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Texts for Students of International Relations.

No. 2.

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SULLY'S
Grand Design of Henry IV.

FROM THE

**Memoirs of Maximilien de Béthune
duc de Sully (1559-1641).**

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

DAVID OGG,

Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford.

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THE GRAND DESIGN OF HENRY IV.

INTRODUCTION.

Schemes for securing perpetual peace generally have for their authors either philosophers (such as Bentham and Kant) or accomplished scholars (like Pope Leo X.) or idealist statesmen (*e.g.*, President Wilson), but rarely financiers. The realm of finance is an uncongenial one for the altruist and the day-dreamer; the uncompromising, the matter-of-fact, and, perhaps, the unexuberant are likely to be its most flourishing types. There is, however, one striking exception to this generalisation. Maximilian of Béthune, Duke of Sully (1559—1641), acquired considerable reputation as Henry IV.'s Superintendent of Finance after he had laid the foundations of a very large private fortune from booty appropriated in the troublous times preceding the accession of his royal master. His task as finance minister was a herculean one, since not only had he to find new sources of revenue, increase the prosperity of France by devising new roads and canals, and redeem many Crown lands and prerogatives from pawn, but he had also to reorganise the whole system of tax-collecting and, perhaps most difficult of all, to refuse all grants of money to the monarch that were likely to be spent in private pleasure. That imagination was not Sully's strongest characteristic is shown by the fact that he was the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who could boast that his budgets were honest. Avarice, austerity, and shrewdness were the qualities attributed to him by contemporaries; and in his *Memoirs* he shows that he was quite aware of his reputation. It is therefore a remarkable fact that he should himself have been the author of one of the most imaginative and comprehensive schemes for securing what so

many have regarded as a mere chimera; and it is perhaps evidence of his consciousness of this seeming inconsistency that he took great pains to father the scheme on someone else.

Before examining the Grand Design in detail, it is necessary to say something of the history of the book, a part of which is here reprinted.

After the murder of Henry IV., Sully went into retirement; and though during the minority of Louis XIII. there were a few occasions when he might have been invited to return to public life, he was nevertheless condemned to political inactivity for over thirty years. Like St. Simon after him, he employed a considerable part of his enforced leisure in compiling his Memoirs, and, like St. Simon also, he adopted a consistent attitude of "laudator temporis acti." He had always prided himself on his literary skill. During the lifetime of Henry he had completed a biography of that monarch, and in retirement he wrote several treatises on miscellaneous subjects. With the aid of one of his secretaries, he began, about 1611, to draw up his *Memoires*, or *Oeconomies Royales d'Etat*, and these were at first compiled in the second person, the secretary calling to mind the many achievements of Sully's administration. In this, the original form, they were completed by about 1617, and the manuscripts were acquired by the Bibliothèque Nationale in 1843. These manuscripts contain six or seven references to what has been called the Grand Design, and a brief enumeration of these will reveal the scheme in embryo (a).

The first reference is under the year 1596, just after the submission of D'Epernon and when Henry's victory over his enemies of the League was practically complete. According to Sully, Henry took him aside and confessed that he hoped God would enable him to retake Navarre, that he would be granted a victory against the King of Spain, that he might, in some way, surpass the deeds of Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto, and that he might be relieved of his wife. He referred also to two great projects which he wished to put into execution before his death, but these are not specified by his biographer. The next reference in the MSS. is in connection with Sully's embassy to England in 1603, when

(a) For a complete examination of these MSS., see the articles by Pfister in *Revue Historique*, 1894, Vols. LIV., LV., and LVI.

he was sent to congratulate James on his accession. On this occasion Henry is credited with telling his ambassador that he wished to ally with England, Venice, the Low Countries, the Protestant princes and towns of Germany against Spain, and that for this purpose he wished to effect a marriage alliance with England. Together with these public instructions, Sully, according to his own account, was given certain secret commissions, and, in particular, was to confer with the English king on the following proposals:—

1. France, England, and Holland to combine their naval forces and seize the Spanish Indies or some of the islands on the routes of the Spanish treasure fleets.

2. The Hapsburgs, by the pressure of a great European coalition, to be deprived of the Empire and reduced to Spain.

3. The rivers Meuse, Moselle, and Rhine to be seized so as to control the Low Countries.

With regard to the proposed coalition against the Hapsburgs, Sully notes that all the participants were to benefit territorially except France and England.

The third reference is in 1604, when Sully records that he refused Henry a grant of public money for his pleasures on the ground that every penny would be required for the Grand Design. In 1609 there is a further allusion to the scheme when, in compliance with a request for an inventory of fortresses and troops, Sully proposed that two objects of policy should be, first, to transfer the Empire to some family other than the Hapsburgs, and, second, to confine the Hapsburgs to Spain. When, in this year, the Cleves-Julich succession question became acute, Sully relates that he encouraged Henry to commence hostilities, the French king having now secured the alliance of Savoy, Venice, the German princes, and the Low Countries, and having at his disposal an army of 150,000 men. The last reference is in 1610, when Sully is asked to put his proposals on record. This he does by enumerating all the alliances already formed against Spain, and suggests a scheme for dividing captured territory among the allies when the Hapsburgs shall have met with their inevitable defeat.

Such is the account of the Grand Design as given by Sully

shortly after his retirement. As it stands, it contains several inconsistencies and inventions: in particular, the account of the embassy of 1603 is more imaginative than historical. The letters reproduced, in the manuscript edition, to authenticate this mission are fabrications (*b*), and the secret instructions never existed but in the mind of Sully. It will be noticed also that in this account responsibility for the scheme is at one time attributed to the monarch, at another time to the minister. But, on the whole, the scheme as thus evolved is not unhistorical. Henry IV. certainly did meditate great designs against the Hapsburgs: he was at pains to build up a system of European alliances, and had he been spared the knife of Ravallac he might have lived to see the downfall of the Empire. There is indeed ample contemporary evidence that such a general policy was attributed to him. There exists in manuscript (*c*) an account of a conversation between Henry and Lesdiguières on October 17, 1609. In this account, Henry confessed that he still felt young, and that he hoped God would give him other ten years to complete his work. He compared himself to an architect who has laid the foundations and must leave to a successor the completion of the edifice. He wished the Dauphin to marry a daughter of the Duke of Lorraine and his eldest daughter to marry a prince of Savoy. To the idea of a Spanish marriage he declared himself resolutely opposed, believing that no marriage policy could ever remove the menace to France of Spanish ascendancy, since "the rise of the one must inevitably be the ruin of the other." Finally, he hoped for the day when there would be but one religion in France, though for the present he was content to use Protestants as well as Catholics. Numerous references of this kind are to be found in seventeenth-century books. The *Journal* of Bassompierre, the *Histoire Universelle* of Agrippa d'Aubigné, and the *Memoirs* attributed to Richelieu (*d*) and Fontenay-Mareuil (*e*) allude to

(*b*) This has been conclusively shown by the independent researches of Pfister and Kukulhaus.

(*c*) *Affaires Etrangères France, 767, f. 5, quoted in Hanotaux, Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu, Vol. I., p. 260.*

(*d*) Richelieu, or the scribe employed to compile his *Mémoires*, notes that in 1610 Henry IV. was in his fifty-eighth year, and that his age was therefore the most serious obstacle to the Grand Design (Richelieu, *Mémoires*, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, pp. 12—16).

(*e*) *Mémoires* (ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, pp. 9—12).

such designs and credit Henry IV. with the ambition of raising France, on the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire, to a commanding position in Europe. Matthieu, in his *Histoire de Henri IV.* (1631) says of him: "Sans les infidélités françaises, il eust fait une partie du monde français, comme Probus l'avait fait romain."

As thus stated, the Grand Design resolves itself into little more than a historical truism. Ascendancy in the councils of Europe had traditionally been associated with the country which produced such monarchs as Philip Augustus, St. Louis, Philip the Fair, and Louis XII., and the lead taken by France in the Crusades had helped to confirm this political pre-eminence. As early as the fourteenth century, a French jurist (f) had affirmed that supremacy in the affairs of Europe belonged to the French monarchy by a kind of natural right, "ex nativæ pronitatis ad melius jure." In the fifteenth century, George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia (1420—1471), evolved a scheme for maintaining European tranquillity (g), and addressed himself first of all to the King of France, believing that his approval was the chief preliminary requisite for the success of such schemes. But Louis XI was a poor patron, benefiting more by the strife of his neighbours than by their concord. The years of anarchy and dynastic war following on the reigns of Louis XII. and Francis I. deprived French kings of their birthright. With the restoration of France under the great king Henry IV., it was not unnatural that the tradition should be revived.

In this revival, there was a recrudescence of the old crusading spirit. French policy since the time of Francis I. had tended to an alliance with the Turk, whose fleets frequently harried Hapsburg possessions on the Mediterranean coasts, and for this reason it is unlikely that Henry himself ever meditated any serious designs against the Turks. But nevertheless he was probably familiar with the plan for a crusade proposed in 1609 by a Greek Minotto (h). During the minority of Louis XIII., such proposals take a more concrete form. The Duke of Nevers,

(f) Jean of Jandun.

(g) The scheme was drawn up by Marini in *De Unione Christianorum contra Turcas*. See Ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation*, pp. 108—123.

(h) Cf. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, III. 859.

induced by the promises of the Greeks, actually inaugurated such a crusade, with the help and good will of France, but the attempt proved abortive. A French ambassador (*i*) in Constantinople compiled a *Short Discourse on the Surest Means of Ruining the Ottoman Empire*. Father Joseph—Richelieu's understudy and prompter—meditated for long the project of expelling the Turks from Europe, and even composed a *Turciade*. At the time when Sully was compiling his Memoirs, a crusade against the infidel was so far from being a fantastic scheme as to be almost a commonplace of politics.

If it be added that the career of Richelieu must have proved an inspiration to a man of Sully's type, we shall have completed our enumeration of the contemporary influences that are evident in the first and manuscript edition of the Memoirs. Richelieu revived and amplified the policy of Henry IV., which had been set aside during the regency of Marie de Medicis. Before his death in 1643, the prerogatives of the Empire had been considerably diminished, Spain had become almost isolated, the Hapsburgs were being forced back on their hereditary lands, and French gold was already corrupting the German princes, Protestant and Catholic alike. In a measure it is true to say that the real Grand Design was the inspiration and achievement of Richelieu, and it is noteworthy that the later edition of Sully's Memoirs—the only edition that was printed—was prepared in the period between 1620 and 1635, when the career of the great minister was of surpassing interest to every patriotic Frenchman, and especially to one imbued, as was Sully, with the glorious traditions of the reign of Henry IV.

Thus, despite certain inaccuracies and inconsistencies, the original draft of Sully's Memoirs, so far from containing any fanciful scheme for remaking the map of Europe and introducing an era of perpetual peace, simply reflects the dynastic ambitions of the Bourbons as pursued by Henri IV. and Richelieu. But after 1617 Sully returned to his memoir-writing and, whether because of impaired mental and moral powers or whether because events seemed to be leading to the complete victory of France, he made very important changes in the revised version.

(i) De Brèves, *Discours abrégé des assurez moyens de ruiner la monarchie des princes ottomans* (n. d.).

