

PAGE TEN -- TO WASHINGTON FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER AND ASST SECRETARY PETERSEN

THE EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIANS THROUGH APPROPRIATED FUNDS PD PARA PART FIVE PD NOT
RPT NOT WITHIN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR CAN WE REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES TO ANYTHING APPROACHING A SMALL FRACTION OF WHAT IT IS NOW PD SIGNED
MOORE PD UNQUOTE

MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General


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C/S
Govt Sec

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

This message has been approved for transmission by the Commander-
in-Chief.

Paul Daniel
COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief, Govt. Sect.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

IN THE CLEAR - URGENT

RECEIVED
21 FEB 1947
CINC CW/HBW/sh
20 February 1947
201103

FROM : CINCFE
TO : WASHINGTON (ASST. SECRETARY PETERSEN) (GENERAL EISENHOWER).

2 35794
REURADS WAR NINE ONE NINE SIX NINE AND WAR NINE ONE NINE SEVEN
SIX PD THERE IS ABLE POPULAR MISCONCEPTION THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF VICTORY IN MODERN WAR CMA WHEREIN ABLE CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES IS
INVOLVED CMA IS SOLELY DEPENDENT UPON VICTORY IN THE FIELD PD
HISTORY ITSELF CLEARLY REFUTES THIS CONCEPT PD IT OFFERS
UNMISTAKABLE PROOF THAT THE HUMAN IMPULSES WHICH GENERATED THE
WILL TO WAR CMA NO REPEAT NO LESS THAN THE MATERIAL SINEWS OF
WAR CMA MUST BE DESTROYED PD NOR REPEAT NOR IS IT SUFFICIENT
THAT SUCH HUMAN IMPULSES MERELY YIELD TO THE TEMPORARY SHOCK OF
MILITARY DEFEAT PD THERE MUST BE ABLE COMPLETE SPIRITUAL
REFORMATION CMA SUCH AS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ONLY CONTROL THE
DEFEATED GENERATION BUT WILL EXERT ABLE DOMINANT INFLUENCE UPON
THE GENERATIONS TO FOLLOW AS WELL PD UNLESS THIS IS DONE CMA
VICTORY IS BUT PARTIALLY COMPLETE AND OFFERS HOPE FOR LITTLE MORE
THAN AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN ONE CAMPAIGN AND THE NEXT DASH AS THE
GREAT LESSON AND WARNING OF EXPERIENCE IS THAT VICTORIOUS LEADERS
OF THE PAST HAVE TOO OFTEN CONTENTED THEMSELVES WITH THE INFLICTION
OF MILITARY DEFEAT UPON THE ENEMY POWER CMA WITHOUT EXTENDING
THAT VICTORY BY DEALING WITH THE ROOT CAUSES WHICH LED TO WAR
AS AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE PD THUS IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

CMA WHILE WE HAVE DESTROYED JAPAN APOSTROPHE SUGAR WAR MAKING
POWER AND NEUTRALIZED FROM ^{ABLE} / MATERIAL STANDPOINT ITS WAR MAKING
POTENTIAL CMA WE ARE YET IN THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING THE VICTORY
THAT THE ENSUING PEACE AT WAR APOSTROPHE MUGAR GREAT COST MAY
BE VITAL AND REAL PD THIS WILL REQUIRE ABLE COMPLETE
REFORMATION OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE DASH REFORMATION FROM
FEUDALISTIC SBAVERY TO HUMAN FREEDOM CMA FROM THE IMMATUREITY
THAT COMES OF MYTHICAL TEACHINGS AND LEGENDARY RITUALISM TO THE
MATURITY OF ENLIGHTENED KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH CMA FROM THE BLIND
FATALISM OF WAR TO THE CONSIDERED REALISM OF PEACE PD PARA IN
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS PURPOSE CMA ALL POLICY IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPATION IS ATTUNED TO THOSE VERY IDEALS
FOR WHICH WE FOUGHT DASH THAT BY EXAMPLE WE MAY POINT THE WAY
PD THIS IN TURN IS INFUSING IN THE JAPANESE MIND BOTH AN
UNDERSTANDING OF AND AN ENTHUSIASM FOR OUR OWN CONCEPT IN HUMAN
RELATIONSHIP DASH ABLE CONCEPT WHICH EMBODIES WITHIN ITSELF ABLE
SPIRITUAL REPUGNANCE TO WAR PD PARA IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS PURPOSE CMA WE SHALL NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE
FINALIZED THE VICTORY BY BRINGING UNDER CONTROL BASIC CAUSES OF
WAR CMA BUT WE SHALL HAVE ERECTED HERE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC
ABLE STRONG BULWARK AGAINST THE REAPPEARANCE AND SPREAD OF THOSE
SAME CAUSES WHICH ARE CALCULATED TO PLUNGE THE WORLD INTO FUTURE
WAR DASH FOR HISTORY HAS SHOWN THE FUTILITY OF DEPENDENCE UPON
THE VIOLENCE OF WAR ALONE TO PRESERVE THE PEACE PD THIS IS THE
STAKE FOR WHICH WE STRIVE PD IT IS YET TOO EARLY TO MEASURE
THE DEGREE OF FINAL SUCCESS CMA BUT JAPAN IS NOW ALREADY GOVERNED
BY THE FORM OF DEMOCRATIC RULE AND THE PEOPLE ARE ABSORBING ITS

SUBSTANCE PD THEY HAVE LEARNED BY THE HARD WAY THE FUTILITY
OF RESORT TO ARMS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT CMA
AND APPEAR TO HAVE COMPLETELY ASSIMILATED THIS BITTER LESSON
PD HAVING REPUDIATED WAR AND RENOUNCED ALL RIGHTS OF
BELLIGERENCY CMA THEY HAVE PLACED THEIR FULL RELIANCE FOR FUTURE
PROTECTION ON THE GOOD FAITH AND JUSTICE OF MANKIND CMA AND ARE
PROCEEDING THROUGH LEGISLATED REFORM TO DEVELOP HERE A BLE STATE
DEDICATED CMA IN FULL REALITY CMA TO THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE
PD GIVEN ENCOURAGEMENT THIS CAN PROVE THE EXEMPLIFICATION OF
THE SUPERIORITY CMA IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE HUMAN RACE CMA OF
MORAL FORCE CMA GENERATED BY SPIRITUAL STRENGTH CMA OVER
PHYSICAL FORCE DASH WITH ALL RESOURCES EMPLOYED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
RAATHER THAN DESTRUCTIVE PURPOSES PD A BLE SPONTANEOUS
DEVELOPMENT WHICH OFFERS BOTH ENCOURAGEMENT AND INSPIRATION AS
A BLE MEASURE OF THE PROGRESS OF THIS CONCEPT LIES IN THE
INCREASING NUMBER OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE DASH ALREADY ESTIMATED
AT OVER TWO MILLION DASH WHO CMA UNDER THE STIMULUS OF RELIGIOUS
TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM CMA HAVE MOVED TO EMBRACE THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH AS A BLE MEANS TO FILL THE SPIRITUAL VACUUM LEFT IN JAPANESE
LIFE BY COLLAPSE OF THEIR PAST FAITH PD THIS IS PARTIALLY
RESPONSIVE TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
QUALITIES OF THE OLD AND THE NEW DASH TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE
PRINCIPLES OF TOLERANCE CMA JUSTICE AND HUMAN DECENCY WHICH
GOVERN OUR ACTION IN THE TRAGEDY OF THEIR DEFEAT DASH AND CMA
MORE PARTICULARLY CMA FROM CLOSE HYPHEN HAND OBSERVATION OF THE
AMERICAN SOLDIER STANDING IN THEIR MIDST CMA REFLECTING CMA AS
HE DOES CMA THOSE FINE TRAITS OF CHARACTER CMA OUTGROWTH OF THE

AMERICAN HOME PD THROUGH THE FIRM ENCOURAGEMENT AND STRENGTH-
ENING OF THIS YET FRAIL SPEARHEAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FAR
EAST LIES HOPE THAT TO HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF BACKWARD PEOPLES
CMA NOW EASY PREY TO THE IGNORANT FATALISM OF WAR CMA MAY COME
ABLE HERETOFORE UNKNOWN SPIRITUAL STRENGTH BASED UPON AN
ENTIRELY NEW CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN PURPOSE AND
HUMAN RELATIONSHIP DASH THE VERY ANTITHESIS TO THOSE EVIL
ATTRIBUTES WHICH THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE LED TO WAR PD PARA
THE AMERICAN FORCES COMMITTED TO OCCUPATIONAL DUTY IN JAPAN CMA
NOW CUT TO ONLY ABLE FRACTION OF THEIR FORMER STRENGTH CMA ARE
AT THE LOWEST NUMERICAL LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH EITHER REASONABLE
SECURITY OR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE REGENERATION OF AN ENTIRE
RACE FROM ITS TRADITIONAL THREAT TO PEACE TO A POWERFUL BULWARK
AGAINST THE RECURRENCE OF WAR DASH WITH ITS ORDERLY EMERGENCE
FROM THE CHAOS OF DESTRUCTIVE DEFEAT TO ECONOMIC CMA POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL STABILITY PD AND HIGHLIGHTING ALL ELSE CMA OF
COURSE CMA LIES THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF PROTECTING OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY AGAINST FUTURE THREAT TO OUR PACIFIC COAST PD
IN SHORT CMA THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GAINS WHICH VICTORY HAS
BROUGHT CMA THAT WE MAY HAVE PEACE PD OUR TASK IS THUS BUT
ABLE FINAL PHASE OF WAR CMA AND IT IS INESCAPABLE THAT ITS
AVOIDANCE MAY ONLY BE AT THE EXPENSE OF VICTORY ITSELF PD PARA
IN WAR THE COMPLETE BLOCKADE OF ABLE FORCE DEPENDENT FOR FOOD
AND OTHER SUPPLY FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
WEAPON KNOWN TO MILITARY SCIENCE PD IT WAS THROUGH THE USE OF
THIS WEAPON THAT OUR STARVING MEN ON BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR WERE
FINALLY FORCED TO YIELD TO THE ENEMY HORDES WHO SURROUNDED THEM

PD IT WAS THROUGH THE USE OF THIS SAME WEAPON CMA MORE THAN
ANY OTHER CMA THAT THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES WERE FINALLY
BROUGHT TO THE FUTILITY OF FURTHER RESISTANCE CMA AS SEGMENT
AFTER SEGMENT OF THEIR EXTENDED POSITIONS CMA BY ENVELOPMENT
CMA WERE CUT OFF FROM NEEDED SUPPLIES ON THE GRIM ROAD BACK
PD THEREAFTER CMA WHEN RECONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES COMPLETELY
SEVERED THE JAPANESE WAR HYPHEN GAINED EMPIRE AND PERMITTED ABLE
BLOCKADE OF THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS THEMSELVES CMA
TRADITIONALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUSTENANCE FROM SOURCES WITHOUT CMA
TOTAL COLLAPSE BECAME IMMINENT PD PARA SINCE THE SURRENDER THIS
BLOCKADE OF THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS HAS BEEN CONTINUED CMA
EXTENDED CMA AND INTENSIFIED PD NOT REPEAT NOT ONLY HAVE
MANCHURIA CMA KOREA AND FORMOSA CMA LONG CONTRIBUTORS TO
JAPANESE SUSTENANCE CMA BEEN TAKEN AWAY BUT MANY MILLIONS OF
JAPANESE CITIZENS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED FROM THE OUTSIDE BACK
INTO THESE FOUR HOME ISLANDS PD TRADE AND FINANCIAL INTERCOURSE
WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD IS BY OUR DECREE SO PROHIBITED AS TO
CONSTITUTE ECONOMIC STRANGULATION PD PARA CUT OFF FROM OUR
OWN PROJECTED RELIEF SUPPLIES IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES CMA
COUNTLESS JAPANESE WOULD FACE STARVATION DASH AND STARVATION
BREEDS MASS UNREST CMA DISORDER AND VIOLENCE PD WORSE STILL
CMA IT RENDERS ABLE PEOPLE EASY PREY TO ANY IDEOLOGY CMA
HOWEVER EVIL CMA WHICH BEARS WITH IT LIFE SUSTAINING FOOD PD
TO PERMIT SUCH ABLE CONDITION TO ARISE WOULD BE TO REPUDIATE
THOSE VERY IDEALS AND PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR COUNTRY HAS
ALWAYS STOOD AND FOR WHICH MANY OF OUR COUNTRYMEN SELFLESSLY
HAVE DIED PD FOR UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF VICTORY THE

JAPANESE PEOPLE ARE NOW OUR PRISONERS CMA NO REPEAT NO LESS THAN
DID THE SURVIVING MEN ON BATAAN BECOME THEIR PRISONERS WHEN THAT
PENINSULA FELL PD AS ABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ILL TREATMENT
INCLUDING STARVATION OF ALLIED PRISONERS IN JAPANESE HANDS CMA
WE HAVE TRIED AND EXECUTED MANY JAPANESE OFFICERS UPON PROOF OF
RESPONSIBILITY PD YET CAN WE JUSTIFY SUCH PUNITIVE ACTION IF WE
OURSELVES IN REVERSED CIRCUMSTANCES CMA BUT WITH HOSTILITIES AT
END CMA FAIL TO PROVIDE THE FOOD TO SUSTAIN LIFE AMONG THOSE/^{JAPANESE}
PEOPLE OVER WHOM WE NOW STAND GUARD WITHIN THE NARROW CONFINES
OF THEIR HOME ISLANDS PD PARA NOR REPEAT NOR MUST SIGHT BE
LOST OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SUCH FOOD ,AND OTHER
EMERGENCY RELIEF SUPPLIES ARE PROVIDED PD THERE IS INVOLVED AN
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THEIR
ACQUISITION CMA THE CORRESPONDING COST BECOMING THEREAFTER ABLE
CHARGE AGAINST JAPAN CMA WHICH SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY ABLE FIRST
LIEN ON EVERY ASSET WITHIN JAPAN PD IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT
CHARITY CMA NOR REPEAT NOR HAVE ITEM FOUND THAT THE JAPANESE WANT
CHARITY PD IT IS BUT ABLE MEANS TO SECURE NEEDED LIFE
PRESERVING SUSTENANCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE OURSELVES RELAX THE
RESTRICTIONS WHICH NOW PREVENT JAPAN FROM SECURING THE SAME BY
THE NORMAL METHODS OF TRADE AND COMMERCE WITH THE OTHER NATIONS
OF THE WORLD PD NOR REPEAT NOR CMA IF REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS
ARE TAKEN CMA WILL THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER ULTIMATELY BE OUT OF
POCKET ABLE SINGLE DOLLAR AS ABLE RESULT PD PARA AT MOST IT IS
BUT ABLE TEMPORARY MEASURE IN DISCHARGE OF ABLE CLEAR
RESPONSIBILITY WHICH VICTORY HAS IMPOSED PD IT MUST BE AND
REMAIN OUR FIRM PURPOSE TO RESTORE PEACE AND NORMALCY AT THE

VERY EARLIEST TIME PRACTICABLE CMA AND IT IS MY FULL INTENTION
TO RECOMMEND REMOVAL OF THE EXISTING MILITARY CONTROLS OVER
JAPAN JUST AS SOON AS CIVILIAN CONTROLS SAFELY MAY BE
SUBSTITUTED PD HISTORY POINTS OUT THE UNMISTAKABLE LESSON THAT
MILITARY OCCUPATIONS SERVE THEIR PURPOSE AT BEST ONLY FOR ABL
LIMITED TIME CMA AFTER WHICH ABL DETERIORATION RAPIDLY SETS
IN DASH DETERIORATION OF THE POPULACE IN AN OCCUPIED COUNTRY
WHICH BECOMES INCREASINGLY RESTIVE UNDER THE DEPRIVATION OF
PERSONAL FREEDOM CMA INHERENT IN SUCH ABL SITUATION DASH AND
DETERIORATION OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES WHICH IN TIME ASSUME ABL
DOMINANT POWER COMPLEX POINTING TO THE ILLUSION OF ABL MASTER
RACE II PARA WHILE ITEM HAVE HEREIN DISCUSSED OUR NATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF OCCUPATION LARGELY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
JAPAN CMA MUCH THAT ITEM HAVE SAID APPLIES WITH EVEN MORE
POIGNANT FORCE TO KOREA CMA WHEREIN OUR PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO
ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ABL STABLE FREE GOVERNMENT CMA
FOR ABL FRIENDLY PEOPLE LIBERATED BY ALLIED ARMS CMA IMPOSES
UPON US AN EVEN MORE SOLEMN OBLIGATION PD PARA ITEM AM IN
FULLEST ACCORD WITH THE DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS TO
PRACTICE THE MOST RIGID ECONOMY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT WHICH OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REASONABLY MAY PERMIT
PD ECONOMY IN BOTH BLOOD AND SUPPLY WAS ABL RULE WHICH GUIDED
EVERY STRATEGIC PLAN IN THE PROSECUTION OF OUR PHASE OF THE
OF THE PACIFIC WAR DASH AND ECONOMY HAS SINCE BEEN THE RULE HERE
IN THE EXTENSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF VICTORY PD ABL
RATIONALIZATION OF THE COST INVOLVED IN THIS GREAT TASK SHOWS

IT TO BE CMA IN THE AGGREGATE CMA INFINITESIMAL COMPARED WITH
THAT WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCURRED IN ABL E COMPARABLE PERIOD
OF EXTENDED COMBAT PD PARA ITEM HAVE OBSERVED THE WORKINGS OF
THE AMERICAN CONGRESS FOR MANY YEARS CMA AND HAVE NEVER REPEAT
NEVER SEEN IT HESITATE VIGOROUSLY TO PRESERVE AND ADVANCE OUR
AMERICAN INTERESTS PD WHEN PROVIDED WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE SITUATION CMA ITEM DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE CMA THEREFORE
CMA THAT IT WILL TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE
FULFILLMENT OF OCCUPATION OBJECTIVES CMA TO WHICH WE ARE ALREADY
COMMITTED AND IN HONOR BOUND CMA AS ABL E PPERQUISITE TO
FINALIZING THE VICTORY AND INSURING THE PEACE PD

MacARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD.
Adjutant General.



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

This message has been approved for transmission by the
Commander-in-Chief.

Courtney Whitney
COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Chief, Govt Sect.

FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL ADQUARTERS, ~~U.S. ARMY FORG~~ ~~PACIFIC~~
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RLJ
fed

~~RLJ~~
Gen. Whitney

Secret
PRIORITY

14 Feb 47

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA ES)
TO : SCAP (MACARTHUR PERS)
NR : W 91976

Reurad May C 61198.

1. The new Congress has given positive indications of its intention to reduce substantially the budget requests now before it. Eisenhower has sent you personal cable on broad aspects of this. Following relates civ relief funds including FY 1947 deficiency not covered in Eisenhower's cable and which will be before Congress before FY 1948 appropriations, probably in hearing stage next week. Despite numerous conferences by WD officials with key members of Congress there is still marked intention to make sharp reductions. It is believed that the WD, despite strong support by State Dept, will have great difficulty in obtaining the minimum amounts which are now included in estimates for both the deficiency for FY 1947 and the regular appropriation for "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" for FY 1948.

2. For the deficiency estimate for "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" FY 1947, of a total of \$300,000,000, the following amounts are included for:

A. Japan (including Ryukyus)	
Food	\$111,975,563
POL	8,823,765
Trans of food and POL	23,397,520
Incidental operating expenses	650,000
Total	\$144,846,848

67173

PRIORITY

Secret
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-1-

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16-48710-1 GPO

FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ~~ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA ES) NR: W 91976 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

	B. Korea	
Food		41,074,000
POL		2,297,566
Supplies and equipment		10,000,000
Transportation		15,278,275
Total		68,643,841

3. For the FY 1948, of a total of \$725,000,000 for all occupied areas the following amounts are included

	A. Japan (including Ryukyus)
Food	\$105,388,942
Agric supplies and fertilizer	25,681,915
POL	23,345,228
Medical supplies	11,822,450
Misc supplies and equipment	20,464,944
Pay of civilians	28,622,393
Travel of civs	3,351,731
Transp of supe	49,608,040
Incidental operating expen- ses	1,492,572
Total	\$269,778,215

	B. Korea
Food	\$ 46,159,295
Agric supplies and fertilizer	17,537,142
POL	4,698,435
Medical sups	3,958,120
Misc supe and equipment	20,347,187

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FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL ~~ADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORG~~ ~~PACIFIC~~
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: WAR (WDSCA ES) NR: W 91976 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

Pay of civs	\$ 11,839,348
Tvl of civs	1,096,872
Transp of sups	31,136,357
Incidental operat- ing expenses	600,000
Total	\$137,372,756

4. While the WD has forwarded requirements to the Congress for both the FY 1947 deficiency estimate and the regular FY 1948 estimate for "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" WD representatives have not officially appeared before congressional committees to defend these requirements. Ref is made to yourad on the food crisis in Japan with particular ref to the last sentence of part 1 which states "Either food or soldiers must be brought to Japan without fail and either or both should be started in this direction immediately." This radio was used with marked effect in Washington before Congressional Committees and other Governmental Department to indicate the importance you placed on the continued flow of foodstuffs. In view of the Congressional attitude indicated it is imperative that the WD have the strongest justification and defense for its requirements for occupied areas. Your representatives here have already indicated that the requirements for Japan as reflected in the estimates now being presented to Congress, particularly in the FY 1948 estimate, fall far short of the actual needs for your area. Particular reference is made by them to the amount included for food of only \$105,388,942, leaving a balance of \$115,926,000 to be financed from other than

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PRIORITY

Secret
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FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL ~~ADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FOR~~ ~~PACIFIC~~
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: WAR (WDSCA ES) NR: W 91976 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

appropriated funds (supposedly proceeds from exports) in order to provide a normal consumer ration of 1,246 calories during FY 1948.

5. The WD expects to appear officially before Congress to defend its deficiency estimate for "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" FY 1947 during the next week. In view of the telling effect of your ad it is believed that a radio, forcefully setting forth your views on the necessity of obtaining for your area adequate appropriations for "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" would be very helpful here. Would like it in form of statement I could read to Congressional Committees. This matter is extremely urgent and serious. Request reply soonest.

PETERSON

ACTION: SECY GEN STAFF

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3, G-4, AG, FISCAL DIR, TRANSP SECT, GOVT SECT, PUB HEALTH & WELFARE, ECON & SCI SECT, NAT RES SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

67173

PRIORITY

TOO: 132247/2
MCN: SA 63/14

Secret
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-4-

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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

Confidential
URGENT

14 Feb 47

FROM : WASHINGTON
TO : SCAP (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR)
NR : W-91969

The struggle with the fiscal 48 budget has already developed the certainty that the War Departments ability to stretch slender resources over a multitude of vital duties will not completely meet the strain during the coming year. Taking the proposition as it affects only occupational troops I have personally communicated to a few key members of the Senate and House extracts from your telegrams which have so succinctly and forcibly presented the case for adequate strength of occupational forces and for at least a minimum food level in the occupied territories.

We are insisting that the occupation mission is the one that must under no circumstances be adversely affected, regardless of consequences to other activities, but to illustrate the character of the fight, we are informed that the Congress is determined to make great slashes in the amount set up for civil relief in occupied territories. We estimated 900,000,000 dollars for this item; the Bureau of the Budget cut it to 725,000,000 dollars and we understand informally that Congress is intending to reduce this figure by 50 per cent. Obviously such a development would spell ruin, particularly in Japan and Korea, for which the bulk of the relief money has been requested. To combat any thought that these countries can be immediately self-sustaining I quoted

67088

URGENT
Confidential **URGENT**
-1-

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FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ~~U.S. ARMY FOR~~ ~~PACIFIC~~
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
URGENT

FROM : WASHINGTON NR : W-91969 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

your telegram of last year in which you said: "Send us food or send us soldiers," and cited your other telegram in which you pointed out that there is no such thing as "Partial occupation."

The particular critical allegations of the Senate and House members were as follows:

A. Alleged employment in foreign areas of an unconscionable number of civilians who, according to the critics, are inefficient and are doing nothing but boondoggling.

B. An alleged habit of all Hqs to hold on to unnecessary numbers of officer deputies, executives, and other assistants, as well as a useless number of secretaries, clerks, orderlies, and so on.

C. Charges of loose and inefficient administrative practices throughout our forces at home and abroad, resulting in wastage of direct salaries, and of related costs for food, fuel, motor maintenance, and the like.

You will understand that the President's budget reduced original estimates drastically and the prospect of additional major slashes forces us, throughout the military structure, to apply the most rigid standards of economy in order to sustain the essentials in the occupied territory. I explained to these particular senators and congressmen that such matters were the constant concern of our commanders in the field, particularly in the occupied territories, but they insisted that the Army had never gotten sufficiently hardboiled since the close of hostilities to weed out the useless and the inefficient in order to effect real economy. One senator stated that they heard

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URGENT

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
URGENT

FROM : WASHINGTON NR : W-91969 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

very little criticism of the efficiency and conduct of the military personnel anywhere in the world, but that the horde of civilians who had rushed overseas were to a large extent of the kind that could not obtain profitable employment at home and were merely getting fat off the government. He did of course admit that there were certain exceptions.

For your general information regarding the effect of these projected cuts at home, our plans call for cutting the planned combat strength of the AF in half, although we are attempting to prevent this necessity from affecting to a critical extent your AF deployment. We are retaining in divisions, the equivalent of only 2 and 1/3 in the entire US in Ground Forces. Practically all of these Ground Combat Forces are at this time performing double duty on essential administrative tasks in the ZI primarily in support of occupation and will continue to do so. We must maintain the service, training and transportation elements that will support our troops abroad. Throughout the globe the troops overseas will number between 450,000 and 490,000 after June 30, so you can see that our training and service establishment, in view of the rapid turnover in foreign stations, has to be a very considerable one.

An area analysis of budget estimates indicates a disproportionate sum charged to activities in and in support of the Philippines which has come in for very severe questioning. The original estimates were made prior to decision to withdraw all but token forces from the Philippine Islands and justification must now be made in the light of new

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FROM : WASHINGTON NR : W-91969 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

developments. The amount that can be recovered is not completely determinable at this time.

Current figures in the War Department indicate that at present there are some 90,000 civilians employed in the Philippines. This is approximately 50 per cent of the total War Department civilian employees overseas outside of enemy Nationals, who are not paid out of appropriated funds. I am concerned that the total numbers employed in Philippines-Ryukyus may provoke considerable criticism unless we can assure Congress that the number now employed in that area is being reduced and that reduction will continue until the total number now employed is reduced to about a fraction of those now on our rolls. I realize the Philippines present very complicated problems and that even the process of its virtual evacuation is a most involved one. Nevertheless, any savings that can be made from this source will react directly or indirectly to our benefit.

I would appreciate a personal message from you addressed to me and couched in such terms that I could use it freely before Congress and elsewhere. It could be sent in the clear if you so desire. I have already flatly declared my conviction that your estimates for military personnel were low to the point of danger and that I would not countenance any significant reduction as long as it was humanly possible to meet your requirements. What I would particularly like in the statement is:

(A) A broad analysis of the problem in your

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FROM : WASHINGTON NR : W-91969 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

theater requiring civilian employees.

(B) A description of the methods you have applied to make sure that rigid economy is observed in the employment of civilians and in discharging those who do not meet your standards of efficiency.

(C) The prospects of lowering the costs in the Philippines, particularly in the hire of civilians.

(D) An emphatic statement setting forth your views on the necessity for obtaining the appropriations you have calculated to be required for civilian relief in occupied territories.

I realize that this last figure is primarily the concern of assistant secretary Peterson who is sending you a personal cable covering this item in detail. Nevertheless, as you have already stated, the disastrous effects that unrest and open defiance would have upon your occupational responsibilities would be such that this matter is definitely related to the military problem.

While I have outlined the situation in some detail I am depending primarily upon your own experience in these budgetary matters to provide us with something that will be of assistance in clearly stating the situation and the requirements as well as upon your knowledge of the necessity for our coming into court with clean hands and with the best possible evidence of efficiency and economy in our operations.

EISENHOWER

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FROM : WASHINGTON NR : W-91969 14 FEB 47 CONT'D

ACTION: SECY GEN STAFF

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3,
G-4, AG, FISCAL DIR

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TOO: 132222/Z
MCN: SA 27/14

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