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THE

VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

"Ἀρχὴ τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις."—*Epictetus.*

"Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum."

> "He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps.
> O! they have lived long in the alms-basket of words."
>
> *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act v., Sc. 1.

"If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for."—*Locke.*

"In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other languages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign."—*Coleridge's Aids to Reflection*, Aphor. 12.

"In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic truth."—*Trench on Study of Words*, 12mo, Lond., 1853.

"Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's himsel' an arkiteck—there's nae living for new words in this new warld neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such as me."—Quoth Meg Dods (*St. Ronan's Well*, chap. 2).

"A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise."

"Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, but highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a few primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the first pair of mankind."—*Copleston's Remains*, p. 101.

THE

VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY,

MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL;

QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES;

FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS.

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Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged.

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE aim of the following work, as its title indicates, is humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate illustration of the difficult and important topics denoted or suggested by the several vocables which are successively explained. All that is intended is, to assist the student towards a right understanding of the language of philosophy, and a right apprehension of the questions in discussing which that language has been employed. Instead of affixing a positive or precise signification to the vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to furnish the student with the means of doing so for himself—by showing whence they are derived, or of what they are compounded, and how they have been employed. In like manner, the quotations and references have not been selected with the view of supporting any particular system of philosophy, but rather with the view of leading to free inquiry, extended reading, and careful reflection, as the surest means of arriving at true and sound conclusions.

In our Scottish Universities, the study of philosophy is entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of years and intellect, and in respect of previous preparation and

attainment, differ widely from one another. To many, a help like the present may not be necessary. To others, the Author has reason to think it may be useful. Indeed, it was the felt want of some such help, in the discharge of professional duty, which prompted the attempt to supply it. The labour has been greater than the result can indicate or measure. But, should THE VOCABULARY assist the young student by directing him what to read, and how to understand what he reads, in philosophy, the labourer shall have received the hire for which he wrought.

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,
November, 1856.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY was originally prepared for the use of a Class of students who give attendance on a lengthened course of Lectures on Moral Philosophy. The words and phrases selected for explanation, were chiefly such as were actually employed in the Lectures, or such as the students were likely to meet with in the course of their reading. Of the words and phrases of the German Philosophy, only such were introduced as had found their way into common use.

THE VOCABULARY having been found useful, beyond the limits for which it was originally intended, a Second Edition has speedily been called for. Useful suggestions have spontaneously been made to the Author by persons with whom he was previously unacquainted; and, among others, by Mr. Haywood, the Translator of the *Criticism of the Pure Reason*. Mr. Morell, who was formerly a student at this University, and who is now so well known by his valuable contributions to Philosophy, had the kindness to go over the contents of THE VOCABULARY, and to furnish a list of such additional words and phrases as might be introduced with advantage. The like good office was rendered by Dr. M'Cosh,

the distinguished Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast; and the Author has done what he could to make this Edition more complete and useful. The quotations have, in some instances, been shortened; and, without much increasing the size of the work, many additional words and phrases, from the different departments of Philosophy, have been introduced.

It still retains the name and form of a VOCABULARY, in the hope that it may prove useful in our higher Academies and Colleges. But, should suitable encouragement and co-operation be obtained, it is in contemplation, by extending the plan and enlarging the articles, to claim for the work a higher title, by trying to make it instrumental in rendering to Philosophy among ourselves, a service similar to what has been rendered to Philosophy in France, by the publication of the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques.*

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,
February, 1858.

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ABDUCTION (*abductio*, ἀπαγωγή, a leading away) is a kind of syllogism in which it is plain that the major extreme is contained in the middle; but it is not apparent that the middle is included in the minor extreme, although this is equally credible or more so than the conclusion. From this, therefore, that its major proposition is plain, it approaches to demonstration; but it is not yet demonstration, since its assumption or minor proposition is not evident. But the assumption is not evident because it is not immediate, but requires proof to make the demonstration complete. For example—All whom God absolves are free from sin. But God absolves all who are in Christ. Therefore all who are in Christ are free from sin. In this apagogic syllogism the major proposition is self-evident; but the assumption is not plain till another proposition proving it is introduced, namely, God condemns sin in them by the mission of his Son. This mode of reasoning is called *abduction*, because it withdraws us from the conclusion to the proof of a proposition concealed or not expressed. It is described by Aristotle, *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. ii., cap. 25.

ABILITY and INABILITY—(NATURAL and MORAL).

Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unrestrained in their exercise; thus we say ability to walk, the power of seeing, &c.

Inability (Nat.) is the opposite of this; as when we say of a blind man, he is unable to see; or when an object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it.

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Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and opportunities which God has given; as when it is written, "It is a joy to the just to do judgment."

Inability (Mor.) is the want of a right disposition; as in those of whom it is written, "They have eyes full of adultery, and *cannot* cease from sin." "If there is anything besides want of inclination which prevents a man from performing a particular act, he is said to be *naturally* unable to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to be *morally* unable. That which prevents a man from doing *as he will*, is *natural inability*. That which prevents him from doing *as he ought*, is *moral inability*."—Day, *On the Will*, pp. 96, 97.

ABSCISSIO INFINITI is a phrase applied by some logical writers to a series of arguments used in any inquiry in which we go on *excluding*, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking to ascertain. Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude "*small-pox;*" that is, prove this *not* to be the patient's disorder; other symptoms, suppose, exclude "*scarlatina*" &c., and so one may proceed by gradually narrowing the range of possible suppositions."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. iii., s. 4, and ch. v., s. 1, subs. 7.

ABSOLUTE (*absolutum*, from *ab* and *solvo*, to free or loose from) signifies what is free from restriction or limit.

"We must know what is to be meant by *absolute* or *absoluteness;* whereof I find two main significations. First, *absolute* signifieth *perfect*, and *absoluteness*, *perfection;* hence we have in Latin this expression—*Perfectum est omnibus numeris absolutum.* And in our vulgar language we say a thing is *absolutely* good when it is *perfectly* good. Next, *absolute* signifieth *free from tie or bond*, which in Greek is ἀπολελυμένον."—Knox, *Hist. of Reform.*, Pref.

1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative.

2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed to what exists *secundum quid.* The *soul* of man is immortal *absolutely; man* is immortal *only* as to his soul.

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3. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-existence, and is predicable only of the First Cause.

4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but also free from *condition*.

Absolute, Unconditioned, Infinite.—"The *Absolute*, taking its etymological sense, may be explained as that which *is free* from all necessary relation; which exists in and by itself, and does not require the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The *Unconditioned*, in like manner, is that which is subject to no law or condition of being; which exists, therefore, in and by itself, and does not imply the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The *Absolute* and *Unconditioned* are also identical with the *Real;* for relation is but a phenomenon, implying and depending on the prior existence of things related; while the true *Real* is unrelated. Such a science as metaphysics, which has in all ages been proclaimed as the science of the *Absolute*, the *Unconditioned*, and the *Real*, according to Kant, must be unattainable by man; for all knowledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation between the subject or person conscious, and the object or thing of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot be *Absolute;* for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, its existence as such implies an act of consciousness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the *Unconditioned;* for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the *Real;* for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves."—Mansel, *Lecture on Philosophy of Kant*, p. 25.

"Mr. Calderwood defines the *Absolute*, which he rightly identifies with the *Infinite*, as 'that which is free from all necessary relation:' 'it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence.' Hence he holds that the *Absolute* may exist in the relation of consciousness, and in that relation be apprehended, though imperfectly, by man. On this theory we have two *absolutes:* the *Absolute* as it exists out of consciousness, and the *Absolute* as it is known in consciousness. Mr. Calderwood rests his theory on the

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assumption that these two are one. How is this identity to be ascertained? How do I know that *the* absolute is *my* absolute? I cannot compare them; for comparison is a relation, and the first *Absolute* exists out of relation. Again, to compare them, I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time; for the first *Absolute* is never in consciousness, and the second is never out of it. Again, the *Absolute* as known is an object of consciousness; and an object of consciousness as such, cannot exist, save in relation. But the true *Absolute*, by its definition, can exist out of relation; therefore the *Absolute* as known is not the true *Absolute*. Mr. Calderwood's *Absolute* in consciousness is only the *Relative* under a false name."—Mansel, *Lecture on Philosophy of Kant*, p. 38.

According to Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*, p. 13), "The *Unconditioned* denotes the genus of which the *Infinite* and the *Absolute* are the species."

As to our knowledge or conception of the *Absolute*, there are different opinions.

1. According to Sir William Hamilton, "The mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the *conditionally* limited. The *unconditionally unlimited*, or the *Infinite*, the *unconditionally limited*, or the *Absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently the notion of the *Unconditioned* is only negative—negative of the conceivable itself."

2. According to Kant, the *Absolute* or *Unconditioned* is not an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned.

3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the *Absolute*, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the *Relative* and the *Different*.

4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.

Instead of saying that God is *Absolute* and *Infinite*,

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Krause, and his admirer, Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaissances Humaines*, pp. 738, 745), ascribe to him Sèité (*selbheit*) and Totality. Totality or the Infinite manifests itself everywhere in nature. *Nature* is made up of wholes, and all these constitute one whole. In *spirit* everything manifests itself under the character of spontaneity or sèité. *Spirit* always is what it is by its own individual efforts.

All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the *Absolute* under different phases. In psychology, the fundamental question is, have we ideas that are *à priori* and *absolute?*—in logic, is human knowledge *absolute?*—in ethics, is the moral law *absolute* rectitude?—and in metaphysics, what is the ultimate ground of all existence or *absolute* being?

See *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1829; Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*); Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaissances Humaines*).—*V.* INFINITE, UNCONDITIONED, REAL.

ABSTINENCE (*abs teneo*, to hold from or off)—"is whereby a man refraineth from anything which he may lawfully take."—Elyot, *Governour*, b. iii., c. 16.

Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things which nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the 'Απίχου of the precept of Epictetus, 'Ανίχου καὶ ἀπίχου; *Sustine et abstine.* The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make the soul more independent of the body and the things belonging to the body.—Christian abstinence is founded in humility and self-mortification.—*V.* ASCETISM.

ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (*abstractio*, from *abs traho*, to draw away from. It is also called *separatio* and *resolutio*).

Dobrisch observes that the term *abstraction* is used sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former we are said to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects presented (*abstrahere* [*mentem*] *a differentiis*). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder (*abstrahere differentias*).—Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, note, p. 26.

Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart (*Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind*, chap. iv.), "is the power of con-

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sidering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it." Perhaps it may be more correctly regarded as a *process* rather than a *power*—as a *function* rather than a *faculty*. Dr. Reid has called it (*Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 3) "an *operation* of the understanding. It consists in the resolving or analyzing a subject (object) into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which shall signify that attribute and nothing more." Attributes are not presented to us singly in nature, but in the *concrete*, or growing together, and it is by *abstraction* that we consider them separately. In looking at a tree we may perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its branches, and its leaves, and its fruit; or we may contemplate any one of these to the exclusion of all the rest; and when we do so it is by the operation of mind which has been called *abstraction*. It implies an exercise of will as well as of understanding; for there must be the determination and effort to fix the energy of the mind on the attribute specially contemplated.

The chemist really separates into their elements those bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psychologist does the same thing mentally. Hence *abstraction* has been distinguished as *real* and *mental*. But as the object presented to the psychologist may be an object of sense or an object of thought, the process of *abstraction* may be either *real* or *mental*. He may pluck off a branch from a tree, or a leaf from a branch, in order to consider the sensation or perception which is occasioned in him. And in contemplating mind, he may think of its capacity of feeling without thinking of its power of activity, or of the faculty of memory apart from any or all of the other faculties with which it is allied.

Abstraction (Logical), "As we have described it," says Mr. Thomson (*Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 107), "would include three separate acts; first, an act of *comparison*, which brings several intuitions together; next, one of *reflection*, which seeks for some marks which they all possess, and by which they may be combined into one group; and last, one of *generalization*,

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which forms the new general notion or conception. Kant, however, confines the name of *abstraction* to the last of the three; others apply it to the second. It is not of much consequence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. The word means a drawing away of the common marks from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have."

"The process," says Dr. Whately (*Log.*, book i., sect. 6), "by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by 'common' (or in popular language, 'general') terms is properly called 'generalization,' though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of *abstraction;* for generalization is one of the purposes to which *abstraction* is applied. When we draw off and *contemplate separately* any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to *abstract* that part of it. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the *only* rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of *abstraction;* but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, —*i. e.*, a *common* name, as 'rose;' or, again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as 'fragrance,' or 'redness,' we are then said to 'generalize.' *Abstraction*, therefore, does not necessarily imply *generalization*, though *generalization* implies *abstraction.*" In opposition to this, see Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, part i., sect. 24.

"A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. Stewart (Addenda to vol. i., *Phil. of Hum. Mind*), "might yet have been able to consider its *colour* apart from its other qualities; and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once *abstract* and *particular.* After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be

called a general abstract idea. The words *abstract* and *general*, therefore, when applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any two words to be found in the language. It is indeed true, that the formation of every general notion presupposes *abstraction*, but it is surely improper, on this account, to call a *general* term an *abstract* term, or a *general* idea an *abstract* idea."

Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely (*Log.*, vol. i., 2d edition, p. 35) the practice of applying the expression "abstract name" to all names which are the result of *abstraction* or *generalization*, and consequently to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes. He uses the term *abstract* as opposed to *concrete*. By an abstract name he means the name of an attribute—by a concrete name the name of an object. The sea is a concrete name. Saltness is an abstract name. Some abstract names are general names, such as colour; but rose-colour, a name obtained by abstraction, is not a general name.

"By *abstract* terms, which should be carefully distinguished from *general* names, I mean those which do not designate any object or event, or any class of objects or events, but an attribute or quality belonging to them; and which are capable of standing grammatically detached, without being joined to other terms: such as, the words roundness, swiftness, length, innocence, equity, health, whiteness."—S. Bailey, *Letters on Phil. Human Mind*, p. 195.

"When the notion derived from the view taken of any object," says Dr. Whately (*Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, sect 1), "is expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a *concrete* term, as 'foolish' or 'fool;' when without any such reference, by an *abstract* term, as 'folly.'" And he adds in a note, "It is unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all *common* terms *abstract* terms."—*V.* TERM.

A French philosopher has expressed himself on this point to the following effect:—"In every class, genus, or species, there are two things which may be conceived distinctly, the objects united in the class, and the characters which serve to unite them.

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Hence it follows, that under every term which represents that ideal whole which we call *genus*, under the term 'bird,' for example, there are two different ideas,—the idea of the number of the objects united, and the idea of the common characters; this is what is called the *extension* and the *comprehension* of general terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the *extension*, and another word to denote the *comprehension;* as 'mortals' and 'mortality.' And this has led some philosophers to say that there are general ideas which are *concrete* and general ideas which are *abstract*—the latter referring only to the qualities which are common, and the former to the qualities and to the objects which possess them."

"The mind," says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Under.*, book ii., chap. 11, sect. 9), "makes particular ideas received from particular objects to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called *abstraction*, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names *general* names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such *abstract* ideas."—See also book iv., chap. 7, sect. 9.

In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said (*Principles of Hum. Know.*, Introd., sect. 10), "I own myself able to *abstract* ideas, in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can *abstract* one from another, or conceive separately those qualities which it is impossible should exist separately; or that I can frame a general notion by *abstracting* from particulars, as aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation of *abstraction*."

"It seems to me," says Mr. Hume (*Essays*, p. 371, n. c. edit., 1758), "not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions" (see his *Essay on Sceptical Philosophy*), "if it be admitted that there are no such things as abstract in general ideas, properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality

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particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind. Thus, when the term 'horse' is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or white animal of a particular size or figure; but as that term is also used to be applied to animals of other colours, figures, and sizes, their ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled, and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were actually

In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume which are supported by S. Bailey in *Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind*, see Dr. Reid (*Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 6.)

The Rev. Sidney Smith (*Lectures on Mor. Phil.*, lect. iii.) mentions an essay on *Abstraction* by Dumarsais, and calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's *Essay*.—*V.* COMMON, CONCRETE, GENERALIZATION.

ABSTRACTIVE (KNOWLEDGE) and INTUITIVE.

The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into *abstractive* and *intuitive*, or knowledge of simple *intelligence* and knowledge of *vision*, or immediate beholding. By the former mode of knowing, God knows all things possible, whether they are actually to happen or not. By the latter He knows things future as if they were actually beheld or envisaged by him.—Baronius, *Metaphys.*, sect. 12, disput. ii.

ABSURD (*ab surdo*, a reply from a deaf man who has not heard what he replies to, or, according to Vossius, that which should be heard with deaf ears) properly means that which is logically contradictory; as, a triangle with four sides. What is contrary to experience merely cannot be called *absurd*, for experience extends only to facts and laws which we know; but there may be facts and laws which we have not observed and do not know, and facts and laws not actually manifested may yet be possible. —*V.* ARGUMENT (INDIRECT).

ACADEMICS.—"There are some philosophers who have made denying their profession, and who have even established on that foundation the whole of their philosophy; and amongst these philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, admit-

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ting at the same time probability, and these are the *New Academics;* the others, who are the *Pyrrhonists*, have denied even this probability, and have maintained that all things are equally certain and uncertain."—*Port. Roy. Log.*, part iv., chap. 1.

The *Academic* school embraces a period of four ages, from Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three Academies—first, that of Plato, 388 B.C.; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 B.C.; new, that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. To these some add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, and a fifth, that of Antiochus. But Plato, and his true disciples, Speusippus and Xenocrates, should not be classed with these semi-sceptics, whose characteristic doctrine was τὸ πιθανόν, or the probable.

See Foucher (*Dissertatio de Phil. Academ.*, 12, Paris, 1692); Gerlach (*Commentatio Exhibens de Probabilitate Disputationes*, 4to, Goett.)

ACADEMY.—Academus or Hecademus left to the inhabitants of Athens a piece of ground for a promenade, Hipparchus, son of Piristratus enclosed it with walls, Cimon, son of Miltiades, planted it with trees. Plato assembled his disciples in it, hence they were called *Academics.—Biograph. Univers.*

ACATALEPSY (α, privative; and κατάληψις, *comprehensio*, incomprehensibility) is the term employed by Bacon (*Adv. of Learning*, Moffet's trans., p. 140) to denote the doctrine held by the ancient academics and sceptics that human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to probability. "Their chief error," says Bacon, "lay in this, that they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses; by doing which they tore up the sciences by the roots. But the senses, though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet can afford a sufficient basis for real science." Hence he says (*Novum Organum*, b. i., aphor. 126), "We do not meditate or propose *acatalepsy*, but *eucatalepsy*, for we do not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise the understanding, but direct it." Arcesilas, chief of the second Academy, taught that we know nothing with certainty, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics, who taught κατάληψις, or the possibility of seizing the truth. All Sceptics and Pyrrhonians were called *Acataleptics.*—*V.* ACADEMICS.

ACCIDENT (*accido*, to happen) is a modification or quality which

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does not essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its constituent and invariable attributes; as motion in relation to matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is *ens entis*, or *ens in alio*, while substance was defined to be *ens per se*.

"*Accident*, in its widest technical sense (equivalent to *attribute*), is anything that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to *substance*); in its narrower and more properly logical sense, it is a predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining the same; as for a man to be 'walking,' or 'a native of Paris.' Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a *separable* accident, because it may be separated from the *individual* (*e. g.*, he may sit down); the latter is an *inseparable* accident, being not separable from the individual (*i. e.*, he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise); *from the individual*, I say, because *every accident* must be separable from the *species*, else it would be a property."—Whately, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4, and index.—*V.* SUBSTANCE, PHENOMENON.

ACCIDENTAL.—Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 30,) says, "Suppose that in digging a trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that is *accident*, for the one is neither the effect nor the consequent of the other; and it is not ordinarily that in planting a tree you find a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any being, even with the circumstances of place and time, but which has no cause to determine its being, either actually, or in such a place, that thing is an *accident*. An *accident*, then, has no cause determinate, but only fortuitous; but a fortuitous cause is undetermined. *Accident* is also that which exists in an object without being one of the characters distinctive of its essence; such is the property of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Such *accidents* may be eternal; *accidents* properly so called are not."

A *phenomenon* may be constant, inherent in the nature of things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water; but an *accident*, according to Aristotle, is that which neither occurs necessarily nor ordinarily.—*V.* CHANCE.

ACOSMIST (α, priv., and κόσμος, world).—"Spinoza did not deny the existence of God; he denied the existence of the world; he was consequently an *acosmist*, and not an atheist."—Lewes, *Biograph. Hist. of Philosoph.*, p. 1.

"It has of late been a favourite criticism of Spinoza to say with Hegel, that his system is not atheism but *acosmism;* and this is true in a speculative point of view. But if I allow of no God distinct from the aggregate of the universe, myself included, what object have I of worship? Or if, according to the later manifestations of Pantheism, the Divine mind is but the sum total of every finite consciousness, my own included, what religious relation between God and man, is compatible with the theory? And, accordingly, the Pantheism of Hegel has found its natural development in the atheism of Feuerbach." —Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 279, note.

ACROAMATICAL (from ἀκροάομαι, to hear).—"Aristotle was wont to divide his lectures and readings into *Acroamatical* and *Exoterical;* some of them contained only choice matter, and they were read privately to a select auditory; others contained but ordinary stuff, and were promiscuously, and in public, exposed to the hearing of all that would."—Hales, *Golden Remains* (On John xviii. 36).—V. EXOTERIC.

"In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley" (published in the *Encyclop. Metrop.*), "it has been shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the *acroamatic* treatises of Aristotle differed from the *exoteric*, not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis."—*Mor. and Met. Phil.*, by Maurice, note, p. 165.

Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, in giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners (κατ' ἦχος, according to sound—*viva voce* instruction), and the Teleioi (finished, or thoroughly instructed, from τέλος, an end).

This corresponds to the difference between the written law and the traditions of the elders.

Plutarch (in *Alexand.*) and Aulus Gellius (l. xx., c. 4) maintain that the *acroamatic* works had natural philosophy and logic for their subjects, whereas the *exoteric* treated of

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rhetoric, ethics, and politics. Strabo (l. 13, p. 608), Cicero (*Ad Atticum.*, 13, 19), and Ammonius Herm. (*Ad Categor. Aristot.*), maintain that they were distinguished, not by difference of subject, but of form; the *acroamatic* being discourses, the *exoteric* dialogues. Simplicius (*Ad Categor. in Proem.*) thus characterizes the *acroamatic* in contradistinction to the *exoteric* works, "distinguished by pregnant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of transitions," from his more expanded, more perspicuous, and more popular productions.

Buhle has a *Commentatio de Libris Arist., Exot. et Acroam.*, in his edit. of the works of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo, Deux Ponts, 1791, pp. 142, 143.

ACT, in Metaphysics and in Logic, is opposed to *power*. *Power* is simply a faculty or property of anything, as gravity of bodies. *Act* is the exercise or manifestation of a power or property, the realization of a fact, as the falling of a heavy body. We cannot conclude from *power* to *act; a posse ad actum;* but from *act* to *power* the conclusion is good. *Ab actu ad posse valet illatio.*

An act is *Immanent* or *Transient*. An *immanent* act has no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an *immanent* act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. A *transient* act produces an operation or result out of and beyond the agent. The *act* of writing and of building are *transient* acts—they begin with the agent, but produce results which may affect others.

An act of the will is *Elicit* or *Imperate*. An *elicit* act of will is an act produced immediately by the will, and contained within it, as *velle* and *nolle*, to determine to do or not to do. An *elicit* act of will is either *volition*, which has reference to an end or ultimate object, or *election*, which has reference to means.—*V.* VOLITION, ELECTION.

An *imperate* act of *will* is a movement of body or mind following on a determination of will, as running after or running away, attending or not attending. Also an act done by others, when we order or forbid them to do, encourage or dissuade, assist or prevent.

ACTION.—"The word *action* is properly applied to those exertions

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which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged in study." —Stewart, *Outlines*, No. 111.

It is by the presence of will and intention that an action is distinguished from an event. The intention is one thing; the effect is another; the two together constitute the *action.*

ACTION and ACT are not synonymous. 1. *Act* does not necessarily imply an external result, *action* does. We may speak of repentance as an *act*, we could not call it an *action.* 2. An *act* must be *individual;* we may speak of a *course of action.* Lastly, *act*, when qualified, is oftener, though not universally, coupled with another substantive: *action* always by an adjective preceding it. We say a *kind action*, not an *act of kindness.* A *kind act* might be admissible, though not usual, but an *action of kindness* is not used, though an *action of great kindness* might be. *Deed* is synonymous with *act.*

"*Act* (*actum*) is a thing done; *action* (*actio*) is doing; *act*, therefore, is an incident; an *action*, a process or habit; a virtuous *act;* a course of virtuous *action.*"—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

Actions, in Morals, are distinguished, according to the manner of their being called forth, into spontaneous or instinctive, voluntary or reflective, and free or deliberate; according to the faculty from which they proceed, into physical, intellectual, and moral; and according to the nature of the action and character of the agent, into right and wrong, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy.

An action is said to be *materially right*, when, without regard to the end or the intention of the agent, the action is in conformity with some moral law or rule. An action is said to be *formally right*, when the end or the intention of the agent is *right*, and the action is not *materially wrong.* For a man to give his goods to feed the poor is *materially right*, even though he should not have charity or brotherly love, but when he has charity or brotherly love, and throws even a mite into the treasury of the poor, the action is *formally right*, although, in effect, it may fall short of that which is only *materially right.*

ACTIVE.—That which causes change is *active;* that which is changed is *passive.*—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

ACTIVITY.—*V.* WILL.

ACTUAL (*quod est in actu*) is opposed to *potential.* Before a thing is, it has a capacity of becoming. A rough stone is a statue *potentially;* when chiselled, *actually.*

"The relation of the *potential* to the *actual* Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the unfinished to the finished work; of the unemployed carpenter to the one at work upon his building; of the individual asleep to him awake. *Potentially* the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is it *actually;* the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment philosophizing; even before the battle the better general is the potential conqueror; in fact everything is potentially which possesses a principle of motion, of development, or of change; and which, if unhindered by anything external, will be of itself. *Actuality* or entelechy, on the other hand, indicates the perfect art, the end as gained, the completely actual (the grown-up tree, *e. g.*, is the entelechy of the seed-corn), that activity in which the act and the completeness of the act fall together, *e. g.*, to see, to think where he sees and he has seen, he thinks and he has thought (the acting and the completeness of the act), are one and the same, while in these activities which involve a becoming, *e. g.*, to learn, to go, to become well, the two are separated."—Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 123.

Actual is also opposed to *virtual.* The oak is shut up in the acorn *virtually.*

Actual is also opposed to *real.* My will, though really existing as a faculty, only begins to have an *actual* existence from the time that I will anything.—*V.* REAL, VIRTUAL.

ACTUS PRIMUS (in scholastic philosophy)—*est rei esse*, or *actus quidditativus.*

ACTUS SECUNDUS—*est rei operari*, or *actus entitativus.*

ADAGE (*ad agendum aptum*)—a practical saying, fit for use, a rule of action. "From the Latin *adagium*, a saying handed down from antiquity, comes the English *adage*, which denotes an antique proverb."—Taylor, *Synonyms.* On the disagreement and similitude between *adagies*, *apophthegms*, and moral , see Erasmus, in the Prolegomena to his *Adagia.*

ADJURATION (from *ad-juro*, to put upon oath).—"Our Saviour, when the high priest *adjured* him by the living God, made no scruple of replying upon that *adjuration*."—Clarke, *Works* vol. ii., ser. 125.

ADMIRATION.—"We shall find that *admiration* is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is superior to ignorance; for its appropriate signification is that act of the mind by which we discover, approve, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence."—Cogan, *On the Passions*, part i., c. 2.

ADORATION.—To adore (from the Latin *ad oro*), signifies, to carry to the mouth; as in order to kiss one's hand, the hand is carried to the mouth; but it also includes in this action a sense of veneration or worship. "If I beheld the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness, and *my mouth had kissed my hand*, this also were iniquity." (Job xxxi. 26, 27.) As an act of worship, adoration is due only to God. But the form of kissing the hand to mortals was also used in the East. Pharaoh speaking to Joseph says, "According to thy word shall all my people *kiss*"—that is, in token of veneration to your order. (Gen. xli. 40, margin.)

ADSCITITIOUS (from *ad-scisco*, to seek after), that which is added or assumed. "You apply to your hypothesis of an *adscititious spirit*, what he (Philo) says concerning this πνεῦμα θεῖον, divine spirit or soul, infused into man by God's breathing."—Clarke, *Letter to Dodwell.*

ÆSTHETICS (αἴσθησις, perception or feeling).—"That science which refers the first principles in the arts to sensation and sentiment, as distinguished from mere instruction and utility."

The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the fine arts. Various theories have been entertained as to the idea of the beautiful, by Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine. In modern times, the term *æsthetics* was first used in a scientific sense by A. Baumgarten, a disciple of Christian Wolf. In his *Æsthetica*, 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 1750-8, he considered the idea of the beautiful as an indistinct perception or feeling accompanying the moral ideas. Mendelsshon and others identified the idea of the beautiful with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and

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Hutcheson regarded the two ideas as intimately connected. At the close of the eighteenth century, *æsthetics* was scientifically developed in Germany by Kant, and has been zealously prosecuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult *Cours d'Esthetique par* Ph. Damiron, 8vo, Paris, 1842; *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, by John G. MacVicar, D.D., Edin., 1855; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., ch. 4.—*V.* BEAUTY, IDEAL (BEAU).

AETIOLOGY (αἰτία, cause; λόγος, discourse), is coming into use, by Dr. Whewell and others, to denote that department of Philosophy which inquires into causes.

AFFECTION.—"There are various principles of action in man which have *persons* for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some *person*, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of *affections*, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part ii., chap. 3-6.

They are usually distinguished into *benevolent*, as esteem, gratitude, friendship; and *malevolent*, as hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge.

This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, or to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. By Descartes (*Traité des Passions*, art. 83) it is employed to denote some degree of love.—*V.* LOVE, SENSIBILITY.

AFFINITY is a relation contracted by, or resulting from, marriage; in contradistinction to *consanguinity*, or relation by blood.—*V.* CONSANGUINITY.

AFFIRMATION (κατάφασις) is the attributing of one thing to another, or the admitting simply that something exists. A mental affirmation is a judgment; when expressed it becomes a proposition.—*V.* JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION.

In Law, *affirmation* is opposed to *oath*. There are certain separatists, who, from having scruples as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn *affirmation* that what they say is true; and if they make a false *affirmation* they are liable to the penalties of perjury.

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"*To affirm* is a solitary, to *confirm* is an assisted asseveration. A man *affirms* what he declares solemnly; he *confirms* what he aids another to prove."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

A FORTIORI.—*V.* ARGUMENT (INDIRECT).

AGENT (*ago*, to act), one who, that which, *acts.* "Nor can I think that anybody has such an idea of chance as to make it an *agent*, or really existing and *acting* cause of anything, and much less sure of all things."—Wollaston, *Relig. of Nat.*, 8, 5.

AGNOIOLOGY (λόγος τῆς ἀγνοίας, the theory of true ignorance), is a section of Philosophy intermediate between Epistemology and Ontology. "Absolute Being may be that which we are ignorant of. We must, therefore, examine and fix what ignorance is, what we are, and can be ignorant of."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 48.

ALCHEMY or ALCHYMY (*al*, the article, and χύμα, what is poured, according to Vossius), is that branch of chemistry which proposed to transmute metals into gold, to find the panacea or universal remedy, &c. Louis Figuier, *L'Alchemie et Les Alchemistes*, Paris, 1850.—*V.* HERMETIC PHILOSOPHY, ROSICRUCIAN.

ALLEGORY (ἄλλο ἀγορεύειν, to say another thing), says Quintilian, exhibits one thing in words and another in meaning.

"An *Allegory* is a continued metaphor. It consists in representing one subject (object) by another analogous to it; the subject thus represented is not formally mentioned, but we are left to discover it by reflection; and this furnishes a very pleasant exercise to our faculties. A metaphor explains itself by the words which are connected with it in their proper and natural meaning. When I say, 'Wallace was a thunderbolt of war,' 'In peace Fingal was the gale of spring,' the thunderbolt of war and the gale of spring are sufficiently explained by the mention of Wallace and Fingal. But an *allegory* may be allowed to stand more unconnected with the literal meaning; the interpretation is not so directly pointed out, but is left to our own discovery.

"When the Jewish nation is represented under the notion of a vine or a vineyard, as is done in the Psalms and the Pro-

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phets, you have a fine example of an *Allegory.*" Irving, *English Composition*, p. 189.—*V.* METAPHOR, MYTH.

AMBITION (from *ambio*, to go about seeking place or power), is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of the primary or original desires of human nature. See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part 2, chap. 2 ; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, book i., chap. 2, sect. 4.

AMPHIBOLOGY (ἀμφιβολία, ambiguity), is to use a proposition which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or double sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aristotle, who distinguishes it from *equivocatio*, ὁμωνυμία, by which he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately.—*V.* FALLACY.

AMPHIBOLY is applied by Kant to that kind of amphibology which is natural, and consists in confounding pure notions of the understanding with objects of experience, and attributing to the one characters and qualities which belong to the other; as when we make *identity*, which is a notion *à priori*, a real quality of phenomena, or objects which experience makes known to us.—*V.* ANTINOMY, PROPOSITION.

ANALOGUE (ἀνάλογος, proportionate).—"By an *Analogue* is meant an organ in one animal having the same function as a different organ in a different animal. The difference between *Homologue* and *Analogue* may be illustrated by the wing of a bird and that of a butterfly: as the two totally differ in anatomical structure, they cannot be said to be *homologous*, but they are *analogous* in function, since they both serve for flight." —M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 25.

In Logic a term is *analogous* whose single signification applies with equal propriety to more than one object—as the *leg* of the table, the *leg* of the animal.—Whately, *Log.*, b. iii., § 10.

ANALOGY (ἀναλογία, proportion), has been defined, "The similarity of ratios or relations." "But in popular language we extend the word to resemblances of things as well as relations. Employed as an argument, *analogy* depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of differ-

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ence."—Thomson, *Outlines of Laws of Thought*, p. 363, 1st edit.

"Analogy does not mean the similarity of two *things*, but the similarity, or sameness of two *relations*. There must be more than two *things* to give rise to two *relations;* there must be at least *three*, and in most cases there are *four*. Thus A may be *like* B, but there is no *analogy* between A and B: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an *analogy*. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind instead of misleading it."—Coplestone, *Four Discourses*, p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821.

"*Analogy* implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree; and it is the sameness of the end with the difference of the means which constitutes *analogy*. No one could say the lungs of a man were *analogous* to the lungs of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of a fish and the spiracula of insects are *analogous* to lungs."—Coleridge, *Physiology of Life*, p. 64.

Between one man and another, as belonging to the same genus, there is *identity*. Between a flint and a flower, as belonging to different genera, there is *diversity*. Between the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or between the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, when we think wherein they agree, without forgetting wherein they differ, there is *analogy*.

"When some course of events seems to follow the same order with another, so that we may imagine them to be influenced by similar causes, we say there is an *analogy* between them. And when we infer that a certain event will take place in some other case of a similar nature, we are said to reason from *analogy;* as when we suppose that the stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, which derive from them

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light and heat. The word *analogy* is employed with strict propriety only in those cases where there is supposed to be a *sameness* in the causes of similar effects. When there is a mere similarity in effects or appearances, the word *resemblance* should be used. Resemblances may be well adduced in *illustration* of an argument; but then they should be proposed merely as similes, or metaphors, not as *analogies*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"The meaning of *analogy* is resemblance (?), and hence all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be termed *analogical;* but the word is usually confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do not say that a man reasons from *analogy* when he infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases *identical*, not *analogical.* But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was *analogical.*

"By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of relations; thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind as light to the eye—to enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied to this class of resemblances, I think it is not generally confined to them; it is commonly used with more latitude, except, indeed, in mathematics, when it is employed to designate the identity of ratios."—Sam. Bailey, *Discourses*, p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852.

"As *analogy* is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be connected by *analogy*, though they have in *themselves* no *resemblance;* thus as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word, 'sweet,' is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself. To bear this in mind would serve to guard us against two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of Scripture:—1. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar relation to other things; 2. The still more

common error of supposing the *analogy* to extend farther than it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not considering *in what* the analogy in each case consists"—Whately.

"*Analogy* is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed *analogy*. And although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signify every other habitude, and consequently the term *analogy*, all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is *analogy* between intellect and sight; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body: and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.* For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold *analogy* is distinguished by the schoolmen, *metaphorical* and *proper*. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the *analogy* is merely *metaphorical;* because these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God, as the works wrought by human fingers are to man; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely

* *Vide* Cajetan, *de Nom. Analog.*, c. iii.

above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls *analogia proprie facta.*—And after the same *analogy* we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection."—Berkeley, *Min. Philosoph.*, Dialog. 4.

Analogy and Metaphor.—*Metaphor*, in general, is a substitution of the idea or conception of one thing with the term belonging to it, to stand for another thing, on account of an appearing similitude only, without any real resemblance and true correspondency between the things compared; as when the Psalmist describes the verdure and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing and singing. *Analogy*, in general, is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, on account of a true resemblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aristotle Ἰσότης του λογόν, an equality or parity of reason, though, in strictness and truth, the parity of reasoning is rather built on the similitude, and analogy, and consequent to them, than the same thing with them.

"The ground and foundation of *Metaphor* consists only in an appearing or imaginary resemblance and correspondency; as when God is said to have hands, and eyes, and ears. But the foundation of analogy is an actual similitude and a real correspondency in the very nature of things; which lays a foundation for a parity of reason even between things different in nature and kind; as when God is said to have knowledge, power, and goodness.

"*Metaphor* is altogether arbitrary, and the result merely of imagination, it is rather a figure of speech than a real similitude and comparison of things; and, therefore, is properly of consideration in rhetoric and poetry. But *analogy* being built on the very nature of things themselves, is a necessary and useful method of conception and reasoning; and, therefore, of consideration in Physics and Metaphysics."—Brown, *Divine Analogy*, p. 2.

"I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that all states have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels

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of this sort rather furnish *similitudes* to illustrate or to adorn, than supply *analogies* from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an *analogy* are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings—commonwealths are not physical, but moral essences." —Burke, *Letters on Regicide Peace*, b. iv.

Many fallacies become current through false metaphorical *analogies*. See an example of false *analogy* (Butler, *Analogy*, part i., chap. 7), in the supposed likeness between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures.

Analogy and Example.—*Analogy* is not unfrequently used to mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is *similarity of relations*, and in this consists the difference between the argument by *example* and that by *analogy*,—that in the one we argue from mere *similarity*, from *similarity of relations* in the other. In the one we argue from Pisistratus to Dionysius, who resembles him; in the other, from the *relation* of *induction* to *demonstration*, to the corresponding *relation* of the *example* to the *enthymeme*.—Karslake, *Aids to Log.*, vol. ii., p. 74.

Analogy and Experience.—"*Experience* is not the mere collection of observations; it is the methodical reduction of them to their principles . . . *Analogy* supposes this, but it goes a step farther. *Experience* is mere analysis. *Analogy* involves also a synthesis. It is applied to cases in which some difference of circumstances is supposed; as, for instance, in arguing from the formation of particular parts of one class of animals to the correspondence in another, the different nature, habits, circumstances, of the one class, are considered and allowed for, in extending the given observation."—Hampden, *Introd. Mor. Phil.*, lect. v.

In the *Schools*, what was termed the *analogy* of faith (see Rom. xii. 6), was showing that the truth of one scripture is not repugnant to the truth of another, or of the whole. "Analogia vero est, cum veritas unius scripturæ ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare."—Thom. Aquinas, *Summ. Theolog.*, pars prima, quæst. i., art. 10.

In *Logic*, three modes of reasoning are called analogical. 1. From effect to cause, or from cause to effect. 2. From

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means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From mere resemblance or concomitance. Condillac (*Art de Raisonner*) has shown how these modes of reasoning all concur to prove that the human beings around us, who are formed like ourselves (*analogy of resemblance*), who act as we act (*analogy of cause*), who have the same organs (*analogy of means*), should be in all respects like ourselves, and have the same faculties.

Analogy and Induction.—"There are two requisites in order to every analogical argument: 1. That the two or several particulars concerned in the argument should be known to agree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular *to* which we argue. For herein consists *the essential distinction between an analogical and an inductive argument.*"—Hampden, *Essay on Phil. Evid. of Christianity*, pp. 60-64.

Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16, sect. 12; Beattie's *Essay on Truth*, part i., chap. 2, sect. 7; Stewart's *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 4, sect. 4; Stewart's *Essays*, v., c. 3.

ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS (*ἀνά λύω, σύν τίθημι, resolutio, compositio*), or decomposition and recomposition. Objects of sense and of thought are presented to us in a complex state, but we can only, or at least best, understand what is simple. Among the varied objects of a landscape, I behold a tree, I separate it from the other objects, I examine separately its different parts—trunk, branches, leaves, &c., and then reuniting them into one whole I form a notion of the tree. The first part of this process is *analysis*, the second is *synthesis*. If this must be done with an individual, it is more necessary with the infinitude of objects which surround us, to evolve the one out of many, to recall the multitude to unity. We compare objects with one another to see wherein they agree; we next, by a synthetical process, infer a general law, or generalize the coincident qualities, and perform an act of induction which is purely a synthetical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, from our experience that bodies attract within certain limits,

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we infer that all bodies gravitate towards each other. The antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, the consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought together by the mental insertion of a third proposition, which is, "that nature is uniform." This is not the product of induction, but antecedent to all induction. The statement fully expressed is, this and that body, which we know, gravitate, but nature is uniform; this and that body represent all bodies—all bodies gravitate. It is the mind which connects these things, and the process is synthetical. This is the one universal *method* in all philosophy, and different schools have differed only in the way of employing it. *Method* is the following of one thing *through* another. *Order* is the following of one thing *after* another. *Analysis* is *real*, as when a chemist separates two substances. *Logical*, as when we consider the properties of the sides and angles of a triangle separately, though we cannot think of a triangle without sides and angles.

For an explanation of the processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*, see Stewart, *Elements*, part ii., chap. 4.

The instruments of *analysis* are *observation* and *experiment*; of *synthesis*, *definition* and *classification*.

Take down a watch, *analysis*; put it up, *synthesis*.—Lord Brougham, *Prelimin. Discourse*, part i., sect. 7.

"*Hac* analysi *licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione colligere simplices; ex motibus, vires moventes; et in universum, ex effectis causas; ex causisque particularibus generales; donec ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum.*"—Newton, *Optices*, 2d edit., p. 413.

Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its elements. Objects may be compound, as consisting of several distinct parts united, or of several properties equally distinct. In the former view, *analysis* will divide the object into its parts, and present them to us successively, and then the relations by which they are united. In the second case, *analysis* will separate the distinct properties, and show the relations of every kind which may be between them.—Cardaillac, *Etudes Element.*, tom. i., pp. 8, 9.

Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of a

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compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into these and azote.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 75, 12mo, Lovan., 1840.

Abstraction is *analysis*, since it is decomposition, but what distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which by themselves have no real existence. *Classification* is *synthesis*. *Induction* rests upon *analysis*. *Deduction* is a *synthetical process*. *Demonstration* includes both.

ANALYTICS (Τὰ Ἀναλυτικά) is the title which in the second century was given, and which has since continued to be applied, to a portion of the Organon or Logic of Aristotle. This portion consists of two distinct parts; the *First Analytics*, which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its diverse figures and most simple elements, and the *Posterior Analytics*, which lays down the rules and conditions of demonstration in general. It was in imitation of this title that Kant gave the name of *Transcendental Analytic* to that part of the Criticism of Pure Reason which reduces the faculty of knowing to its elements.

ANGELOLOGY (ἄγγελος, a messenger; λόγος, discourse), is the doctrine of Angels.—*V.* PNEUMATOLOGY.

ANIMA MUNDI (soul of the world).—*Animism* is the doctrine of the *anima mundi* as held by Stahl. The hypothesis of a force, immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving to matter its form and movement, is coeval with the birth of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, but held that there was an infinitely perfect being above it. From Pythagoras it passed into the system of Plato, who could not conceive how pure spirit, the seat of eternal ideas, could act directly upon matter. He thought also that the world would be more perfect if endowed with life. The soul of the world was the source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The school of Alexandria adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized intelligence and Deity as above the *anima mundi*, which in the system of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His name; while Straton of Lampsacus called it *nature*. The hypothesis of the *anima mundi* was not entertained by the scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of

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Archæus, in the systems of Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Van Helmont; while Henry More recognized a *principium hylarchicum*, and Cudworth a *plastic nature*, as the universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organization, and the spring of all the movements of matter. About the same time, some German divines, as Amos Comenius, and John Bayer, attempted to rest a similar opinion on Genesis i. 2, and maintained that the spirit which moved on the face of the waters still gives life to all nature.—Buddeus, *Elem. Phil.*, pars 3, cap. 6, sect. 11, 12, *et seq.*

The doctrine of the *anima mundi*, as held by the Stoics and Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism; while according to others this soul of the universe is altogether intermediate between the Creator and His works.

See Plato, *Timæus*, 29 D.—30 C.

Schelling, *De l'Ame de Monde*, 8vo, Hamb., 1809.

ANTECEDENT (*antecedo*, to go before).—"And the *antecedent* shall you fynde as true when you rede over my letter as himself can not say nay, but that the *consecusyon* is formal."—*Sir T. More's Works*, p. 1115.

In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term is the *antecedent*, the second the *consequent*. Thus in the relation of causality—the cause is the *antecedent*, and the effect the *consequent*.

In Logic, *antecedent* is the former of two propositions, in a species of reasoning, which, without the intervention of any middle proposition, leads directly to a fair conclusion; and this conclusion is termed the *consequent*. Thus, I reflect, therefore I exist. I reflect, is the *antecedent*—therefore I exist, is the *consequent*.—Euler, *Letters to a German Princess*.

Antecedent is that part of a conditional proposition on which the other depends."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., chap. 4, § 6.

In Grammar the word to which the relative refers is called the *antecedent*; as, "God whom we worship,"—where *God* is the *antecedent*, to which *whom* the relative refers.

ANTHROPOLOGY (ἄνθρωπος and λόγος, the science of man).—Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human species. According to Dr. Latham (*Nat. Hist. of Varieties of*

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Man, Lond., 1830), *anthropology* determines the relations of man to the other mammalia; *ethnology*, the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other, p. 559. The German philosophers since the time of Kant have used it to designate all the sciences which in any point of view relate to man—soul and body—individual and species—facts of history and phenomena of consciousness—the absolute rules of morality as well as interests material, and changing; so that works under the general title of *anthropology* treat of very different topics.

"*Anthropology* is the science of man in all his natural variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and temperaments, together with the results which follow immediately from them in their application to human life. Under *psychology*, on the other hand, we include nothing but what is *common to all mankind*, and forms an essential part of human nature. The one, accordingly, may be termed the science of mental *variables*; the other, the science of mental *constants*."—Morell, *Psychology*, pp. 1, 2.

In an anonymous work entitled *Anthropologie Abstracted*, 8vo, Lond., 1655, *Anthropology* is divided into Psychology and Anatomy.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM (ἄνθρωπος, man; μορφή, form).—"It was the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites* that God had all the parts of a man, and that we are, in this sense, made according to his image."—More, *Def. of Cabbala*, c. 1.

Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who ascribed body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or members to Deity is too gross a delusion to call for refutation. It is wittily exposed by Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i., cap. 27. But there is a spiritual *anthropomorphism*, sometimes also called *anthropopathy*, which ascribes to him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of human nature.

"We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a human body, as the *Anthropomorphites* asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any."—Malebranche, *Search after Truth*, book iii., chap. 9.

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Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God is like the mind of man.

"When it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be assigned by you *Anthropomorphites*, than that it is a *rational* faculty, and that such is the nature of Deity?" — *Dialogues on Nat. Relig.*, parts iv., v.

ANTICIPATION (*anticipatio*, *πρόληψις*), is a term which was first used by Epicurus to denote a general notion which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object which had not yet come under the cognizance of the senses. But these general notions being formed by abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalizations *à posteriori*. Buhle (*Hist. de la Phil. Mod.*, tom. i., pp. 87, 88) gives the following account:—"The impressions which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognize these objects when they present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first time, the impression made on the senses leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same animal, we refer the impression to the type already existing in the mind. This type and the relation of the new impression to it, constituted what Epicurus called the *anticipation of an idea*. It was by this *anticipation* that we could determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference of objects actually before us, and those formerly observed."

The language of Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i., cap. 16) seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term *πρόληψις* was extended to what is supersensual, and included what is now called knowledge *à priori*. "*Quae est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine doctrina*, anticipationem *quandam Deorum? quam apellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quæri, nec disputari potest.*" And according to Diogenes Laertius (lib. vii., sect. 51, 53, 54), the Stoics defined *πρόληψις* to mean "a natural conception of the universal." It would appear, however, that this definition was

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not adopted by all. And Sir William Hamilton has said (*Reid's Works*, note A, p. 774):—"It is not to be supposed that the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, φυσικαὶ προλήψεις, of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalizations *à posteriori*. Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen in regard to the former." See *Manuductio ad Stoicam Phil.*, lib. ii., dissert. 11; and Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, Pref. See also Kernius, *Dissert. in Epicuri* πρόληψιν, &c., Goett., 1736.

Anticipation of Nature is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to a due and gradual generalization, which he called an *Interpretation of Nature*.—Pref. to *Nov. Organ.*

ANTINOMY (ἀντί, against; νόμος, law), the opposition of one law or rule to another law or rule.

"If He once willed adultery should be sinful, all His omnipotence will not allow Him to will the allowance that His holiest people might, as it were, by His own *antinomy* or counter statute, live unreproved in the same fact as He Himself esteemed it, according to our common explainers."—Milton, *Doct. and Disc. of Div.*, b. ii., c. 3.

According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction which results from the law of reason, when, passing the limits of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then, we do not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep the limits of our faculties, which reach only to phenomena.

If the world be regarded not as a phenomenon or sum of phenomena, but as an *absolute thing* in itself, the following *Antinomies* or counter-statements, equally capable of being supported by arguments, arise:—

Thesis.	I.	*Antithesis.*
The world has an origin in time, and is *quoad* space shut up in boundaries.		The world has no beginning and no bounds.
	II.	
Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there is nothing but the simple, or that which is compounded from it.		No composite consists of simple parts; and there exists nowhat simple in the world.

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III.

Thesis.	*Antithesis.*
It is requisite to assume a *Free* causality to explain the phenomena of the world.	There is no Freedom. Everything in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

IV.

To the world there belongs somewhat which, either as its part or its cause, is an absolutely necessary being.	There exists no absolutely necessary Being, neither in the world nor out of the world, as its cause.

At the bottom of the two first *antinomies* lies the absurdity of transferring to the world in itself predicates which can be applied only to a world of phenomena. We get rid of the difficulty by declaring that both thesis and antithesis are false. With regard to the third, an act may be in respect of the causality of reason a first beginning, while yet, in respect of the sequences of phenomena, it is no more than a subordinate commencement, and so be, in the first respect free; but in the second, as mere phenomenon, fettered by the law of the causal nexus. The fourth *antinomy* is explained in the same manner; for when the cause *qua* phenomenon is contradistinguished from the cause of phenomena, so far forth as this last may be a thing in itself, then both propositions may consist together.—Semple, *Introd. to Metaphysic of Ethics*, p. 95.

Others think that when the principles are carefully inducted and expressed, the contradiction disappears.—M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, p. 530, 5th edit.

ANTIPATHY (ἀντί πάθος, feeling against).—"There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and *antipathy* of plants; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to *antipathy*."—Bacon, *Nat. Hist.*, sect. 479.

According to Sylvester Rattray, M.D. (*Aditus Novus ad Occultas Sympathiæ et Antipathiæ causas inveniendas.* 12mo, Glasg., 1658,) there is antipathy and sympathy not only between plants, but also between minerals and animals.

A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any

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appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or character of some persons at first sight. An involuntary dislike or aversion entertained by an animate being to some sensible object. A man may have an antipathy to particular smells or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour red, a horse to the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural, others are acquired, as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. Some are founded on sensation, others on sentiment.—Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8.—*V.* SYMPATHY.

A PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST.—These two expressions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to eternity; of which man can only conceive as consisting of two parts; the one without limits in the past, *a parte ante;* and the other without limits in the future, *a parte post.* Both are predicable of Deity; only the latter of the human soul.—*V.* ETERNITY.

APATHY (α, privative; and πάθος, passion).—The absence of passion. "What is called by the Stoics *apathy*, or dispassion; by the Sceptics indisturbance, ἀταραξία; by the Molinists, quietism; by common men, peace of conscience: seem all to mean but great tranquillity of mind."—Sir W. Temple, *Of Gardening.*

As the passions are the springs of most of our actions, a state of *apathy* has come to signify a sort of moral inertia—the absence of all activity or energy. According to the Stoics, *apathy* meant the extinction of the passions by the ascendancy of reason.

"By the perfect *apathy* which that philosophy (the Stoical) prescribes to us, by endeavouring not merely to moderate but to eradicate, all our private, partial, and selfish affections, by suffering us to feel for whatever can befall ourselves, our friends, our country, not even the sympathetic and reduced passions of the impartial spectator,—it endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the success or miscarriage of everything which nature has prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of our lives."—Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, part vii., sect. 2.

"In general, experience will show, that as the wants of

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natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some natural disease; so the *apathy* the Stoics talk of, as much supposes or is accompanied with something amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind."—Butler, Sermon v.

> "In lazy *apathy* let Stoics boast
> Their virtue fix'd; 'tis fix'd as in a frost;
> Contracted all, retiring to the breast;
> But strength of mind is exercise, not rest."—POPE.

Niemeierus (Joh. Barth.), *Dissert. de Stoicorum* Ἀπάθεια, &c. 4to, Helmst., 1679.

Becnius, *Dispp.*, libb. 3, Ἀπάθεια *Sapientis Stoici.* 4to, Copenhag., 1693.

Fischerus (John Hen.), *Diss. de Stoicis* ἀπαθείας *falso suspectis.* 4to, Leips., 1716.

Quadius, *Disputatio tritum illud Stoicorum paradoxon* περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας *expendens.* 4to, Sedini, 1720.

Meiners, *Melanges*, tom. ii., p. 130.

APHORISM, determinate position, from ἀφορίζω, to bound, or limit; whence our *horizon.*—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 16, edit. 1848: "In order to get the full sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines of different colours round the different counties of England, and then cut out each separately, as in the common play-maps that children take to pieces and put together, so that each district can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a whole in itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and detaching, when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of reflection and reason, is to aphorize, and the result an *aphorism.*"

A precise, sententious saying; *e. g.*, "It is always safe to learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our friends."

Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled *Aphorisms*, containing medical maxims, not treated argumentatively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law *aphorisms* are also used.

The three ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, viz.,

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Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given the same definition of an *aphorism*, *i. e.*, "a succinct saying, comprehending a complete statement," or a saying poor in expression, but rich in sentiment. The first *aphorism* of Hippocrates is, "Life is short, and the art is long; the occasion fleeting; experience fallacious, and judgment difficult. The physician must not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and externals, co-operate."

"The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were wont to throw their knowledge into *aphorisms*, or short, scattered, unmethodical sentences."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i., sect. 86. And the *Novum Organum* itself is written in *aphorisms*.

Heraclitus is known by his *aphorisms*, which are among the most brilliant of those

> "Jewels, five words long,
> That on the stretched fore-finger of all time,
> Sparkle for ever."

Among the most famous are,—War is father of all things, *i. e.*, all things are evolved by antagonistic force. No man can bathe twice in the same stream, *i. e.*, all things are in perpetual flux.

APODEICTIC, APODEICTICAL (ἀποδείκνυμι, to show).—"The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore not *apodictick*, or of evident demonstration."—Robinson, *Eudoxa*, p. 23.

This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle (*Analyt. Prior.*, lib. i., cap. 1). He made a distinction between propositions which admitted of contradiction or dialectic discussion, and such as were the basis or result of demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analogous distinction between our judgments, and to give the name of apodeictic to such as were above all contradiction.

APOLOGUE (ἀπόλογος, *fabula*), "a novel story, contrived to teach some moral truth."—Johnson.

"It would be a high relief to hear an *apologue* or fable well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious moral at the end to make the application."—(Shaftesbury, vol. iii., *Miscell.* 4, c. 1.) It is essential to an *apologue* that the circum-

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stances told in it should be fictitious. The difference between a *parable* and an *apologue* is, that the former being drawn from human life requires probability in the narration; whereas the *apologue* being taken from inanimate things or the inferior animals, is not confined strictly to probability. The fables of Æsop are *apologues*.

For an admirable instance of the λόγος or *apologue*, see Coleridge's *Friend*, where the case of the seizure of the Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form.

APOLOGY (ἀπολογία, a defence made in a court of justice).—We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the *Apology of Socrates*, and another with the same title by Plato. The term was adopted by the Christian fathers, and applied to their writings in defence of Christianity, and in answer to its opponents. About the year 125, Quadratus and Aristides presented *Apologies* to the Emperor Hadrian when on a visit to Athens. Tertullian addressed his *Apologetic* to the magistrates of Rome, the Emperor Severus being then absent.

APOPHTHEGM (ἀποφθέγγομαι, to speak out plainly).—A short and pithy speech or saying of some celebrated man; as that of Augustus, *Festina lente*.

"In a numerous collection of our Saviour's *apophthegms*, there is not to be found one example of sophistry."—Paley, *Evidences*, part ii., c. 2.

The Lacedæmonians used much this mode of speaking. Plutarch has a collection entitled the *Apophthegms of Kings and Generals*, many of which are anecdotes; and also another entitled *Laconica*. Drusius (Joan. Prof. Heb. Lugd. Bat.) published in 1612, a collection of Hebrew and Arabic *Apophthegms*. Erasmus has a collection of *Apophthegms*, 12mo, Basil, 1558.

"Of Blackmore's (Sir Richard) attainments in the ancient tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, he has confounded an *aphorism* with an *apophthegm*."—Macaulay, *On Addison*, p. 11.

In *Guesses at Truth* (2d series, 1848), the saying of Demosthenes, "that action was the first, second, and third essential of eloquence," is called an *apophthegm*.

APPERCEPTION (Self-consciousness).—"By *apperception* he (Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which reflects as it were upon itself; by which we are conscious of our own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by which we can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, and can comprehend abstract truths."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., c. 15.

By *apperception* the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the act by which the mind is conscious immediately of the representative object, and through it, mediately of the remote object represented."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D*, sect. 1.

Apperception according to Kant is consciousness of one's self, or the simple representation of the I. If a subject capable of representations possesses such, it, besides, always connects with these representations that it (the subject) has them. This second representation, that I, the representing subject, has these representations, is called the consciousness of myself, or the *apperception*. This representation is simple, and is an effect of the understanding, which thereby connects all the diversity of a representation in a single representation, or, according to Kant's mode of expression, produces a synthesis."—Haywood, *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 592.

"The term *consciousness* denotes a *state*, *apperception* an *act* of the *ego*; and from this alone the superiority of the latter is apparent."—Meiklejohn, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, note, p. 81.

"Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spontaneous thought, into which volition and reflection, and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name *apperception*, explaining it also as a true inspiration, and holding therefore, that inspirations come to man, not by the special volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus constituting a scientific organ of discovery." —MacVicar, *Enquiry into Human Nature*, 8vo, Edin., 1853, p. 216.

APPETITE.—"The word *appetitus*, from which that of appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and the Latinists to desires in general, whether they primarily relate to the body or not, and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification

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is the seeking after whatever may conduce either to gratification or happiness. Thus Cicero observes, '*Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur; appetitus impellit ad agendum.*' By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast with each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word *appetitus* in the same latitude."—Cogan, *On the Passions*, vol. i., p. 15.

In modern use, *appetites* refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire. But desire proper refers to mental objects

"The word *appetite*, in common language, often means hunger, and sometimes figuratively any strong desire."—Beattie, *Mor. Science*, part i., c. 1.

As our perceptions are *external*, which are common to us with the brutes; and *internal*, which are proper to us as rational beings—so *appetite* is *sensitive* and *rational*. The sensitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible.—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii.; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. i., p. 14.

Appetite and Instinct.—"Appetites have been called instinctive, because they seek their own gratification without the aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are common to man with the brute; but they differ at least in one important respect from those instincts of the lower animals which are usually contrasted with human reason. The objects towards which they are directed are prized for their own sake; they are sought as *ends*, while *instinct* teaches brutes to do many things which are needed only as *means* for the attainment of some ulterior purpose. Thus *instinct* enables a spider to entrap his prey, while *appetite* only leads him to devour it when in his possession.

"*Instinct* is an impulse conceived without instruction, and prior to all experience, to perform certain acts, which are not needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, which, in

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fact, are often opposed to it, and are useful only as means for the accomplishment of some ulterior object; and this object is usually one of pre-eminent utility or necessity, either for the preservation of the animal's own life, or for the continuance of its species. The former quality separates it from intelligence, properly so called, which proceeds only by experience or instruction; and the latter is its peculiar trait as distinguished from *appetite*, which in strictness, uses no means at all, but looks only to ends."—Bowen, *Lowell Lect.*, 1849, p. 228.

EHENSION (*apprehendo*, to lay hold of).—"By the *apprehensive* power, we perceive the species of sensible things, present or absent, and retain them as wax doth the print of a seal."—Burton, *Anat. of Melancholy*, p. 21.

Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but also memory or retention.

"How can he but be moved willingly to serve God, who hath an *apprehension* of God's merciful design to save him!"—Barrow, Serm. xlii.

"It may be true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro slaves are extremely dull of *apprehension* and slow of understanding."—Porteous, *On Civilization of Slaves.*

Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. *Incomplex apprehension* regards one object, or several, without any relation being perceived between them, as a man, a card, &c. *Complex apprehension* regards several objects with such a relation, as a man on horseback, a pack of cards, &c.—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 1.

"*Apprehension* is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it, as species, perception proper and sensation proper."—Meiklejohn, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, note, p. 127.

pprehend and Comprehend.—"We *apprehend* many truths which we do not *comprehend.* The great mysteries of our faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity—we lay hold upon it (*ad prehendo*), we hang upon it, our souls live by it; but we do not take it all in, we do not *comprehend* it; for

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it is a necessary attribute of God that He is incomprehensible; if He were not so He would not be God, or the being that comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He may be '*apprehended*,' though not '*comprehended*' by His reasonable creatures; He has made them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to 'apprehend' though not to 'comprehend' Him,"—Trench, *On Study of Words*, p. 110, 12mo, Lond., 1851.

APPROBATION (**Moral**) includes a judgment of an action as *right*, and a feeling favourable to the agent. The judgment precedes and the feeling follows. But in some cases the feeling predominates; and in others the judgment is more prominent. Hence some have resolved an exercise of the moral faculty into an act of the reason; while others would refer it altogether to the sensibility. But both the judgment and the feeling should be taken into account.—See *Manual of Mor. Phil.*, p. 102; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 7.

A PRIORI and A POSTERIORI.—"There are two general ways of *reasoning*, termed arguments *à priori* and *à posteriori*, or according to what is usually styled the *synthetic* and *analytic* method; the one lays down some previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place, descends to the several consequences that may be deduced from them; the other begins with a view of the phenomena themselves, traces them to their original, and by developing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause."—King, *Essay on Evil*, Pref., p. 9.

By an *à priori* argument a conclusion is drawn from an antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order of time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By the argument *à posteriori* we reason from what is consequent in the order of time to what is antecedent, or from effect to cause. An individual may fall under suspicion of murder for two reasons: he may have coveted the deceased's property, or he may be found with it in his possession; the former is an *à priori*, the latter an *à posteriori* argument against him.

