
14 had, in my opinion, brought about among the more intelligent  
15 statesmen in Japan the thought that they were approaching the  
16 brink of an abyss and it was my belief that at that time they  
17 tried to reverse the engine.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, I understood your testimony, pardon  
19 me, Mr. Grew, in that regard, but my question does not relate  
20 definitely to that. There were intelligent people in Japan  
21 who could see the brink of the precipice, as you have indi-  
22 cated it so well, and that they were about to fall off into  
23 the abyss as you have stated, or as you stated it in September,  
24 but as a matter of fact those war lords who were running the  
25 show were not stopped at all. It may have had some effect on



AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further the Chair wishes to state that inquiry has been made of him concerning the question of having a session on Saturday. The Chair is advised that the Congressman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe, will be unable to be here on Saturday, Congressman Murphy of Pennsylvania will be unable to be here Saturday, and that probably two or three other members of the committee will find it impossible to be here on this particular coming Saturday.

So that the committee has felt it wise not to attempt to hold a session on Saturday of this week. That has no relationship to any program for Saturday meetings hereafter and in view of the importance of the hearing and the large number of witnesses, the Chair hopes that we will be able to after this week hold sessions on Saturday. For this coming Saturday there will be no session of the committee.

Now, Mr. Keefe, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, before the questions --

Mr. Keefe: Just a moment, please, Mr. Grew.

May I say to the Chairman that I want to thank him for his conclusion not to hold a meeting Saturday, so far as I am concerned, and having mentioned my name may I state, for

Witness Grew

1  
2 the purpose of the record, that my interest in not being here  
3 Saturday was not prompted by the Army-Navy football game at  
4 Philadelphia.

5 The Chairman: Well, the Chair understands that, Congress-  
6 man Keefe.

7 Mr. Keefe: I am compelled, because of illness in my  
8 family, as the Chairman knows, to get away from here for at  
9 least one day.

10 The Chairman: The Chairman is glad to confirm that and  
11 his announcement that there will be no session Saturday had  
12 no relation whatever to the Army-Navy game.

13 Mr. Keefe: May I say, observing the smiles on the faces  
14 of some of those in the room, they, perhaps, are likewise  
15 afflicted, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman: The Chair wishes to say that several days  
17 ago Congressman Keefe advised him that on account of the illness  
18 of his wife he felt compelled to be away this coming Saturday,  
19 and the Chair is able to appreciate fully how the Congressman  
20 feels about it.

21 So this recess for this approaching Saturday has been,  
22 for the benefit of anybody who may smile, over which the  
23 Chair has no control, has no relationship whatever to the  
24 Army-Navy football game.

25 All right, Mr. Keefe, go ahead.

Witness Grew

1  
2 Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, may I correct one misstatement  
3 of this morning for the record?

4 The Chairman: Yes.

5 Mr. Grew: Is it agreeable to you, Mr. Keefe?

6 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

7 Mr. Grew: I would like to correct one inaccuracy in my  
8 testimony of this morning and also bring forward two documents  
9 which were requested by Senator Ferguson and which I found in  
10 the meantime.

11 This morning Senator Ferguson asked me if I had on return-  
12 ing from Japan in August 1943 submitted a report to Mr. Hull.

13 Well, three years have gone by since that time and,  
14 frankly, I had forgotten the fact that I did submit to Mr. Hull  
15 a series of dispatches, quite a number of reports, covering  
16 the whole story of the last days before Pearl Harbor, the  
17 events as they occurred in Japan, all of which is on the record,  
18 completely on the record and has been brought out, I think,  
19 before this committee, and also a general statement with regard  
20 to the period of our internment in Japan from December 1941  
21 until June 1942.

22 Those reports which were turned in to the State Department  
23 are all available but, as far as I am aware, all the pertinent  
24 information in them has been already brought before this  
25 committee.

## Witness Grew

1  
2       Senator Ferguson: Might I, Mr. Chairman, inquire from  
3 counsel if we have a copy of the information that Ambassador  
4 Grew is now talking about.

5       Mr. Mitchell: He is talking about some reports he made  
6 to Mr. Hull. They haven't been distributed. We haven't seen  
7 them. We will get them.

8       The Chairman: Does the Chair understand those were re-  
9 ports made to Secretary Hull after the Ambassador returned  
10 from Japan in August 1942, after he was exchanged?

11       Mr. Grew: That is true.

12       The Chairman: Along with certain other Americans held  
13 by the Japanese Government for certain Japanese held by the  
14 Government of the United States.