Imagination now freely supplements fact, documentary evidence is carefully forged wherever it might help to give an appearance of verisimilitude, and, quite unconscious of discrepancies and inconsistencies, a far more wonderful Grand Design is evolved. To complete the illusion, Henry IV. is declared its author as the scheme seems more befitting a great monarch than a cautious financier. It is this revised version that was printed (the first part in 1638, the second part in 1662), and one reason for Sully deciding to make this version public may have been his desire to be revenged on Scipion Duplex, who, in his official history of Henry's reign, had carefully underestimated the part played by Sully. In these printed texts, the Grand Design appears only in scattered fragments, but, nevertheless, so fully and carefully were they "documented" that most contemporary readers were led to believe that Henry IV. really had entertained a scheme for securing the peace of Europe. The genuineness of the printed Memoirs was explicitly affirmed by Hardouin de Péréfixe in 1661 (*k*), and the only pre-nineteenth-century writers who expressed their doubts were Vittorio Siri (*l*) and St. Simon (*m*).

It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that in the eighteenth century—a period as uncritical as the seventeenth is pedantic—the Memoirs of Sully were accepted at their face value. Voltaire expressly commended the writings of Sully and Péréfixe as reliable accounts of Henry's reign (*n*). The Abbé de St. Pierre based his "Projet de Paix Perpetuelle" on the assumption that the Grand Design was authentic. The finishing touch was given in 1745, when the Abbé de l'Ecluse des Loges published a new edition of the Memoirs, in which all the scattered fragments relating to the Grand Design were collected together and put into one chapter at the end (numbered XXX.): In doing this, the Abbé was taking an unwarrantable liberty with his text, for Sully had never presented the scheme as a consistent whole; but undoubtedly this helped to popularise the supposed plan of a popular king. By 1778 this compilation had gone through five

(*k*) *Histoire du Roi Henri le Grand*, Amsterdam, 1661, p. 383.

(*l*) *Memorie Recondite* (1677), Vol. I., p. 29. According to Siri, Sully's Memoirs are "sparse di chimere e inverisimili."

(*m*) *Parallèle des trois premiers rois Bourbons* (ed. Faugère, pp. 137—145).

(*n*) *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, Chapter CLXXIV.

editions, and, as thus presented, the Grand Design was elevated to the level of a philosophical system. Rousseau said that it was not good enough for Europe, because Europe was not good enough for it (o); and even Bentham may have been subconsciously influenced when he entrusted the inauguration of his European fraternity of utilitarian States to the combined influence of France and England. Echoes of Sully may be detected here and there in Kant. The direct inspiration of Sully can be traced in the peace projects of more obscure writers, from the Englishman Bellers (p) and the German Rachel (q) to the Frenchman Saintard (r). The scheme attributed to Cardinal Alberoni is little more than a plagiarism. Sully's "Grand Design" is thus the starting-point of many of the schemes which have since been put forward for establishing European peace, and this because it was the first proposal, based on considerable knowledge of European politics, which accepted facts and which presupposed that peace may be not only a moral ideal but a practical blessing. If States can no longer be influenced by religion, they may yet be persuaded by political economy. That is the measure of Sully's difference from his predecessors and the reason for his influence in later times.

The Grand Design is based on two things—an acceptance, so far as possible, of the *status quo*, and an appeal to the innate selfishness of man. The three standard religions (Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist) are admitted; the constitutional forms, whether monarchical or republican, of the European States are accepted as standards, and thus there is to be a minimum of dislocation when Europe is united in the great federation of hereditary monarchies, elective monarchies, and republics. There is, moreover, evidence of some historical insight in the details of the scheme. Holland and Switzerland are to be confirmed in their republican traditions; Italy is to be freed from the foreigner. The Pope is to become a secular prince—an intelligent appreciation of some later papal developments; and the Duchy of Savoy is to be made a monarchy—perhaps the earliest anticipation of

(o) In his Essay on St. Pierre's *Projet de Paix Perpetuelle*.

(p) *Some reasons for an European State Proposed to the Powers of Europe*, 1710.

(q) *De Jure Naturæ et Gentium Dissertationes*, 1676.

(r) *Roman Politique sur l'état présent des affaires de l'Amerique*, 1757.

the great destiny in store for that house. Russia is considered as a power which might more legitimately develop in Asia than in Europe, and as, in any case, too risky a speculation for European investment. As intelligent knowledge of contemporary Europe is the basis of the scheme, so the inducement for prospective partners is one which even the most bellicose could scarcely refuse—the promise of additional territory, and this at the expense of the House of Austria. It does not occur to Sully that by dividing up Hapsburg territory he might create a permanent tradition of *revanche*. The military forces of this great European confederacy are to be directed to one object—the expulsion of the Turk from Europe.

Within this confederation there would be freedom of commerce, and supreme control would be vested in a senate of about sixty-six persons elected every three years from the participating States, a certain number of representatives being assigned to each. There would be subordinate and local assemblies: the decisions of the general senate only would be “final and irrevocable decrees.” The Grand Design has for its backing a composite army, but whether this would be permanent and employed to enforce, if necessary, the decisions of the League, is not quite clear from the text.

Sully's preference for a city of Central Europe as the permanent seat of the senate's activities is noteworthy as, in some respects, an anticipation of the part to be played in later irenist ideals by the Germanic Confederation. Within a few years of his death, the League of the Rhine, in attempting to revive something of German nationalism, attempted also to create a guarantee for the peace of Europe by uniting (with German princes) that power which was most likely to have “annexationist” designs (at German expense), and whose ambitions might thus be neutralised by compact rather than by challenge. Throughout the eighteenth century, indeed, the very existence of the Germanic Confederation was regarded as making for European peace. Its geographical position was held to impose a restraint on ambitious neighbours, and at least one observer maintained that its weight secured that equilibrium to which, despite wars, Europe was (in this view) always automatically restored. It is not less noteworthy that,

of the German States, Prussia was considered the most important as a model of good government and as the strongest rivet in this great bulwark against anarchy and aggression. Mirabeau (s) wrote: " Si la Prusse périt, l'art de gouverner retournera vers l'enfance "; and his admiration was shared by French political thinkers from Voltaire to Rousseau.

It is thus in its concreteness and in its anticipation of several later doctrines of importance that Sully's Grand Design is of most interest to the modern student of international relations. To criticise it in points of detail would scarcely be fair, especially as the scheme was only gradually evolved and was never reduced by its author to a studied form. No doubt one of the weakest parts of the Design is that the Senate—merely an echo of the Imperial Diet—would lose its authority as soon as litigants found that it was not in their interests to obey its behests, but the same weakness may be detected in some more modern projects. Moreover, there is an appeal to base motives in the inception of the scheme, the participants, with the possible exception of France and England, being brought together by the promise of shares in an Empire about to be dismembered. But Sully may have regarded that as means to an end and, like a true optimist, he may have hoped that once his League was established it would, by a gradual and educative process, eliminate rapacity and aggression from international politics. For it is Sully's greatest merit that he preached certain truths, a respect for which in the minds of responsible statesmen might have saved Europe from many years of disaster and crime. Long before Montesquieu and Rousseau this austere Huguenot proclaimed that the happiness and success of a nation may be in inverse ratio to its territorial extent (t), that wars of aggrandisement defeat their own object, and that in great European struggles the plight of the victor may be at least as unhappy as that of the conquered (u). Who can say that these axioms have yet been understood by those who are

(s) In the conclusion to his *Monarchie Prussienne*.

(t) See *infra*, p. 24.

(u) Cf. *Memoirs*, Bk. IX. (1598). "I am not afraid to say that in the present state of Europe it is almost equally unhappy for its princes to succeed or miscarry in their enterprises, and that the true way of weakening a powerful neighbour is not to carry off his spoils but to leave them to be shared by others."

entrusted with the direction of international policy in Europe? Who can dispel from our minds the nightmare of a future world-war of *revanche* or territorial greed? Sully's Grand Design is unsound, unhistorical, and out-of-date, but it is because it has still some lessons for a world grown sick of war that its reprint here may be justified.



BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The text used in this reprint is that of the eighteenth-century English translation (6 vols., London, 1778, and Dublin, 1781). This text was reprinted with a few changes in Bohn's series (4 vols., 1892), and it should be noted that the chapter here reprinted (numbered XXX.) is the composite chapter first inserted by the Abbé de l'Ecluse des Loges in his edition of 1745. It is through this composite chapter that the Grand Design is most familiar to modern times, and so it has been reprinted here. A few minor changes have been made in the English version where it seemed obscure, even at the expense of giving a somewhat free translation of the original. The eighteenth-century footnotes (mostly valueless) have been omitted and a few elementary notes inserted in their place.

A. *Editions of the Memoirs.*

1. *Mémoires des sages et royales oeconomies d'Estat domestiques, politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand.* Vols. I. and II., (Chateau de Sully). 1638.
2. *Ibid.* Vols. III. and IV. Paris, 1662. Two volumes in one.
3. *Ibid.* 8 vols. Rouen, 1663.
4. *Ibid.* 4 vols. Paris, 1664.
5. *Mémoires de Maximilian de Béthune, duc de Sully . . . mis en ordre avec des remarques par M.L.D.L.D.L.* [Abbé de l'Ecluse des Loges.] London, 3 vols. (Subsequent editions in 1747 (3 vols.), 1752 (8 vols.), 1778 (10 vols.), and 1778 (revised, 8 vols.).)
6. *Mémoires du Duc de Sully.* Paris, 1822. 6 vols.
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B. *Monographs relating to the Grand Design.*

1. MORITZ RITTER.—*Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.* (in *Abhandlungen der historischen Classe der kgl. bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.* Bd. XI. Abth. III., 1870).
2. CORNELIUS.—*Der Grosse Plan Heinrichs IV. von Frankreich.* (“*Münchener Historischer Jahrbuch,*” 1886).
3. T. KUKELHAUS.—*Der Ursprung des Planes vom ewigen Frieden.* Berlin, 1892.
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C. *General Works for Reference.*

1. LAVISSE.—*Histoire de France.* Vol. VI., Part 2.
2. HANOTAUX.—*Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu.* 2 vols. 1893-6.
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4. TER MEULEN.—*Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation.* 1917.

MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SULLY.

BOOK XXX.

WHEREIN IS DISCUSSED THE POLITICAL SCHEME,

COMMONLY CALLED

THE GREAT DESIGN OF HENRY IV.

As this part of these Memoirs will be chiefly taken up with an account of the great design of Henry IV. or the political scheme, by which he proposed to govern, not only France, but all Europe, it may not be improper to begin it with some general reflections on the French monarchy and on the Roman empire. We know that on the ruins of the Roman empire were formed not only the French but all the other powers comprising the Christian world.

If we consider all those successive changes which Rome has suffered from the year of its foundation, its infancy, youth and virility; its declension, fall and final ruin; these vicissitudes, which it experienced in common with the great monarchies by which it was preceded, would almost incline one to believe that empires, like all other sublunary things, are subject to be the sport and at last to sink under the pressure of time. Extending this idea still further, we perceive that all states are liable to be disturbed in their careers by certain extraordinary incidents which might be termed epidemic disorders. These frequently hasten the destruction of empires and, their cure by this discovery becoming easier, we may at least save some of them from catastrophes so fatal.