"Of demonstrations there are two sorts; demonstrations *à priori*, when we argue from the cause to the effect; and *à*

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posteriori, when we argue from the effect to the cause. Thus when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, eternity, necessary existence, and the like, that such perfections can reside but in *one* being, and thence conclude that there can be but one supreme God, who is the cause and author of all things, and that therefore it is contradictory to this to suppose that there can be two necessary independent principles, the one the cause of all the good, and the other the cause of all the evil that is in the world; this is an argument *à priori*. Again, when the Manicheans and Paulicians, from what they observe in things and facts, from the many natural evils which they see in the world, and the many moral wickednesses which are committed by men, conclude that there must be two different causes or principles from whence each of these proceed; this is arguing *à posteriori*."—Dr. John Clark, *Enquiry into Evil*, pp. 31-2.

"The term *à priori*, by the influence of Kant and his school, is now very generally employed to characterize those elements of knowledge which are not obtained *à posteriori*—are not evolved out of factitious generalizations; but which as native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective condition) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. Previously to Kant the terms *à priori* and *à posteriori* were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed—the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect—the latter a reasoning from effect to cause. The term *à priori* came, howerer, in modern times, to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions which such a notion involved; hence, for example, the title *à priori* bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the Deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience—from the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological demonstration called *à priori*, is therefore, so far, properly an argument *à posteriori*."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 762.

"By knowledge *à priori*," says Kant (*Criticism of Pure*

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Reason, Introd., § 1), "we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of *all* experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only *à posteriori*, that is, through experience. Knowledge *à priori* is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge *à priori* is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, 'Every change has a cause,' is a proposition *à priori*, but impure because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience."

"We have ordinarily more consideration for the demonstration called *propter quid* or *à priori*, than for that which we call *quia* or *à posteriori;* because the former proceeds from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while the latter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We must nevertheless see whether we have a right to do this; since no demonstration *à priori* can have credence, or be received, without supposing the demonstration *à posteriori*, by which it must be proved. For how is it, for example, that having to prove that *man feels*, from this proposition, every animal feels—how, I say, will you establish the truth of this position, should some one hesitate to grant it, except by making induction of the individual animals, of whom there is not one that does not feel?"—Bernier, *Abridgment of Gassendi* "*De l'Entendement*," vol. vi., pp. 340-1.

"If there are any *truths* which the mind possesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called *à priori* truths, as belonging to it *prior* to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and experience, are called *à posteriori* truths, because they come to the mind *after* it has become acquainted with external facts. How far *à priori* truths or ideas are possible, is the great *campus philosophorum*, the great controverted question of mental philosophy."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 68-9.—*V.* DEMONSTRATION.

ARBOR PORPHYRIANA.—In the third century Porphyry wrote Εἰσαγωγή, or an *Introduction to Logic*. He represented

ARBOR PORPHYRIANA—
the five predicables under the form of a tree with its trunk and branches, and hence the name. By the Greek logicians it was called the ladder (κλῖμαξ) of Porphyry. A delineation of the *Arbor Porphyriana* is given by Aquinas, *Opusc.* xlviii., tract. ii., cap. 3.

ARCHÆUS is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital principle which presides over the growth and continuation of living beings. He called it body; but an *astral body*, that is an emanation from the substance of the stars, which defends us against the external agents of destruction till the inevitable term of life arrives. The hypothesis was extended by Van Helmont to the active principle which presides not only over every body, but over every particle of organized body, to which it gives its proper form.

The word is used by More (*Antidote to Atheism*, pt. i., c. 11,) as synonymous with *form*.

ARCHELOGY (λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν) treats of principles, and should not be confounded with *Archæology* (λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων), which treats of antiquities or things old.—See Alstedius (J. H.), *Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopædia.*—*V.* PRINCIPLE.

ARCHETYPE (ἀρχή, first or chief; and τύπος, form), a model or first form.—"There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one *archetypal* mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 387.

"The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an *archetypal* world which contains intelligibly all that is contained sensibly in our world."—Bolingbroke, Essay iv., sect. 28.

Cornelius Agrippa gave the name of *Archetype* to God, considered as the absolute model of all being.

In the philosophy of Locke, the *archetypes* of our ideas are the things really existing out of us. "By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their *archetypes*."—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., c. 30.

"There is truth as well as poetry in the Platonic idea things being formed after original *archetypes*. But we hold that these *archetypes* are not uncreated, as Plato seems to suppose; we maintain that they have no necessary or independent existence, but that they are the product of Divine wisdom; and that we can discover a final cause for their prevalence, not, indeed, in the mere convenience and comfort of the animal, but in the aid furnished to those created intelligences who are expected to contemplate and admire their predetermined forms."—M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 4.

"Apelles paints a head of Jupiter. The statue of Phidias was his *archetype*, if he paints after it from memory, from idea. It was his *model*, if he paints after it in presence of the statue. He paints a *likeness*, if the resemblance is striking. If he makes a second painting in imitation of the first, he takes a *copy*."—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

ARCHITECTONICK.—"I understand by an *Architectonick* the art of systems. As the systematic unity is what first of all forms the usual cognition into science, that is, from a mere aggregate of it forms a system, so is *Architectonick* the doctrine of the Scientific in our cognition in general, and belongs therefore necessarily to the doctrine of Method."—Kant, *Critick of Pure Reason*, by Haywood, p. 624.

ARGUMENT (*arguo*, from ἀργός, clear, manifest—to show, reason, or prove), is an explanation of that which is doubtful, by that which is known.

Reasoning (or *discourse*) expressed in words, is *Argument*. Every *argument* consists of two parts; that which *is proved;* and that *by means of which* it is proved. The former is called, *before* it is proved, the *question; when proved* the *conclusion* (or *inference*); that which is used to prove it, if stated last (as is often done in *common discourse*), is called the *reason*, and is introduced by "*because*," or some other causal conjunction; *e g.*, "Cæsar deserved death, *because* he was a tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death." If the conclusion be stated *last* (which is the strict logical form, to which all reasoning may be reduced), then, that which is employed to prove it is called the

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premises, and the conclusion is then introduced by some *illative* conjunction, as *therefore; e. g.*,

> "All tyrants deserve death:
> Cæsar was a tyrant;
> *Therefore* he deserved death."—
> Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 3, § 2.

The term *argument* in ordinary discourse, has several meanings.—1. It is used for the premises in contradistinction to the conclusion, *e. g.*, "the conclusion which this *argument* is intended to establish is," &c. 2. It denotes what is a *course* or *series* of *arguments*, as when it is applied to an entire dissertation. 3. Sometimes a *disputation* or *two trains* of *argument* opposed to each other. 4. Lastly, the *various forms of stating* an *argument* are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of *argument*, as if the same *argument* were not capable of being stated in various ways.—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

"In technical propriety *argument* cannot be used for *argumentation*, as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, &c.; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Ramists; and this is the meaning which the expression always first, and most naturally, suggests to a logician."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 147.

In this sense, the *discovery* of *arguments* means the discovery of middle terms.

Argument (The Indirect).—It is opposed to the Ostensive or Direct. Of *Indirect arguments* several kinds are enumerated by logicians.

Argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the principles of an opponent.

Argumentum ex concesso, a proof derived from some truth already admitted.

Argumentum a fortiori, the proof of a conclusion deduced from that of a less probable supposition that depends upon it.—Matthew vi. 30, vii. 11.

Argumentum ad judicium, an appeal to the common sense of mankind.

Argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority.

Argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the multitude.

Argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument founded on the ignorance of an adversary.

Reductio ad absurdum is the proof of a conclusion derived from the absurdity of a contrary supposition. These arguments are called *Indirect*, because the conclusion that is established is not the absolute and general one in question, but some other relative and particular conclusion, which the person is bound to admit in order to maintain his consistency. The *Reductio ad absurdum* is the form of argument which more particularly comes under this denomination. In geometry this mode of reasoning is much employed, by which, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, everything which contradicts that assertion is shown to be absurd. For, if everything which contradicts a proposition is absurd, or unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as true. In other sciences, however, which do not depend upon definition, nor proceed by demonstration, the supposable and the false find a place between what is true and what is absurd.

ARGUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and consciousness, and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price (*Review*, chap. 5).

Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind whereby we infer one proposition from two or more propositions premised.—Watts, *Log.*, Introd.

Argumentation must not be confounded with *reasoning*. *Reasoning* may be natural or artificial; *argumentation* is always artificial. An advocate *reasons* and *argues;* a Hottentot *reasons*, but does not *argue*. *Reasoning* is occupied with ideas and their relations, legitimate or illegitimate; *argumentation* has to do with forms and their regularity or irregularity. One *reasons* often with one's self; you cannot *argue* but with two. A thesis is set down—you attack, I defend it; you insist, I reply; you deny, I approve; you distinguish, I destroy your distinction; your objections and my replies balance or overturn one another. Such is *argumentation*. It supposes that there are two sides,

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and that both agree to the same rules.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

"*Argumentationis nomine tota disputatio ipsa comprehenditur, constans ex argumento et argumenti confutatione.*"—Cicero.

ART (Latin *ars*, from Greek ἀρετή, strength or skill; or from ἄρω, to fit, join, or make agree).

Ars *est ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum.*—Thomas Aquinas.

Ars *est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus; quia per precepta sua dirigit effectionem seu productionem operis externi sensibilis. Differt autem a natura, quod natura operatur in eo in quo est;* ars *vero nunquam operatur in eo in quo est; nisi per accidens, puta cum medicus seipsum sanat.*—Derodon, *Phys.*, p. 21.

Ars *est methodus aliquid juxta regulas determinatas operandi.* —Bouvier.

Ars *est recta ratio* factibilium, *atque in eo differt a* prudentia, *quæ est recta ratio* agibilium.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 31.

Docti rationem artis *intelligunt, indocti voluptatem.*—Quint. This is the difference, in the fine arts especially, between acquired knowledge and natural taste.

"We speak of *art* as distinguished from *nature;* but *art* itself is natural to man. . . . If we admit that man is susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle of progression and a desire of perfecion, it appears improper to say that he has quitted the state of his *nature*, when he has begun to proceed; or that he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the disposition and employs the powers that *nature* has given. The latest efforts of human invention are but a continuation of certain devices which were practised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest state of mankind."—Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, pp. 10-13.

Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be "a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind." It may be defined more concisely to be the adjustment of *means* to accomplish a desired *end.*—Stewart, *Works*, vol ii., p. 36, last edition.

ART—

"*Art* has in general preceded science. There were bleaching and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper and iron, before there was chemistry to explain the processes used. Men made wine before there was any theory of fermentation; and glass and porcelain were manufactured before the nature of alkalies and earths had been determined. The pyramids of Nubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculptured slabs of Nineveh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the obelisks and temples of India, the cromlechs and druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic, all preceded the sciences of mechanics and architecture. There was music before there was a science of acoustics; and painting while as yet there was no theory of colours and perspective."—M'Cosh, *On Div. Govern.*, p. 151.

On the other hand, Cicero has said (*De Oratore*, i., 41), "*Nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.*"

And Mr. Harris (*Phil. Arrangements*, chap. 15) has argued —"If there were no theorems of science to guide the operations of *art*, there would be no *art;* but if there were no operations of *art*, there might still be theorems of science. Therefore science is prior to *art.*"

"The principles which art *involves*, science *evolves.* The truths on which *art* depends lurk in the artist's mind undeveloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions. *Art* in its earlier stages is anterior to science—it may afterwards borrow aid from it."—Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, vol. ii., pp. 111-2, new edit.

If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, the *art* is called *empirical;* but if it be experience reasoned upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a higher character and becomes a *scientific art.*

The difference between *art* and *science* is regarded as merely verbal by Sir William Hamilton in *Edin. Rev.*, No. 115.

On the other side, see Preface of St. Hilaire's translation of the *Organon*, p. 12; Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, part ii., book ii., chap. 8.

"The distinction between *science* and *art* is, that a *science* is a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of some object matter. An *art* is a body of precepts with practical skill for the completion of some work. A *science* teaches us to know, an *art* to do; the former declares that something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence; the latter teaches how something may be produced."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 16, 2d edit.

"The object of *science* is knowledge; the objects of *art* are works. In *art*, truth is a means to an end; in *science* it is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed among the sciences."—Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, aph. 25.

"*Science* gives principles, *art* gives rules. *Science* is fixed, and its object is intellectual; *art* is contingent, and its object sensible."—Harris, *Dialogue on Art.*

ASCETICISM (ἄσκησις, exercise).—The exercise of severe virtue among the Pythagoreans and Stoics was so called. It consisted in chastity, poverty, watching, fasting, and retirement.

"The *ascetics* renounced the business and the pleasures of the age; abjured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness."—Gibbon, *Hist.*, c. 37.

This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as we can; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination, and the mind; for society, the family, most of the sciences and arts of civilization, are proscribed sometimes as rigorously as physical pleasures. The care of the soul and the contemplation of the Deity are the only employments. *Asceticism* may be distinguished as *religious*, which is founded on the doctrine of expiation, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath by voluntary sufferings, and *philosophical*, which aims at accomplishing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and freeing it from the servitude of sense.—*Dict. des Sciences Phil.*

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The *principle of asceticism* is described by Bentham (Introd. to *Prin. of Mor. and Legislation*, ch. 2), as "that principle which approves of actions in proportion as they tend to *diminish* human happiness, and conversely disapproves of them as they tend to augment it." But this is not a fair representation of *asceticism* in any of its forms. The only true and rational *asceticism* is temperance or moderation in all things.

ASSENT (*ad sentio*—to think the same—to be of the same mind or opinion).—"Subscription to articles of religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's *assent*, may properly enough be considered in connection with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation."—Paley, *Mor. Phil.*, b. iii., c. 22.

Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part of judgment; for if you take away from judgment affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple conception without logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before it can be admitted. It is also implied in perception, which would otherwise be a mere phenomenon which the mind had not accepted as true. *Assent* is *free* when it is not the unavoidable result of evidence, *necessary* when I cannot withhold it without contradicting myself. The Stoics, while they admitted that most of our ideas came from without, thought that images purely sensible could not be converted into real cognitions without a spontaneous act of the mind, which is just *assent* or belief, *συγκατάθεσις*.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*—*V.* BELIEF, CONSENT.

"*Assent* of the mind to truth is, in all cases, the work not of the *understanding*, but of the *reason*. Men are not convinced by syllogisms; but when they believe a principle, or wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove it."—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

ASSERTION (*ad sero*, to join to, to declare), in Logic is the affirmation or denial of something.—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 1.

f them be according to the

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kinds of *oaths* divided by the schoolmen, one *assertory*, the other *promissory*, to which some add a third, *comminatory*, is to me unknown."—Fuller, *Worthies*, Cornwall.

Judgments have also been distinguished into the *problematic*, the *assertory*, and the *apodeictic*.—*V.* JUDGMENT, OATH.

ASSOCIATION (*associo*, to accompany).—"Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its *associate* appears with it."—Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., c. 33, sect. 5.—*V.* SUGGESTION, TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

"If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in the mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these thoughts return to the mind, some, or all of the others, will frequently return with it; this is called the *association of ideas*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"By the *law of continuity*, the mind, when the chord has once been struck, *continues*, as Hume describes it, to repeat of itself the same note again and again, till it finally dies away By *association* it falls naturally into the same train of consecutive ideas to which it has been before accustomed. Imagine a glass so constructed that when the face placed before it was withdrawn, the image should still continue reflected on it for a certain time, becoming fainter and fainter until it finally disappeared. This would represent the *law of continuity*. Imagine that when a book and a man had been once placed before it together, it should be able, when the book was next brought alone, to recall the image of the man also. This would be the *law of association*. On these two laws depends the spontaneous activity of the mind."*—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, ch. 14.

"The law of *association* is this,—That empirical ideas which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow."—Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 182.

"I employ the word *association* to express the effect which

* See the use which Butler has made of these in his *Analogy*, ch. 1 and ch. 5.

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an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which it does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly recalls to the mind, in consequence of early and long continued habits."—Stewart, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 449.

"*Intelligitur per associationem idearum non quævis naturalis et necessaria earundem conjunctio, sed quæ fortuita est, aut per consuetudinem vel affectum producitur, qua ideæ, quæ nullum naturalem inter se habent nexum, ita copulantur, ut recurrente una, tota earum catena se conspiciendam intellectui præbeat.*"—Bruckerus, *De Ideis.*

Locke, *Essay*, book ii., chap. 23; Hume, *Essays*, essay iii.; Hartley, *Observ. on Man;* Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv.; Stewart, *Elements*, vol. ii., ch. 5; Brown, *Lectures*, lect. xxxiii.

"The influence of *association* upon morals opens an ample field of inquiry. It is from this principle that we explain the reformation from theft and drunkenness in servants which we sometimes see produced by a draught of spirits in which tartar emetic had been secretly dissolved. The recollection of the pain and sickness excited by the emetic, naturally associates itself with the spirits, so as to render them both equally the objects of aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that we can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the golden calf into a powder, and afterwards dissolving it (probably by means of *hepar sulphuris*) in water, and compelling the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment for their idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in the highest degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, could not be felt without being associated with the remembrance of this disagreeable mixture, and of course being rejected with equal abhorrence."—Dr. Rush, *Medical Enquiries*, vol. ii., 8vo, Philadelphia, 1793, p. 42.—*V.* COMBINATION.

ASSUMPTION (*assumo*, to take for granted).—"The unities of time and place arise evidently from false *assumptions*."—Johnson, *Proposals for, &c., Shakspeare.*

Of enunciations or premises, that which is taken universally is called the *proposition*, that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the *assumption*.—Trendelenburg, *Notæ in Arist.*

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The Assumption is the minor or second proposition in a categorical syllogism.

ATHEISM (α, priv.; and Θεός, God).—The doctrine that there is no God.

"We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers who *atheized* before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of *atheism* they entertained."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 111.

The name *Atheist* is said to have been first applied to Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, who explained all things by motion and matter, or the movement of material atoms. The other form of *atheism* in ancient times was that of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, who accounted for all things by the different transformations of the one element of water. Straton of Lampsacus rejected the purely mechanical system of Democritus, and ascribed to matter a power of organization which gave to all beings their forms and faculties. Epicurus was the contemporary of Straton, but the follower of Democritus, on whose system he grafted the morality which is suited to it. And the materialism of Hobbes and others in modern times has, in like manner, led to *atheism.*

It is a fine observation of Plato in his *Laws*—that *atheism* is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error of the understanding.

Leclerc, *Hist. des Systemes des Anciens Athées.* In *Bibliotheque Choisie.*

"To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the *whole*, nor of any *particulars*, can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at, is to be a perfect *atheist.*"—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*, book i., part i., sect. 2.

Hi soli sunt athei, qui mundum rectoris sapientis consilio negant in initio constitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore administrari.—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 3, c. 1.

Atheists are confounded with *Pantheists;* such as Xenophanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling among

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the moderns, who, instead of denying God, absorb everything into Him, and are rather *Acosmists.*

Atheism has been distinguished from *Antitheism;* and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between *unbelief* and *disbelief* (Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, i., 58), and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between sceptical and dogmatic *atheism.*—Buchanan, *Faith in God*, vol. i., p. 396.

"The verdict of the *atheist* on the doctrine of a God, is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an *atheist.* He is not an *antitheist.*"—Chalmers, *ut supra.*

ATOM, ATOMISM (α, priv.; and τέμνω, to cut, that which cannot be cut or divided is an atom).

"Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of *atoms*, yet notwithstanding, held an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first principle of activity in it, so in like manner did all other ancient *atomists* generally before Democritus join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 26.

Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of *atoms.* To these *atoms* he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which, such as are homogeneous united, whilst the lighter were dispersed throughout space.

The doctrine of *atomism* did not take its rise in Greece, but in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence distinct from the world. But he could not believe matter to be infinitely divisible, as in this case a grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being infinite. Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible *atoms*, which are indestructible and eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit from the universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius gave to

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In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or necessity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God.—Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. ii., last edit., 369.—*V.* MOLECULE.

ATTENTION (*attendo*, to stretch towards).

"When we see, hear, or think of anything, and feel a desire to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the object; this effort of the mind, produced by the desire of knowledge, is called *attention*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

Attention is the voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Sir H. Holland (*Mental Physiol.*, p. 14), that "The phrase of *direction of consciousness* might often be advantageously substituted for it." It implies Will as distinct from Intelligence and Sensibility. It is the voluntary direction of the intelligence and activity. Condillac confounded it with a sensation of which we were passively conscious, all other sensations being as if they were not. Laromiguiere regarded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty of the understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But we may do an act with *attention* as well as contemplate an object with *attention*. And we may attend to a feeling as well as to a cognition. According to De Tracy (*Ideologie*, c. 11), it is a state of mind rather than a faculty. It is to be acquired and improved by habit. We may learn to be attentive as we learn to walk and to write.

According to Dr. Reid, "*Attention* is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; and it may be continued as long as we will; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every thought."—*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., ch. 5.

Attention to external things is *observation*. *Attention* to the subjects of our own consciousness is *reflection*.

Attention and *abstraction* are the same process, it has been said, viewed in different relations. They are the positive and negative poles of the same act. The one evolves the other. *Attention* is the *abstraction* of the mind from all things else, and fixing it upon one object; and *abstraction* is the fixing the mind upon one object to the exclusion of others.

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Attention and Thought.—"By *thought* is here meant the voluntary reproduction in our minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his best and most authentic documents, the teacher of moral or religious truth refers us. In *attention*, we keep the mind passive; in *thought*, we rouse it into activity. In the former, we submit to an impression—we keep the mind steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or duplicate of his work. We may learn arithmetic or the elements of geometry, by continued *attention* alone; but self-knowledge, or an insight into the laws and constitution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality, in addition to the effort of *attention*, requires the energy of *thought*."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 4.

ATTRIBUTE (*attribuo*, to apportion, to ascribe), is anything that can be predicated of another.

> "Heaven delights
> To pardon erring man; sweet mercy seems
> Its darling *attribute*, which limits justice."
>
> Dryden, *All for Love*.

"*Attributes* are usually distributed under the three heads of quality, quantity, and relation."—Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 83.

In the Schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and the accident, were called dialectic *attributes;* because, according to Aristotle (*Topic*, lib. i., c. 6), these were the four points of view in which any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed.

"A predicate, the exact limits of which are not determined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject. It may be called an *attribute*, and conveys not the whole nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to it. 'Metals are heavy,' 'some snakes are venomous,' are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 161.

Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real qualities, essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the substance of things. "By this word *attribute*," said Descartes

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not dependent on the mind, and which are either persistent, or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and are dependent on *normal* causes seated in the nerves or central organs of the nervous system. "Movements influenced simply by sensation, and not at all by the will, are *automatic*, such as winking."—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 99.

Leibnitz, tom. i., p. 156, has said, "anima humana est *spirituale quoddam automaton*." In a note on this passage, Bilfinger is quoted as saying that *automaton* is derived from αὐτός and μάω or ματέω, to seek or desire. The soul is a being desiring of itself, whose changes are desired by itself; whereas the common interpretation of the word is self-moving. The soul, in strict propriety, may be called self-desiring, or desiring changes of itself, as having the principle of change in itself; whereas machines are improperly called self-moving, or self-desiring, or willing.

"By the compound word αὐτόματον (ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more or less than the specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend."—*Nat. Auscult.*, lib. ii., cap. 6; Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, chap. 2, note. Nature operating κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and producing effects not in her intention, is called αὐτόματον or chance, and art operating κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and producing effects not in her intention, is called τύχη, fortune. Thus, chance or fortune cannot have any existence independently of intention or design.

Automatism is one of the theories as to the activity of matter. See Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. ii., pp. 378, 379.

AUTONOMY (αὐτός νόμος, a law itself).—In the philosophy of Kant, *autonomy* is ascribed to the reason in all matters of morality. The meaning is, that reason is sovereign, and the laws which it imposes on the will are universal and absolute. Man, as possessed of reason, is his own lawgiver. In this, according to Kant, consists the true character and the only possible proof of liberty. The term *heteronomy* is applied by him to those laws which are imposed upon us by nature, or the violence done to us by our passions and our wants or desires.—*V.* **AUTOCRASY.**

AUTOTHEISTS (αὐτός θεός).—*Autotheistæ qui nulla alia entia præter se agnoscunt.*—Lacoudre, *Instit. Philosoph.*, tom. ii., p. 120.

AXIOM (ἀξίωμα, from ἀξιόω, to think worthy), a position of worth or authority. In science, that which is assumed as the basis of demonstration. In mathematics, a self-evident proposition.

Diogenes Laertius (*Life of Zeno*, ch. 48) explains an *axiom*, according to Chrysippus, as meaning a proposition asserting or denying something. "It has received the name of *axiom*, ἀξίωμα, because it is either maintained, ἀξιοῦται, or repudiated."

"There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science." —Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 7.

"Philosophers give the name of *axioms* only to self-evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all places."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 20; see also Sir William Hamilton's edition of *Reid*, note A, sect. 5.

Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, part ii., ch. 1) contends that *axioms* are elemental truths necessary in reasoning, but not truths from which anything can be deduced.

That all *axioms* are *intuitive* and *self-evident* truths, is, according to Mr. Tatham (*Chart and Scale of Truth*, chap. 4), a fundamental mistake into which Mr. Locke (*Essay*, b. iv., chap. 7, § 1), and others (*Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. i., b. v., chap. 3, p. 389, and vol. ii., p. 335), have been betrayed, to the great injury of science. All *axioms* though not *intuitive* may, however, be properly said to be *self-evident;* because, in their formation, reason judges by single comparisons without the help of a third idea or middle term; so that they are not indebted to any *other* for their evidence, but have it in themselves; and though inductively framed, they cannot be syllogistically proved. —Ibid, chap. 7, sect. 1.

This term was first applied by mathematicians to a certain number of propositions which are self-evident, and serve as the basis of all their demonstrations. Aristotle applied it to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all science (*Analyt.*

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Post., lib. i., chap. 2). According to him they were all subordinate to the supreme condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of *axioms*, included every kind of general proposition, whether of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is employed by Bacon, who, not satisfied with submitting *axioms* to the test of experience, has distinguished several kinds of *axioms*, some more general than others (*Novum Organum*, lib. i., aphor. 13, 17, 19, &c.) The Cartesians, who wished to apply the methods of geometry to philosophy, have retained the Aristotelian use of the term. Kant has consecrated it to denote those principles which are the grounds of mathematical science, and which, according to him, are judgments absolutely independent of experience, of immediate evidence, and which have their origin in the pure intuition of time and space.

BEAUTY.—"All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which seem to concur in our sense of *beauty*. First, When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and, secondly, This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them." —Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 4.

Beauty is *absolute*, *real*, and *ideal*. The *absolutely* beautiful belongs to Deity. The *really* beautiful is presented to us in the objects of nature and the actions of human life. The *ideally* beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identified the *beautiful* with the *good*, τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. But, although the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of the true are related to each other, they are distinct. There may be truth and propriety or proportion in *beauty*—and there is a *beauty* in what is good or right, and also in what is true. But still these ideas are distinct.

Dr. Hutcheson (*Inquiry Concerning Beauty*, &c.) distinguishes into "*absolute*; or that beauty which we perceive in

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objects without comparison to anything external, of which the object is supposed an imitation or picture; such as that *beauty*, perceived from the works of nature; and *comparative* or relative *beauty*, which we perceive in objects, commonly considered as imitations or resemblances of something else." According to Hutcheson, the general foundation or occasion of the ideas of *beauty* is "*uniformity amidst variety.*"—*Inquiry*, sect. 2.

Berkeley, in his *Alciphron*, and Hume, in many parts of his works, made utility the foundation of *beauty*. But objects which are useful are not always beautiful, and objects which are beautiful are not always useful. That which is useful is useful for some end; that which is beautiful is beautiful in itself, and independent of the pleasure which it gives, or the end it may serve.

On the question whether mental or material objects first give us feelings of *beauty*, see Stewart (*Act. Pow.*, vol. i., p. 279), Smith (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part iv., chap. 1), and Alison (*Essay on Taste*).

Dr. Price, in his *Review of Principal Questions in Morals*, sect. 2, has some remarks on natural *beauty*. See also the article "Beauty" in the *Encyclop. Brit.*, by Lord Jeffrey; Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, vol. i., chap. 3; Burke *On the Sublime and Beautiful;* Knight's *Enquiry into Principles of Taste;* Sir Uvedale Price *On the Picturesque*, with Preface by Sir T. D. Lauder, 8vo, Edin., 1842; Stewart's *Essays*, part ii.; Crousaz, *Traité de Beau;* André, *Essai sur le Beau.*—*V.* ÆSTHETICS, IDEAL.

BEING (τὸ ὄντως ὄν, that which is, existence).

"First, thou madest things which should have *being* without life; then those which should have life and *being;* lastly, those which have *being*, life, and reason."—Bishop Hall, *Contempl.*, "The Creation."

"This (*being*), applies to everything which exists in any way whether as *substance* or *accident*, whether *actually* or *potentially*, whether in the nature of things, or only in our notions; for, even what we call *entia rationis*, or fictions of our minds, such as *hippo-centaur*, or *mountain of gold*, have a *being;* even

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negation or privation have an existence; nay, according to Aristotle,* we can say that *nothing* has a *being*. In short, whenever we can use the substantive verb *is*, there must be some kind of being."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book i., chap. 4.

According to some (*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Etre"), we can have no idea of *nothing;* according to others (Smart, *Man. of Log.*, 1849, p. 130), the knowledge of contraries being one, if we know what *being* is, we know what *not being* is.

Being is either *substance* or *accident*.

Substance is either *matter* or *mind*.

Accident is divided by the other categories.—*V.* ONTOLOGY.

BELIEF (that which we live by, or according to, or *lief*, in German *belieben*, from *lubet*, that which pleases).

"The first great instrument of changing our whole nature, is a firm *belief*, and a perfect assent to, and hearty entertainment of the promises of the gospel."—Bp. Taylor, vol. i., Ser. xi.

"*Belief*, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind signified by them is perfectly simple, and of its own kind. *Belief* must have an object. For he who believes must believe something, and that which he believes is the object of his *belief*. *Belief* is always expressed in language by a proposition wherein something is affirmed or denied. *Belief* admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. There are many operations of mind of which it is an essential ingredient, as consciousness, perception, remembrance. We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of *belief*. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds; such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce *belief* in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call certainty, others in various

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degrees according to circumstances."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 20, and *Inquiry*, chap. 20, sect. 5.

"St. Austin accurately says, 'We *know* what rests upon *reason;* we *believe* what rests upon *authority.*' But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs* or *trusts.* Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that *belief* is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of *belief.* We are compelled to surrender the proud *Intellige ut credas* of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble *Crede ut intelligas* of Anselm."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.—*V.* FEELING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION.

See Guizot, *Meditations*, &c. *Quel est le vrai sens du mot Foi*, p. 135, 8vo, Paris, 1852.

To *believe* is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient, *subjectively;* insufficient, *objectively.*—Kant, *Crit. de la Rais. Prat.*, p. 11.

"The word *believing* has been variously and loosely employed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness which have already their separate and appropriate appellations. Thus it is sometimes said, 'I believe in my own existence and the existence of an external world, I believe in the facts of nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my own mind,' as well as 'I believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in the evidence of historical documents.'"

"Setting aside this loose application of the term, I propose to confine it, *First*, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named contingent reasoning—in a word, the premises of all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative; and, *Secondly*, to the state of *holding true* when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is dissociated from all evidence."—Bailey, *Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, 8vo, 1851, p. 75.

"I propose to restrict the term *belief* to the assent to propo-

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sitions, and demarcate it from those inferences which are made in the presence of objects and have reference to them. I would say, we *believe* in the proposition 'Fire burns,' but *know* the fact that the paper about to be thrust into the flame will ignite."—Lewes, *Biograph. Hist. of Philosoph.*, p 492.

BENEVOLENCE (*benevolentia*, well-wishing).—"When our love or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed good-will or *benevolence*."—Cogan, *On the Passions*, part i., chap. 2.

Bishop Butler has said (Sermon i., *On Human Nature*), that "there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good." These principles in our nature by which we are prompted to seek and to secure our own good are comprehended under the name of self-love, and those which lead us to seek the good of others are comprehended under the name of *benevolence*. The term corresponding to this among the Greeks was φιλανθρωπία, among the writers of the New Testament ἀγάπη, and among the Romans *humanitas*. Under these terms are comprehended all those feelings and affections which lead us to increase the happiness and alleviate the sufferings of others, while the term self-love includes all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good. According to some philosophers, our own good is the ultimate and only proper end of human actions, and when we do good to others it is done with a view to our own good. This is what is called the selfish philosophy, which in modern times has been maintained by Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, and others. The other view, which is stated above in the words of Butler, has been strenuously defended by Cumberland, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Reid.

BLASPHEMY (βλάπτω, to hurt).—"Βλασφημία properly denotes *calumny*, *detraction*, *reproachful* or *abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented."—Campbell, *On the Gospels*, Prelim. Dissert. ix., part ii.

As commonly used, it means the wanton and irreverent use of language in reference to the Divine Being or to His worship

and service.* This is an offence against the light of nature, and was severely condemned by ancient ethical writers. Among the Jews, *blasphemy* was punished by death (Levit. xxiv. 14, 16). And by the laws of many Christian nations it has been prohibited under heavy penalties. So late as the end of the seventeenth century, a man suffered death at Edinburgh for *blasphemy*.—See Arnot, *Crim. Trials.*

Blasphemy differs from sacrilege, in that the former consists in using language, the later in some overt act.

BODY.—"The primary ideas we have peculiar to *body*, as contradistinguished to *spirit*, are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 23.

"*Body* is the external cause to which we ascribe our sensations."—Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 74.

Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 1), distinguishes between *matter* and *body*, and calls *body* matter sensible, that is with those qualities which make it perceptible to our senses. This leaves room for understanding what is meant by a *spiritual body*, σῶμα πνευματικόν, of which we read 1 Cor. xv. 44. He also calls body, "matter with form," in contradistinction to "first matter," which is matter without form.

Body is distinguished as *physical*, *mathematical*, *and metaphysical*. *Physical body* is *incomplete* or *complete*. *Incomplete* as in the *material part* of a living being; thus man is said to consist of *body* and *mind*, and *life* is something different from the *bodily frame* in animals and vegetables. *Complete*, when composed of matter and form, as all natural bodies are. *Mathematical body* is the threefold dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. *Metaphysical body* is *body* as included under the predicament of *substance*, which it divides with *spirit*.—*V.* MATTER, MIND, SPIRIT.

BONUM, when given as one of the transcendental properties of being, means that God hath made all things in the best possible

* Augustine said,—*Jam vulgo blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo dicere.*

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manner to answer the wisest ends, or that no thing is destitute of its essential properties, which metaphysicians call perfections. Perfections are distinguished into absolute and relative, the former making the nature to which they belong happy, and excluding all imperfection; the latter belonging to inferior natures, and not excluding imperfection, but affording help and relief under its effects.—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 1, cap. 3.

Bonum Morale, or what is good, relatively to man, was distinguished into *bonum jucundum*, or what is calculated to give pleasure, as music; *bonum utile*, or what is advantageous, as wealth; and *bonum honestum*, or what is right, as temperance. These may be separate or conjoined in human actions.

Bonum Summum—the chief good.—This phrase was employed by ancient ethical philosophers to denote that in the prosecution and attainment of which the progress, perfection, and happiness of human beings consist. The principal opinions concerning it are stated by Cicero in his treatise *De Finibus*. See also Augustin, *De Summo Bono*.

Tucker, *Light of Nature*, has a chapter (27, of vol. i.), entitled "Ultimate Good," which he says is the right translation of *summum bonum*.

According to Kant, "virtue is not the entire complete good as an object of desire to reasonable finite beings; for, to have this character it should be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but according to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue in general, in the world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue, then, together constitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this condition, that the happiness should be exactly *proportioned* to the morality (this constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of happiness). The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, represents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be considered as the supreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue; whilst happiness, which is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not of

itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally good conduct."

BROCARD.—"I make use of all the *brocardics*, or rules of interpreters; that is, not only what is established regularly, in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best interpreters."—Jeremy Taylor, Preface to *Ductor Dubitantium.*

"To the Stoics and not to the Stagyrite, are we to refer the first announcement of the *brocard—In intellectu nihil est, quod non prius fuerit in sensu.*"—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 772.

§.—*V.* SENSATION, SENSUS COMMUNIS.

CAPACITY.—

> "Is it for that such outward ornament
> Was lavished on their sex, that inward gifts
> Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant,
> *Capacity* not raised to apprehend,
> Or value, what is best
> In choice, but oftest to affect the wrong."
>
> Milton, *Samson Agonistes.*

"The original power which the mind possesses of being taught, we call *natural capacity;* and this in some degree is common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call *genius.* The first transition or advances from natural power, we call *proficiency;* and the end or completion of proficiency we call *habit.* If such habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then called *science;* if it descend from speculation to practice, it is then called *art;* and if such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and affections, it is then called *moral virtue.*"—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrang.*, chap. 8.

"From habit, necessarily results power or *capacity* (in Greek [illegible]), which Aristotle has distinguished into two kinds. The first is the *mere capacity of becoming anything.* The second is the *power* or *faculty* of *energizing*, according to the habit when it is formed and acquired; or, in other words, after the thing

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is *become* and actually exists, which at first was only in the *capacity of existing*. This, Aristotle illustrates by the example of a child, who is then only a general in power (ἐν δυνάμει), that is, has the power of becoming a general, but when he has grown up and has become a general, then he has the power of the second kind, that is, the power of performing the office of a general."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., chap. 4.

"There are powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are called *habits*. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction of power as active or passive. But *capacity* is a passive power, or natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we are conscious we can direct towards an end. A *capacity* is rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifications of our consciousness, in receiving which we are passive. But an original *capacity*, though at first passive, may be brought under the influence of will and attention, and when so exercised it corresponds to a mental power, and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensation, we are in the first instance passive, but our *capacity* of receiving sensations may be employed in various ways under the direction of will and attention, or personal activity.

CARDINAL (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, were so called from *cardo*, a hinge; because they were the hinges on which other virtues turned. Each one of them was a *fons et principium*, from which other virtues took their rise.

The four *cardinal* virtues are rather the necessary and essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a virtue, without the other three.—Thurot, *De l'Entendement*, tom. i., p. 162.

This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, with this difference, that εὐσέβεια or regard to the Deity holds the place of prudence or knowledge, which, united to virtue,

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forms true wisdom. Plato notices temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and in connection with or arising out of these, justice, which he considered not as the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfection of human nature and of human society. The term justice had been employed in the same large sense by Pythagoras, and the corresponding term righteousness, is used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, but all the virtues. The four *cardinal* virtues are alluded to in the Apocrypha, *Wisdom*, viii. 7.

The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity; which being added to the *cardinal*, make the number seven.

"Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads of the family of virtues, give us a division which fails altogether; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both overlap one another, or are undistinguishable; and also leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all."—Whewell, *Systemat. Mor.*, lect. iv.

Clodius, *De Virtutibus quas Cardinales Appellant*, 4to, Leips., 1815. Plethon, *De Quatuor Virtutibus Cardinalibus*, 8vo, Basl., 1552.

The *cardinal* or principal points of the compass are the North, South, East, and West.

The *cardinal* numbers are one, two, three, &c., in opposition to the *ordinal*, as first, second, third, &c.

CASUISTRY is a department of ethics—"the great object of which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us *how* to act wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation."—Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4.

To *casuistry*, as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of what are called cases of conscience—that is, cases in which we are under obligation, but which, from the special circumstances attending, give rise to doubt whether or how far the obligation may be relaxed or dissolved—such as the obligation to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or extorted by force.

"All that philosophy of right and wrong which has become famous or infamous under the name of *Casuistry*, had its

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origin in the distinction between Mortal* and Venial Sin."—*Cambridge Essays*, 1856, p. 6.

CATALEPSY (κατάληψις, catalepsy).—"The speculations of Berkeley and Boscovich on the non-existence of matter, and of Kant and others on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are interested in, for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions of *cataleptics*. The *cataleptic* apprehends or perceives directly the objects around her; but they are the same as when realized through her senses. She notices no difference; size, form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her now as before. In respect again to the future, she sees it, but not in the sense of the annihilation of time; she foresees it; it is the future present to her; time she measures, present and future, with strange precision—strange, yet an approximation, instead of this certainty, would have been more puzzling.

"So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, and the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart from which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to suit our human and temporary being, but elements of eternal truth."—Mayo, *On Popular Superstitions*, p. 125, 8vo, 3d edit., Edin., 1851.

How far is the argument in the foregoing passage affected by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have sensations and perceptions in reference to objects which are not within the reach of the senses?

The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways:—First, by a *reductio ad absurdum;* second, no single existence can effect any change or event, and a change or event of some kind there must be, in order to create those sensations or states of mind in which consciousness consists. There must, therefore, be something in existence foreign to ourselves, for no change, in other words, nothing which stands in the relation of cause and effect, is conceivable, but what is the result of two existences acting upon each other.

See Sir Gilbert Blane on *Muscular Motion*, p. 258, note.

CATEGOREMATIC (κατηγορέω, to predicate).—"A word is so called which may by itself be employed as a Term. Adverbs,

* This subject is fully and clearly discussed by Mr. Jowett.—*Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. ii., pp. 351, 352.

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Propositions, &c., and also Nouns in any other case besides the Nominative, are *Syncategorematic*, *i. e.*, can only form part of a Term."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 3.

CATEGORICAL.—*V.* PROPOSITION.

CATEGORY (κατηγορέω, to predicate).

"So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call *categories* or *predicaments*, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions."—Bacon, *Adv. of Learning*, b. ii.

The *categories* are the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy seeks to know all things. But it is impossible to know all things individually. They are, therefore, arranged in classes, according to properties which are common to them. And when we know the definition of a class, we attain to a formal knowledge of all the individual objects of knowledge contained in that class. Every individual man we cannot know; but if we know the definition of man, we know the nature of man, of which every individual of the species participates; and in this sense we may be said to know all men. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense universal, has been made in all ages of philosophy, and has given rise to the *categories* which have appeared in various forms. They are to be found in the philosophy of Eastern nations, as a classification of things and of ideas. The *categories* of the followers of Pythagoras have been preserved by Aristotle in the first book of his *Metaphysics.* Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal, and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose *categories* are well known. They are ten in number, viz.,—οὐσία, substance; πόσον, quantity; ποῖον, quality; πρὸς τί, relation; ποῦ, place; πότε, time; κεῖσθαι, situation; ἔχειν, possession, or manner of holding; ποιεῖν, action; and πάσχειν, suffering. The Mnemonic verses which contain them, are:—

Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos
Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus ero.*

* A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil Martinus Scriblerus. Calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had seen a the

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The *categories* of Aristotle are both logical and metaphysical, and apply to things as well as to words. Regarded logically, they are reducible to two, *substance* and *attribute*. Regarded metaphysically, they are reducible to *being* and *accident*. The Stoics reduced them to four, viz., substance, quality, manner of being, and relation. Plotinus attempted a new system. But the *categories* of Aristotle were acquiesced in till the time of Bacon, who recommended observation rather than classification. Descartes arranged all things under two great *categories*, the absolute and the relative. In the *Port Royal Logic*, seven *categories* are established. In more modern times the *categories* of Kant are well known. They are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judgments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, the *categories* have been successively a classification universal of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. And a complete theory of classification, or a complete system of *categories* is still a desideratum.—Monboddo, *Origin of Lang.*, vol. i., p. 520, and *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. iii., chap. 1.—*V.* PREDICAMENT, UNIVERSAL.

Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 687, gives a deduction and simplification of the categories of Aristotle. See also *Discussions*, pp. 26, 27, 2d edit.

Mr. Mill (*Log.*, I. iii., ult.), gives the following classification of all nameable things :—

1. Feelings or state of consciousness.
2. The minds which experience these feelings.
3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby they excite them.
4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness.

bear-garden? The man answered that he had seen two men fight for a prize; one was a fair man, a sergeant in the Guards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the predicaments—men (*substantia*)—two (*quantitas*)—fair and black (*qualitas*)—sergeant and butcher (*relatio*)—wounded the other (*actio et passio*)—fighting (*situs*)—stage (*ubi*)—four o'clock (*quando*)—blue and red breeches (*habitus*).

CAUSALITY, CAUSATION, CAUSE.

CAUSE.—

> "He knew the *cause* of every maladie,
> Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie."
>
> Chaucer, *Prologue*, v. 421.

"The general idea of *cause* is, that without which another thing called the *effect*, cannot be; and it is divided by Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 2), into four kinds, known by the name of the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, and the *final*. The first is that of which anything is made. Thus brass or marble are the *material* causes of a statue; earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural bodies. The *formal cause* is the form, idea, archetype, or pattern of a thing; for all these words Aristotle uses to express it. Thus the idea of the artist is the *formal cause* of the statue; and of all natural substances, if we do not suppose them the work of chance, the *formal cause* are the ideas of the Divine mind; and this form concurring with the matter, produces every work, whether of nature or art. The *efficient cause* is the principle of change or motion which produces the thing. In this sense the statuary is the *cause* of the statue, and the God of nature the *cause* of all the works of nature. And lastly, the *final cause* is that for the sake of which anything is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for pleasure or for profit; and the works of nature are all for some good end."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., chap. 4.

In *Metaphys.*, lib. i., cap. 3, Aristotle says we may distinguish four kinds of causes. The *first* is the *form* proper to each thing. Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This is the *quidditas* of the schoolmen, the *causa formalis*. The *second* is the matter and the subject. Ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, *causa materialis*. The *third* is the principle of movement which produced the thing. Ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, *causa efficiens*. The *fourth* is the reason and good of all things; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is good. Τό οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, *causa finalis*. The sufficient reason of Leibnitz, which he, like Aristotle, thought to be essentially good.

In *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 2, Aristotle says, "It is possible that one object may combine all the kinds of *causes*. Thus, in a house, the *principle of movement* is the art and the workmen,

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the *final cause* is the work, the *matter* the earth and stones, and the plan is the *form.*" See also *Nat. Auscult,* lib. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris, Concerning Art, p. 24.

In addition to these four causes, Dr. Gillies (*Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, chap. 2, note, p. 100), says, "The *model* or *exemplar* was considered as a *cause* by the Pythagoreans and Platonists; the former of whom maintained that all perceptible things were imitations of *numbers;* and the latter, that they owed their existence to the participation of *ideas;* but wherein either this imitation or this participation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to show."

Seneca, *Epist.* 66 and 67, explains the common and Platonic divisions of causes; and arraigns both, because he conceived that space, time, and motion, ought to be included.

Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 690, note), says, "The *exemplary cause* was introduced by Plato; and was not adopted by the schoolmen as a fifth *cause* in addition to Aristotle's four." It is noticed by Suarez and others.

According to Derodon (*De Prædicam.*, p. 114), material and formal *causes* are *internal*, and constitute the essence of a thing; efficient, final, and exemplary *causes* are *external*, that is, out from or of the essence of a thing. The material *cause* is that, *ex quo*, anything is, or becomes. The formal *cause* is that, *per quod.* The efficient *cause* is that, *a quo.* The final *cause* is that, *propter quod.* And the exemplary *cause* is that, *ad cujus imitationem res fit.*

When the word *cause* is used without an adjective, it commonly means, active power, that which produces change, or *efficient cause.*

Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a *cause* thus:—*Causam esse principium per se influens esse in aliud.*

Ens quod in se continet rationem, cur alterum existat, dicitur hujus causa.—Wolfius.

"A *cause* is that which, of itself, makes anything begin to be."—Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 74.

We conceive of a *cause* as existing and operating before the effect which is produced. But, to the production of an effect,

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more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it has been said by Mr. Karslake (*Aids to the Study of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 43), "The *cause* of a thing is that antecedent (or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself a self-determining agent, in reference to self-acting power, whose agency it exhibits." And some, instead of the word *cause*, would prefer in many cases to use the word *concauses*.

"Though the antecedent is most strictly the *cause of a thing being*, as, *e.g.*, the passage of the moon between the earth and the sun is the *cause* of an eclipse, yet the effect is that which commonly presents itself to us as the *cause* of our *knowing it to be*. Hence, by what seems to us a strange inversion of *cause* and effect, *effect was said to be a cause*, a *causa cognoscendi*, as distinguished from a *causa essendi*, the strict *cause*."—Karslake, *Aids to Study of Logic*, vol. ii., p. 38.—*V.* OCCASION.

CAUSALITY and CAUSATION.

"Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity move itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or *causality*, but the bare essence of the matter, from whence the motion comes." —H. More, *Immortality of the Soul*, book i., chap. 6.

"Now, always God's word hath a *causation* with it. He said to him, Sit, that is, he made him sit, or as it is here expressed, he made him sit with a mighty power."—Goodwin, *Works*, vol. i., part i., p. 406.

Causality, *in actu primo*, is the energy or power in the *cause* * by which it produces its effect; as heat in the fire. *Causality*, *in actu secundo*, is *causation* or the operation of the power by which the *cause* is actually producing its effect. It is *influxus iile*, *a quo causa influit esse in effectum quæ distinguitur a parte rei*, *tam a principio*, *quam a termino*, *sive*

* The idea of the *reason* is not to be confounded with that of *causality*. It is a more elevated idea, because it applies to all orders of things, while *causality* extends only to things in time. It is true we speak sometimes of the eternal cause; but thus the idea of cause is synonymous with that of the reason. This idea of the reason expresses the relation of a being or thing to what is contained within it; in other words, the reason expresses the *rapport du contenant au contenu*, or the reason is that whose essence encloses the essence and existence of another thing. We thus arrive at the conception of all being contained in God, who is the supreme reason.—Ahrens, *Cours de Psychol.*, tom. ii. —*V.* REASON.

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ab effectu ad quem tendit. "The changes of which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in the external universe, impress me with a conviction that some *cause* must have operated to produce them. There is an intuitive judgment involving the simple idea of *causation*."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, i., chap. 3.

From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a cause is something which not only *precedes*, but has power to *produce* the effect. And when the effect has been produced, we say it is in consequence of the power in the cause having operated. The belief that every exchange implies a cause, or that every change is produced by the operation of some power, is regarded by some as a primitive belief, and has been denominated by the phrase, the* *principle of causality.* Hume, and others, however, have contended that we have no proper idea of cause as implying power to produce, nor of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the production of the effect. All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and consequent; but having seen things in this relation, we associate them together, and imagining that there is some *vinculum* or connection between them, we call the one the cause, and the other the effect. Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this view with the modification that it is in cases where the antecedence and consequence is *invariable*† that we attain to the idea of cause. Experience, however, can only testify that the succession of one thing to

* Lord Bacon (*Nov. Organ.*, book ii., sect. 14), says, "There are some things ultimate and incausable."

† "A cause, in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits, may be said to be that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change."—Brown, *Inquiry*, p. 13.

"Antecedency and subsequency are immaterial to the proper definition of cause and effect; on the contrary, although an object, in order to act as a cause, must be in being antecedently to such action; yet when it acts as a cause, its effects are synchronous with that action and are included in it, which a close inspection into the nature of cause will prove. For effects are no more than the new qualities of newly formed objects. Each conjunction of bodies (now separately in existence, and of certain defined qualities), produces upon their union these new natures, whose qualities must necessarily be in and with them in the very moment of their formation."—*Essay on Cause and Effect*, 8vo, Lond., 1824, p. 50.

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another has, in so far as it has been observed, been *unvaried*, not that in the nature of things it is *invariable*. Mr. Locke, (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chaps. 21 and 26), ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to our experience of the sensible changes which one body produces on another, as fire upon wax. Our belief in an external world rests partly on the principle of *causality*. Our sensations are referred to external objects as their causes. Yet, the idea of *power* which is involved in that of cause, he traces to the consciousness of our possessing power in ourselves. This is the view taken of the origin of our idea of cause by Dr. Reid. "In the strict philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions; for I take this notion of a cause to be derived from the power I feel in myself to produce certain effects. In this sense we say that the Deity is the cause of the universe." —*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 77. And at p. 81 he has said, "I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the conception of a cause, or of any relation beyond a mere conjunction in time and place between it and its effects, if they were not conscious of active exertions in themselves, by which effects are produced. This seems to me to be the origin of the idea, or conception of production."

By origin, however, Dr. Reid must have meant occasion. At least he held that the principle of *causality*, or the belief that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a natural judgment, or *à priori* conviction, necessary and universal. But if the idea of a cause be empirical and grounded on experience, it may be difficult to show how a higher origin can be claimed for the principle of *causality*. Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in language equivalent to that of Dr. Reid. And Maine de Biran (*Nouvelles Considerat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*, 8vo, Par., 1834, pp. 274, 290, 363, 402), thinks that the true origin of our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of the will, or in the consciousness that we are causes, or have in ourselves the power of producing change. Having found the idea of power within the sphere of consciousness, we, by a process which he calls

natural induction, project this idea into the external world, and ascribe power to that which we call cause. According to Kant we have the idea of cause, and also the belief that every commencing phenomenon implies the operation of a cause. But these are merely forms of our understanding, subjective conditions of human thought. In conformity with a pre-existing law of our intelligence, we arrange phenomena according to the relation of cause and effect. But we know not whether, independently of our form of thought, there be any reality corresponding to our idea of cause, or of productive power. The view that the idea of cause is furnished by the fact of our being conscious of possessing power, meets the idealism of Kant, for what greater reality can be conceived than a fact of consciousness? But if experience of external phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of change, and if consciousness of internal phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of power to produce change, the idea of a necessary and universal connection between change and the power which produces it, in other words, a belief in the principle of *causality*, can only be referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, not what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent and absolute.

"Cousin's theory concerning the origin of idea of *causality* is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and the change vary in cases of personal agency (though here he is not very explicit), several times repeated; while the relation between them, viz., the strict idea of personal causation, never varies, but is necessary; that the mind abstracts the invariable and necessary element from the variable and contingent elements of the fact, and thus arrives at the idea of *causality*."
—*Essay on Causality*, By an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3.

"**CAUSATION** is not an object of sense. The only experience we can have of it is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a beginning must have a cause. This is to be admitted as a

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first or self-evident principle."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6.

But Locke has said (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, § 4), "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, *that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind*, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest."

See Cousin, *Œuvres, Prem. Ser.*, tom. i., cours 1817, and *Hist. de Philosoph. Mod.*, sect. 19. See also on the various theories as to the origin of our judgment of cause and effect, Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, App. 1.

(**Final, Doctrine of**).—When we see means independent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, we naturally conclude that the ends have been contemplated, and the means arranged by an intelligent agent; and, from the nature of the ends and of the means, we infer the character or design of the agent. Thus, from the ends answered in creation being wise and good, we infer not only the existence of an Intelligent Creator, but also that He is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness. This is commonly called the argument from design or from *final causes*. It was used by Socrates (see Xenophon, *Memorabilia*), and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. But Lord Bacon has said (*De Aug. Scient.*, lib. iii., cap. 5), that the inquiry into *final causes* is sterile. And Descartes maintained that we cannot know the designs of God in creating the universe, unless he reveal them to us. But Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufficient reason, upheld the doctrine of *final causes*, and thought it equally applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true that in physical science we should prosecute our inquiries without any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be answered, and observe the phenomena as they occur, without forcing them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is against this error that the language of Bacon was directed. But when our contemplations of nature reveal to us innumerable adjustments and arrangements working out ends that are wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have been designed by

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sovereignly wise and good. Notwithstanding the doubts as to the logical validity of this argument, which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, and others, it continues to be regarded as the most popular and impressive mode of proving the being and perfections of God. And the validity of it is implied in the universally admitted axiom of modern physiology, that there is no organ without its function. We say of some things in nature that they are useless. All we can truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. Everything has an end to the attainment or accomplishment of which it continually tends. This is the form in which the doctrine of *final causes* was advocated by Aristotle. With him it was not so much an argument from design, as an argument against chance. But if things do not attain their ends by chance it must be by design. Aristotle, it is true, was satisfied that ends were answered by tendencies in nature. But whence or why these tendencies in nature, but from an Intelligent Author of nature?

"If we are to judge from the explanations of the principle given by Aristotle, the notion of a *final cause*, as originally conceived, did not necessarily imply design. The theological sense to which it is now commonly restricted, has been derived from the place assigned to it in the scholastic philosophy; though, indeed, the principle had been long before beautifully applied by Socrates and by the Stoics to establish the truth of a Divine Providence. Whenever, indeed, we observe the adjustment of means to an end, we seem irresistibly impelled to conclude that the whole is the effect of design. The present acceptation, therefore, of the *doctrine of final causes*, is undoubtedly a natural one. Still it is not a necessary construction of the *doctrine*. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is simply an inquiry into tendencies—an investigation of any object or phenomenon, from considering the ἕνεκα τοῦ, the reason of it, in something else which follows it, and to which it naturally leads.

"His theory of *final causes* is immediately opposed to a doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence; and must be regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive assertion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, between thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the same working

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in order to ends, which is commonly regarded as the attribute of thought alone. He insisted that there is no reason to suppose deliberation necessary in these workings of nature, since it is 'as if the art of shipbuilding were in the timber, or just as if a person should act as his own physician.'"—Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. iv., p. 113.

"The argument from *final causes*," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6), "when reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises:—First, that design and intelligence in the *cause* may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect. This we may call the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects of a wise and intelligent *cause*. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises."

Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, pp. 110-113; Irons, *Doctrine of Final Causes*, 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argument from design is prosecuted by Paley, in *Nat. Theol.*; in *Bridgewater Treatises*; *Burnett Prize Essays*, &c.

CAUSES (Occasional, Doctrine of).—This phrase has been employed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of communicating between mind and matter. The soul being a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, no intercourse can take place between them without the intervention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, therefore, who, on the *occasion* of certain modifications in our minds, excites the corresponding movements of body; and, on the *occasion* of certain changes in our body, awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This theory, which is involved in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Malebranche, Regis, and Geulinx. Laforge limited the theory to involuntary movements, and thus reconciled it in some degree to experience and common sense. Malebranche's *doctrine* is commonly called the "vision of all things in God"—who is the "light of all our seeing."

According to this theory, the admirable structure of the

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body and its organs is useless; as a dull mass would have answered the purpose equally well.

CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (*Certum* (from *cerno*), *proprie idem sit, quod decretum ac proinde firmum.* Vossius).

"This way of *certainty* by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination; and I believe it will appear that all the *certainty* of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 4.

"*Certain*, in its primary sense, is applied (according to its etymology, from *cerno*), to the state of a person's mind; denoting any one's full and complete conviction; and *generally*, though not always, implying that there is sufficient *ground* for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymically to the *truths* or *events*, respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And *uncertain* (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, 'It is *certain*,' &c., meaning that *we* are sure; whereas the fact may be *uncertain* and *certain* to different individuals. From not attending to this, the words *uncertain* and *contingent* have been considered as denoting some quality in the things themselves—and *chance* has been regarded as a real agent."—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix 1.

"*Certainty* is truth brought methodically to the human intellect, that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident in itself. It is the relation of truth to knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology."—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 35.

"In accurate reasoning, the word *certain* ought never to be used as merely synonymous with *necessary*. Physical events we call *necessary*, because of their depending on *fixed causes*, not on *known* causes; when they depend also on *known* causes, they may be called *certain*. The variations of the weather arise from *necessary* and *fixed causes*, but they are proverbially uncertain."—Coplestone, *Remains*, 8vo, Lond., 1854, p. 98.

When we affirm, without any doubt, the existence or non-existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or falsity of a proposition, the state in which our mind is we call *certainty*—

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and we say of the object of knowledge that it is evident or certain. According to the mode in which it is attained, *certainty* is *immediate* by sense and intuition, and *mediate* by reasoning and demonstration. According to the grounds on which it rests, it is called *metaphysical*, when we firmly adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise; such as the first principles of natural law, or the difference between right and wrong. *Physical*, when we adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise, according to the laws of nature, but which may be by miracle; as, fire will *certainly* burn—although it did not burn the Hebrew youths (Dan., chap. iii.) *Moral*, when we adhere to truth which is in accordance with the common order of things, and the common judgment of men—although it may be otherwise without a miracle.

Moral *certainty* may amount to the highest degree of *probability*, and to all practical purposes may be as influential as *certainty*. For it should be observed that *probability* and *certainty* are two states of mind, and not two modes of the reality. The reality is one and the same, but our knowledge of it may be probable or certain. *Probability* has more or less of doubt, and admits of degrees. *Certainty* excludes doubt, and admits neither of increase nor diminution.

Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to know, and the result of a communication or relation being established between them which is knowledge; and certain knowledge or *certainty* is the confidence with which the mind reposes in the information of its faculties. Self-consciousness reveals with *certainty* the different states and operations of our own minds. The operations of memory may give us *certainty* as to the past. We cannot doubt the reality of what our senses clearly testify. Reason reveals to us first truths with intuitive *certainty*. And by demonstration we ascend with *certainty* from one truth to another. For to use the words of Thomas Aquinas (*De Veritate*), "*Tunc conclusiones pro certo sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia, et ideo, quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus, non autem ab homine exterius docente, nisi quatenus conclusiones in principia resolvit, nos docens, ex quo*

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tamen nos certitudinem non acciperemus, nisi in nobis esset certitudo principiorum, in quæ conclusiones resolvuntur."

"The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for anywhere abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity; and Omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity."—Cudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Mor.*, book iv., chap. 5.

"The theories of *certitude* may be reduced to three classes. The *first* places the ground of *certitude* in *reason;* the *second* in *authority;* the *third* in *evidence;* including, under that term, both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them."—Buchanan, *Faith in God*, vol. ii., p. 304.

"*De veritatis criterio frustra laborantur quidam: quum non alia reperienda sit præter ipsam rationis facultatem, aut menti congenitam intelligendi vim.*"—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars i., cap. 2.

Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes and the modern sensationalists, have made sense the measure and ground of *certainty.* Descartes and his followers founded it on self-consciousness, *Cogito ergo sum;* while others have received as certain only what is homologated by human reason in general. But *certainty* is not the peculiar characteristic of knowledge furnished by any one faculty, but is the common inheritance of any or all of our intellectual faculties when legitimately exercised within their respective spheres. When so exercised we cannot but accept the result as true and certain.

But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined to accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that knowledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be absolute,

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or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as they must appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely relative, or a knowledge of things as they appear to us. Now, it is true that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it, *objectify the subjective.* Without rising out of human nature to the possession of a higher, we cannot sit in judgment on the faculties of that nature. But in admitting that our knowledge is *relative,* we are merely saying it is human. It is according to the measure of a man. It is attained by human faculties, and must be relative, or bear proportion to the faculties by which it is attained. In like manner, the knowledge of angels may be called angelic, but this is not to call it uncertain. We may not know all that can be known of the objects of our knowledge, but still, what we do know, we may know with *certainty.* Human knowledge may admit of increase without being liable to be contradicted or overturned. We come to it by degrees, but the higher degree of knowledge to which we may ultimately attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of knowledge. It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground and encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and reality in things, which our faculties are fitted to apprehend. Their testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trustworthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an afterthought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. He who doubts is *certain* that he doubts. *Omnis qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in se ipso habet verum, unde non dubitet.*—Augustin, *De vera Religione.*

Etiam qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse; si enim veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse. Thomas Aquin., *Sum. Theol.;* Savary, *Sur la Certitude,* 8vo, Paris, 1847. —*V.* EVIDENCE, CRITERION, KNOWLEDGE.

CHANCE.—Aristotle says, "According to some, *chance* is a cause not manifest to human reasoning." *Δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλον δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ.*—*Phys.*, ii., 4.

"Many things happen, besides what man intends or purposes; and also some things happen different from what is aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, or from nature, neither can we say that they are from human

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intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, and the cause which produces them is called *chance*. But they have all respect to some end intended by nature or by man. So that nothing can be more true than what Aristotle says (*Phys.*, lib. ii.), that if there were no end intended, there could be no *chance*.

