

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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INTERROGATION NO. 238

Jap. Intel. No. 1

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 1 November 1945.

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division.

Subject: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt. General ARISUE, Seizo, was Chief of G-2, Army
General Staff from August 1942 until the end of the war.
An outline of the posts held by General ARISUE follows:

- 1917 - Commissioned as 2nd Lt.
- 1921 - Promoted to 1st Lt.
- 1925 - Performed minor duties at G.H.Q.
- 1928 - Was sent to Italy for military study in Italian
Army War College.
- 1931 - Promoted to Major. Commander of Battalion.
- 1932 - Private Secretary of Army Minister.
- 1935 - Assigned to duties in the War Ministry.
- 1936 - Military Attache to Rome as Lt. Col.
- 1938 - Advanced to rank of Col.
- 1939 - 6 months, Chief of Staff Section, Army Ministry.
6 months, member of North China Army Staff.
- 1941 - Major General, Vice Chief of North China Army Staff.
- 1942 - July, assigned to G.H.Q.
August, made Chief of G-2, Army General Staff.
- 1945 - March, Lt. General, G.H.Q., representative with
Atsugi and Yokohama Commissions.

Note: Since the occupation Lt. General ARISUE has been the
senior military member of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Navy Liaison Committee.


Where interviewed: Office of Lt. General ARISUE.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS
Lt. Comdr. Wm. BOTZER

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) SCRIBNER W. Mc GOY
Lt. OTIS CARY

SUMMARY:

The 2nd Division (Intelligence) of the Army General Staff was organized as follows:



The area army had an intelligence section and each single army was assigned a full-time intelligence officer. Below the single army echelon intelligence functions were performed by a part-time intelligence officer.

The specialists in intelligence and those assigned on a part-time basis received special training at the war college before being assigned to field units. Some were brought back for further training and were then reassigned as intelligence specialists. The army as a whole thought little of intelligence indoctrination. There was too much emphasis on training on the difficult aspects of the work, code work, etc., and not enough on general intelligence training. Approximately 100 officers were assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff.

It was the function of the Intelligence Division to collect information from all sources, analyse it, and make recommendations to the sections responsible for operations planning. These recommendations in many instances were not followed.

The sources of information upon which the Intelligence Division based its recommendations in order of reliability and usefulness were:

1. Japanese reports from the front lines on actual conditions.
2. Communications interception.
3. Newspapers and magazines.
4. Prisoners of war and captured documents.

There was an exchange of specialists and technical advisers between the Japanese and German Embassies, but they made no contribution to the work of the Intelligence Division. Very little intelligence data was received from the Germans and this by dispatch exclusively.

Dissemination of information to the field was accomplished by dispatch when it was of an urgent operational nature. Weekly intelligence summaries were published and distributed by air both at home and to field units. Intelligence broadcasts in code transmitted to units afield were judged an effective and successful means of disseminating information.

According to General ARISUE, estimates of allied strength and intentions was poor for the following reasons:

1. The Japanese underestimated U.S. capabilities in supplying its forces.
2. Japanese aerial reconnaissance was poor.
3. The United States was able to build airfields quickly on islands thought by the Japanese unsuitable for landing strips.

Conditions of intelligence functions between the army and navy was poor. The Chiefs of the two departments met once a week at Cabinet briefings held on Saturdays, and there was some exchange of information between subordinates, but in the opinion of General ARISUE, planned liaison between the army and navy intelligence departments was non-existent.