But if we endeavour to discover more visible and natural causes of the ruin of this vast and formidable empire, we shall perhaps soon perceive they were produced by a deviation from those wise laws and that simplicity of manners, which were the

origin of all its grandeur, into luxury, avarice and ambition. Yet there was, finally, another cause, the effect of which could hardly have been prevented or foreseen by the utmost human wisdom; I mean, the irruptions of those vast bodies of barbarous people, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Herulians, Rugians, Lombards, &c. from whom, both separately and united, the Roman empire received such violent shocks that it was at last overthrown by them. Rome was three times sacked by these Barbarians; under Honorius, by Alaric, chief of the Goths; by Genseric, king of the Vandals, under Martin; and under Justinian, by Totila and the Goths. Now if it be true that, after this, the city retained only the shadow of what she had been; if we must regard her as divested of the empire of the world, when her weakness and the abuses of her government made her fall to be looked upon, not simply as inevitable, but as very near, and, in fact, already arrived; the date of her fall may then be marked long before the reign of Valentinian III. to whom it will be doing a favour to call him the last emperor of the West. For several of those emperors whom he succeeded were, in reality, no better than tyrants, by whom the empire was torn and divided, and the shattered remnants left to be the spoil of the Barbarians, who, indeed, by their conquests, acquired an equal right to them.

Rome, nevertheless, by intervals, beheld some faint appearances of a revival; those of which she was most sensible were under the reign of the great Constantine, whose victories once more united this vast body under one head. But when he transported the seat of his empire from Rome to Constantinople, he, by that step, contributed more to the destruction of a work which had cost him so much labour than all the ill conduct of his predecessors had been able to effect; and this even he rendered irremediable, by dividing his empire equally between his three sons. Theodosius, who by good fortune, or from his great valour, found himself in the same circumstances with Constantine, would not perhaps have committed the same fault, had he not been influenced by the force of Constantine's example; but this in a manner necessarily obliged him to divide his empire in two; Arcadius had the East, Honorius the West: and from that time there never were any hopes nor opportunity of reuniting them.

According to the order of nature, by which the destruction of one kingdom becomes the instrument for the production of others; so, in proportion as the most distant members of the empire of the East fell off from it, from thence there arose kingdoms; though indeed they did not at first bear that rank. The most ancient of these (its origin appearing to have been in the eighth year of the empire of Honorius) is undoubtedly that which was founded in Gaul by the French, so called from Franconia, from whence they were invited by the Gauls, inhabitants of the countries about the Moselle, to assist them in their deliverance from the oppression of the Roman armies. It being a custom among these Franks or French, to confer the title of king upon whatever person they chose to be their leader; if the first or second of these chiefs have not borne it, it is certain, at least, that the third, Merovius, and more particularly Clovis, who was the fifth, were invested with it. Some of them supported the royal title with so much glory, including Pepin and Charles Martel (to whom it would be doing an injustice to refuse this dignity), that their worthy successor Charlemagne, in Gaul, revived an imperfect image of the now extinguished empire in the West. This indeed was facilitated by those natural advantages France enjoys of numerous inhabitants trained to war and a great plenty of all things serving the different necessities of life, joined to a very great conveniency for commerce, arising from its situation, rendering it the centre of four of the principal powers of Europe; Germany, Italy, Spain, and Britain, with the Low Countries.

Let us here just say one word upon the three races which compose the succession of our kings: in the first of them I find only Merovius, Clovis I. and Clovis II.; Charles Martel, Pippin the Short, and Charlemagne in the second, who have raised themselves above the common level of their race. Take away these six from the thirty-five, which we compute in these two races, and all the rest, from their vices or their incapacity, appeared to have been either wicked kings, or but the shadow of kings; though among them we may distinguish some good qualities in Sigebert and Dagobert, and a very great devotion in Lewis the Debonnair, which, however, ended in his repenting the

loss of empire and his kingdom, together with his liberty, in a cloister.

The Carolingian race having reigned obscurely, the crown then descended upon a third (a); the four first kings of which, in my opinion, appear to have been perfect models of wise and good government. The kingdom which came under their dominion had lost much of its original splendour, for from its immense extent in the time of Charlemagne, it was reduced to nearly the same bounds which it has at this day. There was this difference, however, that though these kings might have desired to restore the ancient limits of their territories, they had no means of doing so, since the form of government was such that the monarchs were subject to the great men of the realm who had a right to choose and even govern their sovereigns. The conduct therefore which they pursued was to condemn arbitrary power to an absolute silence; and, in its place, to substitute equity itself: a kind of dominion which never excites envy. Nothing now was done without the consent of the great men and the principal cities, and almost always in consequence of the decision of an assembly of the estates. A conduct so moderate and prudent put an end to all factions, and stifled all conspiracies, which are fatal to the state or the sovereign. Regularity, economy, a distinction of merit, strict observance of justice, all the virtues which we suppose necessary qualifications for the good of a family, were what characterized this new government, and produced what was never before beheld, and what perhaps we may never see again, an uninterrupted peace (b) for one hundred and twenty-two years. What the Capetians gained by this for themselves was the advantage of introducing into their house a hereditary right to the crown, and this could never have been procured for them by the sole authority of the Salic law. But they nevertheless thought it a necessary precaution not to declare their eldest sons for their successors till they had modestly asked the consent of the people, preceding it by a kind of election, usually having them crowned in their own life-time and seated with them upon the throne.

(a) That is, the Capetian race.

(b) The period between the accession of Hugh Capet (987) and that of Louis VI. (1108).

Philip II. whom Lewis VII. his father caused to be crowned, and reign with him in this manner was the first who neglected to observe this ceremony between the sovereign and his people. Several victories, obtained over his neighbours and subjects having gained him the surname of Augustus, served to open him a passage to absolute power, and a notion of the fitness and legality of this power, by the assistance of favourites, ministers and others, became afterwards so strongly imprinted in his successors, that they looked upon it as a mark of good policy to act contrary to those maxims, the general and particular utility of which had been so effectually confirmed by the experience of his predecessors. And this they did without any fear or perhaps without any conception of the fatal consequences which such a proceeding must necessarily incur at the hands of a nation which adores its liberty. This they might have deduced from the means to which the people had immediate recourse when they saw their liberties threatened. The kings could never obtain of their people any other than that kind of constrained obedience which always inclines them to embrace with eagerness all opportunities of mutiny. This was the source of a thousand bloody wars: that by which almost all France was ravaged by the English; that which we had with Italy, Burgundy, Spain. All of them can be attributed to no other causes than the civil dissensions by which they were preceded and here the weakest side, stifling the voice of honour, and the interest of the nation, constantly called in foreigners to assist them in the support of their tottering liberties. These were shameful and fatal remedies: but from that time they were constantly employed, down even to our times, by the house of Lorraine, in a league, for which religion was nothing more than the pretence (c). Another evil, which may at first appear to be of a different kind, but which, in my opinion, proceeds from the same source, was a general corruption of manners, a thirst for riches and a most shameful degree of

(c) Sully may here be thinking of the affair of the bishopric of Strasburg (1595). In that year Henry, as arbitrator, divided the episcopal domains between the Protestant Elector of Brandenburg and the Catholic Charles of Lorraine. The latter refused to adhere to this, and, by appointing as his coadjutor the Archduke Leopold, cousin of the Emperor Rudolph, was bidding for the support of France's enemy.

luxury: these, sometimes separately, and sometimes united, were alternate causes and effects of many of our miseries.

Thus, in a few words, I have exposed the various species of our bad policy with respect both to the form of the government, successively subjected to the will of the people, the soldiers, the nobles, the states and the kings, and in regard to the persons likewise of these last, whether dependent, elective, hereditary, or absolute.

From the picture here laid before us we may be enabled to form our judgment upon the third race of our kings: we may find a thousand things to admire in Philip Augustus, Saint-Lewis, Philip le Bel, Charles the Wise, Charles VII. and Lewis XII. But it is to be lamented that so many virtues or great qualities have been exercised upon no better principles; with what pleasure might we bestow upon them the titles of great kings, could we but conceal that their people were miserable: what might we not, in particular, say of Lewis IX.? Of the forty-four years which he reigned, the first twenty of them exhibit a scene not unworthy of comparison with the last eleven of Henry the Great. But I am afraid all their glory will appear to have been destroyed in the twenty-four following; wherein it appears that the excessive taxes upon the subjects, to satisfy an ill-judged and destructive devotion; immense sums transported into the most distant countries, for the ransom of prisoners; so many thousand subjects sacrificed; so many illustrious houses extinguished; caused a universal mourning throughout France, and altogether a general calamity.

Let us for once, if it is possible, fix our principles; and being, from long experience, convinced that the happiness of mankind can never arise from war (of which we ought to have been persuaded long ago), let us upon this principle take a cursory view of the history of our monarchy. We will pass by the wars of Clovis and his predecessors, because they seem to have been in some degree necessary to confirm the recent foundations of the monarchy: but what shall we say of those wars in which the four sons of Clovis, the four sons of Clotaire I. and their descendants were engaged, during the uninterrupted course of one hundred and sixty years? and of those also, by which, for the

space of one hundred seventy-two other years, commencing with Lewis le Debonnaire, the kingdom was harassed and torn? What follows is still worse. The slightest knowledge of our history is sufficient to convince any one that there was no real tranquillity in the kingdom from Henry III. to the peace of Vervins: and, in short, all this long period may be called a war of nearly four hundred years' duration (d). After this examination (from whence it incontestibly appears that our kings have seldom thought of any thing but how to carry on their wars) we cannot but be scrupulous in bestowing on them the title of Truly Great kings; though we shall, nevertheless, render them all the justice which appears to have been their due. For I confess (as indeed it would be unjust to attribute to them alone, a crime which was properly that of all Europe) that several of these princes were sometimes in such circumstances as rendered the wars just, and even necessary: and from hence, when indeed there were no other means to obtain it, they acquired a true and lasting glory. Moreover, from the manner in which several of these wars were foreseen, prepared for and conducted, we may in their councils discover such master-strokes of policy, and in their persons such noble instances of courage, as are deserving of our highest praises. From whence then can proceed the error of so many exploits, in appearance so glorious, though the effect of them has generally been the devastation both of France and all Europe? I repeat it again, of all Europe, which even yet seems scarce sensible that in her present situation, a situation in which she has been for several centuries, every attempt tending to her subjection, or only to the too considerably augmenting of any one of her principal monarchies at the expense of the others, can never be any other than a chimerical and impossible enterprise. There are none of these monarchies but whose destruction would require a concurrence of causes infinitely superior to all human force. The whole, therefore, of what seems proper and necessary to be done, is to support them all in a kind of equilibrium; and whatever prince thinks, and in consequence acts otherwise, may indeed

(d) Including the twenty-two years between the accession of Henri III. and the Peace of Vervins, this gives a total period of 354 years.

cause torrents of blood to flow through all Europe, but he will never be able to change her form.

When I observed that the extent of France is not now so considerable as it was in the time of Charlemagne, my intention was not that this diminution should be considered as a misfortune. In an age when we feel the sad effects of having had ambitious princes for our kings, were all to concur in flattering this fatal ambition, it would be the cause of still greater evils; and it may be generally observed that the larger the extent of kingdoms, the more they are subject to great revolutions and misfortunes (*e*). The basis of the tranquillity of our own country, in particular, depends upon preserving it within its present limits. A climate, laws, manners, and language, different from our own; seas, and chains of mountains almost inaccessible, are all so many barriers, which we may consider as fixed even by nature. Besides, what is it that France wants! will she not always be the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe? It must be granted. All therefore which the French have to wish or desire is that Heaven grant them pious, good, and wise kings; and that these kings may employ their power in preserving the peace of Europe; for no other enterprise can truly be to them either profitable or successful.

