

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
OIL CHEMICAL AND RUBBER DIVISION  
(PACIFIC)

PLACE: Tokyo.

TIME: 29 October, 1945.

INTERROGATION NO. 172

Division of Origin: Oil and Chemical.

Subject: Army - Navy production of oil and overall allocation.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Rear Admiral ENOMOTO, Ryuichiro.

Nov. 1938 - July 1942 Chief of Synthetic Fuel Section,  
Fuel Bureau, Commerce and Industry  
Ministry.

Aug. 1942 - Nov. 1943 Naval Attache Singapore.

Dec. 1943 - June 1944 Chief of Naval Fuel Depot, Yokkaichi.

July 1943 - May 1945 Chief of Oil Bureau Munitions Min.

June 1945 - Aug. 1945 Chief of Fuel Bureau, Munitions Min.

Where interviewed: Room 748, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. G.M. Williams.

Interpreter: Lt. Thorlackson  
Kawakita, S. Japanese Army-Navy liaison committee.

Allied officers present: None

Summary:

1. Overall allocation of oil.
2. Fuel Bureau Chief customarily Rear Admiral.
3. Army-Navy relations at Singapore.
4. Navy organization in South.
5. Shipments from occupied areas.
6. Transportation of Oil.
7. Synthetic Oil.
8. Submarines along Japan.

Note: The importance of this interview in the interrogator's mind is that it establishes that there was no overall governmental control of oil thru the Cabinet Planning Board (or General Mobilization Bureau) and that such unity and coordinated control as existed lay in the Army-Navy Joint Committee, with the peculiar situation of the Army controlling about 3/4 of all production and the Navy being the principal user of oil.

INTERROGATION

Allocation:

Admiral ENOMOTO answered the question, "Who controls oil in Japan?" by saying, "The trouble with the oil situation in Japan was that we had no Mr. Ickes."

General Mobilization Bureau, which was supposed to make overall allocation between Army, Navy and Civilians, was actually advised by the Army and the Navy of only that amount of their oil imports that they thought the civilians required. This system applied to all materials but was particularly true of oil. According to the Admiral, the weakness of the whole business was that the General Mobilization Bureau didn't know how much the Army and Navy used and how much they stored.

As Chief of the Fuel Bureau, the Admiral did not officially know either the Navy or the Army import figures. The former he generally learned unofficially and the latter he never knew, altho he guessed at them. All he knew officially is what the Army and the Navy told the General Mobilization Bureau and the allocations made by that Bureau.

While the General Mobilization Bureau was supposed to be the final word on allocating oil, the Admiral when he went to argue for more oil for civilians, went not to the General Mobilization Bureau but directly to the Army or the Navy in person. When he went to the Army, he went to see either Col. SATO (Sembi Kacho). When he went to the Navy, he saw Rear Adm. AKISHIGE, who was junior in rank to Rear Admiral ENOMOTO. Consequently the Admiral said he had a much easier time with the Navy. Occasionally, the conferences were four sided with the General Mobilization setting in.


The Fuel Bureau as part of the formal allocation prepared figures on:

Production of Oil fields in Japan, Manchuria, Korea  
Production of Synthetic in Japan, Manchuria, Korea  
Production of refineries in Honshu.

Civilian demand by sections of industry. These figures were prepared by either Col NAKATA.

The figures were considered in the Mobilization Bureau (headed by TAKAMINE) by Col. TANABE's section. Mr. KIMURA in that section did the actual work of assembling the figures.

ROUGH CHART



Cuban requirements were determined by considering industrial demands. Before the China Affair, maximum consumption was 3,000,000 KL annually. In gradual degrees this was reduced to 1,000,000 KL annually, and finally less than 500,000 KL.

Fuel Bureau Chief:

When the Fuel Bureau was started the Army, Navy and Commerce and Industry Ministry negotiated about the post of chief. The Navy which had considerably more experience in oil than the Army won out, and it became customary to have a Rear Admiral as chief of the Bureau. An Army man was put in as chief of the Planning Section.

Army - Navy Relations at Singapore:

Some time before the attack on Pearl Harbor the Army and the Navy divided the South Sea areas between them. According to Admiral ENOMOTO this was done on the basis of strength of landing forces. The Army being stronger got the civilized and well cultivated areas west of the Central mountain range in Borneo, while the Navy was relegated to the East.

In order to maintain their respective interests in the other's territory the Army sent a liaison officer to Balikpapan and the Navy sent one to Singapore and one to Batavia and Java.