Failure of the Japanese high command to appreciate the importance of intelligence resulted in assignment of inadequate personnel in terms of number and ability. This resulted in an inferior army intelligence organization according to General ARISUE.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERROGATION

Q. Describe the organization of the G-2 General Headquarters.

A. G-2 was organized generally as follows: ()

Chief of General Staff

Deputy Chief of General Staff

2nd Division
Lt Gen ARISUE

<u>5th Section</u>	<u>6th Section</u>	<u>7th Section</u>
Europe Soviet Russia	America South America and Possessions England India	China Manchuria

Q. How did this organization function in gathering information and disseminating it to other organizations?

A. During the war, the method of gathering information with regard to America and England can be divided into the following: The reports from our own front lines, gained from actual combat through communications interception and from our communications units. Espionage reports were nil - no good. The rest of the information was gained from newspapers, magazines, such as Life, and Time, that fell into our hands, enemy radio and American reports, official reports. These were the sources.

Q. When you speak of espionage reports being nil, do you mean those received were of no value, or do you mean that you received none?

A. The Japanese espionage system was extremely poor. The main reason for this being our complete lack of preparation for war with the U.S. and lack of placing of men in positions. We tried through what men we had in Argentina, Brazil, and China and through the embassies and consuls there: But this method was not very successful. Generally, preparation in the country faced more towards war with Russia than the U.S.

Q. Was there any organized system of information gathering through the steamship lines and your whole system of ocean transportation to various countries?

A. Even with the use of steamship lines it was poor because of the lack of contact men. What we got from the people that came back on the exchange ships was general information, and we also checked on the papers, documents, pamphlets that they had been allowed to bring back.

Q. You mentioned communications interception as being a source of information. How was this useful? What form did it take?

A. Generally, the results were not good. The direction of your communications was established; that is, the location and the quality, also call initials, and call letters. We also checked the great number of preparatory communications previous to B-29 attack, and interplane communications.

Q. Concerning the call letters of ships? Did you have those identified so you could tell what ships were simply by call letters?

- A. We were not able to identify the individual ship from the call letters. It was more a matter of identifying concentrations of ships and movements. One that came in very well, "BAMS" (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships), was received very well and from them we estimated quite well the concentrations at San Francisco, and Hawaii.
- Q. You described a number of sources that were useful to you, which were the most accurate, reliable, useful of those you listed?
- A. Most accurate of all were the reports from the front lines, the direct reports of actual conditions. They were considered to be reliable and accurate during and after the conflict. As for the air losses, though, the one defect was the habit of reporting enemy losses as high and own losses as low always. The reason for this was that several reports would come in from Japanese flyers with regard to the one enemy plane, and (2) the lack of reports on damage to planes. The major losses were given but considerable damages were not reported. We could estimate from this side the actual conditions by checking the large orders for parts and spares that came in. This was merely an estimated figure that we had to rely on. It was a very unfortunate way of doing things. That was a definite defect.
- Q. By whom was the front line information gathered?
- A. Each unit has its intelligence representative. The area army has its intelligence section unit and then the army has its intelligence units, and within the army the divisions, battalions have their units. The report of a loss to a small unit would come first to the unit commander who would give it to the intelligence representative who would send it back up his lines. Then it comes finally back to General Headquarters where we assemble all reports and get a picture of the whole situation. General Headquarters doesn't have a direct connection with the intelligence man in a small unit. The reports are gathered progressively into larger and larger units on the way up and finally reach General Headquarters.
- Q. You mention intelligence representatives. Are those representatives employed full time in intelligence work or do they have other duties as well?
- A. Down to the army echelon we have been having the full time intelligence officer. The single army is the smallest unit that has a full time intelligence officer. Anything below the army divisions have men on part time duty. Recently, with the lack of men, we have found even in the army the intelligence officer carries other duties and also some island units that previously had a man doing that exclusively have given him additional duties.
- Q. How are these intelligence officers trained, first the man who has full intelligence duties down to the army echelon, secondly the men below the army echelon?
- A. The initial plan, the initial method, was to use graduates of the War College for intelligence work as G-2. These men received training from the officers within G-2. Later on, with the lack of manpower, they took in even those who were not graduates of the school. They received indoctrination with regard to the importance of intelligence, enemy plans, war ships, equipment. This was generally insufficient in my own mind. Another method was to return the forward intelligence officers back to General Headquarters for training and then send them out again for additional training.
- Q. With regard to the training of intelligence representatives, do you refer only to those down to the army echelon of command or does that apply also to some of the people in the lower echelons below army, that is the division, battalion, and company?