15       Mr. Grew: Yes.

16       The Chairman: Such reports as you now refer to were  
17 made upon your return in August 1942?

18       Mr. Grew: That is correct.

19       Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will counsel get for  
20 the committee that information?

21       Mr. Mitchell: You mean get the report?

22       Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

23       Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

24       The Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Keefe.

25       The Vice Chairman: I think Mr. Grew had another statement

Witness Grew

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to make.

Mr. Grew: The second point, Mr. Chairman, is this, I was asked, with relation to my so-called "green light" telegram, which I think was in December 1940, which referred to an article by Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern Correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, I was asked to obtain that.

I find in the State Department files a long telegram from Mr. Smythe, who was our Charge d'Affaires in Peiping at that time, in which he gives a complete summary of that article.

He says in this telegram:

"Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern Correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steele is an experienced and able observer, the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions, and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department."

As it is a very long telegram shall I pass it on to the

General Counsel?

The Chairman: Yes, I think that would be appropriate.

Shefner follows.

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351

Witness Grew:

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Grew: The other document that I was asked about, I was asked whether I had ever been informed in Tokyo on the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

Well, practically, as far as I knew a report of all those conversations was telegraphed to me in Tokyo. I did not recollect this particular conversation but I have here the record in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State to myself dated August 18th, in which it sets forth the record of the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17th.

Shall I also turn that over to the counsel?

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, might I see that through counsel?

The Chairman: Yes. I am sure that counsel will be glad to pass it on to the Senator.

Is that all now, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew: That is all I have now.

The Chairman: All right, sir.

Mr. Grew: I am still making an examination, I am still exploring for certain other documents which Senator Ferguson asked me to try to find and if we find them we shall promptly produce them.

## Questions by Mr. Keefe

1 Witness Grew:

2 The Chairman: All right, Congressman Keefe.

3 Mr. Keefe: When we concluded at the noon hour, Mr.  
4 Grew, I had asked you to state specifically a fact that would  
5 indicate that the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan  
6 had restrained Japan in her warlike attitude and you stated,  
7 as I recall, that you wanted to make reference to a certain  
8 telegram.

9 Now, I repeat that question to you this afternoon.

10 Mr. Grew: The answer to that question, Mr. Congressman,  
11 I think is contained in two telegrams, the report of my con-  
12 versation with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, the then  
13 Prime Minister of Japan --

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, will you refer to that telegram?

15 Mr. Grew: That is on the record, sir. It has been al-  
16 ready referred to, I think, several times. Do you wish me  
17 to produce it?

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, what is there in that telegram that  
19 indicates specifically any action on the part of Japan that  
20 was retarded as a result of our imposing economic sanctions?

21 Refer to the telegram, if you please, and point out what  
22 there is in it that specifically indicates that the Japanese  
23 were ever retarded as a result of the imposition of economic  
24 sanctions?

25 Mr. Grew: All right, sir.

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 I think there is nothing in that telegram which would  
3 precisely answer your question but I think you will find  
4 material in the telegram which I sent to the Secretary of  
5 State on September 29, 1941 which would.

6 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, will you point out in that  
7 telegram of September 29, 1941 specifically the incidents  
8 that you refer to?

9 Mr. Grew: I would like to get the original text if I  
10 may, Mr. Congressman.

11 Mr. Keefe: All right.

12 Mr. Grew: September 29th. It may be in my bag there.

13 I think to answer your question, Mr. Congressman, I would  
14 have to read a considerable passage from this telegram. Shall  
15 I do so? It is a very long telegram of September 29th, of  
16 which I have before me only the paraphrase. I have not the  
17 true text. I shall be glad to read those passages.

18 Mr. Gesell: That is at page 645 of Volume II.

19 Mr. Keefe: I have it before me.

20 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

21 Mr. Keefe: Where do you propose to read?

22 Mr. Grew: I would like to read from the second para-  
23 graph.

24 Mr. Keefe: Very well.

25 Mr. Grew: The second and third paragraphs, I think will

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1

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cover it.

3

The Chairman: What page?

4

Mr. Grew: (Reading):

5

"The Ambassador recalls his statements" --

6

The Chairman: What page is it?

7

Mr. Mitchell: 645 and 646.

8

The Chairman: 645 and 646, all right.

