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Def. Doc. No. 2921  
(T555)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

INOUE TAKAJIRŌ

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in 1925, and served as secretary in the Bureau of European-American Affairs (later the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs) from 1931 to 1938, during which period I was in charge of business concerning naval disarmament under Director Tōgō Shigenori from 1934 to 1937, and attended the London Naval Conference of 1935-36 as one of the routine of the Japanese delegate, leaving Tokyo in November 1935 and returning to Japan in February 1936. At present, I am in Chief of the Economic Section, Central Liaison Office.

2. The Japanese Foreign Ministry attached importance to the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934-35 in consideration of the situation within and out of Japan, not to speak of the eager desire on the part of the Japanese Government to maintain the peace of the world and to lighten the national burden. It therefore assigned the Fifth Section of the Investigation Bureau exclusively to the transaction of disarmament problems, and ordered the members of that section to serve concurrently in the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs under the direction of Director Tōgō. I was then a member of the Fifth Section, Investigation Bureau, and served concurrently in the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs. It was a matter of common knowledge within the Foreign Ministry at that time that Director Tōgō was well versed in disarmament problems and had an enthusiasm for the success of the Disarmament Conference. The Chief of the Fifth Section of the Investigation Bureau was at first Mr. Yamagata Kiyoshi, who was then succeeded by Mr. Katō Denjirō. I was in charge of the business concerning disarmament under the two section chiefs and was often called before Director Tōgō to receive his orders. He revealed to me his own opinions as to disarmament, in accordance with which knowledge so acquired directly from Director Tōgō, and from the two section chiefs in the course of official duties, I hereby depose as follows:

3. In connection with the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the Preliminary Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934, the two outstanding points which became the subjects of discussion were (A) the common upper limit system of disarmament; and (B) the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty, both of which were advocated by the Navy.



4. As to the proposal of the common upper limit, the Japanese Government had accepted the ratio system of disarmament in the Washington and London Naval Treaties. Moreover, it had even advanced, at the General Disarmament Conference held at Geneva in 1932, a proposal accepting the ratio system. In consideration of these facts as well as the international and the internal situation, it was too sudden a leap to advocate the establishment of the common upper limit. Furthermore, the plan was apparently advantageous exclusively for Japan. There was little hope that the agreement of the other Powers could be obtained, and Mr. Tōgō even foresaw the danger that it might give rise to doubt on the part of the United States and Britain as to the peaceful intention of Japan, effacing, as a result, all hopes for the realization of disarmament. And it would be quite useless, it was considered, to make a proposal which would not be accepted by the United States and Britain. From the above point of view Director Tōgō took a firm stand against the common upper limit plan, and endeavored to find a meeting-point between the Navy and the Foreign Ministry in some other plan. The Navy, however, did not yield. The negotiations lasted for two or three months, but Director Tōgō, adhering to his conviction, opposed the Navy plan to the last. The negotiations thus failed to reach an agreement after all. In the meantime, the opening of the preliminary conference was drawing near. Thereupon, the heads of the Government decided finally to adopt the Navy plan, compelling Director Tōgō to yield to the decision.

5. Director Tōgō considered the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty an exceedingly serious question for Japan, and feared that it would surely stimulate the national sentiments of the Powers. The conclusion would be different if that treaty were to be replaced by some other new treaty immediately, but otherwise chaotic conditions and naval competition would be the sure result, which could aggravate the international situation and, in the long run, lead to war. His opinion, however, was not adopted, owing to the persistent objection on the part of the Navy.

6. In considering the instructions to be given to the Japanese delegates to the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935 (and also thereafter), discussion was had chiefly upon the question whether Japan should accept qualitative disarmament or the obligation to notify the naval construction program in case the Japanese points were not approved. The Navy opposed acceptance on the ground that to do so would be nonsense unless quantitative limitation was established and, moreover, destructive to the national defence of Japan. Director Tōgō, however, insisted upon accepting at least these, as he considered that they would make not a little contribution to the realization of ideal disarmament and would be of service in removing the sense of uneasiness prevailing among the participant Powers. But, as to these questions, his opinions were not brought to realization.

7. With regard to qualitative disarmament, Director Tōgō's opinion was that the limitation of ship sizes and gun calibres alone would be sufficiently effective.

8. As to notification of naval construction program, he tried to persuade the Navy into agreement, pointing out that the Navy would have to make necessary explanations before the Diet, as well as the Finance Ministry, in connection with the estimates for the naval construction, and that, this being so,



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it would be impossible in effect to keep the program secret from other countries. But the Navy insisted upon rejecting it, suggesting that the maintenance of secrecy was not impossible in Japan.

9. Director Tōgō took a serious view of the influence which the termination of the disarmament treaty would exert upon the peace of the world, though it was of course true that he hoped for the substantial solution of the disarmament question partly because he wished thereby to lighten the burdens of the various nations. Especially, it was his heart's desire to restore the international credit which Japan had lost, by managing to bring the disarmament conference to successful conclusion, and thus rescue Japan from the forlorn state she was then in. Quite naturally, therefore, he adhered most persistently to his own stand, and often had heated discussions with Director Yoshida of the Bureau of Naval Affairs of the Navy Ministry.

10. As to the reply of the Japanese Government made in February 1938 in connection with notification of naval construction programs, Mr. Tōgō had nothing to do with it, as he had already been transferred to the post of Japanese Ambassador to Germany when it was issued.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Inoue Takajirō (seal)

On this 2nd day of December, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Inoue Takajirō

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo  
4 December 1947