"A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it; but, in digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his intention, and therefore it is said to be by *chance*.

"When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and crushes him, the destination of nature was only, that the stones of the wall being no longer kept together by the cement, should fall to the ground, according to their natural movement; so that the crushing of the man was something beside the purpose of nature, or παρὰ φύσιν."—Monboddo, *Ancient. Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 20.

As to Aristotle's views of *fortune* and *chance*, see Piccolomineus, *Philosoph. de Moribus*, 1583, p. 713.

Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what happens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. But everything has its own law and its proper cause; and *chance* merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs.

An event or series of events which seems to be the result neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by *chance*.

"It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence of God; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason, that there is no such thing as *chance* or accident; it being evident that these words do not signify anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event; but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause."—Clarke, vol. i., Sermon xcviii.

"If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon *chance* what side may turn up; and, if we draw a prize in a lottery, we ascribe our success to *chance*. We do not, however, mean that these effects were produced by no cause, but only that we are

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ignorant of the cause that produced them."—Arthur, *Discourses*, p. 17.

In what sense we may say there is such a thing as *chance*, and in what sense not, see M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 40; Mill, *Log.*, b. iii., chap. 17.

CHANCES (Theory of).—"The theory of *chances* consists in reducing all events of the same kind to a certain number of cases equally possible, that is, such that we are *equally undecided* as to their existence; and in determining the number of these cases which are favourable to the event of which the probability is sought. The ratio of that number to the number of all the possible cases, is the measure of the probability; which is thus a fraction, having for its numerator the number of cases favourable to the event, and for its denominator the number of all the cases which are possible."—Laplace, *Essai Phil. sur les Probabilités*, 5th edit., p. 7.

CHARITY (ἀγάπη), as one of the theological virtues, is a principle of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his glory and the good of our fellow-men.

Sometimes it is used as synonymous with brotherly love, or that principle of benevolence which leads us to promote, in all possible ways, the happiness of others.

In a more restricted sense it means almsgiving, or relieving the wants of others by communication of our means and substance.

CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appetite of sex. It includes purity of thought, speech, and behaviour. Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversation, as well as incontinent conduct, are contrary to the duty of *chastity*.

CHOICE.

"The necessity of continually *choosing* one of the two, either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with or an argument against liberty, but is itself the very essence of liberty."—Clarke, *Demonstration*, prop. 10.

"For the principle of deliberate *choice*, Aristotle thought that the rational and irrational should concur, producing "orectic intellect," or "dianoetic appetite," of which he emphatically says,—"And this principle is man."—*Catholic Philosophy*, p. 46.

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or arbitrary one. We may classify objects arbitrarily in any point of view in which we are pleased to regard them. But a natural *classification* can only proceed according to the real nature and qualities of the objects. The advantages of *classification* are to give a convenient form to our acquirements, and to enlarge our knowledge of the relations in which different objects stand to one another. A good *classification* should—1st, Rest on one principle or analogous principles. 2d, The principle or principles should be of a constant and permanent character. 3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artificial, it should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly and easily apply to all the objects classified.

The principles on which *classification* rests are these:—1st, of *Generalization*; 2d, of *Specification*; and 3d, of *Continuity*,—q. v.

Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. *Generalization* rests upon the principle, that the same or similar causes will produce similar effects.—Mill, *Log.*, b. i., chap. 7, § 4; M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, b. iii., chap. 1.

COGNITION (*cognosco*, to know).—According to Kant, cognition (*Erkenntniss*) is the determined reference of certain representations to an object, that is, that object in the conception whereof the diverse of a given intuition is united. *Erkenntniss-vermögen* is the cognition faculty, or the faculty of cognition. To cognize, is to refer a perception to an object by means of a conception. For cognizing, understanding is required. A dog *knows* his master, but he does not *cognize* him.

Representing something to one's self (*vorstellen*) is the first degree of *cognition*; representing to one's self with consciousness (*wahrnehmen*), or perceiving, is the second; knowing (*kennen*) something, or representing to one's self something in comparison with other things, as well in respect of identity as difference, is the third; cognizing (*erkennen*) or knowing something with consciousness, the fourth; understanding (*verstanden*) cognizing through the understanding by means of the conceptions, or conceiving something, the fifth; cognizing something through reason or perspecting (*einsehen*), the sixth; and comprehending something (*begriefen*), that is, cognizing it through reason à

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priori in a degree sufficient for our purpose, the seventh. For all our comprehending is only *relative*, that is sufficient for a certain purpose; *absolutely* we do not comprehend anything.—Haywood, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 593, 2d edit.

COLLIGATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase employed by Dr. Whewell to denote the binding together groups of *facts* by means of some suitable conception. The conception must be capable of explanation or definition, not indeed of *adequate* definition, since we shall have to alter our description of it from time to time with the advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and clear explanation. . . . . Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the *colligation of facts*, and may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact *colligation*. . . . . As soon as *facts* occur which a conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it or replace it by a new one.—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 353.

COMBINATION and CONNECTION of IDEAS are phrases to be found in book ii., chap. 33, of Locke's *Essay*, in which he treats of what is more commonly called *Association of Ideas*,—q. v.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.—The phrase *Association of Ideas* seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the title to one of the chapters in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. But in the body of the chapter he uses the phrase *combination of ideas*. These two phrases have reference to the two views which may be taken of the *train of thought* in the mind. In both, under *ideas* are comprehended all the various modes of consciousness. In treating of the association of ideas, the inquiry is as to the laws which regulate the succession or order according to which one thought follows another. But, it has been observed, that the various modes of consciousness not only succeed in some kind of order, but that they incorporate themselves with one another so as to form permanent and almost indissoluble *combinations*.

"When many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind together, there sometimes takes place a process, of a similar kind to chemical combination. When impressions

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have been so often experienced in conjunction, that each of them calls up readily and instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, these ideas sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and appear not several ideas, but one; in the same manner as when the seven prismatic colours are presented to the eye in rapid succession, the sensation produced is that of white. But, as in this last case, it is correct to say, that the seven colours, when they rapidly follow one another, *generate* white, but not that they actually *are* white; so it appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed by the blending together of several simple ones, should, when it really appears simple (that is, when the separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in it), be said to *result from*, or to be *generated by*, the simple ideas, not to *consist* of them. Our idea of an orange really *consists* of the simple ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste, and smell, &c., because we can by interrogating our consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea. But we cannot perceive, in so apparently simple a feeling as our perception of the shape of an object by the eye, all that multitude of ideas derived from other senses, without which, it is well ascertained, that no such visual perception would ever have had existence; nor in our idea of extension can we discover these elementary ideas of resistance derived from our muscular frame, in which Dr. Brown has shown it to be highly probable that the idea originates. These, therefore, are cases of mental chemistry, in which it is proper to say that the simple ideas generate, rather than that they compose the complex ones."—Mill, *Log.*, b. vi., ch. 4, § 4.

Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a fruit knife; a connection comes to be established in our minds between an apple and a fruit knife; so that when the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear; and these two ideas are said to be associated in the way of *combination.*

Or, the same kind of connection may be established between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between a feeling and a volition,—between any two or more mental movements.

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In cutting an apple, we may have wounded our finger; and, afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or feeling of the wound. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards suffered pain; and, when honey is again presented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it.

The *association*, which thus takes place between different mental movements, is more than mere juxtaposition of separate things. It amounts to a perfect *combination* or fusion. And, as in matter, compounds have properties which are not manifested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, so it is in mind; the result of various thoughts and feelings being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new principle, with properties differing from the separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. In this way, many *secondary* and *factitious* principles of action are formed.

COMMON SENSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree of intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common to all men.

"There is a certain degree of *sense* which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called *common sense*, because it is common to all men with whom we can transact business.

"The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., ch. 2.

"It is by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognize their identities. These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative), they may be said to constitute what we call *common sense*."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

COMMON SENSE (The Philosophy of) is that philosophy which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy within

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their respective spheres, and rests all human knowledge on certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the constitutive elements or fundamental forms of our rational nature, and the regulating principles of our conduct.

"As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make some general distinctions of sound; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties, by being diffused through all individuals, may be called common hearing and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that every mind or intellect not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The recognition of these, or at least the ability to recognize them, is called νοῦς κοινός, *common sense*, as being a sense common to all except lunatics and idiots.

"Further, as this power is called κοινὸς νοῦς, so the several propositions which are its proper objects, are called προλήψεις, or pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said that those προλήψεις must be general, as being formed by induction; as also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all instruction—hence, therefore, their definition. A pre-conception is the natural apprehension of what is general or universal."—Harris, *On Happiness*, p. 46.

A fundamental maxim of the Stoics was, that there is nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the sense. They admitted, however, natural notions, which they called *anticipations*, and artificial notions formed in us by the understanding. They also recognized notions which all men equally receive and understand. These cannot be opposed to one another; they form what is called *common sense*.—Bouvier, *Hist. de la Philosoph.*, tom. i., p. 149, 8vo, Paris, 1844.

"A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instinctive and instantaneous impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently upon our will, whenever

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the object is presented, according to an established law; and, therefore, not improperly called a *sense*, and acting in the same manner upon all mankind; and, therefore, properly called *common sense*, the ultimate judge of truth."—Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, pp. 36-42.

"*Common sense*," says Mons. Jaques (*Mem. de l'Academ., Roy. des Sciences Mor. et Pol.*, tom. i., p. 349, Paris, 1841), "is the unanimous sentiment of the whole human race, upon facts and questions which all may know and resolve—or, more precisely, it is the *ensemble* (complement) of notions and opinions common to all men of all times and places, learned or ignorant, barbarous or civilized. Spontaneity, impersonality, and universality, are the characteristics of truths of *common sense;* and hence their truth and certainty. The moral law, human liberty, the existence of God, and immortality of the soul, are truths of *common sense.*"

On the nature and validity of the *common sense* philosophy, see *Reid's Works* by Sir W. Hamilton, Appendix, note A; Oswald, *Appeal to Common Sense;* Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, &c.

COMMON.—*V.* TERM.

COMPACT (*compingo*, to bind close), is that by which or to which men bind or oblige themselves. It is a mutual agreement between two or more persons to do or to refrain from doing something.—*V.* PACT, CONTRACT.

COMPARISON is the act of carrying the mind from one object to another, in order to discover some relation subsisting between them. It is a voluntary operation of the mind, and thus differs from the perception or intuition of relations, which does not always depend upon the will. The result of *comparison* is knowledge, which the intellect apprehends, but the act is an exercise of attention voluntarily directing the energy of the mind to a class of objects or ideas. The theorems of mathematics are a series of judgments arrived at by comparison, or viewing different quantities and numbers in their relations. The result of *comparison* is a judgment.

COMPASSION.—*V.* SYMPATHY.

COMPLEX.—"That which consists of several *different* things, so put together as to form a whole, is called *complex*. *Complex*

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things are the subjects of analysis. The analysis of *complex* notions is one of the first and most important exercises of the understanding."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

COMPREHENSION means the act of comprehending or fully understanding any object or idea.—*V.* APPREHENSION. For the sense in which it is used by the logicians, *V.* EXTENSION.

COMPUNCTION (*compungo*, to prick or sting), is the pricking or uneasy feeling of the conscience on account of something wrong being done. "All men are subject more or less to *compunctions* of conscience."—Blair.

> "Stop up th' access and passage to remorse;
> That no *compunctious* visitings of nature
> Shake my fell purpose."—*Macbeth.*

CONCEIVING and APPREHENDING, or UNDERSTANDING.—Dr. Reid begins his essay on Conception by saying, "*Conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding, having a notion of a thing*, are common words used to express that operation of the understanding which the logicians call *simple apprehension.*"

In reference to this it has been remarked by Mr. Mansel (Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 24), that "*conception* must be distinguished as well from mere *imagination*, as from a mere *understanding* of the meaning of words.* Combinations of attributes, logically impossible, may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible. There is no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase *bilinear figure*, or *iron-gold.* The language is intelligible, though the object is inconceivable. On the other hand, though all conception implies imagination, yet all imagination does not imply conception. To have a conception of a horse, I must not only know the meaning of the several attributes constituting the definition of the animal, but I must also be able to combine these attributes in a *representative image*, that is, to *individualize them.* This, however, is not mere imagination, it is imagination relatively to a concept. I not only see, as it were, the image with the mind's eye, but I also think of it *as a horse*, as possessing the attributes of a given

* These have been confounded by Aldrich, and Reid, and others.

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concept, and called by the name expressive of them. But mere imagination is possible without any such relation. My mind may recall a sensible impression on whose constituent features I have never reflected, and relatively to which I have never formed a concept or applied a name. Imagination would be possible in a being without any power of distinguishing or comparing his presentations; it is compatible with our ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of any presentations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinction of *this* from *that*. Conception proper thus holds an intermediate place between the *intuitive* and *symbolical* knowledge of Leibnitz, being a verification of the latter by reference to the former."

"The words *conception, concept, notion*, should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leibnitzians call this *symbolical*, in contrast to *intuitive* knowledge. This is the sense in which *conceptio* and *conceptus* have been usually and correctly employed."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 360, note.—*V.* KNOWLEDGE.

CONCEPT, A, "is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, and representing a possible object of intuition."—Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 60.

It was used, or *conceit* as synonymous with it, by the older English writers. See Baynes, *Essay on Analytic of Log. Forms*, 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 5, 6; Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 393.

Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word *idea* to denote the absolute products of the reason, and *intuition* to denote the particular notions which we derive from the senses, have applied the word *concept* (*begriff*) to notions which are general without being absolute. They say they are of three kinds,—1. *Pure concepts*, which borrow nothing from experience; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 2. *Empirical concepts*, which are altogether derived from experience; as the notion of colour or pleasure. 3. *Mixed concepts*, composed of elements furnished partly by experience, and partly by the

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pure understanding. See Schmid, *Dictionnaire pour servir aux écrits de Kant*, 12mo, Jena, 1798.

A *concept* is *clear*, when its object, as a whole, can be distinguished from any other; it is *distinct*, when its several constituent parts can be distinguished from each other. The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of the logical perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz. See *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis.*

CONCEPT, CONCEPTION (*conceptus*, *conceptio* = to *notio* or notion).—"*Conception* consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions, by means of some character or characters common to them all. *Concipimus, id est, capimus hoc cum illo*—we take hold of both at once, we *comprehend* a thing, when we have learnt to comprise it in a known class."—Coleridge, *Church and State*, Prelim. Rem., p. 4.

"*Conception* is the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distinguished from *sensation* and *perception*, produced by an object present to the senses; and from *imagination*, which is the joining together of ideas in new ways; it is distinguished from *memory*, by not having the feeling of past time connected with the idea."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

According to Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. i., chap. 3), *conception* is "that faculty, the business of which is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived," or that faculty, whose province it is "to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations or of the objects of sense which we have formerly perceived." But what Mr. Stewart would thus assign to the faculty of *conception* belongs to *imagination* in its reproductive function. Hence Sir Will. Hamilton has said (*Discussions*, p. 276), "Mr. Stewart has bestowed on the reproductive imagination the term *conception*; happily, we do not think; as, both in grammatical propriety and by the older and correcter usage of philosophers, this term (or rather the product of this operation, *concept*) is convertible with *general notion*, or more correctly, *notion* simply, and in this sense

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is admirably rendered by the *begriff* (which is, *grasped up*) of the Germans."

According to Kant, cognition by conception (*begriff*) is a mode of cognizing an object, when I have not the same *immediately* before me. If I see a tree before me, its immediate representation strikes upon the senses, and I have an intuition of it; but if I represent to myself the tree by means of certain characteristics, which I seek for in the intuition of it, as, for example, the trunk, branches, and leaves, these characteristics are termed signs, and the complex of them is termed the content of the *conception*, and affords a *mediate* representation of the tree. The difference between pure and empirical *conceptions* does not concern the origin of either in time, or the mode whereby we come to the consciousness thereof, but the origin of the same, from the source and content. Hence an empirical *conception* is that which does not only arise by occasion of experience, but to which experience also furnishes the matter. A pure *conception* is that with which no sensation is mixed up. The *conception* of cause is a pure conception of this kind, since I have no sensible object which I would term Cause.

Haywood, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 594; Baynes, *Essay on Analyt. of Log. Forms*, pp. 5, 6.

CONCEPTION and IMAGINATION.—"Properly and strictly to *conceive* is an act more purely intellectual than *imagining*, proceeding from a faculty superior to those of sense and fancy, or imagination, which are limited to corporeal things, and those *determined*, as all particulars must be, to this or that, place, time, manner, &c. When as that higher power in man, which we may call the *mind*, can form apprehensions of what is *not material* (viz., of spirits and the affections of bodies which fall not under sense), and also can frame *general* ideas or notions, or consider of things in a general way without attending to their particular limited circumstances, as when we think of length in a road, without observing its determinate measure."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 11.

"It is one thing to *imagine* and another thing to *conceive*. For do we *conceive* anything more clearly than our thought

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when we think? And yet it is impossible to *imagine* a thought, or to paint any image of it in the brain."—*Port Roy. Log.*, part i., chap. 1.

"The distinction between *conception* and *imagination* is real, though it be too often overlooked and the words taken to be synonymous. I can *conceive* a thing that is impossible, but I cannot distinctly *imagine* a thing that is impossible. I can *conceive* a proposition or a demonstration, but I cannot *imagine* either. I can *conceive* understanding and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of mind, but I cannot *imagine* them. In like manner, I can distinctly *conceive* universals, but I cannot *imagine* them."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv.

Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, *conception* with objects of thought. The things which we *imagine* are represented to the mind as individuals, as some particular man, or some particular horse. The things of which we *conceive* are such as may be denoted by general terms, as man, horse.

"The notions" (or *conceptions*) which the "mind forms from things offered to it, are either of single objects, as of 'this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey;' or of many objects taken together, as 'pain, man, abbey.'" Notions of single objects are called *intuitions*, as being such as the mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (*intuetur*) the object. Notions formed from several objects are called *conceptions*, as being formed by the power which the mind has of taking things together (*concipere*, i. e., *capere hoc cum illo*).

"On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, we begin to compare them with one another, and with those which are already reposited in our memory; and we discover that they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for example, which come in our way, however they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, duration, have some common points; they are all covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general notion of a house, that it is a covered building fit for human habitation; and to this notion we attach a particular name,

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house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and to record its results for use. The general notion so formed we call a *conception;* the common points we observed in the various objects are called *marks* or *notes;* and the process of observing them and forming one entire notion from them is termed *abstraction.*"—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 105, *Principles of Necessary and Contingent Truth*, p. 141.

CONCEPTION and IDEA.—By *conception* is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind; as when, for instance, we think of the *sun*, the *earth*, a *tree*, a *circle*, a *square*, *thought*, *being*, without forming any determinate judgment concerning them; and the form through which we consider these things is called an *idea.*"—*Port Roy. Log.*

"The *having an idea of a thing* is, in common language, used in the same sense (as *conceiving*), chiefly, I think," says Dr. Reid, "since Mr. Locke's time."

"A *conception* is something derived from observation; not so *ideas*, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them within the range of our experience. Thus *ideas* are *à priori*, *conceptions* are *à posteriori;* and it is only by means of the former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the *conception* which may be described as the synthesis of the fact and the *idea*. Thus we have an *idea* of the universe, under which its different phenomena fall into place, and from which they take their meaning; we have an *idea* of God as creator, from which we derive the power of conceiving that the impressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing things; we have an *idea* of the soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject, exists as a substratum of every sensation, *conception*, thought."—Chretien, *Essay on Log. Meth.*, p. 137.

"Every *conception*," said Coleridge (*Notes on English Divines*, 12mo, 1853, vol. i., p. 27), "has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An idea is a power, δύναμις νοερά, which constitutes its own reality, and is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the things in

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which it is more or less adequately realized, while a *conception* is as necessarily posterior."

Conception is used to signify—1. The *power* or *faculty* of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, "Under the article of *conception* I shall confine myself to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived."

2. The *act* or *operation* of this power or faculty. "*Conception*," says Sir John Stoddart (*Univ. Gram.*, in *Encyclop. Metropol.*), "which is derived from *con* and *capio*, expresses the *action* by which I *take up together* a portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity."

"*Conception* is the *act* by which we comprehend by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the *perception* of a *present*, and the imagination of an *absent individual*."—*North Brit. Rev.*, No. 27, p. 45.

3. The *result* of the operation of this power or faculty; as when Dr. Whewell says (Pref. to the *Philosoph. of the Induct. Sciences*, p. 13), "our *conceptions* are *that*, in the mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, a square number, a force."

This last signification, however, is more correctly and conveniently given by the word *concept*, i. e., *conceptum*, or *id quod conceptum est.*

CONCEPTUALISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate between *realism* and *nominalism*, *q. v.* Have genera and species a real independent existence? The *Realist* answers that they exist independently; that besides individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind, there exist certain *ideas*, the pattern after which the single objects are fashioned; and that the general notion in our mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. The *Nominalist* says that nothing exists but things, and names of things; and that universals are mere names, *flatus venti.* The *Conceptualists* assign to universals an existence which may be called logical or psychological, that is, independent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of the thinking subject, in which they are as notions or conceptions.—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 112.

Dr. Brown, while his views approach those of the *Conceptualists*, would prefer to call himself a *Relationalist*.—See *Physiol. of Hum. Mind*, p. 295.

Cousin, Introd. *Aux Ouvrages Inedits d'Abelard*, 4to, Par., 1836, p. 181; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. Hamilton's note, p. 412.

CONCLUSION.—When something is simply affirmed to be true, it is called a *proposition;* after it has been found to be true, by several reasons or arguments, it is called a *conclusion.* "Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want," this is a proposition; after all the arguments have been mentioned which prove this to be true, we say, "*therefore* sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want;" this is now the *conclusion.*—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

That proposition which is inferred from the premises of an argument is called the *conclusion.*—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 3, § 1.

CONCRETE (*concresco*, to grow together), is opposed to *abstract.* A *concrete* notion is the notion of an object as it exists in nature, invested with all its qualities. An *abstract* notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quality or attribute separated from the object to which it belongs, and deprived of all the specialities with which experience invests it; or it may be the notion of a substance stripped of all its qualities. In this way *concrete* comes to be synonymous with *particular*, and abstract with *general.*

The names of classes are *abstract*, those of individuals *concrete;* and from *concrete* adjectives are made *abstract* substantives.—*V.* ABSTRACT, TERM.

ONDIGNITY.—*V.* MERIT.

CONDITION—(*Conditio fere sumitur pro qualitate qua quid condi, id est fieri.*—Vossius. Or it may be from *condo*, to give along with, *i. e.*, something given or going along with a cause).

A *condition* is that which is pre-requisite in order that something may be, and especially in order that a cause may operate. A *condition* does not operate but by removing some impediment, as opening the eyes to see; or by applying one's strength in conjunction with another, when two men are required to

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According to some, *conscience* takes cognizance merely of our own conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said (sermon i., *On Hum. Nature*): "The principle in man by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is *conscience*—for this is the strict sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in more."

Locke defined conscience to be "our own judgment of the rectitude and pravity of our own actions."

Dr. Rush (*Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty*, p. 3), has said: "The moral faculty exercises itself upon the actions of others. It approves, even in books, of the virtues of a Trajan, and disapproves of the vices of a Marius, while *conscience* confines its operations to our own actions."

"The word '*conscience*' does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. *Conscience* supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions."—Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii., sect. 3.

"*Conscience* coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others."—Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, pt. i., ch. 2. See also Payne, *Elements of Mor. Science*, 1845, p. 283.

By these writers *conscience* is represented as being the function of the moral faculty in reference to our own conduct, and as giving us a consciousness of self-approbation or of self-condemnation.

By a further limitation of the term, *conscience* has been regarded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise; and by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive in its exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having acted wrong.

But of late years, and by the best writers, the term *conscience*, and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emo-

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tion, have all been applied to that faculty, or combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feelings of approbation and disapprobation. This faculty, or combination of faculties, is called into exercise not merely in reference to our own conduct, but also in reference to the conduct of others. It is not only *reflective* but *prospective* in its operations. It is *antecedent* as well as *subsequent* to action in its exercise; and is occupied *de faciendo* as well as *de facto*.—See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. iii., ch. 8.

In short, *conscience* constitutes itself a witness of the past and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if present when they were actually done. It takes cognizance not merely of the individual man, but of human nature, and pronounces concerning actions as right or wrong, not merely in reference to one person, or one time, or one place, but absolutely and universally.

With reference to their views as to the nature of *conscience* and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philosophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. The difference between them rests on the prominence and precedence which they assign to reason and to feeling in the exercise of the moral faculty; and their respective theories may be distinctively designated the *intellectual* theory and the *sentimental* theory. A brief view of the principal arguments in support of each may be found in Hume's *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5.

CONSCIOUSNESS (*conscientia*, joint knowledge, a knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with another).

Sir William Hamilton has remarked (*Discussions*, p. 110, note,) that "the Greek has no word for *consciousness*," and that "Tertullian is the only *ancient* who uses the word *conscientia* in a psychological sense, corresponding with our *consciousness*."—*Reid's Works*, p. 775.

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. *Unconsciousness*, that is, the want or absence of *consciousness*, denotes the suspension of all our faculties *Consciousness*, then, is the state in which we are

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when all or any of our faculties are in exercise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every mental operation.

The scholastic definition was, *perceptio qua mens de presenti suo statu admonetur.*

"*Consciousness* is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous *consciousness.*" . . . "By *consciousness* more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."—Tappan, *Doctrine of the Will by an Appeal to Consciousness*, chap. 2, sect. 1.

Mr. Locke has said (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 1), "It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks!"

"We not only *feel*, but we *know* that we *feel;* we not only *act*, but we *know* that we *act;* we not only *think*, but we *know* that we *think;* to think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a *consciousness* of itself. *Consciousness* is this interior light which illuminates everything that takes place in the soul; *consciousness* is the accompaniment of all our faculties; and is, so to speak, their echo."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. i., pp. 274-5.

On *consciousness* as the necessary form of thought, see lecture v. of the same volume.

That *consciousness* is not a particular faculty of the mind, but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by

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Amadee Jacques, in the *Manuel de Philosophie*, *Partie Psychologique;* and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen in his *Critical Essays*, p. 131, and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεως—there is not a feeling of a feeling; and that of the schoolmen—"*Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire—non intelligimus, nisi intelligamus nos intelligere.*" "No man," said Dr. Reid, "can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think, without being conscious that he thinks." And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a *consciousness* which was no *consciousness*, or *consciousness* without an object. "Annihilate the object of any mental operation and you annihilate the operation; annihilate the *consciousness* of the object, and you annihilate the operation."

This view of *consciousness*, as the common condition under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of considering these faculties and their operations as so many modifications of *consciousness*, has of late been generally adopted; so much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of *consciousness*. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of *consciousness* can be called in question. They may be more or less clear—more or less complete; but they either are or are not.

In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Conscience," it is maintained that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having *self*, or the *ego*, for its object.

Instead of regarding *consciousness* as the common condition or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer Collard and Adolphe Garnier among the French, and Reid and Stewart among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. "*Consciousness,*" says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1;

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see also essay vi., chap. 5), "is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that *consciousness* is only of things present. To apply *consciousness* to things past, which sometimes is done, in popular discourse, is to confound *consciousness* with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed that *consciousness* is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, 'I am *conscious* of the table which is before me.' I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am *conscious* of it. As that *consciousness* by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects; and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction and never confound things so different in their nature." In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of *consciousness* properly so called as *that consciousness* which is distinct from the *consciousness* by which we perceive external objects—as if perception was another kind or mode of *consciousness.* Whether all his language be quite consistent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by *consciousness* he meant especially attention to the operations of our own minds, or *reflection;* while by *observation* he meant attention to external things. This language has been interpreted as favourable to the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflection except by saying that *consciousness* accompanies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a voluntary act—an energetic attention to the facts of *consciousness.* But *consciousness* may be either spontaneous or reflective.

"This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations."—*Outlines of Mor. Philosoph.*, part i., sect. 1.

Mr. Stewart, in his *Outlines*, has enumerated *consciousness*

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as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory, judgment, &c. But *consciousness* is not confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the development of the feelings and the determinations of the will. And the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, is not only founded on a false analysis, but is an opinion, which if prosecuted to its results would overturn the doctrine of immediate knowledge in perception—a doctrine which Stewart and Reid upheld as the true and only barrier against the scepticism of Hume. "Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need another power termed *consciousness*, by which I become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against scepticism is cut off. . . . . I am conscious of *self* and of *notself;* my knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make *consciousness* a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediatecy of our knowledge of an external world." —Morell, *Hist. of Spec. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., p. 13.

"We may give *consciousness* a separate name and place, without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other faculties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it more of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever the soul is intelligently exercised."—M'Cosh, *Method of Div. Govern.*, p. 533, fifth edition.

See Fearn, *Essay on Consciousness.*

CONSCIOUSNESS and FEELING.—"Feeling and sensation are equivalent terms, the one being merely the translation of the other; but feeling and *consciousness* are not equivalent, for we are conscious that we feel, but we do not feel that we are conscious. *Consciousness* is involved in all mental operations, active or passive; but these are not therefore kinds or parts of consciousness. Life is involved in every operation, voluntary or involuntary, of our bodily system; but movement or action are not, therefore, a species of life. *Consciousness* mental life."—*Agonistes; or, Philosophical Strictures*, p. 336.

CONSENT.—"Believing in the prophets and evangelists with a calm and settled faith, with that *consent* of the will, and heart, and understanding, which constitutes religious belief, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth." —Southey, *Progress of Society*, colloquy 2.

Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the understanding. *Consent* arises from the state of the disposition and the will. The one accepts what is *true;* the other embraces it as *true and good*, and worthy of all acceptation.—*V.* ASSENT.

CONSENT (Argument from Universal).—*V.* AUTHORITY.

Reid applies this argument to establish first principles.—*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 2. He uses it against the views of Berkeley and Hume.—Essay ii., chap. 19.

Cicero (*De Officiis*, lib. i., cap. 41,) says, *Major enim pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura deducitur.* It is used to prove the existence of the gods. *De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos, confitendum est.* (*De Nat. Deorum*, lib. i., cap. 17,) Cotta argues against it, cap. 23. The argument is also used (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. ii., 2; and *Tuscul. Quæst.*, lib. i., 13), where we read, *Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.*

Bacon is against this argument in the preface to his *Instauratio Magna*, in aphorism 77, and in *Cogitata et Visa.*

"These things are to be regarded as *first truths*, the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in themselves. As for *probable* truths, they are such as are admitted by *all* men, or by the *generality* of men, or by *wise* men; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."—Aristotle, *Topic.*, i., 1.

Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.—Seneca, *Epist.*, cvii., cxvii.

CONSEQUENT.—*V.* ANTECEDENT, NECESSITY.

CONSILIENCE of INDUCTIONS takes place when an induction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induction obtained from a different class. This *consilience* is the test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs.—Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 14.

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Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*, which consists of gathering together undesigned coincidences, is an example of the *consilience* of inductions.

"The law of gravitation may be proved by a *consilience* of inductions."—*Quarterly Rev.*, vol. xlviii., p. 233.

CONSTITUTIVE (in German, *constitutiv*), means objectively determining, or legislating. It is a predicate which expresses that something *à priori* determines how something else must be, or is to be. That which is *constitutive* is opposed to that which is *regulative*—q. v.

CONTEMPLATION (*contemplor*), means originally to gaze on a shire of the heavens marked out by the augur.—Taylor, *Synonyms.* "The next faculty of the mind (*i. e.*, to perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of these simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways; first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view, which is called *contemplation*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 10.

When an object of sense or thought has attracted our admiration or love we dwell upon it; not so much to know it better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is *contemplation*, and differs from reflection. The latter seeks knowledge, and our intellect is active. In the former, we think we have found the knowledge which reflection seeks, and luxuriate in the enjoyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated the benefits of *contemplation*, and have directed it exclusively to God, and to the cherishing of love to Him.

CONTINENCE (*contineo*, to restrain), is the virtue which consists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied to men, as *chastity* is to women. *Chastity* may be the result of natural disposition or temperament—*continence* carries with it the idea of struggle and victory.

CONTINGENT (*contingo*, to touch).—"Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls *necessary* agents), and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call

free agents), and that some agents should work, and we know not how (and their effects we call *contingents*)."—Hobbes, *Liberty and Necessity.*

"When any event takes place which seems to us to have no cause, why it should happen in one way, rather than another, it is called a *contingent* event; as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a *certain spot*, or the turning up of any particular number when the dice are thrown."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

The *contingent* is that which does not exist necessarily, and which we can think as non-existing without contradiction. Everything which had a beginning, or will have an end, or which changes, is *contingent.* The *necessary*, on the contrary, is that which we cannot conceive as non-existing—that which has always been, which will always be, and which does not change its manner of being.

"*Contingent* is that which does not happen constantly and regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distinguished three different opinions; for either the event happens more frequently one way than another, and then it is said to be ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ; of this kind are the regular productions of nature, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it happens more rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other extraordinary productions of nature, and many accidents that happen to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and happens as often the one way as the other; or, as they express it in Greek, ὁπότερ ἐτύχη. Of this kind are some things in nature, such as the birth of a male or female child; a good or bad day in some climates of the earth; and many things among men, such as good or bad luck at play. All these last-mentioned events are in reality as necessary as the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen constantly and uniformly, and as we cannot account for their happening sometimes one way and sometimes another, we say they are *contingent.*"—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. i., p. 295.

The *contingent* is known empirically—the *necessary* by the reason. There are but two modes of being, the *necessary* and the *contingent.* But the *contingent* has degrees: 1. Simple

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facts which appear and disappear, or, in the language of the Schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties inherent in a substance, which constitute its specific character. 3. The substance itself considered as a particular and finite existence.

A thing may be *contingent* in three ways:—

1. *Æqualiter*, when the thing or its opposite may equally be, from the determination of a free will.

2. *Ut plurimum*, as when a man is born with five digits, though sometimes with more or less.

3. *Raro*, as when it happens seldom; *by a necessary agent*, as when a tile falls on a man's head; or *by a free agent*, as when a man cleaving wood wounds the bystander.—See Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

An event, the opposite of which is *possible*, is *contingent.*

An event, the opposite of which is *impossible*, is *necessary.*

An event is *impossible* when the opposite of it is *necessary.*

An event is *possible* when the opposite of it is *contingent.*

CONTINUITY (Law of).—"The supposition of bodies *perfectly* hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of the leading doctrines of Leibnitz, *that* of the constant maintenance of the same quantity of force in the universe, and *that* of the proportionality of forces to the squares of the velocities—he found himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining that all changes are produced by insensible gradations, so as to render it impossible for a body to have its state changed from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the intermediate states of velocity. From this assumption he argued with much ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of perfectly hard bodies, is impossible; because, if two of them should meet with equal and opposite motions, they would necessarily stop at once, in violation of the *law of continuity.*"—Stewart, *Dissert.*, part ii., p. 275.

"I speak," said John Bernouilli (*Discourse on Motion*, 1727), "of that immovable and perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, which may be called the *law of continuity*, in virtue of which everything that is done, is done by degrees infinitely small. It seems to be the dictate of good sense that no change is made *per saltum; natura*

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non operatur per saltum; and nothing can pass from one extreme to another without passing through all the intermediate degrees."

The *law of continuity*, though originally applied to *continuity of motion*, was extended by Charles Bonnet to *continuity of being.* He held that all the various beings which compose the universe, form a scale descending downwards without any chasm or *saltus*, from the Deity to the simplest forms of unorganized matter. A similar view had been held by Locke and others (*Spectator*, No. 519). The researches of Cuvier have shown that it can only be held with limitations and exceptions, even when confined to the comparative anatomy of animals.—*V.* ASSOCIATION.

CONTRACT (*contraho*, to draw together).—A *contract* is an agreement or pact in which one party comes under obligation to do one thing, and the other party to do some other thing. Paley calls it a mutual promise. *Contracts* originate in the insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One wants what another has abundance of and to spare; while the other may want something which his neighbour has. Men are drawn more closely together by their individual insufficiency, and they enter into an agreement each to give what the other needs or desires.

Contracts being so necessary and important for the welfare of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in all countries been made the object of positive law. Viewed ethically, the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that to fulfil a promise. The consideration of *contracts*, and of the various kinds and conditions of them belongs to Jurisprudence.

While all *contracts* are *pacts*, all *pacts* are not *contracts.* In the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts or agreements entered into without any cause or consideration antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing a *συνάλλαγμα*, or bargain, or as it may be popularly expressed, a *quid pro quo*—in which one party came under obligation to give or do something, on account of something being done or given by the other party. Agreements of the latter kind were properly

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contracts, while those of the former were called *bare pacts*. A *pactum nudum*, or *bare pact*, was so called because it was not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law. *Nuda pactio obligationem non facit.* It is the same in the English law, in which a *contract* is defined: "An agreement of two or more persons, upon *sufficient consideration*, to do or not to do a particular thing,"—and the consideration is necessary to the validity of the *contract*.

CONTRADICTION, Principle of (*contradico*, to speak against). —It is usually expressed thus: A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject.—Pierron and Zevort, *Introd. à la Metaphys. d'Aristote*, 2 tom., Paris, 1840.—*V.* IDENTITY.

Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic and of all Metaphysic.

Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth and reasoning, and added the principle of the *sufficient reason*—*q. v.*

Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, as he called them, analytic judgments; as when we say, all body has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judgment, that it implies no *contradiction*. But in synthetic judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason or the testimony of experience, according as they are *à priori* or *à posteriori*.—Aristot., *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 3; lib. ix., cap. 7; lib. x., cap. 5.

"The law of *contradiction* vindicates itself. It cannot be denied without being assented to, for the person who denies it must assume that he is denying it, in other words, he must assume that he is saying what he is saying, and he must admit that the contrary supposition—to wit, that he is saying what he is *not* saying—involves a contradiction. Thus the law is established."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 21.

It has also been called the law of *non-contradiction*. It is one and indivisible, but develops itself in three specific forms,

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which have been called the *Three Logical Axioms. First*, "A is A." *Second*, "A is not Not-A." *Third*, "Everything is either A or Not-A." This last is sometimes called the *Law of Excluded Middle—q. v.*

The principle of *contradiction* is the same with the *Dictum de omni et nullo—q. v.* See Poste, *Poster. Analyt.*, Appendix A.

CONTRARIES.—Aristotle (*De Anima*, lib. iii., cap. 3), says—"There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." This, by Themistius, in his *Paraphrase*, is thus illustrated:—"Of things contrary there is one science and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other."

"There is an essential difference between *opposite* and *contrary*. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus positive and negative electricity, are opposites. *Sweet* and *sour* are *opposites; sweet* and *bitter* are *contraries*. The *feminine* character is *opposed* to the *masculine;* but the *effeminate* is its *contrary*."—Coleridge, *Church and State*, note, p. 18.

We should say *opposite* sides of the street, not *contrary*.

Aristotle defines *contrary*, "that which in the same genus differs most;" as in colour, white and black; in sensation, pleasure and pain; in morals, good and evil. *Contraries* never co-exist, but they may succeed in the same subject. They are of two kinds, one admitting a middle term, participating at once in the nature of the things opposed. Thus, between absolute being and nonentity, there may be contingent being. In others no middle term is possible. There are *contraries* of which the one belongs necessarily to a subject, or is a simple privation, as health and sickness; light and darkness; sight and blindness. *Contraries* which admit of no middle term are *contradictories;* and form, when united, a *contradiction*. On this rests all logic. Aristotle wished to make virtue a middle term, between two extremes.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

CONVERSION, in Logic, is the transposition of the subject of a proposition into the place of the predicate, and of the predicate into the place of the subject. The proposition to be *converted* is called the *convertend* or *exposita*, and that into which it is converted the *converse*. Logical conversion is *illative*, that is, the truth of the *convertend* necessitates the truth of the *converse*. It can only take place when no term is distributed in the *converse* which was undistributed in the *convertend*. It is of three kinds, viz., *simple conversion*, *conversion per accidens*, and *conversion* by *negation or contraposition*.—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 4.

COPULA (The) is that part of a proposition which indicates that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. This is sometimes done by *inflection;* as when we say, Fire burns; the change from *burn* to *burns* showing that we mean to affirm the predicate burn of the subject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word *is*, when an affirmation is intended—*is not*, when a negation; or by some other part of the verb *to be*. Sometimes this verb is both copula and predicate, *e. g.*, "One of Jacob's sons is not." But the copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence, *e. g.*, "A faultless man is a being feigned by the Stoics."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 3. Mill., *Log.*, b. i., ch. 4, § 1.

COSMOGONY (κόσμος, world; γίγνομαι, to come into being).—"It was a most ancient, and, in a manner, universally received tradition among the Pagans, that the *cosmogonia*, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine *cosmogonists* agreeing therein with the atheistic ones): this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 248.

The different theories as to the origin of the world may be comprehended under three classes:—

1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, as having existed from eternity.—Aristotle.

2. Those which represent the *matter* but not the *form* of the world to be from eternity.—Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus.

3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause.

COSMOGONY—

"*Cosmogony* treats of the birth, *cosmography* of the description, and *cosmology* of the theory of the world."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

COSMOLOGY, Rational.—*V.* METAPHYSICS.

CRANIOLOGY.—*V.* PHRENOLOGY.

CRANIOSCOPY.—*V.* PHRENOLOGY, ORGAN, ORGANOLOGY.

CREATION is the act by which God produced out of nothing all things that now exist. Unless we deny altogether the existence of God, we must either believe in *creation* or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, which may be called *theological dualism* and *pantheism.* According to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in *creation* admits only the existence of one necessary and eternal being, who is at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good. God and the universe are essentially distinct. God has self-consciousness, the universe has not and cannot have. —*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

CREDULITY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, is set down by Dr. Reid as an original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart of this he reckons *veracity* or a propensity to speak truth and to use language so as to convey our real sentiments, to be also an original principle of human nature.—Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 6, § 24; and also *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. i., chap. 2; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. ii., p. 344; Priestley, *Exam.*, p. 86; Brown, Lect. lxxxiv.

CRITERION (κριτήριον, from the Greek verb κρίνω, to judge), denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It has been distinguished into the *criterion a quo*, *per quod*, and *secundum quod*—or the *being* who judges, as man; the *organ* or faculty by which he judges, and the *rule* according to which he judges. Unless utter scepticism be maintained, man must be admitted capable of knowing what is true.

"With regard to the *criterion* (says Edw. Poste, M.A., Introd., p. 14, to trans. of *Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle*), or organ of truth among the ancient philosophers, some advocated a

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simple and others a mixed *criterion.* The advocates of the former were divided into Sensationalists or Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason; the advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensationalists; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists; Plato and Aristotle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who advocated reason as a *criterion*, there was an important difference: some advocating the common reason, as Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; others, the scientific reason, or the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the *Republic* (7, sect. 9), Plato prescribes a training calculated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used the word measure, instead of *criterion;* and Protagoras had said, that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of truth (*Metaphys.*, x. 2; xi. 6), and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition. These names, then, cannot properly be ranked among the *common sense* philosophers, where they are placed by Sir William Hamilton.

"When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must include, besides the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This is the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension of truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of these instruments, in order to discover their capabilities and right use, is Logic. This appears to be the reason why Aristotle gave the title of *Organon* to his Logic. So Epicurus called his the *Canon* or *Criterion.*" The controversy on the *Criterion* is to be found at length in Sextus Empiricus, *Hypot.*, lib. ii., cap. 5-7.

Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character which distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it corresponds with the ground of certitude.—*V.* CERTITUDE.

CRITICK, CRITICISM, CRITIQUE (German, *critik*), is the examination of the pure reason, and is called in Germany simply the *critick* or *critik*, κατ' ἐξοχήν. It is the science of the pure faculty of reason, or the investigation of that which

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reason is able to know or effect, independently of experience, and is opposed to dogmatism. Sir J. Mackintosh terms the critical philosophy a self-reviewing philosophy.

CUMULATIVE (The Argument).—"The proof of a Divine agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an *argument* separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is *cumulative* in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract anything from the force of the example."—Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, chap. 6.

CUSTOM.—"Let *custom*," says Locke, "from the very childhood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity."—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 33, 17; and book i., chap. 4, 16.

Custom is the queen of the world.

> "Such precedents are numberless; we draw
> Our right from *custom; custom* is a law
> As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land."
>
> Lansdown, *Beauty and Law.*

A *custom* is not necessarily a *usage.* A *custom* is merely that which is often repeated; a *usage* must be often repeated and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a "new *custom*," but not of a "new *usage.*" *Custom* had probably the same origin as "accost," to come near, and thence to be habitual. The root is the Latin *costa*, the side or rib.—See Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, chap. 14; Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Politics* chap. 20, sect 9.

"An aggregate of habits, either successive or cotemporaneous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words *custom*,

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usage, or *practice*.* When many persons—either a class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation—agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a *custom* or usage to that effect.

"*Customs* may be of two kinds:—*First*, There may be voluntary *customs*—*customs* which are adopted spontaneously by the people, and originate from their independent choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c., prevalent in any country, and most of the items which constitute the manners of a people.—*Secondly*, There are the *customs* which are the result of laws—*customs* which have grown up in consequence of the action of the government upon the people. Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of procedure, and the advocates pleading before the court have observed these rules, such is called the established *practice* of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive judges and practitioners constitute the *practice* of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly, or any other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its members. In churches the equivalent name is *rites* and *ceremonies*."
—*V.* HABIT.

Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act; *habit* is the effect of such repetition: *fashion* is the *custom* of numbers; *usage* is the *habit* of numbers. It is a good *custom* to rise early; this will produce a *habit* of so doing; and the example of a distinguished family may do much toward reviving the *fashion*, if not re-establishing the *usage*.—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

Usage has relation to space, and *custom* to time; *usage* is more universal, and *custom* more ancient; *usage* is what many people practise, and *custom* is what people have practised long. A vulgar *usage*; an old *custom*.—Ibid.

CYNIC.—After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynosarges, one of the gymnasia of Athens,—and hence they were called *Cynics*. According to others, the designation comes from κύων, a dog,

* A similar distinction between *mos* and *consuetudo* is made by Macrobius, *Saturn.* iii., 8, commenting on Virgil, *Æneid*, 6, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that *mos* is the unit, and *consuetudo* the resulting aggregate.

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because like the dog they were destitute of all modesty. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates were the first heads of the sect. Zeno, by checking and moderating their doctrines, gave birth to the sect of Stoics.

Richterus, *Dissertatio de Cynicis*, Leips., 1701; Diogenes Laertius, lib. vi., c. 103.

DÆMONIST.—"To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a *Dæmonist*."—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i., pt. i., sect. 2.

DATA (the plural of *datum*—given or granted).—"Those facts from which an inference is drawn, are called *data*; for example, it has always been found that the inhabitants of temperate climates have excelled those of very hot or very cold climates in stature, strength, and intelligence: these facts are the *data*, from which it is inferred that excellence of body and mind depend, in some measure, upon the temperature of the climate."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

DEDUCTION (from *deduco*, to draw from, to cause to come out of), is the mental operation which consists in drawing a particular truth from a general principle antecedently known. It is opposed to *induction*, which consists in rising from particular truths to the determination of a general principle. Let it be proposed to prove that Peter is mortal; I know that Peter is a man, and this enables me to say that all men are mortal; from which affirmation I *deduce* that Peter is mortal.

The syllogism is the form of *deduction*. Aristotle (*Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 1), has defined it to be "an enunciation in which certain assertions being made, by their being true, it follows necessarily, that another assertion different from the first is true also."

Before we can *deduce* a particular truth we must be in possession of the general truth. This may be acquired *intuitively*,

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as every change implies a cause; or *inductively*, as the volume of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure.

Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is demonstration or science. Truths drawn from the latter kind are contingent and relative, and admit of correction by increasing knowledge.

The principle of *deduction* is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of *induction* is, that in the same circumstances, and in the same substances, from the same causes the same effects will follow.

The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on *deduction*, the physical sciences rest on *induction*.

For the different views of *deduction* and *induction*, see Whewell, *Philosoph. of Induct. Sciences*, book i., chap. 6; Mill, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5; *Quarterly Rev.*, vol. lxviii., art. on "Whewell."

DE FACTO and DE JURE.—In some instances the penalty attaches to the offender at the instant when the fact is committed; in others, not until he is convicted by law. In the former case he is guilty *de facto*, in the latter *de jure*.

De facto is commonly used in the sense of *actually* or *really*, and *de jure* in the sense of *rightfully* or *legally;* as when it is said George II. was king of Great Britain *de facto;* but Charles Stuart was king *de jure*,

DEFINITION (*definio*, to mark out limits).—*Est definitio, earum rerum, quæ sunt ejus rei propriæ, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quædam explicatio.*—Cicero, *De Orat.*, lib. i., c. 42.

"The simplest and most correct notion of a *definition* is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word."—Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. i , p. 182.

Definition signifies "laying down a boundary;" and is used in Logic to signify "an expression which explains any term so as to *separate* it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields. Logicians distinguish *definitions* into *Nominal* and *Real.*

"Definitions are called *nominal*, which explain merely the *meaning of the term;* and *real*, which explain the nature of the

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thing signified by that term. Logic is concerned with *nominal* definitions alone."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 6.

"By a *real*, in contrast to a *verbal* or *nominal definition*, the logicians do not intend 'the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of a thing;' that is, of a thing considered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already possessed. By *verbal* definition is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a *word;* by *real* the more accurate determination of the contents of a *notion*. The one clears up the relation of *words to notions;* the other of *notions to things*. The substitution of *notional* for *real* would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term *real*, the aim of a *verbal* definition being to specify the *thought denoted by the word*, such definition ought to be called *notional*, on the principle on which the definition of a notion is called *real;* for this definition is the exposition of what things are comprehended in a thought."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 691, note.

"In the sense in which *nominal* and *real* definitions were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with *real*, i. e., *notional* definitions only; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or grammars."—Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 189.

"There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a *definition*, but a postulate. The *definition* is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of importance. It affirms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth."—Mill, *Log.*, p. 197.

Real definitions are divided into *essential* and *accidental*. An *essential* definition states what are regarded as the con-

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stituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined; and an accidental *definition* (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c.

"*Essential definition* is divided into *physical* (natural), and *logical* (metaphysical); the *physical definition* being made by an enumeration of such parts as are *actually* separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a 'ship;' the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a 'tree.' The *logical definition* consists of the genus and difference, which are called by some the *metaphysical* (ideal) parts; as being not two real parts into which an *individual* object can (as in the former case), be actually divided, but only different views taken (notions formed) of a *class* of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet would be defined *logically*, 'an iron ore having attraction for iron.'"—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 6.

Accidental or descriptive definition, may be—1. *Causal;* as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for his glory. 2. *Accidental;* as when he is defined to be *animal, bipes implume.* 3. *Genetic;* as when the means by which it is made are indicated; as, if a straight line fixed at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle will be described. Or, 4. *Per oppositum;* as, when virtue is said to be flying from vice.

The rules of a good definition are:—1. That it be adequate. If it be too narrow, you explain *a part* instead of *a whole;* if too extensive, *a whole* instead of *a part.* 2. That it be clearer (*i. e.*, consist of ideas less complex) than the thing defined. 3. That it be in just a sufficient number of proper words. Metaphorical words are excluded because they are indefinite.—Mansel's *Aldrich.*, p. 35.

Aristotle, *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. ii.; *Topic.*, lib. vi.; *Port Royal Log.*, part i., chap. 12, 13, 14; part ii., chap. 16; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., c. 3 and 4; Leibnitz, *Noveaux Essais*, liv. iii., cap. 3 et 4; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 4; Tappan, *Appeal to Consciousness*, chap. 2, § 1.

DEIST (*Deus*, God).—There are different kinds of *deists* noticed by Dr. Sam. Clarke, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 12.

1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing.

2. Those who believe in God and in Providence, but deny moral distinctions and moral government.

3. Those who believe in God and His moral perfections, but deny a future state.

4. Those who believe in God and His moral government, here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes; but doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation.

Kant has distinguished between a *theist* and a *deist*—the former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the creator and preserver of all things; the latter believing that the first principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is inherent in matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena of nature. *Deism*, in this sense, is mere materialism. But *deism* is generally employed to denote a belief in God, without implying a belief in revelation.

"That modern species of infidelity, called *deism*, or *natural religion*, as contradistinguished from *revealed*."—Van Mildert, *Bampton Lect.*, sermon ix.

"Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination of *Christian deists*, though it implied no less than an absolute contradiction in terms."—Van Mildert, *Bampton Lect.*, sermon x.

See Leland, *View of Deistical Writers*.—*V.* THEIST.

DEMIURGE (δημιουργός, workman, architect).—Socrates and Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. Plotinus confounded the *demiurge* with the soul of the world, and represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. The Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the supreme divinity, and having a separate existence. The difficulty of reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the variable and contingent effects observable in the universe has given rise to the hypotheses of a *demiurge*, and of a plastic nature; but they do not alleviate the difficulty. This term is applied to God, Heb. xi. 10.

).—"The *demon kind* is of an intermediate nature between the divine and human. What is the power and virtue, said I, of this intermediate kind of being? To transmit and to interpret to the gods, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the gods; from men their petitions and their sacrifices; from the gods, in return, the revelation of their will."—Sydenham, *Plato*, *The Banquet.*

Socrates declared that he had a friendly spirit, or *Demon*, who restrained him from imprudence, and revealed to him what was true. Plutarch has a Dialogue on the *Demon* of Socrates, and Apuleius also wrote *De Deo Socratis.* In modern times we have Lélut, *Du Demon de Socrate*, Paris, 1836, 1856. He thinks Socrates was subject to hallucinations of sight and hearing.

DEMONSTRATION (*demonstro*, to point out, to cause to see).—In old English writers this word was used to signify the *pointing out* the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a phenomenon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with *proof* from first principles. To draw out a particular truth from a general truth in which it is enclosed, is *deduction;* from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily follow, is *demonstration.* To connect a truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain knowledge. But it is knowledge which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification by new discoveries; but the knowledge which *demonstration* gives is fixed and unalterable.

A *demonstration* is a reasoning consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposition brought into question is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain.

Demonstration is *direct* or *indirect.* *Direct demonstration* is

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descending—when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny; or *ascending*—when starting from the subject and its attributes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we connect the proposition in question. Both these are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with a general principle. *Indirect demonstration* is when we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demonstrate, and show that this admission leads to absurdity; that is, an impossibility or a contradiction. This is, *demonstratio per impossible*, or *reductio ad absurdum*. It should only be employed when *direct demonstration* is unattainable.

"*Demonstration* was divided by ancient writers into two kinds: one kind they called *demonstration* ὅτι; the other *demonstration* διότι.

"The *demonstration* διότι, or argument from cause to effect, is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. When, *e. g.*, we argue that at a certain time the tides will be unusually high, because of its being the day following the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that condition of the moon is in some way connected as a cause with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called *spring tide*.

"On the other hand, the *demonstration* ὅτι, or argument from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as their cause."—Karslake, *Aids to Logic*, vol. ii., p. 46.

The theory of *demonstration* is to be found in the *Organon* of Aristotle, "since whose time," said Kant, "Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing."

DENOMINATION, External.—*V.* MODE.

DEONTOLOGY (τὸ δέον, what is due, or binding; λόγος, discourse).

"*Deontology*, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a

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fitter term than any other which could be found, to represent, in the field of morals, the principle of *utilitarianism*, or that which is useful."—Bentham, *Deontology; or, the Science of Morality*, vol. i., p. 34.

"The term *deontology* expresses moral science, and expresses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty, and contains no reference to utility."—Whewell, *Preface to Mackintosh's Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 20.

Deontology involves the being bound or being under obligation; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and which utility does not give.

"The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be Ἕξις τοῦ δέοντος (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding), the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy."—Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Powers*, vol. ii., p. 446.

And Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 540, note) has observed that ethics are well denominated *deontology*.

DESIGN (*designo*, to mark out).—"The atomic atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and *designedly* for those uses."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 670.

"What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own sake, but with a view to some effect that is to follow, is said to be the result of *design*. None but intelligent beings act with *design;* because it requires knowledge of the connection of causes and effects, and the power of comparing ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be produced, and to devise the means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure that it is the work of a being capable of thought."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer *design* and a designer; because the only circumstances in which we can trace the origination of adaptation, are those

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in which human mind is implicated."—Dove, *Theory of Hum. Progression*, p. 482.

On the argument for the being of God from the evidences of *design*, or the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia of Socrates*, book i., chap. 4; Buffier, *Treatise on First Truths*, part ii., chap. 16; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book iii., chap. 2; Paley, *Nat. Theol.; Bridgewater Treatises; Burnett Prize Essays.*—*V.* CAUSE (Final).

DESIRE.—"*Desire* may be defined that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view or by the contemplation of any desirable good which is not in our possession, which we are solicitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible." —Cogan, *On Passions*, part i., chap. 2, sect. 3.

According to Dr. Hutcheson (*Essay on the Passions*, sect. i.), "*desires* arise in our mind from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil."

But, while *desires* imply intelligence, they are not the mere efflux, or product of that intelligence; and, while the objects of our *desires* are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of knowing them, that we desire them; but, rather, because we have a capacity of *desiring*. There is a tendency, on our part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure, when they are attained. Our *desires* of such ends or objects are *natural* and *primary*. *Natural*, but not *instinctive*, for they imply intelligence; *primary*, and not *factitious*, for they result from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to experience and education.

It has been maintained, however, that there are no original principles in our nature, carrying us towards particular objects, but that, in the course of experience, we learn what gives us pleasure or pain—what does us good or ill—that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after the other; that in this way, likings and dislikings—inclination and aversion,

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spring up within us; and that all the various passions and pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of what affects that sensibility; and thus, all our *desires* may be resolved into one general *desire* of happiness or well-being.

There is room for difference of opinion as to the number of those *desires* which are original; but there is little room for doubting, that there are some which may be so designated. Every being has a nature. Everything is what it is, by having such a nature. Man has a nature, and his nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain tendencies. He feels inclination or *desire* towards certain objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of these objects gives pleasure, the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In seeking them, he comes to know them better and *desire* them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is gradually developed, and the development which it may give to the *desires*, should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the *desires* primarily existed, as inherent tendencies in our nature, aiming at their correspondent objects; spontaneously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and strength, by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and rational powers.

DESTINY (*destinatum*, fixed), is the necessary and unalterable connection of events; of which the heathens made a divine power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irresistible *destiny*, against which man strives in vain, pervades the whole of Greek tragedy.—*V.* FATALISM.

DETERMINISM.—This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 601, note) to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of *fatalism*. The principle of the *sufficient reason* is likewise called by Leibnitz the principle of the *determining reason*. In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, nothing is given under *determinism*, but a reference made to *fatalism*.* And fatalism is explained as

* But in the article "Liberté," *determinism* is applied to the doctrine that motives *invincibly determine* the will, and is opposed to liberty of indifference, which is described as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives.

the doctrine which denies liberty to man.—*V.* NECESSITY, FATALISM, LIBERTY.

DIALECTIC (*dialektik*) is the logic of appearance as distinguished from universal Logic, or it may be that which teaches us to excite appearance or illusion. As logical or formal it treats of the sources of error and illusion, and the mode of destroying them; as transcendental, it is the exposure of the natural and unavoidable illusion that arises from human reason itself, which is ever inclined to look upon phenomena as things in themselves, and cognitions *à priori*, as properties adhering to these things, and in such way to form the super-sensible, according to this assumed cognition of things in themselves."—Haywood, *Transl. of Kant*, p. 596.

"How to divide and subdivide, and dissect, and analyze a topic, so as to be directed to the various roads of argument by which it may be approached, investigated, defended, or attacked, is the province of *dialectic*. How to criticise those arguments, so as to reject the sophistical, and to allow their exact weight to the solid, is the province of Logic. The dialectician is praised in proportion as his method is *exhaustive;* that is, in proportion as it supplies every possible form of argument applicable to the matter under discussion. The logician is praised in proportion as his method is *demonstrative;* that is, in proportion as it determines unanswerably the value of every argument applied to the matter under discussion. *Dialectic* provides, and Logic appreciates argumentation; *dialectic* exercises the invention, and Logic the judgment."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη).—"The Greek verb διαλέγω, in its widest signification,—1. Includes the use both of reason and speech as proper to man. Hence *dialectics* may mean Logic, as including the right use of reason and language. 2. It is also used as synonymous with the Latin word *disserere*, to discuss or dispute; hence, *dialectics* has been used to denote the Logic of probabilities, as opposed to the doctrine of demonstration and scientific induction. 3. It is also used in popular language to denote Logic properly so called. But *dialectics*, like science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic.

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Dialectics is handled, anatomized, and its conditions determined by Logic; but, for all that, it is not Logic, any more than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable kingdom is Botany."—Poste, *Introd. to Poster. Analyt.*, p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850.

"Xenophon tells us (*Mem.*, iv. 5, 11), that Socrates said, 'That *dialectic* (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) was so called because it is an inquiry pursued by persons who take counsel together, separating the subjects considered according to their kinds (διαλέγοντας). He held accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue it with diligence. By this means he thought they would become good men, fitted for responsible offices of command, and truly *dialectical*' (διαλεκτικώτατους). And this is, I conceive, the answer to Mr. Grote's interrogatory exclamation (vol. viii., p. 577). 'Surely the etymology here given by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (διαλέγεσθαι), cannot be considered as satisfactory.' The two notions, of investigatory dialogue and distribution of notions according to their kinds, which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, connected in fact; the *dialectic* dialogue was supposed to involve of course the *dialectic* division of the subject."—Dr. Whewell, *On Plato's Notion of Dialectic*, *Trans. of Camb. Philosoph. Soc.*, vol. ix., part 4.

DIANOIOLOGY—*V.* NOOLOGY.

DICHOTOMY (διχοτομία, cutting in two, division into two parts, logically), is a bimembral division.—"Our Saviour said to Pilate, 'Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell thee?' And all things reported are reduceable to this *dichotomie*,—1. The fountain of invention. 2. The channel of relation."—Fuller, *Worthies*, vol. i., c. 23.

"The divisions of Peter Ramus always consisted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other, as if one should divide England into Middlesex." In a note on this passage, Sir William Hamilton says, "There is nothing new in Ramus' Dichotomy by contradiction. It was, in particular, a favourite with Plato."—*Reid's Works*, p. 689.

"Every division, however complex, is reducible at each of

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its steps to a *Dichotomy;* that is, to the division of a class into two sub-classes, opposed to each other by contradiction. The term X, if divisible positively by several terms, of which Y is one, is divisible also by the terms Y and not Y."—Spalding, *Logic*, p. 146.

DICTUM DE OMNI ET NULLO may be explained to mean "whatever is predicated (*i. e.*, affirmed, or denied) universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner (viz., affirmed, or denied) of anything comprehended in that class." —*V.* CONTRADICTION.

DICTUM SIMPLICITER.—When a term or proposition is to be understood in its plain and unlimited sense, it is used *simpliciter;* when with limitation or reference, it is said to be used *secundum quid*—*q. v.*

DIFFERENCE (διαφορά, *differentia*).—When two objects are compared they may have qualities which are common to both, or the one may have qualities which the other has not. The first constitutes their *resemblance*, the second their *difference.* If the qualities constituting their resemblance be *essential* qualities, and the qualities constituting their difference be merely *accidental*, the objects are only said to be *distinct;* but if the qualities constituting their difference be *essential* qualities, then the objects are different.* One man is *distinct* from another man, or one piece of silver from another; but a man is *different* from a horse, and gold is *different* from silver. Those accidental differences which distinguish objects whose essence is common, belong only to individuals, and are called *individual* or *numerical differences.* Those *differences* which cause objects to have a different nature, constitute species, and are called *specific differences.* The former are passing and variable; but the latter are permanent and form the objects of science, and furnish the grounds of all *classification*, *division, and definition*—*q. v.*

"*Difference* or *differentia*, in Logic, means the formal or distinguishing part of the essence of a species." When I say that the *differentia* of a magnet is "its attracting iron," and that its *property* is "polarity," these are called respectively, a

* Derodon, *De Universalibus*, seems to use *differentia* and *distinctio* indiscriminately.