And this explains to us the nature of the design which Henry IV. was on the point of putting in execution when it pleased God to take him to Himself, too soon by some years for the happiness of the world. From hence likewise we may perceive the motives of his pursuing a conduct so opposite to any thing that had hitherto been undertaken by crowned heads: and here we may behold what it was that acquired him the title of Great. His designs were not inspired by a mean and despicable ambition, nor guided by base and partial interests: to render France happy for ever was his desire, and she cannot perfectly enjoy this felicity, unless all Europe likewise partake of it. So

(*e*) Cf. Montesquieu: "Si une république est petite, elle est détruite par une force étrangère; si elle est grande, elle se détruit par une vice intérieure" (*De l'Esprit des Loix*, IX. 1); Rousseau: "De deux états qui nourrissent le même nombre d'habitants, celui qui occupe une moindre étendue de terre est réellement le plus puissant" (*Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*); and Volney: "Ce sont les grands états qui ont perdu les mœurs et la liberté des peuples" (*Considerations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs*).

it was the happiness of Europe in general which he laboured to procure, and this in a manner so solid and durable, that nothing should afterwards be able to shake its foundations.

I must confess I am under some apprehensions, lest this scheme should at first be considered as one of those chimeras, or idle political speculations, in which a mind susceptible of strange and singular ideas may be so easily engaged. Those who shall thus think of it must be that sort of people on whom first impressions have the force of truth; or those, who by their distance from the times, and their ignorance of the circumstances, confound the wisest and noblest enterprises that have ever been formed, with those chimerical projects which princes, intoxicated with their power, have in all ages amused themselves in forming. I confess, that if we attentively examine the designs which have been planned from motives of vanity, confidence in good fortune, ignorance, nay, from sloth, and even timidity itself, we must be surprised at beholding sovereigns plunged blindly into schemes, specious perhaps in appearance, but which at bottom have not the least degree of possibility. The mind of man, with so much complacency, nay, even with so much ardour, pursues whatever it fancies great or beautiful that it is sorry to realise that these objects have frequently nothing real or solid in them. But in this, as well as in other things, there is an opposite extreme to be avoided; namely, that as we usually fail in the execution of great designs, from not commencing and continuing them with sufficient vigour and spirit, so likewise we are defective in the knowledge of their true worth and tendency, because we do not thoroughly and properly consider them in all their dependencies and consequences. I have myself been more difficult to persuade in this matter than perhaps any of those who shall read these Memoirs, and this I consider as an effect of that cold, cautious and unenterprising temper, which makes so considerable a part of my character.

I remember the first time the king spoke to me of a political system, by which all Europe might be regulated and governed as one great family, I scarce paid any attention to what he said, imagining that he meant no more by it than merely to divert himself, or perhaps to shew that his thoughts on political subjects

were greater and penetrated deeper than most others: and my reply was a mixture of pleasantry and compliment. Henry said no more at that time. He often confessed to me afterwards, that he had long concealed from me what he meditated on this subject, from a sense of shame, which many labour under, lest they should disclose designs which might appear ridiculous or impossible. I was astonished when, some time after, he renewed our conversation on this head and continued from year to year to entertain me with new regulations and new improvements in this scheme.

I had been very far from thinking seriously about it. If by accident it came into my thoughts for a moment, the first view of the design, which conceived a re-union of all the different states of Europe; immense expenses, at a time when France could scarce supply her own necessities; a concatenation of events, which to me appeared infinite: these were considerations which had always made me reject the thought as vain. I even apprehended there was some illusion in it, and I recollected some of those enterprises in which we had endeavoured to engage Europe. I considered those in particular which had been formed by some of our kings, from much less considerable motives, and I felt myself disgusted with this, from the bad success of all the former. The disposition of the princes of Europe to take umbrage against France, when she would have assisted them to dissipate their fears from the too great power of Spain, this alone to me appeared an unsurmountable obstacle.

Strongly prejudiced by this opinion, I used my utmost efforts to undeceive Henry, who, on his side, surprised not to find me of his sentiment in any one point, immediately undertook, and readily succeeded in convincing me that my thus indiscriminately condemning all parts of his project, in which he was certain that every thing at least was not blameable, could proceed from nothing but strong prejudices. I could not refuse, at his solicitations, to use my endeavours to gain a thorough comprehension of it. I formed a clearer plan of it in my mind. I collected and united all its different branches. I studied all its proportions and dimensions, if I may say so, and I discovered in them a regularity and mutual dependence, of which, when I had only considered the design in a confused and careless manner, I had not been at

all sensible. The benefit which would manifestly arise from it to all Europe was what most immediately struck me, as being in effect the plainest and most evident; but the means to effect so good a design were, therefore, what I hesitated at the longest. The general situation of the affairs of Europe, and of our own in particular, appeared to me every way contrary to the realisation of the project. I did not consider that, since the execution of the scheme might be deferred till a proper opportunity, we could prepare ourselves with all those resources which time affords to those who know how to make the best use of it. I was at last convinced, that however disproportionate the means might appear to the effect, a course of years, during which every thing should as much as possible be made subservient to the great object in view, would surmount many difficulties. It is indeed somewhat extraordinary that this point, which appeared to be and really was the most difficult of any, should at last become the most easy.

Having thus seen all parts of the design in their just points of view, having thoroughly considered and calculated and from thence discovered and prepared for all events which might happen, I found myself confirmed in the opinion, that the design of Henry the Great was, upon the whole, just in its intention, possible and even practicable in all its parts, and infinitely glorious in all its effects. So that, upon all occasions, I was the first to recall the king to his engagements, and sometimes to convince him by those very arguments which he himself had taught me.

The constant attention this prince paid to all affairs transacted round him arising from those singularly unhappy circumstances by which, in almost every instant of his life, he found himself embarrassed, had been the cause of his forming this design even from the time when, being called to the crown by the death of Henry III. he considered the humbling of the house of Austria as absolutely necessary for his security. Yet, if he was not beholden to Elizabeth for his thought of the design, it is, however, certain that this great queen had herself conceived it long before, as a means to avenge Europe for the attempts of its common enemy. The troubles in which all the following years were

engaged, the war which succeeded in 1595, and that against Savoy after the peace of Vervins, forced Henry into difficulties which obliged him to lay aside all thoughts of other affairs; and it was not till after his marriage and the firm re-establishment of peace, that he renewed his thoughts upon his first design, the execution of which appeared then more impossible, or at least more improbable, than ever.

He, nevertheless, communicated it by letters to Elizabeth, and this was what inspired them with so strong an inclination to confer together in 1601 when this princess came to Dover and Henry to Calais. What the ceremony of an interview would not have permitted them to do I at last begun by the voyage which I made to this princess. I found her deeply engaged in the means by which this great design might be successfully executed; and, notwithstanding the difficulties which she apprehended in its two principal points, namely, the agreement of religions and the equality of the powers, she did not to me appear at all to doubt of its success. This she chiefly expected, for a reason of the justness of which I have since been well convinced, namely, that as the plan was only contrary to the design of some princes, whose ambitious views were sufficiently known to all Europe, this fact would rather promote than retard its success. She farther said, that its execution by any other means than that of arms would be very desirable, as this has always something odious in it: but she confessed that indeed it would be hardly possible to begin it otherwise. A very great number of the articles, conditions, and different dispositions is due to this queen and sufficiently shew, that in respect of wisdom, penetration, and all the other perfections of the mind, she was not inferior to any king the most truly deserving of that title.

It must indeed be considered as a very great misfortune that Henry could not at this time second the intention of the queen of England, who wished to have the design put in immediate execution; but when he thus laid the foundation of the edifice he scarcely hoped to see the time when the finishing hand would be put to it. The recovery of his own kingdom from the various maladies by which it was afflicted was a work of several years; and unhappily he had himself seen forty-eight when he began it.

He pursued it, nevertheless, with the greatest vigour. The edict of Nantes had been published with this view and every other means was used which might gain the respect and confidence of the princes of Europe. Henry and I, at the same time, applied ourselves with indefatigable labour to regulate the interior affairs of the kingdom. We considered the death of the king of Spain (*f*) as the most favourable event that could happen to our design, but it received so violent a shock by the death of Elizabeth, as almost made us abandon all our hopes. Henry had no expectation that the powers of the North nor king James, the successor to Elizabeth, when he was acquainted with his character, would any of them so readily consent to support him in his design, as this princess had done. However, the new allies whom he daily gained in Germany (*g*), and even in Italy, comforted him a little for the loss of Elizabeth. The truce (*h*) between Spain and the Low Countries may also be numbered among the incidents favourable to it.

Yet, if we consider all the obstacles which afterwards arose in his own kingdom, from the protestants, the catholics, the clergy, nay, even from his own council, it will appear as if all things conspired against it. Could it be imagined that Henry, in his whole council, should not find one person besides myself to whom he could, without danger, disclose the whole of his designs? or that the respect due to him could scarcely restrain those apparently most devoted to his service from treating as wild and extravagant chimeras whatever of the plan he had, with greatest circumspection, revealed to them? But nothing discouraged Henry, who was an able politician and a better judge than all his council and kingdom. When he perceived that, notwithstanding all these obstacles, affairs began, both at home and abroad, to appear in a favourable situation, he then considered the success as infallible.

Nor will this his judgment, when thoroughly considered, be found so presumptuous as from a slight examination it may to some appear. For what did he hereby require of Europe?

(*f*) Philip II. of Spain died in 1598.

(*g*) Notably Maurice of Hesse, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Wurtemberg, and the Elector of Brandenburg.

(*h*) In 1609.

Nothing more than that Europe should promote the means whereby he proposed to stabilise Christendom in that position towards which it had, by his efforts, been tending for some time. These means he rendered so easy of execution that for their fulfilment there would be required scarcely as much as the princes of Europe would voluntarily sacrifice for advantages less real, certain or durable. What they would gain by it, besides the inestimable benefits arising from peace, would greatly exceed all the expenses they would incur. What reason then could any of them have to oppose it? and, if they did not oppose it, how could the house of Austria support itself against powers who would have risen as open and secret enemies in the hope of depriving it of that strength which it had used only to oppress them? In other words, the house of Austria would have to face a united and hostile Europe. Nor would these princes have any reason to be jealous of the restorer of their liberty, for he was so far from seeking to re-imburse himself for all the expenses which his generosity would hereby involve, that his intention was voluntarily and for ever to relinquish all power of augmenting his dominions, not only by conquest, but by all other just and lawful means.

By this he would have convinced all his neighbours that his whole design was to save, both himself and them, those immense sums which the maintenance of so many thousand soldiers, so many fortified places, and so many military expenses requires; to free them for ever from the fear of those bloody catastrophes so common in Europe; to procure them an uninterrupted repose; and, finally, to unite them all in an indissoluble bond of security and friendship, after which they might live together like brethren, and reciprocally visit like good neighbours without the trouble of ceremony and without the expense of a train of attendants which princes use at best only for ostentation and frequently to conceal their misery. Does it not indeed reflect shame and reproach on a people who affect to be so polished and refined in their manners that all their pretended improvements have not yet guarded them from these barbarities which they detest in nations the most savage and uncultivated? To destroy these pernicious seeds of confusion and disorder, and prevent the barbarities of which they are the cause, could any

scheme have been more happily and perfectly contrived than that of Henry the Great?

