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Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

January 26, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

SHORT, Major General Walter C. (Resumed)

PAGE

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E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 46

(5th COPY)

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*International Prosecution Section 8522*

1 S. Con. Res. 27

2 - - -

3 Saturday, January 26, 1946

4 - - -

5 Congress of the United States,  
6 Joint Committee on the Investigation  
7 of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
8 Washington, D. C.

9 The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10 10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
11 Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

12 Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
13 Ferguson, and Brewster.

14 Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
15 Gearhart and Keefe.

16 Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;  
17 Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.  
18 Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2       The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be  
3 in order.

## TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

(Resumed)

4  
5  
6       The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything at  
7 this time to present before examination of the witness is  
8 resumed?

9       Mr. Richardson: No, sir.

10       The Vice Chairman: General Short, do you have anything  
11 you want to present to the committee before your examina-  
12 tion is resumed?

13       General Short: No, sir.

14       The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will  
15 inquire.

16       Senator Ferguson: General Short, you brought in the  
17 other day a telegram dated December 5, 1941 to the Panama  
18 Department. Had you seen the reply to the message of the  
19 27th by General Andrews -- it is in Exhibit 32.

20       General Short: I have it here. It is dated November  
21 29, 1941.

22       Senator Ferguson: Now, it would appear that that was  
23 mailed air mail and there was a telegram sent prior to  
24 that indicating he would send the report by air mail.

25       General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: He says:

3 "REURAD FOUR SIX ONE NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN SIGNED  
4 MARSHALL REPORT REQUESTED BEING FORWARDED AIR MAIL. CDC SIX  
5 EIGHT SEVEN."

6 Signed "Andrews".

7 Then we have the memorandum showing in detail just  
8 exactly what he was doing.

9 Now, apparently that was received prior to the 5th.  
10 And then General Miles sends this wire:

11 "U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS STRAINED. WILL INFORM YOU  
12 IF AND WHEN SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMMINENT."

13 Did you take that wire as a modification of the message  
14 of the 27th so that they really didn't want Andrews to be  
15 alerted to the full extent that he had notified them?

16 General Short: No, sir, I took it that he was given  
17 to understand that he could expect additional and probably  
18 last minute information as to exactly what was taking place  
19 diplomatically.

20 Senator Ferguson: And that Miles' construction of  
21 the message of the 27th was that diplomatic relations weren't  
22 as bad as the message of the 27th indicated or that severance  
23 of diplomatic relations being imminent that they would be  
24 notified of that?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2           Senator Ferguson: Well, now, I note on this telegram  
3 this language "send number five twelve" -- that is apparently  
4 the number of the telegram -- "twelve seven". In other  
5 words, it was drawn up on the 5th. Severance of diplomatic  
6 relations was not imminent at this time and it wasn't sent  
7 until the 7th. Sent on the very day -- even after we had  
8 the 14-part message?

9           General Short: Yes, sir.

10           Senator Ferguson: So that as far as General Milos was  
11 concerned he didn't even consider that the 1:00 o'clock and  
12 the 14-part message indicated that a severance of diplomatic  
13 relations was imminent.

14           General Short: Is it possible that he failed to mark  
15 the message "urgent" or "priority" and that it was held  
16 here in Washington for two days?

17           Senator Ferguson: That was going to be my next question.  
18 This message is not marked "priority", the same as General  
19 Marshall's message to you of the 7th, it wasn't marked  
20 priority.

21           General Short: Yes.

22           Senator Ferguson: So that it didn't receive the same  
23 attention that a priority message would receive. Now, was  
24 it the understanding as far as you were concerned that when  
25 messages were not marked "priority" that they were not

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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considered important messages?

General Short: If the lines were not loaded they would be sent through, but if the lines were loaded all of the priority or urgent messages would be sent ahead of those not so marked.

Senator Ferguson: And if at the other end there was any translating or interpreting of codes the ones that were marked "priority" would all go through first and these non-priority messages would be taken up after those?

General Short: That is correct.

Shefner follows 10:15

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Is that the system?

2 General Short: Yes, sir, that is correct.

3  
4 Senator Ferguson: So that you account for this message  
5 to Panama that while it was drawn on the 5th, they did not  
6 get it until the 7th because it was not marked "Priority" and  
7 it is not marked "Priority". I have gone over it carefully.  
8 It is a photostatic copy and I cannot find where it was sent  
9 "Priority".

10 Do you want to look at it and see whether or not you  
11 can find anything on it indicating "Priority"? (Handing  
12 document to witness).

13 General Short: I see nothing to indicate either "Prior-  
14 ity" or "Urgent".

15 Senator Ferguson: I have before me, - and I received  
16 it from your counsel when going over the papers that were out  
17 in yesterday morning on the question of priority of the mes-  
18 sage of General Marshall to you.

19 General Short: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: And that it was not a priority mes-  
21 sage. I think it is clear now from what was out in yesterday  
22 that it was not a priority message but I think this should be  
23 in to make the record complete. Do you have a copy of it  
24 before you?

25 General Short: I think so.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Would you read it into the record?

General Short: You mean the message itself or the --

Senator Ferguson: No.

General Short: The inquiry?

Senator Ferguson: The inquiry.

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What was told you or what was told one of your officials when they made an inquiry.

General Short: (Reading)

"Paragraph 3 WAR L 54 1 EXTRA URGENT

"WASHINGTON, D. C. 219 PM DECEMBER 9 1941

"C G HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H

"FIVE FOUR NINE NINTH PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY EXACT TIME OF RECEIPT OF OUR NUMBER FIVE TWO NINE."

Senator Ferguson: That "529" was the Marshall message of the 7th?

General Short: Yes, sir. (Reading)

"REPEAT FIVE TWO NINE DECEMBER SEVEN AT HONOLULU EXACT TIME DECIPHERED MESSAGE TRANSMITTED BY SIGNAL CORPS TO STAFF AND BY WHAT STAFF OFFICE RECEIVED

COLTON ACTING."

Now, there is a pencilled note on that:

"529 DELIVERED TO C/S 300 PM 7 Dec. - receipted for by Capt. Trueman delivered by Mr. Hough."

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 And then out to one side there is a notation that ap-  
3 parently places it at "2:58 P.M., Col. Dunlop."

4 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what that "2:58 P.M." is?

5 General Short: I beg your pardon?

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what that "2:58 P.M." is?

7 General Short: I think what that means is that that  
8 was delivered to Colonel Dunlop, the Adjutant General, at  
9 2:58 P.M. and he turned it over to my aide, Captain Trueman,  
10 at three o'clock, two minutes later, because it would take  
11 about that length of time to walk from his office to mine.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do you have this memo before you?

13 General Short: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you ask someone there to get  
15 this information for you so that you could wire it back to  
16 the War Department?

17 General Short: I probably did not personally but un-  
18 questionably a member of my staff did.

19 Senator Ferguson: And this is a memorandum?

20 General Short: Yes.

21 Senator Ferguson: Would you read that into the record?

22 General Short: (Reading)

23 "Radio War Department 529 Received. Filed at  
24 Washington, D. C. 12:18 PM Washington time (or 6:48  
25 A. Haw. time) (as RCA 1549 WS), "I think it is.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

"Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A.M. Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A.M. Not marked priority. Other priority messages handled first. Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P.M. Decoded and delivered to Col. Dunlop 2:50 P.M. Delivered to Capt. Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P.M."

And then this was the message, using that information, that was sent to the War Department:

" Re your five four nine. Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh received Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning (this time approximate but within five minutes) seventh Stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh (Received by Chief of Staff Hq Haw Dept three o'clock afternoon seventh All Hawaiian).

SHORT."

That "All Hawaiian" indicates all Hawaiian time.

Senator Ferguson: Now, all of the other messages that you read, the foundation for the message that you sent, "Not marked priority, other priority messages handled first," do you know what they were?

General Short: No, sir, I do not. There may have been a considerable number.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Would counsel look in and see whether  
3 they can find out what messages were sent in there that same  
4 day?

5 Mr. Masten: I did not hear that, Senator.

6 Senator Ferguson: On the same day there is a memorandum  
7 here on the 7th that this message was not marked priority,  
8 "other priority messages handled first." Would you try and  
9 ascertain what those other priority messages were on the 7th  
10 going into Hawaii that were translated first?

11 Mr. Masten: Yes.

12 Senator Ferguson: Then I take these messages to indi-  
13 cate this, that on the 9th of December, that is the Tuesday  
14 following the disaster, the War Department here undertook to  
15 investigate at least to the extent of ascertaining when you  
16 had received their message of the 7th. Is that correct?

17 General Short: That is correct.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you know anything about the Gen-  
19 eral Bundy mission that was coming out to Hawaii to investi-  
20 gate as to the disaster?

21 General Short: Not for two or three years afterwards I  
22 think.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, was there any mission that came  
24 out for the War Department other than the Roberts Commission?

25 General Short: No, sir. Secretary Knox came out ahead

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 of the Roberts Commission.

3 Senator Ferguson: I understand that he went more into  
4 the details of the Navy than he did of the War Department.

5 General Short: He went completely through my field head-  
6 quarters and spent I would say probably two hours, in which  
7 we had officers detailed from every section to explain every-  
8 thing that had happened. He got a very complete picture not  
9 only of our headquarters but how we were functioning and ex-  
10 actly what happened and at the end of the time he was so im-  
11 pressed with our headquarters that he directed the Navy to  
12 make arrangements to move over into an underground head-  
13 quarters right alongside of us.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, did he indicate in any way that  
15 he was not satisfied with what you had done?

16 General Short: He did not.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, I may be repeating on this, I do  
18 not want to repeat but I want to try and find out whether or  
19 not you were present when Colonel Knox, Secretary of the  
20 Navy, said something to Admiral Kimmel about a message being  
21 sent on the 6th, the afternoon or the evening of the 6th?

22 General Short: I do not remember it. I talked with  
23 Colonel Knox at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters soon after he  
24 arrived but I do not remember the conversation. It may have  
25 taken place.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, did he mention in any way to  
3 you a message being sent on the 6th, a warning message?

4 General Short: I do not remember that. I think that in  
5 some way that we must have misunderstood each other as to the  
6 time because I explained to him about the Chief of Staff's  
7 message on the 7th and it was the only message I received and  
8 I think that there must have been a misunderstanding somewhere  
9 between us.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, on the message of the 27th, were  
11 you familiar with exhibit 45? I wish you would look at exhibit  
12 45. Does counsel have exhibit 45 there?