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specific difference and *property;* because magnet is (I have supposed) an *infima species* (*i. e.*, only a species). When I say that the *differentia* of iron ore is "its containing iron," and its *property* "being attracted by the magnet," these are called respectively, a *generic difference* and *property*, because "iron ore" is a subaltern species or genus; being both the genus of magnet, and the species of mineral."—Whately, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, § 4.

The English word *divers* expresses *difference* only, but *diverse* expresses *difference with opposition.* The Evangelists narrate the same events in "divers manners," but not in "*diverse manners.*"

Porphyry, *Introd. to Categor.;* Arist., *Top.*, lib. vii., c. 1, 2. —*V.* DISTINCTION.

DILEMMA is a syllogism with a conditional premiss, in which either the antecedent or consequent is disjunctive. When an affirmative is proved, the *Dilemma* is said to be in the *modus ponens*, and the argument is called *constructive;* when a negative is proved, the *Dilemma* is said to be in the *modus tellens*, and the argument is called *destructive.* Of the *constructive* dilemma there are two sorts—the *simple*, which concludes categorically, and the *complex*, which has a disjunctive conclusion. There is but one sort of the true *destructive* dilemma.

The *dilemma* is used to prove the absurdity or falsehood of some assertion. A conditional proposition is assumed, the antecedent of which is the assertion to be disproved, while the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumerating the suppositions on which the assertion can be true. Should the supposition be rejected, the assertion also must be rejected. If A is B, either C is D or E is F. But neither C is D nor E is F; therefore, A is not B.

This syllogism was called the *Syllogismus Cornutus*, the two members of the consequent being the horns of the *dilemma*, on which the adversary is caught between two difficulties. And it was called *dilemma*, *quasi* δὶς βάνων; according to others it was so called from δίς, twice, and λῆμμα, an assumption, because in the major premiss there

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are generally two antecedents, which in the minor become two assumptions.

The hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism, or *dilemma*, must not be confounded with the sophism called *dilemma*, in which, by a fallacy, two contradictories seem to be proved.

DISCOVERY.—*V.* INVENTION.

DISCURSUS—"If the mind do not perceive intuitively the connection betwixt the prædicate and subject, as in the case of axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no otherwise than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the use of middle terms, as they are called, in the language of Aristotle. And this application of the middle term, first to one of the terms of a proposition, and then to the other, is performed by that exercise of the intellect which is very properly called in Greek διάνοια, because the intellect in this operation goes betwixt the two terms, as it were, and passes from the one to the other. In Latin, as there is not the same facility of composition, it is expressed by two words, *discursus mentis*, *mens* being the same thing in Latin as Νοῦς in Greek; and the Latin expression is rendered into English by *discourse of reasoning*, or as it is commonly called, reasoning."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book v., ch. 4.

"Reasoning (or *discourse*) is the act of proceeding from certain judgments to another *founded* on them (or the result of them.)"—Whately, *Log.*, book ii., ch. 1, §. 2.

DISJUNCTIVE.—*V.* PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

DISPOSITION (διάθεσις, *dispositio*), according to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 19), is the arrangement of that which has parts, either according to place, or to potentiality, or according to species; for it is necessary that there be a certain position, as also the name *disposition* makes manifest."

As applied to mind, it supposes the relation of its powers and principles to one another, and means the resultant bias, or tendency to be moved by some of them rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just

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as there are differences of bodily *temperaments;* and these differences may give rise to a *disposition* or bias, in the one case, more directly in the other. According as intellect, or sensitivity, or will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But it is in reference to original differences in the *primary desires*, that differences of *disposition* are most observable. Any *desire,* when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.* *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

DISTINCTION (διαίρεσις) is wider in signification than *difference;* for all things that are *different* are also *distinct;* but all things that are *distinct* are not also *different.* One drop of water does not *specifically differ* from another; but they are *individually distinct.*

Distinction is a kind of *alietas* or otherness. Those things are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. Thus *Peter*, precisely because he is not *Paul*, is said to be distinct from *Paul. Union* is not opposed to *distinction;* for things may be so united that the one shall not be confounded with the other. Thus the soul is united to the body. Indeed *union* implies *distinction;* it is when two things which are mutually *distinct* become, as it were, *one.*

Distinction is *real* and *mental, a parte rei* and *per intellectum. Real distinction* is founded in the nature of the thing, and amounts to *difference.* It is threefold:—1. Object from object—as God from man. 2. Mode from mode—as blue from black. 3. Mode from thing—as body from motion. *Mental distinction* is made by the mind—as when we distinguish between light and heat, which are naturally united, or between the length and

* "The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's *natural temper.*"—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part ii., ch. 8.

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breadth of a body. It amounts to *abstraction*.—Bossuet, *Log.*, liv. i., c. 25; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, ch. 2, sect. 3.

"Separation by the touch (*dis* and *tango*) makes a *distinction;* by turning apart (*dis* and *verto*) makes a *diversity;* by carrying asunder (*dis* and *fero*) makes a *difference;* by affixing a mark (*dis* and *crimen*) makes a *discrimination. Distinction*, therefore, is applied to delicate variations; *diversity* to glaring contrasts; *difference* to hostile unlikenesses; and *discrimination* to formal criticism."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

DISTRIBUTION—"is the placing particular things in the places or compartments which have already been prepared to receive them."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"In Logic, a term is said to be *distributed* when it is employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its significates —everything to which it is applicable."—Whately, *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 3, § 2.

"A term is said to be '*distributed*,' when an assertion is made or implied respecting *every member* of the class which the term denotes. Of every universal proposition, therefore, the subject is *distributed; e. g.*, all *men* are mortal; No *rational being* is responsible; Whatsoever things were *written aforetime* were written for our learning. When an assertion is made or applied respecting some member or members of a class, but not necessarily respecting all, the term is said to be 'undistributed;' as, for example, the subjects of the following propositions:—Some *men* are benevolent; There are some *standing here* that shall not die; Not every one *that invokes the* sacred name shall enter into the heavenly kingdom."—Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179.

"When the whole of either term (in a proposition) is compared with the other, it is said to be *distributed;* when a part only is so compared, it is said to be *undistributed.* In the proposition 'All, A is B,' the term A is distributed; but in the proposition 'Some, A is B,' it is undistributed."—Solly, *Syll. of Log.*, p. 47.

The rules for *distribution* are:—

1. All universal propositions, and no particular, distribute the *subject.*

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2. All negative, and no affirmative, the predicate.—Wesley, *Guide to Syllogism*, p. 10.

"A singular term can never denote anything less than the object of which it is a name. A common term may be understood as denoting *all*, or fewer than all, of the objects of the class. When it denotes *all*, it is said to be taken universally, or to be *distributed;* that is, to be spread over the whole class, or to be applied to all the objects distributively—not collectively—to each, not to all together. When it denotes fewer than all the objects of the class, it is said to be taken particularly, or to be *undistributed.*"—Spalding, *Log.*, p. 57.

DITHEISM.—"As for that fore-mentioned *ditheism*, or opinion of two gods—a good and an evil one, it is evident that its original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of Deity, &c."—Cudworth, *Intell. System*, p. 213.—*V.* DUALISM.

DIVISION—"is the separating things of the *same kind* into parcels; *analysis* is the separating of things that are of *different kinds;* we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into twenty pieces; we analyze it by separating the bark, the wood, and the pith—a *division* may be made at pleasure, an *analysis* must be made according to the nature of the object."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

Division is either *division proper* or *partition. Partition* is the distribution of some *substance* into its parts; as of the globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. *Division proper* is the distribution of *genus* and *species* into what is under them; as when *substance* is divided into *spiritual* and *material.* The members which arise from *division* retain the name of their whole; but not those from *partition.*

"*Division* is the separation of a whole into its parts.

"But as there are *two kinds of wholes*, there are also two kinds of *division.* There is a *whole* composed of parts really distinct, called in Latin, *totum*, and whose parts are called *integral parts.* The division of this *whole* is called properly *partition;* as when we divide a *house* into its apartments, a *town* into its wards, a *kingdom* or *state* into its provinces, *man* into *body* and *soul*, the *body* into its *members.* The sole rule

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of their division is, to make the enumeration of particulars very exact, and that there be nothing wanting to them.

"The other *whole* is called, in Latin, *omne*, and its parts *subjected* or *inferior parts*, inasmuch as the whole is a *common term*, and its parts are the terms comprising its extension. The word *animal* is a whole of this nature, of which the inferiors, as man and beast, which are comprehended under its extension, are subjected parts. This division obtains properly the name of *division*, and there are four kinds of division which may be noticed.

"The *first* is, when we divide the *genus by its species;* every substance is body or mind, every animal is man or beast. The *second* is, when we divide the *genus by its differences;* every animal is rational or irrational, every number is even or uneven. The *third* is, when we divide a *common subject* into the *opposite accidents* of which it is susceptible, these being according to its different inferiors, or in relation to different times; as, every star is luminous by itself, or by reflection only; every body is in motion or at rest, &c. The *fourth* is, that of an *accident* into its *different subjects*, as division of *goods* into those of mind and body."—*Port Roy. Log.*, part ii., chap. 15.

"*Division* (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several things signified by one common name. It is so called from its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its parts." —Whately, *Log.*, book ii., ch. 5, § 5.

The rules of a good *division* are :—

1. Each of the parts, or any, short of all, must contain less (*i. e.*, have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. "Weapon" could not be a division of the term "sword." 2. All the parts taken together must be exactly equal to the thing divided. In dividing the term "weapon" into "sword," "pike," "gun," &c., we must not omit anything of which "weapon" can be predicated, nor introduce anything of which it cannot. 3. The parts, or members, must be *opposed*, *i. e.*, must not be contained in one another. "Book" must not be divided into "Quarto," "French;" for a French book may be a quarto, and a quarto French. It may be added, that a divi-

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sion should proceed throughout upon the same principle. Books may be divided according to *size, language, matter*, &c., all these being so many cross-divisions.

Aristotle, *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. ii., c. 13; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. ii., sect. 2.—*V.* WHOLE, FALLACY.

DIVORCE (*diverto*, to separate), is a separation, especially of husband and wife. It is used to signify,—1. Separation of a married pair without any right of re-marriage. 2. The like separation with that right; and 3. The declaratory sentence, pronouncing a marriage to have been void *ab initio*—that is, never to have existed in law.—Paley (*Mor Phil.*, b. iii., pt. iii., c. 7), understands by *divorce*, "the dissolution of the marriage contract by the act and at the will of the husband."—*Quarterly Rev.*, No. 203, p. 256.

DOGMATISM (δόγμα, from δοκέω, to think).—"Philosophers," said Lord Bacon, "may be divided into two classes, the *empirics* and the *dogmatists*. The empiric, like the ant, is content to amass, and then consume his provisions. The *dogmatist*, like the spider, spins webs of which the materials are extracted from his own substance, admirable for the delicacy of their workmanship, but without solidity or use. The bee keeps a middle course—she draws her matter from flowers and gardens; then, by art peculiar to her, she labours and digests it. True philosophy does something like this."

"He who is certain, or presumes to say he *knows*, is, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a *dogmatist*."—Shaftesbury, *Miscell. Reflect.*, Miscell. ii., c. 2.

Kant defined *dogmatism*, "the presumption that we are able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to principles which the reason has long had in use, without any inquiry into the *manner* or into the *right* by which it has attained them."—Morell, *Elements of Psychology*, p. 236, note.

"By *dogmatism* we understand, in general, both all propounding and all receiving of tenets, merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others; in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is offered is *dogmatical*."—Chalybæus, *Specul. Philosoph.*, p. 4.

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To maintain that man cannot attain to knowledge of the truth, is *scepticism*. To maintain that he can do so only by renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and surrendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior intuition, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all personal existence, is *mysticism*. *Dogmatism* is to maintain that knowledge may be attained by the right use of our faculties, each within its proper sphere, and employed in a right method. This is the natural creed of the human race. Scepticism and mysticism are after thoughts.

Dogmatism, or faith in the results of the due exercise of our faculties, is to be commended. But *dogmatism* in the method of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. Instead of laying down *dogmatically* truths which are not proven, we should proceed rather by observation and doubt. The scholastic philosophers did much harm by their *dogmatic method*. It is not to be mistaken for the *synthetic method*. There can be no *synthesis* without a preceding *analysis*. But they started from positions which had not been proved, and deduced consequences which were of no value.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

There is wisdom as well as wit in the saying that, *Dogmatism* is *Puppyism* come to maturity.

DOUBT (*dubito*, to go two ways).—Man knows some things and is ignorant of many things, while he is in *doubt* as to other things. *Doubt* is that state of mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions—having no preponderance of evidence in favour of either. Philosophical *doubt* has been distinguished as *provisional* or *definitive*. *Definitive doubt* is *scepticism*. *Provisional*, or *methodical doubt* is a voluntary suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure conclusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method by Descartes, who tells us that he began by doubting everything, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and true till he had subjected them to a rigorous examination.

"*Doubt* is some degree of belief, along with the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute *dis-*

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belief implies knowledge: it is the knowledge that such or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is *credulity*. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance concerning it, this is *doubt*. In proportion as knowledge increases, *doubt* diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*—*V.* CERTAINTY, SCEPTICISM.

DREAMING.—The phenomena of sleep and *dreaming*, are treated by almost all writers on psychology. *Dreams* very often take their rise and character from something in the preceding state of body or mind. "Through the multitude of business cometh a *dream*," said Solomon; and Aristotle regarded dreams as the vibrations of our waking feelings.—*Ethic.*, lib. i., cap. 13.

According to these views, *dreams*, instead of being prospective or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The former opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and among all nations; and hence, *oneiromancy* or prophesying by *dreams*, that is, interpreting them as presages of coming events.

DUALISM, DUALITY.—"Pythagoras talked, it is said, of an immaterial unity, and a material *duality*, by which he pretended to signify, perhaps, the first principles of all things, the efficient and material causes."—Bolingbroke, *Hum. Reason*, essay ii.

Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created and is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, equally necessary, eternal, and independent.

Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the Magi, who maintained the existence of a good principle and an evil principle; and thus explained the mixed state of things which prevails. It would appear, however, according to Zoroaster, that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were subordinate to Akerenes, or the Supreme Deity; and that it was only a sect of the Magi who held the doctrine of *dualism* in its naked form. Their views were revived in the second century by the Gnostics, and in the third century were supported by Manes, whose followers were called Manicheans.

Many of the ancient philosophers regarded the universe as constituted by two principles, the one active, the other passive,

the one mind, the other matter—the one soul, the other body. But the supposition of two infinites, or of two first causes, is self-contradictory, and is now abandoned.

The term *dualism* also finds a place in the theory of *perception*—*q. v.*

DURATION.—"After some thought has entirely disappeared from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief that it has been in the mind before; this is called *memory*. Memory and the consciousness of succession give us the notion signified by the word *duration*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 15.

According to Kant, *duration* or time, and also space, are necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as occurring in time.—*V.* TIME.

DUTY.—That which we *ought* to do—that which we are under *obligation* to do. In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that it is our *duty* to do it. There is a complete synthesis between *rectitude* and *obligation*. Price has used *oughtness* as synonymous with *rightness*.—*V.* OBLIGATION.

Duty and *right* are relative terms. If it be the *duty* of one party to do some thing, it is the *right* of some other party to expect or exact the doing of it.—*V.* RIGHT, RECTITUDE.

See Wordsworth, *Ode to Duty*.

DYNAMISM, the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance involves *force*.—*V.* MATTER.

ECLECTICISM (ἐκλέγω, to select, to choose out).—The Alexandrian philosophers, or Neo-Platonicians, who arose at Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian, professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true in all systems of philosophy. To their method of philosophizing, the name *eclecticism* was first applied. Clemens Alexandrinus (*Stromm.*, lib. i., p. 288) said, "By philosophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian; but whatever things have been properly said by each

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of these sects, inculcating justice and devout knowledge,—*this whole selection I call philosophy.*" Diogenes Laertes tells us (1, sect. 21), that Potamos of Alexandria introduced ἐκλεκτικὴν αἵρεσιν. But the method had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle before, and has been followed by many in all ages of philosophy. Leibnitz said that truth was more widely diffused than was commonly thought; but it was often burdened and weakened, mutilated and corrupted by additions which spoiled it and made it less useful. In the philosophy of the ancients, or those who had gone before, he thought there was *perennis quædam philosophia*—if it could only be disintricated from error and disinterred from the rubbish which overwhelmed it. In modern times the great advocate of *eclecticism* is Mons. Cousin. But its legitimacy as a mode of philosophizing has been challenged.

"The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of Alexandria) says Mr. Maurice (*Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, p. 53), "is obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such; far less did he care for the opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names; he found in each hints of precious truths of which he desired to avail himself; he would gather the flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. *Eclecticism*, in this sense, seemed only like another name for catholic wisdom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey wherever it was to be found; he would find sweetness in it if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had imparted the skill; to receive them thankfully was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of *devotion* and *gratitude*, which belonged so remarkably to Clemens—once let it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectical doctrine would lead to more self-conceit, would be more unreal and heartless

than any one of the sectarian elements out of which it was fashioned. It would want the belief and conviction which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteristics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each other. In general the superficialities and formality of each creed would be preserved in the new system; its original and essential characteristics sacrificed."

"In philosophy Cicero was never more than an *eclectic*, that is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very essence of the philosophical mind lies in this, that it is constrained by an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, necessary principles, and cannot halt until it reaches the living, streaming sources of truth; whereas the *eclectic* will stop short where he likes, at any maxim to which he chooses to ascribe the authority of a principle. The philosophical mind must be systematic, ever seeking to behold all things in their connection, as parts or members of a great organic whole, and impregnating them all with the electric spirit of order; while the *eclectic* is content if he can string together a number of generalizations. A philosopher incorporates and animates; an *eclectic* heaps and ties up. The philosopher combines multiplicity into unity; the *eclectic* leaves unity straggling about in multiplicity. The former opens the arteries of truth, the latter its veins. Cicero's legal habits peer out from under his philosophical cloak, in his constant appeal to precedent, his ready deference to authority. For in law, as in other things, the practitioner does not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or tertiary principles, taking his stand upon the mounds which his predecessors have erected."—Second Series of *Guesses at Truth*, edition 1848, p. 238.

See Cousin, *Fragmens Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1826; Jouffroy, *Melanges Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1833; Damiron, *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie au dixneuvieme siecle*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1834.

ECONOMICS (οἶκος, a house; νόμος, a law).—Treatises under this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero.

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They seem to have treated of the best means of managing and increasing the comforts and resources of a household. Only fragments of them remain. But in modern times justice or social duty has been distinguished by Henry More into *ethical*, *economical*, and *political*. And *economics* has been employed to denote those duties which spring from the relations which exist in a family or household. These are the duties—

1. Of husband and wife.
2. Of parent and child.
3. Of master and servant.

ECSTASY (ἔκστασις, standing out), a transport of the soul by which it seems as if out of the body.

"Whether that which we call *ecstasy* be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 19.

This word does not occur in philosophy before the time of Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry pretended to have *ecstasies* in which they were united to God. Among Christian writers, Bonaventura (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*), Gerson (*Theologia Mystica*), and Francis de Sales, recommend those contemplations which may lead to *ecstasy*. But there is danger of their leading to delusion, and to confound the visions of a heated imagination with higher and nearer views of spiritual things.

Baader, *Traitè sur l'Extase*, 1817.

EDUCATION (*educo*, to lead out), means the development of the bodily and mental powers. The human being is born and lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have a tendency to call forth and strengthen his powers of body and mind. And this may be called the *education* of nature. But by *education* is generally meant the using those means of development which one man or one generation of men may employ in favour of another. These means are chiefly *instruction*, or the communication of knowledge to enlighten and strengthen the mind; and *discipline*, or the formation of manners and habits. Instruction and discipline may be physical or moral, that is, may refer to the body or to the mind. Both, when employed in all their extent, go to make up *education*, which is the aid given

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to assist the development, and advance the progress of the human being, as an individual, and as a member of a family, of a community, and a race.

"The business of *education* is to *educe* or bring out that which is within, not merely or mainly to *instruct* or impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the ministration of others; and hence *instruction* must ever be a chief element of *education*. Hence too we obtain a criterion to determine what sort of *instruction* is right and beneficial—that which ministers to *education*, which tends to bring out, to nourish and cultivate the faculties of the mind, not that which merely piles a mass of information upon them. Moreover, since nature, if left to herself, is ever prone to run wild, and since there are hurtful and pernicious elements around us, as well as nourishing and salutary, pruning and sheltering, correcting and protecting are also among the principal offices of *education*."—Second Series, *Guesses at Truth*, 1848, p. 145.

Milton, *On Education;* Locke, *On Education;* Guizot, *Meditations*, 8vo, Paris, 1852; *Conseils d'un Père sur l'Education.*

EFFECT.—That which is produced by the operation of a cause.—*V.* CAUSE.

EGO (I).—"Supposing it proved that my thoughts and my consciousness must have a *subject*, and consequently that I exist, how do I know that all that train and succession of thoughts which I remember belong to one subject, and that the *I* of this moment is the very individual *I* of yesterday, and of time past?"—Reid, *Inquiry*, Introd., sect. 3.

Sir William Hamilton's note upon this passage is as follows:—"In English, we cannot say the *I* and the *not I*, so happily as the French *le moi* and *le non-moi*, or even the German *das Ich* and *das nicht Ich*. The ambiguity arising from identity of sound between the *I* and the *eye*, would itself preclude the ordinary employment of the former. The *ego* and the *non-ego* are the best terms *we* can use; and as the expressions are scientific, it is perhaps no loss that their technical precision is guarded by their *non-vernacularity*."

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In another note (*Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1, p. 806) he has added:—"The *ego* as the subject of thought and knowledge, is now commonly styled by philosophers the *subject;* and *subjective* is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms *object* and *objective* are, in like manner, now in general use to denote the *non-ego*, its affections and properties, and in general, the *really existent* as opposed to the *ideally known.*"

EGOISM, EGOIST—"Those Cartesians who in the progress of their doubts ended in absolute *egoism.*"

"A few bold thinkers, distinguished by the name of *egoists*, had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to doubt of everything but their own existence. According to *these*, the proposition, *Cogito ergo sum*, is the only truth which can be regarded as absolutely certain."—Stewart, *Dissert.*, part ii., p. 161, and p. 175.

Dr. Reid says (*Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 8), that some of Descartes' disciples who doubted of everything but their own existence, and the existence of the operations and ideas of their own mind, remained at this stage of his system and got the name of *egoists.* But Sir William Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says, "He is doubtful about the existence of this supposed sect of *egoists.*"

The first sense and aspect of *egoism* may seem to be selfishness. But this is contradicted by the following epitaph :—

In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelmham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who died Nov. 17, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following epitaph:—

"MYSELF.

"As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself,
And thus myself said to me,
Look to thyself, and take care of thyself,
For nobody cares for thee.

"So I turned to myself and I answered myself,
In the self-same reverie,
Look to myself, or look not to myself,
The self-same thing will it be."

ELECTION (*eligo*, to choose), is an elicit act of will, by which, after deliberation of several means to an end proposed by the

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understanding, the will elects one rather than any other. *Volition* has reference to the end, *election* is of the means. According to others, no distinction should be taken between *election* and *volition;* as to will an end is the same act as to choose the means. But an end may be accomplished by different means—of one or other of which there is *election.*

Aristotle (*Ethics*, book iii., chap. 3, 4) says, "moral preference, προαίρεσις, then, relates to those things only which may be accomplished by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason; and conversant not about *ends*, but about the best *means* by which they may be attained. *Volition*, on the contrary, is conversant only about *ends;* which consist, according to some, in real, and according to others, in seeming good.

ELEMENT (στοιχεῖον).—The Stoic definition of an element is, "that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved." —Diog. Laert., vii., 176.

"We call that elementary which in a composition cannot be divided into heterogeneous parts—thus the *elements* of sound constitute sound, and the last parts into which you divide it—parts which you cannot divide into other sounds of a different kind. The last parts into which bodies can be divided—parts which cannot be divided into parts of a different kind, are the *elements* of bodies. The *elements* of every being are its constitutive principle."—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 3.

"*Elements* are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια—the inherent or inexisting causes, such as matter and form. There are other causes, such as the tribe of *efficient causes*, which cannot be called *elements*, because they make no part of the substances which they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his statue; the painter of his picture. Hence it appears that all *elements* are causes, but not all causes *elements.*"—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrang.*, chap. 5, note. And in the chap. he says, "In form and matter we place the *elements* of natural substance."

Materia prima, or matter without form—ὕλη, was an *element* ready to receive form. This seems to be the use of the word

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as retained in the communion service. Bread and wine are *elements* ready to receive the form of the body and blood of Christ. "Like the *elements* of the material world, the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed."—Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. vii.—See Doublado's *Letters*.

"The *elementes* be those originall thynges unmyxt and uncompounde, of whose temperance and myxture all other thynges having corporal substance be compact; of them be foure, that is to say, earth, water, ayre, and fyre."—Sir T. Elyot, *Castel of Health*, b. i.

Element is applied analogically to many things; as to letters, the *elements* of words; to words the *elements* of speech; and in general to the principles or first truths or rules of any science or art.

ELEMENTOLOGY.—*V.* METHODOLOGY.

ELICIT (*elicio*, to draw out), is applied to acts of will which are produced directly by the will itself, and are contained within it; as *velle aut nolle*. An *elicit* act of will is either election or volition—the latter having reference to ends, and the former to means.

ELIMINATION (*elimino*, to throw out), in Mathematics, is the process of causing a function to disappear from an equation, the solution of which would be embarrassed by its presence there. In other writings the correct signification is, "the extrusion of that which is superfluous or irrelevant." Thus, in *Edin. Rev.*, April, 1833, Sir W. Hamilton says:—"The preparatory step of the discussion was, therefore, an *elimination* of those less precise and appropriate significations, which, as they would at best only afford a remote genus and difference, were wholly incompetent for the purpose of a definition."

It is frequently used in the sense of eliciting, but incorrectly.

EMANATION (*emano*, to flow from).—According to several systems of philosophy and religion which have prevailed in the East, all the beings of which the universe is composed, whether body or spirit, have proceeded from, and are parts of, the Divine Being or substance. This doctrine of *emanation* is

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to be found in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, and Neo-Platonicians. It differs little, if at all, from Pantheism.

EMINENTLY.—*V.* VIRTUAL.

EMOTION (*emoveo*, to move out), is often used as synonymous with feeling. Strictly taken, it means "a state of feeling which, while it does not spring directly from an affection of body, manifests its existence and character by some sensible effect upon the body."

An *emotion* differs from a *sensation*, by its not originating in a state of body; and from a *cognition*, by its being pleasurable or painful.

Emotions, like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is known and contemplated; and on the contemplation, springs up the appropriate feeling, followed by the characteristic expression of countenance, or attitude, or manner.

In themselves considered, *emotions** can scarcely be called springs of action. They tend rather, while they last, to fix attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited them. In many instances, however, *emotions* are succeeded by desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken them, or to remove ourselves from the presence of such objects. When an *emotion* is thus succeeded by some degree of desire, it forms, according to Lord Kames, a *passion*, and becomes, according to its nature, a powerful and permanent spring of action.

Emotions, then, are awakened through the medium of the intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we form of the objects to which they refer.

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sensible effects upon the body.

Emotions, in themselves, and by themselves, lead to quiescence and contemplation, rather than activity. But they combine with springs of action, and give to them a character and

* "The feelings of beauty, grandeur, and whatever else is comprehended under the name of taste, *do not lead to action*, but terminate in delightful contemplation, which constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, to which, in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened."—Mackintosh, *Dissert.*, p. 238.

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a colouring. What is said to be done from surprise or shame, has its proper spring—the surprise or shame being concomitant.—See Dr. Chalmers, *Sketches of Ment. and Mor. Phil.*, p. 88.

EMPIRIC, EMPIRICISM.—Among the Greek physicians those who founded their practice on experience called themselves *empirics* (ἐμπειρικοί); those who relied on theory, *methodists*); and those who held a middle course, *dogmatists* The term *empiricism* became naturalized in England when the writings of Galen and other opponents of the *empirics* were in repute, and hence it was applied generally to any ignorant pretender to knowledge. It is now used to denote that kind of knowledge which is the result of experience. Aristotle applies the terms *historical* and *empirical* in the same sense. *Historical* knowledge is the knowledge that a thing is. *Philosophical* knowledge is the knowledge of its cause, or why it is. The Germans laugh at our phrase *philosophical transactions*, and say, "Socrates brought down philosophy from the clouds—but the English have brought her down to the dunghill."

Empiricism allows nothing to be true nor certain but what is given by experience, and rejects all knowledge *à priori*.

In antiquity the Ionian school may be said to have been sensualist or *empirical*. The saying of Heraclitus that nothing is, but that all things are beginning to be, or are in a continual flux, amounts to a denial of the persistence of substance. Democritus and the atomists, if they admitted the substance of atoms, denied the fundamental laws of the human mind. And the teaching of Protagoras, that sense is knowledge, and man the measure of all things, made all science individual and relative. The influence of Plato and Aristotle re-established the foundation of true philosophy, and *empiricism* was regarded as scepticism.

In the middle ages *empiricism* was found only among the physicians and alchemists, and was not the badge of any school of philosophy.

Empiricism, as applied to the philosophy of Locke, means that he traces all knowledge to experience, ἐμπειρία. Expe-

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rience, according to him, included sensation and reflection. The French philosophers, Condillac and others, rejected reflection as a distinct source of knowledge; and their doctrine, to distinguish it from that of Locke, is called *sensualism*. *Ideology* gives nothing to the mind but sensations remembered or generalized, which it calls ideas. But Reid and the common sense philosophers, as well as Cousin and the rationalist philosophers, hold that the mind has primary beliefs, or universal and necessary ideas, which are the ground of all experience and knowledge.—*V.* EXPERIENCE.

Empirical or *experimental* "is an epithet used by Madame de Stael and other writers on German philosophy, to distinguish what they call the philosophy of sensation, from that of Plato and of Leibnitz. It is, accordingly, generally, if not always, employed by them in an unfavourable sense. In this country, on the contrary, the *experimental* or *inductive* philosophy of the human mind denotes those speculations concerning mind, which, rejecting all hypothetical theories, rest solely on phenomena for which we have the evidence of consciousness. It is applied to the philosophy of Reid, and to all that is truly valuable in the metaphysical works of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume."—Stewart, *Dissert.*, pt. ii., p. 146, note.

EMULATION (*æmulus*, striving; from ἄμιλλα, a strife), is the desire of superiority. It is one of those primitive desires which manifest themselves in very early years. It prompts, when properly directed and regulated, to the most strenuous and persevering exertion. Its influence in the carrying forward of education is most important.

ENDS.—*Ends* are of two kinds, according to Aristotle (*Eth.*, lib. i., cap. 1), ἐνέργειαι, operations; ἔργα, productions. An ἐνέργεια is the *end*, when the object of a man's acting is the pleasure or advantage in being so employed, as in music, dancing, contemplation, &c., which produce nothing, generally speaking, beyond the pleasure which the act affords. An ἔργον is something which is produced beyond the operation or energy; thus, the shoe is the ἔργον produced by the ἐνέργεια of shoe-making.—Paul, *Analysis of Arist.*, p. 2.

This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour as

productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does not give a material product.

An *end* is that for the sake of which an action is done. Hence it has been said to be, *principium in intentione et terminus in executione.*

When one *end* has been gained, it may be the means of gaining some other *end.* Hence it is that *ends* have been distinguished, as *supreme* and *ultimate*, or *subordinate* and *intermediate.* That which is sought for its own sake, is the *supreme* and *ultimate end* of those actions which are done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other end, is a *subordinate* and *intermediate* end.

Ends as ultimate, are distinguished into the *end simpliciter ultimus*, and *ends* which are ultimate *secundum quid.* An *end* which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of actions, is called ultimate *secundum quid.* But that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded as a means to any other *end*, is an ultimate end, simply and absolutely.

See Edwards, *Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World;* Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.*

is either *ens reale* or *ens rationis.*

Ens Rationis.—That which has no existence but in the idea which the mind forms of it; as a golden mountain.

Reale, in philosophical language, is taken *late et stricte*, and is distinguished as *ens potentiale*, or that which may exist, and *ens actuale*, or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken as the concrete of *essentia*, and signifies what has essence and may exist—as a rose in winter. Sometimes as the participle of *esse*, and then it signifies what actually exists. *Ens* without intellect is *res*, a thing.

ΓΕΛΕΟΗΥ (ἐντελέχεια, from ἐντελές, perfect; ἔχειν, to have; and τέλος, an end; in Latin *perfectihabia*).—"In one of the books of the Pythagoreans, viz., *Ocellus Lucanus*, Περὶ τοῦ πάντος, the word συντέλεια is used in the same sense. Hence it has been thought that this was borrowed from the Pythagoreans."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. i., ch. 3, p. 16, note.

Cicero (*Tuscul. Quæst.*, lib. i., quæst. 1) interprets it to mean *quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem.*

Melancthon (*Opera*, tom. xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846) gives two interpretations of *Endelechy*, as he writes it. He says that ἐνδελεχές signifies *continuus*, and ἐνδελέχεια *continuitas.* According to him, Aristotle used it as synonymous with ἐνέργεια. Hence Cicero translated it by continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolus blames Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning "interior perfection," as if it were τὸ ἐντὸς τελειοῦν. But Melancthon thinks Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philosophy of Aristotle.

According to others, ἐνδελέχεια means *continuance*, and is a totally different word from ἐντελέχεια, which means *actuality.* Arist. *Metaphys.*, Bohn's Libr., pp. 68, 301; Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, pp. 339-344.

According to Leibnitz, *entelecheia* is derived apparently from the Greek word which signifies *perfect*, and therefore the celebrated Hermoläus Barbarus expressed it in Latin, word for word, by *perfectihabia*, for act is the accomplishment of power; and he needed not to have consulted the devil, as he did, they say, to tell him this much.—Leibnitz, *Theodicée*, partie i., sect. 87.

"You may give the name of *entelechies* to all simple substances or created monads, for they have in them a certain perfection (ἔχουσι τὸ ἐντελές), they have a sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) which makes them the source of their internal actions, and so to say incorporeal automatons."—*Monadologie*, sect. 18. He calls a monad an autarchic automaton, or first *entelechie*—having life and force in itself.

"*Entelechy* is the opposite to *potentiality*, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality, *actuality.* Εἶδος expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose—its form or constitution; ἐνέργεια its substance, considered as active and generative; ἐντελέχεια seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The *effectio* of Cicero, therefore, represents the most important side of it, but not the whole."—Maurice, *Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, note, p. 191.

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ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par consequent ne relève que de soi meme, et constitue une unite indivisible. —Cousin, note to *Transl. of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, book xii., p. 212.

"*L'Entelechie* est oppose a la simple puissance, comme la forme a la matière, l'être au possible. C'est elle qui, par la vertu de la fin, constitue l'essence meme des choses, et imprime le mouvement a la matière aveugle; et c'est en ce sens qu' Aristote a pu donner de l'ame cette celebre definition, qu'elle est l'entelechie ou forme premiere de tout corps naturel qui possède la vie en puissance."—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an *entelechy;* a definition of which Dr. Reid said he could make no sense.—*V.* SOUL, ACTUAL.

ENTHUSIASM (ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν)—"is almost a synonym of genius; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever achieved."—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 338.

The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According to its composition it should signify "divine inspiration." But it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior, the devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, are so many different phases of *enthusiasm.* "According to Plutarch, there be five kinds of *Enthusiasm:—Divinatory*, *Bacchical* (or corybantical), *Poetical* (under which he comprehends musical also), *Martial* and *Erotical*, or *Amatorie.*" A *Treatise concerning Enthusiasm* by Meric Casaubon, D.D., chap. 1. Shaftesbury, *Of Enthusiasm.* See also *Natural Hist. of Enthusiasm*, by Isaac Taylor; Madame de Staël, *Germany;* Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 19; More, *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.*

ENTHYMEME (ἐν θύμῳ, in the mind), is an irregular syllogism in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but kept in mind; as "every animal is a substance, therefore, every man is a substance;" in which the premiss, "man is an animal," is

suppressed. "This is the vulgar opinion regarding Aristotle's *Enthymeme*, but, as I have shown, not the correct."—See *Edin. Rev.*, vol. lvii., p. 221; Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 704, note. Aristotle's *Syllogism* was an inference in matter necessary; his *Enthymeme* was an inference in matter probable.—Bachmann, p. 260. The famous expression of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*, is, as to form, an *enthymeme*. It was not put, however, as a proof of existence, but as meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in the consciousness of thinking.

(*entitas*), in the scholastic philosophy was synonymous with essence or form.

To all individuals of a species there is something in common —a nature which transiently invests all, but belongs exclusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and viewed apart from any individual, was what the scholastics called an *entity*. Animals had their *entity*, which was called *animality*. Men had their *entity*, which was called *humanity*. It denoted the common nature of the individuals of a species or genus. It was the idea or model according to which we conceived of them. The question whether there was a reality corresponding to this idea, divided philosophers into *Nominalists* and *Realists*—*q. v.*

It is used to denote anything that exists, as an object of sense or of thought.—*V.* ENS.

ENUNCIATION, in Logic, includes the doctrine of *propositions*—*q. v.*

EPICHEIREMA (ἐπιχειρέω, to put one's hand to a thing), an attempted proof—is a syllogism having the major or minor premiss, or both, confirmed by an incidental proposition called a *Prosyllogism*. This proposition, with the premiss it is attached to, forms an enthymeme. The *incidental* proposition is the *expressed premiss* of the enthymeme, and the premiss it is attached to is the *conclusion*: *e. g.*,—

All sin is dangerous.

Covetousness is sin (for it is a transgression of the law), therefore,

It is dangerous.

The minor premiss is an enthymeme. "Covetousness is a transgression of the law; therefore, it is sin.

EPICUREAN.—A follower of Epicurus, a philosopher, who was born 341, B. C.

"The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, in making virtue consist in acting in the most suitable manner to obtain primary objects of natural desire. It differed from all of them in two other respects;—1st, in the account which it gave of these primary objects of natural desire; and, 2dly, in the account which it gave of the excellence of virtue, or the reason why that quality ought to be esteemed."—Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part vii., sect. 2.

See Gassendi, *De Vita Moribus et Doctrina, Epicuri*, 4to, Lyons, 1647.

EPISTEMOLOGY (λόγος τῆς ἐπιστήμης, the science of true knowing)—"the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as Ontology is the doctrine or theory of being."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 46.

EPISYLLOGISM.—In a chain of reasoning one of the premisses of the main argument may be the conclusion of another argument, in that case called a *Prosyllogism;* or the conclusion of the main argument may be a premiss to a supplementary one, which is called an *episyllogism.* The question is, "Has A. B. been poisoned?" and the *syllogism* is, "A man who has taken a large quantity of arsenic has been poisoned, and A. B. is found to have done so, therefore, he has been poisoned." With the addition of a *prosyllogism* and an *episyllogism* the meaning would run—"A man who has taken arsenic has been poisoned; and A. B. has taken arsenic, for tests discover it (*Prosyl.*), therefore, A. B. has been poisoned, and, therefore, there cannot be a verdict of death from natural causes (*Episyll.*)"

EQUANIMITY.—*V.* MAGNANIMITY.

EQUITY (ἐπιείκεια, or τὸ ἴσον, as distinguished from τὸ νομικόν), is described by Aristotle (*Ethics*, book v., chap. 10), as that kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the parties. An *equitable* man will not press the letter of the law in his own favour, when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his neighbour. The ancients, in measuring rusticated building, in which the stones alternately projected and receded,

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used a leaden rule. *Equity*, like this leaden rule, bends to the specialities of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice cannot do so.

"*Equity* contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of nature; and justice contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of society. *Equity* treats of our dues as equals; justice treats of our dues as fellow-subjects. The purpose of *equity* is respect for humanity; the purpose of justice is respect for property. *Equity* withstands oppression; justice withstands injury."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*—*V.* JUSTICE.

"In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that *equity* which, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and right, and which properly arises *ex æquo et bono.* In this sense it answers precisely to the definition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in his *Pandects*, '*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.*' And the word *jus* is used in the same sense in the Roman law, when it is declared that *jus est ars boni et æqui*, where it means that we are accustomed to call jurisprudence." This is natural jurisprudence. In this sense *equity* is coincident with it. But Wolfius says, "*Justum appellatur quicquid fit secundum jus perfectum alterius; æquum vero quod secundum imperfectum.*"—Story, *Comment. on Equity Jurisp.*, pp. 1-3.

EQUIVOCAL or HOMONYMOUS words have different significations, as *bull*, the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. *Gallus*, in Latin, a cock, or a Frenchman. *Canis*, a dog, or the dog-star. They originate in the multiplicity of things and the poverty of language.

Words signifying different things may be used,—

First, By accident; or, second, With intention. 1st, It has happened, that *Sandwich* is the name of a peer—of a town—of a cluster of Islands, and of a slice of bread and meat. 2d, There are four ways in which a word may come to be used equivocally with knowledge or intention:—

1. On account of the resemblance of the things signified, as when a statue or a picture is called a man.

2. On account of proportion, as when a point is called a principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in respect to number.

3. On account of common derivation—thus, a *medical* man, a *medical* book, a *medical* instrument, are all derived from *medicine.*

4. On account of common reduction or reference—thus, a *healthful* medicine, *healthful* pulse, *healthful* herb, all referring to human *health.*

Some of these are intermediate between *equivocal* and *analogous* terms, particularly No. 4.

An *Equivocal* noun, in Logic, has more than one signification, each of its significations being *equally* applicable to several objects, as pen, post. "Strictly speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded as in this sense *equivocal;* but the title is usually applied only in any case when a word is *employed equivocally; e. g.*, when the middle term is used in different senses in the two premises, or where a proposition is liable to be understood in different senses, according to the various meaning of one of its terms." Whately, *Log.*, b. iii., § 10.

EQUIVOCATION (*æque*, *voco*, to use one word in different senses).—"How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or *equivocation* will undo us."—*Hamlet*, act v., scene 1.

In morals, to *equivocate* is to offend against the truth by using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the intention of its being understood in another—or in either sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles gave responses of ambiguous meaning. *Aio, te, Æacide, Romanos vincere posse*—may mean either; "I say that thou, O descendant of Æacus, canst conquer the Romans;" or, "I say that the Romans can conquer thee, O descendant of Æacus." *Latronem Petrum occidisse*, may mean, "a robber slew Peter;" or, "Peter slew a robber."

Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est. The message penned by Adam Orleton, Bishop of Hereford, and sent by Q. Isabella to the gaolers of her husband, Edw. II. Being

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written without punctuation, the words might be read two ways; with a comma after *timere*, they would mean, "Edward, to kill fear not, the deed is good;" but with it after *nolite*, the meaning would be, "Edward kill not, to fear the deed is good."

Henry Garnet, who was tried for his participation in the Gunpowder Plot, thus expressed himself in a paper dated 20th March, 1605-6:—"Concerning *equivocation*, this is my opinion; in moral affairs, and in the common intercourse of life, when the truth is asked among friends, it is not lawful to use *equivocation*, for that would cause great mischief in society —wherefore, in such cases, there is no place for *equivocation*. But in cases where it becomes necessary to an individual for his defence, or for avoiding any injustice or loss, or for obtaining any important advantage, without danger or mischief to any other person, then equivocation is lawful."—Jardine, *Gunpowder Plot*, p. 233.

Dr. Johnson would not allow his servant to say he was not at home when he really was. "A servant's strict regard for truth," said he, "must be weakened by such a practice. A philosopher may know that it is merely a form of denial, but few servants are such nice distinguishers. If I accustom a servant to tell a lie for *me*, have I not reason to apprehend that he will tell many lies for *himself?*"—Boswell, *Letters*, p. 32.

There may be *equivocation* in sound as well as in sense. It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the dignitaries of the church, if ladies might *knot* on Sunday? His reply was, Ladies may *not;* which, in so far as sound goes, is *equivocal.*—*V.* RESERVATION.

ERROR.—Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, *error* is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 20.

"The true," said Bossuet, after Augustine, "is that which is, the false is that which is not." To *err* is to fail of attaining to the true, which we do when we think that to be which is not—or think that not to be which is. *Error* is not in things

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themselves, but in the mind of him who *errs*, or judges not according to the truth.

Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. We *err* by a wrong use of them. The causes of *error* are partly in the objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is only the true and real which exists, it is only the true and real which can reveal itself. But it may not reveal itself fully—and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial evidence for complete evidence, falls into *error*. Hence it is, that in all *error* there is some truth. To discover the relation which this partial truth bears to the whole truth, is to discover the origin of the *error*.

The causes in ourselves which lead to *error*, arise from wrong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, custom, authority, and education, may also contribute to lead us into *error*.—*V.* FALSITY.

Bacon, *Novum Organum*, lib. i.; Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité;* Descartes, *On Method;* Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. vi., c. 20.

ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC (ἔσωθεν, within; ἔξω, without). —"The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into the *exoteric* and the *esoteric;* the open, taught to all; and the secret, taught to a select number."—Warburton, *Div. Leg.*, book ii., note BB.

According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, the distinction of *esoteric* and *exoteric* among the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples—according to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, being fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants. —Ritter, *Hist. de Philosophie*, tom. i., p. 298, of French translation.

Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught publicly to all—and other doctrines which he taught only to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinction of doctrines in the writings of Plato. Aristotle (*Phys.*, lib. iv., c. 2), speaks of opinions of Plato which were not

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written. But it does not follow that these were secret—Ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν. They may have been oral.

Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings as *exoteric;* and others as acroamatic, or *esoteric.* The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way; while the *esoteric* are more scientific in their form and matter.

Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote*, tom. i., c. 1; Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. ii., chap. 2.—*V.* ACROAMATICAL.

ESSENCE (*essentia*, from *essens*, the old participle of *esse*, to be —introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero).

"*Sicut ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia.*"—August., *De Civ.*, lib. xii., c. 11.

"*Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est.*"—Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

"*Essence* may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 3, sect. 15.

Mr. Locke distinguishes the *real* and the *nominal essence.* The nominal essence depends upon the real essence; thus the *nominal* essence of gold, is that complex idea which the word "gold" represents; viz., "a body yellow, heavy, malleable, fusible, and fixed;" but its *real* essence is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which these qualities and all its other properties depend, which is wholly unknown to us.

"The *essence* of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we speak of the formality or *formalis ratio* (the formal consideration) of things; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the *essence* of things, though 'tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it.

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"The *essence* of a thing most properly and strictly is, what does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part of the constituent *essence;* in man to be a living creature, or to be capable of religion; his being capable of celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not constituently."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

"Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its *essence.* Self-consciousness, therefore, is the *essence* of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that the mind is the mind—that a man is himself."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 245.

"All those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the *essence* of a thing. Three lines joining are the *essence* of a triangle; if one is removed, what remains is no longer a triangle."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

The essential attributes, *faciunt esse entia*, cause things to be what they are.

The Greeks had but one word for *essence* and substance, viz., *οὐσία.* The word *ὑπόστασις* was latterly introduced. By Aristotle *οὐσία* was applied—1. To the *form*, or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being. 2. To the *matter*, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us—the substratum or subject (*ὑποκείμενον*). 3. To the concrete or individual being (*σύνολον*), constituted by the union of the two preceding.

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between *essence* and *substance.* *Substance* was applied to the abstract notion of matter—the undetermined subject or substratum of all possible forms, *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*; *Essence* to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined *substance* as "that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist"—(*Princip. Philosoph.*, pars, 4, sect. 1)—a definition applicable to deity only. *Essence* he

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stripped of its logical signification, and made it the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of *essence*, and on which the others depend as modifications—as extension, in matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified *essence* and *substance*. But extension supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz *essence* and *substance* were the same, viz., force or power.

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the qualities or ideas which should enter into the definition; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular language *essence* is used to denote the nature of a thing.

ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of *eternity*, *a parte ante*, and *a parte post*. The *Scotists* maintained that *eternity* is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, one from another. The *Thomists* held that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of *eternity*. The common symbol of *eternity* is a circle. It may be doubted how far it is competent to the human mind to compass in thought the idea of absolute beginning, or the idea of absolute ending.

On man's conception of *eternity*, see an *Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time*. By Mr. Mansel.

> "What is *eternity*? can aught
> Paint its duration to the thought?
> Tell all the sand the ocean laves,
> Tell all its changes, all its waves,
> Or, tell with more laborious pains,
> The drops its mighty mass contains;
> Be this astonishing account
> Augmented with the full amount
> Of all the drops that clouds have shed,
> Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread,

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Through all time's long protracted tour,
From Adam to the present hour;—
Still short the sum, nor can it vie
With the more numerous years that lie
Embosomed in *eternity*.
Attend, O man, with awe divine,
For this *eternity* is thine."—Gibbons.

ETERNITY (OF GOD).—*Deus non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest.* This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being of God.* Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. The ideas of time and space necessarily force themselves upon our minds. We cannot think of them as not existing. And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an infinite substance, that is, of God, necessarily existing.

ETHICS "extend to the investigation of those principles by which *moral* men are governed; they explore the nature and excellence of virtue, the nature of *moral* obligation, on what it is founded, and what are the proper motives of practice; *morality* in the more common acceptation, though not exclusively, relates to the practical and obligatory part of *ethics. Ethics* principally regard the theory of morals."—Cogan, *Ethic. Treat. on Passions*, Introd.

Aristotle (*Eth.*, lib. 2), says that ἦθος, which signifies moral virtue, is derived from ἔθος, custom; since it is by repeated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is acquired. Cicero (*De Fato*, cap. 1), says, *Quia pertinet ad mores, quod ἦθος illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiæ, De moribus, appellare solemus: sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem. Ethics* is thus made synonymous with *morals* or *moral philosophy*—*q. v.*

Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the moral sciences or natural jurisprudence, may be divided into—

1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations, rights, and duties, by which men are under obligation towards God, themselves, and their fellow-creatures.

2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by which all nations, as constituting the universal society of the human race, are bound in their mutual relations to one another.

3. Public or Political Law, or the science of the relations between the different ranks in society.

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4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and duties, by which individuals in civil society are bound,—as commercial, criminal, judicial, Roman, or modern.

5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political.—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 96.

ETHNOGRAPHY (ἔθνος and γραφή), **and ETHNOLOGY** bear the same relation almost to one another as *geology* and *geography*. While *ethnography* contents herself with the mere description and classification of the races of man, *ethnology*, or the science of races, "investigates the mental and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they depend; seeks to deduce from these investigations principles of human guidance, in all the important relations of social and national existence."

"*Ethnology* treats of the different races into which the human family is subdivided, and indicates the bonds which bind them all together."—Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, p. 13.

Ethnological Journal, June 1, 1848; *Edin. Rev.*, Oct., 1844.

ETHOLOGY (ἦθος, or ἔθος, and λόγος), is a word coming to be used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the best *ethology* extant, meaning that it contains the best account of the passions and feelings of the human heart, and of the means of awakening and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or action. Mr. Mill calls *ethology* the science of the formation of character.—*Log.*, book vi., chap. 5.

EUDEMONISM (εὐδαιμονία, happiness), is a term applied by German philosophers to that system of morality which places the foundation of virtue in the production of happiness.—Whewell, *Pref. to Mackintosh's Dissert.*, p. 20.

This name, or rather *Hedonism*, may be applied to the system of Chrysippus and Epicurus.

EURETIC or EURISTIC.—*V.* OSTENSIVE.

EVIDENCE (*e* and *video*, to see, to make see).—"Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or th other."—Blackstone, *Comment.*, b. iii., c. 23.

Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the

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light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. *Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens.*

In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, there is some proportion or relation. The qualities manifest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge; or the thing is made evident—that is, it not only exists, but is revealed as existing.

There are as many kinds of evidence as there are powers or faculties by which we attain to truth. But according as truth may be attained, more or less directly, *evidence* is distinguished into *intuitive and deductive.*

Intuitive evidence comprehends all *first truths,* or *principles of common sense*, as, "every change implies the operation of a cause"—*axioms,* in science, as, "things equal to the same thing are equal to one another"—and the evidence of *consciousness,* whether by sense, or memory, or thought, as when we touch, or remember, or know, or feel anything. *Evidence* of this kind arises directly from the presence or contemplation of the object, and gives knowledge without any effort upon our parts.

Deductive evidence is distinguished as *demonstrative* and *probable.*

Demonstrative evidence rests upon axioms, or first truths, and from which, by ratiocination, we attain to other truths. It is scientific, and leads to certainty. It admits not of degrees; and it is impossible to conceive the contrary of the truth which it establishes.

Probable evidence has reference, not to necessary, but contingent truth. It admits of degrees, and is derived from various sources; the principal are the following, viz.:—*Experience, Analogy*, and *Testimony—q. v.*

Glassford, *Essay on Principles of Evidence*, 8vo, Edin., 1820; Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, book i.; Gambier, *On Moral Evidence*, 8vo, Lond., 1824; Smedley, *Moral Evidence*, 8vo, Lond, 1850; Butler, *Analogy*, Introd.; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 15.

EVIL is the negation or contrary of good.—"That which hath in it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, is called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called *evil*."—Wilkins, *Nat. Relig.*, book i.

"Every man calleth that which *pleaseth*, and is delightful to himself, good; and that *evil* which *displeaseth* him."—Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap. 7.

Pleasure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to, the nature of a sensible being, or a *natural good;* pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural evil.*

"The voluntary *application* of this natural good and *evil* to any *rational* being, or the production of it by a rational being, is *moral good and evil.*"—King, *Essay on Origin of Evil*, translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth edit.

"*Metaphysical evil* consists simply in imperfection, *physical evil* in suffering, and *moral evil* in sin."—Leibnitz, *On Goodness of God*, part 1, sect. 21.

"*Evil* does not proceed from a *principle of evil. Cold* does not proceed from a *principle of coldness*, nor *darkness* from a *principle of darkness. Evil* is mere privation."—Part 2, sect. 153.

Evil is not a generation, but a degeneration; and as Augustine often expresses it, it has not an efficient, but only a deficient cause.—*De Civ. Dei*, l. 17, c. 7.

Metaphysical evil is the absence or defect of powers and capacities, and the consequent want of the higher enjoyment which might have flowed from the full and perfect possession of them. It arises from the necessarily limited nature of all created beings.

Physical evil consists in pain and suffering. It seems to be necessary as the contrast and heightener of pleasure or enjoyment, and is in many ways productive of good.

Moral evil originates in the will of man, who could not have been capable of moral good without being liable to moral evil, a power to do right being, *ex necessitate rei*, a power to do wrong.

The question concerning the *origin of evil* has been answered by—1. The doctrine of pre-existence, or that the *evils* we are here suffering are the punishments or expiations of moral delinquencies in a former state of existence. 2. The doctrine of the Manicheans which supposes two co-eternal and inde-

pendent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other of *evil.* 3. The doctrine of optimism, or, that *evil* is part of a system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness.—Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. iii., c. 3, sect. 1.

On the origin of *evil*, its nature, extent, uses, &c., see Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, Clarke and Leibnitz, Bledsoe, *Theodicy;* Young, *Mystery;* King, J. Müller.

EXAMPLE.—*V.* ANALOGY.

EXCLUDED MIDDLE.—*Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.*—"By the principle of 'Contradiction' we are forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes can both be present in the same object; by the principle of 'Excluded Middle' we are forbidden to think that both can be absent. The first tells us that both differentiæ must be compatible with the genus: I cannot, for example, divide animal into animate and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other must be found in every member of the genus; but in what manner this is actually carried out, whether by every existing member possessing one of the differentiæ and none of the other, or by some possessing one and some the other, experience alone can determine."—Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 193.

The formula of this principle is—"Everything is either A or not A: everything is either a given thing, or something which is not that given thing." That there is no mean between two contradictory propositions is proved by Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, book iii., ch. 7. "So that if we think a judgment true, we must abandon its contradictory; if false, the contradictory must be accepted."—Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, p. 295.

EXISTENCE (*exsisto*, to stand out).—"The metaphysicians look upon *existence* as the formal and actual part of a being."—H. More, *Antid. agt. Atheism*, app., c. 44.

It has been called the *actus entitativus*, or that by which anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature of things.

Essence pertains to the question, *Quid est?*

Existence pertains to the question, *An est?*

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Essence *formal*, combined with essence *substantial*, gives *existence;* for *existence* is essence clothed with form.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 739, note.

Existence is the actuality of essence. It is the act by which the essences of things are actually in *rerum natura*—beyond their causes. Before things are produced by their causes, they are said to be in the objective power of their causes; but when produced they are beyond their causes, and are actually in *rerum natura*—as maggots before they are warmed into life by heat of the sun.

"Existentia *est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio partium sive attributorum quibus ens constat.* . . . . Existentia *dicitur quasi rei* extra *causas et nihilum* sistentia."—Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Lovan, 1840, p. 45.

Existence and Essence.—*Incaute sibi finxerunt quidam*, "Essentias *quasdam easque eternas, fuisse sine* existentia;" *siquando autem subnascatur Res istiusmodi ideæ similis, tunc censent existentiam essentiæ supervenientem, veram rem efficere, sive ens reale. Atque hinc, essentiam et existentiam dixerunt essendi principia, sive entis constitutiva. Quicquid vero* essentiam *habet veram, eodem tempore habet* existentiam, *eodem sensu quo habet* essentiam, *aut quo est ens, aut aliquid.*"—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, p. 4.

"*Essence*, in relation to God, must involve a *necessary existence;* for we cannot in any measure duly conceive *what he is*, without conceiving *that he is*, and, indeed, *cannot but be.* The name he takes to himself is I am (or, I will be). This is the contraction of that larger name, I am what I am (or, I will be what I will be), which may seem closely to conjoin God's unquestionable necessary *existence* with his unsearchable, boundless *essence.*"—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 48.

See art. "Existence," in *French Encyclopédie*, by Mons. Turgot.

EXOTERIC.—*V.* ESOTERIC.

EXPEDIENCY (Doctrine of).—Paley has said, "Whatever is expedient is right."—*V.* UTILITY (Doctrine of).

EXPERIENCE (ἐμπειρία, *experientia*).—According to Aristotle (*Analyt. Poster.*, ii., 19), from sense comes memory, but from repeated remembrance of the same thing we get *experience.*

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Wolf used *experience* as co-extensive with the contents of consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as all that it suffers from without. "Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad perceptiones nostras attenti cognoscimus. *Solem lucere, cognoscimus ad ea attenti, quæ visu percipimus. Unde experientia constare dicitur, quod sol luceat.* Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attenti cognoscimus, nos non posse assensum præbere contradictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere tanquam verum, quod simul pluit et non pluit."—*Philosoph. Rat.*, sect. 664.

"*Experience*, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. *Experience*, in this sense of course, relates to the *past* alone. Thus it is that a man knows by *experience* what sufferings he has undergone in some disease; or what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. More frequently the word is used to denote that judgment which is derived from *experience in the primary sense*, by reasoning from that in combination with other data. Thus a man may assert, on the ground of *experience*, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine—that that medicine is generally beneficial in that disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of these can be known *by experience*, but are conclusions *from experience*. It is in this sense only that *experience* can be applied to the *future*, or, which comes to the same thing, to any *general* fact; as, *e. g.*, when it is said that we know *by experience* that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze."—Whately, *Log.*, app. i.

Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 1). has assigned *experience* as the only and universal source of human knowledge. "Whence hath the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience;* in that, all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These are the fountains of knowledge

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from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring—that is, sensation and reflection."

In opposition to this view, according to which all human knowledge is *à posteriori*, or the result of *experience*, it is contended that man has knowledge *à priori*—knowledge which *experience* neither does nor can give, and knowledge without which there could be no *experience*—inasmuch as all the generalizations of *experience* proceed and rest upon it.

"*No accumulation of experiments whatever can bring a general law home to the mind of man;* because if we rest upon experiments, our conclusion can never logically pass beyond the bounds of our premises; we can never infer more than we have proved; and all the past, which we have not seen, and the future, which we cannot see, is still left open, in which new *experiences* may arise to overturn the present theory. And yet the child will believe at once *upon a single* experiment.* Why? Because a hand divine has implanted in him the tendency to generalize thus rapidly. Because he does it by an instinct, of which he can give no account, except that he is so formed by his Maker."—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 24.

"We may have seen one circle, and investigated its properties, but why, when our individual *experience* is so circumscribed, do we assume the same relations of all? Simply because the understanding has the conviction intuitively that similar objects will have similar properties; it does not acquire this idea by sensation or custom; the mind develops it by its own intrinsic force—it is a law of our faculties, ultimate and universal, from which all reasoning proceeds."—Dr. Mill, *Essays*, p. 337.

Experience, more especially in physical philosophy, is either active or passive, that is, it is constituted by observation and experiment.

"*Observationes fiunt spectando id quod natura per seipsam sponte exhibet. Experimenta fiunt ponendo naturam in eas circumstantias, in quibus debeat agere, et nobis ostendere id quod quærimus.*"—Boscovich, Note to Stay's Poem, *De Systemate.*

* As having been once burnt by fire.

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These are more fully explained and characterized in the following passage from Sir John Herschel, *On the Study of Nat. Phil.*, *Lardner's Cyclop.*, No. xiv., p. 67:—

"The great, and indeed the only ultimate source of our knowledge of nature and its laws is *experience;* by which we mean not the *experience* of one man only, or of one generation, but the accumulated *experience* of all mankind in all ages, registered in books, or recorded by tradition. But *experience* may be acquired in two ways: either, first, by noticing facts as they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of their occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they occur; this is *observation:* or secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely varying their combinations, and noticing what effects take place; this is *experiment.* To these two sources we must look as the fountains of all natural science. It is not intended, however, by thus distinguishing *observation* from *experiment*, to place them in any kind of contrast. Essentially they are much alike, and differ rather in degree than in kind; so that, perhaps, the terms *passive* and *active observation* might better express their distinction; but it is, nevertheless, highly important to mark the different states of mind in inquiries carried on by their respective aids, as well as their different effects in promoting the progress of science. In the former, we sit still and listen to a tale, told us, perhaps obscurely, piecemeal, and at long intervals of time, with our attention more or less awake. It is only by after rumination that we gather its full import; and often, when the opportunity is gone by, we have to regret that our attention was not more particularly directed to some point which, at the time, appeared of little moment, but of which we at length appreciate the importance. In the latter, on the other hand, we cross-examine our witness, and by comparing one part of his evidence with the other, while he is yet before us, and reasoning upon it in his presence, are enabled to put pointed and searching questions, the answer to which may at once enable us to make up our minds. Accordingly it has been found invariably, that in those departments of physics where the phenomena are beyond our control, or into

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which experimental inquiry, from other causes, has not been carried, the progress of knowledge has been slow, uncertain, and irregular; while in such as admit of experiment, and in which mankind have agreed to its adoption, it has been rapid, sure, and steady."—*V.* ANALOGY.

EXPERIMENT.—*V.* OBSERVATION.

EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS.—A crucial or decisive experiment in attempting to interpret the laws of nature; so called, by Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out roads, because they determine at once between two or more possible conclusions.

Bacon (*Nov. Org.*, book ii., sect. 36) says, "Crucial instances are of this kind; when in inquiry into any nature the intellect is put into a sort of equilibrium, so that it is uncertain to which of two, or sometimes more natures, the cause of the nature inquired into ought to be attributed or assigned, on account of the frequent and ordinary concurrence of more natures than one; the *instances of the cross* show that the union of the one nature with the nature sought for is faithful and indissoluble; while that of the other is varied and separable; whence the question is limited, and that first nature received as the cause, and the other sent off and rejected."