Here then is all that could be reasonably expected or required. It is only in the power of man to prepare and act, success is the work of a more mighty hand. Sensible people cannot be blamed for being prejudiced in favour of the scheme in question, from this circumstance only, that it was formed by the two potentates whom posterity will always consider as the most perfect models of the art of governing. In regard to Henry in particular I insist that it belongs only to princes who, like him, have had a constant succession of obstacles to encounter in all their designs. These are the princes who alone are privileged to judge what are real obstacles; and when we behold them willing to lay down their lives in support of their opinions, surely we may abide by their sentiments, without fear of being deceived. For my own part, I shall always think with regret that France, by the blow which it received from the loss of this great prince, was deprived of a glory far superior to that which his reign had acquired. There remains only to explain the several parts of the design, and the manner in which they were to be executed. We will begin by what relates to religion.

Two religions principally prevail in Christendom, the Roman and the Reformed; but, as this latter admits of several variations in its worship, which render it, if not as uniform as the roman, at least as far from being re-united, it is therefore necessary to divide it in two, one of which may be called the reformed, and the other the protestant religion (i). The manner in which these three religions prevail in Europe is extremely various. Italy and Spain remain in possession of the roman religion, pure and without mixture of any other. The reformed religion subsists in France with the roman, only under favour of the edicts, and is the weakest. England, Denmark, Sweden, the Low Countries, and Switzerland, have also a mixture of the same kind, but with this difference, that in them the protestant is the governing religion, the others are only tolerated. Germany unites all these and in several of its circles, as well as in Poland, shews them equal favour. I say nothing of Muscovy and Russia. These vast

(i) That is, the Calvinist and the Lutheran.

countries, which are not less than six hundred leagues in length and four hundred in breadth, being in great part still idolaters, and in part schismatics, such as Greeks and Armenians, have introduced so many superstitious practices in their worship, that there scarce remains any conformity with us among them; besides, they belong to Asia at least as much as to Europe. We may indeed almost consider them as a barbarous country, and place them in the same class with Turkey, though for these five hundred years, we have ranked them among the christian powers.

Each of these three religions being now established in Europe in such a manner that there is not the least appearance that any of them can be destroyed and experience having sufficiently demonstrated the inutility and danger of such an enterprise, the best therefore that can be done, is to preserve, and even strengthen all of them in such a manner that indulgence may not become an encouragement to the production of new sects or opinions which should carefully be suppressed on their first appearance. God Himself, by manifestly supporting what the catholics were pleased to call the new religion, has taught us this conduct which is not less conformable to the Holy Scripture than confirmed by its examples; and besides, the unsurmountable difficulty of forcing the pope's authority where it is no longer acknowledged renders what is here proposed absolutely necessary. Several cardinals equally sagacious and zealous and even some popes as Clement VIII. and Paul V. were of this opinion (*k*).

All therefore that remains now to be done is to strengthen the nations who have made choice of one of these religions in the principles they profess, as there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as a liberty in belief; and those nations, whose inhabitants profess several or all these religions should be careful to observe those rules necessary to remedy the ordinary inconveniences of a toleration in other respects beneficial. Italy, therefore, professing the roman religion and being moreover the residence of the popes, should preserve this religion in all its purity, and there would be no hardship in obliging all its

(*k*) Though it was Clement VIII. who absolved Henry, neither he nor his successor, Paul V. can be credited with very advanced views on toleration.

inhabitants either to conform to it or quit the country. The same regulations, very nearly, might be observed in regard to Spain. In such states as that of France where there is at least a governing religion, whoever should think the regulation too severe, by which calvinism would be always subordinate to the religion of their prince, might be permitted to depart the country. No new regulations would be necessary in any of the other nations, no violence on this account, but liberty unrestrained, seeing this liberty is become even a fundamental principle in their governments (l).

Thus we may perceive every thing on this head might be reduced to a few maxims, so much the more certain and invariable, as they were not contrary to the sentiments of any one. The protestants are very far from pretending to force their religion upon any of their neighbours by whom it is not voluntarily embraced. The catholics doubtless are of the same sentiments, and the pope would receive no injury in being deprived of what he confesses himself not to have possessed for a long time. His sacrificing these chimerical rights would be abundantly compensated by the regal dignity with which it would be proper to invest him and by the honour of being afterwards the common mediator between all the christian princes, a dignity which he would then enjoy without jealousy and for which it must be confessed the papal office has shown itself, by sagacious conduct, most peculiarly fitted.

Another point of the political scheme which also concerns religion, relates to the infidel princes of Europe, and consists in forcing out of it those who refuse to conform to any of the christian doctrines of religion. Should the grand duke of Muscovy or czar of Russia, who is believed to be the ancient khan of Scythia, refuse to enter into the association after it is proposed to him, he ought to be treated like the Sultan of Turkey, deprived of his possessions in Europe, and confined to Asia only, where he might, as long as he pleased, and without any interruption from us, continue the wars in which he is almost constantly engaged against the Turks and Persians.

(l) That is, so long as their rulers neither change their religion nor are succeeded by rulers of a different religion. Sully's view on toleration is simply the orthodox "cujus regio, eius religio."

To succeed in the execution of this plan will not appear difficult if we suppose that all the christian princes unanimously concurred in it. It would only be necessary for each of them to contribute, in proportion to their several abilities, towards the support of the forces and all the other incidental expenses which the success of such an enterprise might require. These respective quotas were to have been determined by a general council of which we shall speak hereafter. The following is what Henry the Great had himself conceived on this head. The pope for this expedition should have furnished eight thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and ten galleys; the emperor and the circles of Germany, sixty thousand foot, twenty thousand horse, five large cannons, and ten galleys or other vessels; the king of France, twenty thousand foot, four thousand horse, twenty cannons, and ten ships or galleys; Spain, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland, the like number with France, observing only, that these powers should together supply what belonged to the sea-service in the manner most suitable to their respective conveniences and abilities therein; the king of Bohemia, five thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and five cannons; the king of Hungary, twelve thousand foot, five thousand horse, twenty cannons, and six ships; the duke of Savoy, or king of Lombardy, eight thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, eight cannons, and six galleys; the republic of Venice, ten thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and twenty-five galleys; the republic of the Swiss cantons, fifteen thousand foot, five thousand horse, and twelve cannons; the republic of Holland, twelve thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, twelve cannons, and twelve ships; the Italian republics, ten thousand foot, twelve hundred horse, ten cannons, and eight galleys; the whole together amounting to about two hundred and seventy thousand foot, fifty thousand horse, two hundred cannons, and one hundred and twenty ships or galleys, equipped and maintained at the expense of those powers, each contributing according to his particular proportion.

This armament of the princes and states of Europe appears so inconsiderable and so little burdensome, when compared with the forces which they usually keep on foot to awe their neighbours, or perhaps their own subjects, that were it to have subsisted,

even perpetually, it would not have occasioned any inconvenience and would have been an excellent military academy. But since the enterprises for which it was destined, would not always have continued, the number and expense might have been diminished in proportion to the necessities which would have remained a constant factor. Moreover I am convinced that such an armament would have been so highly approved of by all these princes that after they had, with its help, conquered all those territories in Europe (which they would not willingly share with a stranger), they would seek to unite with these conquests such parts of Asia as are most commodiously situated and particularly the whole coast of Africa which is too near to our territories for our complete security. The only precaution to be observed in regard to these additional countries would have been to form them into new kingdoms, declare them united with the rest of the christian powers, and bestow them on different princes, carefully observing to exclude those who before bore rank among the sovereigns of Europe.

That part of the design which may be considered as purely political turned almost entirely on a first preliminary which, I think, would not have met with more difficulty than the preceding article. This was to divest the house of Austria of the empire and of all the possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries; in a word, to reduce it to the sole kingdom of Spain, bounded by the ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Pyrenean mountains. But that it might, nevertheless, be equally powerful with the other sovereignties of Europe, it should have Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca; and, in the other islands on its own coasts, the Canaries, the Azores; and Cape-Verde, with its possessions in Africa, Mexico and the American islands belonging to it: countries, which alone might suffice to found great kingdoms, finally, the Philippines, Goa, the Moluccas, and its other possessions in Asia.

From hence a method seems to present itself whereby the house of Austria might be made amends for what it would be deprived of in Europe, which is to increase its dominions in the three other parts of the world by assisting it to obtain and by declaring it the sole proprietor both of what we do know and what we may here-

after discover in those parts. We may suppose that on this occasion it would not have been necessary to use force to bring this house to concur in such a design and, indeed, even on this supposition it was not the prince of this house reigning in Spain, to whom these parts of the world were to be subjected, but to different princes, of the same or of different branches, who in acknowledgment of their possessions should only have rendered homage to the crown of Spain or, at most, a tribute as due to the original conquerors. This house, which is so very desirous of being the most powerful in the world, might hereby have continued to flatter itself with so pleasing a pre-eminence without the other powers being endangered by its pretended grandeur.

The steps taken by the house of Austria to arrive at universal monarchy which evidently appear from the whole conduct of Charles V. and his son have rendered this severity as just as it is necessary and I will venture to say that this house would not have had any reasonable cause to complain of it. It is true it would be deprived of the empire; but impartially considered it will appear that all the other princes of Germany and even of Europe have an equal right to it. Were it necessary to prove this we need only recollect on what conditions Charles V. himself, the most powerful of them all, was acknowledged emperor; conditions, which, at Smalcalde, he solemnly swore to observe, in presence of seven princes or electors and the deputies of twenty-four protestant towns, the landgrave of Hesse and the prince of Anhalt being speakers for them all. He swore never to act contrary to the established laws of the empire, particularly the famous Golden Bull, obtained under Charles IV., unless it were to amplify them and even that only with the express consent and advice of the sovereign princes of Germany; not to infringe nor deprive them of any of their privileges; not to introduce foreigners into their council; not to make either war or peace without their consent; not to bestow honours and employments but on natives of Germany; not to use any other but the German language in all writings; not to levy any taxes by his own authority, nor apply any conquests which might be made, to his own particular profit. He, in particular, formally renounced all pretences of hereditary right in his house to the imperial dignity and according to the

several articles of the golden bull he swore never in his life-time to recognize a king of the Romans. When the protestants of Germany, after they had in a manner driven Ferdinand out of it, consented to have the imperial crown placed on his head, they were careful to make him renew his engagements in regard to all these articles and to all these new regulations relative to the free exercise of their religion.

As to the possessions of the house of Austria in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, acquired by tyrannical usurpation, it would, after all, be only depriving it of territories which it keeps at so prodigious an expense (I speak, in particular, of Italy and the Low Countries) as all its treasures of the Indies have not been able to defray: and besides, by investing it with the exclusive privilege above-mentioned, of gaining new establishments and appropriating to its own use the mines and treasures of the three other parts of the world, it would be abundantly indemnified; for these new acquisitions would be at least as considerable, and undoubtedly far more rich, than those already held. But what is here proposed must not be understood as if the other nations of Europe were excluded from all commerce with those countries; on the contrary, it should be free and open to every one and the house of Austria, instead of considering this stipulation, which is of the greatest consequence, as an infringement of its privileges, would rather have reason to regard it as a farther advantage.