9

Mr. Grew: (Reading):

10

"The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swing between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advances to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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2 and by a demonstration of American willingness to use  
3 this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also  
4 his statement that if Japan's leadership could be dis-  
5 credited eventually by such American action, there might  
6 take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought  
7 which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with  
8 the United States, leading to a readjustment of the en-  
9 tire problem of the Pacific.

10 "The Ambassador suggests that the United States has  
11 been following very wisely precisely this policy which,  
12 furthered by other developments in the world, has helped  
13 to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former  
14 Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world  
15 developments arousing a positive reaction from the United  
16 States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alli-  
17 ance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei re-  
18 gime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the  
19 Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the  
20 Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German  
21 Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and  
22 thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the  
23 Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time  
24 Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by  
25 getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the  
3 effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably  
4 changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal  
5 elements in Japan might come to the top in due course  
6 as a result of the trend of events. He considers that  
7 such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of  
8 Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed  
9 of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration  
10 of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.  
11 American policy--of forbearance, patient argumentation,  
12 efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a  
13 manifest determination of the United States to take  
14 positive measures when called for--plus the impact of  
15 world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's  
16 political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds  
17 which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and  
18 nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration  
19 of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of rela-  
20 tions between Japan and the United States."

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Mr. Keefe, I appreciate your  
22 courtesy in reading these two paragraphs from your message  
23 to the State Department of September 29, 1941. I must con-  
24 fess, however, that the reading does not in any sense answer  
25 the question which I asked you.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 I would like to have you point out, if you can, either  
3 from this message or from any fact within your knowledge any  
4 specific fact which demonstrates that Japan was deterred in  
5 its militaristic policy of expansion and aggression by the  
6 imposition of economic sanctions.

7 Here you are talking about going forward with military  
8 and naval force. I am referring and limiting my questions  
9 alone to the application of economic sanctions.

10 Mr. Grew: The point which I am trying to bring out,  
11 Mr. Congressman, is this, that the imposition of economic  
12 sanctions on Japan had placed Japan in an exceedingly danger-  
13 ous position economically, socially and in every other way.  
14 The result of this policy that we had followed had, in my  
15 opinion, brought certain leaders in Japan, - I do not refer  
16 to the militarists; I refer to certain leaders --

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Mr. Grew, if I may interrupt right  
18 there.

19 Mr. Grew: Yes.

20 Mr. Keefe: We are interested in the impact upon those  
21 who were formulating and carrying out the policy of Japan, not  
22 isolated leaders that were intimate with you, that were in-  
23 timate in talking with you in terms of peace, but the people  
24 that were actually formulating and carrying out the policies.

25 Mr. Grew: I am talking about the very person who was

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 formulating and carrying out the policy, namely, the Prime  
3 Minister at that time.

4 Mr. Keefe: Very well.

5 Mr. Grew: Prince Konoye. He was the man. My talk  
6 with him, which is recorded on September 6th, and the conver-  
7 sation which this telegram aims to analyze; that he, in spite  
8 of all his appalling record, which was set forth by Mr. Hull  
9 the other day, which, as I said, was one of the worst train  
10 of events of international banditry in all history, - he was  
11 responsible for many of the things which had been done by  
12 Japan through these years; at the same time he was intelli-  
13 gent enough, I think, to see the handwriting on the wall and  
14 to realize that Japan had got herself into an exceedingly  
15 dangerous position and that there were only two ways out:  
16 One way out was by war and the other way out was an arrange-  
17 ment and agreement with the United States.

18 Now, he had been in our country, he knew something about  
19 our productive capacity, he knew something about our national  
20 spirit, of which the militarists did not know, to which they  
21 paid no attention, and I think he realized at that time, I  
22 gathered from evidence which appeared from time to time, that  
23 he realized that Japan if she should go to war with the  
24 United States and Great Britain might readily be defeated and  
25 emerge from that war as a third or a fifth class power.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 I think he realized the country was on the brink of an  
3 abyss and I think that with all his appalling record he hon-  
4 estly tried to reverse the engine.

5 Now, that is my precise answer to what effect our econ-  
6 omic policy had on Japanese leaders and when I say the Prime  
7 Minister himself, I know that he was backed and supported by  
8 a considerable element among what I call the liberal leaders  
9 of Japan.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, can you point to one single ob-  
11 jective of the Japanese war lords or militarists who were in  
12 control that they receded from or refrained from carrying  
13 out as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions?

14 Mr. Grew: I might read one more passage to answer that  
15 question, Mr. Congressman. I go back to --

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, do you have any present recollection  
17 yourself?