13 Mr. Masten: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: Pass it to General Short, please.

15 Mr. Masten: All right (handing document to witness.)

16 Senator Ferguson: That is an explanation or partial ex-  
17 planation as to the message of the 27th. (Reading)

18 "The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 A.M." --  
19 this is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

20 "General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted  
21 to know what warning messages have been sent to General  
22 MacArthur and what were proposed."

23 Now, you will note there that there was nothing said about  
24 Hawaii. It is only what had been sent to General MacArthur  
25 and what was proposed.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 "I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy mes-  
3 sage sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the  
4 draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.  
5 He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the Presi-  
6 dent this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had  
7 been terminated with the barest possibility of resump-  
8 tion. The President wanted a warning message sent to  
9 the Philippines."

10 And you will note there that nothing is said about the  
11 President wanting a message sent to you. Then going on and  
12 reading:

13 "I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and pre-  
14 pare an appropriate cablegram."

15 Now, when did you first learn about that exhibit?

16 General Short: I think that I learned the substance of  
17 that exhibit when I read the testimony of Secretary Stimson  
18 and General Gerow before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944.  
19 I do not know whether I had actually seen the memorandum but  
20 I did learn the substance.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now I would like to go to several  
22 answers in the Top Secret. Admiral Ingersoll on page 423 of  
23 the Hart record. Now, you were asked and others were asked  
24 about that preparatory deployment. Here is question No. 38:

25 "Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant by its



Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 directive to make a preparatory deployment as contained  
3 in this dispatch of October the 16th?"

4 That is the first they used that "preparatory deploy-  
5 ment", in that message also. Now, here is what he answers:

6 "I think the preparatory deployment that would not  
7 constitute provocative action or disclose strategic in-  
8 tentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of  
9 certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea  
10 area toward the Southern Philippines rather than any  
11 particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the  
12 possible exception of sending out submarines for obser-  
13 vation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed  
14 to both the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander-  
15 in-Chief Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here in connec-  
16 tion with this dispatch and others which followed that  
17 they were released by me. In all cases such dispatches  
18 were drafted in the War Plans Division and were pre-  
19 sented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being  
20 sent. In many cases I am quite certain that he may have  
21 notified both the State Department and the President of  
22 his intention to send dispatches of this character. The  
23 fact that it bears my release simply means that after  
24 the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral  
25 Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 I released these dispatches in the form which he had  
3 approved."

4 Now, on page 426, question No. 49 and 50. Let me read  
5 both of them.

6 "Question: In drafting the dispatch of the 27th of  
7 November was consideration given to the thought that  
8 mention of Western Pacific objectives only might tend  
9 to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the  
10 Hawaiian area?

11 "Answer: I am sure that the drafting of the dispatch  
12 was not meant to give such an impression. The impression  
13 it was intended to give was that the events were moving  
14 in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States  
15 would become involved in war in a few days and conse-  
16 quently that the United States forces elsewhere in the  
17 Pacific and also in the Atlantic world find themselves at  
18 war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in  
19 the Asiatic waters."

20 "Question No. 50: What action on the part of the  
21 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was expected incident  
22 to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the  
23 dispatch of the 27th of November?"

24 "Again" -- this is his answer -- "Again this dis-  
25 patch is dispatched both to the Commander-in-Chief of

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific  
3 Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements  
4 which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding  
5 withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for oper-  
6 ations contemplated elsewhere and the movements in the  
7 Hawaiian area were those regarding observations, the  
8 establishment of a patrol and the reinforcement of out-  
9 lying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered  
10 that an early dispatch in October had warned both Com-  
11 manders-in-Chief against taking action which would pro-  
12 voke "war."

13 Now, did you ever hear of that testimony or that interpre-  
14 tation of this word "deployment" in these messages?

15 General Short: I know at the time that it did not strike  
16 me that it was intended to be only the Asiatic Fleet. I do  
17 not believe I have had access to the Hart report; at least I  
18 do not remember those particular passages. I would like to  
19 ask my counsel if we have ever had a copy of the Hart report?

20 Captain Ford: No, we have not.

21 General Short: We have never had a copy of the Hart re-  
22 port.

23 Senator Ferguson: In other words, you have never seen  
24 the Hart report?

25 General Short: That is correct.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Even to the time you are testifying here?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, is this the kind of difficulty we find in messages that are given to two or more outposts where certain words are intended for one outpost and not for another?

General Short: Unquestionably in this case it was of great difficulty because it never occurred to me when I read those two messages that they applied just to the Asiatic Fleet. I think they directly applied to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson: But the man who drafted the messages or sent them out gives this interpretation, that they were intended more for the Asiatic Fleet because they had certain missions which were outlined in the war plans. Now, were you familiar with the War Plan No. WPL 46?

General Short: I knew in general terms what it provided for. It was an offensive into the Mandate Islands.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, General, in this message  
3 it said that you were not to commit an overt act against  
4 Japan.

5 General Short: What is that?

6 Senator Ferguson: You were not to commit the first  
7 overt act against Japan.

8 I want to ask you how, as the head of the Army in Hawaii,  
9 it was possible for you to commit an overt act of war against  
10 Japan?

11 General Short: Only by sending out my long-range  
12 bombers, which would have been acting under the orders of  
13 the Navy, not under my own orders.

14 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand there was only  
15 one way in which you could have committed an overt act  
16 against Japan, and that would have been to send out the long-  
17 range bomber and that bomber had done something in relation  
18 to a ship or submarine, or something of Japan?

19 General Short: I might add, something that I might  
20 have done to a Japanese national that the Japanese might  
21 have construed it that way. They were apparently looking  
22 for excuses. For instance, if I had arrested on the  
23 consular agents that we knew the names of, they might have  
24 considered that an overt act. It would have been possible  
25 for me to do that.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, the Navy  
3 did not get this message and they were in a position to  
4 commit many overt acts?

5 General Short: That is correct.

6 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for that?

7 General Short: I cannot account for it.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you think that the arrest by  
9 the military police of one of the consular agents would  
10 have been an overt act in war?

11 General Short: I do not, but I do not know what  
12 the Japs might have tried to make it appear, or how they  
13 might have tried to make it appear.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, how did you read the overt act  
15 part of your message? What did it mean to you?

16 General Short: It meant to me simply that the War  
17 Department was extremely anxious to avoid war, and they  
18 did not want any international incident to happen in Hawaii  
19 that might provoke war or might give the Japanese an oppor-  
20 tunity to claim that we had started the war.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, let us look at it this way.  
22 We had put the Fleet in Hawaii in order that we might show  
23 Japan our strength, and we were backing up our diplomacy  
24 by the Fleet being out there.

25 Now, why would the exhibition of a strong army in

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Hawaii have a greater tendency to prevent war than by  
3 showing we were weak and afraid and we were not doing  
4 anything?

h3  
5 General Short: It would look like it would be a  
6 similar action that they were using to impress Japan.

7 Senator Ferguson: With the Navy?

8 General Short: A strong army would have been the  
9 same means of impressing the Japanese.

10 Senator Ferguson: But in one case, we put the Navy  
11 in there as a symbol of strength, and in the other case,  
12 in your case, we tried to conceal the fact that you had a  
13 strong army and you were ready for anything that might  
14 happen.

15 General Short: That would be true.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, would it have been possible,  
17 in your opinion as an expert -- laying aside this question  
18 of the first overt act as far as the army was concerned,  
19 that if we had a full mobilization of the army -- some  
20 40,000 was it in Hawaii?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: If we had shown a full mobilization  
23 of that army, if we had shown that we were on the alert  
24 for everything that might come that we would have never  
25 had an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Short: I think it quite probable that if that had been reported to the Japanese, they would have turned back the attacking force.

Senator Ferguson: That would have meant that we would have had no attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: These two phrases, one, don't commit the first overt act, and the other one, don't do anything -- what is the language in the message of the 27th?

General Short: Alarm the public or disclose intent.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you had not had those, and you were fully alerted, where the soldiers were wearing regalia, full arms, your machine guns were manned, your radar was working 24 hours a day, then you would come to the conclusion, would you not that in your opinion as an Army General, they would have turned back?

General Short: There would have been a very excellent chance that they would have turned back. That would have been the tendency, because they would have felt, or they would be sure that they would take heavy losses. Surprise was the only opportunity that they had to succeed.

Senator Ferguson: Now, in your prepared statement, you use this language, on page 60, paragraph 98:

"I do not feel that I have been treated fairly, or



Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster."

Now, you are covering very broad ground when you use the word "War Department." I wish you would be specific and tell me whom you had in mind was the War Department?

General Short: I had in mind the General Staff in particular, because they were primarily responsible for the policies pursued by the War Department.

Senator Ferguson: And the General Staff was headed by whom?

General Short: General Marshall.

Senator Ferguson: And who else would be in there? I would like for you to be specific instead of covering the whole ground.

General Short: General Gerow as head of the War Plans Division had the direct responsibility for keeping me informed. General Miles, the head of G-2, had a very direct responsibility.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: What about the Secretary of War?  
3 Is he included in the words there "War Department"?

4 General Short: As far as technical things went, I  
5 would not have expected him to be as fully aware of the  
6 significance of technical things. I would expect him to  
7 be fully aware of any policy.

8 Senator Ferguson: So as far as the policy was con-  
9 cerned, he would be included in that?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now when you use the word "scapegoat",  
12 will you give us the meaning that you want to convey to us  
13 in that word?

14 General Short: It seems to me that may be a slang  
15 expression, but it is a word in very common usage, and I  
16 meant just exactly what the common usage meant, that it was  
17 someone that they saddled the blame on to get it off of  
18 themselves.

19 Senator Ferguson: In other words, they were in this  
20 position, in your opinion, and that is what you wanted to  
21 convey, that someone had to take some blame for what happened  
22 at Pearl Harbor, that certain people in Washington that  
23 you had named in your opinion were to blame, that they  
24 shifted that blame over to you as the Commanding General  
25 at Hawaii and therefore made you, in the common language, a

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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scapegoat?

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General Short: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Is that what you want to convey to  
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this committee?

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General Short: That is exactly what I want to convey.

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Senator Ferguson: Now yesterday you read to us some  
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letters about your retirement, and you read part of General  
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Marshall's testimony where I had examined him. What is it  
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that you wanted to convey by the reading of General Marshall's  
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testimony? Were you of the opinion that it was in conflict  
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with what you were about to read from the messages?

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General Short: I thought his testimony conveyed the  
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idea that the matter of my retirement had been handled  
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entirely by the Secretary of War and that he had had nothing  
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to do with it, in fact he was not cognizant of what was  
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being done, and the correspondence I had did not agree  
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with that.

