

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
APC 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO.

INTERROGATION NO: 127

PLACE: Yokosuka
DATE: 22 Oct 45

Division of Origin: Military Supplies

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding and Bombing Effect - Yokosuka
Navy Yard

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

- a. Vice Admiral HOSOYA, Shinzaburo - Superintendent of Yard
- b. Rear Admiral AITOKU, I. - General Affairs Dept.
- c. Rear Admiral YANO, - Ship Construction
- d. Rear Admiral KIDERA, K. - Finance and Supply
- e. Capt AKABANE, T. - Charge of Engine Dept.
- f. Mr SAWEMURA, N. - Ordnance Dept Engineer

Where Interviewed: YOKOSUKA Navy Yard

Interrogator: Lt H. M. Bell

Interpreter: 2nd Lt R. A. Nelson

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

Request for data relating to production of military supplies and supplementary questionnaire covering shipbuilding submitted to Naval Ministry in Tokyo. This interrogation based on supplementary questionnaire and all answers from memory of interrogated personnel, due to lack of records.

- a. Explanation of lack of records.
- b. Lists of ships obtained - 2 -
 - 1. New construction by type, name, and completion date from 1941 to end of war.
 - 2. Same information on ships repaired.
- c. Confusion of planning production schedules and yard bottlenecks.
- d. Ordnance
- e. Bombing Results and Affects

INTERROGATION REPORT

A. Explanation of Lack of Records: Yokosuka is one of the largest construction and repair yards of naval vessels and one of two in the construction of large ships such as battleships and large aircraft carriers.

Vice Admiral HOSOYA stated that when the Allies were massing off Japan preparatory to landing operations it was believed the landing would be made in the vicinity of YOKOSUKA and consequently all records were ordered burned. He said some records were under U. S. military guard and were therefore unavailable to him, and in addition some information could possibly be obtained in Tokyo from the Naval Ministry. He added that very few of the original wartime personnel were still in YOKOSUKA and that Tokyo was constantly requesting information which he could not furnish.

B. List of Ships Obtained:

1. New Construction at YOKOSUKA Navy Yard:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE OF COMPLETION</u>
Aircraft Carrier	SHOKAKU	Aug 1941
Mine Layer	TSUGARU	Nov 1941
Cruiser	FUSHIRO	May 1943
Aircraft Carrier	UNRYU	Aug 1944
Aircraft Carrier	SHINANO	Nov 1944
Coast Defense Ship	6 (Nos. 2, 4, 6, 12, 14, 16)	Feb to March 44
T. B. D. (T - Type)	TAKE	Jun 1944
	HINOKI	Sept 1944
	KENYAKI	Dec 1944
	TSUTA	Jan 1945
	SUMIRE	Mar 1945
	HATZAKURA	Jun 1945
	KIRI	Jul 1944
	KAYEDE	Oct 1944
	TACHIBANA	Dec 1944
	HAGI	Feb 1945
	KUSUKOKI	Apr 1945
	MOMI	Aug 1944
	SAKURA	Nov 1944
	KAKI	Feb 1945

Submarine "I"

No. 17	Mar 1941
No. 36	1942
No. 180	Mar 1943
No. 184	Nov 1943
No. 54	Apr 1944
No. 365	Jul 1944
No. 372	Jan 1945
No. 23	Sept 1941
No. 29	1942
No. 44	Feb 1944
No. 182	May 1943
No. 185	Aug 1943
No. 56	Jun 1944
No. 58	Oct 1944
No. 368	Sept 1944
No. 369	Nov 1944
No. 373	Mar 1945

Small Submarine
(6 completed)

Koryu July--Aug 1945

Smaller Submarine
(210 completed)

KAIRYU Mar - Aug 1945

2. List of Ships Repaired at YOKOSUKA Navy Yards:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Aircraft Carrier	RYJHO	1942
Aircraft Carrier	SHOKAKU	Mar 1943
Aircraft Carrier	HIYO	Sept 1943
Aircraft Carrier	TAIYO	1943
Cruiser	UBARI	Aug 1943
Cruiser	ATAGO	Dec 1943
Cruiser	TAKAO	Dec 1943
Cruiser	HOSHIRO	Feb 1944
Cruiser	MAYA	Apr 1944
Cruiser	ISUZU	Sep 1944
Aircraft Tender	KAMOI	Dec 1944
T. B. Destroyer	HIBIKI	Sept 1942 and Feb 1945
T. B. Destroyer	YAMAGUMO	Oct 1943
T. B. Destroyer	USHIO	Not Yet Finished
Coast Defense Ship	OKI	Mar 1945
Battleship	NAGATO	Not Yet Finished

C. Confusion in Planning Production Schedules and Yard Bottlenecks:

The interrogated personnel stated that even when their plans were available it was difficult to determine their construction schedule with reference to planned and actual construction, because of confusion existing at the yard after every large battle. After Midway rush orders to aircraft carriers came in, upsetting any planned schedules; after Guadalcanal destroyers carried most weight; and as losses of merchant ships grew greater, emphasis was placed on coast defense

ships.

Two main bottlenecks at the yard were transportation and lack of fuels and lubricants, which changed to some extent any semblance of a planned schedule. Shortage of steel was due not because of steel itself, but to lack of coal, which in turn was due to lack of transportation. Consequently, the building of large ships was cut down considerably and facilities were used to build submarines. Of the two main transportation facilities, shipping and rail, the lack of shipping was the most important because it was not possible to bring coal from Hokkaido and North China.

On engine production for the small submarines, the local commercial shops dropped to 30% production due to material shortage. Substitute engines were used, which necessitated remodeling of the submarine hulls. However regardless of material shortage or bombing and subsequent delay to other programs, submarine production was constantly maintained.

In answering the question regarding what percentage of the overall naval construction program was carried on at YOKOSUKA, there seemed to be great discussion, but no definite answer except one suggestion of 10%.

D. Ordnance: YOKOSUKA as a naval arsenal manufactured guns, and gun mounts for less than five-inch guns. Mines, torpedoes, and depth charges were assembled only at YOKOSUKA. Shells were also charged there. Less than 30% of all ordnance going through the arsenal was assembled there. It was stated that although ordnance supplies were generally bad all over, YOKOSUKA experienced little trouble locally.

E. Bombing Results and Effects: YOKOSUKA had one bombing attack on 1 August 1945. The main damage was to the electric power system which was cut off ten days and consequently stopped production practically 100%. Water mains were

broken and a supply of oxygen could not be generated, which in turn held up welding for two weeks. Yard equipment was not damaged to any great extent, due to underground dispersion of facilities. Only one large crane was left usable. Some small subs, parts, and railroads sidings were slightly damaged. Thirty percent of small shops and buildings on the base were destroyed and 50% of the production of small shops in the local area was stopped, due to damage or lack of materials due to transportation difficulties.

- 1 DD the YAEZAKURA was sunk -- just being commissioned.
- 1 SS the I-372 " " -- was being repaired.
- 1 Cable Ship, the HARSHIMA MARU was sunk - being repaired.