From a farther examination and consideration of these dispositions I do not doubt but the house of Austria would have accepted the proposed conditions without being forced to it; but, supposing the contrary, what would a resistance have signified? The promise made to all the princes of Europe of enriching themselves by the territories of which this house was to be divested, would deprive it of all hopes of assistance from any of them.

Upon the whole then it appears that all parties would have been gainers by it and this was what assured Henry the Great of the success of his design. The empire would again become a dignity to which all princes, but particularly those of Germany, might aspire. This dignity would become so much the more desirable that, although in accordance with its original institution

no revenues would be annexed to it, the emperor would be declared the first and chief magistrate of the whole christian republic. And as we may suppose this honour would afterwards be conferred only on the most worthy, all his privileges in this respect, instead of being diminished, would be enlarged; his authority over the Belgic and Helvetic republics would be more considerable and upon every new election they would be obliged to render him a respectful homage. The electors would still continue to enjoy the right of electing the emperor as well as of maintaining the king of the Romans; with this restriction only, that the election should not be made twice together out of the same family. The first to have been elected in this manner was the elector of Bavaria (*m*), who was also, in consequence of the partition, to have had those territories possessed by the house of Austria which joined to his own on the side of Italy.

The rest of these territories were to have been divided and equally distributed by the kings of France, England, Denmark, and Sweden among the Venetians (*n*), the Grisons (*o*), the duke of Wurtemberg, and the marquis of Baden, Anspach, and Dourlach (*p*). Bohemia was to have been constituted an elective kingdom by annexing to it Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia. Hungary was also to have been an elective kingdom and the pope, the emperor, the kings of France, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy were to have had the right of nomination to it and because this kingdom may be considered as the barrier of Christendom against the infidels, it was to have been rendered the most powerful and able to resist them. This was to have been done by adding to it the monarchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola and by afterwards incorporating with it

(*m*) Of the German princes, the Elector of Bavaria was the most consistent ally of France at the time when Sully was compiling his Memoirs. On several occasions he was the French nominee for the imperial dignity.

(*n*) Traditionally at enmity with her Spanish and Italian neighbours, the policy of Venice constantly gravitated to alliance with France. Moreover, she was the one "liberal" State in an ultramontane world.

(*o*) The Grisons were Protestants, and were of paramount importance in Richelieu's foreign policy because they controlled one of the Alpine passes into Italy.

(*p*) These German princes were members of the Evangelical Union formed in 1608 to secure the religious integrity of their respective States, to vote in the Diet as one body, to settle their own disputes by arbitration, and to maintain an army for defence. Henry IV. was godfather of this league.

whatever might be acquired in Transylvania, Bosnia, Slavonia, and Croatia. The same electors were to have obliged themselves, by oath, to assist it upon all occasions and they were to have been particularly careful never to grant their suffrages from partiality, artifice, or intrigue but always to confer the dignity on a prince who, by his great qualifications, particularly for war, should be generally acknowledged as most proper. Poland being, from its nearness to Turkey, Muscovy, and Tartary in the same situation with Hungary was also to have been made an elective kingdom by the same eight potentates; and its power was to have been augmented by annexing to it whatever should be conquered from the infidels adjoining its own frontiers and by determining in its favour those disputes which it had with all its other neighbours. Switzerland, when augmented by Franche-comté, Alsace, Tyrol, and other territories was to have been united into a sovereign republic governed by a council or senate, of which the emperor, the princes of Germany, and the Venetians were to have been umpires.

The changes to be made in Italy were that the pope should be declared a secular prince bearing rank among the monarchs of Europe and under this title should possess Naples, Apulia, Calabria and all their dependencies, which should be indissolubly united to St. Peter's patrimony. But in case the holy father had opposed this, which indeed could scarce have been supposed, the disposition must then have been changed and the kingdom of Naples would have been divided and disposed as the electoral kings should have determined. Sicily was to have been ceded to the republic of Venice, by letters from the same eight principal potentates, upon condition that it should render homage for it to every pope, who should bear the title of Immediate Chief of the Whole Italian republic; otherwise (for this reason) called The republic of the Church. The other members of this republic were to have been Genoa, Florence, Mantua, Modena, Parma and Lucca, without any alterations in their government. Bologna and Ferrara were to have been rendered free cities and all these governments were every twenty years to have rendered homage to the pope their chief, by the gift of a crucifix of the value of ten thousand crowns.

Of the three great republics of Europe, it appears, upon the first glance, that this would have been the most brilliant and the richest. Nevertheless, it would not have been so; for what belonged to the duke of Savoy was not comprised herein. His territories were to have been constituted one of the greatest monarchies of Europe, hereditary to males and females, and to have borne the title of the kingdom of Lombardy; wherein, beside the territory so called, the Milanese and Montserrat would also have been comprised. The duke of Mantua, in exchange for these, was to have the duchy of Cremona. An authentic testimony of the institution would have been given by the pope, the emperor and the other sovereigns of the christian republic.

Among all these different dismemberings, we may observe that France reserved nothing for itself but the glory of distributing them with equity. Henry had declared this to be his intention long before. He even sometimes said, with equal moderation and good sense, that were these dispositions once firmly established, he would have voluntarily consented to have the extent of France determined by a majority of suffrages. Nevertheless, as the districts of Artois, Hainault, Cambresis, Tournay, Namur and Luxembourg might more suitably be annexed to France than to any other nation, they were to have been ceded to Henry but divided into ten distinct governments and bestowed on so many French princes or lords, all of them bearing rank as sovereigns (*q*).

In regard to England it was precisely the same: this was a determined point between Elizabeth and Henry, the two princes who were authors of the scheme. This was probably due to an observation made by this queen, that the Britannic isles, in all the different states through which they had passed, whether under one or several monarchs, elective, hereditary, masculine or feminine, and among all the variations of their laws and policy, had never experienced any great disappointments or misfortunes, but when their sovereigns had meddled in affairs out of their little continent. It seems, indeed, as if they were concentered in it even by nature, and their happiness appears to depend entirely on themselves and their having no concerns with their neighbours,

(*q*) Compare this with statements in second paragraph of p. 46. Sully might have removed this inconsistency if he himself had ever reduced the scheme to a composite whole.

provided that they seek only to maintain peace in the three nations subject to them, by governing each according to its own laws and customs. To render every thing equal between France and England, Brabant from the dutchy of Limbourg, the jurisdiction of Malines, and the other dependencies on Flemish Flanders, Gallican or Imperial, were to have been formed into eight sovereign fiefs, to be given to so many princes or lords of this nation. C

These two parts excepted, all the rest of the seventeen United Provinces, whether belonging to Spain or not, were to be erected into a free and independent state under the title of the Belgic republic; though there was one other fief to be formed from them, bearing the title of a principality, to be granted to the prince of Orange; also some other inconsiderable indemnities for three or four other persons. The succession of Cleves was to have been divided among those princes whom the emperor would have deprived of it, as well as among some other princes of the same district, to whom the imperial towns situated therein would have been granted. Even Sweden and Denmark, though they were to be considered as under the influence of the same law which England and France had imposed on themselves, would, by this distribution, have enlarged their territories and acquired other considerable advantages. An end would have been put to the perpetual trouble which agitated these two kingdoms and this, I think, would have been rendering them no inconsiderable service. All these cessions, exchanges, and transpositions towards the north of Germany were to have been determined by the kings of France, England, Lombardy, and the republic of Venice. ←

And now perhaps the purport of the design may be perceived, which was to divide Europe equally among a certain number of powers and in such a manner that none of them might have cause either of envy or fear from the possessions or power of the others. The number of them was reduced to fifteen and they were of three kinds: six great hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four sovereign republics. The six hereditary monarchies were France, Spain, England or Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy; the five elective monarchies were the Empire, the Papacy or Pontificate, Poland, Hungary, and }

Bohemia; the four republics were the Venetian, the Italian, or what, from its dukes, may be called the ducal, the Swiss, Helvetic or Confederate, and the Belgic or Provincial republic.

The laws and ordinances proper to cement a union between all these princes and to maintain that harmony which should be once established among them, the reciprocal oaths and engagements in regard both to religion and policy, the mutual assurances in respect of the freedom of commerce and the measures to be taken to make all these partitions with equity and to the general content and satisfaction of the parties: all these matters are to be understood; nor is it necessary to say any thing of the precaution taken by Henry in regard to them. The most that could have happened would have been some trifling difficulties which would easily have been obviated in the general council, representing all the states of Europe the establishment of which was certainly the happiest invention that could have been conceived for preventing those innovations often introduced by time into the wisest and most useful institutions.

The model of this general council of Europe had been formed on that of the ancient Amphictyons of Greece, with such alterations only as rendered it suitable to our customs, climate, and policy. It consisted of a certain number of commissaries, ministers, or plenipotentiaries from all the governments of the christian republic, who were to be constantly assembled as a senate, to deliberate on any affairs which might occur; to discuss the different interests, pacify the quarrels, clear up and determine all the civil, political, and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neighbours. The form and manner of proceeding in the senate would have been more particularly determined by the suffrages of the senate itself. Henry was of opinion that it should be composed of four commissaries from each of the following potentates: The Emperor, the Pope, the kings of France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Lombardy, Poland, and the republic of Venice; and of two only from the other republics and inferior powers, which all together would have composed a senate of about sixty-six persons, who should have been re-chosen every three years.

In regard to the place of meeting, it remained to have been

determined whether it would be better for the council to be fixed or ambulatory, divided in three, or united into one. If it were divided into three, each containing twenty-two magistrates, then each of them must have been fixed in such a centre as should appear to be most commodious, as Paris or Bourges for one, and somewhere about Trente and Cracovia for the two others. If it were judged more expedient not to divide their assembly, whether fixed or ambulatory, it must have been nearly in the centre of Europe and would consequently have been fixed in some one of the fourteen cities following: Metz, Luxembourg, Nancy, Cologne, Mayence, Treves, Francfort, Wurtzbourg, Heidelberg, Spire, Strasbourg, Bale, Bezancon.

Besides this general council, it would perhaps have been proper to have constituted some others, of an inferior degree, for the particular convenience of different districts. For example, were six such created, they might have been placed at Dantzic, Nuremberg, Vienna, Bologna, Constance and the last, wherever it should be judged most convenient for the kingdoms of France, Spain, England and the Belgic republic. But whatever the number or form of these particular councils might have been, it would have been absolutely necessary that they should be subordinate, and recur, by appeal, to the great general council, whose decisions, when considered as proceeding from the united authority of all the sovereigns, pronounced in a manner equally free and absolute, must have been regarded as so many final and irrevocable decrees.

But let us quit these speculative designs, in which practice and experience would perhaps have caused many alterations; and let us come to the means actually employed by Henry to facilitate the execution of his great design.

To gain one of the most powerful princes of Europe, with whom to concert all his designs, was what Henry had always considered as of the utmost consequence: and this was the reason, that after the death of Elizabeth, who had indissolubly united the interest of the two crowns of France and England, every means was used which might inspire her successor, king James, with all her sentiments. Had I but succeeded in the solemn embassy, the particulars of which I have related already, so far as to have

gained this prince's consent to have his name appear openly with Henry's, this military confederacy, especially if it had, in like manner, been strengthened with the names of the kings of Denmark and Sweden, would have prevented the troubles and difficulties of many negotiations: but nothing farther could be obtained of the king of England than the same promises which were required of the other courts; namely, that he would not only not oppose the confederacy, but, when Henry had made his designs public, would declare himself in his favour, and contribute towards it in the same manner as the other powers interested therein. A means was indeed afterwards found to obtain the execution of this promise, in a manner so much the more easy as it did not disturb the natural indolence of this prince. This was, by getting what he hesitated to undertake in his own name, executed by his son, the prince of Wales, who, as soon as he had obtained his father's promise (that he would at least not obstruct his proceedings), anticipated Henry's utmost wishes, being animated with a thirst of glory, and desire to render himself worthy of the esteem and alliance of Henry, for he was to marry the eldest of the daughters of France. He wrote me several letters upon this subject and expressed himself in the manner I have mentioned. He also said that the king of France might depend on having six thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, which he would undertake to bring into his service whenever they should be required: and this number was afterwards augmented by two thousand more foot, and eight cannons, maintained in all respects at the expense of England for three years at least. The king of Sweden did not shew himself less zealous for the common cause; and the king of Denmark also appeared to be equally well disposed in its favour.

In the mean time we were indefatigable in our negotiations in the different courts of Europe, particularly in the circles of Germany and the United Provinces, where the king, for this purpose, had sent Boissise, Fresne-Canaye, Baugy, Ancel, and Bongars. The council of the States were very soon unanimous in their determinations: the prince of Orange sent the sieurs Malderet and Brederode from them to offer the king fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. They were soon followed

by the landgrave of Hesse, and the prince of Anhalt, to whom as well as to the prince of Orange, the confederacy was obliged for being increased by the duke of Savoy; by all of the reformed religion in Hungary, Bohemia, and lower Austria; by many protestant princes and towns in Germany; and by all the Swiss Cantons of this religion. And when the succession of Cleves, which the Emperor shewed himself disposed to usurp, became another incentive to the confederacy, there was then scarce any part of Germany that was not for us; which evidently appeared from the result of the general assembly at Hall (*r*). The elector of Saxony, who perhaps remained alone of the opposite party, might have been embarrassed in an affair out of which he would probably have found it difficult to extricate himself; and this was to have been done by recalling to his memory the fate of the branch of John Frederic, deprived of this electorate by Charles V. (*s*).

There were several of these powers, in regard to whom I am persuaded nothing would have been risked, by disclosing to them the whole intent and scope of the design. On the contrary, they would probably have seconded it with the greater ardour when they found the destruction of Austrian grandeur was a determined point. These powers were more particularly the Venetians, the United Provinces, almost all the protestants, and especially the evangelics of Germany. But as too many precautions could not be taken to prevent the catholic powers from being prejudiced against the new alliance in which they were to be engaged, a too hasty discovery, either of the true motives, or the whole intent of the design, was therefore cautiously avoided. It was at first concealed from all without exception and afterwards revealed but to a few persons of approved discretion and those only such as were absolutely necessary to engage others to join the confederacy. The association was for a long time spoken of to others only as a kind of general treaty of peace, wherein such methods would be

(*r*) By the Treaty of Hall (1610), Henry IV. and the Evangelical Union agreed to support the Elector of Brandenburg and Count Philip of Neuburg in their claims to the Cleves-Julich territories.

(*s*) Presumably a threat. After the victory of Charles V. over the Protestants at Muhlberg (1547), the electorate of Saxony was transferred from the elder (Ernestine) to the younger (Albertine) branch of the family. There would therefore be good precedent for depriving the Elector should he refuse to conform.

projected as the public benefit and the general service of Europe might suggest as necessary to stop the progress of the excessive power of the house of Austria. Our ambassadors and agents had orders only to demand of these princes a renewal or commencement of alliance, in order more effectually to succeed in the projected peace; to consult with them upon the means whereby to effect it; to appear as if sent only for the purpose of joint enquiry into the discovery of these means. According to the disposition in which they found these princes, they were to insinuate, as if by accidental conjecture, some notion of a new method for maintaining the equilibrium of Europe and for securing to each religion a more undisturbed peace than it had hitherto enjoyed. The proposals made to the kings of England and Sweden, and the dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, for alliances by marriage, proved very successful: it was absolutely determined that the dauphin should espouse the heiress of Lorraine, which dutchy still continued, as before, to depend on the Empire.

But no precaution appeared so necessary, nor was more strongly recommended to our negotiators, than to convince all the princes of Europe of the disinterestedness with which Henry was resolved to act on this occasion. This point was indefatigably laboured, and they were convinced of it, when, on the supposition that it would be necessary to have recourse to arms, we strongly affirmed that the forces, the treasures, and even the person of Henry, might be depended on; and this in a manner so generous on his side, that, instead of expecting to be rewarded, or even indemnified for them, he was voluntarily inclined to give the most positive assurances, not to reserve to himself a single town, nor the smallest district. This moderation, of which at last no one doubted, made a suitable impression, especially when it was perceived to be so much the more generous, as there was sufficient to excite and satisfy the desires of all. And in the interim, before the solemn publication of this absolute renunciation, which was to have been made in the manifestoes that were preparing, Henry gave a proof of it, in the form of an absolute demonstration to the pope (*t*).

No one being ignorant that as it was, at least, intended to

deprive Spain of those of its usurpations which were the most manifestly unjust (Navarre and Rousillon would infallibly revert to France), the king therefore voluntarily offered to exchange them for the two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily and at the same time to make a present of both to the Pope and the republic of Venice. This, certainly, was renouncing the most incontestible right he could have to any of the territories of which this Crown was to be deprived; and by submitting this affair, as he did, to the determination of the Pope and the Venetians, he the more obviously obliged them, as both the honour and profit which might arise therefrom would be in their favour. The Pope, therefore, on the first proposition made to him, even anticipated Henry's intentions. He immediately demanded whether, as affairs were then circumstanced, the several powers would approve his taking upon him the office of common mediator, to establish peace in Europe and convert the continual wars among its several princes into a perpetual war against the infidels. This was a part of the design he had been very careful to acquaint him with: and the pope sufficiently shewed that he was desirous nothing should be done without his participation and that he was still less disposed to refuse the advantage offered to him.

Paul V. when a favourable opportunity offered, explained himself more openly on this head. Ubaldini, his nuncio, told the king that his holiness, for the confederacy against the house of Austria, would, on various pretences, engage to raise ten thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and ten cannons; provided that his majesty would promise to defray the necessary expenses of their subsistence for three years; would give all possible security for the cession of Naples, and the other rights of homage, according to promise; and would sincerely consent to the other conditions, in regard to the treaty that he should think necessary to impose. These conditions, at least the principal of them, were, that only catholics should be elected emperors; that the Roman religion should be maintained in all its rights, and ecclesiastics in all their privileges and immunities; and that the protestants should not be permitted to establish themselves in places where they were not established before the treaty. The king promised Ubaldini that he would religiously observe all these conditions

and farther, he relinquished to the pope the honour of being the arbitrator of all those regulations to be made in the establishment of the new republic.

The removing of these difficulties in regard to the pope was of no inconsiderable consequence for his example would not fail to be of great force in determining the other catholic powers, especially those of Italy. Nothing was neglected which might promote the favourable dispositions in which they appeared to be, by punctually paying the cardinals and petty princes of Italy their pensions, and even by adding to them several other gratuities. The establishment of a new monarchy in Italy was the only pretence these petty courts had for not joining in the confederacy; but this vain apprehension would be easily dissipated. The particular advantages which each would acquire might alone have satisfied them in this respect; but if not, all opposers might have been threatened with being declared, after a certain time, divested of all right to the proposed advantages and even of all pretensions to the empire, or the elective kingdoms; and that the republics amongst them should be converted into sovereignties, and sovereignties into republics. There is but little probability that any of them would even have demurred what to do. The punishment of the first offender would have compelled the submission of all these petty states, who were besides sufficiently sensible of their impotence. But this method was not to be used but on failure of all others; and even then, no opportunity would have been neglected of shewing them favour.

And now we are arrived at the point to which every thing was advanced at the fatal moment of the death of Henry the Great; and the following is a circumstantial detail of the forces for the war (*u*), which all the parties concerned had, in conjunction with him, agreed to furnish. The contingents of the kings of England, Sweden, and Denmark were each eight thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and eight cannons, to be raised and maintained, in all respects, at their expense, at least for three years; and this expense, reckoning ten livres a month for each foot soldier, thirty livres for each trooper, the pay of the officers included, and the year to be composed of ten months, would amount, for each of

(*u*) Compare these figures with those already given on p. 34.

these states, to three millions three hundred and seventy thousand livres for three years; the expense of the artillery, fifteen hundred livres a month for each piece being also included. The princes of Germany, before mentioned, were to furnish twenty-five thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and forty cannons: they had themselves computed the expense at nine or ten millions for three years. The United Provinces, twelve thousand foot, two thousand horse, and ten cannons: the expense twelve millions. Hungary, Bohemia, and the other evangelics of Germany, the same number, and nearly at the same expense. The Pope, ten thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and eight cannons. The duke of Savoy, eighteen thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twelve cannons. The Venetians, twelve thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twelve cannons. The expense of these last mentioned armaments the king himself had engaged to defray. The total of all these foreign forces, allowing for deficiencies, which might probably have happened, would always have been, at least one hundred thousand foot, from twenty to twenty-five thousand horse and about one hundred and twenty cannons.

The king, on his side, had actually on foot two good and well furnished armies; the first, which he was to have commanded in person, consisted of twenty thousand foot, all native French, eight thousand Switzers, four thousand Lansquenets or Walloons, five thousand horse, and twenty cannons. The second, to be commanded by Lesdiguières, in the neighbourhood of the Alps, consisted of ten thousand foot, one thousand horse, and ten cannons; besides a flying camp, of four thousand foot, six hundred horse, and ten cannons; and a reserve of two thousand foot to garrison such places where they might be necessary. We will make a general calculation of all these troops.

The twenty thousand foot, at twenty-one livres a month to each man, including the appointments of generals and officers, would, by the month, require four hundred and twenty thousand livres, and by the year, five millions and forty thousand livres; the eight thousand Switzers and four thousand Lasquenets, three millions; the five thousand horse, at sixty livres a month to each, by the month, would require two hundred and forty thousand livres, and by the year, two millions eight hundred and forty thousand livres.

This computation is made so high as sixty livres a month to each, because the pay of the officers, and particularly of the king's body-guard, composed of a thousand men of the first rank in the kingdom, who served as volunteers, was therein included. The expense of the twenty large cannons, six culverins, and four demi-culverins, supposing all necessary furniture for them provided, would amount to three thousand six hundred livres a month for each piece; the thirty together would consequently require one hundred and eight thousand livres. Extraordinary expenses and losses, in regard to the provisions and ammunition for his army, might be computed at one hundred and fifty thousand livres.

