

Doc. 3312 Evid

Folder 4

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3312

Date 20 October 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Loose shorthand record, "Secret Meeting on Diplomatic and World Situation in the Budget Committee Meeting," 84 Diet Session

Date: 22 January 1944 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Diet

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Shigemitsu, Mameru

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Greater East Asia War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Item 85 - On 22 January 1944 in the 84th Diet Budget Session Shorthand record of the secret meeting on the Diplomacy and International Affairs Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU, Mameru, spoke as follows:

"Now we are standing at the epoch of a decisive battle. The wartime diplomacy of Japan is to fight it out to victory, hand in hand with military operations; and we are doing our best day and night.

"We, diplomats, always believe that this war is the war of international justice and the war for the existence of Japan.

"The Declaration of the Greater East Asia expressed the true meaning of Japan's war aim, and this is the spirit of the war. This spirit itself will break down the enemy's war objectives. By means of diplomatic attack in this spirit, the victory may be obtained for Japan."

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"As for the European War, the Allied countries are intending to let Germany surrender unconditionally. Germany is doing her best to break them down.

In this respect, Japan is keeping a firm stand, encouraging and helping Germany to fight out the war to victory.

This is also the basis of the diplomatic Policy of Japan."

"In regard to the war of objects of Japan and Germany, it is better for both states to have a common understanding between them.

Both Japan and Germany are engaged in establishing a so-called New-Order in the East and in the West.

By this policy, Japan's international justice or righteousness will be clearly shown abroad, and we are making strenuous efforts in executing this war to victory in cooperation with the Army."

Analyst: 1st Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa

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28337 Ministry * which made the first report of the incident to the cabinet.
28338 He became interested in the Shanghai Incident for the first time when this report was made * about the middle of January. Concerning the matter about the priests and the other incidents he did not know of it. Such report may have been made but he was not sure. When asked if it was his position that he just picked out the incident about which the Japanese could complain and ignored the rest he stated that inasmuch as the Navy was handling such matters and as the Navy Minister was the one who reported it for the first time he remembered the incident of the Buddhist priest. He thought it was about the 20th of January. But since the matter was entirely in the navy's hands before that date he had no interest in it.

28339 When asked if he took any interest in the foreign minister's announcement which had been referred to he stated it did not remain indelible in his memory because there were many protests * made to China at that time. He did not know that on January 20 the Shanghai Japanese Consul MURAI presented five demands to the Mayor of Shanghai. When asked if he inquired what demands had been presented and the answer received he stated that since the details related to something that happened about fifteen years before he could not say.

28340 He did send troops to Shanghai. When asked if before sending them he didnt trouble to find out the rights and wrongs of the dispute he stated that about the 14th or 15th of February Navy Minister OSUMI told him the Shanghai situation was threatening and asked for army assistance. * That was the first time he heard of it. He had written in his affidavit that the navy also reported to the cabinet and requested reinforcements. Since the matter could not be decided by himself he brought the matter up to the General Staff and they came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to comply with the request and send reinforcements.

28341 The accused was told that he had stated that the first he had heard of the Shanghai Incident was from the Navy Minister but before that had stated that he heard it at a cabinet meeting January 20th. When asked which was the right statement he stated that with respect to the Buddhist Priests he heard that at a cabinet meeting in January, either from the navy or foreign minister. Inasmuch as it was in the hands of the Navy to deal with matters in the Shanghai area, he was not familiar nor interested in it until the request * came from the Navy in February asking for reinforcements.

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26102 When Craigie called on the 29th, TOGO told him that the U. S. * tends to be too doctrinarian and unrealistic, and that there was little chance of success. If the negotiations failed, the developments would be unpredictable, and such developments would not be in the interests of Britain, who has important rights and interests in the Far East. It was therefore proper for her to strive to improve Japanese-British-U. S. relations and to maintain world peace. Craigie promised to transmit the matter to his government. TOGO repeated this to Craigie on the 30th.

26103 The witness stated that Craigie advised TOGO that his government felt it should entrust the negotiations to U. S. Meanwhile, NOMURA reported that the U. S. was carrying on careful consultation with Britain, Netherlands and China. At that time Britain's attitude was considered approved by Japanese circles, that U. S. and Britain adopted a unified front in East Asia, as in Europe. They also considered that Churchill had on November 10, committed Britain to going to war automatically on an outbreak of war between the U. S. and Japan.

26105 Exhibit No. 2958, excerpt from the speech of Winston Churchill, * stated that U. S. interests in the Far East are well known. They are doing their best to preserve peace in the Pacific. We do not know whether they will be successful, but if they fail it was his duty to say that if the U. S. became involved in war with Japan, the British declaration would follow within the hour.