The big problem for the Navy was the fact that the Army controlled about 85% of the oil capacity in the South. While the Navy was the larger user. Rear Admiral ENOMOTO's job as liaison officer broken down into three categories.

1. Getting reports from the Army refineries and oil wells to send to the Navy in Tokyo so that they could keep their eye on the Army. This was his most important job.
2. Keeping the fleet supplied with oil, when it was near Singapore.
3. Expediting shipments to Japan.

Admiral ENOMOTO had to deal with two organizations of the Army in Singapore. One was the Southern General Army (Nanpo Sogun) HQ, specifically a Major AIZAWA of the Fuel Unit (Nenryo Han). AIZAWA is not in Tokyo; and the other was the Southern Fuel Depot (Nanpo Nenryo Sho), specifically a General Yamado - who went to New Guinea.

There was no Army - Navy Oil Committee in Singapore as such, ENOMOTO proposed to the Navy Ministry that one be instituted, but this objective was never realized.

Navy Organization in South:

As far as the Navy representative in Singapore was concerned he had no function to perform except to carry out the directives of the Navy Military Affairs Bureau (Gummu Kyoku) in general matters and the directives of the Navy Supply Bureau (Gunju Kyoku) in specific shipping matters etc. This, of course, was in addition to his enumerated functions above. In Singapore the Navy dealt almost exclusively with Army Production. The Navy had some storage plants in Singapore but they filled those almost entirely out of Army stocks.

The local administration of the oil fields and refineries can be charted as follows.

CinC SW Expeditionary Fleet  
Chief Engineer

CinC 2nd Fleet  
Chief Engineer

101st Fuel Depot

102nd Fuel Depot

The 101st Fuel Depot ran the Tarakan and Sanga Sauga oil fields and the 102nd ran the Balikpapan refinery. The 101st and 102nd Fuel Depots made monthly reports of their production and shipments to Tokyo with a copy to the Naval Liaison officer in Singapore.

Shipments from occupied areas:

The following information prepared largely from memory by Admiral ENOMOTO's assistant, Captain HARA is presented here:

Quantity of Oil Shipped from Each Occupied Area

Area	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
Singapore (1)(5)	1129	2014	1020	-	4,163)
Miri (1)	300	600	480	-	1,380) *
Balikpapan (2)	350	620	150	-	1,120
Tarakan (3)	-	300	150	-	450
Totals:	1779	3534	1800	7,113	7,113

Unit 1000 KL

\* The Singapore and Miri totals exactly equal import figures cited by Major TAKASHI.

1. Quantity shipped from Singapore and Miri is actual quantity reaching Japan. It was divided and distributed between Army, Navy and Civilians.

2. Figure of Balikpapan includes quantity sent to Japan and amount sent to Fleet. Out of total quantity about 300,000 KL sent to Japan. Balikpapan quantities represent quantities at time of shipping (not receipts).

3. Tarakan figures indicated quantity at time of shipping. All Tarakan fuel supplied to fleet in that area.

4. Of quantity sent to Japan, Navy got

1942	370,000 KL
1943	820,000 KL
1944	580,000 KL

5. Singapore in addition to quantities sent to Japan supplied about 60,000 KL each year to the fleet in 1942, 1943, and 1944.

Interrogators note - Those figures do not show distribution to South.

Transportation:

Chief problem in Singapore was shortage of ships. There was plenty of oil but no ships.

As soon as oil was in a botton it became neutral in the sense that it might end up in Army, Navy or civilian hands. While ships had orders in Singapore to go to particular placed, these might be changed before they reached Japan.

Synthetic Oil:

Army and Navy made separate plans for war, Neither Army nor Navy pushed Synthetic Oil until 1937. Then the Imperial Fuel Development Company law passed as the result of research and experimentation by various groups, especially the Navy, Enomoto went in as Chief of the Synthetic Fuel section with a program to produce 2,000,000 XL/Y in Japan, Manchuria and Korea. This oil was to have been produced largely from coal. 50% in Manchuria, 30% in Japan, and 20% in Korea in very rough figures. Manchuria plants include:

S. Manchuria Ry Co. at Fushien near Mukden.

Manchu Yukka KK at Kinsei.

Kirin Jinzo Sekiyu KK at Kirin.

None of these plants ever lived up to hopes and the largest total Japanese production was about 400,000 KL in 1944.

Submarines and Japan:

The Yokkaichi (2nd Fuel Depot) had the largest production capacity but because of the submarine menace the Tokuyama (3rd) Depot actually produced more oil as Tokuyama was nearer the oil fields.