And for expenses, whether ordinary or extraordinary, in spies, for sick and wounded, and other unforeseen contingencies, computing at the highest, a like sum of one million eight hundred thousand livres. To supply the deficiencies which might happen in the armies of the confederate princes, to pay the pensions, and to answer other particular exigencies which might arise in the kingdom, three hundred thousand livres a month; for the year, three millions six hundred thousand livres. The army of Lesdiguières would require three millions a year; and as much for each of the armies of the Pope, the Venetians, and the duke of Savoy. These four last articles together, make twelve millions a year; which, added to the preceding sums amount in the whole to about thirty millions one hundred and sixty thousand livres a year.

It remains only to triple this total for three years, during which it was supposed there might be occasion for the forces, and the whole amount will appear to be between ninety and ninety-one millions, which might perhaps be necessary to defray the expenses of the intended war. I say perhaps, for in this calculation I have not included the flying camp, nor the two thousand men for garrisons: the first of these two, at the rate of eighteen livres a month to each foot soldier, and fifty livres to each trooper, would require a farther sum of about one hundred and thirty thousand livres a month; which, for a year, would be one million five hundred thousand livres, and four millions five hundred thousand livres for three years: the second for the three years, would require about twelve hundred thousand livres.

On a supposition that the expense of France, on this occasion, would not have amounted to more than between ninety and ninety-five millions (which supposition is far from being hazardous, because we have here computed every thing at the highest it would bear), it is easy to shew that, at the expiration of three years, Henry would have remaining in his coffers thirty millions over and above what would be expended, the total amount of all the receipts from the several funds, formed and to be formed for these three years, being one hundred and twenty-one millions five hundred and forty thousand livres, as appears from the three estimates which I drew up and presented to his majesty.

The first of these estimates, which contained only a list of the sums actually deposited in the Bastile, amounted to twenty-two millions four hundred and sixty thousand livres, in several coffers, marked Phelipeaux, Puget, and Bouhier. The second was another list of the sums actually due from the farmers (*v*), partisans, and receivers-general which might be considered as in possession, and produced another total of eighteen millions six hundred and thirteen thousand livres. These two totals together made forty-one millions seventy-three thousand livres which the king would immediately have at his disposal. To acquire the rest of these hundred and twenty-one millions, I had no recourse, in the third estimate, to any new taxations. The whole remainder would arise solely from the offers of augmentation upon the several royal revenues which the farmers and partisans (*w*) had made for a lease of three years, and from what the officers of justice and the finances had voluntarily engaged to furnish, provided they might be permitted the free enjoyment of certain privileges: so that in these one hundred twenty-one millions, I had not comprehended the three years receipts of the other royal revenues. And in case it were afterwards necessary to have recourse to means somewhat more burthensome, I had given the king another estimate, whereby, instead of these one hundred and

(*v*) That is, the tax-farmers.

(*w*) The "partisans" were a hated class who, when ready money was short, would advance a portion ("parti") of the expected total yield of a tax and then recoup themselves by extracting the full amount of the tax from those on whom it was levied. Although Sully, as Superintendent of Finance, effected several reforms, he was never able to eradicate the vicious system by which, in the absence of a civil service, the taxes were batted upon by a host of human parasites.

twenty-one millions, it appeared that one hundred and seventy-five millions might have been raised. I also demonstrated, that, upon any pressing emergency, this kingdom could open itself resources of treasure that are almost innumerable.

It was very much to be wished that the sums of money and the number of men to be furnished by the other confederates would be equally well secured by such estimates. But whatever deficiencies might have happened, having forty-one millions to distribute wherever it might be found necessary, what obstacles could Henry have to fear from a power which was known to be destitute of money, and even of troops? no one being ignorant, that the best and most numerous forces which Spain had in its service were drawn from Sicily, Naples, and Lombardy or else were Germans, Switzers, and Walloons.

Every thing therefore concurring to promote success, and good magazines being placed in proper parts of the passage, the king was on the point of marching, at the head of his army, directly to Mezières; from whence, taking his route by Clinchamp, Orchimont, Beauraing, Offais, Longpré, &c. after having caused five forts to be erected in these quarters, and therein placed his two thousand men destined for that purpose, with the necessary provisions and ammunition, he would, near Duren and Stavelo, have joined the two armies, which the princes of Germany and the United Provinces would have caused to march thither. Thereupon beginning by occupying all those passages through which the enemy might find entrance into the territories of Juliers and Cleves, these principalities, which were a pretext for the armament, would consequently have immediately submitted to him and would have been sequestered, till it should appear how the Emperor and the king of Spain would act in regard to the designs of the confederate princes.

This was the moment fixed on to publish and make known throughout Europe, the declarations, in form of manifestoes, which were to open the eyes of all in regard to their true interests and the real motives which had caused Henry and the confederate princes thus to take up arms. These manifestoes were composed with the greatest care; a spirit of justice, honesty, and good faith, of disinterestedness and good policy, were every where apparent

in them. Without wholly revealing the several changes intended to be made in Europe, it was intimated that their common interest had thus compelled its princes to arm themselves; not only to prevent the house of Austria from getting possession of Cleves, but also to divest her of the United Provinces, and of whatever else she unjustly possessed; that their intentions were to distribute these territories among such princes and states as were the weakest; that the design was such, as could not surely give occasion to a war in Europe; that, though armed, the kings of France and the North rather chose to be mediators in the causes of complaint which Europe, through them, made against the house of Austria, and only fought amicably to determine all differences subsisting among the several princes; and that whatever was done on this occasion should be not only with the unanimous consent of all these powers, but even of all their people, who were hereby invited to give in their opinions to the confederate princes. Such also would have been the substance of the circular letters which Henry and the associated princes would at the same time send to all places subject to them; that so the people being informed, and joining their suffrages, a universal cry from all parts of Christendom would have been raised against the house of Austria.

As it was determined to avoid, with the utmost caution, whatever might give umbrage to any one, and Henry being desirous to give still more convincing proofs to his confederates that to promote their true interests was his sole study and design; to these letters already mentioned he would have added others to be written to different courts, particularly to the electors of Cologne and Treves, the bishops of Munster, Liège, and Paderborn and the duke and duchess of Lorraine. This conduct would have been pursued in regard even to our enemies, in the letters which were to be written to the archduke, and the infanta his wife, to the Emperor himself, and to all the Austrian princes, requesting them, from the strongest and most pressing motives, to embrace the only right and reasonable party. In all places, nothing would have been neglected, to instruct, convince, and gain confidence; the execution of all engagements, and the distribution or sequestration of whatever territories might require to be so disposed

would have been strictly, and even scrupulously, observed; force would never have been employed, till arguments, entreaties, embassies, and negotiations should have failed; finally, even in the use of arms, it would have been not as enemies, but pacifiers. The queen would have advanced as far as Metz, accompanied by the whole court, and attended by such pomp and equipage as were suitable only to peace.

Henry had projected a new method of discipline in his camp, which very probably would have produced the good effects intended by it, especially if his example had been imitated by the other princes his allies. He intended to have created four marshals of France, or at least four camp marshals, whose sole care should have been to maintain universal order, discipline, and subordination. The first of these would have had the inspection of the cavalry, the second of the French infantry, the third of the foreign forces, and the fourth of whatever concerned the artillery, ammunition, and provisions and the king would have required an exact and regular account from these officers of whatever was transacted by them in their respective divisions. He applied himself with equal ardour to make all military virtues revered and honoured in his army by granting all employes and places of trust to merit only, by preferring good officers, by rewarding good soldiers, by punishing blasphemies and other impious language, by shewing a regard both for his own troops and those of his confederates, by stifling a spirit of discord, caused by a difference of religions and, finally, by uniting emulation with that harmony of sentiments which contributes more than all the rest to obtain victory.

The consequence of this enterprise, with regard to war, would have depended on the manner in which the Emperor and the king of Spain would receive the propositions and their reply to the manifestoes of the confederate princes. It seems probable that the emperor, submitting to force, would have consented to every thing. I am even persuaded he would have been the first to demand an amicable interview with the king of France, that he might at least extricate himself with honour out of the difficulties in which he would have been involved and he would probably have been satisfied with assurances that the imperial dignity, with

all its rights and prerogatives, should be secured to him for his life. The archdukes had made great advances; they engaged to permit the king, with all his troops, to enter their territories and towns, provided they committed no hostilities in them and paid punctually, in all places, for whatever they required. If these appearances were not deceitful, Spain being abandoned by all, must, though unwillingly, have submitted to the will of its conquerors.

But it may be supposed, that all the branches of the house of Austria would, on this occasion, have united, and, in defence of their common interests, would have used all the efforts of which they were capable. In this case, Henry and the confederate princes would declare war in form against their enemies and deprived the Spaniards of all communications, especially with the Low Countries after having, as we have said, united all their forces, given audience to the princes of Germany, promised assistance to the people of Hungary and Bohemia who should come to implore it of them, and finally, secured the territory of Cleves. These princes would then have caused their three armies to advance towards Bale and Strasbourg to support the Switzers, who after having, for form's sake, asked leave of the emperor, would have declared for the union. The United Provinces, though at a considerable distance from these armies, would yet have been sufficiently defended by the flying camp, which Henry would have caused to advance towards them, by the arms of England and the North, to whose protection they would be entrusted, by the care which at first would have been taken to get possession of Charlemont, Maestricht, Namur, and other places near the Meuse, and finally, by the naval forces of these provinces, which, in conjunction with those of England, would have reigned absolute masters at sea.

These measures being taken, the war could have fallen only in Italy or Germany and supposing it to have happened in the former, the three armies of Henry, the prince of Orange, and the princes of Germany, quitting Franche-Comté, after having fortified it in the same manner as the Low Countries by a small body of troops, would have marched with their forces towards the Alps, where they would have been joined by those of Lesdiguières,

the pope, the Venetians, and the duke of Savoy. These latter would then have declared themselves openly; the duke of Savoy, by requiring a portion for his duchess, equal to what had been given to the infanta Isabella and the other powers, by demanding the execution of the agreement in regard to Navarre, Naples, and Sicily. Thus, from all parts of Europe, war would be declared against Spain. If the enemy should appear inclined to draw the war into Germany, then the confederates, having left a considerable number of troops in Italy, would have penetrated even into the heart of Germany, where, from Hungary and Bohemia, they would have been strengthened by those powerful succours which were there preparing.

The other events, in consequence of these dispositions, can only be conjectured, because they would greatly depend on the degree of alacrity with which the enemy should oppose the rapidity of our conquests and on the readiness with which the confederates, especially those at the extremity of Germany, should make good their engagements. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that, from the dispositions as here laid down, there are none but must regard the house of Austria as penetrated by the blow whose force was for ever to annihilate its power and open a passage to the execution of the other projected designs, to which this attack could only be considered as the preliminary. I will add too (and here the voice of all Europe will vindicate me from the imputation of partiality) that if the force necessary to render such an enterprise successful does always depend on the person of the chief who conducts it, this could not have been better conferred than upon Henry the Great. With a valour alone capable of surmounting the greatest difficulties and a presence of mind which neither neglected nor lost any opportunities; with a prudence which, without precipitating any thing, or attempting too many things at a time, could regularly connect them together and perfectly knew what might and what might not be the result of time; with a consummate experience; and finally, with all those other great qualifications, whether as a warrior or politician, which were so remarkable in this prince; what is there which might not have been obtained? This was the meaning of that modest device which this great king caused to be inscribed on some of the last medals that were struck under his reign, *Nil sine consilio*.

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