18 Mr. Grew: Yes, I have and I can state it but I can  
19 state it more precisely by reading one passage from my re-  
20 port here of my conversation with the Prime Minister on  
21 September 6th.

22 Now, nobody can possibly say how much weight we should  
23 attach to the following statement which I am about to read.  
24 It is one of those things that can never be proved, whether  
25 it was genuine or whether it was not genuine, whether Prince

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Konoye in trying to see President Roosevelt had wished to  
3 pull the wool over our eyes and cause a delay so that it  
4 would give Japan more time to arm and prepare, nobody can  
5 answer that question. The Japanese militarists seemed to be,  
6 so far as I could understand at that time, completely self-  
7 confident of their power; I do not think they needed more  
8 time and I think they realized that time would play in our  
9 hands.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Ambassador Grew, pardon me.  
11 I do not want to interject myself into your answer but  
12 perhaps I am not making myself clear.

13 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, you are. My answer will answer  
14 your question.

15 Mr. Keefe: For the purpose of getting a clear answer  
16 may I state this at this time:

17 During the summer of 1941 and in the fall and especial-  
18 ly in September Japan steadily continued her march to the  
19 south and her infiltration into Indochina.

20 Mr. Grew: That is absolutely true.

21 Mr. Keefe: Which caused you and the State Department  
22 and the President great concern.

23 Mr. Grew: Certainly.

24 Mr. Keefe: So that the imposition of economic sanctions  
25 did not stop Japan from going on down into Indochina.

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1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Grew: It did not. It had not up to that point.  
3 The question arose at that time whether at the point that  
4 I am now speaking about it was going to be possible to stop  
5 that expansion.

6 Mr. Keefe: May I also call your attention to the fact,  
7 so that you will have this in mind in answering my question,  
8 that we are now furnished with information that starting in  
9 January 1941 there was called into session in Tokyo repre-  
10 sentatives of the fleet to discuss a plan that had been  
11 devised in January, I believe, 1941 for an attack on Pearl  
12 Harbor.

13 Mr. Grew: Perfectly true.

14 Mr. Keefe: And that as a result of those conversations  
15 which continued during the summer, in September 1941 they  
16 had reached a full and complete agreement, very secret, in  
17 their top naval circles setting out the exact plan and set-  
18 ting the date as of December 7, 1941. Those were the war  
19 lords in action, as we now know them to be.

20 Shef--

21 S' hack

22 fls

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Grew: That is absolutely true, Mr. Congressman, and in addition to that I would say every country presumably has its war plans prepared long in advance to put into force, if necessary, with regard to any potential enemy. A country will have its so-called orange plan, its blue plan, its yellow plan, whatever it may be.

I have seen it in the old days in Europe. But the mere fact that this plan had been elaborated on paper in January, 1941, does not necessarily mean that events might possibly have brought about a situation where that plan would, in fact, have to be put into effect.

Mr. Keefe: Obviously, events did not occur that prevented placing that plan into effect, because it was put into effect on December 7.

Mr. Grew: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like to have you also bear in mind the fact that you yourself have testified repeatedly here as to the infiltration, and continued infiltration into Indochina, as to its concern on you and the State Department, and the assembling of this large fleet, which was being assembled, and which later sailed down apparently to land forces on the Kra Peninsula, and into Thailand.

Mr. Grew: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: They continued right straight on with their

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 aggressive war in China, and with the infiltration into  
3 Indochina and down to the south, one step at a time.

4 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

5 Mr. Keefe: Now, what I have asked you to do is to point  
6 out, if you will, to me, any particular act that was stopped  
7 or retarded as the result of the imposition of these economic  
8 sanctions.

9 Mr. Grew: I cannot point out any specific act that  
10 actually did stop that procedure, but I can point out, as  
11 is perfectly clear on the record that we in Tokyo at that  
12 time felt if the Prime Minister and the President of the  
13 United States could meet face to face, it might be possible  
14 to put a stop to that movement.

15 Mr. Keefe: It was all guesswork?

16 Mr. Grew: We could not tell, but that is my answer to  
17 your question.

18 Mr. Keefe: That was an expression of a pious hope that  
19 that would take place, was it not?

20 Mr. Grew: That was an expression of a pious hope, and  
21 also, as I have said repeatedly, and I would like to repeat  
22 now once again, that in that telegram of analysis of this  
23 situation, I said, in the last paragraph of my telegram of  
24 September 29:

25 "In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador