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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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15 April 1948

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Two Reports to the Allied War Crimes Investigation Committee by the Korean LI UCK-KWAN, Subject "Submission of Reference Material" and "Report on War Criminals"

Date: 23 April 1946 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: ) Official Records Netherlands Forces  
) Intelligence Service  
SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: )

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Atrocities

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Plan of Action No. 4 of the Java POW Administration

- A. Plan of Action of the 16th Army
- B. Plan of Action of the Java POW and Internees Administration (#4)

Statement concerning atrocities at sea in early 1944

Analyst: J HOYT

Doc. No. 3371

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

CITY OF BATAVIA

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IP 5 Doc 3371

Drs. A.F.P. Hulswé, Naval Officer IIIrd class R.N.N., Official of the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs N.E.I., being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states that he duly translated for NEFIS (NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE), the annexed documents, i.e. two reports to the Allied War Crimes Investigation Committee, dated April 23, 1946, by the Korean LI UCK-KWAN, subject "submission of reference material" and "report on warcriminals", from the Japanese original into the English language, and that the annexed English version is a full, true, complete and accurate translation of the original. However, as the writer is a Korean, not completely master of the Japanese language, the original text is not perfectly clear everywhere. Therefore it has been necessary for the translation of some parts of sentences to deviate slightly from the original text, in order to reproduce as correctly as possible the meaning as apparently desired by the writer.

The original Japanese document is a part of the files of NEFIS.

Signature:

*A.F.P. Hulswé*

Subscribed and sworn before me this eighth day of June, 1946,

Signature:

*G.J. Dissevelt*

G.J. Dissevelt, first lieutenant R.N.F.A., Head NEFIS Department I, Section 4 (Japanese Affairs).



To the Allied War Crimes Investigation Committee.

Subject : Submission of reference material.  
Date : 23 April 1946.  
Author : Li Uck-Kwan.

I beg to submit the following, as per subject-heading.

Plan of action No: 4 of the Java P.O.W. Administration.

The P.O.W. Administration possessed a plan of action which provided for all possibilities corresponding to critical emergency situations.

The plan of action of the 16th Army which was in charge of actions on Java provided for counterattacks by the Allied forces from outside; the P.O.W. administration's plans however were mainly concerned with measures for the P.O.W. and internees. Of course the latter were intimately connected with the former, and, being based on the regulations and instructions of the former, they closely followed the continuous changes of the warsituation, and their contents were repeatedly revised.

There were not many revisions as is proved by the fact that from the first plan of action, made in 1942, the fourth plan was made in 1944. (TN.: Text unclear).

The fiery counterattacks of the Allied forces, particularly the forceful penetration strategy of the American forces in the S.W.Pacific, led by General MacArthur, and the attacks by the British and Chinese forces in Burma, brought fear and oppression to bear on the Japanese forces. The 16th Army, observing the strategic situation, realised that in the near future the spearhead of the Allied counterattacks would be directed towards Java and to cope with this, the plan of action of the 16th Army was considerably revised in the second half of 1944. The new revision to cope with the changes in the objective strategic situation produced Plan of action No.4 of the P.O.W. and Internees Administration on Java.

A. Plan of action of the 16th Army.

The plan of action of the 16th Army was roughly divided in the three following stages :

1. As it was impossible to cope with the material attack, especially the bridgehead strategy, of the Allied forces, (the Japanese forces) were to withdraw to a second line of positions, after having inflicted the greatest possible casualties on the water edge.
2. The second line positions were 50 to 100 km. inland; the Allied forces were to be repulsed there (the Japanese army's forte being field action).
3. Long drawn guerilla action using the central mountain ranges of Java as the third line of positions.

Of course the time and place of these strategic withdrawals were to depend all on the orders of the supreme commander (the commander of the 16th Army).

That is to say that - when in view of the development of the warsituation, things had become so serious that the supreme commander had to execute the alarm and emergency regulations - upon the promulgation of these regulations, the various units completed their preparations for withdrawal but only retreated to the second line upon receiving the order there to.

The main point of the plan of action of the P.O.W. Administration was how to act when these alarm and emergency regulations were enforced.

If the nearly 100,000 P.O.W. and internees were to fall into the hands of the Allied forces, this would not only mean a decrease of manpower to that extent as rather an addition to the fighting strength of the Allied forces and so absolutely no P.O.W. nor internees were to be handed to the Allied forces.

The Plan of Action of the P.O.W. and internees Administration (no.4) was the concrete scheme to provide the methods and means to realise this.

B. Plan of Action of the Java P.O.W. and Internees Administration (no.4).

1. Time of preparation : September-October 1944.
2. Originator : Captain SUZUKI Hiroshi, seconded to the Java P.O.W. Administration.

Disposal of P.O.W.:

When the order concerning the alarm and emergency regulations was proclaimed, the P.O.W. were to be incited and to be provoked to disturbances by means mentioned below whereupon they were all to be killed off, under the pretext of the suppression of disturbances.

1. pro-Japanese P.O.W. (P.O.W. spies) were to be used to stimulate excitement secretly by exaggerating Allied successes.
2. pro-Japanese elements (whites) living outside the camps were to be used to arrange for contact with the inhabitants of the camps for the same purpose.
3. propaganda leaflets were to be forged, to be distributed in the camps during the night.

If by these means the P.O.W. had been roused and had caused disturbances it goes without saying (that they would have been killed) but if there would have been no reaction to this (incitement), a deterioration of the atmosphere among the P.O.W. was envisaged and under the pretext of "removal" they would have been brought outside the camps and all be killed off in areas away from the towns. After having finished this (task, the troops engaged in it) were to be combined with other fighting units and withdrawn to the second line of positions.

Disposal of Internees.

- /and methods
1. The 2,000 internees (high Dutch officials) held in Internees camp II 5 (Baros, Tjimahi) were to be killed off by the same means/as the P.O.W. as mentioned above. Internees in other internment camps were to be withdrawn to areas previously fixed by the controlling organisation, only just before occupation by the Allied forces.

The policy was not to release them as long as possible and to hand them over in concentration, so as to counteract any obstacle in fighting or espionage activities which might result from an early release.

The plans for killing off the P.O.W. and internees as contained in the Java P.O.W. and Internees Organisation (no.4) are as described above.

Judging from the command and the chain of responsibility, the originator was the chief of the Java P.O.W. and Internees Organisation, Colonel NAKATA Masayuki, but in actual fact the proposal was made by the above mentioned SUZUKI Hiroshi.

In view of the fact that SUZUKI Hiroshi at that time was working as officer in charge of P.O.W. Affairs of the main office of the Java P.O.W. Administration, all matters concerning P.O.W. were managed by him.

How we came to know this plan.

At the Cairo conference on 28 November 1943 the prime ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and China promised Korea independence.

Surreptitiously I heard this wireless news. I appreciated that Korean independence could only be obtained when the Allied forces were victorious. Later I held a meeting with like-minded friends and we made plans for a movement to resist the Japanese

and to help the Allies. On the other hand we would be diligent in trying to get surreptitiously insight of extremely secret military papers and in sharply observing all activities of the Japanese forces.

According to the programme of the Young Man's Party for Korean Independence we desired to be the bombs to overthrow the militarism of Japan, the robber of Asia, in order to obtain the independence of Korea, but for us Koreans on Java, there was nothing else to do but activities to resist Japan and help the Allies.

1. After the victory of the Allied forces, Korea will be independent and so we Koreans must fight for a victory of the Allied forces.

2. For the sake of an Allied victory we must maintain close contact with all anti-Japanese nationals, in order to develop anti-Japanese resistance movements, so as to create interior disturbances at the moment of the landing of the Allied forces, thereby causing as much as possible obstructions and confusion for the action of the Japanese forces and to render the situation favorable for the fighting of the Allied forces.

3. Maintaining close contact with the P.O.W. and internees, we must exchange information and when things start to happen, they must arise together with their guards the Koreans and attack the Japanese forces.

Guided by this plan I kept a constant watch on the activities of the Japanese and also I was diligent in taking surreptitious looks at extremely secret military documents availing myself of the facilities my work gave me. Since my arrival on Java I had been ordered to work in the General Affairs Branch of the main office of the Java P.O.W. Administration and due to my writing work in the Gen. Aff. Branch I had many occasions to touch extremely secret military documents.

The motive for surreptitiously reading the plan of action of the P.O.W. Administration and of the 18th Army was that I had to do so as being engaged in anti-Japanese and pro-Allied work; this I can swear with a clear conscience.

I hid a considerable amount of reference material and reports but when three of our members had started an armed rising and the Japanese military authorities due to this tightened up their control, I was afraid that these proofs would be discovered and I burnt them all.

Thereupon eleven comrades having been arrested by the Kenpeitai were condemned to maximum 10 and minimum 3 years hard labour. They were released on 4 September last year after Japan had unconditionally surrendered.

I write this now from memory in order that these lawless acts as of savage beasts, unpermissible either from a humanitarian standpoint or by international law, may completely grasped and punished, to serve as a warning for later generation. Such is my hope.

FINIS

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To the Allied Warcrimes Investigation Committee.

Subject : Report on warcriminals.  
Date : 23 April 1946.  
Author : Li Uck-Kwan.

I beg to submit the following report as per subject-heading.

1. time : about February (or March) 1944.
2. place : the Makassar sea.
3. agent : O.C. transport (directly responsible commander)  
IKEDA Masatsugu, 2nd lieut. of the Military Administration.  
4/4. victims

4. victims : about 500 Allied forces; British and Dutch P.O.W.

5. the facts of the crime : In April 1943 Camp Group III of the Java P.O.W. Administration was despatched by action order of the Japanese forces with the duty of building airdromes on the islands of Flores and Ambon in the S.W.Pacific.

Camp Group III as despatched by the Java P.O.W. Administration at that time was organised as follows :

destination	officers & NCOs (Japanese)	guards (Koreans)	Allied P.O.W. (British, Dutch, Australian).
Flores	7	70	1.500
Ambon	20	200	5.000

In February 1944, about 500 sick Allied P.O.W. were embarked on the transport .... (name forgotten), to be sent back to Java. During their voyage the ship was vitally damaged by torpedos fired by an Allied submarine, in the Makassar sea, and the transport sank after about 15 minutes. Although all Japanese military and auxiliary personnel amongst the victims floating in the sea was saved by the guardship that had come to save them, the remaining P.O.W. without leaving any were all strafed with machinegun fire from the guardship and came to a frightful end, so that the Makassar sea was coloured with their blood.

They did not have any arms ; in fact did the sick and weak Allied P.O.W. not make the slightest resistance, but on the contrary, without considering their own danger, they exerted themselves in the work of saving the Japanese military and auxiliary personnel. However when the saving of the Japanese was finished, the guardship used its motivepower and circling around to extirpate the Allied P.O.W., who floated in the sea waiting to be rescued, it strafed them with machineguns, and foully murdered them all without leaving a single one.

6. those responsible for the crime : the two persons directly responsible for the crime, where in actual fact a large number of Allied P.O.W. were foully murdered, are undoubtedly the C.O. transport, 2nd lieut. of the Military Administration (now either lieutenant or captain) IKEYA Masatsugu and the commander of the guardship (I do not know his name nor that of the ship).

Although the C.O. of detached Camp Group III, major ANAMI Misoo cannot escape responsibility as C.O. Camp Group, I presume that C.O. transport IKEYA Masatsugu is directly responsible, because it is within the powers of a C.O. transport during the transport of P.O.W. to use his authority independently according to circumstances.

7. measures taken by the Japanese forces: after the above mentioned criminal event had occurred, the P.O.W. authorities covered up the fact of foul murder, and when compiling official documents, they disposed of it by saying that the P.O.W. had all been drowned in the sea together with the transport, having met with a torpedo attack by an Allied submarine. On the name-cards of the deceased P.O.W. which were sent to the P.O.W. Office in Tokyo they reported as follows :

front

back

name-card  
 nationality .....  
 service branch .....  
 rank .....  
 name .....  
 residence .....

column for information  
 drowned in the sea  
 together with transport  
 at ... degrees ... mi-  
 nutes East and ... de-  
 grees ... minutes South.

8. material proof of the crime.

: of the above mentioned crime actually no material proof remains, but as far as human proof is concerned, I presume the guards (Koreans) during transport will definitely make statements when questioned.

9. reference material for future investigation

1. Getting a confession from the person responsible for the crime, IKIYA Masatsugu, will be the best method.  
 2. If IKIYA Masatsugu were consistently to deny the facts of the crime, statements of the facts must be obtained from the Koreans who were guards at the time, by way of human proof.

10.

: the above mentioned facts I have heard directly from the guards at that time (Koreans); at that moment I made detailed notes of the facts (time, place, name of the transport, name of the guardship, names of the guards, etc.) and I kept these carefully hidden, but when our anti-Japanese pro-Allied movement had been discovered, I burnt them. So at present I have no definite proof, and as I write only from memory nothing is clear, (time, place, name of the ship, the exact number of people, etc.); however, I have no doubts that the abovementioned crime is an absolute fact.

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