26106 He hoped that peace of the Pacific would be preserved in accordance with the wishes of the wisest statesman of Japan, but every preparation to defend British interests in the Far East are being made. The witness stated that under such circumstances, it was felt by the Liaison Conference * that the U. S. would notify Britain immediately on receipt of notice of termination, and the delivery of notice to Britain was unnecessary.

Consuls stationed abroad had the duty to report information on politics, economy, finance, military and other matters of interest in the places they were stationed. With respect to such affairs, other government officials frequently requested use of facilities for their investigations. These requests were dealt with as routine, instructions from the appropriate bureau or section going to the consuls to make the required investigations and report. These instructions, like all others, were always issued in the name of the Foreign Minister, but actually they were never seen by him but were sent to the Cable Section for dispatch, with approval of the chief of the appropriate bureau or section, or at times of a competent secretary.

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26098 Japan did not notify Britain in advance. TOGO had long been solicitous over Anglo-Japanese relations, and had repeatedly attempted to induce the British to participate in the Washington negotiations. NOMURA had been directed to urge the U. S. to take necessary steps to have Britain and Holland sign an agreement simultaneously with the U. S.

26099 Exhibit No. 2956, telegram from TOGO to NOMURA, November 4, 1941, * stated since Britain is a de facto contracting party to the present negotiations, and since she possesses extensive rights and interests in the Far East, it is to be noted that when Proposals A and B are to be carried out, both Britain and the Netherlands must be in a position to carry them out. Unless there is a definite guarantee on this, Japan cannot rest assured by having an understanding with the U. S. Britain and Holland should simultaneously concur in the agreement on matters concerning them. He was directed to approach the U. S. to have her take the necessary steps to obtain from the two countries their assurances of concurrence.

26100 The witness stated that TOGO had discussed the matter with Grew, Exhibit No. 2918, and had requested Craigie to have Britain make a positive effort for conclusion of the negotiations, informing him of the acute situation.

26101 Exhibit No. 2957, telegram from TOGO to NOMURA, November 3, 1941, stated that in his interview with the American Ambassador, TOGO had expressed regret on the recent aggravation of tense relations with the U. S. and pointed out the danger that there may be serious consequences. He pointed out that Japan had become impatient with the slow progress of the negotiations which had dragged on for six months * and expressed his desire to bring them to a prompt conclusion, and asked further cooperation. TOGO emphasized that to break the deadlock, the U. S. should consider some measures for settlement of the matter fitting to the Far Eastern situation, without clinging to theories.

He referred to the problem of withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, pointing out that there were certain other countries whose forces were in China, and also to the situation in Outer Mongolia where the Soviet had stationed considerable troops, despite the fact that China regarded it as part of her territory. He requested that the U. S. should recognize the real state of affairs there and understand Japan's viewpoint. Grew listened and promised to cooperate, and replied it was desirable to proceed with negotiations simultaneously in Tokyo and Washington.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

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August 18, 1947
DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific
Diplomatic Section
YAMAMOTO - Direct

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The resort to free action without terminating the negotiations would not only be utilized for propaganda, but would prejudice Japan's good faith. These steps involved matters of military secrecy. It is advisable that the negotiations be terminated, depending on government decision, either by notice to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, by an open declaration, or any other means. He would like to be informed in advance so that he could give notification simultaneously, and he would like immediate instructions.

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The witness stated that the conference adjourned on December 2, without arriving at a conclusion. During the conference of December 3, the result of further discussions was embodied in the decision on the procedure for opening war, the decision being that a notice closing negotiations would be given at Washington. The witness drafted the notification in accordance with the * various decisions. His draft was submitted to the Army and Navy Ministries, who made some suggestions and changes, and it was then brought to the Liaison Conference on December 4 and approved. TOGO told him that he had also reported the gist of it to the Cabinet meeting on December 5. It was the belief and conclusion that the intent of breaking off negotiations and going to war was, under the circumstances, clearly expressed in the concluding words, that the earnest hope of Japan to adjust relations and preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the U. S. has finally been lost. Japan regrets to have to notify the U. S. that in view of its attitude, Japan cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

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At the December 6 Liaison Conference, the time for delivery was fixed. * TOGO reported that the decision was to deliver at 1 p.m. Washington time, December 7, which would be in advance of commencement of hostilities. No members of the Conference except those concerned with military operations knew when or where they would begin, and no one from the Foreign Ministry knew that the fleet had sailed on November 26 and was approaching Hawaii, or was informed of any of the other secret operational plans.

TOGO ordered the text of the notification sent ahead of time to insure its delivery at the time appointed, and they arranged carefully that it should reach Washington in ample time to be delivered to the U. S. without fail at 1 p. m. December 7. The time of dispatch being also a matter of concern to the Navy, it was after consultation with Navy officials that the earliest time for dispatching the message was decided.