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Senator Ferguson: Therefore you were of the opinion  
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that his testimony was not in line with what the letters  
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showed that you were about to put in? Is that what you  
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wanted to convey to the committee?

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General Short: That is correct.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you consider, in a way, that  
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your retirement request was a conditional one, that is that

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 you would be consulted later by General Marshall before  
3 it would be turned in?

4 General Short: When I sent that to General Marshall I  
5 had very great confidence in both his judgment and his  
6 loyalty to me. I felt that he would use it only if his  
7 best judgment indicated that he should use it, but I did  
8 expect -- not necessarily before he used it if there was not  
9 time, but he would communicate with me before he used it,  
10 or he would communicate with me immediately afterwards and  
11 explain why it was necessary to use it. I had given him  
12 full authority to use it.

13 Senator Ferguson: It would indicate, from the fact  
14 that you had talked to him at 1:00 o'clock on the 25th,  
15 that is Sunday, when the Roberts Report came out, and it  
16 was used on the 26th, that he would not have had time to  
17 read all of the testimony in the Roberts Report to find out  
18 the facts, would he?

(4)  
19 General Short: He would have had time, of course,  
20 to read all of the findings published in the newspaper, but  
21 he would not have had time to read all of the testimony.

22 Senator Ferguson: When you use a report as a rule you  
23 want to know on what facts it is based, do you not?

24 General Short: That is correct.

25 Senator Ferguson: When those facts are in existence?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Short: That is correct.

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Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted by Justice Roberts as to whether or not you had magic? You know what I mean by "magic", the intercepted codes, either the codes themselves or the means of getting the codes?

7

8

General Short: You mean the intercepts?

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General Short: I do not think that at any place any inquiry was made of me as to whether I had received them. I am rather sure no inquiry was made. I think they understood that I had not.

13

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Senator Ferguson: Well, at least you were not asked the specific questions as to whether or not you had or did not have magic?

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General Short: I am sure that is correct.

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Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the Roberts Report is based upon the fact that you and Admiral Kimmel did have magic and had the means of getting the magic?

General Short: I have seen no testimony from the War Department that indicated that they were told that I did have magic. I believe that there has been testimony here that the Roberts Board was informed by someone in the Navy Department --

Senator Ferguson: By Turner and Stark?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: Yes, sir. -- that Admiral Kimmel did  
3 have magic.

4 Senator Ferguson: And that would have meant if Kimmel  
5 had it you would have it?

6 General Short: If he had been told to give it to me.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. General, do you have a clipping  
8 as to what appeared in the press about your retirement?

9 General Short: I do. I have one here that I do not  
10 know whether it actually appeared, but I have a statement  
11 by the Secretary of War that was mimeographed, and it is  
12 presumed that it appeared in the press. My memory is not  
13 definite now to say whether it actually appeared.

14 Senator Ferguson: By the way, where did you get the  
15 copy?

16 General Short: Colonel Dumcombe gave it to me this  
17 morning.

18 Senator Ferguson: At least it was in the War Department?

19 General Short: Yes.

20 Senator Ferguson: You received it when?

21 General Short: This morning.

22 Senator Ferguson: Will you read it?

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: It was in the War Department file?

25 General Short: Yes, sir. (Reading)

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

" WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

PRESS BRANCH

Tel. - RE 6700  
Brs. 3425 and 3438

February 28, 1942

" I M M E D I A T E

R E L E A S E

RETIREMENT OF GENERAL SHORT APPROVED

"The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 1942, of the application for retirement of Major General Walter C. Short without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

"The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit."

END

DISTRIBUTION: A, D, M, N.

1:00 P.M."

Senator Ferguson: I understand then from that that

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts Report you would be courts martialled at some time?

General Short: He at least stated that he had directed this to be drawn.

Senator Ferguson: That is right. That would be the same as if you would be courts martialled?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now did you ever do anything in any way to prevent that courts martial, the charges being filed?

General Short: I did not. In fact, I signed a waiver that I would agree to a courts martial within six months after the termination of hostilities.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D

Hook follows



Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, who came to you about that  
3 waiver?

4 General Short: General Woodruff, retired, was sent  
5 from the War Department to Dallas, to see me.

6 Senator Ferguson: What was the conversation about  
7 the waiver? About when was it?

8 General Short: I have forgotten the date. I believe  
9 it was sometime before December 7, 1943, because they wanted  
10 the waiver before the time was up. Perhaps along in  
11 September or October of 1943.

12 He explained to me that Admiral Kimmel had signed  
13 such a waiver and gave me the letter of the Secretary of  
14 War requesting me to sign the waiver, and also a copy  
15 of the correspondence that Admiral Kimmel had had with  
16 the Secretary of the Navy.

17 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, they had used  
18 your request for retirement in getting Admiral Kimmel's  
19 request for retirement.

20 Now, do I understand that they used what Admiral  
21 Kimmel had done to waive the statute of limitations when  
22 they came to you?

23 General Short: That is correct.

24 Senator Ferguson: Did they explain that Admiral  
25 Kimmel had waived the statute of limitations?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 General Short: They furnished me with a copy of  
3 his letter and a copy of the waiver signed by him.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did they ask you to sign such a  
5 waiver?

6 General Short: Yes, sir, by the Secretary of War in  
7 a written letter delivered by General Woodruff.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you happen to have that written  
9 letter?

10 General Short: I have it. I think we have it here  
11 probably. The waiver and letter were both read into the  
12 record yesterday, on page 8495. Do you wish to have it?

13 Senator Ferguson: No, no, just let it go.

14 General Short: The date of that letter was the 18th  
15 of September, 1943.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not  
17 any department of the Government ever made any request  
18 of Congress to pass a statute extending the statute of  
19 limitations?

20 General Short: I do not.

21 Senator Ferguson: But you were requested by the  
22 Secretary of War to sign a waiver of the statute of limi-  
23 tations, and you did so?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, have you ever made any direct

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 request for a courts martial trial?

3 General Short: I have not.

4 Senator Ferguson: And you have done nothing, as I  
5 understand it to prevent such a trial?

6 General Short: I have not.

7 Senator Ferguson: You are prepared, then, to defend  
8 any trial that the Government may start? Is that the way  
9 it stands?

10 General Short: That is the way it stands.

11 Senator Ferguson: A trial that the Government may  
12 start?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Do you consider that this is a  
15 fair hearing for you?

16 General Short: I consider that this hearing has been  
17 extremely fair, very thorough, and that I have been ac-  
18 corded very great courtesy by the Chairman and by every  
19 member of the committee.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to go toa another  
21 subject.

22 On October 17, 1941, George W. Bicknell, Lieutenant  
23 Colonel, G.S.C., Assistant A.C. of S., G-2, Contact Officer  
24 -- he was in your department?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: He was what?

General Short: He was one of my intelligence officers.  
He was the assistant to the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

Senator Ferguson: Now were you familiar with what  
he drew up? It is here in evidence as Exhibit 139, dated  
the 17th of October, 1941. Will you look at that and tell  
us when you first saw that?

General Short: I probably saw that the day it was  
prepared, or maybe the day after it was prepared.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I will take you to paragraph  
3, on page 3, and ask you to read that. It is headed  
"Attack on British Possession in the Far East."

General Short: You want me to read from there on?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I want you to read from there  
on to the bottom of the page.

General Short : "3. Attack British Possessions in  
the Far East.

"4. Defend against an American attack in support  
of the British.

"5. Attack simultaneously" --

Senator Ferguson: No, no, I guess you did not under-  
stand my question. I mean on page 3, the paragraph numbered  
3, "Attack on British Possessions in the Far East." Then I  
would like to have you read from there down to the bottom

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

of the page.

General Short: I was on page 2. I am sorry.

"Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time - famous with her Axis partner, Hitler - it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time."

You want me to read on from there?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Short: "4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.

"While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our Naval

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 program is completed.

3 "An attack on the United States could not be under-  
4 taken without almost certain involvement of the entire  
5 ABCD block. Hence there remains the possibility that  
6 Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at  
7 whatever point might gain for her the most strategic,  
8 tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents."

9 Senator Ferguson: All right.

10 Now, General, prior to that, what was your information  
11 in relation to any agreement we may have had, whether  
12 legally binding or not, with the British and Dutch?

13 General Short: I had no information whatever about  
14 an agreement between the British and Dutch.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any information about  
16 any understanding that we had with them?

17 General Short: I did not.

18 Senator Ferguson: You notice that your G-2 officer  
19 uses this language:

20 "it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain  
21 British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly  
22 attack the British, and do so without a simultaneous attack  
23 on American possessions, because of no known binding agree-  
24 ment between the British and Americans for joint military  
25 action against Japan, and that the American public is not

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 yet fully prepared to support such action."

2  
3 Now, he uses the language "no known binding agree-  
4 ment." What do you understand by "binding agreement"?  
5 Do you mean by treaty?

6 General Short: To be binding, it should be approved  
7 by the Congress, as I understand it.

8 Senator Ferguson: Is that what he was talking about  
9 there? He was telling you that we had no treaty, we had  
10 no agreement that was approved by Congress?

11 General Short: It is difficult to say. He might  
12 have meant simply any agreement that had been made and  
13 approved by the President, and not made public, something  
14 that the President expected to set forth in the Senate.  
15 I do not know.

16 Senator Ferguson: What was your understanding about  
17 that part of it that "the American public is not yet  
18 fully prepared to support such action"?

19 General Short: I felt at that time that the American  
20 public would not have been willing to have an agreement  
21 ratified that we would go to war to defend the Netherlands  
22 East Indies or Singapore.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, were you familiar at that  
24 time with the message from Tokyo to Berlin, where we  
25 openly intercepted -- I will not put it that way. We can

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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only locate, in the War Department, two parts of three parts of a message sent from Tokyo to Berlin on this question.

General Short: I was not familiar with it.

Senator Ferguson: You had no knowledge as to that?

General Short: None whatever.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that we had met with the British and Dutch and had talked over this question?

General Short: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: You had no knowledge at all on that?

General Short: No knowledge whatever.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that this plan, which we now have in evidence, this WPL-46, talked about certain agreements? Whether or not they were binding agreements is another question, but at least talked about it.

General Short: I knew when we received Rainbow Five at the same time that it was drawn up with the idea apparently that when it went into effect we would be allied with Britain and the Dutch, but I had had no basis for the writing of that plan.

WARTS & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that we had received  
3 word from the British on the morning of the 6th, sent to  
4 the State Department, that the Japanese ships were going  
5 into the Kra Peninsula?

6 General Short: I did not.

7 Senator Ferguson: Would that have meant anything to  
8 you, what you knew about our understanding?

9 General Short: It meant certainly war against the  
10 British.

11 Senator Ferguson: Have you ever tried to find out  
12 personally what it would mean if Japan and Britain would go  
13 to war with no attack on America?

14 General Short: No, sir, I have not asked the War De-  
15 partment.

16 Senator Ferguson: You heard Admiral Kimmel testify  
17 here, did you?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And you have read his testimony?

20 General Short: I did not hear him, I read his testimony.

21 Senator Ferguson: You read his testimony?

22 General Short: I read his testimony.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you know, prior to the time that  
24 you read his testimony, that there was certain correspondence  
25 by Admiral Kimmel on this question of attack on the British

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 and Dutch alone?

3 General Short: I did not.

4 Senator Ferguson: The exhibit that I have just re-  
5 ferred to, the WPL-46, is Exhibit No. 129, so that the  
6 record will show it.

7 Now have you gone over this war plan?

8 General Short: I think I had gone over it some time  
9 ago. Not the WPL-46, but the Rainbow 5, which would have  
10 the same provisions, probably, in regard to fighting with  
11 the Allies.

12 Senator Ferguson: That is true. This is the "Navy  
13 Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5".

14 "INTRODUCTION

15 "CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN.

16 "This Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5, was pre-  
17 pared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

18 "It is based upon the report of the United States-British  
19 Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-  
20 United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the  
21 Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5.

22 "The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1)  
23 and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will  
24 be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan."

25 Now you did not know anything about these negotiations?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Short: I knew nothing about the negotiations, but I think I had a copy of the plan, about what you have read there, a short time before the attack. That was a modification of our existing war plans, and I think we received that.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when Singapore was alerted?

General Short: I do not exactly. I think probably a short time before December 7, maybe a week or 10 days before, but it would be just guess work.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the Dutch, on December 1st, sent this dispatch by the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon, to Mr. Hornbeck, "The Netherlands Minister informed me by telephone this morning that the Governor of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of his armed forces"?

General Short: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: You did not know that?

General Short: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now under the knowledge that you had would that have meant anything to you?

General Short: With the information that I had had from the War Department always pointing to an attack to the Southwest Pacific, and including the Netherlands East Indies, I would have thought that was what was going to take place.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Would that have meant anything to you?

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General Short: It would have meant that they considered war very imminent out there naturally.

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Senator Ferguson: Would it have meant that war was imminent on the Hawaiian Islands?

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General Short: Not necessarily, because there had never been an estimate since June 17, 1940 of an attack on Hawaii. It would have meant possible hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the President had delivered to Japan, on August 17, a message in relation to the entire Pacific?

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General Short: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have the copy or copies of information from any diplomatic notes between Japan and the United States?

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General Short: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, if they had brought to your attention the alerting of Singapore, the fact that the Singapore troops were alerted, what would that have meant to you?

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General Short: With the information I had from the War Department it was just a confirmation that the Japanese action was going to come in that part of the world and not

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson: So it meant just the opposite to you than an alert in Hawaii? It indicated to you that there was going to be war many thousands of miles away from you with another country?

General Short: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Is that what the information meant to you?

General Short: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Now I am not clear on the radar. I would like to get some information about it.

There isn't any doubt that the radar machine will catch a plane going out as well as coming in?

General Short: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And there isn't any doubt that early on that morning, about 7:00 o'clock, our radar machine saw planes 132 miles, I believe it was, 130 or 132 miles, coming in from the north, and that those very planes bombed American fortifications and sunk our ships? Is there any doubt about that?

General Short: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And as shown by the map, that same radar machine, or other radar machines saw the planes going out in the same direction, is there any doubt about that? This

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(10)

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 map shows them coming in from the north 130-some miles,  
3 and we had contact with them going out, 130-some miles out  
4 even further north. At 7:02 we catch them first going out.

5 General Short: Major Berquist, who was the Chief  
6 Control Officer, stated that there was so much confusion --  
7 I suppose he meant because they were going in every direction --  
8 that he was not able to draw any logical conclusion from  
9 what he had.

10 Senator Ferguson: There wasn't any confusion about  
11 the fact that they were coming in at that distance?

12 General Short: Absolutely, because that is a definite  
13 direction.

14 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for the fact  
15 that the ships in these task forces were notified to go  
16 south and look for them, when our only information was that  
17 they came from the north, and they even had the degree, or  
18 the line on which they had come, and we saw them coming  
19 in at 132 miles and we saw some of them, at least, going  
20 out the same way, so why did we go to the south to look  
21 for them?

22 General Short: Lieutenant Tyler states he did not  
23 make a report on that until some days later, when he reported  
24 to General Davidson the coming in. I personally did not  
25 hear that day that the Opana Station had picked them up.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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It seems when Major Tindall came back, when they remanned the station about 8:30, that they took off all of the old information on the board in the Information Center. So apparently Lieutenant Tyler was not experienced enough to have this mean anything, and it not having been reported to Major Tindall when the station opened he did not know it, and the result was that it was not reported.

Senator Ferguson: But, as I understand it, it was brought out definitely yesterday that Lieutenant Tyler has been promoted at least twice.

General Short: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: There was no disciplinary action  
3 against him for not reporting this matter?

4 General Short: That is correct.

5 Senator Ferguson: And that may have meant the dif-  
6 ference between bombing and not bombing this Jap Fleet?

7 General Short: I think unquestionably if the Navy  
8 had had that information, they would have tried to locate  
9 the carriers.

10 Now, there is one other thing I did not mention. I  
11 believe that they picked up radar information, an inter-  
12 cept that indicated a Japanese ship sending radio messages  
13 from the southwest. Now, that may have been a small  
14 ship that was sent out there purposely by the Japanese,  
15 and I think that that influenced the Navy to send to the  
16 southwest first.

17 Senator Ferguson: That was not as definite information,  
18 was it?

19 General Short: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: As that the ships had come in from  
21 the north and had gone out to the north?

22 General Short: No, sir, but they did not have that  
23 and I did not have it.

24 Senator Ferguson: I take it from your testimony, you  
25 knew nothing about them coming in from the north on the day

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 of the 7th?

3 General Short: Beg pardon?

4 Senator Ferguson: On the day of the 7th you had no  
5 knowledge of these planes coming in from the north?

6 General Short: That is correct. I did know that  
7 our flying fortresses from California came in from the  
8 north. I knew that definitely.

9 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand now that you had  
10 no information on the 7th about the radar chart showing  
11 planes coming in from the north?

12 General Short: That is correct.

13 Senator Ferguson: Any one could see these planes  
14 coming in at various times from the north, could they not?

15 General Short: They came in from every direction,  
16 Senator. They had different tasks assigned them. Some  
17 came in from the east of the Island to actually make the  
18 attack, and others came in from the west, so apparently  
19 they had diverted from their original direction so as to  
20 approach certain targets in certain ways.

21 Senator Ferguson: I would assume that after they  
22 got near the Island they would take a position so they  
23 could approach a target from a certain direction.

24 General Short: Yes.

25 Senator Ferguson: But prior to that did not everything

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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indicate that they were coming from the north?

General Short: All we had was what Lieutenant Tyler knew. If he had reported, it would have been a definite indication, but we did not have it at that time.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: General, how can you account for the fact that there was no disciplinary action against an Army officer for not reporting a thing like that that was so vital to America's defense?

General Short: There was no device at that time by which he could differentiate between friend and foe.

Senator Ferguson: But it turned out in a few minutes that everyone on the Island knew that these ships were foe.

General Short: But coming in about three degrees difference in direction, and five minutes difference in time. He just made a false assumption that the ships picked up were the American planes.

Senator Ferguson: There isn't any evidence in the record that Tyler knew that the B-17's were coming in, other than that the music played all right on the Hawaiian radio, and therefore he assumed that our planes must be coming in on that beam.

General Short: You see, they had no beam at that time, and I think it was common knowledge with the air people that that music was used as a beam to guide our planes in.

Senator Ferguson: Were our planes all equipped with radio?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Then why couldn't our radio stations  
4 contact the planes and ask them whether they were enemy  
5 or friend?

6 General Short: If the report had been made by Lieuten-  
7 ant Tyler, it could have been done.

8 Senator Ferguson: I come back --

9 General Short: Even if they had gotten the report,  
10 they might have been misled because they were so close  
11 to the same position at the same time.

12 Senator Ferguson: Couldn't we have asked the B-17's  
13 "Are you friend or foe"? Didn't we have any codes at that  
14 time?

15 General Short: We could have asked them, yes.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did we ask them?

17 General Short: We did not.

18 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for that? I  
19 realise you personally were not in charge of it, but I am  
20 trying to find out why there wasn't some discipline as  
21 far as men down in the ranks were concerned in relation  
22 to these fatal errors. I consider that you considered  
23 them fatal.

24 General Short: Apparently Lieutenant Tyler felt so  
25 sure they were friendly planes, that he made no inquiry.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3  
2 Senator Ferguson: But within a few minutes after he  
3 gets this message raining down on the American possessions  
4 and our men were bombs from an enemy. How could this same  
5 man then keep the conclusion in his mind that they were  
6 friends?

7 General Short : I don't think he did.

8 Senator Ferguson: Then why couldn't he at that moment,  
9 at the dropping of the first bomb, even, if necessary, by  
10 foot, give the alarm and tell where these planes were coming  
11 from so that we could go out and get the carriers, so at  
12 least they would never do it again?

13 General Short: He did alert the command, but he gave  
14 nobody the information he had as to what direction they  
15 were coming.

16 Senator Ferguson: In other words, he alerted the  
17 command, enemy planes came in, and he never even told them  
18 what direction the planes were coming from?

19 General Short: Apparently not.

20 Senator Ferguson: And that man was promoted?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did anybody ask him from what  
23 direction they were coming? Didn't somebody think to ask  
24 him. I realize you were taken away from there about the  
25 16th.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: What I did as soon as I heard it  
3 was this -- it was too late to accomplish anything, but  
4 as soon as I heard of the incident, I sent an officer  
5 to take affidavits of Lieutenant Tyler and Lieutenant  
6 White, and I believe they got one from the operator,  
7 Private McDonald.

8 Senator Ferguson: General, did you know that we even  
9 went out and bombed one of Admiral Newton's ships, one  
10 of the ships of his fleet?