Sir G. Blane (*Med. Log.*, p. 30), notices that in chemistry a single experiment is conclusive, and the epithet *experimentum crucis* applied; because the crucible derives its name from the figure of the cross being stamped upon it.

A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain number of similar effects; find some effect which the one produces and the other does not, and this will point out, as the direction-post (*crux*), at a point where two highways meet, which of these causes may have been in operation in any particular instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of the Oriental plague are common to other diseases; but when the observer discovers the peculiar bubo or boil of the complaint, he has an *instantia crucis* which directs him immediately to its discovery.

"If all that the senses present to the mind is sensations, Berkeley must be right; but Berkeley assumed this premiss without any foundation or any proof of it. The size and shape

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of things are presented to us by our senses, yet every one knows that size and shape are not sensations.

"This I would therefore humbly propose as an *experimentum crucis*, by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue. Extension, figure, and motion, may—any one or all of them—be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph."—Reid, *Inquiry into Hum. Mind*, ch. 5, sect. 7.

"If, in a variety of cases presenting a general resemblance, whenever a certain circumstance is present, a certain effect follows, there is a strong probability that one is dependent on the other; but if you can also find a case where the circumstance is absent from the combination, and the effect also disappears, your conclusion has all the evidence in its favour of which it is susceptible. When a decisive trial can be made by leaving out, in this manner, the cause of which we wish to trace the effect, or by insulating any substances so as to exclude all agents but those we wish to operate, or in any other way, such a decisive trial receives the title of *experimentum crucis*. One of the most interesting on record is that of Dr. Franklin, by which he established the identity of lightning and the electricity of our common machines."—S. Bailey, *Discourses*, Lond., 1852, p. 169.

EXTENSION (*extendo*, to stretch from).—"The notions acquired by the sense of touch, and by the movement of the body, compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up the idea expressed by the word *extension*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Extension is that property of matter by which it occupies space; it relates to the qualities of length, breadth, and thickness, without which no substance can exist; but has no respect to the size or shape of a body. Solidity is an essential quality of matter as well as *extension*. And it is from the resistance

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of a solid body, as the occasion, that we get the idea of *externality—q. v.*

According to the Cartesians, *extension* was the essence of matter. "*Sola igitur extensio corporis naturam constituit, quum illa omni solum semperque conveniat, adeo ut nihil in corpore prius percipere possumus.*"—Le Grand, *Inst. Philosoph.*, pars iv., p. 152.

Hobbes's views are given, *Phil. Prima*, pars ii., c. 8, sect. 1.

Locke's views are given, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., chap. 13, see also chap. 15; Reid, *Inquiry*, c. 5, sect. 5, 6; *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., c. 19.

Extension (Logical), when predicated as belonging to a general term, means the number of objects included under it, and *comprehension* means the common characters belonging to such objects.

"I call the *comprehension* of an idea, those attributes which it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it; as the *comprehension* of the idea triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c.

"I call the *extension* of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles."—*Port. Roy. Logic*, part i., chap. 6.

We cannot detach any properties from a notion without extending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, if we abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending only to those which it connotes as a plant, we *extend* its application, before limited to flowers with red petals, to the oak, fir, &c. But as we narrow the sphere of a notion, the qualities which it *comprehends* proportionally increase. If we restrict the term body to animal, we include life and sensation —if to man, it *comprehends* reason.

Thus emerges the law of the inverse ratio between the extension of common terms and their comprehension, viz., the greater the *extension* the less the *comprehension*, and *vice versa*.

EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS.—"Pressure or resistance necessarily supposes *externality* in the thing which presses or resists." —Adam Smith, *On the Senses.*

"Distance or *outness* is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, but is only *suggested* to our thoughts," &c.—Berkeley, *Principles of Knowledge*, part i., sect. 43.—*V.* PERCEPTION.

FABLE.—"The word *fable* is at present generally limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct but analogical."—Whately, *Rhet.*, part i., ch. 2, § 8.

Fable and *Myth* were at one time synonyms. "*Fables* of Æsop and other eminent *mythologists*," by Sir R. L'Estrange, fol., Lond., 1704.—*V.* APOLOGUE.

FACT.—"Whatever really exists, whether necessarily or relatively, may be called a *fact.* A statement concerning a number of *facts*, is called a doctrine (when it is considered *absolutely* as a truth), and a law (when it is considered *relatively* to an intelligence ordaining or receiving it)."—Irons, *On Final Causes*, p. 48.

By a *matter of fact*, in ordinary usage, is meant something which might, *conceivably*, be submitted to the *senses;* and about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement among persons who should be *present*, and to whose senses it should be submitted; and by a *matter of opinion* is understood anything respecting which an exercise of *judgment* would be called for on the part of those who should have certain objects before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their judgment thereupon."—Whately, *Rhet.*, pt. i., ch. 2, § 4.—*V.* OPINION.

"By a matter of *fact*, I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Essay on Influence of Authority*, pp. 1–4.

It is thus opposed to matter of *inference.* Thus, the destructiveness of cholera is *matter of fact*, the mode of its propa-

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gation is *matter of inference*. *Matter of fact* also denotes what is certain, as opposed to *matter of doubt*. The existence of God is *matter of fact*, though ascertained by reasoning.

"The distinction of *fact* and *theory* is only relative. Events and phenomena considered as particulars which may be colligated by induction, are *facts;* considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other *facts*, they are *theories*. The same event or phenomenon is a *fact* or a *theory*, according as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the inductive bracket."—Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 23.

"Theories which are true, are *facts*."—Whewell, *On Induction*, p. 23.—V. OPINION.

FACTITIOUS (*factito*, to practise), is applied to what is the result of use or art, in distinction to what is the product of nature. Mineral waters made in imitation of the natural springs are called *factitious*.

Cupiditas aliorum existimationis non est factitia *sed nobis congenita; deprehenditur enim et in infantibus qui, etiam ante reflectionis usum, molestia afficiuntur, quum parvi a ceteris penduntur*.—N. Lacoudre, *Inst. Philosoph.*, tom. iii., p. 21.

"It is enough that we have moral ideas, however obtained; whether by original constitution of our nature, or *factitiously*, makes no difference."—Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Philosoph.*, p. 13.

"To Mr. Locke, the writings of Hobbes suggested much of the sophistry displayed in the first book of his essay on the *factitious* nature of our moral principles."—Stewart, *Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 64.

FACULTY.—*Facultates sunt aut quibus* facilius *fit, aut sine quibus omnino confici non potest*.—Cicero, *De Invent.*, lib. ii., 40.

Facultas est quælibet vis activa, seu virtus, seu potestas. Solet etiam vocari potentia, *verum tunc intelligenda est potentia activa, seu habilitas ad agendum*.—Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

"The word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the mind."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

A *faculty* is the natural power by which phenomena are produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct and concentrate the power which he possesses.—Jouffroy, *Melanges*, Bruxell, 1834, p. 249.

Bodies have the *property* of being put in motion, or of being melted. The magnet has an attractive *power*. Plants have a medical *virtue*. But instead of blind and fatal activity, let the being who has power be conscious of it, and be able to exercise and regulate it; this is what is meant by *faculty*. It implies intelligence and freedom. It is personality which gives the character of *faculties* to those natural powers which belong to us.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

"The *faculties* of the mind and its *powers*," says Dr. Reid, "are often used as synonymous expressions. But," continues he, "as most synonyms have some minute distinction that deserves notice, I apprehend that the word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are not called *faculties*, but habits. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."

Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Reid would assign to these words, and these meanings are in accordance both with their philosophical and more familiar use. The distinction between *power* and *faculty* is, that *faculty* is more properly applied to what is natural and original, in opposition or contrast to what is acquired. We say the *faculty* of judging, but the *power* of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the *power* of judging and the *power* of habit. The acquiring of habits is peculiar to man: at least the inferior animals do so to a very limited extent. There must, therefore, be something in the constitution of the human mind upon which the acquiring of habits depends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a *capacity*. The capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did

not recognize the distinction between active and passive power. But a capacity is a passive power. The term is applied to those manifestations of mind in which it is generally regarded as passive, or as affected or acted on by something external to itself. Thus, we say a man is *capable* of gratitude, or love, or grief, or joy. We speak also of the *capacity* of acquiring knowledge. Now, in these forms of expression, the mind is considered as the passive recipient of certain affections or impressions coming upon it. Taking into account the distinction of powers as active and passive, "these terms," says Sir Wm. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 221), "stand in the following relations. *Powers* are *active* and *passive*, *natural* and *acquired*. Powers natural and active are called *faculties*. Powers natural and passive, *capacities* or *receptivities*. Powers acquired are *habits*, and habit is used both in an active and passive sense. The power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." This is quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. Reid, only that instead of disposition he employs the term capacity, to denote that on which the acquiring of habits is founded. Disposition is employed by Dr. Reid to denote one of the active principles of our nature.

One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts and phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy of mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the operations of mind according to the general circumstances under which they are observed. Thus we find that the mind frequently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of the objects around it by means of the bodily senses. These operations vary according to the sense employed, and according to the object presented. But in smelling, tasting, and touching, and in all its operations by means of the senses, the mind comes to the knowledge of some object different from itself. This general fact is denoted by the term perception; and we say that the mind, as manifested in these operations, has the *power* or *faculty* of perception. The knowledge which the mind thus acquires can be recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation which the mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure which it feels in reviving objects of former knowledge, and the

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benefit which results from reflecting upon them. But the recalling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an act altogether different from the act of originally obtaining it. It implies the possession of a peculiar power to perform it. And hence we ascribe to the mind a power of recollection or a *faculty* of memory. A perception is quite distinct from a recollection. In the one we acquire knowledge which is new to us—in the other we reproduce knowledge which we already possess.

In the operations of recollection or memory it is often necessary that the mind exert itself to exclude some objects which present themselves, and to introduce others which do not at first appear. In such cases the mind does so by an act of resolving or determining, by a volition. Now, a volition is altogether different from a cognition. To know is one thing, to will is quite another thing. Hence it is that we assign these different acts to different powers, and say that the mind has a power of understanding, and also a power of willing. The power of understanding may exert itself in different ways, and although the end and result of all its operations be knowledge, the different ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved may be assigned, as we have seen they are, to different powers or *faculties*—but these are all considered as powers of understanding. In like manner the power of willing or determining may be exerted under different conditions, and, for the sake of distinctness, these may be denoted by different terms; but still they are included in one class, and called powers of the will.

Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure or pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that state or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of which we are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the power or capacity of being affected by them is denoted by the term sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only to have powers of understanding and will, but powers of sensibility.

When we speak, therefore, of a power or *faculty* of the mind, we mean that certain operations of mind have been observed, and classified according to the conditions and circumstances under which they manifest themselves, and that distinct names have been given to these classes of phenomena, to mark what

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is peculiar in the act or operation, and consequently in the power or *faculty* to which they are referred. But when we thus classify the operations of the mind, and assign them to different powers, we are not to suppose that we divide the mind into different compartments, of which each has a different energy. The energy is the same in one and all of the operations. It is the same mind acting according to different conditions and laws. The energy is one and indivisible. It is only the manifestations of it that we arrange and classify.

This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the friend and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, which is translated from his work *De Ratione Animæ*:—"The soul bears divers names according to the nature of its operations; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul (*anima*); inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit (*spiritus*); inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment (*sensus*); since it reflects, it is thought (*animus*); as it comprehends, intelligence (*mens*); inasmuch as it discerns, reason (*ratio*); as it consents, will (*voluntas*); as it recollects, memory (*memoria*). But these things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one soul only."

Faculties of the Mind (Classification of).—The faculties of the human mind were formerly distinguished as gnostic or cognitive, and orectic or appetent. They have also been regarded as belonging to the understanding or to the will, and have been designated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to the heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, and of activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, it is common to speak of several subordinate *faculties*.

"This way of speaking of *faculties* has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings: which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, § 17, 20.

Dr. Brown, instead of ascribing so many distinct *faculties* to

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the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different *states*, or under different *affections*.—Lecture xvi.—*V.* OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

"Les divers facultés que l'on considere dans l'ame, ne sont point des choses distinctes reellement, mais le même être differement consideré."—Arnaud, *Des Vrais et des Fausses Idees*, ch. 27.

"Quoique nous donnions a ces facultés des noms differents, par rapport a leur diverses operations, cela ne nous oblige pas a les regarder comme des choses differentes, car l'entendement n'est autre chose que l'ame, en tant qu'elle retient et se ressouvient; la volonté n'est autre chose que l'ame, en tant qu'elle veut et qu'elle choisit. . . . . De sorte qu'on peut entendre que toutes ces facultés ne sont, au fond, que le même ame, qui, recoit divers noms, a cause de ses differentes operations."—Bossuet, *Connaissance de Dieu*, ch. 1, art. 20.

"*Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence, sometimes in a predominant state of feeling, and sometimes in a predominant state of action and determination.* To call these, however, *separate faculties*, is altogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed without the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst they each have their own distinctive characteristics, yet there is a perfect unity at the root."—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 61.

"I feel that there is no more reason for believing my mind to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, or *faculties*, than that my foot is made up of walking and running. My mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, and remembers, just as simply as my body walks, and runs, and rests."—Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 93.

"It would be well if, instead of speaking of 'the powers (or *faculties*) of the mind' (which causes misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several 'operations of one mind;' which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget."—Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychol.*, 8vo, 1847, p. 120.

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"The judgment is often spoken of as if it were a distinct power or *faculty* of the soul, differing from the imagination, the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the lungs, or the brain from the stomach. All that ought to be understood by these modes of expression is, that the mind sometimes compares objects or notions; sometimes joins together images; sometimes has the feeling of past time with an idea now present, &c."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"Notwithstanding we divide the soul into several powers and *faculties*, there is no such division in the soul itself, since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, understanding, will, imagination, and the like *faculties*, is for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in the soul itself."—*Spectator*, No. 600.

"The expression, 'man perceives, and remembers, and imagines, and reasons,' denotes all that is conveyed by the longer phrase, 'the mind of man has the *faculties* of perception, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.'"—S. Bailey, *Letters on Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, p. 13.

"Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent *faculties* as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which is open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in physical mechanics, we know force only from its effects; but the consciousness of distinct effects will thus form the real basis of psychology. The *faculties* may then be retained as a convenient method of classification, provided the language is properly explained, and no more is attributed to them than is warranted by consciousness. The same consciousness which tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that volition is distinct from both; and to speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental phenomena."—Mansel, Prolegom. *Log.*, p. 34, note.

L—*V.* BELIEF.

FALLACY (A) is an argument, or apparent argument, professing to decide the matter at issue, while it really does not. Fallacies have been arranged as *logical*, *semi-logical*, and *non-logical*. By Aristotle they were arranged in two classes —according as the *fallacy* lay in the *form*, *in dictione;* or in the *matter*, *extra dictionem*. The *fallacies*, in form or expression, are the following:—

Fallacia Æquivocationis, arising from the use of an equivocal word; as, the dog is an animal; Sirius is the dog; therefore, Sirius is an animal.

Fallacia Amphiboliæ, arising from doubtful construction; *quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit; columna tangitur a Socrate; ergo columna sentit.* In the major proposition *sentit* means "Socrates feels." In the conclusion, it means "feels Socrates."

Fallacia Compositionis, when what is proposed, in a *divided* sense, is afterwards taken collectively; as, two and three are even and odd; five is two and three; therefore five is even and odd.

Fallacia Divisionis, when what is proposed in a *collective*, is afterwards taken in a divided sense; as, the planets are seven; Mercury and Venus are planets; therefore Mercury and Venus are seven.

Fallacia Accentus, when the same thing is predicated of different terms, if they be only written or pronounced in the same way; as, *Equus est quadrupes; Aristides est æquus; ergo Aristides est quadrupes.*

Fallacia Figuræ Dictionis, when, from any similitude between two words, what is granted of one is, by a forced application, predicated of another; as, projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a project; therefore, this man is unfit to be trusted.

Fallacies in the matter, or *extra dictionem*, according to some, are the only fallacies strictly logical; while, according to the formal school of logicians, they are beyond the province of logic altogether.

Fallacia Accidentis, when what is *accidental* is confounded with what is *essential;* as, we are forbidden to kill; using capital punishment is killing; we are forbidden to use capital punishment.

Fallacia a Dicto Secundum quid ad Dictum Simpliciter, when a term is used, in one premiss, in a limited, and in the other in an unlimited sense; as, the Ethiopian is *white as to his teeth;* therefore he is *white.*

Fallacia Ignorationis Elenchi, an argument in which the point in dispute is intentionally or ignorantly overlooked, and the conclusion is irrelevant; as if any one, to show the inutility of the art of logic, should prove that men unacquainted with it have reasoned well.

Fallacia a non Causa pro Causa, is divided into *fallacia a non vera pro vera,* and *fallacia a non tali pro tali;* as, "a comet has appeared, therefore, there will be war." "What intoxicates should be prohibited. Wine intoxicates." Excess of it does.

Fallacia Consequentis, when that is inferred which does not logically follow; as, "he is an animal; therefore he is a man."

Fallacia Petitionis Principii (begging the question), when that is assumed for granted, which ought to have been proved; as, when a thing is proved *by itself* (called petitio *statim*), "he is a man, therefore, he is a man; or by a *synonym;* as, "a sabre is sharp, therefore a scimitar is;" or by *anything equally unknown;* as, Paradise was in Armenia, therefore, Gihon is an Asiatic river; or by *anything more unknown;* as, "this square is twice the size of this triangle, because equal to this circle;" or by *reasoning in a circle, i. e.,* when the disputant tries to prove reciprocally conclusion from premises, and premises from conclusion; as, "fire is hot, therefore it burns;" and afterwards, "fire burns, therefore it is hot;" "the stars twinkle, therefore they are distant;" "the stars are distant, therefore they twinkle."

Fallacia Plurium Interogationum, when two or more questions, requiring each a separate answer, are proposed as one, so that if *one* answer be given, it must be inapplicable to *one* of the particulars asked; as, "was Pisistratus the usurper and scourge of Athens?" The answer "no" would be false of the former particular, and "yes" would be false of the latter. The *fallacy* is overthrown by giving to each particular a separate reply.

FALSE, FALSITY.—The *false*, in one sense, applies to things; and there is *falsity* either when things really are not, or when it is impossible they can be; as when it is said that the proportion of the diagonal to the side of a square is commensurable, or that you sit—the one is absolutely *false*, the other accidentally—for in the one case and the other the fact affirmed is not.

The *false* is also predicated of things which really exist, but which appear other than they are, or what they are not; a portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but they really are not what they represent. Thus, we say that things are *false*, either because they do not absolutely exist, or because they are but appearances and not realities.

Falsity is opposed to verity or *truth*—*q. v.*

To transcendental truth, or *truth of being*, the opposite is *nonentity* rather than *falsity*. A thing that really is, is what it is. A thing that is not is a *nonentity*. *Falsity*, then, is twofold —*objective* and *formal*. *Objective falsity* is when a thing resembles a thing which it really is not, or when a sign or proposition seems to represent or enunciate what it does not. *Formal falsity* belongs to the intellect when it fails to discover objectively *falsity*, and judges according to appearances rather than the reality and truth of things. *Formal falsity* is error; which is opposed to logical truth. To moral truth, the opposite is falsehood or lying,

FANCY (*Φαντασία*).—"Imagination or *phantasy*, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty *representative* of the phenomena both of the internal and external worlds."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1.

"In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among them *fancy* next
Her office holds; of all external things
Which the five watchful senses represent
She forms imaginations, airy shapes."
Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book v.

"Where *fantasy*, near handmaid to the mind,
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all;
Compounds in one things different in their kind,
Compares the black and white, the great and small."
Sir John Davies, *Immortality*.

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"When nature rests,
Oft in her absence mimic *fancy* wakes
To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes,
Wild work produces oft, but most in dreams."

"Tell me where is *fancy* bred,
Or in the heart, or in the head?
How begot, how nourished?
Merch. of Venice, act iii., scene 2.

"Break, *Phantsie*, from thy cave of cloud,
And wave thy purple wings,
Now all thy figures are allowed,
And various shapes of things.
Create of airy forms a stream;
It must have blood and nought of phlegm;
And though it be a waking dream,
Yet let it like an odour rise
To all the senses here,
And fall like sleep upon their eyes,
Or music on their ear."—Ben Jonson.

"How various soever the pictures of *fancy*, the materials, according to some, are all derived from sense; so that the maxim—*Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*—though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the *phantasy*."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. ii., ch. 7.

Addison said (*Spectator*, No. 411), that he used the words *imagination* and *fancy* indiscriminately.

Mr. Stewart said (*Elements*, chap. 5), "It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as forming one characteristic of his genius, implies a power of summoning up at pleasure a particular class of ideas; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature," that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name *fancy*. "The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagination; and therefore, the latter power presupposes the former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or

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analogous ideas, we call a man of *fancy;* but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment; without which we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power of *fancy* which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions: but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To *fancy* we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime."

Fancy was called by Coleridge "the aggregative and associative power." But Wordsworth says, "To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to *imagination* as to *fancy*. But *fancy* does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the *imagination*. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite."—Wordsworth, *Preface to Works*, vol. i., 12mo, Lond., 1836.—*V.* IMAGINATION.

FATALISM, FATE.—"*Fatum* is derived from *fari;* that is, to pronounce, to decree; and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of Providence."—Leibnitz, *Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke.* "*Fate*, derived from the Latin *fari*, to speak, must denote the *word spoken* by some intelligent being who has power to make his words good."—Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. ii., part ii., chap. 26.

Among all nations it has been common to speak of *fate* or destiny as a power superior to gods and men—swaying all things irresistibly. This may be called the *fate* of *poets* and *mythologists*. *Philosophical fate* is the sum of the laws of the universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the blind properties of matter. *Theological fate* represents Deity as above the laws of nature, and ordaining all things according to his will—the expression of that will being the law.

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Leibnitz (*Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke*) says:—"There is a *Fatum Mahometanum*, a *Fatum Stoicum*, and a *Fatum Christianum*. The Turkish *fate* will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be avoided; as if there was an *absolute necessity*. The Stoical *fate* will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience whether he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is *Fatum Christianum*, a *certain destiny* of everything, regulated by the fore-knowledge and providence of God."

"Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads—*First*, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of *fate*, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. *Secondly*, such as suppose a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it: which *fate* is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, *lastly*, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which *fate* Epicurus calls τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένην, the *fate* of the naturalists, that is, indeed, the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical *fatalists*."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, book i., chap. 1.

Cicero, *De Fato;* Plutarchus, *De Fato;* Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententiæ De Fato.*

FEAR is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or contemplation of something evil coming upon us.

FEELING.—"This word has two meanings. *First*, it signifies the perceptions we have of external objects, by the sense of touch. When we speak of *feeling* a body to be hard or soft, or rough or smooth, hot or cold, to *feel* these things is to perceive

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them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the mind by which we *feel* them is easily distinguished from the objects felt. *Secondly*, the word *feeling* is used to signify the same thing as *sensation;* and in this sense, it has no object; the *feeling* and the thing felt are one and the same.

"Perhaps betwixt *feeling*, taken in this last sense, and *sensation*, there may be this small difference, that *sensation* is most commonly used to signify those *feelings* which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and pleasures. But there are *feelings* of a nobler nature accompanying our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to which the word *sensation* is less properly applied."*—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

"*Feeling*, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus, *feeling* being the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense; and accordingly we say indifferently, 'I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold;' or, 'I have a sensation of pleasure from heat and of pain from cold.' But the meaning of *feeling*, as is said, is much more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy; sensation is not properly applied to any of these.

"The term *feeling* is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains."—Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, Appendix.

All sensations are *feelings;* but all *feelings* are not sensations. Sensations are those *feelings* which arise immediately and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. But we have

* The French use of *sensation*—as when we say such an occurrence excited a great *sensation*, that is, *feeling* of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is becoming more common.

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feelings which are connected not with our animal, but with our intellectual, and rational, and moral nature; such as *feelings* of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and gratitude, of approbation and disapprobation. Those higher *feelings* it has been proposed to call *Sentiments*—*q. v.*

From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the sense of touch, *feeling* has been extended to signify immediate perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in this sense to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths or the principles of common sense. "By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as existing; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind, may not, in reality, be a mode of mind; I can only say, using the simplest language, 'I know it to be true, because I *feel*, and cannot but *feel*,' or 'because I *believe*, and cannot but *believe*,' it so to be. And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured that I thus *feel* or thus *believe*, I can make no better answer than, in the one case, 'because I *believe* that I *feel*;' in the other, 'because I *feel* that I *believe*.' It thus appears, that when pushed to our last resort, we must retire either upon *feeling* or *belief*, or upon both indifferently. And, accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even though they may award a preference to one. . . . In this application of it we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure." —Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.—*V.* BELIEF.

FETICHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the theological philosophy; and is described as consisting in the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial.—(Comte, *Philosoph. Positive*, i., 3.) The Portuguese call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa *fetisso*—bewitched or possessed by fairies. Such are the *grisgris* of Africa, the *manitous* and the *ockis* of

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America, and the *burkhans* of Siberia—good and evil genii inhabiting the objects of nature which they worship. The priests of this worship are called *griots* in Africa, *jongleurs* or *jugglers* in America, and *chamanes* in Central Asia.

Mr. Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, vol. v., p. 22), in reference to Xerxes scourging the Hellespont which had destroyed his bridge, remarks, that the absurdity and childishness of the proceeding is no reason for rejecting it as having actually taken place. "To transfer," continues he, "to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion; and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary *fetichism*, and banishes it from the region of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an *intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered.*"

Dr. Reid was of opinion that children naturally believed all things around them to be alive—a belief which is encouraged by the education of the nursery. And when under the smarting of pain we kick or strike the inanimate object which is the occasion of it, we do so, he thought, by a momentary relapse into the creed of infancy and childhood.

FIGURE.—*V.* SYLLOGISM.

FITNESS and UNFITNESS "most frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude, of any means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they generally signify the same with *right* and *wrong;* nor is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to be understood. It is worth observing that *fitness* in the former sense is equally undefinable with *fitness* in the latter; or, that it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, 'that they have a *fitness* to one another; or are *fit* to answer certain purposes,' as when we say, 'reverencing the Deity is *fit*, or beneficence is *fit* to be practised.' In the first of these instances, none can

avoid owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the source of the idea of *fitness*, and of concluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can be properly the *means* of another. In both cases the term *fit* signifies a simple perception of the understanding."—Price, *Review*, ch. 6.

According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in acting in conformity to the nature and *fitness* of things. In this theory the term *fitness* does not mean the adaptation of an action, as a means towards some end designed by the agent; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr. Brown (Lect. lxxvi.) and others. See Wardlaw, *Christ. Ethics*, note E.

"Our perception of vice and its desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, *unfit*, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious."—Butler, *Dissertation on Virtue*.

In like manner, when our moral faculty determines actions to be virtuous, there is a propriety in the application of the epithets congruous, suitable, proportionate, *fit*.

FORCE is an energy or power which has a tendency to move a body at rest, or to affect or stop the progress of a body already in motion. This is sometimes termed *active force*, in contradistinction to that which merely resists or retards the motion of a body, but is itself apparently *inactive*. But according to Leibnitz, by whom the term *force* was introduced into modern philosophy, no substance is altogether passive. *Force*, or a continual tendency to activity, was originally communicated by the Creator to all substances, whether material or spiritual. Every *force* is a *substance*, and every *substance* is a *force*. The two notions are inseparable; for you cannot think of action without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance entirely passive is a contradictory idea. See Leibnitz, *De primæ Philosophiæ emendatione, et de notione substantiæ.*—*V.* MONAD.

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In like manner Boscovich maintained that the ultimate particles of matter are indivisible and unextended points, endowed with the *forces* of attraction and repulsion.—*Dissertationes duœ de viribus vivis*, 4to, 1745. See also Stewart, *Philosophical Essays*, essay ii., chap. 1.

According to the dynamic theory of Kant, and the atomic theory of Leucippus, the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion.

"*La force proprement dite, c'est ce qui regit les actes, sans regler les volontes.*" If this definition of *force*, which is given by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a distinction between *force* and *power*. Power extends to *volitions* as well as to *operations*, to mind as well as matter. But we also speak of *force* as physical, vital, and mental.

FORM "is that of which matter is the receptacle," says Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 2). A trumpet may be said to consist of two parts; the *matter* or brass of which it is made, and the *form* which the maker gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the former; since although the matter were silver, it would still be a trumpet; but without the *form* it would not. Now, although there can be no *form* without matter, yet as it is the *form* which makes the thing what it is, the word *form* came to signify essence or nature. "*Form* is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its other qualities."

Matter void of *form*, but ready to receive it, was called, in metaphysics, *materia prima*, or elementary; in allusion to which Butler has made Hudibras say, that he

> Professed
> He had first matter seen undressed,
> And found it naked and alone,
> Before one rag of *form* was on.

Form was defined by Aristotle λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, and as οὐσία signifies, equally, substance and essence, hence came the question whether *form* should be called substantial or essential; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, and the Cartesians the latter.

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According to the Peripatetics, in any natural composite body, there were—1. The matter. 2. Quantity, which followed the matter. 3. The substantial *form*. 4. The qualities which followed the *form*. According to others, there were only—1. Matter. 2. Essential *form*; as *quantity* is identified with *matter*, and *qualities* with *matter* or *form*, or the compound of them.

According to the Peripatetics, *form* was a subtle substance, penetrating *matter*, and the cause of all acts of the compound; in conformity with the saying, *formæ est agere, materiæ vero pati.* According to others, *form* is the union of material parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some added a certain motion and position of the parts.—Derodon, *Phys.*, pars prima, pp. 11, 12.

He who gives *form* to matter, must, before he do so, have in his mind some idea of the particular *form* which he is about to give. And hence the word *form* is used to signify an idea.

Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite points. "That which contemplated *objectively* (that is, as existing externally to the mind), we call a law; the same contemplated *subjectively* (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato (?), describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature. *Quod in natura naturata* lex, *in natura naturante* idea *dictur*."—Coleridge, *Church and State*, p. 12. In *Nov. Org.*, ii., 17, Bacon says, "When we speak of *forms*, we understand nothing more than the *laws* and *modes* of action which regulate and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them; so that the *form* of heat, or the *form* of light, and the *law* of heat, and the *law* of light, are the same thing." Again he says, "Since the *form* of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing no otherwise differs from the *form*, than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe, it follows clearly that no nature can be taken for the true *form*, unless

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it ever decreases when the nature itself decreases, and in like manner is always increased when the nature is increased."—*Nov. Org.*, 2, 13.

As the word *form* denotes the *law*, so it may also denote the class of cases brought together and united by the law. "Thus to speak of the *form* of animals might mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general; second, the part of any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is what it is; and last, the class of animals in general formed by the law."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 33, 2d edit.

"The sense attached at the present day to the words *form* and *matter*, is somewhat different from, though closely related to, these. The *form* is what the mind impresses upon its perceptions of objects, which are the *matter; form* therefore means *mode of viewing* objects that are presented to the mind. When the attention is directed to any object, we do not see the object itself, but contemplate it in the light of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant under the *form* of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above their own reach; by the religious mind under the *form* of a person with more than ordinary temptations to contend with; by the political economist, under that of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. Now, the object is really the same to all these observers; the same rich man has been represented under all these different *forms*. And the reason that the observers are able to find many in one, is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The *form*, then, in this view, is *mode of knowing;* and the *matter* is the *perception*, or *object* we have to know."—*Ibid*, p. 34.

Sir W. Hamilton calls the theory of *substantial forms*, "the theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter."—*Reid's Works*, p. 827.

Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. 7 et 8; Michelet, *Examen Critique de la Metaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1836, p. 164 et p. 287;

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Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1837, tom i., p. 149.—*V.* LAW, MATTER.

—*V.* REAL, VIRTUAL, ACTION.

is one of the virtues called *cardinal.* It may display itself *actively* by *resolution* or *constancy*, which consists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and difficulty which cannot be avoided, or by *intrepidity* or *courage*, which consists in maintaining firmness and presence of mind in the midst of perils from which there may be escape. The displays of *fortitude passively* considered may be comprehended under the term *patience*, including humility, meekness, submission, resignation, &c.

FREE WILL.—*V.* LIBERTY, NECESSITY, WILL.

FRIENDSHIP is the mutual affection cherished by two persons of congenial minds. It springs from the social nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each entertains for the good qualities of the other. The resemblance in disposition and character between friends may sometimes be the occasion of their contracting friendship; but it may also be the effect of imitation and frequent and familiar intercourse. And the interchange of kind offices which takes place between friends is not the cause of their friendship, but its natural result. Familiarities founded on views of interest or pleasure are not to be dignified by the name of friendship.

Dr. Brown (Lect. lxxxix.) has classified the duties of *friendship* as they regard the *commencement* of it, the *continuance* of it, and its *close.*

See the various questions connected with *friendship* treated by Aristotle, in *Ethics*, books viii. and ix., and by Cicero, in his treatise *De Amicitia.*

FUNCTION (*fungor*, to perform).—"The pre-constituted forms or elements under which the reason forms cognitions and assigns laws, are called ideas. The capacities of the reason to know in different modes and relations, we shall call its *functions.*"—Tappan, *Log.*, p. 119.

"The *function* of conception is essential to thought." The first intention of every word is its real meaning; the second intention, its logical value, according to the *function* of thought to

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which it belongs."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of* 25 and 40, 2d edit.

"The *function* of names is that of enabling us to *remember* and to *communicate* our thoughts."—Mill, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 2.

GENERAL TERM.—*V.* TERM.

GENERALIZATION "is the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate."

"When we are contemplating several individuals which *resemble* each other in some *part* of their nature, we can (by attending to *that part alone*, and not to those points wherein they differ) assign them *one common name*, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all *agree;* and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which process is called *generalization*); and each of these names is called a *common* term, from its belonging to them *all alike;* or a *predicable*, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them or any of them."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 2.

Generalization is of two kinds—*classification* and *generalization* properly so called.

When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circumstances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are essential and common, we obtain a law.

When we observe individual objects and arrange them according to their common characters, we obtain a class. When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. When the character selected is not natural the *classification* is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, we would have a *classification* which had no reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate or invertebrate, we have a *classification* founded on their organization. Artificial *classification* is of no value in science, it is a mere aid to the memory. Natural *classification* is the foundation of all

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science. This is sometimes called *generalization.* It is more properly *classification.*—*V.* CLASSIFICATION.

The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a single stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the fact was generalized, and the law stated. And in this process of *generalizing* there is involved a principle which experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive soever it may be, can only give the particular, yet from the particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that all heavy bodies which have been observed, but that all heavy bodies whether they have been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order in nature, that under the same circumstances the same substances will present the same phenomena. This is a principle furnished by reason, the process founded on it embodies elements furnished by experience.—*V.* INDUCTION.

The results of *generalization* are general notions expressed by general terms. Objects are classed according to certain properties which they have in common, into genera and species. Hence arose the question which caused centuries of acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind?—*V.* REALISM, NOMINALISM, CONCEPTUALISM.—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 6; Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 4.

The principle of *generalization* is, that beings howsoever different agree or are homogeneous in some respect.

(from *geno*, the old form of the verb *gigno*, to produce).

This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary god or spirit appointed to watch over every individual from his birth to his death. As the character and capacities of men were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature of their *genius*, the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men, and more particularly their natural inclination or disposition. But the peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote that high degree of mental power which produces or invents. "*Genius*," says Dr. Blair (*Lectures on Rhetoric*, lect. iii.), "always imports something inventive or creative." "It produces," says another, "what has never

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been accomplished, and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive and productive. According as one or other predominates, *genius* becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case, it seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous application; and as it were intuitively recognizing in phenomena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates the beautiful."

"To possess the powers of common sense in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call *genius*, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

"Nature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits, and that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by *genius*." —*Couper.*

Dryden has said,—

> "What the child admired,
> The youth *endeavoured*, and the man *acquired*."

He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exactness, before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted his eyes in the picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled the margin of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, in the beginning of childhood, drew with a piece of charcoal on the walls of the house.—*Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28.

"In its distinctive and appropriate sense, the term *genius* is applied to mind only when under the direction of its individual tendencies, and when those are so strong or clear as to concentrate all its powers upon the production of new, or at least independent results; and that whether manifested in the regions of art or science. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, were

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no less men of *genius*, than Michael Angelo, Raphael, Shakespeare, and Scott, although the work they performed and the means they employed were different."—Moffat, *Study of Œsthetics*, p. 203, Cincinnati, 1856.

Sharp, *Dissertation on Genius*, Lond., 1755; Duff, *Essays on Original Genius*, Lond., 1767; Gerard, *Essay on Genius*, Lond., 1774; *Lælius and Hortensia; or, Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste and Genius*, Edin., 1782; Beattie, *Dissertations, Of Imagination*, chap. 3, 4to, Lond., 1783.

and Talent.—"Genius is that mode of intellectual power which moves in alliance with the *genial* nature; *i. e.*, with the capacities of pleasure and pain; whereas *talent* has no vestige of such an alliance, and is perfectly independent of all human sensibilities. Consequently, *genius* is a voice or breathing that represents the *total* nature of man, and therefore, his enjoying and suffering nature, as well as his knowing and distinguishing nature; whilst, on the contrary, *talent* represents only a single function of that nature. *Genius* is the language which interprets the synthesis of the human spirit with the human intellect, each acting through the other; whilst *talent* speaks only of insulated intellect. And hence also it is that, besides its relation to suffering and enjoyment, *genius* always implies a deeper relation to virtue and vice; whereas *talent* has no shadow of a relation to *moral* qualities any more than it has to vital sensibilities. A man of the highest *talent* is often obtuse and below the ordinary standard of men in his feelings; but no man of *genius* can unyoke himself from the society of moral perceptions that are brighter, and sensibilities that are more tremulous, than those of men in general."—De Quincey, *Sketches, Crit. and Biograph.*, p. 275.

E.—*V.* AUTHENTIC.

GENUS is "a predicable which is considered as the material part of the species of which it is affirmed."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 3. It is either *summum* or *subalternum*, that is, having no *genus* above it, as *being*, or having another *genus* above it, as *quadruped; proximum* or *remotum*, when nothing intervenes between it and the species, as *animal* in respect of man, or when something intervenes, as *animal* in respect of a crow, for

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between it and crow, *brute* and *bird* intervene. A *genus physicum* is part of the species, as *animal* in respect of man, who has an animal body and a rational soul. A *genus metaphysicum* is identified adequately with the species and distinguished from it extrinsically, as *animal* in respect of brute, *colour* in respect of blackness in ink. Logically the *genus* contains the species; whereas metaphysically the species contains the *genus; e. g.*, we divide logically the *genus man* into European, Asiatic, &c., but each of the species, European, &c., contains the idea of man, together with the characteristic difference.

In modern classification, *genus* signifies "a distinct but subordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of which it is composed."

GNOME (γνώμη) a weighty or memorable saying.—The saying in the parable (Matt. xx. 1-16), "Many that are first shall be last, and the last shall be first," is called by Trench (*On the Parables*, pp. 164, 165) a *gnome*.—*V.* ADAGE.

GOD, in Anglo-Saxon, means good.

One of the names of the Supreme Being. The corresponding terms in Latin (*Deus*) and in Greek (Θεός) were applied to natures superior to the human nature. With us, *God* always refers to the Supreme Being.

That department of knowledge which treats of the being, perfections, and government of *God*, is *Theology*—*q. v.*

"The true and genuine idea of *God* in general, is this—a perfect conscious understanding being (or mind), existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, b. i., ch. 4, sect. 4.

"The true and proper idea of *God*, in its most contracted form, is this—a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable."—Ibid, sect. 8.

"I define *God* thus—*an essence or being, fully and absolutely perfect.* I say fully and absolutely perfect, in contradistinction to such perfection as is not full and absolute, but the perfection of this or that species or kind of finite beings, suppose a lion, horse, or tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect, is to be, at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive

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without a contradiction."—H. More, *Antidote against Atheism*, ch. 2.

GOOD (The Chief).—An inquiry into the chief good, or the *summum bonum*, is an inquiry into what constitutes the perfection of human nature and the happiness of the human condition. This has been the aim of all religion and philosophy. The answers given to the question have been many. Varro enumerated 288; August., *De Civit.*, lib. 19, cap. 1. But they may easily be reduced to a few. The ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, interest and duty. What conduces to these ends we call *good*, and seek after; what is contrary to these ends we call evil, and shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and *the chief good* of man lies in the discharge of duty. By doing so he perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the highest happiness.

"Semita certe
Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ."
Juvenal, lib. iv., sat. 10.

Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum;* L'Abbe Anselme, *Sur le Souverain bien des anciens*, *Mem. d. l'Acad. des Inscript.*, *et Belles Lettres*, 1 ser., tom. v.—Jouffroy, *Miscell.*—*V.* BONUM (Summum).

GRAMMAR (Universal).—This word *grammar* comes to us from the Greeks, who included under τέχνη γραμματιστική the art of writing and reading letters. But "*grammar*," says B. Johnson (*English Grammar*, c. 1), "is the art of true and well speaking a language; the writing is but an accident." Language is the expression of thought—thought is the operation of mind, aud hence language may be studied as a help to psychology.—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 5.

Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that is, the object of thought is either simply apprehended or conceived of, or something is affirmed concerning it. Ideas are expressed in words, judgments by propositions; so that as ideas are the elements of judgments, words are the elements of propositions.

Every judgment involves the idea of a *substance*, of which some *quality* is affirmed or denied—so that language must have

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the *substantive* or noun, the adjective or *quality*, and the *verb* connecting or disconnecting.

If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contemplated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. But the relations between objects and the connection between propositions, render other parts of speech necessary.

It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas that are individual, that we have also *nouns common* and *proper;* and it is because we have ideas of unity and plurality, that we have *numbers*, *singular*, *dual*, and *plural*. *Tenses* and *moods* arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional or positive. Even the order or construction of language is to be traced to the calm or impassioned state of mind from which it proceeds.

In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between *grammar* and psychology, it may be noticed that those who have done much for the one have also improved the other. Plato has given his views of language in the *Cratylus*, and Aristotle, in his *Interpretation* and *Analytics*, has laid the foundations of general *grammar*. And so in later times the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been attentive to the theory of language.

In Greek, the same word (λόγος) means reason and language. And in Latin, reasoning is called *discursus*—a meaning which is made English by our great poet, when he speaks of "large discourse of reason." In all this the connection between the powers of the mind and language is recognized.

Montémont, *Grammaire General ou Philosophie des Langues*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1845; Beattie, *Dissertations*, *Theory of Language*, part ii., 4to, Lond., 1783; Monboddo, *On the Origin and Progress of Language*, 3 vols.

GRANDEUR.—"The emotion raised by *grand* objects is awful, solemn, and serious."

"Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the most grand. . . . . The emotion which this grandest of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion—a serious *recollected* temper, which inspires magnanimity, and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue.

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"The emotion produced by other objects which may be called *grand*, though in an inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a contempt of what is mean. . . . .

"To me *grandeur* in objects seems nothing else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 3.—*V.* SUBLIMITY, BEAUTY, ÆSTHETICS.

GRATITUDE is one of the affections which have been designated benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or intended, and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also characterized as a moral affection, because the party cherishing it has the idea that he who did or intended kindness to him has done right and deserves a return; just as the party who has received an injury has not merely a sense or feeling of the wrong done, but a sense of injustice in the doing of it, and the feeling or conviction that he who did it deserves punishment.

See Chalmers, *Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy*, chap. 8; Shaftesbury, *Moralists*, pt. iii., sect. 2.

GYMNOSOPHIST (γυμνός, naked; σοφός, wise).—"Among the Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call *gymnosophists*, who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able to endure all the day long, looking full against the sun, without winking or once moving their eyes."—Holland, *Pliny*, b. vii., c. 2.

The Brahmins, although their religion and philosophy were but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by Cicero. *Tuscul.*, lib. v., c. 27; Arrian, *Exped. Alexand.*, lib. vii., c. 1.

Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained the Indian philosophy.

:, *habitus*).—"*Habit*, or state, is a constitution, frame, or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted to act or suffer in a certain way."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, chap.

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4. By Aristotle ἕξις is defined (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 20) to be, in one sense, the same with διάθεσις, or disposition. His commentators make a distinction, and say ἕξις is more permanent. A similar distinction has been taken in English between *habit* and *disposition.*

Habits have been distinguished into natural and supernatural, or acquired and infused. Natural *habits* are those acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural *habits* are such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology.

Acquired *habits* are distinguished into intellectual and moral. From *habit* results power or virtue, and the intellectual *habits* or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. "These may be subservient to quite contrary purposes, and those who have them may exercise them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different *habits* of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the same manner the habits of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately."—Arist., *Ethic.*, lib. v., cap. 1.

Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of our bodily organs, give birth to active *habits;* the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive *habits.*

Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii.) proves that our habits are voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. "But it may be asked, does it depend merely on our own will to correct and reform our bad *habits?* It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that health which has been lost by profligacy. When we have thrown a stone we cannot restrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourselves whether we should throw it or not."

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Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout; *habits* only as to their beginnings.

Thurot (*De l'Entendement*, tom. i., p. 138) calls "*habit* the memory of the organs, or that which gives memory to the organs."

Several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of the exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall enumerate a few of them.

"The first is, that we should, from the very commencement, be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too easy a nature; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the diffident temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in the self-confident temper you will excite an opinion whereby it will promise itself more than it can accomplish, the consequence of which will be sloth. But in both dispositions it will happen that the trial will not answer the expectation, a circumstance which always depresses and confounds the mind. But if the task be of too trivial a kind, there will be a serious loss on the total progress.

"The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty for the acquirement of *habit*, two particular times should be carefully observed: the one when the mind is best disposed, the other, when worst disposed to the matter; so that, by the former, we may make most progress on our way; by the latter, we may, by laborious effort, wear out the knots and obstructions of the mind, by which means the intermediate times shall pass on easily and smoothly.

"The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes incidental mention:—'That we should, with all our strength (yet not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the opposite of that to which we are by nature the most inclined;' as when we row against the current, or bend into an opposite direction a crooked staff, in order to straighten it.

"The fourth precept depends on a general law, of undoubted truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything more successfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be not the chief object in the agent's design, but is accomplished, as it were, by doing something else; since the bias of our nature is such, that

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it usually dislikes constraint and rigorous authority. There are several other rules which may be given with advantage on the government of *habit;* for *habit*, if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying is); but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, the ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only clumsily and awkwardly."

Bacon, *On Advancement of Learning*, book vii.

Maine de Biran, *L'Influence de Habitude;* Dutrochet, *Theorie de l'Habitude;* M. F. Ravaisson, *De l'Habitude;* Butler, *Analogy*, pt. i., ch. 5; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. i., ch. 3; *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., ch. 4.—*V.* CUSTOM.

HAPPINESS "is not, I think, the most appropriate term for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that is, chance.

"Felicity, in its proper sense, is but another word for fortunateness, or happiness; and I can see no advantage in the improper use of words, when proper terms are to be found, but on the contrary, much mischief."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 31-2.

The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted or happens to a man εὐτυχία, that is, good hap; or, more religiously, εὐδαιμονία, that is, favourable providence.—Ibid.

To live well and to act well is synonymous with being happy. —Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. i., c. 4.

Happiness is never desired but for its own sake only. Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desirable on their own account, but they are also desirable as means towards *happiness*. But *happiness* is never desirable as a means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself.

" *Happiness* is the object of human action in its most general form, as including all other objects, and approved by reason. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of prudence, so *happiness* is the aim of wisdom. *Happiness* is conceived as necessarily an *ultimate* object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not; if we are

not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The desire of *happiness* is the supreme desire. All other desires of pleasure, wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so only by identifying them with this. *Happiness* is our being's end and aim.

"Since *happiness* is necessarily the supreme object of our desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our *happiness* coincide with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of our intentions. As moral beings, our *happiness* must be found in our moral progress, and in the consequences of our moral progress we must be happy by being virtuous."—Whewell, *Morality*, Nos. 544, 545.

See Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. i.; Harris, *Dialogue on Happiness.* —*V.* Good (Chief).

ONY (Pre-established).—When an impression is made on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the bodily organs are ready to execute it. How is this brought about? The doctrine of a *pre-established harmony* has reference to this question, and may be thus stated.

Before creating the mind and the body of man, God had a perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all possible bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and bodies, it was impossible but that there should come together a mind the sequence of whose ideas and volitions should correspond with the movements of some body: for, in an infinite number of possible minds and possible bodies, every combination or union was possible. Let us, then, suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifications corresponded with the series of movements to take place in some body, God would unite the two and make of them a living soul, a man. Here, then, is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, no action and reaction. The mind is an independent force

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which passes from one volition or perception to another, in conformity with its own nature; and would have done so although the body had not existed. The body, in like manner, by virtue of its own inherent force, and by the single impression of external objects, goes through a series of movements; and would have done so although it had not been united to a rational soul. But the movements of the body and the modifications of the mind correspond to each other. In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a material automaton. Like two pieces of clockwork, they are so regulated as to mark the same time; but the spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves the other; yet they go exactly together. The harmony between them existed before the mind was united to the body. Hence this is called the doctrine of *pre-established harmony.*

It may be called *correspondence* or *parallelism*, but not *harmony* between mind and body—for there is no unity superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause of their mutual penetration. In decomposing human personality into two substances,* from eternity abandoned each to its proper impulse, which acknowledges no superior law in man to direct and control them, liberty is destroyed.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 394.

The doctrine of *pre-established harmony* differs from that of occasional causes "only in this respect, that by the former the accordance of the mental and the bodily phenomena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their *harmony* was supposed to be brought about by His constant interposition."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Meta-*, p. 478.—*V.* CAUSES (Occasional).

This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his *Theodicée* and *Monadologie.*

Bilfinger, *De Harmonia Præstabilita*, 4to, Tubing., 1740.

NY (of the Spheres).—The ancient philosophers supposed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodies throughout space formed a kind of *harmony*, which they called the *harmony of the spheres.*

* Soul and body, however, constitute one *suppositum* or person.

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> "Look how the floor of heaven
> Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
> There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
> But in his motion like an angel sings,
> Still quiring to the young-ey'd cherubim:
> Such harmony is in immortal souls;
> But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
> Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it."
>
> *Merchant of Venice*, Act v., sc. 1.

HATRED.—*V.* LOVE.

HEDONISM (ἡδονή, pleasure), is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school.

HERMETIC BOOKS.—A collection of treatises ascribed to the Egyptian Thoth or Taaut, and also to the Hermes or Mercury of the Greeks. Different opinions have been entertained as to their origin and author. Marsilius Ficinus has collected the quotations made from the *Hermetic books* scattered throughout the writings of the Platonicians and early Christians; of which he published a Latin translation in 1471. They are a miscellany of theosophy, astrology, and alchemy—partly Egyptian, partly Greek, and partly Jewish and Christian.—Lenglet du Fresnoy, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Hermetique*, 3 tom., 12mo, Paris, 1742.

HEURISTIC.—*V.* OSTENSIVE.

HOLINESS suggests the idea, not of perfect virtue, but of that peculiar affection wherewith a being of perfect virtue regards moral evil; and so much indeed is this the precise and characteristic import of the term, that, had there been no evil either actual or conceivable in the universe, there would have been no *holiness*. There would have been perfect truth and perfect righteousness, yet not *holiness;* for this is a word which denotes neither any one of the virtues in particular, nor the assemblage of them all put together, but the recoil or the repulsion of these towards the opposite vices—a recoil that never would have been felt, if vice had been so far a nonentity as to be neither an object of real existence nor an object of thought."—Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, vol. ii., p. 380.

OLOGUE (ὁμός, same; λόγος).—"A *homologue* is defined as the same organ in different animals, under every variety of form and function. Thus, the arms and feet of man, the fore

and hind feet of quadrupeds, the wings and feet of birds, and the fins of fishes, are said to be *homologous*."—M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 25.

"The corresponding parts in different animals are called *homologues*, a term first applied to anatomy by the philosophers of Germany: and this term Mr. Owen adopts to the exclusion of terms more loosely denoting identity or similarity."—Whewell, *Supplem. Vol.*, p. 142.

See Owen, *On the Archetype aud Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton*, 1848.—*V.* ANALOGUE.

HOMONYMOUS.—*V.* EQUIVOCAL.

HOMOTYPE (ὁμός, same; τύπος, type).—"The corresponding or serially repeated parts in the same animal are called *homotypes*. Thus, the fingers and toes of man, indeed the fore and hind limbs of vertebrate animals generally, are said to be *homotypal*." —M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 25.

HUMOUR (*humor*, moisture).—As the state of the mind is influenced by the state of the fluids of the body, *humour* has come to be used as synonymous with *temper* and *disposition*. But *temper* and *disposition* denote a more settled frame of mind than that denoted by the word *humour*. It is a variable mood of the *temper* or *disposition*. A man who is naturally of a good temper or kind disposition may occasionally be in bad *humour*. —*V.* WIT.

HYLOZOISM (ὕλη, matter; and ζωή, life).—The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been held under different forms. Straton of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. This doctrine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. *Omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt.*

Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confounding of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and Bosco-

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vich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even the *vis inertiæ* ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and repulsion, and chemical affinity, all indicate activity in matter; but life is a force always connected with organization, which much of matter wants. Spontaneous motion, growth, nutrition, separation of parts, generation, are phenomena which indicate the presence of life; which is obviously not co-extensive with matter.

HYPOSTASIS.—*V.* SUBSISTENTIA.

HYPOTHESIS (*ὑπόθεσις, suppositio*, supposition). — In Logic Aristotle gave the name *θέσις* to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of demonstration, and did not require to be demonstrated itself. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which expressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the *ὁρισμός* or definition—the second, the *ὑπόθεσις*.

When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we are uneasy and try to reconcile it to unity by assigning it *ad interim* to some cause which may appear to explain it. Before framing an *hypothesis*, we must see *first* that the phenomenon really exists. Prove ghosts before explaining them. Put the question *an sit?* before *cur sit?* *Second*, that the phenomenon cannot be explained by any known cause. When the necessity of an *hypothesis* has been admitted, a good *hypothesis*—*First*, should contain nothing contradictory between its own constituent parts or other established truths. The Wernerians suppose water once to have held in solution bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The Huttonians ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now produce. *Second*, it should fully explain the phenomenon. The Copernican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho Brahe. *Third*, it should simply explain the phenomenon, that is, should not depend on any other *hypothesis* to help it out. The Corpernican system is more simple. It needs only gravitation to carry it out—that of Tycho Brahe depends on several things.

By *hypothesis* is now understood the supposing of something, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to explain

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phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in signification from theory, which explains phenomena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. "*Hypothesis*," says Dr. Gregory (*Lectures on Duties and Qualifications of a Physician*), "is commonly confounded with *theory;* but a *hypothesis* properly means the supposition of a principle, of whose existence there is no proof from experience, but which may be rendered more or less probable by facts which are neither numerous enough nor adequate to infer its existence."

"In some instances," says Boscovich (*De Solis ac Lunæ Defectibus*, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212), "observations and experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other cases, we avail ourselves of the aid of *hypothesis;* by *which word, however, is to be understood, not fictions altogether arbitrary, but suppositions conformable to experience or analogy.*" "This," says Dr. Brown, "is the right use of *hypothesis*—not to supersede, but to direct investigation—not as telling us what we are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to ascertain." And it has been said (*Pursuit of Knowledge*, vol. ii., p. 255, weekly vol., No. 31), that "the history of all discoveries that have been arrived at, by what can with any propriety be called philosophical investigation and induction, attests the necessity of the experimenter proceeding in the institution and management of his experiments upon a previous idea of the truth to be evolved. This previous idea is what is properly called an *hypothesis*, which means something *placed under* as a foundation or platform on which to institute and carry on the process of investigation."

Different opinions have been held as to the use of *hypotheses* in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, that *hypotheses* are admissible and may be useful as a means of stimulating, extending, and directing inquiry. But they ought not to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the absence of support from facts. They are not to be set up as barriers or stopping places in the path of knowledge, but as way-posts to guide us in the road of observation, and to cheer us with the prospect of speedily arriving at a resting place—at another

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stage in our journey towards truth. They are to be given only as provisional explanations of the phenomena, and are to be cheerfully abandoned the moment that a more full and satisfactory explanation presents itself.—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 3.—*V.* THEORY.

HYPOTHETICAL.—*V.* PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

I.—*V.* EGO, SUBJECT.

IDEA (ἰδέα, εἶδος, *forma*, *species*, image).—"Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas.

"In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Diety fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal world."—Sir William Hamilton.

The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says:—

> "God saw his works were good,
> Answering his fair *ideas*."

And Spenser gives its meaning in the following passage:—

> "What time this world's great workmaister did cast,
> To make all things such as we now behold,
> It seems that he before his eyes had plast
> A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould
> He fashioned them as comely as he could,
> That now so fair and seemly they appear,
> As nought may be amended anywhere.
> That wondrous patterne, wheresoever it be,
> Whether in earth, laid up in secret store,
> Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
> With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore,
> Is perfect beauty."

We are accustomed to say that an artificer contemplating the *idea* of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a chair or bed. But he does not make the *idea* of them. "These forms of things," said Cicero (*Orat.*, c. 3), "Plato called *ideas*, and

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denied that they were born, but were always contained in reason and intelligence."—Heusde, *Init. Philosoph. Platon.*, tom. ii., pars, 3.

"*Idea* is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no subsistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, and becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and evidence. Socrates and Plato supposed that there be substances separate and distinct from matter, howbeit subsisting in the thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, of mind and understanding. Aristotle admitted verily these forms and *ideas*, howbeit not separate from matter, as being patterns of all that God hath made. The Stoics, such at least as were of the school of Zeno, have delivered that our thoughts and conceits are the *ideas*."—Plutarch, *Opinions of Philosophers*, ch. 10, fol. 666 of the translation by Holland.

Ideæ *sunt principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles, atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur: et cum ipsæ neque oriantur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur, quicquid oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.*"—Augustine, lib. lxxxiii., 99, 46.

> "Tu cuncta superno
> Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherimus ipse
> Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formans."—
> Boeth., *De Consol.*, 9.

Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 207) has said,—"Seneca considered *ideas*, according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form*, Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle*, Aristotle as *substances;* and in the middle ages and in our day they are *general notions*, in opposition to particular or individual notions. The *ideas* of Plato embrace all these meanings. The terms which he employs are ἰδέα and εἶδος to designate the Divine image, the ideal model or type (τύπος) of all things and beings. He also calls them παραδείγματα, αἰτίαι ἀρχαί, to denote that these eternal exemplars are the principle and cause of the existence and development of all that is in nature. They are also the thoughts

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of God (νοήματα), who has produced all things according to the type of these *ideas*. And the terms ἰνάδες, μονάδες, indicate the affinity between the theory of Plato and the numbers of Pythagoras."

In another passage (*Essai des Connais. Hum.*, pp. 33, 34) the same author has said, that, "according to the Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, *ideas* are as it were the essence and matter of our intelligence. They are not as such, a product or result of intelligence, they are its primitive elements, and at the same time the immediate object of its activity. . . . . They are the primary anticipations which the mind brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not create *ideas*, it creates by means of *ideas*. . . . . There are two great classes of *ideas*—1. Those which are related in some sense to experience; as the principles of mathematics, notions of figure, magnitude, extension, number, time, and space. 2. Those which are completely independent of all sensible representation, as the *ideas* of good and evil, just and unjust, true or false, fair or deformed."—p. 208.—*V.* NOTION.

According to Plato, *ideas* were the only objects of science or true knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual flux, there can be no real knowledge with respect to them. But the divine *ideas* being eternal and unchangeable, are objects of science properly so called. According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, knowledge, instead of originating or consisting in the contemplation of the eternal *ideas*, types, or forms, according to which all things were created, originated, and consisted in the contemplation of the things created, and in the thoughts and the operations of mind to which that contemplation gives rise. But as external things cannot themselves be in the mind, they are made known to it by means of *species*, *images*, or *phantasms* (*q. v.*); so that, in perception, we are not directly cognizant of the object, but only of a representation of it. In like manner, in imagination, memory, and the operations of intellect, what is directly present to the mind is not the real object of thought, but a representation of it.

Instead of employing the various terms *image*, *species*, *phan-*

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tasm, &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes adopted the term *idea*, which till his time had been all but exclusively employed in its Platonic sense.

By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term *idea* was employed to signify all our mental representations, all the notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in contradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modern use of the word. Mr. Locke, for example, who uses the word *idea* so frequently as to think it necessary to make an apology for doing so, says—"It is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks: I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."

Against this modern use of the word *idea*, more especially in reference to the doctrine of *perception* (*q. v.*), Dr. Reid most vehemently protested.—"Modern philosophers," said he (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1), "as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thoughts; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea*, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the *idea*, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we would have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object.

"When, therefore, in common language, we speak of *having an idea* of anything, we mean no more by that expression than thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this expression implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth; to wit, the *idea* which is the immediate object. The *idea* is in the mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that thinks; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon; it may be something past or future; it may be

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something which never existed. This is the philosophical meaning of the word *idea;* and we may observe that this meaning of the word is built upon a philosophical opinion; for if philosophers had not believed that there are such immediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word *idea* to express them.

"I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use the word *idea* in this philosophical sense in explaining the opinions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it in expressing my own, because I believe *ideas*, taken in this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, because the English words *thought*, *notion*, *apprehension*, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word *idea;* with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous."

Now it may be doubted whether in this passage Dr. Reid has correctly understood and explained the meaning of the word *idea* as employed by all modern philosophers, from the time of Descartes.

Dr. Reid takes *idea* to mean something interposed between the mind and the object of its thought—a *tertium quid*, or a *quartum quid*, an independent entity different from the mind and from the object thought of. Now this has been the opinion both of ancient and modern philosophers; but it is not the opinion of all. There are many, especially among modern philosophers, who, by the *idea of a thing*, mean the thing itself in the mind as an object of thought. Even when the object thought of is represented to the mind, the representation is a modification of the mind itself, and the act of representing and the act of knowing the object thought of, are one and the same; the representation and cognition are indivisible. But Dr. Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is representative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of *ideas* as meaning something interposed between the mind and the objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our knowledge immediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things past, and of an immediate knowledge of things future. Now all knowledge is present knowledge, that is, it is only know-

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ledge when we have it. But all knowledge is not immediate knowledge. Things that are past are not actually present to the mind when we remember them. Things that are future are not actually present when we anticipate them, for they have as yet no actual existence. But the mind frames to itself a representation of these things as they have been, or as they will be, and in thus representing them has knowledge of them. This knowledge, however, cannot be called immediate. In memory there is the faculty, and there is the object of the faculty or the thing remembered. But the object or the thing remembered is not actually present to the faculty. It is reproduced or represented, and in representing the object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as a past reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a representative faculty. Now, in perception, where the object of the faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct contact, and the knowledge or perception is the immediate result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had acknowledged the distinction, he might have called perception a presentative faculty, as memory is a representative faculty.* According to other philosophers, however, there is a representation even in perception. The external reality is not in the mind. The mind merely frames to itself a representation or image of what the external reality is, and in this way has knowledge of it. But this representation or image is not something interposed or different from the mind and the external object. It is a modification of the mind itself. It is the external object in the mind as an object of thought. It is the *idea* of the external reality. This is a theory of perception which Dr. Reid did not clearly distinguish; but it is at variance with his own, and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he would have condemned it. In like manner he would have condemned the use of the word *idea* to denote a representative image, even although that representation was held to be merely a

* See *Reid's Works*, edited by Sir William Hamilton; Note B, Of Presentative and Representative Knowledge; and Note C, Of the Various Theories of External Perception.

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modification of mind. But this is the sense in which the term *idea* is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense it means anything present to the mind, whether really or representatively, as an object of thought.*

Ideas, regarded according to the nature and diversity of their objects, are *sensible*, *intellectual*, or *moral;* according to the essential characters of these objects, they are *necessary* and *absolute*, or *contingent* and *relative;* according to the aspect in which they represent things, they are *simple* or *compound*, *abstract* or *concrete*, *individual* or *general*, *partitive* or *collective;* according to their origin or formation, they are *adventitious*, *factitious*, or *innate;* according to their quality or fidelity, they are *true* or *false*, *real* or *imaginary*, *clear* or *obscure*, *distinct* or *confused*, *complete* or *incomplete*, *adequate* or *inadequate*.—Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, b. ii., ch. 22.

As to the origin of our *ideas*, the opinions of metaphysicians may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who deny the senses to be anything more than instruments conveying objects to the mind, perception being active (Plato and others). 2. Those who attribute all our *ideas* to sense (Hobbes, Gassendi, Condillac, the ancient Sophists). 3. Those who admit that the earliest notions proceed from the senses, yet maintain that they are not adequate to produce the whole knowledge possessed by the human understanding (Aristotle, Locke).—Dr. Mill, *Essays*, 314, 321.—*V.* INNATE.

See Trendlenburg, *De Ideis Platonis;* Richter, *De Ideis Platonis;* Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy; Reid's Works;* Dugald Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Appendix ii.; Adam Smith, *Essays on Philosoph. Subjects*, p. 119, note.

IDEAL.—"Though ideas are widely separated from sensible reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely separated, and that is the *ideal*. A few examples will enable you to comprehend the difference between *ideas* and the *ideal:*

* Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise meaning of the word *idea* (which she said she had been reading about in some metaphysical work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, "*Idea*, madam, is the feminine of *idiot*, and means a female fool."—Moore, *Diary*, vol. iv., p. 38.

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Perfection is an *idea;* humanity in all its perfection is an *ideal;* human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are *ideas;* the wisdom of the Stoics is an *ideal.* The *ideal*, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing which has no other characters than those determined by the *idea* itself. The *idea*, thus individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions; it is a model, which we may approach in a greater or lesser degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor, that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves with reference to this *ideal*, without the power of ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely chimerical. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. But would you realize the *ideal* in experience as the hero of a romance? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and useless enterprise; for the imperfection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction."—Henderson, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 119.

"By *ideal* I understand the idea, not *in concreto* but *in individuo*, as an individual thing, *determinable* or *determined* by the idea alone. What I have termed an *ideal*, was in Plato's philosophy an *idea of the Divine mind*—an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences."—Meiklejohn, *Translation of Kant's Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 351.

"We call attention," says Cousin (*On the Beautiful*), "to two words which continually recur in this discussion—they are, on the one hand, *nature* or *experience;* on the other, *ideal.* Experience is individual or collective; but the collective is resolved into the individual; the *ideal* is opposed to the individual and to collectiveness: it appears as an original conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives me the oc-

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for conceiving the *ideal*, but the *ideal* is something entirely different from experience or nature; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fill up the condition of the *ideal* conception, and we are obliged to *imagine* them exact. The word *ideal* corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one."

"L'idéal, voilà l'echelle mysterieuse qui fait monter l'ame du fini, a l'infini."—Cousin, *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien*, 9me. leçon, p. 189.

When the word *ideal* is used as a noun and qualified by the adjective *beau*, its sense is critical or æsthetic, and has reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and painting. "The common notion of the *ideal* as exemplified more especially in the painting of the last century, degrades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an *ideal*, you must get rid of everything individual about it. Whereas the true *ideal* is the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded, and animated, and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre."—*Guesses at Truth*, second series, p. 218.

The *ideal* is to be attained by selecting and assembling in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen in different individuals, excluding everything defective or unseemly, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus, the Apollo Belvedere is the *ideal* of the beauty and proportion of the human frame; the Farnese Hercules is the type of manly strength. The *ideal* can only be attained by following nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits; but the elements of beauty and perfection must be disengaged from individuals, and embodied in one faultless whole. This is the empirical account of the *ideal*.

According to Cicero (*Orator.*, c. 2, 3), there is nothing of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. "We can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. Nor did the artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one individual from which to take a likeness; but there was in his mind a form of y, gazing on which, he guided his hand and skill in

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imitation of it." In the philosophy of Plato this form was called παράδειγμα. Seneca (*Epist.* lviii., sect. 15-18) takes the distinction between ἰδέα and εἶδος, thus:—when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his ἰδέα—the likeness is the εἶδος or image. The εἶδος is in the work—the ἰδέα is out of the work and before the work. This distinction is commended by Heusde (*Init. Phil. Plat.*, vol. ii., pars. 3, p. 105). And he refers to Cicero (*De Invent.*, ii., 1), who states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platónic sense of παράδειγμα or the *ideal.* According to this view, the *beau ideal* is a type of hypothetical perfection contemplated by the mind, but which may never have been realized, how nearly soever it may have been approached in the shape of an actual specimen.

IDEALISM is the doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held under various forms.—See Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note C; Berkeley, *Works;* Sir W. Drummond, *Academic Questions;* Reid, *Inquiry.*

Some of the phases of modern *idealism* among the Germans, may be seen in the following passage from Lewes, *Biograph. Hist. of Phil.*, vol. iv., p. 209:—"I see a tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz.: a tree, an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist. The tree and the image of it are one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. This is *subjective idealism.* Schelling tells me that both the tree and my *ego* (or self), are existences equally real or ideal; but they are nothing less than manifestations of the absolute, the infinite, or unconditioned. This is *objective idealism.* But Hegel tells me that all these explanations are false. The only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The *ego* and the tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is *absolute idealism.* According to this there is neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth, God nor man.—*V.* NIHILISM. The only real exis-

tences are certain ideas or relations. Everything else that has name or being derives its name and being from its constituting one or other of the two related terms, subject and object; but the only thing that is true or real is the identity of their contradiction, that is, the relation itself."

The doctrine opposed to *idealism* is *realism*—*q. v.* See also PERCEPTION.

IDEALIST.—"In England, the word *idealist* is most commonly restricted to such as (with Berkeley) reject the existence of a material world. Of late its meaning has been sometimes extended (particularly since the publication of Reid) to all those who retain the theory of Descartes and Locke, concerning the immediate objects of our perceptions and thoughts, whether they admit or reject the consequences deduced from this theory by the Berkeleian. In the present state of the science, it would contribute much to the distinctness of our reasonings were it to be used in this last sense exclusively." —Stewart, *Dissert.*, part ii., 166, note.

IDEATION and IDEATIONAL.—"The term sensation has a double meaning. It signifies not only an individual sensation, as, when I say, I smell this rose, or I look at my hand; but it also signifies the general faculty of sensation; that is, the complex notion of all the phenomena together, as a part of our nature."

"The word idea has only the meaning which corresponds to the first of these significations; it denotes an individual idea; and we have not a name for that complex notion which embraces, as one whole, all the different phenomena to which the term idea relates. As we say *sensation*, we might also say *ideation;* it would be a very useful word; and there is no objection to it, except the pedantic habit of decrying a new term. *Sensation* would, in that case, be the general name for one part of our constitution; *ideation* for another."

Quoting this from Mr. James Mill as his authority, Dr. Carpenter (*Princip. of Hum. Phys.*, p. 546), has introduced the adjective *ideational* to express a state of consciousness which is excited by a sensation through the instrumentality of the sensorium.

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"The basement convolutions of the cerebrum are the central organs of the perceptive consciousness, the portals to intellectual action, where sensory impressions, the intuitions of the special senses, whether sights, sounds, tastes, smells, or feelings become *idealized and registered;* that is, *perceived*, *remembered*, and *associated;* and where, too, the *ideation* of outward *individualities* is effected. . . . *Ideation* is the first step in the intellectual progress of man. *Ideas are the pabula* of thought, and form equally a constituent element in the *composite nature* of our animal propensities, and of our emotional and moral feelings. *Ideation* is as essential to the very existence of memory, as memory is to the operation of thought. For what, in reality, is memory but the fact of *retained idealized impressions* in the mind? And without these retained idealizations, embodied in the memory as *representative ideas*, where are the materials of thought? and how are the processes of thought to be effected?"—*Journal of Psychol. Med.*, Jan., 1857, pp. 139, 144.

IDENTICAL PROPOSITION.—"It is Locke, I believe, who introduced, or at least gave currency to the expression *identical proposition*, in philosophic language. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, in which an idea is affirmed by itself, or in which we affirm of a thing what we already know of it."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, lect. xxiv.; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 8, sect. 3.

We must distinguish between *analytic* and *tautologous* judgments. Whilst the *analytic* display the meaning of the subject, and put the same matter in a new form, the *tautologous* only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter, in the same form, as, "Whatever is, is."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 196.

A proposition is called *identical* whenever the attribute is contained in the subject, so that the subject cannot be conceived as not containing the attribute. Thus, when you say a body is solid, I say that you make an *identical proposition*, because it is impossible to have the idea of body without that of solidity.

IDENTISM or IDENTITY (*idem*, the same), or the doctrine

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of absolute *identity*, teaches that the two elements of thought, objective and subjective, are absolutely one; that matter and mind are opposite poles of the same infinite substance; and that creation and the Creator are one. This is the philosophy of Schelling. It coincides ultimately with *Pantheism*—*q. v.*

"If the doctrine of *identity* means anything, it means that thought and being are essentially one; that the process of *thinking* is virtually the same as the process of *creating;* that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplished in developing himself in all the forms and regions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world."—Morell, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. ii., p. 127.

IDENTITY means sameness. *Unity* is opposed to division, *identity* to distinction. A thing is *one* when it is not divided into others. A thing is the *same* when it is not distinguishable from others, whether it be divided from them or not. *Unity* denies the divisibleness of a thing in itself. *Identity* denies the divisibleness of a thing from itself, or from that with which it is said to be the same. It is unity with persistence and continuity; unity perceived even in plurality; in multiplicity and succession, in diversity and change. It is the essential characteristic of all substance or being, that it is one and endures.

Unorganized matter may be said to have *identity* in the persistence of the parts or molecules of which it consists. Organized bodies have *identity* so long as organization and life remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a great tree, is still the same tree.—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27, sect. 3.

IDENTITY (Personal).—"What is called *personal identity*, is our being the same persons from the commencement to the end of life; while the matter of the body, the dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. We feel and know that we are the same. This notion or persuasion of *personal identity* results from memory. If a

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man loses all recollection of his early life, he continues, nevertheless, actually the same person."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

Dr. Brown (Lecture xi.) changes the phrase *personal identity* into *mental identity.* Locke says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27)—"To find wherein *personal identity* consists we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places."

This looks like confining *personal identity* to the mind. But Leibnitz (*Theodicée*, p. 172) called it a "metaphysical communication by which soul and body make up one *suppositum*, which we call a person." In a *Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity*, p. 73, 8vo, London, 1827, it has been proposed to define it as "the continuation of the same organization of animal life in a human creature possessing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with the ordinary faculties of reason and memory, without reference to the original formation or constitution of that mind, whether it be material or immaterial, or whether it survives or perishes with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be said *personal identity* consists in the same thinking intelligent substance united to the same human body. By the same human body, however, is not meant the same particles of matter, but of the same human structure and form."—*V.* PERSONALITY.

Locke makes *personal identity* consist in consciousness. "Consciousness is inseparable from thinking; and since it is so, and is *that* which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings, in *this alone consists personal identity*, *i. e.*, the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the *identity* of that person."—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 27.

But it has been remarked that "Consciousness, without any regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent substance, cannot constitute *personal identity.* For, then, a disordered

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imagination might make *one man* become *two*, or even *twenty persons*, whose actions he should imagine himself to have performed. And if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then not be the same person who did them."—Whitehead, *On Materialism*, p. 79.

Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates *personal identity*, but does not constitute it. Consciousness presupposes *personal identity* as knowledge presupposes truth.

See Butler, *Dissertation on Personal Identity;* Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iii., ch. 6, with note; Stewart, *Elements*, part ii., ch. 1, sect. 2.

IDENTITY (Principle of).—It is usually expressed thus—a thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to the same as the principle of *contradiction—q. v.* In Logic it is expressed thus—conceptions which agree can be in thought united, or affirmed of the same subject at the same time.

IDEOLOGY or IDEALOGY.—The analysis of the human mind by Destutt de Tracy, published about the end of last century, was entitled "*Elemens d'Ideologie*," and the word has come to be applied to the philosophy of the sensational school, or the followers of Condillac—as Cabanis, Garat, and Volney. Of this school, De Tracy is the metaphysician; Cabanis (*Rapports du Physique et de Moral de l'Homme*) is the physiologist; and Volney (*Catechism du Citoyen Francais*) is the moralist. The followers of this school were leading members of the *Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, and also took an active share in political assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were contrary to the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike by suppressing the *Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*. But the members of the school kept up their doctrines and their meetings, and it was on the motion of De Tracy that the Senate decreed the abdication of the emperor in 1814.—Damiron, *Hist. de Philosoph. en France au* 19 *siecle.*

"For Locke and his whole school, the study of the understanding is the study of ideas; hence the recent and celebrated expression *ideology*, to designate the science of the human understanding. The source of this expression is in the *Essay on the Hum. Understanding*, and the ideological school is the

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natural offspring of Locke."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, lect. 16.

"By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, *ideologie* (for *idealogie*), a word which could only *properly* suggest an *à priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Edin. Rev.*, Oct., 1830, p. 112.

"Destütt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title of *the father of ideology*."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, essay iii.

IDIOSYNCRASY (ἴδιος, *proprius*; σύν, *con*, and κρᾶσις, *mixtio*), means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. "The soul in its first and pure nature hath no *idiosyncrasies*, that is, hath no *proper natural inclinations*, which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition."—Glanvill, *Pre-existence of Souls*, c. 10. It is seen, however, that different persons "of the same kind and condition" may soon manifest different inclinations—which if not natural are partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their *temperament*, as well as to the effect of circumstances.

Sir Thomas Browne (*Vulgar Errors*, book iii., chap. 28), asks, "Whether quails from any *idiosyncrasy* or peculiarity of constitution do invariably feed upon hellebore, or rather sometimes but medically use the same?" In like manner some men are violently affected by honey and coffee, which have no such effects on others. This is bodily *idiosyncrasy*. *Sympathy* and *antipathy*—*q. v.*, when peculiar, may be traced to *idiosyncrasy*.

Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his *Elements*, says he uses temperament as synonymous with *idiosyncrasy*.—*V.* TEMPERAMENT.

IDOL (εἴδωλον, from εἶδος, an image).—Something set up in place of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon (*De Augment. Scient.*, lib. iv., cap. 5) calls those false appearances by which men are led into error, *idols*. "I do find, therefore, in this enchanted glass four *idols*, or false appearances, of several distinct sorts, every sort comprehending many subdivisions: the first sort I call *idols* of the nation or tribe; the second, *idols* of the den or cave; the third, *idols* of the forum; and

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the fourth, *idols* of the theatre."—*De Interpretatione Naturæ*, sect. 39; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 8.—*V.* PREJUDICE.

IGNORANCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the law or the action, and is distinguished into *ignorantia juris*, and *ignorantia facti*.

Ignorantia facti excusat. Ignorance of what is done excuses, as, when a contract is signed under a wrong impression as to the meaning of the terms, such contract is voidable.

Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scive neminem excusat. Every man is supposed to know the laws of the land in which he lives; and if he transgress any of them, although in ignorance, he is not excused. A merchant continuing to deal in goods which have been declared contraband is liable to the penalty, though he did not know the law.

In respect of an action, *ignorance* is called *efficacious* or *concomitant*, according as the removal* of it would, or would not, prevent the action from being done. In respect of the agent, *ignorance* is said to be *vincible* or *invincible*, according as it can, or cannot, be removed by the use of accessible means of knowledge.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished into *affected* or *wilful*, by which the means of knowing are perversely rejected; and *supine* or *crass*, by which the means of knowing are indolently or stupidly neglected.

Ignorance is said to be *invincible* in two ways—*in itself, and also in its cause*, as when a man knows not what he does, through disease of body or of mind; *in itself, but not in its cause*, as when a man knows not what he does, through intoxication or passion.

ILLATION (*illatum*, from *infero*, to bring in), or "*inference* consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the *ideas* in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*, as in demonstration, in which it arrives

* Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done *through ignorance* (διὰ ἄγνοιαν), and an action done *ignorantly* (ἀγνοῶν). In the former case the ignorance is the direct cause of the action, in the latter case it is an accident or concomitant.

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at knowledge; or their probable connection on which it withholds its assent, as in opinion."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 17.—*V.* INFERENCE, INDUCTION.

ILLUMINATI (*illumino*, to enlighten).—The name given to a secret society said to exist in Germany and other countries of Europe, towards the close of the last century. They professed the purest principles of virtue; but their real design was to subvert all religion and all government. Doubts have been entertained as to the extent and influence of any such society; and some have even denied its existence.—Robison, *Proofs of a Conspiracy, &c.*

IMAGINATION.—"Nihil aliud est *imaginari* quam rei corporeæ figuram seu imaginem contemplari."—Descartes, *Medit. Secunda.*

Mr. Addison says (*Spectator*, No. 411), "The pleasures of *imagination* are such as arise from visible objects, since it is the sense of sight that furnishes the *imagination* with its ideas." Dr. Reid says, "*Imagination*, in its proper sense, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight. It is distinguished from conception, as a part from a whole." But a much wider signification has been given to the word by others.

"By *imagination* we mean, in a comprehensive sense, that operation of the mind by which it—(1) *receives*, (2) *retains*, (3) *recalls*, and (4) *combines*, according to higher laws the ideal *images* furnished to it by the cœnesthesis and by the senses; for all these acts are manifestly links of one chain. At the first step, we usually call this operation* the faculty of conception; at the second, memory; at the third, reproductive fancy; and at the fourth, productive fancy." — Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychol.*, p. 120. 8vo, 1847.

"In the language of modern philosophy, the word *imagination* seems to denote—first, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, simply as they are in themselves, without any view to their reality: secondly, the power of combining into new forms or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions,

* "It would be well, if instead of speaking of the *powers of the mind* (which causes a misunderstanding), we adhere to the designation of the several *operations of one mind*; which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget."

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which we have derived from experience or from information. These two powers, though distinguishable, are not essentially different."—Beattie, *Dissert.*, *Of Imagination*, chap. 1.

"*Imagination* as *reproductive*, stores the mind with ideal images, constructed through the medium of attention and memory, out of our immediate perceptions. These images, when laid up in the mind, form *types* with which we can compare any new phenomena we meet with, and which help us to begin the important work of reducing our experience to some appreciable degree of unity.

"To understand the nature of *productive* or *creative imagination*, we must suppose the reproductive process to be already in full operation, that is, we must suppose a number of ideas to be already formed and stored up within the mind. . . . . They may now be combined together so as to form new images, which, though composed of the elements given in the original representations, yet are *now* purely mental creations of our own. Thus, I may have an image of a rock in my mind, and another image of a diamond. I combine these two together and create the purely ideal representation of a diamond rock." —Morell, *Psychol.*, pp. 175, 176. 8vo, Lond., 1853.

IMAGINATION and FANCY.—"A man has *imagination* in proportion as he can distinctly copy in idea the impressions of sense; it is the faculty which *images* within the mind the phenomena of sensation. A man has *fancy* in proportion as he can call up, connect, or associate at pleasure, these internal images (Φαντάζω, is to cause to appear) so as to complete ideal representations of absent objects. *Imagination* is the power of depicting, and *fancy*, of evoking or combining. The *imagination* is formed by patient observation; the *fancy*, by a voluntary activity in shifting the scenery of the mind. The more accurate the *imagination*, the more safely may a painter, or a poet, undertake a delineation or description, without the presence of the objects to be characterized. The more versatile the *fancy*, the more original and striking will be the decorations produced."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

Wordsworth (Preface to his *Works*, vol. i., 12mo, Lond., 1836) finds fault with the foregoing discrimination, and says,

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"It is not easy to find how *imagination* thus explained, differs from distinct remembrance of images; or *fancy*, from quick and vivid recollection of them: each is nothing more than a mode of memory." According to Wordsworth, "*imagination*, in the sense of the poet, has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy, existing in the mind, of absent external objects; but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects, and processes of creation or composition governed by fixed laws."

"It is the divine attribute of the *imagination*, that it is irrepressible, unconfinable; that when the real world is shut out, it can create a world for itself, and with a necromantic power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of the dungeon."—W. Irving, *Sketch Book*.

> "And as *imagination* bodies forth
> The form of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing
> A local habitation and a name."

To *imagine* in this high and true sense of the word, is to realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, *imagination* may be regarded as the *differentia* of man—the distinctive mark which separates him *a grege mutorum*. That the inferior animals have memory, and what has been called *passive imagination*, is proved by the fact that they dream—and that in this state the sensuous impressions made on them during their waking hours, are reproduced. But they show no trace of that higher faculty or function which transcends the sphere of sense, and which out of elements supplied by things seen and temporal, can create new objects, the contemplation of which lifts us to the infinite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander through eternity. High art is highly metaphysical, and whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or in sculpture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or heard, or handled in the world around us, but in carrying us across the gulf which separates

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the phenomenal from the real, and placing us in the presence of the truly *beautiful*, and surrounding us with an atmosphere more pure than that which the sun enlightens.

IMAGINATION and CONCEPTION.—"The business of *conception*," says Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, chap. 3), "is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our *conceptions*, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word *imagination* to express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word; if *imagination* be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations." And he adds (chap. 6), "The operations of *imagination* are by no means confined to the materials which *conception* furnishes, but may be equally employed about all the subjects of our knowledge."—*V.* CONCEPTION, FANCY.

IMAGINATION and MEMORY.—"*Memory* retains and recalls the past in the form which it assumed when it was previously before the mind. *Imagination* brings up the past in new shapes and combinations. Both of them are reflective of objects; but the one may be compared to the mirror which reflects whatever has been before it, in its proper form and colour; the other may be likened to the kaleidoscope which reflects what is before it in an infinite variety of new forms and dispositions."—M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 450.

> "Music when soft voices die
> Vibrates in the memory;
> Odours, when sweet violets sicken,
> Live within the sense they quicken."—Shelley.

See Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy;* Wordsworth, Preface to *Lyrical Ballads; Edin. Review* for April, 1842, article on Moore's *Poems;* Akenside, *Pleasures of Imagination.*

IMITATION (*imitor, quasi mimitor*, from μιμέομαι. Vossius.)—"is a facultie to expresse livelie and perfitelie that example,

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which ye go about to follow."—Ascham, *The Schulemaster*, b. ii.

As a social and improvable being, man has been endowed with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This propensity manifests itself in the first instance spontaneously or instinctively. Children try to follow the gestures and movements of others, before their muscles are ready to obey, and to *imitate* sounds which they hear, before their voice is able to do so. Mr. Stewart has made a distinction (*Elements*, vol. iii., chap. 2) between the *propensity* and the *power* of *imitation*. Both are peculiarly strong and lively in children, and answer the most important purposes. But the propensity to imitate what others do, and the manner of doing it, continues throughout life, and requires to be carefully watched and properly directed.

Man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries to copy nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he imitates the forms which strike and please him. And the germ of some of the highest discoveries in science has been found in attempts to copy the movements and processes of nature.—Reid, *Act. Powers*, essay iii., part i., chap. 2.

IMMANENCE implies the unity of the intelligent principle in creation, in the creation itself, and of course includes in it every genuine form of pantheism. *Transcendence* implies the existence of a separate divine intelligence, and of another and spiritual state of being, intended to perfectionate our own."—J. D. Morell, *Manchester Papers*, No. 2, pp. 108-9.

IMMANENT (*immaneo*, to remain in), means that which does not pass out of a certain subject or certain limits. "Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations of the mind; the first kind produces no effect without the mind, the last does. The first they call *immanent* acts; the second *transitive*. All intellectual operations belong to the first class; they produce no effect upon any external object."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 14.

"Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, purpose, are also *immanent*."—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 81.

"Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are what

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the schoolmen called *immanent* acts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a *transitive* act, which produces an effect distinct from the operation, and this effect is the picture."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 1.

The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is somewhat different. According to him we make an *immanent* and valid use of the forms of the understanding, and conceive of the matter, furnished by the senses, according to our notions, of time and space. But when we try to lift ourselves above experience and phenomena, and to conceive of things as they are in themselves, we are making a *transcendent* and illegitimate use of our faculties.

Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by an *immanent* act, but he created the world by a *transient* act.

The doctrine of Spinoza (*Ethic.*, pars 1, pref. 18) is, *Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens*,—that is, all that exists, exists in God; and there is no difference in substance between the universe and God.

"We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves, we ascribe *intellections*, *volitions*, *decrees*, *purposes*, and such like *immanent actions* to that nature which hath nothing in common with us, as being infinitely above us."—Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, edit. 1661, p. 101.

IMMATERIALISM is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that there is no material substance, and that all being may be reduced to mind, and ideas in a mind.

Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, "Going to England very young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a sect there, called the *immaterialists*, by the force of a very curious book upon that subject."

"In the early part of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs us that he was actually a convert to the scheme of *immaterialism;* a scheme which he probably considered as of a perfectly inoffensive tendency, so long as he conceived the existence of the material world to be the only point in dispute."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 10.

A work published a few years ago in defence of Berkeley's

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doctrine, was entitled *Immaterialism;* and a prize offered to any one who would refute the reasoning of it.

IMMATERIALITY is predicated of mind, to denote that as a substance it is different from *matter*. *Spirituality* is the positive expression of the same idea. Simplicity is also used in the same sense. Matter is made up of parts into which it can be resolved. Mind is simple and has no parts, and so cannot be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was maintained by Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the three first centuries. At the end of the fourth, the *immateriality* of the soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, and Mamertus Claudianus.—Guizot, *Hist. of Civiliz.*, vol. i., p. 394.

IMMORTALITY (OF THE SOUL) is one of the doctrines of natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, is not affected by the dissolution of the body. How long, or in what state it may survive after the death of the body, is not intimated by the term *immortality*. But the arguments to prove that the soul survives the body, all go to favour the belief that it will live for ever.

See Plato, *Phædon;* Porteous, *Sermons;* Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul;* Watson, *Intimations of a Future State;* Bakewell, *Evidence of a Future State;* Autenrieth, *On Man, and his Hope of Immortality*, Tubingen, 1815.

IMMUTABILITY is the absence or impossibility of change. It is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there can be no inconstancy in his character or government. It was argued for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, *Natural Religion*

IMPENETRABILITY is one of the primary qualities of matter, in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot at the same time be occupied by more than one portion of matter. It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. A nail driven into a board does not *penetrate* the wood; it merely separates and displaces the particles. Things are *penetrable*, when two or more can exist in the same space—as two angels; *impenetrable*, when not—as two stones.

IMPERATE.—*V.* ELICIT, ACT.

IMPERATIVE (*imperativ*), that which contains a *should* or ought

(*sollen*). It is the formula of the commandment (*geboi*) of reason.

IMPERATIVE (CATEGORICAL, THE), is the phrase employed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and obligatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the *categorical imperative*, that is, in seeing an action to be right, we see, at the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense of obligation springs from no view of the consequences of the action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and absolute idea of the reason; involving, according to Kant, the power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obligation, therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom.

IMPOSSIBLE (THE), or that which cannot be, has been distinguished as the *metaphysically* or absolutely *impossible*, or that which implies a contradiction, as to make a square circle, or two straight lines to enclose a space; the *physically impossible*, the miraculous, or that which cannot be brought about by merely physical causes, or in accordance with the laws of nature, as the death of the soul; and the *ethically impossible*, or that which cannot be done without going against the dictates of right reason, or the enactments of law, or the feelings of propriety. That which is *morally impossible*, is that against the occurrence of which there is the highest probable evidence, as that the dice should turn up the same number a hundred successive times.—Whately, *Log.*, Append. i.

"It may be as *really impossible* for a person in his senses, and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, as it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it; but who sees not these impossibilities to be totally different in their foundation and meaning? or what good reason can there be against calling the one a *moral* and the other a *natural* impossibility?"—Price, *Review*, chap. 10, p. 431.

IMPRESSION (*imprimo*, to press in, or on), is the term employed to denote the change on the nervous system arising from a communication between an external object and a bodily organ. It is obviously borrowed from the effect which one piece of matter which is hard has, if pressed upon another piece of matter which is softer; as the seal leaving its impression or

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configuration upon the wax. It is not intended, however, to convey any affirmation as to the nature of the change which is effected in the nervous system, or as to the nature of sensation; and still less to confound this preliminary change with the sensation itself. The term *impression* is also applied to the effects produced upon the higher sensibility, or our sentiments. Thus, we speak of moral *impressions*, religious *impressions*, *impressions* of sublimity and beauty.

Hume divided all modifications of mind into *impressions* and *ideas*. Ideas were *impressions* when first received; and became *ideas* when remembered and reflected on. See Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

"Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. iii., Addenda to vol. i., p. 43), seems to think that the word *impression* was first introduced as a *technical* term, into the philosophy of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct; for, besides the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, of the illustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory from the analogy of an *impress* and a *trace*, words corresponding to *impression* were among the ancients familiarly applied to the processes of external perception, imagination, &c., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical philosophies; while among modern psychologists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was likewise in common use."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 294, note.

Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay ii.), distinguishes the *impressions* made on the organs of sense into *mediate* and *immediate*. The *impressions* made on the sense of touch are *immediate*, the external body and the organ being in contact. The *impressions* made on the ear by sounding bodies are *mediate*, requiring the air and the vibrations of the air to give the sensation of hearing. It may be questioned whether this distinction is well or deeply founded. See Dr. Young, *Intell. Philosoph.*, p. 71; Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 104.

IMPULSE and IMPULSIVE (*impello*, to drive on), are used in contradistinction to *reason* and *rational*, to denote the influence of appetite and passion as differing from the authority of reason and conscience. "It may happen, that when appe-

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tite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any *impulsive* force. — Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. ii., chap. 1.

"Passion often gives a violent *impulse* to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he lives."—*Ibid*, chap. 6.

IMPUTATION (*imputo*, to ascribe, to charge), is a judgment by which a person is considered the author of an action. In all moral action there is the presence of knowledge and intention on the part of the agent. In such cases he is held to be responsible, and the action is *imputed* to him or set down to his account.

INCLINATION (*inclino*, to lean towards), is a form or degree of natural desire. It is synonymous with propensity or with the *penchant* of the French. It is more allied to affection than to appetite. "It does not appear that in things so intimately connected with the happiness of life, as marriage and the choice of an employment, parents have any right to force the *inclinations* of their children."—Beattie, *Mor. Science*, vol. ii., part ii.—*V.* DISPOSITION, TENDENCY.

INDEFINITE (*in* and *definitum*, that which is not limited), means that, the limits of which are not determined, or at least not so determined as to be apprehended by us. The *definite* is that of which the form and limits are determined and apprehended by us. That of which we know not the limits, comes to be regarded as having none; and hence *indefinite* has been confounded with the *infinite*. But they ought to be carefully distinguished. The *infinite* is absolute; it is that of which we not only know not the limits, but which has and can have no limit. The *indefinite* is that of which there is no limit fixed. You can suppose it enlarged or diminished, but still it is finite. —*V.* INFINITE.

Leibnitz, *Discours de la Conformité de la Foi et de la Raison*, sect. 70; Descartes, *Princip. Philosoph.*, pars 1, c. 26, et 27.

INDIFFERENCE (**Liberty of**) is that state of mind in which the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an

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object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also called liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called liberty of indetermination, or that state in which the mind is when it has not determined to do one of two or more things.—*V.* LIBERTY, WILL.

INDIFFERENT.—An action in morals is said to be *indifferent*, that is, neither right nor wrong, when, *considered in itself* or *in specie*, it is neither contrary nor conformable to any moral law or rule; as, to bow the head. Such an action becomes right or wrong, when the end for which it is done, or the circumstances in which it is done are considered. It is then regarded in *individuo;* as, to bow the head, in token of respect, or in a temple, in token of adoration.

INDIFFERENTISM or IDENTISM—*q. v.*, is sometimes employed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to which there is no difference between the real and the ideal, or the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea is the reality.

Indifferentism is also used to signify the want of religious earnestness. "In the *indifferentism* of the Lutheran Church, we see a marked descent towards the rationalism which has overspread the states of Germany."—Dr. Vaughan, *Essays*, vol. ii., p. 255.

INDISCERNIBLES (Identity of).—It is a doctrine of the philosophy of Leibnitz, that no two things can be exactly alike. The difference between them is always more than a numerical difference. We may not always be able to discern it, but still there is a difference. Two things radically indiscernible the one from the other, that is, having the same qualities, and of the same quantity, would not be two things, but one. For the qualities of a thing being its essence, perfect similitude would be identity. But Kant objected that two things perfectly alike, if they did not exist in the same place at the same time, would, by this numerical difference, be constituted different individuals. —Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais, Avant-Propos.*

"There is no such thing as two individuals *indiscernible* from each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me, in the presence of Her Electoral Highness the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herenhausen, thought

he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The Princess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some, but it was to no purpose. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed through a microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other. This is an argument against *atoms;* which are confuted, as well as a *vacuum*, by the principles of true metaphysics.

"To suppose two things *indiscernible*, is to suppose the *same thing* under *two names*."—Leibnitz, *Fourth Paper to Clarke*, p. 95.

"From the principle of the *sufficient reason* I infer that there cannot be in nature two real beings absolutely *indiscernible*; because if there were, God and nature would act without reason, in treating the one differently from the other; and thus God does not produce two portions of matter perfectly equal and alike."—Leibnitz, *Fifth Paper to Clarke.*

INDIVIDUAL, INDIVIDUALISM, INDIVIDUALITY, INDIVIDUATION (from *in* and *divido*, to divide).

Individual was defined by Porphyry—*Id cujus proprietates alteri simul convenire non possunt.*

"An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, and cannot be logically divided, is called *individual*."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 5.

An *individual* is not absolutely indivisible, but that which cannot be divided without losing its name and distinctive qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other things of the same nature, is an *individual* whole. A stone or a piece of metal may be separated into parts, each of which shall continue to have the same qualities as the whole. But a plant or an animal when separated into parts loses its *individuality;* which is not retained by any of the parts. We do not ascribe *individuality* to brute matter. But what is that which distinguishes one organized being, or one living being, or one thinking being from all others? This is the question so much agitated by the schoolmen, concerning the principle of *individuation.* In their barbarous Latin it was called *Hœcceietas*, that is, that in virtue of which we say *this* and not *that;* or *Ecceietas*, that of which we say, lo! here, and not anywhere

else. Peter, as an *individual*, possesses many properties which are *quiddative*, or common to him with others, such as *substantialitas*, *corporeietas*, *animalitas*, *Humanitas*. But he has also a reality, which may be called *Petreietas* or *Peterness*, which marks all the others with a difference, and constitutes him Peter. It is the *Hœcceietas* which constitutes the principle of *individuation*. It was divided into the *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*.

The number of properties which constituted an *individuum extrinsecum*, are enumerated in the following versicle :—

Forma, figura, locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis,
a, sunt septem, quæ non habet unum et alter.

You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xantippe, &c., any one of which properties might belong to another man; but the congeries of all these is not to be found but in Socrates.

The *intrinsic* principle of *individuation*, is the ultimate reality of the being—*ipsa rei entitas*. In physical substances, the *intrinsic principle of individuation* is *ipsa materia et forma cum unione*.

Hutcheson has said (*Metaphys.*, pars 1, chap. 3), "*Si quæratur de causa cur res sit una, aut de Individuationis principio in re ipsa; non aliud assignandum, quam ipsa rei natura existens. Quæcunque enim causa rem quamlibet fecerat aut creaverat, eam unam etiam fecerat, aut individuam, quo sensu volunt Metaphysici.*"

Leibnitz has a dissertation, *De principio Individuationis*, which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he maintained that *individual* substances have a real positive existence, independent of any thinking subject.

Individuality, like personal identity, belongs properly to intelligent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it to us that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded with us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible.

"*Individuality* is scarcely to be found among the inferior animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. *Individuality* is not *individualism*. The latter refers everything to

self, and sees nothing but self in all things. *Individuality* consists only in willing to be self, in order to be something."—Vinet, *Essais de Philosoph., Mor.*, Paris, 1847, p. 142.

But in the *Elements of Individualism*, by William Maccall, 8vo, Lond., 1847, the word *individualism* is used in the sense assigned above to *individuality*.

INDUCTION (Method or Process of) (ἐπαγωγή, *inductio*).—"It has been said that Aristotle attributed the *discovery* of *induction* to Socrates, deriving the word ἐπαγωγή from the Socratic accumulation of instances, serving as antecedents to establish the requisite conclusion."—Devey, *Log.*, p. 151, note.

"*Inductio est argumentum quo ex plurium singularium recensione aliquid universale concluditur.*"—Le Grand, *Inst. Philosoph.*, p. 57, edit. 1675.

Inductio est argumentum quo probatur quid verum esse de quopiam generali, ex eo quod verum sit de particularibus omnibus, saltem de tot ut sit credibile.—Wallis, *Inst. Log.*, p. 198, 4th edit.

Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class.—Whately, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, § 5.

"*Induction* is that operation of mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, *induction* is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true under similar circumstances at all times."—Mill, *Log.*, b. iii., ch. 2, § 1.

"*Induction* is usually defined to be the process of drawing a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases; *deduction* is the converse process of proving that some property belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. That all bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we have obtained from examining a number of bodies coming under our notice, by *induction;* if from this general principle we argue that the stone we throw from our hand will show the same tendency, we adopt the *deductive* method. . . . .

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More exactly, we may define the *inductive* method as the process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from effects; and the *deductive*, as the method of deriving facts from laws and effects from their causes."—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 321, 323.

According to Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*, p. 156), "*Induction* has been employed to designate three very different operations—1. The objective process of investigating particular facts, as preparatory to *induction*, which is not a process of reasoning of any kind. 2. A material illation of the universal from the singular, as warranted either by the general analogy of nature, or the special presumptions afforded by the object-matter of any real science. 3. A formal illation of the universal from the individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of thought, and abstract from the conditions of this or that 'particular matter.' The second of these is the *inductive* method of Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclusions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars unknown to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct examination. Aristotle's definition coincides with the third, and '*induction* is an inference drawn from all the particulars' (*Prior Analyt.*, ii., c. 23). The second and third have been confounded. But the second is not a logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily inferrible from the premiss, for the *some* of the antecedent does not necessarily legitimate the *all* of the conclusion, notwithstanding that the procedure may be warranted by the material problem of the science or the fundamental principles of the human understanding. The third alone is properly an *induction* of Logic; for Logic does not consider things, but the general forms of thought under which the mind conceives them; and the logical inference is not determined by any relation of casuality between the premiss and the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of reason and consequence as involved in the thought."

"The Baconian or Material *Induction* proceeds on the assumption of general laws in the relations of physical phenomena, and endeavours, by select observations and experi-

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ments, to detect the law in any particular case. This, whatever be its value as a general method of physical investigation, has no place in Formal Logic. The Aristotelian or Formal *Induction* proceeds on the assumption of general laws of thought, and inquires into the instances in which, by such laws, we are necessitated to reason from an accumulation of particular instances to an universal rule."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 209.

On the difference between *induction* as known and practised by Aristotle, and as recommended by Lord Bacon, see Stewart, *Elements*, part ii., chap. 4, sect 2.

INDUCTION (Principle of).—By the principle of *induction* is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases, which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man, Eccles. i. 9, "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be: and that which is done is that which shall be done." In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason, all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Newton, *Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eædem sunt causæ.* The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of *induction* is an application of the principle of casuality. Phenomena have their proper causes, and these causes operate according to a fixed law. This law has been expressed by saying, substance is persistent. Our belief in the established order of nature is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from experience. According to others this belief is a result or inference derived from experience. On the different views as to this point compare Mill's *Log.*, b. iii., ch. 3, with Whewell's *Philosophy of Inductive Sciences*, book i., ch. 6. Also, the *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxviii.

On the subject of *induction* in general, see Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., ch. 5; *Inquiry*, ch. vi., sect. 24; Stewart, *Elements*, vol. i., ch. 4, sect. 5; *Philosoph. Essays*, p. 74; Royer Collard, *Œuvres de Reid*, par Mons. Jouffroy, tom. iv., p. 277.

INERTIA.—That property of matter by which it would always continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it was put, unless changed by some external force. Resistance to change of state. The quantity of matter in a body is determined by its quantity of *inertia;* and this is estimated by the quantity of force required to put it in motion at a given rate. Kepler conceiving the disposition of a body to maintain its state of motion as indicating an exertion of power, prefixed the word *vis* to *inertia.* Leibnitz maintained that matter manifests force in maintaining its state of rest.

"The *vis insita*, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it is; and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass but in our manner of conceiving it. A body, from the inactivity of matter, is not without difficulty put out of its state of rest or motion. Upon which account this *vis insita* may, by a most significant name, be called *vis inertiæ*, or force of inactivity."—Newton, *Princip.*, defin. 3.

IN ESSE; IN POSSE.—Things that are not, but which may be, are said to be *in posse;* things actually existing are said to be *in esse.*

INFERENCE (*infero*, to bear, or bring in), is of the same derivation as *illation* and *induction*—*q. v.*

"To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to *draw in* another as true; *i. e.*, to see, or suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the *inferred* proposition."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 17.

"An *inference* is a proposition which is perceived to be true, because of its connection with some known fact. There are many things and events which are always found together; or which constantly follow each other: therefore, when we observe one of these things or events, we *infer* that the other also exists, or has existed, or will soon take place. If we see the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, we *infer* that the country is inhabited; if these prints appear to

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be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we *infer* that the inhabitants are at no great distance; if the prints are those of naked feet, we *infer* that these inhabitants are savages; or if they are the prints of shoes, we *infer* that they are, in some degree, civilized."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"We ought to comprehend, within the sphere of *inference*, all processes wherein a truth, involved in a thought or thoughts given as antecedent, is evolved in a thought which is found as consequent."—Spalding, *Log.*, p. 1.

"We *infer immediately*, either by contraposition, by subalternation, by opposition (proper), or by conversion."—p. 160.

Mediate inference is the syllogistic.

INFERENCE and PROOF.—"Reasoning comprehends *inferring* and *proving;* which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in *two different points of view;* like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who *infers*, *proves;* and he who *proves*, *infers;* but the word *infer* fixes the mind *first* on the *premiss* and then on the *conclusion;* the word *prove*, on the contrary, leads the mind *from* the conclusion *to* the premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is *last* in the mind; *inference* being often used to signify the *conclusion* (*i. e.*, proposition *inferred*), and *proof*, the premiss. To *infer*, is the business of the *philosopher;* to *prove*, of the *advocate.*"—Whately, *Log.*, b. iv., ch. 3, § 1.

Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the support of a *given* proposition; *inferring* is the deduction of a conclusion from *given* premisses."—Whately, *ibid.*

"When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act or state induced a *conjecture;* when they are strong, we term it an *inference* or *conclusion.* Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture."—S. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 31, 32, 8vo, Lond., 1851.—*V.* FACT.

INFINITE (*in* and *finitum*, unlimited or rather limitless).—In geometry, *infinite* is applied to quantity which is greater

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than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speaking it means that which is not only without determinate bounds, but which cannot possibly admit of bound or limit.

"The *infinite* expresses the entire absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one *infinite* Being in all his attributes. The *absolute* expresses perfect independence, both in being and in action. The *unconditioned* indicates entire freedom from every necessary relation. The whole three unite in expressing the entire absence of all restriction. But let this be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one *infinite* Being cannot exist in *relation*, they only imply that He cannot exist in a *necessary relation*, that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his existence."—Calderwood, *Philosoph. of the Infinite*, p. 37.—*V.* ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED.

As to our idea of the *infinite* there are two opposite opinions.

According to some, the idea is purely negative, and springs up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or some object of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. Or, if the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished by the imagination, which goes on enlarging the finite without limit.

On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the finite can never furnish the idea of the *infinite*, but only of the indefinite. The indefinite is merely the confused apprehension of what may or may not exist. But the idea of the *infinite* is the idea of an objective reality, and is implied as a necessary condition of every other idea. We cannot think of body but as existing in space, nor of an event but as occurring in time; and space and duration are necessarily thought of as *infinite*.

But have we or can we have knowledge of the *infinite?* Boethius (*In Præd.*, p. 113, edit. Bas.) is quoted as saying, "*Infinitorum* nulla cognitio est; *infinita* namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur: quare *infinitorum* scientia nulla est."

On the other hand, Cudworth has said (*Intell. System*, p. 449),—"Since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we

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having a notion or idea of the latter must needs have of the former."

But, while we cannot *comprehend* the *infinite*, we may *apprehend* it in contrast or relation with the finite. And this is what the common sense of men leads them to rest satisfied with, and, without attempting the metaphysical difficulty of reconciling the existence of the *infinite* with that of the *finite*, to admit the existence of both.

"Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather *apprehenders* than *comprehenders* thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essence of things."—Cudworth.

Ancillon, *Essai sur l'Idée et le Sentiment de l'Infini;* Cousin, *Cours de Philosoph., et Hist. de la Philosoph;* Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, &c.; L. Velthuysen, *Dissertatio de Finito et Infinito;* Descartes, *Meditations.*

"The *infinite* and the *indefinite* may be thus distinguished: the former implies an actual conceiving the absence of limits; the latter is a not conceiving the presence of limits—processes as different as searching through a house and discovering that a certain person is not there, as from shutting our eyes and not seeing that he is there. *Infinity* belongs to the object of thought; *indefiniteness* to the manner of thinking of it."—Mansel, *Lect. on Philosoph. of Kant*, p. 29.

INFLUX (Physical) (*influo*, to flow in), is one of the theories as to our perception of external objects.—"The advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes of our perceptions, the word *efficient* being employed to signify that the things by means of some positive power or inherent virtue which they possess, were competent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. . . . . External objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influence, the nervous system was supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain images or representations, and thus our knowledge of external

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things was supposed to be brought about. The representations alone came before the mind; the things by which they were caused remained occult and unknown."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 472.—*V.* CAUSES (OCCASIONAL).

INJURY (*injuria*, from *in* and *jus*, neglect or violation of right), in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing of wrong. We may bring *harm* or *evil* upon others without intending it. But *injury* implies intention, and awakens a sense of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is on this difference in the meaning of *harm* and *injury* that Bishop Butler founds the distinction of resentment into *sudden* and *deliberate*.—Butler, *Sermons*, viii. and 9.

INNATE (IDEAS).—Ideas, as to their origin, have been distinguished into *adventitious*, or such as we receive from the objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a mountain, or a tree; *factitious*, or such as we frame out of ideas already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a tree with golden fruit; and *innate*, or such as are inborn and belong to the mind from its birth, as the idea of God or of immortality. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise *De Natura Deorum*, speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being *inserted*, or *engraven*, or *inborn* in the mind. "*Intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus.*"—Lib. i., sect. 17. In like manner, Origen (*Adv. Celsum*, lib. i., cap. 4), has said, "That men would not be guilty if they did not carry in their mind common notions of morality, *innate* and written in divine letters." It was in this form that Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i.), attacked the doctrine of *innate ideas*. It has been questioned, however, whether the doctrine, as represented by Locke, was really held by the ancient philosophers. And Dr. Hutcheson (*Oratio Inauguralis, De Naturali hominum Societate*) has the following passage:—"*Omnes autem ideas, apprehensiones, et judicia, quæ de rebus, duce natura, formamus, quocunque demum tempore hoc fiat, sive quæ naturæ nostræ viribus quibuscunque, necessario fere, atque universaliter* recipiuntur, innata quantum memini,*

* We have here, in 1730, the two marks of *necessity* and *universality* which subsequently were so much insisted on by Kant and others as characterizing all our *à priori* cognitions.

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dixerunt antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas *innate* they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with *natural*, and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certain ideas which men, as human or rational beings, *necessarily* and *universally* entertain.—See NATURAL as distinguished from INNATE.

"There are three senses in which an idea may be supposed to be *innate;* one, if it be something originally superadded to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance fully developed; or as one undeveloped, but having the power of self-development: another, if the idea is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in, or interwoven with, the powers by which the mind receives those ideas: a third, if, without being a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of mind, the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to produce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at our first creation, without its bearing any special relation to our other faculties, in the second case, it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought; in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power or powers; not, however, as in the preceding case, simply as a pre-requisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea."—Dr. Alliot, *Psychology and Theology*, p. 93, 12mo, Lond., 1855.

The first of these three is the form in which the doctrine of innate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine was at one time thought essential to support the principles of natural religion and morality. But Locke saw that these principles were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, although a belief in God and immortality, and a sense of the difference between

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right and wrong were not implanted or inserted in the mind; if it could be shown that men *necessarily* and *universally* came to them by the ordinary use of their faculties. He took a distinction between an *innate law*, and a *law of nature* (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., ch. 3); and while he did not admit that there was a law "imprinted on our minds in their very original," contended "that there is a law knowable by the light of nature." In like manner, Bishop Law said (King's *Essay on Origin of Evil*, p. 79, note), "It will really come to the same thing with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature of virtue and vice, whether the Deity has *implanted* these instincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner—has given us such powers and placed us in such circumstances, that we must *necessarily* acquire them."—*V.* NATURE (Law of.)

"Though it appears not that we have any *innate* ideas or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, antecedently to the exercise of our senses and understandings; yet it must be granted, that we were born with the natural faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves; as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are; that one and two make three, that gold is not silver, nor ice formally water; that the whole is greater than its part, &c., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive knowledge, or natural certainty wrought into our very make and constitution."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707.

"Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can be drawn from the state of the passions for or against the Divine Benevolence, because they are not *innate* but acquired. This is frivolous. If we are so framed and placed in such circumstances, that all these various passions must be acquired; it is just the same thing as if they had been planted in us originally."—Balguy, *Divine Benevolence*, p. 100, note.

"Ni nos idées, ni nos sentiments, ne sont *innés*, mais ils sont *naturels*, fondés sur la constitution de notre esprit et de

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notre ame, et sur nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous environne." —Turgot, *Œuvres*, tom. iv., p. 308; quoted by Cousin, *Œuvres*, 1 serie, tom. iv., p. 202.

"We are prepared to defend the following propositions in regard to *innate ideas*, or constitutional principles of the mind. *First*,—Negatively, that there are no innate ideas in the mind (1.) as images or mental representations; nor (2.) as abstract or general notions; nor (3.) as principles of thought, belief, or action before the mind as principles. But, *Second*,—Positively (1.) that there are constitutional principles operating in the mind, though not before the consciousness as principles; (2.) that these come forth into consciousness as individual (not general) cognitions or judgments; and (3.) that these individual exercises, when carefully inducted, but only when so, give us primitive or philosophic truths. It follows that, while these native principles operate in the mind spontaneously, we are entitled to use them reflexly in philosophic or theologic speculations only after having determined their nature and rule by abstraction and generalization." M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, p. 508, 5th edit.

"Though man does not receive from his Maker either speculative or moral maxims, as rules of judgment and of conduct, like so many perfect *innate* propositions enforcing assent in his very infancy; yet he has received that constitution of mind which enables him to form to himself the general rules or first principles on which religion and science must be built, when he allows himself these advantages of cultivation and exercise, which every talent he possesses absolutely requires. And this is all that is pleaded for; and it is sufficient for the end. Nor is there anything either mystical, or unphilosophical, or unscriptural in the notion. For if the proposition be not strictly innate, it arises from an innate power, which, in a sound mind, cannot form a proposition in any other way that will harmonize with enlightened reason and purified moral sentiment than in that to which the natural bias of the mind leads." —Hancock, *On Instinct*, p. 414.

The doctrine of *innate ideas* is handled by Locke in his *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., and by most authors

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who treat of intellectual philosophy.—See also Ellis, *Knowledge of Divine Things*, pp. 59-86; Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, chap. 2.

INSTINCT (*ἐν* or *ἐντός* and *στίζω*, *intus pungo*), signifies an internal stimulus.

In its widest signification it has been applied to plants as well as to animals; and may be defined to be "the power or energy by which all organized forms are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species." It is more common, however, to consider *instinct* as belonging to animals. And in this view of it, Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part 1, chap. 2) has said:—"By *instinct* I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." An *instinct*, says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, chap. 18), "is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction."

"An instinct," says Dr. Whately (*Tract on Instinct*, p. 21), "is a blind tendency to some mode of action independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads."

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been referred to *instinct* as their spring. 1. Those which have reference to the preservation of individuals—as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack. 2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species—as the bringing forth and bringing up of their young.

The theories which have been proposed to explain the *instinctive* operations of the inferior animals may be arranged in three classes.

I. According to the *physical* theories, the operations of *instinct* are all provided for in the structure and organization of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed—

1. By *the mechanical play of bodily organs.* See Descartes, *Epistles;* Polignac, *Anti-Lucretius*, book vi.; Norris, *Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World*, part 2, ch. 2.

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2. By *Irritability:* Badham, *Insect Life;* Mason Good, *Book of Nature*, vol. ii., p. 132; Virey, *De la Physiologie dans ses rapports, avec la Philosophie*, p. 394.

3. By *Sensation:* Bushnan, *Philosophy of Instinct and Reason*, p. 178; Barlow, *Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy;* Kirby, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. ii., p. 255.

II. According to the *psychical* theories, the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those of understanding in man.

1. Mr. Coleridge calls *instinct* "the power of selecting and adapting means to a proximate end." But he thinks "that when *instinct* adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to *varying* circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior animals, an instinctive intelligence, which is not different in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense in man."—*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 193, 6th edit.; Green, *Vital Dynamics*, App. F, p. 88, or Coleridge's *Works*, vol. ii., App. B, 5.

2. Dr. Darwin contends (*Zoonomia*, vol. i., 4to, pp. 256-7), that what have been called the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are to be referred to experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species; "though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy."

3. Mr. Smellie (*Philosophy of Nat. Hist.*, vol. i., 4to, p. 155), instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards the power of reasoning as itself an *instinct*. He holds that "all animals are, in some measure, rational beings; and that the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are necessary results of the great variety of *instincts* which nature has been pleased to confer on the species."—p. 159.

III. According to the theories which may be called *hyper-psychical*, the phenomena of *instinct* are the results of an intelligence, different from the human, which emanates upon the inferior animals from the supreme spirit or some subordinate spirit.

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Egypt, and took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds.

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, *A Philosophical Amusement on the Language of Beasts*, contends that the bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate spirits.

Mr. French (*Zoological Journal*, No. 1) holds that the actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and evil spirits; the former being the cause of the *benevolent*, and the latter of the *ferocious* instincts.

Others have referred the operations of *instinct* to the direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals.—See Newton, *Optics*, book iii., xx., query subjoined; *Spectator*, No. 120; Hancock, *Essay on Instinct.*

Dr. Reid has maintained (*Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. i., chap. 2), that in the human being many actions, such as sucking and swallowing, are done by *instinct;* while Dr. Priestley (*Examin. of Reid*, &c., p. 70) regards them as automatic or acquired. And the interpretation of natural signs and other acts which Dr. Reid considers to be instinctive, Dr. Priestley refers to association and experience.—*V.* APPETITE.

INTELLECT (*intelligo*, to choose between, to perceive a difference).—*Intellect*, *sensitivity*, and *will*, are the three heads under which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now generally arranged. In this use of it, the term *intellect* includes all those powers by which we acquire, retain, and extend our knowledge, as perception, memory, imagination, judgment, &c. "It is by those powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature commonly called his *intellect* or *understanding* that man acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view; and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisitions he has made."—Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, Introd.

The *intellectual* powers are commonly distinguished from the *moral* powers; inasmuch as it is admitted that the

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moral powers partake partly of the *intellect* and partly of the *sensitivity*, and imply not only *knowledge* but *feeling*.

And when the moral powers are designated active, it is not meant to assert that in exercising the intellectual powers the mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate that while the function of the intellectual powers is to give knowledge, the function of the active and moral powers is to prompt and regulate actions.

Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphysics*, book ii., chap. 7) reduces the gnostic powers to two, viz.—*sense* and *intellect*. Under sense he includes the phantasy and also the comparing faculty, and that by which we apprehend ideas, either single or in combination. This he considers to be partly rational, and shared by us with the brutes. But *intellect* or νοῦς, he considers peculiar to man—it is the faculty by which we generalize and have ideas altogether independent of sense. He quotes Hierocles on the golden verses of Pythagoras, p. 160, edit. Needham), as representing the λόγος or ψυχὴ λογική, as holding a middle place betwixt the irrational or lowest part of our nature and intellect, which is the highest.

"The term *intellect* is derived from a verb (*intelligere*), which signifies to *understand:* but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than the understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual."—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, introd. 12.

"*Understanding* is Saxon and *intellect* is Latin for nearly the same idea: perhaps *understanding* describes rather the power of inference, a quickness at perceiving that which *stands under* the object of contemplation: perhaps *intellect* describes rather the power of judgment, a quickness at *choosing between* (*inter* and *legere*) the objects of contemplation."—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

Intellect and Intellection.—"The mind of man is, by its native faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in the same manner as the sense does particular ones—that is, as the truth

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of these propositions—Socrates exists, An eagle flies, Bucephalus runs, is immediately perceived and judged of by the sense; so these contradictory propositions cannot be both true; What begins to exist has its rise from another; Action argues that a thing exists (or, as it is vulgarly expressed, a thing that is not, acts not), and such-like propositions, which the mind directly contemplates and finds to be true by its native force, without any previous notion or applied reasoning; which method of attaining truth is by a peculiar name styled *intellection*, and the faculty of attaining it the *intellect*."—Barrow, *Mathem. Lectures*, 1734, p. 72.

Intellect and Intelligence.—"By Aristotle, νοῦς is used to denote—

"1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge.

"2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments.

"The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by *intellectus* and *intelligentia;* and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

Intellect and *intelligence* are commonly used as synonymous. But Trusler has said, "It seems to me that *intellectus* ought to describe *art* or *power*, and *intelligentia* ought to describe *use* or *habit* of the understanding; such being the tendency of the inflections in which the words terminate. In this case *intellect* or understanding power is a gift of nature; and *intelligence*, or understanding habit, an accumulation of time. So discriminated, *intellect* is inspired, *intelligence* is acquired. The Supreme *Intellect*, when we are speaking of the Wisdom, the Supreme *Intelligence* when we are speaking of the Knowledge of God. Every man is endowed with understanding; but it requires reading to become a man of *intelligence*."—*V.* REASON, UNDERSTANDING.

Intellectus Patiens, and Intellectus Agens.—Aristotle distinguished between the *intellectus patiens* and *intellectus agens*. The former, perishing with the body (*De Anima*, cap. 5), by means of the senses, imagination, and memory, furnished the

matter of knowledge; the latter, separable from the body, and eternal, gave that knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive; but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal notions, but merely generalized ones. The *intellectus agens*, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the senses, actually evolves the idea which the *intellectus patiens* potentially possessed. His illustration is,—as light makes colours existing potentially, actually to be, so the *intellectus agens* converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the *intellectus patiens*. As the senses receive the forms of things expressed in matter, the *intellect* comprehends the universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common illustration of Aristotle is that the senses perceive the form of a thing, as it is *τό σῖμόν* or a height; the *intellect* has knowledge of it as resembling *τῳ κοίλῳ*, a hollow, out of which the height was produced.

Aristotle has often been said to reduce all knowledge to experience. But although he maintained that we could not shut our eyes and frame laws and causes for all things, yet he maintained, while he appealed to experience, that the *intellect* was the ultimate judge of what is true.

See Hermann Rassow, *Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina*, Berol., 1343.

According to Thomas Aquinas (*Adv. Gentes*, lib. iii., cap. 41,) "*Intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate.*" But he distinguished between the *intellect passive* and the *intellect active;* the one receiving impressions from the senses, and the other reasoning on them. Sense knows the individual, *intellect* the universal. You see a triangle, but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this power of generalizing which specializes man and makes him what he is, *intelligent.*

INTENT or INTENTION (*in-tendo*, to tend to), in morals and in law, means that act of the mind by which we contemplate

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and design the accomplishment of some end. It is followed by the adoption and use of suitable means. But this is more directly indicated by the word *purpose*. "He had long harboured the *intention* of taking away the life of his enemy, and for this *purpose* he provided himself with weapons." *Purpose* is a step nearer action than *intention*. But both in law and in morals, *intention*, according as it is right or wrong, good or bad, affects the nature or character of the action following. According to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, *intention* may altogether change the nature of an action. Killing may be no murder, if done with the *intention* of freeing the church from a persecutor, and society from a tyrant. And if a priest administers any of the sacraments without the *intention* of exercising his priestly functions, these sacraments may be rendered void.—*V.* ELECTION.

INTENTION (Logical).

> Quoth he, whatever others deem ye,
> I understand your metonymy,*
> Your words of second-hand *intention*,
> When things by wrongful names you mention.
>
> Butler, *Hudibras*, part ii., canto 3, l. 587.

Intention, with logicians, has the same meaning as *notion*; as it is by *notions* the mind tends towards or attends to objects. —*V.* NOTION.

Intention (First and Second).

"Nouns of the *first intention* are those which are imposed upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. Such are *man* and *stone*. But nouns of the *second intention* are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of what they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being subject to the *intention* which the mind makes concerning them; as, when we say that man is a *species*, and animal a *genus*."—Aquinas, *Opuscula*, xlii., art. 12, ad init.

Raoul le Breton, *Super Lib. Poster. Analyt.* He was a Thomist.

* "The transference of words from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what grammarians call metonymy. Thus a *door* signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the doorway) and a board which closes it; which are things neither similar nor analogous."—Whately, *Log.*, b. iii., § 10.

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See *Tractatio de Secundis Intentionibus secundum doctrinam* Scoti. By Sarnanus, 4to, Ursellis, 1622.

A *first intention* may be defined "a conception of a thing or things formed by the mind from materials existing without itself."

A *second intention* is "a conception of another conception or conceptions formed by the mind from materials existing in itself." Thus the conceptions "*man*, *animal*, *whiteness*," &c., are framed from marks presented by natural objects. "The conceptions, *genus*, *species*, *accident*, &c., are formed from the *first intentions* themselves viewed in certain relations to each other."—Mansel, *Note to Aldrich*, 1849, pp. 16, 17.

See *Review of Whately's Logic*, No. cxv., *Edin. Review.*

INTERPRETATION of NATURE.—"There are," says Bacon, (*Nov. Org.*, i., Aph. 19,) "two ways, and can be only two, of seeking and finding truth. One springs at once from the sense, and from particulars, to the most general axioms; and from principles thus obtained, and their truth assumed as a fixed point, judges and invents intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other obtains its axioms (that is, its truths) also from the sense and from particulars, by a connected and gradual progress, so as to arrive, in the last place, at the most general truths. This is the true way, as yet untried. The former set of doctrines we call," he says, (Aph. 26,) "for the sake of clearness, '*Anticipation of Nature*,' the latter the '*Interpretation of Nature*.'"

INTUITION (from *intueor*, to behold).—"Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call *intuitive* knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

"What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or attend to it, we are said to know by *intuition:* things which we

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know by *intuition*, cannot be made more certain by arguments, than they are at first. We know by *intuition* that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms are propositions known by *intuition*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

"*Intuition* has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice; according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of *intuition* are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to Euclid's *Elements*. In some other respects this innovation might perhaps be regarded as an improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present discussions."—Stewart, *Elements*, part ii., chap. 1, sect. 2.

"*Intuition* is properly attributed and should be carefully restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and which we have called the *Primary Principles*, whilst self-evidence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, or the *Secondary Principles* of truth."—Tatham, *Chart and Scale of Truth*, ch. 7, lect. 1.

On the difference between knowledge as *intuitive*, *immediate*, or *presentative*, and as *mediate*, or *representative*, see Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B.

Intuition is used in the extent of the German *Anschauung*, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an *individual*, thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 9.

"Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been employed to denote a kind of *appre-*

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hension and a kind of *judgment.* Under the former head it has been used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and present, in opposition to the *abstractive* knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination, and of the past in memory. 2. An immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious or mediate, apprehension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others, *intuition* is employed to designate the *cognition* as opposed to the *conception* of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge, which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the term to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of Time and Space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding). 4. Perception proper (the objective), in contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 5. The simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.

"Under the latter head it has only a single signification, viz.:—To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are called self-evident propositions."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works,* note A, sect. 5, p. 759.

INTUITION and CONCEPTION.—"The perceptions of sense are immediate, those of the understanding mediate only; sense refers its perceptions directly and immediately to an object. Hence the perception is singular, incomplex, and immediate, *i. e.*, is *intuition.* When I see a star, or hear the tones of a harp, the perceptions are immediate, incomplex, and intuitive. This is the good old logical meaning of the word *intuition.* In our philosophic writings, however, *intuitive* and *intuition* have come to be applied solely to propositions; it is here extended to the first elements of perception, whence such propositions spring. Again, *intuition*, in English, is restricted to perceptions *à priori;* but the established logical use and wont applies the word to every incomplex representation whatever; and

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it is left for further and more deep inquiry to ascertain what *intuitions* are founded on observation and experience, and what arise from *à priori* sources."—Semple, *Introd. to Metaphys. of Ethics*, p. 34.

INVENTION (*invenio*, to come in, or to come at) is the creation or construction of something which has not before existed. Discovery is the making manifest something which hitherto has been unknown. We *discover* or uncover what is hidden. We *come at* new objects. Galileo *invented* the telescope. Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood.

"We speak of the *invention* of printing, the *discovery* of America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of the *invention* of America, you feel at once how unsuitable the language is. And why? Because Columbus did not make that to be which before him had not been. America was there before he revealed it to European eyes; but that which before was, he showed to be; he withdrew the veil which hitherto had concealed it, he *discovered* it."—Trench, *On Words.*

Newton *discovered* the law of gravitation, but Watt *invented* the steam engine. We speak with a true distinction, of the *inventions* of Art, the *discoveries* of Science.

In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the older writers, to *invent* is currently used for to *discover*. Thus Bacon says, "Logic does not pretend to *invent* science, or the axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a *cuique in sua arte credendum*."—*Adv. of Learning.*

IRONY (εἰρωνεία, dissimulation), is an ignorance purposely affected to provoke or confound an antagonist. It was very much employed by Socrates against the Sophists. In modern times it was adopted by Burke in his *Defence of Natural Society*, in which, assuming the person of Bolingbroke, he proves, according to the principles of that author, that the arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally lie against civil, institutions. Sir William Drummond, in his *Œdipus Judaicus*, maintained that the history of the twelve patriarchs is a mythical representation of the signs of the Zodiac. Dr. Townsend, in his *Œdipus Romanus*, attempts to show that upon the same principles the twelve patriarchs

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were prophecies of the twelve Cæsars. Dr. Whately, in a pamphlet entitled *Historic Doubts*, attempted to show that objections similar to those against the Scripture-history, and much more plausible, might be urged against all the received accounts of Napoleon Bonaparte.

JUDGMENT.—"A judgment is a combination of two concepts, related to one or more common objects of possible intuition." —Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 60.

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either *problematical*, *assertive*, or *demonstrable*; or, in other words, the results of *opinion*, of *belief*, or of *science*.

"The *problematical judgment* is neither subjectively nor objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of certainty; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testimony, we can but form a *problematical judgment*, and must admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our decision.

"The *assertive judgment* is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is therefore *subjectively*, but not *objectively*, certain. It commends itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise.

"The *demonstrative judgment* is both *subjectively* and *objectively* true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical

axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theories of mathematics and the laws of physical science." —Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 304-6.

Port Royal definition:—"*Judgment* is that operation of the mind through which, joining different ideas together, it affirms or denies the one or the other; as when, for instance, having the ideas of the earth and roundness, it affirms or denies that the earth is round."

When expressed in words a *judgment* is called a proposition. According to Mr. Locke, *judgment* implies the comparison of two or more ideas. But Dr. Reid says he applies the word *judgment* to every determination of the mind concerning what is true or false, and shows that many of these determinations are simple and primitive beliefs (not the result of comparing two or more ideas), accompanying the exercise of all our faculties, *judgments* of nature, the spontaneous product of intelligence.—*Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 1.

Chap. 4.—"One of the most important distinctions of our *judgments* is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument."

In his *Inquiry*, chap. 2, sect. 4, he shows that *judgment* and belief, so far from arising from the comparison of ideas, in some cases precede even simple apprehension.

The same view has been taken by Adolphe Garnier, in his *Traité des Facultés de l'ame*, 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1852.

Judgments, Analytic, Synthetic, and Tautologous.—"Some *judgments* are merely explanatory of their subject, having for their predicate a conception which it fairly implies, to all who know and can define its nature. They are called *analytic judgments* because they *unfold* the meaning of the subject, without determining anything new concerning it. If we say that 'all triangles have three sides,' the *judgment* is *analytic*; because having three sides is always implied in a right notion of a triangle. Such *judgments*, as declaring the nature or essence of the subject, have been called 'essential propositions.'

"*Judgments* of another class attribute to the subject something not directly implied in it, and thus increase our knowledge. They are called *synthetic*, from *placing together* two

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notions not hitherto associated. 'All bodies possess power of attraction' is a *synthetic judgment*, because we can think of bodies without thinking of attraction as one of their immediate primary attributes.

"We must distinguish between *analytic* and *tautologous judgments*. Whilst the *analytic* display the meaning of the subject, and put the same *matter* in a new *form*, the *tautologous* only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter in the same form, as 'whatever is, is.' 'A spirit is a spirit.'

"It is a misnomer to call *analytic judgments* identical propositions.—Mill, *Log.*, b. i., chap. 6. 'Every man is a living creature' would not be an identical proposition unless 'living creature' denoted the same as 'man;' whereas it is far more extensive. Locke understands by identical propositions only such as are tautologous (b. iv., ch. 8, 3)."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 194, 195.

JURISPRUDENCE (*jurisprudentia*, the science of rights).—Some refer the Latin word *jus* to *jussum*, the supine of the verb *jubeo*, to order or enact. Others refer it to *justum*, that which is just and right. But as right is, or ought to be, the foundation of positive law, a thing is *jussum*, *quia justum est*—made law because it was antecedently just and right.

Jurisprudence is the science of rights in accordance with positive law. It is distinguished into universal and particular. "The former relates to the science of law in general, and investigates the principles which are common to all positive systems of law, apart from the local, partial, and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by which these systems respectively are distinguished from one another. Particular *jurisprudence* treats of the laws of particular states; which laws are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of universal *jurisprudence* itself, specifically developed and applied."

There is a close connection between *jurisprudence* and *morality*, so close that it is difficult to determine precisely the respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But while *morality* enjoins obedience to that law in all its extent, *jurisprudence* exacts obedience to it only in so far as the law

of nature has been recognized in the law of nations or the positive institutions of society. *Morality* is, therefore, more extensive than *jurisprudence*. *Morality* has equal reference to the whole of human duty. *Jurisprudence* has special reference to social duty. All social duty as enjoined by the light of nature—whether included under justice or benevolence—belongs to *morality*. *Jurisprudence* treats chiefly or almost exclusively of duties of justice, which have been made the subject of positive law; which duties of benevolence cannot well be. The rules of *morality* as such, are enforced merely by the law within; but in so far as they have been adopted by *jurisprudence*, they can be enforced by external law. The *moralist* appeals to our sense of duty, the *jurist* to a sense of authority or law. "As the sense of duty is the sense of moral necessity simply, and excluding the sense of physical (or external) compulsion, so the sense of law is the sense of the same necessity, in combination with the notion of physical (or external) compulsion in aid of its requirements."—Foster, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, p. 39.

The difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence* as to extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of signification between the word *right*, when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. *Morality* contemplates all that is *right* in action and disposition. *Jurisprudence* contemplates only that which one man has a *right* to from another. "The adjective *right*," says Dr. Whewell (*Elements of Morality*, No. 84), "has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is a *right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say, that, a poor man has *no right* to relief; but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields; but to do so would not *be right*." So that the sphere of *morality* is wider than that of *jurisprudence*;—the former embracing all that is *right*, the latter only particular *rights* realized or vested in particular persons.

Morality and *jurisprudence* differ also in the immediate ground of obligation. *Morality* enjoins us to do what is *right*, because it is *right*. *Jurisprudence* enjoins us to give to others their *right*, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so; but, appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. And this difference between the immediate ground of obligation in matters of *morality* and matters of *jurisprudence*, gives rise to a difference of meaning in the use of some words which are generally employed as synonymous. For example, if regard be had to the difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence*, *duty* is a word of wider signification than *obligation*; just as *right*, the adjective, is of wider signification than *right*, the substantive. It is my *duty* to do what is *right*. I am under *obligation* to give another man his *right*. A similar shade of difference in meaning may be noticed in reference to the words *ought* and *obliged*. I *ought* to do my duty; I am *obliged* to give a man his *right*. I am not *obliged* to relieve a distressed person, but I *ought* to do so.

These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that what is enjoined by *jurisprudence* is of *perfect obligation*, and what is enjoined only by *morality* is of *imperfect obligation*,—that is, that we may or may not do what our conscience dictates, but that we can be compelled to do what positive law demands. But these phrases of *perfect* and *imperfect obligation* are objectionable, in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of *morality* as inferior to those of *jurisprudence*—the dictates of conscience as of less authority than the enactments of law—whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of nature.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis;* Puffendorff, *De Officio Hominis et Civis;* Leibnitz, *Jurisprudentia;* Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws;* Burlamaqui, *Principles of Natural Law;* Rutherforth, *Institutes of Natural Law;* Mackintosh, *Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations;* Lerminier, *Sur le Droit.*

JUSTICE (δικαιοσύνη, *justitia*), is one of the four cardinal virtues. It consists, according to Cicero (*De Finibus*, lib. v., cap. 23), *in suo cuique tribuendo*, in according to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. The word righteousness is used in our translation of the Scripture in a like extensive signification. As opposed to equity, *justice* (τὸ νομικόν) means doing merely what positive law requires, while equity (τὸ ἴσον) means doing what is fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. *Justice* is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of what is right. And laws are just or unjust in so far as they do or do not conform to that idea.

"To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Montesquieu (*Spirit of Laws*, book i., chap. 1), "is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference."

Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and political. The first consists in doing *justice* between man and man as men; the second, in doing *justice* between the members of a family or household; and the third, in doing *justice* between the members of a community or commonwealth. These distinctions are taken by More in his *Enchiridion Ethicum*, and are adopted by Grove in his *Moral Philosophy*.

Plato's *Republic* contains a delineation of *justice*.—Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. v.; Cicero, *De Finibus*.

Horace gives the idea of a just or good man.—*Epist.*, lib. i., 16, 40.—*V.* RIGHT, DUTY, EQUITY.

KABALA.—In Hebrew *kabal* signifies "to receive;" *masora* "to hand down." "The Kabalists believe that God has expressly committed his mysteries to certain chosen persons, and that they themselves have received those mysteries in trust, still further to hand them down to worthy recipients."—Etheridge, *Heb. Liter.*, p. 293.

The origin of the *kabala* has been carried back to Moses,

and even to Adam. The numerous allusions to it in the Mishna and Gemara, show, that under the Tanaim, a certain philosophy, or religious metaphysic, was secretly taught, and that this system of esoteric teaching related especially to the Creation and the Godhead. So early as A.D. 189, the time of the Mishna redaction, it was recognized as an established theosophy, the privilege of select disciples. Two works of the Mishnaic period are still extant in authentic and complete form, viz., *Sepher Tetsira* and the *Zohar*. The *kabala*, considered as a constructed science, is theoretical and practical. The practical department comprises a symbolical apparatus, and rules for the use of it. The theoretical consists of two parts—the *cosmogonic*, relating to the visible universe, and the *theogonic* and *pneumatological*, relating to the spiritual world and the perfections of the Divine nature. Pantheism is the foundation of both. The universe is a revelation of the Infinite—an immanent effect of His ever active power and presence. Towards the end of the fifteenth century the *kabala* was adopted by several Christian mystics. Raymond Lully, Reuchlin, Henry More, and others paid much attention to it.

Reuchlin, *De Arte Cabalistica*, fol., Hagen, 1517; *De Verbo Mirifico*, fol., Basil, 1494; Athanasius Kircher, *Œdipus Œgyptiacus*, fol., Rom., 1652; Henry More, *Cabbala*, fol., Lond., 1662; Ad. Franck, *La Kabbale*, 8vo, Paris, 1843; Etheridge, *Hebrew Literature*, 8vo, Lond., 1856; Picus (J. Paris.), *Cabalistarum Selectiora Obscurioraque Dogmata*, 12mo, Venet., 1569.

KNOWLEDGE (γνῶσις, *cognitio*).

> . . . . "Learning dwells
> In heads replete with thoughts of other men,
> *Knowledge* in minds attentive to their own."

"*Knowledges* (or cognitions), in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any English lexicographer."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 763.

"*Knowledge* is the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.

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Where this perception is, there is *knowledge;* and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *knowledge.*"—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 1. And in chap. 14, he says, "The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. *First, knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. *Secondly, judgment*, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so." *Knowledge* is here opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to certainty, as well as to opinion. "And," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., chap 3), "I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, for calling *knowledge* a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty."

"*Knowledge* implies three things,—1st, *Firm Belief;* 2d, Of what is *true;* 3d, On sufficient *grounds.* If any one, *e. g.*, is in *doubt* respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to *know* the proposition proved by it; if, again, he is fully *convinced* of anything that is not *true*, he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it; lastly, if two persons are each *fully confident*, one, that the moon is inhabited, and the other, that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true), neither of them could properly be said to *know* the truth, since he cannot have sufficient *proof* of it."—Whately, *Log.*, book iv., chap 2, § 2, note.

Knowledge supposes three terms: a *being* who knows, an *object* known, and a *relation* determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation properly constitutes *knowledge.*

But this relation may not be exact, in conformity with the nature of things; *knowledge* is not *truth. Knowledge* is a subjective conception—a relative state of the human mind; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its object. *Truth,* on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal conceptions.

Truth has its source in God; *knowledge* proceeds from man. *Knowledge* is true and perfect from the moment that our conception is really conformable to that which is—from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view, truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thought with the nature of its object.

But truth is not yet *certitude*. It may exist in itself without being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired it by the employment of method. *Certitude* is thus truth brought methodically to the human intelligence,—that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indirectly; and that we may have of these truths, howsoever remote, a *certainty* as complete as that of the point of departure.

Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is *the relation of truth to knowledge*, the relation of man to God, of ontology to psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, to individualize the truth in us; and from this individualization results the *certitude* which becomes, in some sort, personal, as *knowledge;* all the while preserving the impersonal nature of *truth*.

Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the one *subjective*—man or the human consciousness; the other *objective* and absolute—the Supreme Being. God and consciousness are the two arbiters of certitude.—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 34.

"The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two species, *cognitio intuitiva*, and *cognitio abstractiva*. By intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate presentation of the *real individual object;* by abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the medium of a general term; the one being, in modern language, a *perception*, the other a *concept*."—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 158.

V. ABSTRACTIVE.

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Leibnitz took a distinction between *knowledge* as *intuitive* or *symbolical.* When I behold a triangle actually delineated, and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles, &c., according to the idea of it in my mind, my *knowledge* is *intuitive.* But when I use the word triangle, and know what it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea of it, my *knowledge* is blind or *symbolical.*—Leibnitz, *De Cognitione*, &c.; Wolf, *Psychol. Empir.*, sect. 286, 289.

Knowledge as Immediate and **Presentative** or **Intuitive**—and **as Mediate** and **Representative** or **Remote.**

"A thing is known *immediately* or *proximately*, when we cognize it *in itself; mediately* or *remotely*, when we cognize it *in or through something numerically different from itself.* Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the *fact* of its existence; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the *possibility* of its existence.

"An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *itself presented* to observation, may be called a *presentative;* and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, *viewed by the mind face to face*, may be called an *intuitive* cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation*, may be called a *representative* cognition.

"A thing known is an *object* of knowledge.

"In a *presentative* or immediate cognition there is *one sole object;* the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a *representative* or mediate cognition there may be discriminated *two objects;* the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being numerically different.

"A thing known *in itself* is the (sole) *presentative* or *intuitive object* of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a *presentative* or *intuitive knowledge.* A thing known *in and through something else* is the *primary*, *mediate*, *remote*, *real*, *existent*, or *represented object* of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quod;* and a thing *through which something else is known* is the

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secondary, *immediate*, *proximate*, *ideal*, *vicarious*, or *representative object* of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quo* or *per quod*. The former may likewise be styled—*objectum entitativum*."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B, sect. 1.

Knowledge, in respect of the mode in which it is obtained, is *intuitive* or *discursive*—*intuitive* when things are seen in themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them—as, a whole is greater than any of its parts—*discursive* when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In respect of its strength, *knowledge* is *certain* or *probable*. If we attend to the degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either *science*, or *art*, or *experience*, or *opinion*, or *belief*—*q. v.*

"*Knowledge* is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale; but a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's estate."—Bacon.—*V.* CERTAINTY, TRUTH, WISDOM.

E.—"The ends of language in our discourse with others are chiefly these three: first, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another; secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible; and thirdly, thereby to convey knowledge of things."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., ch. 10.

Language has been thus divided by Mons. Duval-Jouve, *Logic*, p. 201:—

Languages are	Natural	Absolute	*Cries and Gestures.*
		Conventional	*Speech.*
	Artificial	Absolute	*Painting, Sculpture.*
		Conventional	*Emblems, Telegraphic Signs, Hieroglyphics, Writing.*

Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. ii., sect. 2.—*V.* SIGNS.

LAUGHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridiculous. This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which prompts

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it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals.*—Hutcheson, *Essay on Laughter;* Beattie, *Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition;* Akenside, *Pleasures of Imagin.*, book iii., *Spectator*, Nos. 47 and 249.

LAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying "to lay down."

"All things that are have some operation not violent or casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *law*."—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i., sect 2.

"*Laws* in their most extended signification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has his laws."—Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, book i., ch. 1.

Thus understood, the word comprehends the *laws* of the physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary signification was that of a command or a prohibition, addressed by one having authority to those who had power to do or not to do. There are in this sense *laws* of society, *laws* of morality, and *laws* of religion—each resting upon their proper authority. But the word has been transferred into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. And when a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has been established, and say it recurs according to a *law*. On the analogy between political *laws* or *laws* proper, and those which are called metaphorically *laws* of nature, see Lindley, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, App., p. 1.

Austin, *Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, p. 186.

Law and Cause.

The word *law* expresses the constant and regular order according to which an energy or agent operates. It may thus

* The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful; and Montaigne said he was not sure whether his favourite cat might not sometimes be laughing as much *at* him as *with* him.

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be distinguished from *cause*—the latter denoting *efficiency*, the former denoting the mode according to which efficiency is developed. "It is a perversion of language," says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 1), "to assign any *law*, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A *law* presupposes an agent; this is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing, is nothing." To the same purpose Dr. Reid has said, "The *laws* of nature are the rules according to which effects are produced; but there must be a *cause* which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never steered a ship, nor the *law* of gravity never moved a planet."

"Those who go about to attribute the origination of mankind (or any other effect) to a bare order or *law* of nature, as the primitive effecter thereof, speak that which is perfectly irrational and unintelligible; for although a *law* or rule is the method and order by which an intelligent being may act, yet a *law*, or rule, or order, is a dead, unactive, uneffective, thing of itself, without an agent that useth it, and exerciseth it as his rule and method of action. What would a *law* signify in a kingdom or state, unless there were some person or society of men that did exercise and execute, and judge, and determine, and act by it, or according to it?"—Hale, *Prim. Origin.*, chap. 7, sect. 4.

To maintain that the world is governed by *laws*, without ascending to the superior reason of these *laws*—not to recognize that every *law* implies a legislator and executor, an agent to put it in force, is to stop half-way; it is to hypostatize these *laws*, to make beings of them, and to imagine fabulous divinities in ignoring the only God who is the source of all *laws*, and who governs by them all that lives in the universe.—See Tiberghien, *Essai des Connais. Hum.*, p. 743.

"A *law* supposes an agent and a power; for it is the mode, according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the *law*

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depends, producing the effects which the *law* prescribes, the *law* can have no efficacy, no existence. Hence we infer, that the intelligence by which the *law* is ordained, the power by which it is put into action, must be present at all times and in all places, where the effects of the *law* occur; that thus the knowledge and the agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion of the universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and change. The *laws* of matter are the *laws* which he, in his wisdom, prescribes to his own acts; his universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of events; his universal agency, the only organ of any efficient force."—Whewell, *Astronomy*, p. 361.

Law, Physical, Mental, Moral, Political.

Laws may acquire different names from the difference in the agents or energies which operate according to them. A stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height proportional to the force with which it is thrown, and then falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place according to *physical laws*, or what are commonly called *laws* of *nature*.—See M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b. ii., chap. 1.

"Those principles and faculties are the general *laws* of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general *laws* we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science."—Stewart, *Elements*, part i., Introd. When an impression has been made upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in the mind. And when a state of sensation has been long continued or often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. These are *mental laws*. We have a faculty of memory by which the objects of former consciousness are recalled; and this faculty operates according to the *laws* of association.

Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man, and may be understood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude should be cherished. These things are in accordance with the nature and condition

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of man, and with the will of God—that is, they are in accordance with the *moral law* of conscience and of revelation.

Political laws are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or disobeyed; but the disobedience of them implies punishment.

"The *intent* or *purpose* of a law is wholly different from the *motives* or *grounds* of the law. The former is its practical end or effect; the latter, the pre-existing circumstances which suggested and caused its enactment.* For example, the existence of a famine in a country may tend to the enactment of a poor law. In this case the famine is the motive or ground of the *law;* and the relief of the poor its intent or purpose. The one is its positive cause, the latter its desired effect."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Politics*, ch. 12, sect. 6.

In reference to the moral *law*, Hobbes and his followers have overlooked the difference between a *law* and the *principle* of the *law*. An action is not right merely in consequence of a *law* declaring it to be so. But the declaration of the *law* proceeds upon the antecedent rightness of the action.

Law and Form, "though correlative terms, must not, in strict accuracy, be used as synonymous. The former is used properly with reference to an operation; the latter with reference to its product. *Conceiving, judging, reasoning,* are subject to certain *laws; concepts, judgments, syllogisms,* exhibit certain *forms*."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 240.

LAW (Empirical).—"Scientific inquirers give the name of *empirical laws* to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason *why* such a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an *empirical*

* Suarez (*De Legibus*, iii., 20, sect. 2) says, "Sine dubio in animo legislatoris hæc duo distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas seu intentio ejus, secundum quam vult præcipere, et ratio, ob quam movetur."

The *ratio legis* and the *mens legis* are distinguished by Grotius (J. B. et P., ii., 16, sect. 8) with Barbeyrac's notes; and by Puffendorff (v., 12, sect. 10). The *purpose* of a *law* and its *motive* have often been confounded under the general term *ratio legis*.—See Savigny, *System des Rechts*, vol. i., pp. 216-224.

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law, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, and requires to be, accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the *why* of the *empirical law*, would be to state the laws from which it is derived; the ultimate causes on which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we should also know what are its limits; under what conditions it would cease to be fulfilled."—Mill, *Log.*, b. iii., chap. 16.

As instances of *empirical laws* he gives the local laws of the flux and reflux of the tides in different places; the succession of certain kinds of weather to certain appearances of the sky, &c. But these do not deserve to be called *laws.*

LEMMA (from λαμβάνω, to take for granted, to assume).—This term is used to denote a preliminary proposition, which, while it has no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serves to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a *lemma.* To prove some proposition in mechanics, some of the propositions in geometry may be taken as *lemmata.*

LIBERTARIAN.—"I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may claim the merit of adding the word *Libertarian* to the English language, as Priestley added that of *Necessarian.*"—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 88.

Both words have reference to the questions concerning liberty and necessity, in moral agency.

LIBERTY of the WILL or LIBERTY of a MORAL AGENT.

"The idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 21, sect. 8.

"By the *liberty* of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the *liberty*

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of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iv., ch. 1.

It has been common to distinguish *liberty* into *freedom from co-action*, and *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from *co-action*. This general explanation of freedom agrees equally with *bodily* freedom, *mental* freedom, and *moral* freedom. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have *bodily* freedom, when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion—*mental* freedom, when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind—and *moral* freedom, when our moral principles and feelings are allowed to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Now it is with freedom regarded as moral that we have here to do—it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light of reason, and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind is called *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from necessity is also called *liberty of election*, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into *liberty of contrariety*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contrary, as right or wrong, good or evil; and *liberty of contradiction*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another.

Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called *liberty of indifference*, because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. *Liberty of indifference*, however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more

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inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has *liberty of election*, if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase *liberty of indifference* be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with *liberty of indifference* in the former of these senses would not be a reasonable being; and an action done without a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent.

Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect to the *object*, and 2d, in respect of the *action*. In both respects it may be *liberty* of, 1st, *contrariety*, or 2d, of *contradiction*.

Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the will is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or contrary—as when a man is free, for the sake of health, to take hot water or cold water. *Liberty of contradiction* is when the will is indifferent to any object, and to its opposite or contradictory—as walking and not walking.

In respect of the act of will, there is *liberty of contrariety*, when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions concerning the same particular object,—as to choose or reject some particular good. There is *liberty of contradiction*, when the will is free not to contrary action, but to act or not to act, that is, to will or not to will, to exercise or suspend volition.

Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, *liberty of specification*, and 2d, *liberty of exercise*. The former may be said to coincide with *liberty* of contrariety, and the latter with *liberty* of contradiction.—Baronius, *Metaphys.*, p. 96.

belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vegetables. Birth and development, decay and death, are peculiar to living bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct on the one hand from matter and its forces, and on the other, from mind and its energies? According to Descartes, Borelli, Boerhäave, and others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter.

According to Bichat, there is nothing in common—but rather an antagonism—between the forces of dead matter and the phenomena of life, which he defines to be "the sum of functions which resist death." Bichat and his followers are called *Organicists*. Barthez and others hold that there is a vital principle distinct from the organization of living bodies, which directs all their acts and functions which are only vital, that is, without feeling or thought. Their doctrine is *Vitalism*. The older doctrine of Stahl was called *Animism*, according to which the soul, or *anima mundi*, presides not only over the functions of the sensibility and thought but over all the functions and actions of the living economy.

Are *life* and *sensibility* two things essentially distinct, or two things essentially united?

Irritability and *Excitability* are terms applied to the sensibility which vegetables manifest to external influences, such as light, heat, &c. Bichat ascribed the functions of absorption, secretion, circulation, &c., which are not accompanied with feeling, to what he called *organic sensibility*.

The characteristics of the several kingdoms of nature given by Linnæus are the following:—Lapides *crescunt;* vegetabilia *crescunt* et *vivunt;* animalia *crescunt vivunt* et *sentiunt*.

The theories of life and its connection with the phenomena of mind are thus classified by Morell, *Psychology*, p. 77, note:—

"1. The *chemical* theory. This was represented by Sylvius in the seventeenth century, who reduced all the phenomena of vital action and organization to *chemical processes*. 2. The *mechanical* theory. This falls to the time when Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, and Boerhäave represented the human frame as one great hydraulic machine. 3. The *dynamical* theory. Here we have the phenomena of mind and of life drawn closely together. The writings of Stahl especially show this point of view. He regarded the whole man as being the product of certain *organic powers*, which evolve all the various manifestations of human life, from the lowest physical processes to the highest intellectual. 4. The theory of *irritation*. This we find more especially amongst the French physiologists, such as Bichat, Majendie, and others, who

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regard life as being the product of a mere organism, acted on by physical stimuli from the world without. 5. The theory of *evolution*. Schultz and others of the German writers of the same school, regard life as a regular *evolution*, created by opposing powers in the universe of existence, from the lowest forms of the vital functions to the highest spheres of thought and activity. To these speculators nature is not a fixed reality, but a *relation*. It is perpetual movement, an unceasing *becoming*, a passing from death to life, and from life to death. And just as physical life consists in the tension of the lower powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of its higher powers. 6. The theory of the *Divine ideal*. Here, Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the *ideal* side of nature, as well as the *real*, and united them together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus connected the whole dynamics of nature with their *Divine original*."

Plato, *Timæus;* Aristotle, *De Anima*, lib. ii., cap. 10; Descartes, *Œuvres*, par Cousin, tom. iv.; Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard; Coleridge, *Posthumous Essay: Hints towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life.*

(λογική, λόγος, reason, reasoning, language).—The word *logica* was early used in Latin; while ἡ λογική and τὸ λογικόν were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle did not use either of them. His writings which treat of the syllogism and of demonstration were entitled *Analytics* (*q. v.*) The name *organon* was not given to the collected series of his writings upon *logic* till after the invention of printing. The reason of the name is, that *logic* was regarded as not so much a science in itself as the *instrument* of all science. The Epicureans called it κανονική, the rule by which true and false are to be tried. Plato in the Phædrus, has called it a *part* (μέρος), and in the Parmenides the organ (ὄργανον) of philosophy.—See Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, 8vo, Basil, 1842, pp. 48, 49. An old division of philosophy was into *logic*, *ethics*, and *physics*. But excluding physics, philosophy may be regarded as consisting of four parts—

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viz., *psychology*, *logic*, *ethics*, and *metaphysics* properly so called.

"*Logic* is derived from the word (λόγος), which signifies communication of thought usually by speech. It is the name which is generally given to the branch of inquiry (be it called science or art) in which the act of the mind in reasoning is considered, particularly with reference to the connection of thought and language."—De Morgan, *Formal Logic*, ch. 2.

"We divide logicians into three schools, according as they hold words, things, or conceptions, to be the subject of logic; and entitle them respectively, the *verbal*, the *phenomenal*, and the *conceptional*."—Chretien, *Logical Method*, p. 95.

"When we attend to the procedure of the human intellect we soon perceive that it is subject to certain supreme laws which are independent of the variable matter of our ideas, and which posited in their abstract generality, express the absolute and fixed rules not only of the human intellect, but of all thought, whatever be the subject which frames it or the object which it concerns. To determine those universal laws of thought in general, in order that the human mind in particular may find in all its researches a means of control, and an infallible criterion of the legitimacy of its procedure, is the object of *logic*. At the beginning of the *prior analytics*, Aristotle has laid it down that 'the object of *logic* is demonstration.'

"*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought as thought—that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, considered in itself, is subject."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 698, note.

"'*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought.' It is a science rather than an art. As the science of the necessary laws of thought it is pure. It only gives those principles which constitute thought; and pre-supposes the operation of those principles by which we gain the materials for thinking. And it is the science of the *form* or *formal laws* of thinking, and not of the *matter*."—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*.

—*V.* INTENTION, NOTION.

Others define *logic* to be the science of the laws of reason-

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ing. Dr. Whately has said, "*Logic* in its most extensive application, is the science as well as the art of reasoning. So far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a *science;* while so far as it investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions, it may be called the *art* of reasoning."

Kirwan had said (*Logic*, vol. i., p. 1), "*Logic* is both a science and an art; it is a *science* inasmuch as, by analyzing the elements, principles, and structure of arguments, it teaches us how to discover their truth or detect their fallacies, and point out the sources of such errors. It is an *art*, inasmuch as it teaches us how to arrange arguments in such manner that their truth may be most readily perceived or their falsehood detected." Sir William Hamilton thinks that Dr. Whately had this passage in view when he constructed his own definition; but he adds, "Not a single reason has been alleged to induce us to waver in our belief, that the *laws of thought*, and not the *laws of reasoning*, constitute the adequate object of the science."—*Discussions*, pp. 131-4.

According to the significations attached to the terms art and science, and according to the point of view in which it is regarded, *logic* may be called a science or an art, or both, that is, a scientific art.

Thought may manifest itself in framing concepts, or judgments, or reasonings; and *logic* treats of these under three corresponding heads. Method, which is the scientific arrangement of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. But to some it appears that method belongs more properly to psychology than to *logic*. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, who takes this view, has said (*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Logique"), "In *logic* considered as a science there are necessarily four essential parts, which proceed from the simple to the compound, and in the following order, which cannot be changed: 1, A theory of the elements of a proposition; 2, A theory of propositions; 3, A general theory of reasoning formed of propositions connected with one another according to certain laws; and, lastly, a theory of that special and supreme kind

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of reasoning which is called demonstration, and gives assurance to the mind of man of the forms of truth, if it be not truth itself."

LOVE and HATRED are the two genetic or mother passions or affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of something which is regarded as good; and the latter by the contemplation of something which is regarded as evil. Hence springs a desire to seek the one, and a desire to shun the other; and desire, under its various forms and modifications, may be found as an element in all the manifestations of the sensitivity.

MACROCOSM and MICROCOSM (μακρός, large; μικρός, small; κόσμος, world).

"As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if (as some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man a *microcosm*, because his body is really made up of all the several kinds of creatures the *macrocosm* or greater world consists of, and so is but a model or epitome of the universe."—Boyle, *Works*, vol. ii., p. 54.

Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the *macrocosm* and the *microcosm*, according to which man was an epitome of creation, and the universe was man on a grand scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. Hence arose Alchemy and Astrology, which were united in the Hermetic medicine. Such views are fundamentally pantheistic, leading to the belief that there is only one substance, manifesting itself in the universe by an infinite variety, and concentred in man as in an epitome. Van Helmont, Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and others held some of these views.

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Dr. Reid has said (*Active Pow.*, essay iii., part i., chap. 1), "Man has not, without reason, been called an epitome of the universe. His body, by which his mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material system, is subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all."

"Man is not only a *microcosm*, in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most sublime."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, cap. 17.

"Man is a living synthesis of the universe."—Tiberghien.

Cousin (*Introd. aux Œuvres Inedites d'Abelard*, p. 127,) has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de Chartres, entitled *Megacosmus et Microcosmus.*

MAGIC (*μαγεία*, from *μάγος*, a Magian).—"It is confessed by all of understanding that a *magician* (according to the Persian word) is no other than a studious observer and expounder of divine things."—Raleigh, *Hist. of the World*, b. i., c. 11, s. 3.

But while *magic* was used primarily to denote the study of the more sublime parts of knowledge, it came at length to signify a science of which the cultivators, by the help of demons or departed souls, could perform things miraculous.

"*Natural magic* is no other than the absolute perfection of natural philosophy."—Raleigh, *Hist. of the World*, b. i., c. 11, s. 2. Baptista Porta has a treatise on it, which was published in 1589 and 1591. It is characterized by Bacon (*De Augm.*, lib. iii.) as full of credulous and superstitious observations and traditions on the sympathies and antipathies and the occult and specific qualities of things. Sir D. Brewster has a treatise under the same title, but of very different character and contents, and answering to the definition of Raleigh. Campanella, *De Sensu Rerum et Magia*, 4to, Par., 1637; Longinus, *Trinon Magicum*, 12mo, Francf., 1616.

MAGNANIMITY and EQUANIMITY (*magnus*, great; *aequus*, even; *animus*, mind), are two words which were much used by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers.

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Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and evil of this life—so that while the former was not necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The favourite example of *magnanimity*, among the Romans, was Fabius Maximus, who, amidst the provocation of the enemy and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed to give battle till he saw how he could do so successfully.

Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and means the preservation of an even mind in the midst of vicissitude—neither elated unduly by prosperity nor depressed unduly by adversity. *Equanimity* springs from *Magnanimity*. Indeed both these words denote frames or states of mind from which special acts of virtue spring—rather than any particular virtue. They correspond to the active and passive *fortitude* of modern moralists.

> "Aequam memento rebus in arduis
> Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
> Ab insolenti temperatam
> Lætitia, moriture Delli."—Hor.

> . . . . . "Est hic,
> Est ubi vis, animus si te non deficit æquus."—Hor.

> "True happiness is to no spot confined;
> If you preserve a firm and equal mind,
> 'Tis here, 'tis there, 'tis everywhere."

MANICHEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century), is the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or powers, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained dualism so as to give the supremacy to the good principle; and that Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute.

The doctrine of *manicheism* was ingrafted upon Christianity about the middle of the third century. The Cathari or Albigenses who appeared in the twelfth century are said also to have held the doctrine of *dualism or ditheism*—*q. v.*

MANICHEISM—

To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing principles were equal, they would neutralize each other—if they were unequal, the stronger would prevail, so that there would be nothing but evil, or nothing but good in the world; which is contrary to fact.

Matter, *Hist. Critiq. du Gnosticism*, 3 tom., Paris, 1843; Beausobre, *Hist. du Manichéisme.*

MATERIALISM.—"The *materialists* maintain that man consists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses; and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain."—Belsham, *Moral Philosophy*, chap. xi., sect. 1. The doctrine opposed to this is *spiritualism*, or the doctrine that there is a spirit in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In like manner he who maintains that there is but one substance (*unisubstancisme*), and that that substance is matter, is a *materialist.* And he who holds that above and beyond the material frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining and directing it, is a *spiritualist.* The philosopher who admits that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the universe, is a perfect *spiritualist.* He who denies spirit in man or in the universe, is a perfect *materialist.* But some have been inconsistent enough to admit a spirit in man and deny the existence of God, while others have admitted the existence of God and denied the soul of man to be spiritual.—*V.* IMMATERIALITY.

Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateriality of the soul. Belsham and Priestley have defended *materialism* without denying the existence of God.

Priestley, *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit; Three Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity;* Price, *Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity.*

MATHEMATICS (*μαθηματική* [sc. *ἐπιστήμη*] *τὰ μαθήματα*), according to Descartes, treat of order and measures. "*Illa omnia tantum, in quibus ordo vel mensura examinatur, ad mathesim referri, nec interesse utrum in numeris vel figuris, vel astris, vel sonis, aliove quovis objecto talis mensura quærenda est.*"—Reg. ad Direct. Ingenii, Reg. 4.

MATHEMATICS—

Mathematics are either *Pure* or *Mixed.* Arithmetic, Geometry, Algebra, and the Differential and Integral Calculus belong to *Pure Mathematics. Mixed Mathematics* is the application of Pure Mathematics to physical science in its various departments: *Mechanics*, *Hydrodynamics*, *Optics*, *Astronomy*, *Acoustics*, *Electricity*, *Magnetism*, &c., are physico-mathematical sciences. Among philosophers, Anaximander of Miletus, and Pythagoras are called mathematicians.

MATTER, as opposed to *mind* or *spirit* (*q.v.*), is that which occupies space, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of which we have any knowledge is either *matter* or *mind*, *i. e.*, *spirit. Mind* is that which knows and thinks. *Matter* is that which makes itself known by means of the bodily senses.

"The first form which *matter* assumes is extension, or length, breadth, and thickness—it then becomes *body.* If body were infinite there could be no *figure*, which is body bounded. But body is not physical body, unless it partake of or is constituted of one or more of the elements, fire, air, earth, or water."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. ii., c. 2.

According to Descartes the essence of *mind* is *thought*, and the essence of *matter* is *extension.* He said, Give me extension and motion, and I shall make the world. Leibnitz said the essence of all being, whether *mind* or *matter*, is *force.* *Matter* is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of physics may be called *dynamical*, in opposition to that of Newton, which may be called *mechanical;* because Leibnitz held that the monads possessed a vital or living energy. We may explain the phenomena of *matter* by the movements of ether, by gravity and electricity; but the ultimate reason of all movement is a force primitively communicated at creation, a force which is everywhere, but which while it is present in all bodies is differently limited; and this force, this virtue or power of action is inherent in all substances material and spiritual. Created substances received from the creative substance not only the faculty to act, but also to exercise their activity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz, *De Primæ Philosophiæ Emendatione et de Notione Substantiæ*, or *Nouveau*

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Systeme de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, in the *Journal des Savans*, 1695. On the various hypotheses to explain the activity of *matter*, see Stewart, *Outlines*, part ii., ch. 2, sect. 1, and *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, last edit., vol. ii., note A.

The properties which have been predicated as essential to *matter* are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, and motion; and by observation it is discovered to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c.

Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of *matter* into primary and secondary, and have said that our knowledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and absolute—while our knowledge of the latter, as of sound and smell, is obscure and relative. This distinction taken by Descartes, adopted by Locke and also by Reid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. And others who do not doubt the objective reality of *matter*, hold that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously upheld by Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D; and ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emile Saisset, in *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Matiere."

Matter and Form.

Matter as opposed to *form* (*q. v.*) is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all without distinguishing them from one another. Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else; and this something else is called its *subject* or *matter*. Such is iron to the boat, such is timber to the boat. *Matter* void of *form* was called ὕλη πρώτη, or, *prima materia*—(ὕλη, means wood.—*V.* HYLOZOISM). *Form* when united to *matter* makes it determinate and constitutes *body*—*q. v.*

"The term *matter* is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within the province of the art itself to supply. The *form* is that which is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In sculpture, the *matter* is the marble in its rough state as given

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to the sculptor; the *form* is that which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between *matter* and *form* in any mental operation is analogous to this. The former includes all that is given *to*, the latter all that is given *by*, the operation. In the division of notions, for example, the generic notion is that given to be divided; the addition of the difference in the art of division constitutes the species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated by logicians the *material*, Difference, the *formal* part of the species."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 226.

Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. iv.; Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 1; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 19.—*V.* ACTION, PROPOSITION.

MAXIM (*maxima propositio*, a proposition of the greatest weight), is used by Boethius as synonymous with *axiom*, or a self-evident truth.—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5. It is used in the same way by Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 7. "There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science." "By Kant, *maxim* was employed to designate a subjective principle, theoretical or practical, *i. e.*, one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. *Maxim* and *regulative principle* are, in the critical philosophy, opposed to *law* and *constitutive principle*."

In Morals, we have Rochefoucald's *Maxims*.

In Theology, Fenelon wrote *Maxims of the Saints*, and Rollin made a collection of *Maxims* drawn from holy writ.

MEMORY (from *memini*, preterite of the obsolete form *meneo* or *meno*, from the Greek μένειν, *manere*, to stay or remain. From the contracted form μναω comes μνήμη, the memory in which things remain. Lennep).—"The great Keeper, or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been."—Bishop Hall, *Righteous Mammon*.

Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with

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the additional consciousness that it has formerly been present to it. When this takes place we are said to *remember*, and the faculty of which *remembrance* is the act is *memory*.

Memory implies,—1. A mode of consciousness experienced. 2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of consciousness so that it may subsequently be revived without the presence of its object. 3. The actual revival of that mode of consciousness; and 4. The recognizing that mode of consciousness as having formerly been experienced.

"The word *memory* is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word *memory* is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a *retentive memory*, we use it in the former sense; when of a *ready memory*, in the latter."—Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 6.

Memory has, and must have, an object; for he that remembers must remember something, and that which he remembers is the object of memory. It is neither a decaying sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Condillac would have it to be; but a distinct and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of any other power. The objects of *memory* may be things external to us, or internal states and modes of consciousness; and we may remember what we have seen, touched, or tasted; or we may remember a feeling of joy or sorrow which we formerly experienced, or a resolution or purpose which we previously formed.

Hobbes would confine *memory* to objects of sense. He says (*Hum. Nature*, ch. 3, sect. 6), "By the senses, which are numbered according to the organs to be five, we take notice

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of the objects without us, and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice also, some way or other, of our conception, for when the conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same conception before, which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is impossible to the sense which is only of things present; this, therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal; not external as the rest, and is commonly called *remembrance.*"

Mr. Stewart holds that *memory* involves "a power of recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts that from time to time occur to us: a power which is not implied in that law of our nature which is called the association of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between *memory* and *association* is not very consistent with a further distinction which he takes between the *memory of things* and the *memory of events.* (*Elements*, chap. 6). "In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever; as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the mind by the name of *conception;* but in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of *memory.* In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past. The case is different with respect to the *memory of events.* When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time; so that, of every such act of *memory*, the idea of the past is a necessary concomitant." Mr. Stewart therefore supposes "that the remembrance of a past *event* is not a simple act of the mind; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it is to be referred. But the remembrance of a *thing* is not a simple act of the mind, any more than the remembrance of an *event.* The truth seems to

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be that *things* and *events* recur to the mind equally unclothed or unconnected with the notion of pastness. (See Young, *Intellect. Philosoph.*, lect. xvi.) And it is not till they are recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be said to be remembered. But the recognition is the act of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have formerly been present to the mind may again become present to it without being recognized. Nay, they may be entertained for a time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be regarded as remembered thoughts,* so that an act of *memory*, whether of things or events, is by no means a simple act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in any mental operation we can detect any single faculty acting independently of others. What we mean by calling them distinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar function; not that that function is exercised independently of other faculties. —*V.* FACULTY.

Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., c. 10), treats of *retention*. "The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways: first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view; which is called *contemplation*. The other way of *retention*, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is *memory*, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas."—*V.* RETENTION.

The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the *memory*, are chiefly—*Vividness*, *Repetition*, and *Attention*. When an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable

* Aristotle (*De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, cap. 1), has said that *memory* is always accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the notion of time have *memory*.

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manner—when it is frequently or familiarly observed—or when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more easily and surely remembered.

"The things which are best preserved by the *memory*," said Lord Herbert (*De Veritate*, p. 156), "are the things which *please or terrify*—which are *great* or *new*—to which much *attention* has been paid—or which have been oft *repeated*,—which are *apt to* the circumstances—or which have many things *related to them*."

The qualities of a good *memory* are *susceptibility*, *retentiveness*, and *readiness*.

The common saying that *memory* and judgment are not often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must be received with qualification.

Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced, and guided by what have been called the laws of *association—q. v.*

In its first manifestations, *memory* operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will; some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. *Spontaneous memory* is *remembrance*. *Intentional memory* is *recollection* or *reminiscence*.

The former in Greek is Μνήμη, and the latter Ἀνάμνησις. In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible of the influence which *association* has in regulating the exercise of this faculty.

By *memory*, we not only retain and recall former knowledge, but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means of *memory* that we have the notion of continued existence or duration; and also the persuasion of our personal identity, amidst all the changes of our bodily frame, and all the alterations of our temper and habits.

Memory, in its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is common to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle denied that they are capable of *recollection* or *reminiscence*, which is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present conscious-

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ness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. And Dr. Reid has remarked that the inferior animals do not measure time nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of time. In man *memory* is the condition of all experience, and consequently of all progress.

Memory in its exercises is very dependent upon bodily organs, particularly the brain. In persons under fever, or in danger of drowning, the brain is preternaturally excited; and in such cases it has been observed that *memory* becomes more remote and far-reaching in its exercise than under ordinary and healthy circumstances. Several authentic cases of this kind are on record. (See Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria;* De Quincey, *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater;* and Sir John Barrow, *Autobiography*, p. 398). And hence the question has been suggested, whether thought be not absolutely imperishable, or whether every object of former consciousness may not, under peculiar circumstances, be liable to be recalled?

Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia;* Beattie, *Dissertations;* Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iii.; Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 6.

MEMORIA TECHNICA, or MNEMONICS.—These terms are applied to artificial methods which have been devised to assist the memory. They all rest on the association of ideas. The relations by which ideas are most easily and firmly associated are those of contiguity in place and resemblance. On these two relations the principal methods of assisting the memory have been founded. The methods of *localization*, or local memory, associate the object which it is wished to remember with some place or building, all the parts of which are well known. The methods of *resemblance* or *symbolization*, establish some resemblance either between the things or the words which it is wished to remember, and some object more familiar to the mind. Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, technical verses have been framed for that purpose in various departments of study.

The topical or local memory has been traced back to Simonides, who lived in the sixth century, B.C. Cicero (*De Oratore*, ii., 86) describes a local memory or gives a Topology.

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Quintilian (xi., 2) and Pliny the naturalist (vii., 24) also describe this art.

In modern times, may be mentioned, Gray, *Memoria Technica*, 1730; and Feinagle, *New Art of Memory*, 1812.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.—The adjective *mental* comes to us from the Latin *mens*, or from the Greek μένος, or these may be referred to the German *meinen*, to mean, to mark. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the Latin *mens*, then *mental philosophy* will be the philosophy of the human mind, and will correspond with psychology. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the German *meinen*, to mean or to mark, then the phrase *mental philosophy* may be restricted to the philosophy of the mind in its intellectual energies, or those faculties by which it marks or *knows*, as distinguished from those faculties by which it *feels* or *wills*. It would appear that it is often used in this restricted signification to denote the philosophy of the intellect, or of the intellectual powers, as contradistinguished from the active powers, exclusive of the phenomena of the sensitivity and the will.

See Chalmers, *Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy*, c. 1.

MERIT (*meritum*, from μέρος, a part or portion of labour or reward), means good desert; having done something worthy of praise or reward.

> "Fear not the anger of the wise to raise;
> Those best can bear reproof, who *merit* praise."
>
> Pope, *Essay on Criticism.*

In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that we ought to do it; and when we have done it we experience a feeling of conscious satisfaction or self-approbation. We thus come by the idea of *merit* or good desert. The approbation of our own mind is an indication that God approves of our conduct; and the religious sentiment strengthens the moral one. We have the same sentiments towards others. When we see another do what is right, we applaud him. When we see him do what is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we say he has much *merit*. Such conduct appears to be deserving of reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. We are satisfied that under the government of God they will do so.

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The idea of *merit* then is a primary and natural idea to the mind of man. It is not an after thought to praise the doing of what is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but a spontaneous sentiment indissolubly connected with our idea of what is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its truthfulness by the structure of the human mind and the character of God.—See Price, *Review*, ch. 4.

The scholastic distinction between *merit of congruity* and *merit of condignity* is thus stated by Hobbes (*Of Man*, pt. i., ch. 14):—"God Almighty having promised paradise to those that can walk through this world according to the limits and precepts prescribed by Him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall *merit* paradise *ex congruo*. But because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God only; they say, no man can *merit* paradise *ex condigno*."—*V.* VIRTUE.

METAPHOR (μεταφορέω, to transfer).—"A *metaphor* is the transferring of a word from its usual meaning, to an analogous meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such transfer." Arist., *Poet.*, cap. 21. For example: the usual meaning of evening is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclusion, the conclusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all conclusions, we arrange in order the two we have alleged, and say, that "as evening is to the day, so is age to human life." Hence by an easy permutation (which furnishes at once two *metaphors*) we say alternately, that "evening is the age of the day," and that "age is the evening of life."—Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, p. 441.

"Sweet is primarily and properly applied to tastes; secondarily and improperly (*i. e.*, by analogy) to sounds.

"When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some *fanciful* analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament's sake, we call this a *metaphor*, as when we speak of a ship's *ploughing* the deep; the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to the ship." —Whately, *Log.*, b. iii., § 10.

METAPHOR and SIMILE.—"A *metaphor* differs from a *simile* in form only, not in substance. In a *simile*, the two

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subjects are kept distinct in the expression, as well as in the thought; in a *metaphor* they are kept distinct in the thought, but not in the expression. A hero resembles a lion; and upon that resemblance many *similies* have been founded by Homer and other poets. But let us invoke the aid of the imagination, and figure the hero to be a lion, instead of only resembling one; by that variation the *simile* is converted into a *metaphor*, which is supported by describing all the qualities of the lion that resemble those of the hero. (Arist., *Rhet.*, lib. iii., cap. 4.) When I say of some great minister, that 'he upholds the state like a pillar which supports the weight of a whole edifice,' I evidently frame a comparison; but when I say of the same minister, that 'he is a pillar of the state,' this is not a comparison but a *metaphor*. The comparison between the minister and the pillar is instituted in the mind, but without the aid of words which denote comparison. The comparison is only insinuated, not expressed; the one object is supposed to be so like the other, that, without formally drawing the comparison, the name of the one may be substituted for that of the other."—Irving, *English Composition*, p. 172.—*V.* ANALOGY, ALLEGORY.

METAPHYSICS.—This word is commonly said to have originated in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the collectors and conservers of the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion of them the words Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. But a late French critic, Mons. Ravaisson (*Essai sur la Metaphysique*, tom. i., p. 40), says he has found earlier traces of this phrase, and thinks it probable that, although not employed by Aristotle himself, it was applied to this portion of his writings by some of his immediate disciples. Whether the phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should *stand*, or that it should be *studied*, after the physics, in the collected works of Aristotle, are the two views which have been taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand after the physics. But in the order of science or study, Aristotle said, that after physics should come mathematics. And Derodon (*Proem. Metaphys.*) has given reasons why *metaphysics* should be studied after logic, and before physics and other parts of philosophy. But the

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truth is that the preposition μετά means *along with* as well as *after*, and might even be translated *above*. In Latin *metaphysica* is synonymous with *supernaturalia*. And in English Shakspeare has used *metaphysical* as synonymous with *supernatural*.

> . . . "Fate and *metaphysical* aid doth seem
> To have thee crowned."
>
> *Macbeth*, Act i., scene 3.

Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. i.) considered *metaphysical* as equivalent to *supernatural;* and is supported by an anonymous Greek commentator, whom Patricius has translated into Latin, and styles Philoponus.

But if μετά be interpreted, as it may, to mean *along with*, then *metaphysics* or metaphysical philosophy will be that philosophy which we should take *along with* us into physics, and into every other philosophy—that knowledge of causes and principles which we should carry with us into every department of inquiry. Aristotle called it the governing philosophy, which gives laws to all, but receives laws from none (*Metaphys.*, lib. i., cap. 2). Lord Bacon has limited its sphere, when he says, "The one part (of philosophy) which is *physics* enquireth and handleth the *material* and *efficient* causes; and the other which is *metaphysic* handleth the *formal* and *final* cause."—(*Advancement of Learning*, book ii.)* But all causes are considered by Aristotle in his writings which have been entitled *metaphysics*. The inquiry into causes was called by him the first philosophy —science of truth, science of being. It has for its object—not those things which are seen and temporal—phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and eternal, things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the first principles of nature and

* In another passage, however, Bacon admits the advantage, if not the validity, of a higher *metaphysic* than this. "Because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore, it is good to erect and constitute one universal science by the name of '*philosophia prima*,' primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science, whether I should report deficient or no, I stand doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by speculation *à priori*, even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon.

of thought, the ultimate causes of existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their essence, independently of the particular properties or determined modes which make a difference between one thing and another. In short, it is ontology or the science of being as being, that is, not the science of any particular being or beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but the science of being in its general and common attributes. There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. But *metaphysics* is the science of being as common to both.

"The subject of *metaphysics* is the *whole* of things. This cannot be otherways known than in its principles and causes. Now these must necessarily be what is *most general* in nature; for it is from *generals* that *particulars* are derived, which cannot exist without the *generals;* whereas the *generals* may exist without the *particulars.* Thus, the species, *man*, cannot exist without the genus, *animal;* but *animal* may be without *man.* And this holds universally of all genuses and specieses. The subject therefore of *metaphysics,* is what is principal in nature, and first, if not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, and in order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and their several properties, to particular sciences, this universal science compares these subjects together; considers wherein they differ and wherein they agree: and that which they have in common, but belongs not, in particular, to any one science, is the proper object of *metaphysics.*"—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book iii., chap. 4.

Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in opposition to the many and the apparent (Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. iii., c. 2). *Matter*, as perceived by the senses, is a combination of distinct and heterogeneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some by smell, &c. What is the *thing itself*, the subject and owner of these several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them? What is it by virtue of which those several attributes constitute or belong to one and the same thing? *Mind* presents to consciousness so many distinct states, and operations, and feelings. What is the

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nature of that one mind, of which all these are so many modifications? The inquiry may be carried higher still, can we attain to any single conception of *being* in general, to which both *mind* and *matter* are subordinate, and from which the essence of both may be deduced?—Wolf, *Philosoph. Ration. Disc. Prelim.*, sect. 73 ; Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277.

"Aristotle said every science must have for investigation a determined province and separate form of being, but none of these sciences reaches the conception of being itself. Hence there is needed a science which should investigate that which the other sciences take up hypothetically, or through experience. This is done by the first philosophy, which has to do with being as such, while the other sciences relate only to determined and concrete being. The *metaphysics*, which is this science of being and its primitive grounds, is the *first philosophy*, since it is pre-supposed by every other discipline. Thus, says Aristotle, if there were only a physical substance, then would physics be the first and the only philosophy; but if there be an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, then must there be also an antecedent, and because it is antecedent, a universal philosophy. The first ground of all being is God, whence Aristotle occasionally gives to the first philosophy the name of theology."—Schwegler, *Hist. of Philos.*, p. 112.

Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into *general* and *special*. The former was called *Ontology*—(*q. v.*), or the science of being in general, whether infinite or finite, spiritual or material; and explained therefore the most universal notions and attributes common to all beings—such as entity, non-entity, essence, existence, unity, identity, diversity, &c. This is *metaphysics* properly so called. *Special metaphysics* was sometimes called *Pneumatology*—(*q. v.*), and included—1. *Natural Theology*, or *Theodicy*; 2. *Rational Cosmology*, or the science of the origin and order of the world; and 3. *Rational Psychology*, which treated of the nature, faculties, and destiny of the human mind.

The three objects of *special metaphysics*, viz., God, the world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas

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of the pure reason. According to him, a systematic exposition of those notions and truths, the knowledge of which is altogether independent of experience, constitutes the *science of metaphysics.*

"Time was," says Kant (Preface to the first edition of the *Crit. of Pure Reason*), "when *metaphysics* was the *queen* of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba—

'Modo, maxima rerum,
Tot generis, natisque potens,
Nunc trahor exul, inops.'"

According to D'Alembert (*Melanges*, tom. iv., p. 143), the aim of *metaphysics* is to examine the generation of our ideas, and to show that they all come from *sensations.* This is the *ideology* of Condillac and De Tracy.

Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, part ii., p. 475) has said that "*Metaphysics* was a word formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology of the schools, but now understood as equally applicable to all those inquiries which have for their object, to trace the various branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the human mind." And in the Preface to the *Dissert.*, he has said that by *metaphysics* he understands the "inductive philosophy of the human mind." In this sense the word is now popularly employed to denote, not the *rational psychology* of the schools, but *psychology*, or the philosophy of the human mind prosecuted according to the inductive method. In consequence of the subtle and insoluble questions prosecuted by the schoolmen, under the head of *metaphysics*, the word and the inquiries which it includes have been exposed to ridicule.*

* The word *metaphysics* was handled by Rev. Sydney Smith (*Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, chap. 1, p. 3,) with as much caution as if it had been a hand-grenade. "There is a word," he exclaimed, when lecturing, with his deep, sonorous, warning voice, "of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept concealed if I possibly could, but as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at once, and get out of it as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very tremendous one of

But there is and must be a *science of being*, otherwise there is and can be no *science of knowing*.

"If by *metaphysics* we mean those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually discerned, and this is the true and legitimate meaning of *metaphysics*, μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, then I affirm, that this very controversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists (as to grace), in which both are partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without *metaphysics* there can be no light of faith."—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 340.

In French the word *metaphysique* is used as synonymous with *philosophie*, to denote the first principles, or an inquiry into the first principles of any science. La *Metaphysique* du Droit, La *Metaphysique* du Moral, &c. It is the same in German.

METEMPSYCHOSIS (μετά, beyond; ἐμψυχόω, to animate), is the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to another. "We read in Plato, that from the opinion of *metempsychosis*, or transmigration of the souls of men into the bodies of beasts most suitable unto their human condition, after his death, Orpheus the musician became a swan."—Browne, *Vulgar Errors*, b. iii., c. 27.

This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and immortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus (lib. ii., sect. 123), the Egyptians were the first to espouse both doctrines. They believed that the soul at death entered into some animal created at the moment; and that after having inhabited the

'*metaphysics*,' which in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems likely to produce as much alarm as the cry of 'fire' in a crowded playhouse; when Belvidera is left to cry by herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner he can. I must beg of my audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to make use of the language which the manager would probably adopt on such an occasion: I can assure ladies and gentlemen there is not the smallest degree of danger."

The blacksmith of Glamis' description of *metaphysics* was—"Twa folk disputin' thegither; he that's listenin' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's speakin' disna ken what he means himsel'—that's *metaphysics*."

Another said—"God forbid that I should say a word against *metaphysics*, only, if a man should try to see down his own throat, with a lighted candle in his hand, let him take care lest he set his head on fire."

forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of India the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the doctrine of *emanation*—*q. v.*) The common opinion is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into Greece. But, before any communication between the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pythagoras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly taught among the early Christians, according to one of St. Jerome's letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras.

METHOD (μέθοδος, μετά and ὁδός), means the way or path by which we proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. In its widest acceptation, it denotes the means employed to obtain some end. Every art and every handicraft has its *method.* Cicero translates μέθοδος by *via*, and couples it with *ars.* (*Brutus*, c. 12. Compare *De Finibus*, ii., 1, and also *De Orat.*, i., 19).

Scientific or philosophical *method* is the march which the mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is the putting of our thoughts in a certain order with a view to improve our knowledge or to convey it to others.

Method may be called, in general, *the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for the discovering truth when we are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already known.* Thus there are two kinds of *method*, one for discovering truth, which is called *analysis*, or the *method of resolution*, and which may also be called the *method of invention;* and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called *synthesis*, or the *method of composition*, and which may also be called the *method of doctrine.*—*Port Roy. Logic*, part iv., ch. 2.

"*Method*, which is usually described as the fourth part of Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. It is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does,

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than its tangible product."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 119.

Every department of philosophy has its own proper *method;* but there is a universal *method* or science of *method.* This was called by Plato, dialectic; and represented as leading to the true and the real. (*Repub.*, lib. vii.) It has been said that the word μέθοδος, as it occurs in Aristotle's *Ethics*, should be translated "system," rather than "method."—(Paul, *Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 1.) But the construction of a system implies *method.* And no one was more thoroughly aware of the importance of a right *method* than Aristotle. He has said (*Metaphys.*, lib. ii.), "that we ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject; for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of *method;* two things, the acquisition of which offers great difficulty." The deductive *method* of philosophy came at once finished from his hand. And the inductive *method* was more extensively and successfully followed out by him than has been generally thought.

James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, was born at Trent, and came to England in 1567. He published a work, *De Methodo*, of which Mons. Degerando (*Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie,* part. ii., tom. ii., p. 3) has given an analysis. According to him all knowledge deduced from a process of reasoning presupposes some primitive truths, founded in the nature of man, and admitted as soon as announced; and the great aim of *method* should be to bring these primitive truths to light, that by their light we may have more light. Truths obtained by the senses, and by repeated experience, become at length positive and certain knowledge.

Descartes has a discourse on *Method.* He has reduced it to four general rules.

I. To admit nothing as true of which we have not a clear and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this idea, it ought to be received or rejected.

II. To divide every object inquired into as much as possible into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the ego, or self-consciousness. In proportion as the object of inquiry is simplified, the evidence comes to be nearer that of self-consciousness.

III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that are more complex. The real is often complex: and to arrive at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by synthesis reunite the parts which were previously separated.

IV. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful and incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give the reality.

This *method* begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness.

These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. But different sciences have different *methods* suited to their objects and to the end in view.

In prosecuting science with the view of extending our knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow the *method* of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *analysis*. But in communicating what is already known, we follow the *method* of exposition or doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *synthesis*.

In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the object of the science is to discover the possible application of them. In these sciences the *method* is deductive, as in geometry. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are given, and the object of the science is to discover the principles or laws. In these sciences the proper *method* is inductive, proceeding by observation or experiment, as in psychology and physics. The *method* opposed to this, and which was long followed, was the constructive *method;* which, instead of discovering causes by induction, imagined or assigned them *à priori*, or *ex hypothesi*, and afterwards tried to verify them. This *method* is seductive and bold but dangerous and insecure, and should be resorted to with great caution.—*V.* HYPOTHESIS.