- A. The specialists in intelligence and those carrying other duties were trained by General Headquarters initially before going out, but those coming back for further indoctrination usually resulted in the specialists alone; that is, the men who were attaches as far down as the army. In 1943 it became impossible to get these men together for the indoctrination meetings. Previous to 1943 and before that it was possible. In 1943, I remember that it was not possible for the men in Rabaul and New Guinea to come to the meetings.
- Q. Am I correct in understanding that the people below the army command also received special training when that was possible.
- A. Yes, when that was possible.
- Q. Are there any other schools and training establishments for intelligence officers other than the War College?
- A. No, there were no others as far as the army is concerned.
- Q. Tell us something about the navy system of training intelligence officers?
- A. As far as I know, they are generally the same, the training facilities.
- Q. Were both Army and Navy intelligence officers trained in the War College?
- A. The Navy method and the army method were the same generally. I believe that the indoctrination was possibly easier in that the navy work was less in scope than the army's. The navy men were probably better than the army because of their more technical, factual training in technical lines. The navy communication was definitely better than the army's. When the men in the front were not able to return for the additional books and documents and pamphlets, they were sent to them, but this was not very successful because of the great length of time which elapsed in receiving these pamphlets, etc.

Generally speaking, there was not enough intelligence training in the army. I advocated a great deal more. I believe one of the main reasons for defeat was a lack of sufficient intelligence on our part. The army as a whole thought little of intelligence indoctrination, contrary to my own beliefs. I pointed out continually that there were many failures through a lack of good intelligence as to the enemy. There was too much emphasis on difficult intelligence work, code work, things of that sort, and not enough emphasis on overall general intelligence training.

The army considered that the training received in the War College was sufficient to take care of the general part of it and then give them a little more of the technical and thought that would be sufficient, but I myself believe that there was not enough time given to general intelligence work.

As an example, when a report came in that three transports left California January 1, I actually had to teach these men that it was necessary to check the speed and the possible direction and make a further check and try to find out where they were. It was simple basic things like that which were lacking in the training. Another example was your landing on Lai, September 4, 1943. An American officer, dead, was found, and your landing plans and maps were found in his pocket. But until the operation was over, this information was not given to General Headquarters. Whether the local intelligence officer got it late or what happened I don't know--anyway, it did not come up. The reason for this lack of basic intelligence training was the relatively successful operations in China without intelligence. Though losses were high, we were successful. There was a feeling on the part of the General Army officers that intelligence was not necessary. The necessity was not felt, and then, when the war with the U.S. began, we found ourselves

in a position where you had no actual lines, that is the war was in the air, on the sea, and we had no material lines of communications and then we had no intelligence plans.

Q. Where did the navy intelligence officers train?

A. I think at the Naval War College, but I suggest that you ask my counterpart in the Navy.

Q. Were the army intelligence representatives always officers or were enlisted men engaged in intelligence duties?

A. Just officers.

Q. How were the officers selected for this duty? How did you decide that an officer should be assigned to intelligence duties?

A. I think it is fair to say, by and large, the dregs were thrown into the intelligence service. There was no way of choosing. Since I joined Imperial General Headquarters, I made a point of at least trying to get English speaking men in on the American war and those who had some ability in Chinese into the Chinese war. At first we were drafting many men with diplomatic, commercial and economic backgrounds who had a certain amount of commercial background, and I tried to, and succeeded in getting a lot of them assigned to duties under G-2 at General Headquarters, and also, in turn, sent them out forward. For instance, in the early days of the China incident, we had no sense of intelligence, we had no sense of the need of intelligence because the fighting went pretty well and we did very much as we wanted and so intelligence was not of prime concern, and by the time it got to be a prime concern, it was too late; we had not made enough adjustments. By and large, in almost any unit of army size, not down as far as divisions necessarily, but army corps size at least, the main track is from the Chief of Staff to the Operations Officer, and the Operations Officer is usually senior.

The G-2 officer is next, the supply next, but the main line runs between the Chief of Staff and the Operations officer and that is where most things are decided. They support operations and operations pretty much determines. G-1 is operations in the Japanese organization. G-2 is intelligence. G-3 is Supply and Transportation. There was a time when the G-4 section dealt with administrative matters, personnel, history and so forth, but it has largely been eliminated. The Operations officer, by and large, would write up most operations orders and he would take into account the G-2 section estimates as to the conditions of the enemy at the time, but he would incorporate that as he saw fit a good majority of the time. There was also another reason for not building up a good intelligence section. By and large, the Intelligence officers were pretty poor grade and there were instances where intelligence should have come in before or during an engagement or operation, but all too often it would come in too late or even after the issue had been decided. The people who did the planning got in the habit of thinking of G-2 in general as a pretty undependable organization.

As the war wore on, we became more and more aware that we had to improve G-2 and so we started putting Operations Officers into G-2 because Operations officers were better grade, also, in turn, putting intelligence officers into operations; interchanging them, trying to build up G-2 that way. But decisions still were made by operations because most of the operations officers were the ones that carried the most weight in G-2; starting in 1943, through my efforts, we were able to re-allot personnel whom I was able to train here at Imperial Headquarters, sending good Chinese specialists to China, good English speaking men against America to the South. That was in 1943. I was able to get this program underway and it succeeded not only in getting out into China some of my good men here, but also in getting good men to return to Imperial General Headquarters.

Not only did I send the G-2 men forward, but I also made special effort to send them to Operations sections to get the G-2 point of view across and to get the Operations point of view back to G-2.

Q. You have told how Intelligence Officers were trained and sent out to the echelons command down to army echelon. Were any of the Intelligence Officers who were sent out responsible directly and only back to General Headquarters?

A. No, we thought of it but by and large, because of problems of chain of command and the problems of various theater commanders, we never got around to it. We assigned them directly to theaters and armies.

Q. Approximately how many people were assigned to Intelligence duties at General Headquarters in the G-2 Section?

A. About a hundred officers. It increased and decreased at various times.

Q. At the beginning of the War?

A. There were probably less then. I was not in control then.

Q. A report is received that three transports left California. Through what channels did you receive that information?

A. The initial report was gotten through the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships), from California. Reports of movements through Gibraltar and Suez, usually came in newspapers or general information; and also through Germans in the embassies, consuls, legations with regard to America. These reports were given to our advance units immediately. They took a long time in getting around to understanding that they should track these vessels as best they could, try to estimate these vessels, and prepare for a possible attack. We had a great deal of trouble in indoctrinating our men in these basic methods. This got progressively better. Another example was the movement, formations, and flights of your planes. We had to indoctrinate our forward intelligence officers with regard to common sense in statistical analysis of possible operations, that is, analyzing the number of observation planes and their movements, further too, after the observation planes come and go, recording the number, and using common sense analysis of your movements. Using judgement would result in anticipation of a definite movement on your part. As regards the use of the natives, the advantages to us of treating them well was seemingly overlooked in many of the early days, the result being that the natives gave you information rather than to us. Another source that can be mentioned in addition to those mentioned above is the reports that we had coming in from Germany. We got a great deal from Germany, most of this with regard to U.S. forces in Europe and not to home conditions. I don't think that Germany knew a great deal about actual conditions in the U.S. They exchanged information with regard to air forces within our own areas, Japan and Germany. The reports generally from Germany were such that we could not estimate correctly or judge conclusively the actual U.S. war effort conditions at all.

Q. For what period were you Chief of G-2?

A. From August 1942 until the end of the war.

Q. Describe the method of processing information that came into General Headquarters. What was done with it?

A. Some information was worked on immediately, some a little bit later. Information that needed to be expedited, of a vital operational character was worked on immediately. For example let's say a B-29 is reported approaching from India.

Immediately to Singapore and Nanking word is passed, by dispatch of course, so that they can get it to China and Singapore and so forth. Then, weekly summaries were sent; the information up to Friday was sent on Saturdays and this information, by and large, dealt with the war in the CBI, the Rabaul war, and a little of the German war and a little of the homeland air assaults.

Q. Did you provide for the dissemination of background material resulting from this inflow of intelligence material through publications?

A. Up until the Mariannas fell, we also sent out weekly resumes about the conditions and character of the immediate fighting, not much research material. This was sent to forces in the homeland by air because we could reach anywhere in the homeland by air overnight. Japanese communications were very poor. In addition the summaries were sent to forward areas but they would get there a good deal later.

Q. How were they sent.

A. By air. After the Mariannas fell, we had our hands too full. Publications of the summaries dropped off to three times a month instead of weekly. Because of the paper shortage we had to restrict our distribution towards the end. At the beginning of the war, troops afield, especially the Headquarters G-2 units in the field, had a good deal of spare time and they liked to look over all the information they could get. Later the troops, the garrisoning troops, were busy consolidating territories - they had taken and did not have much time to worry about other things. As the war increased in intensity and gathered momentum, they became more and more concerned with everything that was going on, both Headquarters sections and troops, and it became a problem to supply them with as much information as they needed. We failed in this because of the paper shortage and congestion at home. In the beginning, when the war with the U.S. was going well, troops received information from the newspapers. The newspapers were sent to troops in the field so there was not a great deal of need for a wide variety of special intelligence data. About radio communications, in order to encode here and decode at various army area headquarters and then for them to work up a summary encoding that and sending it along to subordinate units took so much time and was so much trouble that there was a complaint to the effect that there was no reason to disseminate information other than the information of that theater to lower units.

The rest took too much trouble, and too much time. We initiated a program of news intelligence broadcasts to troops in the field at certain times over certain stations, that would give all units as much information as possible so we wouldn't have to disseminate so much material. I think that these broadcasts were extremely effective in disseminating intelligence. The broadcasts were transmitted in code.

Q. Did you have any radio transmission or reception difficulties?

A. Yes, we had a great deal of difficulty. Because of the inefficiency of operators, for one thing; because of priority, messages on the wires for another. We worked out a system of staggering these intelligence messages and giving them in five parts for 15 minutes beginning on the hour so that we would send the first of five parts and then send priority messages for 45 minutes between intelligence broadcasts.

Q. What procedure was used in estimating U.S. strength, U.S. losses, and U.S. intentions for operational purposes?

A. We broke up the analysis into three main factors (1) the Enemy air, land and sea power (2) topography and weather of the area under question and (3) Japanese strength in the area. Research was conducted. Sometimes we would even have war games and then work out, after further research, the probabilities, a, b, and c., etc.

- Q. How reliable and accurate did you find those methods to be in the light of war experience?
- A. It was poor for the following reasons: We continually under-estimated the effectiveness of your supply, and reconnaissance was poor, we couldn't break your codes at all, and the fact is that the sea was an unknown quantity. If B-29's would come from China to raid Japan we could pick them up. Someone would pick it up along the line and send warning or if they would go from India to Singapore, somebody would send warning because they would have to go overland. But when operations would come from across the sea we had no previous warning. Intelligence would be very little. Another reason was your ability to build airfields on islands that we had passed up as impossible for airfields. You would land, take over, and in two weeks be operating.
- A. You mentioned earlier that there was considerable trouble over reporting or over optimism in the damage and sinkings to allied ships and air force by Japanese pilots. How did General Headquarters deal with that problem? Did you have yardsticks which you applied to help solve that problem?
- A. We had no official yardstick. However, I cut the report of enemy losses and damage from 1/2 to 2/3. It would depend on the operation and how much information we received afterwards. Often, the information was inconclusive. During an operation there was nothing to do but to judge information from past experiences. This is a personal opinion.
- Q. Do you believe that echelons in the field knowingly reported their losses inaccurately, or was it the result of incomplete information in the field.
- A. In reporting losses of aircraft, it was the Japanese practice to report aircraft lost, aircraft heavily damaged, aircraft moderately damaged, aircraft lightly damaged. Aircraft damaged beyond repair were often not reported as lost, leading to some over-optimism in the estimate of Japanese air forces remaining in potentially operational status. For instance, initial claims on damage inflicted on the U.S. would by and large not increase very much after an operation was on the decline but Japanese damage and losses would keep increasing.
- Q. What procedure was followed in extracting information from U.S. Prisoners of War?
- A. I discount prisoners of war as a source of information. Very little good information was obtained from them. Theaters were instructed to send good prisoners back to the mainland. The rank of B-29 prisoners of war was not very high. We obtained interesting bits of information such as the fishing tackle often carried and air sea rescue maps, etc., and some technical information of your communications equipment. However, the information gained from prisoners of war did not help us very much.
- Q. Did you make an attempt to interrogate all prisoners of war?
- A. No, there was no calculated attempt to question all prisoners of war. In field manuals, certain very elementary and basic instructions were given such as asking the PW how his supplies were, but on the whole it was completely up to local units in various theaters. Sometimes the Kempei would have a hand in the questioning, but there were no instructions from Imperial Headquarters as to how certain information was to be obtained.
- A. To what extent did captured documents provide useful information?
- A. There were no captured documents that were really worth while. In the Philippines, Lingayen, we were very successful in getting a few minor articles like diaries and various scraps of paper from the dead but in regard to really, official documents, we got none that were worth while at all.

Q. Were the documents that were secured sent back to General Headquarters here for processing?

A. It was left up to the decision of theater commanders. Things that they deemed worth while to send up here were sent. Because of the general lack of development of the intelligence service -- they could have secured many more documents but actually very few got into our hands. When the war was going well, I think that perhaps we secured quite a few, but after the allies began their offensive, we secured nothing that was worth while. It was because of the general point of view towards intelligence, the lack of appreciation of it. It resulted in few captured documents. A manual called "Jungle Battle Lessons" from Australian sources was found in the early days of the war in Buna and that helped us greatly in anticipating the lessons you had learned.

Q. Did the Japanese make provision for securing and analyzing captured equipment including crashed aircraft in their intelligence organizations?

A. No.

Q. How then did you secure that information and how was it disseminated to the field? We know that there was a considerable amount of equipment captured and documents were published. Who did that -- How was it done?

A. The technical section of the Air General Headquarters was notified as soon as new information planes came in, and it was their responsibility to take action on these developments. G-2 merely informed such sections about new developments as soon as we found out. It was not G-2's function to do the analyzing. They captured a jeep in Burma and I immediately wanted to get it back up here, and examine it because we had been depending on ox carts. I informed the General Ordnance Administrative Headquarters and also G-1, suggesting that they look into the merits of the jeep and do something about getting it to General Headquarters. As it finally turned out transportation facilities were such that they did not send it. Air General Headquarters was notified about technical matters pertaining to air; in matters of ordnance, General Ordnance Administration Headquarters was notified.

Q. To what extent did aerial photography and photo reconnaissance aid in providing intelligence data?

A. We had a school of aerial photography which dealt with everything from how to take pictures to methods of interpreting them. The work was done in the field and certain sets of pictures were sent back here. Officers from various branches of the service were sent to the school of aerial photography.

Q. Was the Aerial Photo School operated by G-2?

A. No, under Air General Headquarters.

Q. How effective were the search planes in reporting back positions of ships in such a way as to make that information useful in taking action against that ship?

A. The results were very ineffective. (1) lack of planes, very few reconnaissance planes. (2) small searches, searches that were not extensive enough. In fact, the navy did most of the searching. They couldn't begin to reconnoiter all the approaches to Japan. The army also started to send sea searches in 1943 and certain good results were obtained. In July of 1945, we obtained 2 good pictures of the navy forces which came to shell Japan. By and large, the reconnaissance was not good, but where our aircraft could find your forces, it wasn't bad. It was not the quality but the quantity which was deficient.

- Q. How was communication between search planes and the bases from which they operated?
- A. I don't know too much about this subject but I do know that often the operations people wouldn't let them report. We had many losses among reconnaissance planes because of the speed of U.S. planes and various other problems. We often wouldn't allow our planes to break radio silence.
- Q. Would it be possible to secure the search planes used by the Japanese throughout various phases of the war by the army?
- A. All records are gone. I suggest you ask the Technical Group, Air Staff Officer.
- Q. What was the maximum range of operation of your search planes?
- A. Not certain, I believe about a thousand kilometers.
- Q. You have mentioned previously that you received intelligence from the Germans on Allied and U.S. equipment and air forces. Could you elaborate a little on that and tell us how concrete that help was, how useful, and to what extent it was used?
- A. The help that was received from the Germans which came through my hands was all by dispatch. The information on equipment and planes went direct to Air General Headquarters or to General Ordnance Administration Headquarters and did not pass through my hands. They did not send any technicians and very little actual equipment, it was mostly by dispatch.
- Q. The Germans did not send technicians and intelligence officers to Japan to work with G-2 here?
- A. No. The German Military Attache here would help a little but he would usually send our information to Germany and the Japanese Military Attache in Germany would send information here. Specialists, technical attaches, were among the embassy groups on both sides.
- Q. What would you consider the main strength of the Japanese Intelligence organization, what was the branch of your intelligence service which performed best, which was most useful to you?
- A. I couldn't name anything as outstanding or even good.
- Q. Could you give an example of any outstanding success achieved by the Intelligence organization?
- A. No. There is nothing.
- Q. How was the army G-2 coordinated with the navy intelligence organization to make sure there was proper integration of information and exchange of information between the army G-2 and the navy?
- A. Liaison was very poor. I met with the head of the navy intelligence once a week because they give a little intelligence summary to the cabinet once a week, on Saturday, and subordinates went and came, but there was no real intergrated liaison plan of any sort. During the last six months the navy moved away, and it was much more difficult for us to get together. Every Saturday afternoon we had a conference between the local army intelligence officers and the navy intelligence officers at Defense General Army Headquarters. As far as any intergrated liaison plan, it was non-existent.
- Q. What was the name of the top navy intelligence representative who conferred with the general.

- A. Admiral ONO; he came to office a year after me. His predecessor died at Saipan.
- Q. Did the G-2 and thenavy intelligence organizations have any connection with the civil police organization of Japan or throughout the home islands?
- A. No, the War Ministry handled that. It was not a function of Army Intelligence.
- Q. Could you tell me the name of the top man in the Technical Air Group?
- A. I am not sure.
- Q. What was the Japanese estimate of U.S. intelligence?
- A. I have a great deal of praise and respect for your intelligence. You consistently bombed plants and after they were dispersed you would bomb places to which they were dispersed. We would often trace reconnaissance B-29's and thus would forecast targets that would be hit and often we would be right. But the main point about the whole intelligence organization is that the recommendations made would be followed sometimes or would not but there was not a great deal of consistency in following the G-2 recommendations. Our voice did not have much effect. The intelligence may have been inadequate but when we did make any recommendations, they were not followed. You probably must have used spies. Prewar preparations on your part must have been fairly complete.

Japanese Interpreters: Col TEJIMA, Haruo

1st Lt TAKEUCHI.

Japanese Technical Air Intelligence Officer: Major HAGISHA, Eichi.

E N D