11 General Short: I don't know that we ever actually  
12 bombed one. I knew at one time that we had mistaken  
13 information, but fortunately our pilots recognized the  
14 ship as an American ship and did not bomb it. I never  
15 heard that we actually bombed a ship.

16 Senator Ferguson: If you will bear with me a moment --

17 Mr. Murphy: You will find something on it, Senator,  
18 in the Naval Narrative. I don't have the page, but it  
19 is in the Naval Narrative.

20 Mr. Masten, do you have volume 2 of the Navy  
21 Narrative here?

22 Mr. Masten: Yes.

23 Senator Ferguson: Here it is. It was the Portland.

24 "None, except we carried on air patrol looking for  
25 any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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destroyers from a tanker, and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false.

"The Portland was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but, fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the Portland as an enemy carrier and the Porter, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes was reported as an accompanying cruiser."

Did you ever hear about that?

General Short: I don't remember. If I did, I have forgotten about it.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, this fleet of ours went south to look for this task force instead of north, with a good prospect of finding it to the north, as I understand the testimony, and that we bombed our own ship, the Portland.

General Short: The search was in control of the Navy. They gave our people the information on which they wanted the search. I think we made one search that was not directed by the Navy. There were persistent reports that there were Japanese planes off Pearl Harbor, 25 or 50 miles to the southwest off Barber's Point, and I believe that General Martin went out on his own and investigated that when he

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 had no mission from the Navy, and found it was false.

3 Senator Ferguson: General, I realize that we were  
4 at peace for something like 25 years, and that we had  
5 put our heads in the corner and didn't look for any war.  
6 That is, some people did, but I wonder whether the Army  
7 and the Navy were doing the same thing. Here it was said  
8 that our people weren't ready to enter into an understand-  
9 ing that in case there was an attack down there we would  
10 go to bat. But we weren't consulted on the question of  
11 the shooting orders in the Atlantic, as I recall. Congress  
12 didn't say anything about that.

13 Now, was the Army and the Navy, and I use this expres-  
14 sion because it is one that is well-known, were they  
15 asleep at the switch up to December 7?

16 General Short: I think we had worked very seriously  
17 in Hawaii to make preparations against any type of attack,  
18 but all of the information that we had from Washington  
19 indicated to us not an attack on Hawaii, but toward the  
20 Philippines and South Pacific, and definitely gave us the  
21 opinion that hostile action in Hawaii would be in the  
22 nature of sabotage and internal disorder, and that was  
23 what we were immediately alerted for, that is what we  
24 immediately expected.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did the Army and the Navy ever come

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 to use "possible" and "probable" as they are commonly  
3 understood? This word "possible" is so weak that if you  
4 tell a man a thing is possible you can hardly blame him  
5 for not paying attention to it.

6 General Short: I think the message of July 8th,  
7 when they were pointing out action of the Japanese against  
8 Russia, was a rather definite prediction, and was the only  
9 prediction that the War Department ever made direct to  
10 me.

11 Some of the Naval messages pointed directly toward  
12 the Philippines and toward the Kra Peninsula. No message  
13 of the Army after July 8th ever pointed anywhere.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, General, I know that you had  
15 your own forces and your own job out there, but did you  
16 know about where Newton's course was? Newton's force was  
17 about 300-odd miles from Midway when he learned of the  
18 attack. You know where Midway is as you see it on that  
19 map (indicating)?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: About 300 miles. He said that he  
22 thought he would receive orders to intercept the enemy,  
23 who, he felt must be to the northwest, northward of Oahu.  
24 Therefore he signalled the Lexington that the flight to  
25 Midway was cancelled, because presumably Midway had also

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 been attacked.

3 Now, if he had received the message to go north,  
4 wouldn't there be good prospects, where you see this red  
5 line, this lower red line on that chart, to have inter-  
6 cepted that force?

7 General Short: He might have intercepted it after  
8 they had lost their planes and were withdrawing. He would  
9 have had to go east, I think, to intercept it beforehand.

10 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, the Lexington  
11 had a full deployment of airplanes on her. Notwithstanding  
12 those that they had taken to Midway or were taking to  
13 Midway.

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: So they would have had the capacity  
16 with planes at least to attempt to do something to the  
17 Jap Fleet, which it turned out nothing was ever done to,  
18 it was never intercepted, never seen, and it gave the Japs  
19 a great stimulant, I would assume, to know that they had  
20 made an attack and were not intercepted by the American  
21 forces. Wouldn't that indicate to the Japanese that we  
22 were asleep at the switch?

23 General Short: It would indicate that they had succeeded  
24 in putting over a complete surprise on us.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator Ferguson: Now, coming back to this "asleep at the switch", do you think that we were, as a War Department and a Navy Department, our Intelligence, and the whole thing, really asleep at the switch as to war coming to America on the 7th?

General Short: I think that our Intelligence definitely failed to draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the intercepts and that they failed to transmit anything to us that would be helpful.

Senator Ferguson: Was it true in the Army that we treated Intelligence somewhat, to use the old saying, as a step-child, that that is about the way we treated Intelligence?

General Short: I had not been in Washington on duty with the General Staff since 1924. It would be hard for me to say what the attitude toward Intelligence was in 1941.

Senator Ferguson: What was the reputation of the Intelligence Branch in the Army? Did good officers try to avoid it?

General Short: I don't believe they did. When I was in the War Department General Staff from 1921 to 1924, that was soon after the first World War, General Stuart Heintzleman, whom the Army considered one of the really top-notch men in the Army, was placed in charge of the Military Intelligence Division.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you said yesterday  
3 that it took almost a year to get permission from the  
4 Interior Department to put up radar equipment, permanent  
5 radar equipment in the Hawaiian Islands.

6 General Short: That is correct.

7 Senator Ferguson: Would you say that we really had  
8 an alert Army when it took a year to place radar in position,  
9 which was one of the new things to protect Hawaii, would  
10 you say that if it took a year that we were really alert  
11 and going as an army?

12 General Short: I don't believe you could place that  
13 on G-2 because I wrote to the Chief of Staff personally  
14 about that and had a reply signed by the Deputy Chief of  
15 Staff General Bryden as to the reasons why they did not  
16 feel they could do it. I don't believe it stopped at G-2.

17 Senator Ferguson: But the Commander in Chief of the  
18 United States Army, the President of the United States, was  
19 at least over both those branches?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for it taking  
22 almost a year to get the right to put up permanent equipment,  
23 and we didn't even have it up on the 7th of December, when  
24 we had a war message, a war warning in June, on June 17,  
25 1940. How do you account for the fact that we, having that

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 kind of a warning that we were going to have an attack on  
3 Hawaii, either ships or planes, and radar would catch both,  
4 that it took a year after that to get the right to build  
5 radar equipment on those islands?

6 General Short: I would say that the Department of  
7 Interior at least did not have any proper appreciation of  
8 the international situation.

9 Senator Ferguson: But who was over the Department of  
10 the Interior? Wasn't the President of the United States?

11 General Short: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: And he was the Commander in Chief  
13 of our Army?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand you said yester-  
16 day we had fine radar equipment in New York City?

17 General Short: That is my understanding.

18 Senator Ferguson: Where else -- on the West Coast?

19 General Short: The West Coast, Seattle and San Francisco.  
20 I sent these officers to attend an exercise meeting conducted  
21 at Seattle. When they finished there they went to New  
22 York City to look over the establishment. They reported to  
23 me that those establishments were all set up.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not they  
25 were working 24 hours a day?

Witness Short,

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

General Short: I do not.

2

Senator Ferguson: On the 6th and the 7th?

3

General Short: I do not.

4

Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel if he will ascertain from those radar stations what they were doing and

5

whether or not those radar stations were alerted on the 6th and the 7th.

6

7

8

General, as an Army Officer, would you consider that our possessions, the Hawaiian Islands, were in more danger than New York City on the 7th?

9

10

11

General Short: Very much so.

12

Senator Ferguson: From what you know now?

13

General Short: Very much more.

14

Senator Ferguson: From what you know now?

15

General Short: Yes, sir.

16

Senator Ferguson: Would you consider also that it was in more danger than Seattle or San Francisco?

17

18

General Short: Yes, sir.

19

Senator Ferguson: From what you know now?

20

General Short: Yes, sir.

21

Senator Ferguson: Now, coming back, and I know this is a hypothetical matter because we didn't get those radars established, but if those radars had been established under priority -- and I understand the priority was solely

22

23

24

25

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 in Washington -- is that correct?

3 General Short: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: It wasn't in your hands?

5 General Short: No, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you try to get high priority,  
7 the best priority to get the equipment in?

8 General Short: On June 10 I radioed the War Department  
9 and asked that the priority be advanced to A-1A, which was  
10 the highest priority.

11 Senator Ferguson: Were you a believer in radar?

12 General Short: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you feel that it was good equip-  
14 ment and new equipment such as would help the Army of the  
15 United States?

16 General Short: I stated in the telegram that it was  
17 probably the most important thing that we were trying to do  
18 at that time. I think I can find that and read it if you  
19 wish.

20 Mr. Murphy: I think you will also find it, once or  
21 twice, in your correspondence with General Marshall, that  
22 very same statement.

23 General Short: I was looking for the definite wire.  
24 I know I covered it in the wire to General Marshall.

25 I have the telegram:

(4)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 "TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

2 "WASHINGTON D C

3 "DIVISION ENGINEER SAN FRANCISCO HAS INFORMED ME THAT  
4 THE PRIORITY COVERING CONTRACT W-FOUR ONE FOUR ENGR. SEVEN  
5 EIGHT FOUR WITH INTERSTATE EQUIPMENT CORPORATION ELIZABETH  
6 NEW JERSEY IS NOW DASH ONE DASH G STOP THIS CONTRACT IS  
7 THE ONE FOR FURNISHING ALL MATERIALS FOR CABLEWAY TO KAALA  
8 AIRCRAFT WARNING STATION STOP MOTORS AND ALL ELECTRICAL  
9 EQUIPMENT AND SUB CONTRACT TO GENERAL ELECTRIC STOP  
10 DIVISION ENGINEER STATES THAT WITH THIS PRIORITY THERE  
11 IS STRONG PROBABILITY THAT DELIVERY THIS ELECTRICAL MATERIAL  
12 TO CONTRACTOR WILL BE DELAYED ABOUT FIFTEEN WEEKS STOP  
13 THIS KAALA STATION IS THE MOST IMPORTANT IN AIRCRAFT  
14 WARNING SYSTEM AND EARLY COMPLETION OF THIS CABLEWAY IS  
15 ESSENTIAL STOP I CONSIDER THIS AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE  
16 AS THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE PROJECT IN THIS DEPARTMENT  
17 STOP STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE WAR DEPARTMENT GIVE ALL  
18 POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO CHIEF OF ENGINEERS TO HAVE PRIORITY  
19 ON THIS CONTRACT CHANGED TO DASH ONE DASH B"

20  
21 I thought I requested that it be A-1A. This copy  
22 states 1-B.



Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Senator Ferguson: On March 6 you wrote to General  
3 Marshall:

4 "Defense of these islands and adequate warning for  
5 the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early  
6 completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I be-  
7 lieve all quibbling over details should be stopped at  
8 once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board  
9 of Officers in this Department who made several personal  
10 investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic  
11 decisions as to locations, types of stations and general  
12 plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly  
13 recommend that this project be decentralized, and that I  
14 be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts  
15 and other details to expedite its completion."

16 Signed Walter C. Short.

17 What were you talking about there when you said "I  
18 believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at  
19 once." This was back in March.

20 General Short : Because we had to get the design of  
21 the buildings going into the national parks approved by  
22 the Department of Interior.

23 From an architectural standpoint, it had to hit in  
24 with their ideas of the scenery.

25 Senator Ferguson: In other words, we were talking

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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about beauty rather than efficiency, as far as war was concerned?

General Short: It might appear that way.

Senator Ferguson: Well, how does it appear to you?

General Short: It appears to me that the Department of Interior considered their routine requirements of more importance than preparations for war.

Senator Ferguson: Well now, what was more important to the United States when we knew war was coming, to get prepared, or to determine upon the beauty of the structure that was to prepare us?

General Short: Unquestionably it was important and I think I made my letter to the Chief of Staff about as strong as I could afford to make it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you say "afford". There  
3 are certain things you do not say, --

4 General Short: To a superior officer. I told him I  
5 thought it was time to stop quibbling.

6 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it there are certain  
7 things that in the Army you do not say to your superior, is  
8 that it?

9 General Short: You say it in a tactful way.

10 Senator Ferguson: I see. You stop just a little short,  
11 or you say it in a tactful way. That is what you tried to  
12 do here?

13 General Short: That is what I tried to do.

14 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the same rule ap-  
15 plies to Cabinet officers?

16 General Short: I do not.

17 Senator Ferguson: You haven't been a Cabinet officer?

18 General Short: No, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: I am sure it does not apply to mem-  
20 bers of the House or the Senate.

21 Well, now, General Short, the Intelligence Department  
22 of the Army was to be used for two purposes if I am right,  
23 and if I am wrong you correct me: One was to determine when  
24 war might come. The other one was to determine where war  
25 might come. Is that correct?

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: That is correct.

3 Senator Ferguson: That is really the duty of an Intel-  
4 ligence Department?

5 General Short: Yes, sir. I might add another thing,  
6 and also the strength that the prospective enemy might have to  
7 pursue this.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And do you consider them of equal  
9 importance?

10 General Short: I would say you might say they were of  
11 equal importance because one without the other does not give  
12 you the information.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, in your opinion did these mes-  
14 sages that reached you, - and you have listed five, I think  
15 there were five, - tell you when war was coming?

16 General Short: They indicated in that message of the  
17 27th that war should be coming reasonably soon, although it  
18 left a possible chance of avoiding it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, did they tell you when war was  
20 coming?

21 General Short: I mean when, not where.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did they tell you where war was  
23 coming?

24 General Short: At no time after July the 8th did a  
25 War Department message directed to me ever point in any

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

direction.

Senator Ferguson: Would you say that the message of June 17, 1940 the alert, told General Herron where war was coming?

General Short: It told him definitely that they were afraid of a trans-Pacific raid on the Island of Oahu.

Senator Ferguson: And that was definite information?

General Short: Absolutely.

Senator Ferguson: Not the date but definite information as to where?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any such warning?

General Short: I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Were you kept advised as to what we were doing as far as our Army was concerned in the proposed attack on the Azores, the sending of the Army up to Iceland and whether or not we had contemplated a force going into Ireland?

General Short: General Marshall in one of his personal letters to me indicated confidentially that there was a possibility of attack on the Azores. That was some months before.

Senator Ferguson: Did you put that letter in here?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: It is in?

3 Mr. Murphy: It is in the record.

4 Senator Ferguson: It is in the record?

5 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

6 Senator Ferguson: So that we have then before us all  
7 the so-called personal mail between you and General Marshall?

8 General Short: I believe that you have everything.

9 Senator Ferguson: There has been no determination that  
10 the thing was personal or departmental. You have put them  
11 all in.

12 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

13 General Short: The War Department selected it. I do  
14 not have any other letters.

15 Mr. Murphy: When I say it is in the record I mean it is  
16 in the exhibit which has been offered.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I understand.

18 Well, now, did you know of any investigations, outside of  
19 the Roberts investigation, made by the War Department up until  
20 the Army Board was created under the statute of Congress?

21 General Short: No, sir, I do not.

22 Senator Ferguson: You did not have information on the  
23 Bundy investigation, where they were lost in the plane?

24 General Short: I did not.

25 Senator Ferguson: And afterwards you were not informed

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 of any investigation. Did you know that the President had  
3 asked or requested that a compilation, at least, of messages,  
4 and so forth, be prepared and it was sent to General Marshall  
5 and that he made certain alterations in it?

6 General Short: I did not.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you know what preparation was  
8 made by the Army by investigation that they might court martial  
9 you?

10 General Short: I do not.

11 Senator Ferguson: You were never advised of any of those  
12 investigations?

13 General Short: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you knew about the statute  
15 that was passed asking that there be an investigation?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: And such action taken as was required?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever know about the  
20 Clausen investigation?

21 General Short: I think there was something in the news-  
22 papers indicating that it was taking place but I was never  
23 advised by the War Department that it was being made.

24 Senator Ferguson: Did Clausen ever come to you and try  
25 to get an affidavit?

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: He did not.

3 Senator Ferguson: Do you know now why the Clausen in-  
4 vestigation was undertaken?

5 General Short: I think that there is an explanation of  
6 that. You have to read between the lines.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, will you read between the lines  
8 for us and give us that explanation? What are you looking for?

9 General Short: It is exhibit 63. I am looking for the  
10 recommendation. Here it is.

11 This is a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General,  
12 General Cramer, dated November 25, 1944, for the Secretary of  
13 War. "Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board."

14 Senator Ferguson: Will you read what you have in mind?  
15 Read the lines and read between them.

16 General Short: On page 48, the first paragraph.

17 (Reading)

18 "Unexplored Leads:

19 "In the course of my examination of the report and  
20 record certain further inquiries have suggested them-  
21 selves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously  
22 be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not,  
23 in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at  
24 the same time in order to complete the picture and in  
25 fairness to certain personnel these leads should be fur-



Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 ther explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board  
3 should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could  
4 be done by an individual officer familiar with the mat-  
5 ter."

6  
7 Now, I would like to state there --

8 Senator Ferguson: Now you are going to read between the  
9 lines?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: All right.

12 General Short: General Marshall testified before this  
13 committee that in all his service he had never heard of a  
14 reviewing officer if he were dissatisfied with the findings  
15 of a court martial or a board taking such action; that the  
16 normal action was to refer the proceedings back to the board  
17 and direct that additional evidence be taken if that were  
18 desired, or direct that a review of their findings be made  
19 by the board and they would then be returned to the review-  
20 ing officer with a further explanation.

21 In this case the Judge Advocate General goes out of his  
22 way to state he does not want it referred back to the board  
23 but suggests an officer who has been on duty with the board.

24 Now, there were only three officers who could have met  
25 that qualification.

Senator Ferguson: Who were they?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 General Short: They were Colonel Toulmin, who was the  
3 executive of the Board, Colonel West, who was the recorder  
4 of the Board and Lieutenant Colonel Clausen, who was a Major  
5 at the time, who was assistant recorder of the board. Un-  
6 questionably General Cramer had in his mind the recommending  
7 of Colonel Clausen at the time that he made that recommenda-  
8 tion, which would have taken the further investigation out  
9 of the hands of the Army Board and placed it in the hands of  
10 a selected individual.

11 Senator Ferguson: He placed it in the hands of a Major,  
12 who was an assistant?

13 General Short: Yes, sir, assistant recorder, who was  
14 promoted to Lieutenant Colonel since.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, in your experience in the Army  
16 did you ever know of that?

17 General Short: I have never known of it. I have seen  
18 cases repeatedly where the reviewing officer might return the  
19 proceedings to the board and direct that additional evidence  
20 be taken and return it to the board, stating that he did not  
21 agree with their findings and asking them to review their  
22 findings, but I have never heard of a case of this kind.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, before a  
24 real review of these findings was made they sent Major Clausen  
25 out?

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: I think the review had been made but it  
3 was not what they wanted.

4 Senator Ferguson: Oh. Now, that is what you are read-  
5 ing between the lines, that when they read this report they  
6 were not satisfied and they used the words "certain personnel"  
7 in there?

8 General Short: And they apparently did not believe  
9 there they could get what they wanted out of the Army Board,  
10 so reading between the lines --

11 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

13 Mr. Murphy: I ask at this point in the record that the  
14 complete file of the Adjutant General, in view of what is  
15 now going on here, be placed in the record.

16 Senator Ferguson: I have no objection.

17 Mr. Murphy: I understand that there is a transcript or  
18 mimeograph, a complete mimeograph of that prepared, which we  
19 have.

20 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

21 Senator Ferguson: Do you have it?

22 General Short: I will look at it.

23 Mr. Murphy: I understand the file is in Senator  
24 Brewster's hands and it has been prepared for the committee.

25 Senator Ferguson: Oh, that is the one.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: I mean the Judge Advocate General's, that  
3 is the one I am talking about.

4 Lt. Col. Karr: This is a different one.

5 Mr. Murphy: It is the one in which the charges in this  
6 case are contained.

7 Lt. Col. Karr: That may be. I have looked at the file  
8 that you have reference to and this is not the complete file.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, I ask that we have the complete file  
10 then of everything. And in that connection, Senator, may I  
11 also request -- I understand that the Army has made available  
12 all the papers concerning General Marshall in this transac-  
13 tion and I ask that they be made available and spread on the  
14 record and I also ask that Secretary Stimson's diary insofar  
15 as it pertains in any way to the retirement of General Short,  
16 that that also be brought in here and spread on the record.

17 I ask that everything the Army has in regard to this  
18 question of General Short's retirement and the preparation  
19 of charges be brought in here and placed in the record.

20 The Vice Chairman: Spread on the record or as an exhibit?

21 Mr. Murphy: As an exhibit.

22 Senator Ferguson: I not only approve of what the Con-  
23 gressman is saying, but I would like to say I have been en-  
24 deavoring here for weeks to get all of the evidence.

25 Mr. Murphy: I agree the Senator has and I am not trying

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 to steal a march or anything like that. I want to be cooper-  
3 ative.

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I will say this: I not only  
5 want Mr. Stimson's diary as it relates to this particular  
6 question, but I want it as it relates to the whole Far East.  
7 I think that we will find in that diary an explanation of many  
8 things that we have been searching for here days and days and  
9 weeks and that we have hundreds, if not thousands, of pages  
10 in this record that could have been boiled down to a few  
11 lines out of the Secretary of War's diary. I think that we  
12 ought to get it immediately.

13 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield for just one minute?

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

15 Mr. Murphy: I also again call the attention of the com-  
16 mittee to the exhibit which has just been offered, which  
17 should be made available to all of us.

18 Senator Ferguson: May I look at it to see what you are  
19 putting in?

20 The Vice Chairman: Without objection Mr. Murphy's re-  
21 quest is granted, but do you want it as an exhibit or spread  
22 on the transcript?

23 Mr. Murphy: I think an exhibit is enough.

24 The Vice Chairman: What is the next exhibit number?

25 Mr. Kaufman: 1940.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 The Vice Chairman: It will be received as exhibit 140.  
3 That is this document here?

4 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

5 The Vice Chairman: Will you furnish the reporter a copy  
6 of it?

7 Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

8 (The document above referred to  
9 was marked Exhibit No. 140.)

10 Mr. Murphy: I would like to call the attention of the  
11 committee to the fact that yesterday there were certain let-  
12 ters read into the record and, as I recall it, it was a series  
13 of letters in connection with the General's retirement.

14 There were present here some photostatic copies and I,  
15 at least, listening to them intently, thought they did not get  
16 into the record but I would like everybody to know that they  
17 are in the record and there is among them a notation in the  
18 handwriting of General Marshall, where he turns over to the  
19 Secretary of War the Judge Advocate General's recommendations  
20 in refer to, - I don't know what these words are - "retirement  
21 of General Walter C. Short", and the initials of General Mar-  
22 shall.

23 And then there is a letter dated the 27th of January  
24 1942 from the Judge Advocate General to General Marshall  
25 explaining the prob lem before him and there is a letter of

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 January the 31st from the Judge Advocate General to the  
3 Secretary of War, in which he encloses the letter which he  
4 had sent to General Marshall and I suggest a reading of those  
5 letters in connection with the evidence that went in yester-  
6 day.

7 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman.

8 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

9 Mr. Richardson: It probably would be appropriate to  
10 say that with reference to the Stimson diary, that diary was  
11 referred to by the Secretary of War in a hearing before the  
12 Army Board.

13 An effort was made by Mr. Mitchell before the hearing  
14 commenced with reference to this diary and he ran into a  
15 situation of illness on the part of Mr. Stimson under which  
16 his doctor refused even to permit the question of the diary  
17 to be referred to him.

18 Our information as to Secretary Stimson's present  
19 physical condition is not very accurate. I will be very glad  
20 to contact him again and ascertain, first, whether he can  
21 present himself as a witness with his diary; or, second,  
22 whether he would be willing to submit his diary to the com-  
23 mittee. When I get that information I will report it to the  
24 chairman.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, we will let it rest on that

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 for the present.

3 Mr. Murphy: I will say, Senator, in connection with this  
4 business of the Judge Advocate General, in all fairness to  
5 General Short that it is in effect a complaint, with General  
6 Short not, in fact, being given a chance to answer it. I  
7 do not want to have any one-sided partisan proposition, but  
8 in view of his referring to what the Judge Advocate General  
9 had in mind and why he did certain things I think we ought to  
10 have everything.

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest  
12 then that -- this volume is rather large, I haven't seen a  
13 copy of it yet; it has been here among my papers and it is  
14 quite large and I assume that General Short will want some  
15 time to go over it. I would like to question him on it. I  
16 wonder whether or not after I am through with these other mat-  
17 ters that I have and counsel and all the rest of the members  
18 ask their questions, if we can bring him back and I can ques-  
19 tion him Monday morning, which will give him plenty of time  
20 to go over this and also give me plenty of time to go over it.

21 General Short: Senator, I would like to make a state-  
22 ment right now. I have been over it.

23 Senator Ferguson: Oh, you have been over it?

24 General Short: And I have a statement, since Mr. Murphy  
25 says I should be given an opportunity, that I would like to



1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 make.

3 Senator Ferguson: I ask you now to make it if you de-  
4 sire to.

5 General Short: This relates to exhibit 140.

6 Regarding the memorandum of specifications drawn up  
7 against me by Colonel Munson, I want to point out that the  
8 Judge Advocate General reviewed all the evidence of the Rob-  
9 erts Commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the  
10 Clausen affidavits, and came to the conclusion that he could  
11 not prove any offense.

12 The Judge Advocate General's letter dated January 27,  
13 1942 reads in part as follows:

14 "General Short's non-feasance or omissions were  
15 based on an estimate of the situation which although  
16 proved faulty by subsequent events was insofar as I am  
17 able to ascertain from the report of the commission made  
18 or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best  
19 qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estim-  
20 ate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree  
21 improbable."

22 In the Judge Advocate General's opinion dated 25 November  
23 1944, page 50, the last paragraph, General Cramer said:

24 "I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be  
25 made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceed-

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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ings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence."

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I have looked over the specifications that were drawn up by Colonel Munson and shown in this exhibit and I will say very definitely that if these charges had been preferred and I had been arraigned my plea in every case would have been "Not Guilty".

14  
15

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement on that, General?

16  
17

General Short: Yes, sir.

18  
19

The Vice Chairman: It is now twelve o'clock. We will recess until two o'clock this afternoon.

20  
21

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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AFTERNOON SESSION 2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson will resume his examination of General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: General, there has been offered and received in evidence this paper --

The Vice Chairman: Senator, I think it is Exhibit 140.

Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 140.

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: In that exhibit there is a memorandum for Mr. Bundy, November 27, 1944, subject: "Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 re General Short."

Then it says:

"1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 February 1942."

And then:

"2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's office on 4 March undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with 11 specifications

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 as follows:"

3 Before I go to those specifications, the end of that  
4 letter says:

5 "3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible  
6 charges and were never approved by The Judge Advocate General  
7 or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they  
8 were never made public."

9 It is signed "William J. Hughes, Jr., Colonel, JAGD".

10 Now, I would like to ask you about those specific  
11 charges. They are in the record and I would like to have  
12 your opinion on them.

13 "1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial  
14 patrol."

15 You made the statement that you plead not guilty to  
16 all of them, but I think that we should have an explanation  
17 on the record of these charges and what your answers to  
18 them are rather than the conclusion of "not guilty".

19 General Short: Do you wish me to indicate my answer  
20 on each one?

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Give us what you consider is  
22 your complete answer on it.

23 General Short: Not guilty.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, is there anything you want to  
25 say more than that on number 1?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

General Short: On the inshore aerial patrol?

2

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

3

4

General Short: I did have an adequate patrol. The air people were satisfied and had full control. If the purpose was anti-submarine defense and it was not designed for air defense.

5

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Senator Ferguson: Were you using all the equipment that you had?

9

10

General Short: We had one observation squadron, six planes, in commission, and we were operating them several hours a day. I couldn't say exactly what the hours were.

11

12

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Senator Ferguson: Were you using them as much as possible?

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General Short: I would say we were using them all we should use them. In addition to that there was a lot of observation that accomplished the same thing because our pursuit training was all over Oahu, pretty much around the perimeter, and they were all given to understand that they should learn to observe for submarines.

21

22

Senator Ferguson: Now, is that all you want to say on number 1?

23

24

25

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Number 2:

"Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense."

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Short: Not guilty. We would have had an adequate anti-aircraft defense if the War Department had given us the equipment, and had given us the information which indicated imminent attack. Or, if they had replied to my report and indicated any desired modification.

Senator Ferguson: Were you using all the anti-aircraft guns and facilities that were provided from Washington for you?

General Short: We were not alerted for an anti-aircraft defense because we had not received any information indicating a probable air attack.

Senator Ferguson: The next:

"Failure to set up an Interceptor Command."

General Short: Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as we could to operate an effective Interceptor Command, and it was set up and operating as effectively as it could.

Senator Ferguson: Number 4:

"Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service."

General Short: Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast as we could to set up an effective aircraft warning service. It was in operation.

Senator Ferguson: Now, number 5:

"Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 warnings to interested agencies."

3 General Short: Not guilty. We were restricted by  
4 direct order from Marshall, from transmitting the November  
5 27th warning to any other than the minimum essential officers.

6 Senator Ferguson: And that would exclude giving it  
7 to what was called interested agencies; is that your opinion?

8 General Short: Yes, sir. If I had set up an aircraft  
9 warning service and gotten it to everybody we would have had  
10 to give it to all the enlisted men.

11 Senator Ferguson: Number 6:

12 "Failure to establish a proper system of defense by  
13 cooperation and coordination with the Navy."

14 General Short: Not guilty. We had full, complete  
15 plans for defense by cooperation with the Navy, which had  
16 been approved by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

17 Senator Ferguson: And in your opinion was that being  
18 carried out, was it being carried out?

19 General Short: It would have been carried out 100  
20 percent if they would have given us the information they  
21 had.

22 Senator Ferguson: No. 7:

23 "Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates  
24 as to their duties in case of sudden attack."

25 General Short: Not guilty. I could not tell "subordinates"

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 to expect a sudden attack which neither nor the War Depart-  
3 ment nor anyone else expected. Our information regarding  
4 impending hostile action was, by direction of the Chief  
5 of Staff, limited to the minimum essential officers. Our  
6 Standard Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941 prescribed  
7 fully the duties of all personnel in event of any sudden  
8 attack.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, I understand from some evidence  
10 that the people in Honolulu were given no information as to  
11 what to do in case of an air raid. Can you explain why  
12 that was true?

13 General Short: The civilians?

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes, the civilian population was  
15 not instructed.

16 General Short: We had had a number of alerts and black-  
17 outs. We had had definite training of the surgical teams  
18 and of the first-aid people and of the ambulance corps.  
19 They had turned out and set up these several times. And I  
20 think that the civilian agencies that had to act now only  
21 knew but they performed their duties extremely well on  
22 December 7.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that your claim is  
24 that you had given intimation previously to civilian agencies  
25 what to do in case of raids?



Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Short: The ones who had positive things to do.

3

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7

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you had called in the civilian authorities and explained to them that you anticipated an attack as of after November 27, would you have been violating the instructions given to you in the message of the 27th?

8

9

10

11

General Short: I certainly would, because in all probability a considerable part of the population would have moved to the hills, notifying every Jap agent that we expected an attack practically immediately.

12

13

14

Senator Ferguson: Well, from what you know now, didn't the Japanese agents know all about the defense and all about the various activities there?

15

16

17

18

General Short: They knew quite largely, probably most all about it, but they would have known definitely then that we were expecting an attack. I doubt if they knew that because we didn't know it ourselves.

19

20

21

Senator Ferguson: .But if you had been alerted as they were in 1940 would you then have alerted the civilian population?

22

23

24

25

General Short: I think that we would have encouraged them, except the ones in the very congested areas, to remain definitely where they were. We had plans completely drawn for the evacuation of certain areas where they thought there

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 was danger of bombing or sabotage of the gasoline supply  
3 and we had asked for money to build those evacuation camps  
4 and we had not succeeded in getting it. The Delegate, Sam  
5 King, and the Governor, had also made strenuous efforts  
6 to get that money.

7 Senator Ferguson: Had the responsible authorities  
8 in Washington been notified of the M-Day plan that you had  
9 under the legislature of Hawaii?

10 General Short: Yes, sir, they knew that that legislation  
11 was being passed, I am sure, because we had made requests  
12 for these funds and when we didn't get it through the War  
13 Department then the Governor and the Delegate had tried  
14 through their channels.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, had you any notice to put that  
16 into effect, to declare M-Day?

17 General Short: We had not.

18 Senator Ferguson: Would that have helped the situation?

19 General Short: We had things worked out so that the  
20 Governor was able to put that in effect in a very few  
21 hours. He put it into effect sometime before 7:00 o'clock  
22 in the afternoon of December 7 so that it turned out the  
23 Home Guard.

24 Senator Ferguson: How many civilians were killed in  
25 the attack?

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 General Short: I couldn't answer that question. Not  
3 a great many. There were a few.

4 Senator Ferguson: Our casualty lists, I understand,  
5 only include the Army and Navy, the military casualties.  
6 Can you give us an idea?

7 General Short: We lost in the Army 9 officers and  
8 223 men. My guess would be that there were perhaps 10  
9 civilians killed, but that might be off.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether that has ever  
11 been listed authoritatively?

12 General Short: I think it has. And one rather unusual  
13 part of it is that I think a very considerable proportion  
14 of them were Japanese.

15 Senator Ferguson: Number 8:

16 "Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet  
17 and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor."

18 General Short: Not guilty. I took every measure I  
19 thought necessary to protect the Fleet and Naval Base against  
20 sabotage. I so reported to the War Department. Marshall  
21 testified that I was reasonable in assuming that I was  
22 doing exactly what he wanted, because otherwise he would  
23 have notified me that he wanted more measures taken.

24 Senator Ferguson: Number 9:

25 "Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof."

General Short: Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent danger of an air attack. The planes were therefore grouped for more adequate protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Therefore, when you wrote on the  
3 28th, or sent a message back that you were alerted for  
4 sabotage, that would indicate, would it, that the planes  
5 were grouped?

6 General Short: Yes, sir. That was laid down in our  
7 standard operating procedure.

8 Senator Ferguson: No. 10:

9 "Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness  
10 for an attack."

11 General Short: Not guilty. My aircraft were not  
12 in a state of readiness for a surprise attack, but were  
13 protected against sabotage as directed by the War Depart-  
14 ment in the sabotage-alert messages of 27th of 28th  
15 November, 1941, and as reported to the War Department by  
16 me.

17 If they had been equipped with ammunition, grouped  
18 as they were, and a sabotage attack had been made, there  
19 would have been much more damage by exploding ammunition.

20 We never permitted, when alerted for sabotage, we  
21 never permitted them to be armed or to have ammunition in  
22 the planes.

23 Senator Ferguson: In other words, the sabotage alert  
24 was one that wouldn't permit ammunition to be in the planes  
25 when they were grouped for sabotage?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2

2 General Short: That is correct.

3 Senator Ferguson: No. 11:

4 "Failure to provide for the protection of military  
5 personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees  
6 on various reservations."

7 General Short: We made a quite elaborate plan for  
8 evacuating the families of civilians on the military reser-  
9 vation. We asked the War Department for money to estab-  
10 lish a camp some four miles east of Schofield. I wrote  
11 a personal letter to the Chief of Staff and told him that  
12 we were asking for the money to establish these camps  
13 on the basis of recreation camps and the different units,  
14 different families would be assigned to different locations,  
15 but our real purpose was to get ready for a possible attack  
16 and this would give us a chance to acquaint everybody with  
17 the details without advertising what we were doing.

18 He answered my letter and stated that guns were needed  
19 worse for other purposes.

20 Shef  
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Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: I notice that you left out the words  
3 "Not Guilty" to this last one. Is there any reason?

4 General Short: No, sir. I plead not guilty.

5 Now, I might say when we failed to get our concentration  
6 camp plans approved, get the money, we then made an alternate  
7 plan for taking care of the women and children in school  
8 buildings that we thought would be out of the range of an at-  
9 tack.

10 We had blankets placed in those school buildings, we had  
11 all arrangements set up for the establishment of cafeterias and  
12 they were moved in there on the afternoon of the 7th and  
13 everybody was taken care of.

14 Senator Ferguson: In this evidence that was put in this  
15 morning, this exhibit, Myron C. Cramer, Major General, Judge  
16 Advocate General, gives a report. I wish you would look on  
17 page 50 of that report; I don't know what page it is in the  
18 record.

19 General Short: I think it is the paragraph I read into  
20 the record this morning.

21 Senator Ferguson: Oh, it is in exhibit 63 that I had  
22 in mind.

23 General Short: Exhibit 63, Top Secret, yes.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes, Top Secret.

25 Now, I notice at the bottom of page 49 this remark by the

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Judge Advocate General:

"As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge."

Why would the Judge Advocate be concerned in advance and before he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty?

General Short: It would look like that he was thinking of the possible effect on public opinion. If I were tried and found not guilty, or given a very mild sentence, that the public would tend to feel that there had been no justification, that is the only conclusion I can draw.

Senator Ferguson: And then he goes on:

"As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken."

Now, was he talking about your reply to General Marshall's message?

General Short: He undoubtedly was, in spite of his statement about it being ambiguous and incomplete.



Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, in your opinion was it an ambigu-  
3 ous message that you had taken an alert against sabotage?

4 General Short: I don't see how it could have been brief-  
5 er or more concise or clearer.

6 Senator Ferguson: The next sentence:

7 "My experience with courts martial leads me to  
8 the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge  
9 a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the gen-  
10 eral picture would be clouded by a claim that others  
11 were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Con-  
12 clusion 18, p. 21.)"

13 General Short: I do not have a copy of the Roberts re-  
14 port here.

15 Senator Ferguson: Would you see that he gets a copy?

16 Mr. Masten: Yes. (Handing document to witness).

17 Senator Ferguson: I want to ask you this question in  
18 relation to that: Couldn't that have been cured by trying  
19 all that were guilty of contributory causes?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not the War  
22 Department has ever considered the question of trying all that  
23 were guilty of contributory causes or causes of the disaster  
24 at Pearl Harbor?

25 General Short: I am quite sure they have never made a

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 public statement to that effect. I do not know whether any  
3 consideration has been given to it or not.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, you have before you the Roberts  
5 report, do you?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to look at those conclu-  
8 sions 18 on page 21 and see what he was talking about?

9 General Short: I have looked at it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to make any answer in re-  
11 lation to them?

12 General Short: I would say in regard to 18 that it was  
13 a complete surprise, because we had not been furnished the  
14 information that was definitely available in Washington and  
15 that should have been furnished to us.

16 In regard to 19, the things that he mentioned are large-  
17 ly beyond our control. "Disregard of international law by the  
18 Japanese". There was nothing that we could do about that.

19 "The restrictions they prepared on counter-espionage."  
20 That was a question of our own laws. The Hawaiian Department  
21 could do nothing about that.

22 "Emphasis in the warning messages of the probability of  
23 aggressive action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage meas-  
24 ures." That was wholly on the shoulders of the War Depart-  
25 ment. That could not apply to the Hawaiian Department.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 "Failure of the War Department to reply to the message  
3 relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the  
4 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." That was  
5 entirely a War Department failure.

6 "Information received by the interested parties  
7 prior to the attack of warning message of December 7th."  
8 That was entirely the failure of the War Department.

9 Senator Ferguson: The War Department is defined there  
10 as you defined it this morning?

11 General Short: I beg your pardon?

12 Senator Ferguson: Is it defined as you defined it this  
13 morning?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Is there anything more that you want  
16 to add?

17 General Short: I would like to call attention to the  
18 fact that he admits in paragraph 20 that when the attack came  
19 that the command did act efficiently. He said that they were  
20 present and that certain things had not interfered in any  
21 way with their efficiency and that subordinate commanders  
22 executed their orders without question. They were not re-  
23 sponsible for the state of readiness.

24 I would like to say there that I have never at any time  
25 tried to pass the buck to any single subordinate. My deci-

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 sion was made on the information that the War Department had  
3 furnished me and I had no desire and absolutely never took  
4 any steps to pass the buck to some individual man below me.

5 Senator Ferguson: Is there such a thing as a joint  
6 trial in courts-martial, where men can be tried jointly?

7 General Short: There is, yes, sir. It is rather un-  
8 usual but it is possible. I think I am correct in that, am I  
9 not?

10 Lt. Col. Karr: Yes.

11 Senator Ferguson: Then reading on:

12 "There is also in cases like this the historic  
13 precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Sec-  
14 retary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judg-  
15 ment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol.  
16 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that  
17 if General Short is tried and if such trial should re-  
18 sult in his conviction there is considerable likelihood  
19 the court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal  
20 and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand."

21 Would that lead us to believe, then, that he was of the  
22 opinion that he was concerned with the sentence and they  
23 were concerned with that alone?

24 General Short: I would say they were very greatly con-  
25 cerned with the effect on public opinion and that they wanted