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The use of *method*, both in obtaining and applying knowledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it to others, is great and obvious. "*Currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.*"—*Nov. Org.*, i., 61. "Une bonne methode donne a l'esprit une telle puissance qu'elle peut en quelque sorte remplacer le talent. C'est un levier qui donne a l'homme faible, qui l'employe, une force que ne sauvait posséder l'homme le plus fort qui serait privé d'un semblable moyen."—Comte, *Traité de l'Legislation*, lib. i., c. 1. La Place has said,—"La connaissance de la methode qui a guidé l'homme de genie, n'est pas moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a sa propre gloire, que ses decouvertes."

"Marshal thy notions into a handsome *method.* One will carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in bundles, than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging about his shoulders."—*Pleasures of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1851, p. 104.

See Descartes, *On Method;* Coleridge, *On Method*, Introd. to *Encyclop. Metropol.; Friend*, vol. iii.—*V.* SYSTEM.

METHODOLOGY (*Methodenlehre*) is the transcendental doctrine of method. See Kant, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 541, Haywood's translation. The elementary doctrine has been called by some *Elementology*, or the science treating of the form of a metaphysical system.

I.—*V.* INTENTION.

I.—*V.* MACROCOSM.

MIND is that which moves, body is that which is moved.—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 3. See his remarks on the definition of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4.

"By *mind* we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned."—Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227.

"*Mind*, that which perceives, feels, thinks, and wills."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"Among metaphysicians, *mind* is becoming a generic, and *soul* an individual designation. *Mind* is opposed to matter;

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soul to body. *Mind* is soul without regard to personality; soul is the appropriate *mind* of the being under notice. Etymologically, *mind* is the principle of volition, and *soul* the principle of animation. "I *mean* to go" was originally "I mind to go." *Soul*, at first identical with *self*, is from *sellan*, to say, the faculty of speech being its characteristic.

> "Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty,
> He has no *mind* to marry."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

—*V.* SOUL.

MIRACLE (*miror*, to wonder).—"A *miracle* I take to be a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by men to be divine."—Locke, *A Discourse of Miracles.*

"A miracle," says Mr. Hume (*Essay on Miracles*), "is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined; and if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever derived from human testimony."

This sceptical objection is said to have been suggested by a sermon of Dr. South, vol. ix., sermon 8. It has been replied to by Dr. Adams, *Essay in Answer*, &c.; Dr. Campbell, *Dissert. on Miracles*; Bp. Douglas, *Criterion of Miracles.* See also Lemoine, *A Treatise on Miracles*, 8vo, Lond., 1747.

-*V.* MEMORIA TECHNICA.

is the term employed to denote the most general points of view under which the different objects of thought present themselves to our mind. Now all that we think of we think of as *possible*, or *contingent*, or *impossible*, or *necessary.* The *possible* is that which may equally be or not be, which is not yet, but which may be; the *contingent* is that which already is, but which might not have been; the *necessary* is that which always is; and the *impossible* is that which never is. These are the *modalities* of being, which neces-

sarily find a place in thought, and in the expression of it in judgments and in propositions. Hence arise the four *modal propositions* which Aristotle has defined and opposed (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, c. 12-14). He did not use the term *modality*, but it is to be found among his commentators and the scholastic philosophers. In the philosophy of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and *modality*. In reference to *modality* they are either problematic, or assertory, or apodeictical. And hence the category of *modality* includes possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence should have no place; the contingent and the necessary are not different from being.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

MODE.—"The manner in which a thing exists is called a *mode* or affection; shape and colour are *modes* of matter, memory and joy are *modes* of mind."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"*Modes*, I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of, substances."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., chap. 12, sect. 4.

"There are some *modes* which may be called *internal*, because they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, square; and others which may be called *external*, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance, as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the action of another; and this is what is called in the schools an *external denomination*."—*Port Roy. Logic*, part i., chap. 2.

"*Modes* or *modifications of mind*, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by *states of mind;* and include both the *active* and *passive* phenomena of the conscious subject. The terms were used by Descartes as well as by his disciples."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 295, note.

Mode is the manner in which a substance exists; thus wax may be round or square, solid or fluid. *Modes* are secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which

exists by itself. Substances are not confined to any *mode*, but must exist in some. *Modes* are all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. *Modification* is properly the bringing of a thing into a *mode*, but is sometimes used to denote the *mode* of existence itself. *State* is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term than *mode*.

A *mode* is a variable and determinate affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not, without affecting its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, a mind may affirm or deny, without ceasing to be. They are not *accidents*, because they arise directly from the nature of the substance which experiences them. Nor should they be called *phenomena*, which may have or not have their cause in the object which exhibits them But *modes* arise from the nature of the substance affected by them. It is true that one substance *modifies* another, and in this view *modes* may sometimes be the effect of causes out of the substance in which they appear. They are then called *modifications*. Fire melts wax; the liquidity of wax in this view is a *modification*.

All beings which constitute the universe modify one another; but a soul endowed with liberty is the only being that modifies itself, or which can be altogether and in the same *mode*, cause and substance, active and passive.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

"That quality which distinguishes one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a *modification;* then the same particular that is termed a *property* or *quality*, when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a *modification* when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another; a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro; the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of different species, are denominated *modifications*."
—Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, App.

MOLECULE (*molecula*, a little mass), is the smallest portion of matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something real, and thus differs from *atom*, which is not *perceived* but *conceived*.

It is the smallest portion of matter which we can reach by our means of dividing, while *atom* is the last possible term of all division. When *molecules* are of simple homogeneous elements, as of gold or silver, they are called *integrant*; when they are of compound or heterogeneous elements, as salts and acids, they are called *constituent.*

MONAD, MONADOLOGY (*μονάς*, unity, one).—According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces not acting mechanically, but from an internal principle. They are incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible to all change from without, but subject to internal movement. This hypothesis he explains in a treatise entitled *Monadologie.* He thought inert matter insufficient to explain the phenomena of body, and had recourse to the *entelechies* of Aristotle, or the *substantial forms* of the scholastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, constituting the substance of matter, atoms of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, metaphysical points, full of vitality, *exact* as mathematical points, and *real* as physical points. These substantial unities which constitute matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but they are imperishable, although they may undergo *transformation.*

"Leibnitz conceived the whole universe, bodies as well as minds, to be made up of *monads*, that is, simple substances, each of which is, by the Creator, in the beginning of its existence, endowed with certain active and perceptive powers. A *monad*, therefore, is an active substance, simple, without parts or figure, which has within itself the power to produce all the changes it undergoes from the beginning of its existence to eternity. The changes which the *monad* undergoes, of what kind soever, though they may seem to us the effect of causes operating from without, are only the gradual and successive evolutions of its own internal powers, which would have produced all the same changes and motions, although there had been no other being in the universe."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., ch. 15.

Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, part ii., note 1, p. 219), has said,—"After studying, with all possible diligence, what Leibnitz has

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said of his *monads* in different parts of his works, I find myself quite incompetent to annex any precise idea to the word as he has employed it." The most intelligible passage which he quotes is the following (tom. ii., p. 50) :—"A *monad* is not a *material* but a *formal* atom, it being impossible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to revive the obsolete doctrine of *substantial forms* (the essence of which consists in *force*), separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable."

"*Monadology* rests upon this axiom—Every substance is at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has therefore in itself the principle of its own development: such is the *monad;* it is a simple force. Each *monad* has relation to all others; it corresponds with the plan of the universe; it is the universe abridged; it is, as Leibnitz says, a living mirror which reflects the entire universe under its own point of view. But every *monad* being simple, there is no immediate action of one *monad* upon another; there is, however, a natural relation of their respective development, which makes their apparent communication; this natural relation, this harmony which has its reason in the wisdom of the supreme director, is *pre-established harmony.*"—Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., p. 86.

MONOGAMY (μόνος, γάμος, one marriage), is the doctrine that one man should have only one wife, and a wife only one husband. It has also been interpreted to mean that a man or woman should not marry more than once.—*V.* POLYGAMY.

MONOTHEISM (μόνος, θεός, one God), is the belief in one God only.

"The general propensity to the worship of idols was totally subdued, and the Jews became *monotheists*, in the strictest sense of the term."—Cogan, *Discourse on Jewish Dispensation*, c. 2, s. 7.

V. THEISM, POLYTHEISM.

MOOD.—*V.* SYLLOGISM.

MORAL (*moralis*, from *mos*, manner), is used in several senses in philosophy.

In reasoning, the word *moral* is opposed to *demonstrative*,

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and means *probable.* Sometimes it is opposed to *material*, and in this sense it means *mental*, or that the object to which it is applied belongs to *mind* and not to *matter*. Thus we speak of *moral science* as distinguished from *physical* science.

It is also opposed to *intellectual* and to *æsthetic*. Thus we distinguish between a *moral habit* and an *intellectual habit*, between that which is *morally* becoming and that which pleases the powers of *taste*.

Moral is opposed to *positive*. "*Moral precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we see; *positive precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. *Moral duties* arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command; *positive duties* do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from Him whose creatures and subjects we are."—Butler, *Analogy*, part ii., ch. 1.

"A *positive* precept concerns a thing that is right because commanded; a *moral* precept respects a thing commanded because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both to honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem; but the former was *commanded* because it was right, and the latter was right *because* it was commanded." — Whately, *Lessons on Morals.*

MORAL FACULTY.—*V.* CONSCIENCE.

MORALITY.—"To lay down, in their universal form, the laws according to which the conduct of a free agent ought to be regulated, and to apply them to the different situations of human life, is the end of *morality*."

"*A body of moral truths, definitely expressed, and arranged according to their rational connection*," is the definition of a "system of *morality*" by Dr. Whewell, *On Systematic Morality*, lect. i.

"The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong is *morality*."—Whewell, *Morality*, sect. 76.

"There are in the world two classes of objects, persons and things. And these are mutually related to each other. There are relations between persons and persons, and between things and things. And the peculiar distinctions of *moral* actions,

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moral characters, *moral* principles, *moral* habits, as contrasted with the intellect and other parts of man's nature, lies in this, *that they always imply a relation between two persons*, not between two things."—Sewell, *Christ. Morals*, p. 339.

"*Morality* commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 265.

"What the duties of *morality* are, the apostle instructs the believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of negative and positive; negative, to keep himself pure from the world; and positive, beneficence from loving-kindness, that is, love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last and highest come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, acts, and duties, that have an especial reference to the timeless, the permanent, the eternal, to the sincere love of the true as truth, of the good as good, and of God as both in one. It comprehends the whole ascent from uprightness (morality, virtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affections, that are requisite or conducive to the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image.

"It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is more particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corresponds to the sense and the understanding; the moral, to the heart and the conscience; the spiritual, to the will and the reason, that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with, and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will, universal reason and will absolute."

How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the Platonic, see PRUDENCE.—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 22, 23.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of human duty. The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary

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to know what man is. Not that the moral philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, must go over the science of human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to examine those elements of human nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A full course of *moral philosophy* should consist, therefore, of two parts—the first containing an analysis and illustration of those powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and by the possession of which, he is capable of acting under a sense of duty; the second, containing an arrangement and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of the active and moral nature of man, the first part may be characterized as *psychological;* and as laying down the duties arising from the various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been placed, the second part may be designated as *deontological.*

"The moral philosopher has to investigate the principles according to which men act—the motives which influence them in fact—the objects at which they commonly aim—the passions, desires, characters, manners, tastes, which appear in the world around him, and in his own constitution. Further, as in all moral actions, the intellectual principles are implicated with the feelings, he must extend his inquiry to the phenomena of the mental powers, and know both what they are in themselves, and how they are combined in actions with the feelings."—Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. vi., p. 187.—*V.* ETHICS.

MORAL SENSE.—*V.* SENSES (Reflex).

MORPHOLOGY (μορφή, form; λόγος).—"The branch of *botanical* science which treats of the forms of plants is called *morphology*, and is now regarded as the fundamental department of botany."—M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 23.

"The subject of *animal morphology* has recently been expanded into a form, strikingly comprehensive and systematic, by Mr. Owen."—Whewell, *Supplem.* vol., p. 140. So that *morphology* treats of the forms of plants and animals, or organized beings.

MOTION (κίνησις) is the continued change of place of a body, or of any *parts* of a body; for in the cases of a globe turning on its axis, and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of these bodies change their places, while the bodies themselves remain stationary.

Motion is either *physical*, that is, obvious to the senses, or *not physical*, that is, knowable by the rational faculty.

Aristotle has noticed several kinds of *physical* motion. Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as when a body from being round, becomes square. Augmentation or diminution, as when a body becomes larger or smaller. All these are changes from one attribute to another, while the substance remains the same.

But body only moves because it is moved. And Aristotle traced all *motion* to impulses in the nature of things, rising from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and desire, up to the intelligent contemplation of what is good.

As Heraclitus held that all things are continually changing, so Parmenides and Zeno denied the possibility of motion. The best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that given by Diogenes the Cynic, who walked into the presence of Zeno in refutation of them.

The notion of movement or *motion*, like that of extension, is acquired in connection with the exercise of the senses of sight and touch.

MOTIVE.—"The deliberate preference by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of action; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference."—Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. vi., cap. 2.

Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of appetition which he calls the mobile or spring (*die Triebfeder*), and the objective principle of the will, which he calls motive or determining reason (*beweggrund*); hence the difference between *subjective ends* to which we are pushed by natural disposition, and *objective ends*, which are common to us with all beings endowed with reason.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 357.

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This seems to be the difference expressed in French between *mobile* and *motif*.

"A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as to produce either desire or aversion."—Lord Kames, *Essay on Liberty and Necessity.*

"By *motive*," said Edwards (*Inquiry*, part i., sect. 2), "I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex *motive*. . . . . Whatever is a *motive*, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty*. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all."

Hence it has been common to distinguish *motives* as *external* or *objective*, and as *internal* or *subjective*. Regarded *objectively*, *motives* are those external objects or circumstances, which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the will. Regarded *subjectively*, *motives* are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term *motive* is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind, to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid said, that he "understood a *motive*, when applied to a human being, to be that for the sake of which he acts, and therefore that what he never was conscious of, can no more be a *motive* to determine his will, than it can be an argument to determine his judgment."* (*Correspondence prefixed to his Works*, p. 87). In his *Essays on the Active Powers* (essay iv., chap. 4), he said, "Everything that can be

* "This is Aristotle's definition (τὸ ἕνεκα οὗ) of *end* or *final cause;* and as a synonym for end or final cause the term *motive* had been long exclusively employed."—Sir Will. Hamilton.

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called a *motive* is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature." Here the word *motive* is applied *objectively* to those external things, which, when contemplated, affect our intelligence or our sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, "*motives* of the former kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word *motive* is applied *subjectively* to those internal principles of our nature, such as appetite, desire, passion, &c., which are excited by the contemplation of external objects, adapted and addressed to them.

But, in order to a more precise use of the term *motive*, let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal principle which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire for food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term *motive* might be applied to any one of these three; and, it might be said, that the *motive* for such an action was *bread*, or *appetite*, or *hunger*. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the *motive;* it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of *motives* of every kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind; and the term *motive* may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them; but speaking strictly it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it; because, it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The *motive* of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been *injury*, or *resentment*, or *anger*—meaning by the first of these words, the

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wrongous behaviour of another; by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behaviour; and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted *prudently*, it may intimate that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted *conscientiously*, it may mean, that the particular action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or, that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or, that he felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term *motive* is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act.

To the question, therefore, whether *motive* means something in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated —must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called *motives*, or be said to move the will. *Motives* are, strictly speaking, *subjective*—as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent.

And *motives* may be called *subjective*, not only in contradistinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals, at different times.

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that with the same *motives* (*objectively* considered) presented to

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them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively, will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought.

And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times, or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal in order to satisfy his hunger; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession.

It would thus appear that *motives* are in their nature *subjective*, in their influence *individual*, and in their issue *variable*.

MYSTICISM and MYSTERY have been derived from μύω, to shut up; hence μύστης, one who shuts up.

"The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descriptive of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by the lofty

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mysticism of his philosophy, and even by the remote origin of the theological fables which are said to have descended to him from Orpheus." — Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, ii., chap. 5.

Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of Him.—Cousin, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Mod.*, première série, tom. ii., leçon 9, 10.

Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God either in nature, and hence a *physical* and *naturalistic mysticism;* or in the soul, and hence a *moral* and *metaphysical mysticism.* It has also its historical views; and in history it considers especially that which represents *mysticism* in full, and under its most regular form, that is religious; and it is not to the letter of religions, but to their spirit, that it clings; hence an *allegorical* and *symbolical mysticism.* Van Helmont, Ames, and Pordage, are *naturalistic mystics;* Poiret is *moral*, and Bourignon and Fenelon are *Divine mystics.* Swedenborg's *mysticism* includes them all.

"Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, *mysticism* is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without."—Mill, *Log.*, b. v., chap. iii., § 5.

The Germans have two words for *mysticism; mystik* and *mysticismus.* The former they use in a favourable, the latter in an unfavourable sense. Just as we say *piety* and *pietism*, or *rationality* and *rationalism;* keeping the first of each pair for use, the second for abuse.—Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. i., p. 23.

Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. ii., pp. 94-7; Schmidt

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(Car.), *Essai sur les Mystiques du Quatorzieme siecle.* Strasburg, 1836.

MYTH and MYTHOLOGY (μῦθος, a tale; λόγος).—"I use this term (*myth*) as synonymous with 'invention,' having no historical basis."—Pococke, *India in Greece*, p. 2, note.

The early history and the early religion of all nations are full of fables. Hence it is that *myths* have been divided into the *traditional* and the *theological*, or the *historical* and the *religious.**

A *myth* is a narrative framed for the purpose of expressing some general truth, a law of nature, a moral phenomenon, or a religious idea, the different phases of which correspond to the turn of the narrative. An *allegory* agrees with it in expressing some general idea, but differs from it in this,—that in the *allegory* the *idea* was developed before the *form*, which was invented and adapted to it. The *allegory* is a reflective and artificial process, the *myth* springs up spontaneously and by a kind of inspiration. A *symbol* is a silent *myth*, which impresses the truths which it conveys not by successive stages, but at once (σύν, βάλλω) throws together significant images of some truth.

Plato has introduced the *myth* into some of his writings in a subordinate way, as in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Timæus.*

Blackwell, *Letters Concerning Mythology*, 8vo, Lond., 1748; Huttner, *De Mythis Platonis*, 4to, Leipsic, 1788; Bacon, *On the Wisdom of the Ancients;* Muller, *Mythology:* Translated by Leitch, 1844.

On the philosophic value of *myths*, see Cousin, *Cours*, 1828; 1 and 15 leçons, and the Argument of his translation of *Plato.*

Some good remarks on the difference between the *parable*, the *fable*, the *myth*, &c., will be found in Trench, *On the Parables*, Introd.

On the different views taken of Greek *mythology*, see Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann.

* Among the early nations, every truth a little remote from common apprehension was embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class would contain *myths* concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last are properly called *philosophemes.*

See an *Essay on Comparative Mythology*, in the *Oxford Essays* for 1856; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. i., p. 400.

NATURA.—*V.* NATURE.

NATURAL, as distinguished from **Supernatural** or **Miraculous.**—"The only distinct meaning of the word *natural* is *stated*, *fixed*, or *settled;* since what is *natural* as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once."—Butler, *Analogy*, part i., chap. 1.

Natural, as distinguished from **Innate** or **Instinctive.**

"There is a great deal of difference," said Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i., ch. 3), "between an *innate law*, and a *law of nature;* between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and application of our *natural* faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an *innate law*, or deny that there is a law knowable by the *light of nature*, without the help of positive revelation."

"Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are necessary to the preservation of the individual, or to the continuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture.* It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in intellectuals, in taste, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature; while, on the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption."—Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. 1, sect. 2.

* Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of *natural* rights (*Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 5) uses *innate* as synonymous with *natural.*

"Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are *necessarily* led to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, and by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to our preservation, are to be considered as parts of human nature, no less than those which are implanted in the mind at its first formation."—Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i., p. 351.

"Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed *natural*, as much as those which are commonly so called, if they are as rarely found wanting."—Mackintosh, *Prelimin. Dissert.*, p. 67.

NATURALISM is the name given to those systems of the philosophy of *nature* which explain the phenomena by a blind force acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found in Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, and was held by Leucippus and Epicurus. The *Systeme de la Nature* of D'Holbach, the *Traité de la Nature* of Robinet, and the *Philosophie de la Nature* of Delisle de Sales, also contain it.

Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to *idealism*. Of Albert Durer it is said that "he united to the brilliant delicacies of Flemish *naturalism* the most elevated and varied of Italian *idealism*."—Labarte, *Handbook of the Middle Ages*.

NATURE (*nascor*, to be born).—According to its derivation, *nature* should mean that which is produced or born; but it also means that which produces or causes to be born. The word has been used with various shades of meaning, but they may all be brought under two heads, *Natura Naturans*, and *Natura Naturata*.

I. *Natura Naturans.*—*a.* The Author of *nature*, the uncreated Being who gave birth to everything that is. *b.* The plastic *nature* or energy subordinate to that of the Deity, by which all things are conserved and directed to their ends and uses. *c.* The course of *nature*, or the established order according to which the universe is regulated.

Alii naturam *censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem.*—Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. ii.

II. *Natura Naturata.*—*a.* 1. The works of *nature*, both mind

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and matter. 2. The visible or material creation, as distinct from God and the soul, which is the object of *natural science.*

"The term *nature* is used sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word φύσις was general in its meaning; and the great branch of philosophy, styled '*physical* or *physiological*,' included under it not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term *nature* is more vaguely extensive than the terms *physics*, *physical*, *physiology*, *physiological*, or even than the adjective, *natural;* whereas, in the philosophy of Germany, *natur* and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelligence."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 216, note.

b. Nature as opposed to *art*, all physical causes, all the forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inorganic. *c.* The *nature* or essence of any particular being or class of beings, that which makes it what it is.

"The word *nature* has been used in two senses,—viz., actively and passively; energetic (= *forma formans*), and material (= *forma formata*). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing as *existent;* while the *essence,* or essential property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the *possibility* of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the *nature*, because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, there is no expression or implication of their real existence. In the second or material sense of the word *nature*, we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience—the aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning *nature*, would therefore (the word physiology being both ambiguous in itself, and

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already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, somatology* and psychology."—Coleridge, *Friend*, p. 410.

NATURE (Course or Power of).—"There is no such thing as what men commonly call the *course of nature*, or the *power of nature*. The *course of nature*, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the *will of God* producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting, being in every movement perfectly *arbitrary*, is as easy to be *altered* at any time as to be *preserved*. And if (as seems most probable), this continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of created intelligences appointed for that purpose by the Supreme Creator, then it is easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power (by the permission of God), to *alter* the course of *nature* at any time, or in any respect, as it is to *preserve* or continue it."—Clarke, *Evidences of Nat. and Revealed Religion*, p. 300, 4th edit.

"All things are artificial," said Sir Thomas Browne, "for *nature* is the *art* of God." The antithesis of *nature* and *art* is a celebrated doctrine in the peripatetic philosophy. Natural things are distinguished from artificial, inasmuch as they have, what the latter are without, an intrinsic principle of formation."—Arist., *De Gen.*, *Anim.* ii., c. 1.

"*Nature*," said Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, essay i., ch. 5), "is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under observation. But if it be asked what *nature* is? whether the first universal cause† or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether intelligent or unintelligent?—upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter.

The Hon. Robert Boyle wrote an *Enquiry into the vulgarly*

* Both these are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty years ago,—viz., *Somatopsychonologia.*

† *Natura est principium et causa efficiens omnium rerum naturalium, quo sensu a veteribus philosophis cum Deo confundebatur.*—Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i., c. 8, and lib. ii., c. 22, 32.

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received notion of Nature, in which he attempted to show the absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy between the Creator and His works, 12mo, Lond., 1785.

Nature or Force (Plastic) (πλάσσω, to form), was the name given by ancient physiologists to a power to which they attributed the formation of the germs and tissues of organized and living beings. In opposition to the doctrine of Democritus, who explained all the phenomena of *nature* by means of matter and motion, and in opposition to the doctrine of Strato, who taught that matter was the only substance, but in itself a living and active force, Cudworth maintained that there is a *plastic nature*, a spiritual energy, intermediate between the Creator and His works, by which the phenomena of *nature* are produced. To ascribe these phenomena to the immediate agency of Deity would be, he thought, to make the course of *nature* miraculous; and he could not suppose the agency of the Deity to be exerted directly, and yet monstrosities and defects to be found in the works of *nature*. How far the facts warrant such an hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis explains the facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not much different from that of the *anima mundi*, or soul of matter, which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers.—*V.* ANIMA MUNDI.

Nature (Philosophy of).—The philosophy of *nature* includes all the attempts which have been made to account for the origin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of these have been noticed under *Matter*—*q. v.* And for an account of the various *Philosophies of nature*, see T. H. Martin, *philosophie Spiritualiste de la Nature*, 2 tom., Paris, 1849; J. B. Stallo, A.M., *General Principles of Philosoph. of Nature*, Lond., 1848.

NATURE (Law of).—By the *law of Nature* is meant that law of justice and benevolence which is written on the heart of every man, and which teaches him to do to others as he would wish that they should do unto him. It was long called the *law of nature and of nations*, because it is natural to men of all nations.*

* *Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos perœque w, vocaturque jus gentium; quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur.*—Galus.

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But by the phrase *law of nations* is now meant international law, and by the *law of nature*, natural law. It is not meant by the phrase that there is a regular system or code of laws made known by the light of nature in which all men everywhere acquiesce, but that there are certain great principles universally acknowledged, and in accordance with which men feel themselves bound to regulate their conduct.

"Why seek the law or rule in the world? What would you answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you would only listen to it? You are like a dishonest debtor who asks for the bill against him when he has it himself. *Quod petis intus habes.* All the tables of the law, the two tables of Moses, the twelve tables of the Romans, and all the good laws in the world, are but copies and extracts, which will be produced in judgment against thee who hidest the original and pretendest not to know what it is, stifling as much as possible that light which shines within thee, but which would never have been without and humanly published but that that which was within, all celestial and divine, had been contemned and forgotten."—Charron, *De la Sagesse*, liv. ii., chap. 3, No. 4.

According to Grotius, "*Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem; et consequenter ab authore naturæ, ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi.*"

"*Jus gentium* is used to denote, not international law, but positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, they termed it *Jus Feciale*, the law of heralds, or international envoys."—Whewell, *Morality*, No. 1139.

Selden, *De Jure Naturali*, lib. i., c. 3; Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, *Prolegom.*, sect. 5, 6, lib. i., cap. 1, sect. 10; Puffendorff, *De Officio Hominis et Civis*, lib. iii., c. 3; Sanderson, *De Oblig. Conscientiæ*, Prælect. Quarta, sect. 20-24; Tyrell, *On Law of Nature;* Culverwell, *Discourse of the Light of Nature.*

NATURE (of Things).—The following may be given as an outline of the views of those philosophers, Cudworth, Clarke, Price,

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and others, who place the foundation of virtue in the nature, reason, and fitness of things :—

"Everything is what it is, by having a nature. As all things have not the same nature, there must be different *relations*, *respects*, or *proportions*, of some things towards others, and a consequent *fitness* or *unfitness*, in the application of different things, or different relations, to one another. It is the same with *persons*. There is a *fitness*, or *suitableness* of certain circumstances to certain *persons*, and an *unsuitableness* of others. And from the different relations of *different persons to one another*, there necessarily arises a *fitness* or *unfitness* of certain *manners of behaviour* of some persons towards others, as well as in respect to the things and circumstances with which they are surrounded. Now, we stand in various relations to God, as our Creator, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Governor, and our Judge. We cannot contemplate these relations, without seeing or feeling a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing certain affections and discharging certain services towards Him, and a Wrongness in neglecting to do so, or in manifesting a different disposition, or following a different course of action. We stand, also, in various relations to our fellow-creatures; some of them inseparable from our nature and condition as human beings, such as the relations of parent and child, brother and friend; and others which may be voluntarily established, such as the relations of husband and wife, master and servant. And we cannot conceive of these relations without at the same time seeing a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing suitable affections and following a suitable course of action. Not to do so we see and feel to be Wrong. We may even be said to stand in various relations to the objects around us in the world; and, when we contemplate our nature and condition, we cannot fail to see, in certain manners of behaviour, a suitableness or unsuitableness to the circumstances in which we have been placed. Now, Rectitude or conformity with those relations which arise from the nature and condition of man, is nothing arbitrary or fictitious. It is founded in the nature of things. God was under no necessity to create human beings. But, in calling them into existence,

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he must have given them a nature, and thus have constituted the relations in which they stand to Him and to other beings. There is a suitableness or congruity, between these relations and certain manners of behaviour. Reason, or the Moral Faculty, perceives and approves of this suitableness or congruity. The Divine mind must do the same, for the relations were constituted by God; and conformity to them must be in accordance with His will. So that Conscience, when truly enlightened, is a ray from the Divine Reason; and the moral law, which it reveals to us, is Eternal and Immutable as the nature of God and the nature of things."—*Manual of Mor. Phil.*, p. 124.

NATURE (Human).—As to the different senses in which *nature* may be understood, and the proper meaning of the maxim, Follow *nature*,—see Butler, *Three Sermons on Hum. Nature.*

NECESSITY (*ne* and *cesso*, that which cannot cease).—"I have one thing to observe of the several kinds of *necessity*, that the idea of some sort of firm connection runs through them all:—and that is the proper general import of the name *necessity*. Connection of mental or verbal propositions, or of their respective parts, makes up the idea of *logical necessity*,—connection of end and means makes up the idea of *moral necessity*,—connection of causes and effects is *physical necessity*, and connection of existence and essence is *metaphysical necessity*."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. iv., p. 432.

Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that man be a rational animal, because these are the terms in which he is defined.

Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot well be, although, absolutely speaking it may. A man who is lame is under a *moral necessity* to use some help, but absolutely he may not.

"The phrase *moral necessity* is used variously; sometimes it is used for *necessity* of moral obligation. So we say a man is under *necessity*, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that sure connection of things that is a

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foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense *moral necessity* signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind in their conduct and behaviour in the world. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that *necessity* of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between them, and such certain volitions and actions. It is in this sense that I use the phrase *moral necessity* in the following discourse."—Edwards, *Works*, vol. i., p. 116.

"By *natural* (or *physical*) *necessity*, as applied to men, I mean such *necessity* as men are under through the force of natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by *necessity;* they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truths of certain propositions as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a *natural* (a *physical*) *necessity* men's bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support them."—Edwards, *Works*, vol. i., p. 146.

Necessity is characteristic of *ideas* and of *actions*. A necessary *idea* is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained by the human mind; as every change implies a cause. *Necessity* and *universality* are the marks of certain ideas which are native to the human mind, and not derived from experience. A necessary *action* is one the contrary of which is impossible. *Necessity* is opposed to freedom, or to free-will.—*V.* LIBERTY.

NECESSITY (Doctrine of).

"There are two schemes of *necessity*,—the necessitation by *efficient*—the necessitation by *final* causes. The former is brute or blind fate; the latter rational determinism. Though their practical results be the same, they ought to be carefully distinguished."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 87, note.

Leibnitz, in his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 157, distinguishes between—

1. *Hypothetical necessity*, as opposed to absolute *necessity*, as

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that which the supposition or the hypothesis of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents.

2. *Logical, metaphysical,* or *mathematical necessity*, which takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction; and

3. *Moral necessity*, whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination.

Dr. Clarke replies, p. 287, "*Necessity*, in philosophical questions, always signifies *absolute necessity. Hypothetical necessity* and *moral necessity* are only figurative ways of speaking, and in philosophical strictness of truth, are no *necessity* at all. The question is not, whether a thing *must* be, when it is *supposed* that it *is*, or that it is *to be* (which is *hypothetical necessity*). Neither is the question whether it be true, that a *good* being, continuing to be *good*, cannot do evil; or a *wise* being, continuing to be *wise*, cannot act unwisely; or a *veracious* person, continuing to be *veracious*, cannot tell a lie (which is *moral necessity*). But the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty, is, whether the *immediate physical cause*, or *principle of action* be indeed in him whom we call the agent; or whether it be some other *reason*, which is the *real cause* by operating upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed an *agent*, but a mere *patient*."

NECESSITY (Logical).

"The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of *necessity—necessitas consequentiæ*, and another—*necessitas consequentis*. The former is an *ideal* or *formal necessity;* the inevitable dependence of one *thought* upon another, by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a *real* or *material necessity*; the inevitable dependence of one *thing* upon another because of its own nature. The former is a logical *necessity*, common to all legitimate *consequence*, whatever be the material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical *necessity*, over and above the syllogistic inference, and wholly dependent upon the modality of the *consequent*. This ancient distinction modern philosophers have not only overlooked but confounded. (See contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. Dugald Stewart, in *Dissertations* on Reid, p. 701, note).—Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 144.

NEGATION (*nego*, to deny), is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it; as when we say—A stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; or when we say—A carpenter or fisherman is unlearned; these are mere *negations*.—Watts, *Log.*, part i., chap. 2, sect. 6.

According to Thomas Aquinas (*Summa*, p. i., qu. 48, art. 5) simple *negation* denies to a thing some certain realities which do not belong to the nature of the same. *Privation*, on the contrary, is deficiency in some reality which belongs to the notion of the being.—*V.* PRIVATION.

In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, notions, or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called represent the most positive realities; as infinity, immensity, immortality, &c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, deafness, insensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away of something from the object of which these ideas are entertained. But this is privation (στέρησις) rather than *negation* (ἀπόφασις). And in general it may be said that *negation* implies some anterior conception of the object of which the *negation* is made. Absolute *negation* is impossible. We have no idea of nothing. It is but a word.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

NIHILISM (*nihil*, *nihilum*, nothing), is scepticism carried to the denial of all existence.

"The sum total," says Fichte, "is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (*Bilder*) there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of

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a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream."—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 129, note.

In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as according to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of external realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not prove the existence of mind—so that there is neither matter nor mind, for anything that we can prove.

NIHILUM or NOTHING "is that of which everything can truly be denied, and *nothing* can be truly affirmed. So that the idea of *nothing* (if I may so speak) is absolutely the negation of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a finite or infinite *nothing*, is a contradiction in terms."—Clarke, *Answer to Seventh Letter*, note.

Nothing, taken *positively*, is what does not but may exist, as a river of milk—taken *negatively*, it is that which does not and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a valley. Nothing positively is *ens potentiale*. Nothing negatively is *non ens*.

NOMINALISM (*nomen*, a name), is the doctrine that general notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is *realism*. To the intermediate doctrine of *conceptualism*, *nominalism* is closely allied. It may be called the envelope of *conceptualism*, while *conceptualism* is the letter or substance of *nominalism*. "If *nominalism* sets out from *conceptualism*, *conceptualism* should terminate in *nominalism*," says Mons. Cousin, *Introd. aux ouvrages inédits d'Abailaird*, 4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181.

Universalia ante rem, is the watchword of the *Realists*; *Universalia in re*, of the *Conceptualists*; *Universalia post rem*, of the *Nominalists*. The *Nominalists* were called Terminists about the time of the Reformation.—Ballantyne, *Examin. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 3, sect. 4.

"The *Terminists*, among whom I was, are so called be-

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cause they speak of a thing in its own proper words, and do not apply them after a strange sort. They are also called *Occamists*, from Ockham their founder. He was an able and a sensible man."—Luther, *Table Talk*, p. 540-2.

In asserting that universals existed, but only in the mind, Ockham agreed exactly with the modern *Conceptualists*.—*V.* UNIVERSALS.

NON SEQUITUR (it does not follow; the inference is not necessary.)—It is sometimes used as a substantive; and an inconclusive inference is called a *non sequitur*.

NOOGONIE (νοῦς, mind; γόνος, birth, or generation).—"Leibnitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized notions, in that system which I might call a *noogonie*, in place of admitting two different sources of our representations, which are objectively valid only in their connection." —Kant, *Crit. de la Raison Pure*, pp. 326, 327.

NOOLOGY (νοῦς, mind; λόγος), is a term proposed by Mons. Paffe (*Sur la Sensibilite*, p. 30), to denote the science of intellectual facts, or the facts of intellect; and *pathology* (*psychological*), to denote the science of the *phenomenes affectifs*, or feeling, or sensibility.

The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 770), as the title given to Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles, by Calovius, in 1651; Mejerus, in 1662; Wagnerus, in 1670; and Zeidlerus, in 1680—and he has said, "The correlatives *noetic* and *dianoetic* would afford the best philosophical designations, the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. *Noology* or *noological*, *dianoialogy* and *dianoialogical*, would be also technical terms of much convenience in various departments of philosophy."

Mons. Ampère proposed to designate the sciences which treat of the human mind *Les sciences Noologiques*.

"If, instead of considering the *objects* of our knowledge, we consider its *origin*, it may be said that it is either derived from experience alone, or from reason alone; hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls *noologists:* at their head

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are Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz among the moderns."—Henderson, *Philosoph. of Kant*, p. 172.

NORM (*norma*, from γνώριμος, a square or rule of builders), is used as synonymous with law. Anything not in accordance with the law is said to be *abnormal*.

"There is no uniformity, no *norma*, principle, or rule, perceivable in the distribution of the primeval natural agents through the universe."—Mill, *Log.*, b. iii., ch. 16, § 3.

NOTION (*nosco*, to know).—Bolingbroke says (Essay i., *On Human Knowledge*, sect. 2), "I distinguish here between *ideas* and *notions*, for it seems to me, that, as we compound simple into complex ideas, so the composition we make of simple and complex ideas may be called, more properly, and with less confusion and ambiguity, *notions*."

Mr. Locke says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 22), "The mind being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex *ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think it is that these *ideas* are called *notions*, as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things."

"The distinction of *ideas*, strictly so called, and *notions*, is one of the most common and important in the philosophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their discrimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence; it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stillingfleet, Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet signalized it; and under the contrast of *Anschauungen* and *Begriffe*, it has long been an established and classical discrimination with the philosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself suggests it in the distinction he requires between *imagination* and *conception*,—a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry out, and which Mr. Stewart still more unhappily perverted. The terms *notion* and *conception* (or more correctly *concept* in this sense), should be reserved to express what we comprehend but cannot picture in *imagination*, such as a rela-

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tion, a general term, &c. The word *idea*, as one prostituted to all meanings, it were better to discard. As for the representations of imagination or phantasy, I would employ the term *image* or *phantasm*, it being distinctly understood that these terms are applied to denote the *representations* not of our visible perceptions merely, as the term taken literally would indicate, but of our sensible perceptions in general."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Woks*, p. 291, note.

Notion is more general in its signification than *idea*. Idea is merely a *conception*, or at most a *necessary* and *universal* conception. *Notion* implies all this and more,—a judgment or series of judgments, and a certain degree of knowledge of the object. Thus we speak of having no *notion* or knowledge of a thing, and of having some *notion* or knowledge. It began to be used by Descartes in his *Regulæ ad Directionem Ingenii*, and soon came into current use among French philosophers. It enables us to steer clear of the *ideas* of Plato, of the *species* of the scholastics, and of the *images* of the empirical school. Hence Dr. Reid tells us that he used it in preference.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Des Maistre (*Soirées de St. Petersbourgh*, p. 164), uses the French word *notion* as synonymous with pure idea, or innate idea, underived from sense,

Chalybæus, in a letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator of his work), says, "In English as in French, the word *idea*, *idée*, is applied, without distinction, to a representation, to a *notion*, in short to every mental conception; while in German, in scientific language, a very careful distinction is made between sensuous '*vorstellung*' (representation), abstract '*verstandesbegriff*' (intellectual notion), and '*ideen*' (ideas), of reason."

Notions or *concepts* are *clear* and *distinct*, or *obscure* and *indistinct*. "A concept is said to be *clear* when the degree of consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a whole from others, and *obscure* when the degree of consciousness is insufficient to accomplish this. A concept is said to be *distinct* when the amount of consciousness is such as enables us to discriminate from each other the several characters or constituent parts of which the concept is the sum, and *indistinct* or *confused*

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when the amount of consciousness requisite for this is wanting." In the darkness of night there is no perception of objects, this is *obscurity*. As light dawns we begin to see objects, this is *indistinctness*. As morning advances we make a distinction between trees and houses, and fields and rivers, as wholes differing from one another, this is *clearness*. At length when day approaches noon, we see the parts which make up the wholes, and have a *distinct* view of everything before us.

We have a *clear notion* of colours, smells, and tastes; for we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But we have not a *distinct notion* of them, for we are not acquainted with the qualities which form the difference; neither can we describe them to such as cannot see, smell, and taste. We have a *clear notion* of a triangle when we discriminate it from other figures. We have a *distinct notion* of it when we think of it as a portion of space bounded by three straight lines, as a figure whose three angles taken together are equal to two right angles.

First Notions and Second Notions.

The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) of *first* and *second notions* (*notiones*, *conceptus*, *intentiones*, *intellecta prima et secunda*) is a highly philosophical determination.* . . . . . A *first notion* is the concept of a thing *as it exists of itself*, and independent of any operation of thought; as man, John, animal, &c. A *second notion* is the concept, not of an object as it is in reality, but of the *mode under which it is thought by the mind;* as individual, species, genus, &c. The former is the *concept of a thing*, *real*, *immediate*, *direct:* the latter the *concept of a concept*, *formal*, *mediate*, *reflex*."—Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 137.

"*Notions* are of two kinds; they either have regard to *things as they are*, as horse, ship, tree, and are called *first notions;* or to things as they are *understood*, as *notions* of genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are called *second notions*, which, however, are based upon the first, and cannot be con-

* The Americans call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinkets, &c., being "laden with *notions*," and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps in his head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is "laden with *notions*."—Moore, *Diary*, p. 249.

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ceived without them. Now logic is not so much employed upon first *notions* of things as upon second; that is, it is not occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascertaining whether a horse, or a ship, or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or species, whether it can be called a subject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many second *notions* a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. The *first intention* of every word is its real meaning; the *second intention*, its logical value according to the function of thought to which it belongs."*—Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d ed., pp. 39, 40.—*V.* INTENTION.

Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical

Leibnitz was the first to employ *intuitive* and *intuition* to denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual object either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to our indirect and *symbolical* cognitions acquired through the use of signs or language in the understanding.

"When our *notion* of any object or objects consists of a clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential ones, he would call it *intuitive*. But where the *notion* is complex and its properties numerous, we do not commonly realize all that it conveys; the powers of thinking would be needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more compendiously by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties of our *notion*, and this naturally is the term by which we are accustomed to convey the *notion* to others. A name, then, employed in thought is called a *symbolical cognition;* and the names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every sovereign which

* "See Buhle (Arist., 1, p. 432), whose words I have followed. See also Cracanthorp (*Log. Proem.*), and Sir W. Hamilton (*Edin. Rev.*, No. 115, p. 210). There is no authority whatever for Aldrich's view, which makes second intention mean, apparently, 'a term defined for scientific use;' though with the tenacious vitality of error it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal."—*V.* INTENTION.

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passes through their hands is equiavlent to 240 pence. Such words as the State, Happiness, Liberty, Creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose that we realize their full sense every time we read or pronounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds, we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the moment. A very simple *notion* is always *intuitive;* we cannot make our *notion* of brown or red simpler than it is by any symbol. On the other hand, a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom fully realized—seldom other than *symbolical.*" —Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 47.

NOTIONES COMMUNES, also called *prœnotiones, anticipationes, communes notitiæ, προλήψεις, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—first truths, natural judgments, principles of common sense,* are phrases employed to denote certain *notions* or cognitions which are native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but forming the ground of proof and evidence as to other truths.—*V.* ANTICIPATION, TRUTHS (First).

NOUMENON (*τὸ νοούμενον*), in the philosophy of Kant (an object as conceived by the understanding, or thought of by the reason, *νοῦς*), is opposed to *phenomenon* (an object such as we represent it to ourselves by the impression which it makes on our senses). *Noumenon* is an object in itself, not relatively to us. But we have, according to Kant, no such knowledge of things in themselves. For besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding, according to which, and not according to the nature of things in themselves, it may be, are our conceptions of them.

Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as they appear to us, Kant calls *negative noumena;* and reserves the designation of *positive noumena*, to intelligibles properly so called, which are the objects of an intuition purely intellectual. —Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 200.

The two kinds of *noumena* taken together are opposed to *phenomena*, and form the *intelligible* world. This world we

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admit as possible, but unknown. Kantism thus trends towards scepticism.

"The word *phenomenon* has no meaning except as opposed to something intelligible—to a *noumenon*, as Kant says. Now, either we understand by the latter word a thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in a *negative* sense; or we understand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a *positive* sense. Which of these two is truth? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed *à priori* that the only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming that there really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our knowledge; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. We, therefore, cannot adopt the word *noumenon* in any positive sense; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a conception—in other words a hypothesis of the understanding."—Henderson, *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 76.—*V.* PHENOMENON.

NOVELTY (*novus*, new), "is not merely a sensation in the mind of him to whom the thing is new; it is a real relation which the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But we are so constituted, that what is new to us commonly gives pleasure upon that account, if it be not in itself disagreeable. It rouses our attention, and occasions an agreeable exertion of our faculties. . . . . Curiosity is a capital principle in the human constitution, and its food must be what is in some respect new. . . . . Into this part of the human constitution, I think, we may resolve the pleasure we have from *novelty* in objects."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 2.

Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, the consideration of which belongs to Æsthetics—or that department of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste.

NUMBER was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, *numbers* and the proportions subsisting between them, were employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, *numbers* were banished from metaphysics, and the consideration of them was allotted to a separate science—arithmetic and algebra.

OATH.—An *oath* is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of all that is true and right, and a solemn promise to speak the truth and to do what is right; renouncing the divine favour and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we fail to do so. *Oaths* have been distinguished as—1. The *assertory*, or *oath* of evidence, and 2. The *promissory*, or *oath* of office—the former referring to the past, and the latter to the future. But both refer to the future, inasmuch as both are confirmatory of a promise, to give true evidence, or to do faithful service.—*V.* AFFIRMATION.

OBJECTIVE (*objicio*, to throw against), is now used to describe the absolute independent state of a thing; but by the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as *objects* of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, "Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their *real* and *objective* natures are, therefore, one and the same." *Siris*, sect. 292, where *real* and *objective* are expressly distinguished. The modern nomenclature appears to me very inconvenient.—Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle*, p. 191.

With Aristotle ὑποκείμενον signified the *subject* of a proposition, and also substance. The Latins translated it *subjectum*. In Greek *object* is ἀντικείμενον, translated *oppositum*. In the Middle Ages *subject* meant *substance*, and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza; sometimes also in Reid. *Subjective* is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind, *objective* that which the mind feigned. This shows what is meant by *realitas objectiva* in Descartes

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(*Med.* 3). Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings: *subject* is the mind which knows—*object* that which is known. *Subjective* the varying conditions of the knowing mind—*objective* that which is in the constant nature of the thing known. —Trendelenburg, *Notes to Aristotle's Logic.*

By *objective reality* Descartes meant the reality of the object in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it—by *formal*, or *actual reality* the reality of the object as conform to our idea of it. Thus the sun was *objectively* in our thought or idea of it—*actually* or *formally* in the heavens. He had also a third form of reality which he called *eminent*—that is, an existence superior at once to the *idea* and the *object*, and which contained in *posse* what both these had in *esse.*—*Response à la Seconde Objection.*

"In philosophical language, it were to be wished that the word *subject* should be reserved for the *subject of inhesion*—the *materia in qua;* and the term *object* exclusively applied to the *subject of operation*—the *materia circa quam.* If this be not done, the grand distinction of *subjective* and *objective*, in philosophy, is confounded. But if the employment of *subject* for *object* is to be deprecated, the employment of *object* for purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) is to be absolutely condemned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which should be carefully distinguished." —Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 97, and App., note B.—*V.* SUBJECT.

OBLIGATION (*obligo*, to bind), is legal or moral.

"*Obligation*, as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In consequence of original sin man comes into the world a *debtor* to divine justice. He is under an *obligation* to punishment, on account of his *deficiency* from that form of original justice in which he rendered to God all that service of love which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence our terms *due* and *duty*, to express right conduct."—Hampden, *Bampton Lect.*, vi., p. 296.

Obligation (Moral) has been distinguished as *internal* and *external;* according as the reason for acting arises in the mind of the agent, or from the will of another.

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In seeing a thing to be right we are under *obligation* to do it. This is *internal obligation*, or that reason for acting which arises in the mind of the agent, along with the perception of the rightness of the action. It is also called *rational obligation*. Dr. Adams (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*) has said, "*Right* implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is *right*, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very *essence of obligation;* that which commands the approbation of choice, and *binds the conscience* of every rational being." And Mr. Stewart (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. ii., p. 294) has said, "The very notion of virtue implies the notion of *obligation*."

External obligation is a reason for acting which arises from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. It is also called *authoritative obligation*. Bishop Warburton (*Div. Leg.*, book i., sect. 4) has contended that all *obligation* necessarily implies an *obliger* different from the party obliged; and moral *obligation*, being the *obligation* of a free agent, implies a law; and a law implies a lawgiver. The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all *obligation*, strictly and properly so called. The perception of the difference between right and wrong can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of God.

There is no incompatibility between these two grounds of obligation.—See Whewell, *Sermons on the Foundation of Morals*, pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. i., p. 78.

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters has been parted. They have grounded *obligation* altogether on the will of God, and have overlooked or made light of the *obligation* which arises from our perception of rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke. (*Life by Lord King*, vol. ii., p. 129.) And both Warburton and Horsley, as well as Paley and his followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, prominence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as prompting to the practice of

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virtue. But, although God, in accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief spring, of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the divine will may spring from veneration and love to the divine character, arising from the most thorough conviction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. To do what is right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and veneration for the character and commands of Him who is just and good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inadequate. That which should bind us to the throne of the Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden links of a love to all that is right; and our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings after the prevalence of universal purity, rather than desires of our own individual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of all that is right and good; and expands with a love which refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and the capacities of enjoyment. In the nature and will of Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission; and in surrendering itself to His authority is purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is right and good.

See Sanderson, *De Juramenti Obligatione*, prælec. i., sect. 11; *De Obligatione Conscientiæ*, prælec. v.; Whewell, *Morality*, book i., chap. 4, pp. 84-89; King, *Essay on Evil*, Prelim. Dissert., sect. 2.—*V.* RIGHT, SANCTION.

OBSERVATION.—"The difference between *experiment* and *observation*, consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries; or rather in the comparative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2.

Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. i., p. 106, note) has said, that according to Dr. Reid, "Attention to external things is *observation*, and attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 1) has said, that "reflection, in its common and proper meaning, is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of consciousness—and has censured Locke for restricting it to that reflection which is employed about the operations of our minds. In like manner we may *observe* the operations of our own minds as well as external phenomena. *Observation* is better characterized by Sir John Herschell as passive experience.—*V.* EXPERIENCE.

It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and matter. According to some (*Edin. Rev.*, vol. iii., p. 269), *experiment* can be applied to matter, but only *observation* to mind. But to a certain extent the study of mind admits experiment. See Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil*, sect. ii., p. 51; and Mr. Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2.

"We can scarcely be said to make experiments on the minds of others. It is necessary to an experiment, that the observer should know accurately the state of the thing observed before the experiment, and its state immediately after it. But when the minds of other men are the subject, we can know but little of either the one state or of the other. We are forced, therefore, to rely not on experiment, but on experience; that is to say, not on combinations of known elements effected for the purpose of testing the result of each different combination; but on our observation of actual occurrences, the results of the combination of numerous elements, only a few of which are within our knowledge. And the consequence is, that we frequently connect facts which are really independent of one another, and not unfrequently mistake obstacles for causes. . . . .

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"When we direct our attention to the workings of our own minds; that is to say, when we search for premises by means of consciousness instead of by means of *observation*, our powers of trying experiments are much greater. To a considerable degree we command our own faculties, and though these are few, perhaps none which we can use separately, we can at will exercise one more vigorously than the others. We can call, for instance, into peculiar activity, the judgment, the memory, or the imagination, and note the differences in our mental condition as the one faculty or the other is more active. And this is an experiment. Over our mental sensations we have less power. We cannot at will feel angry, or anxious, or frightened; but we can sometimes, though rarely, put ourselves really into situations by which certain emotions will be excited. And when, as is usually the case, this is impossible or objectionable, we can fancy ourselves in such situations. The first is an actual experiment. We can approach the brink of an unprotected precipice and look down—we can interpose between our bodies and that brink a low parapet, and look over it, and if we find that our condition in the two cases differ, that though there is no real danger in either case, though in both our judgment equally tells us that we are safe, yet that the apparent danger in the one produces fear, while we feel secure in the other, we infer that the imagination can excite fear for which the judgment affirms that there is no adequate cause. The second is the resemblance of an experiment, and which when tried by a person with the vivid imagination of Shakspeare or Homer, may serve for one; but with ordinary minds it is a fallacious expedient. Few men, when they picture themselves in an imaginary situation, take into account all the incidents necessary to that situation; and those which they neglect may be the most important."—Senior, *Four Lectures on Pol. Econ.*, 1852, p. 31.

"Instead of contrasting *observation* and *experiment*, we should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena as alike subjects of *observation*. Facts furnished by artificial contrivances require to be *observed* just in the same way as

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those which are presented by nature without our interference; and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in confining *observation* to the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of something which ceases where experiment begins; while in simple truth, the business of experiment is to extend the sphere of *observation*, and not to take up a subject where *observation* lays it down."—S. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 114-15, 8vo, Lond., 1851.

All men are apt to notice likenesses in the facts that come before them, and to group similar facts together. The faculty by which such similarities are apprehended is called *observation;* the act of grouping them together under a general statement, as when we say, "All seeds grow—all bodies fall," has been described as *generalization*—*V.* GENERALIZATION.

According to M. Comte (*Cours de Philosoph. Positive*, tom. ii., p. 19) there are three modes of *observation*:—1. *Observation*, properly so called, or the direct examination of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally. 2. *Experiment*, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, so modified more or less by artificial circumstances introduced intentionally by ourselves, with a view to its more complete investigation. 3. *Comparison*, or the successive consideration of a series of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple. The third head (as to which see tom. iii., p. 343) seems not so much a species of *observation*, as a mode of arranging *observations*, with a view to a proper investigation of the phenomena.—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Meth. of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 5, note.

According to Humboldt (*Cosmos*, vol. ii., p. 212) there are three stages of the investigation of nature—*passive observation*, *active observation*, and *experiment*.

The difference between active and passive *observation* is marked in Bacon (*Nov. Org.*, 1, Aphor. 100). The former is when *Experientia lege certa procedit, seriatim et continenter.*

"This word *experimental* has the defect of not appearing to comprehend the knowledge which flows from *observation*, as well as that which is obtained by *experiment*. The German

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word *empirical* is applied to all the information which experience affords; but it is in our language degraded by another application. I therefore must use *experimental* in a larger sense than its etymology warrants."—Sir J. Mackintosh, *On Bacon and Locke*, *Works*, vol. i., p. 333.

Experiential has been proposed as equivalent to *empirical.*

OCCASION.—Cicero (1. *De Inventione*) says:—*Occasio est pars temporis, habens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi opportunitatem.* (*De Offic.*, lib. i.) *Tempus autem actionis opportunum*, Græce, εὐκαιρία; Latine, *appellatur occasio.* The watchman falling asleep gives *occasion* to thieves to break into the house and steal.

"There is much difference between an *occasion* and a proper *cause:* these two are heedfully to be distinguished. Critical and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, distinguish betwixt the ἀρχή and the αἰτία, the beginning *occasions* and the real causes, of a war."—Flavell, *Discourse of the Occasions, Causes, Nature, Rise, Growth, and Remedies of Mental Errors.*

"What is *caused* seems to follow naturally; what is *occasioned* follows incidentally, and what is *created* receives its existence arbitrarily. A wound *causes* pain, accidents *occasion* delay, scandal *creates* mischief.

"Between the real cause and the *occasion* of any phenomenon, there is a wide diversity. The one implies the *producing power*, the other only some *condition* upon which this power comes into exercise. If I cast a grain of corn into the earth, the occasion of its springing up and producing plant, ear, and grain, is the warmth and moisture of the soil in which it is buried; but this is by no means the cause. The cause lies in the mysterious vital power which the seed contains within itself; the other is but the condition upon which this cause produces the effect."—Morell, *Specul. Phil.*, vol. i., p. 99.

OCCASIONAL CAUSES (Doctrine of).—*V.* CAUSE.

OCCULT QUALITIES.—*V.* QUALITY.

ONE.—*V.* UNITY.

O.—*V.* DREAMING.

ONTOLOGY (ὄν and λόγος, the science of being).—"*Ontology* is a discourse of being in general, and the various or most universal modes or affections, as well as the several kinds or divisions of it. The word *being* here includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever can be."—Watts, *On Ontology*, c. 1.—See also Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, book v., c. 1.

Ontology is the same as metaphysics. Neither the one name nor the other was used by Aristotle. He called the science now designated by them *philosophia prima*, and defined it as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄντος—*Scientia Entis Quatenus Entis*, that is, the science of the essence of things; the science of the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being in any given circumstances, not as physical or mathematical, but as being. The name *ontology* seems to have been first made current in philosophy by Wolf. He divided metaphysics into four parts—*ontology*, psychology, rational cosmology, and theology. It was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c., without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied that we had any knowledge of substance or cause as really existing. But there is a science of principles and causes, of the principles of being and knowing. In this view of it, *ontology* corresponds with *metaphysics*—*q. v.*

"*Ontology* may be treated of in two different methods, according as its exponent is a believer in τὸ ὄν, or in τὰ ὄντα, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. In the former, all objects whatever are regarded as phenomenal modifications of one and the same substance, or as self-determined effects of one and the same cause. The necessary result of this method is to reduce all metaphysical philosophy to a Rational Theology, the one substance or Cause being identified with the Absolute or the Deity. According to the latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of beings independently, metaphysics will contain three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, Rational Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Rational Theology. The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as distinguished from the phenomena

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of the material world; the second discusses the nature and origin, as distinguished from the faculties and affections, of the human soul and of other finite spirits; the third aspires to comprehend God himself, as cognizable *à priori* in his essential nature, apart from the indirect and relative indications furnished by his works, as in Natural Theology, or by his Word, as in Revealed Religion.

"These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the Pure Reason; and the object of his Critique is to show that in relation to all these, the attainment of a system of speculative philosophy is impossible."—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277.

"The science of *ontology* comprehends investigations of every real existence, either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties of the human soul."—Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy.*

OPERATIONS (of the Mind).—"By the *operations of the mind*,"* says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1), "we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious.

"It deserves our notice, that the various modes of thinking have always and in all language, as far as we know, been called by the name of *operations of the mind*, or by names of the same import. To body, we ascribe various properties, but not *operations*, properly so called: it is extended, divisible, moveable, inert; it continues in any state in which it is put; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that force. These are the general properties of matter, and these are not *operations;* on the contrary, they all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are

* *Operation*, *act*, and *energy*, are nearly convertible terms; and are opposed to *faculty*, as the *actual* to the *potential*.—Sir Will. Hamilton.

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called its *operations*, is that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active."—*V.* STATES OF MIND.

OPINION (*opinor*, to think).—"The essential idea of *opinion* seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. . . . . Any proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Essay on Opinion*, p. i., iv.

According to the last of these definitions, matter of *opinion* is opposed not to matter of *fact*, but to matter of *certainty*. Thus, the death of Charles I. is a *fact*—his authorship of *Icon Basilike*, an *opinion*. It is also used, however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light, is matter of *fact;* that it is inhabited or uninhabited, is matter of *opinion*.

It has been proposed (*Edin. Rev.*, April, 1850, p. 311), to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, into matter of *perception* and matter of *inference;* and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of *certainty* and matter of *doubt*.

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the three following degrees:—*opinion*, *belief*, and *knowledge*. *Opinion* is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. *Belief* is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. *Knowledge* is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed *conviction* (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed *certainty* (for all).—Meiklejohn, *Transl. of Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 498.—*V.* BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINTY, FACT, JUDGMENT.

OPPOSED, OPPOSITION (τὸ ἀντικείμενον, that which lies over against).—Aristotle has said, that "one thing may be opposed to another in four ways; by relation, by contrariety, or as privation is to possession, affirmation to negation. Thus, there is the *opposition* of relation between the double and the half;

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of contrariety between good and evil; blindness and seeing are *opposed* in the way of privation and possession; the propositions, he sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation and affirmation."—*V.* CONTRARY, PRIVATION, TERM.

OPPOSITION (in Logic).—"Two propositions are said to be *opposed* to each other, when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ in *quantity*, or *quality*, or *both*. It is evident, that with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz., A, E, I, and O; any two of which are said to be *opposed;* hence there are four different kinds of *opposition*, viz., 1st, the two universals (A and E), are called *contraries* to each other; 2d, the two particular (I and O), *subcontraries;* 3d, A and I, or E and O, *subalterns;* 4th, A and O, or E and I, *contradictories.*"—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 3.

The *opposition* of propositions may be thus exhibited:—

All A is B. No A is B.	Contraries—may be both false, but cannot both be true.
Some A is B. Some A is not B.	Subcontraries—may both be true, but cannot both be false.
All A is B. Some A is not B.	Contradictories—one must be true and the other false.
No A is B. Some A is B.	Also Contradictories.
All A is B. Some A is B. and	No A is B. Some A is not B. Respectively subalternate.

"Of two subalternate propositions the truth of the universal proves the truth of the particular, and the falsity of the particular proves the falsity of the universal, but not *vice versa.*"—Mill, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1.

OPTIMISM (*optimum*, the superlative of *bonum*, good), is the doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an infinitely perfect Being, is the best that could be created.

This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great philosophical schools of antiquity. During the Middle Ages it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times comparatively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and Malebranche. But the doctrine has been developed in its highest form by Leibnitz.

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According to him, God, being infinitely perfect, could neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good compared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things were present to the Divine Mind in idea, and composed an infinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wisdom chose the best. Creation was the giving existence to the most perfect state of things which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind.

The *optimism* of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Voltaire and others. But the doctrine which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole—and not even to the universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite progress of which it may contain the germs.—Leibnitz, *Essais de Theodicée;* Malebranche, *Entretiens Metaphysiques.*

According to Mr. Stewart (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. iii., ch. 3, sect. 1), under the title of *optimists*, are comprehended those who admit and those who deny the freedom of human actions, and the accountableness of man as a moral agent.

ORDER means rank, *series* means succession; hence there is in *order* something of voluntary arrangement, and in *series* something of unconscious catenation. The *order* of a procession. The *series* of ages. A *series* of figures in uniform—soldiers in *order* of battle.—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accomplish an end, the harmonious relation established between the parts for the good of the whole. The primitive belief that there is *order* in nature, is the ground of all experience. In this belief we confidently anticipate that the same causes, operating in the same circumstances, will produce the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who orders all things.

Order has been regarded as the higher idea into which moral rectitude may be resolved. Every being has an end to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accom-

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plishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly towards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place he holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and intelligently endeavour to realize that universal *order* of which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what is right.

"There is one parent virtue, the universal virtue, the virtue which renders us just and perfect, the virtue which will one day render us happy. It is the only virtue. It is the love of the universal *order* as it eternally existed in the Divine Reason, where every created reason contemplates it. The love of *order* is the whole of virtue, and conformity to *order* constitutes the morality of actions."—*Traité de Morale*, Rott., 1634.

Such is the theory of Malebranche, and more recently of Jouffroy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, tends to the discovery of universal *order*. And art, in its highest attainments, is only realizing the truth of nature; so that the true, the beautiful, and the good, ultimately resolve themselves into the idea of *order*.

ORGAN.—An *organ* is a part of the body fitted to perform a particular action, which, or rather the performance of which action, is denominated its function.

"By the term *organ*," says Gall (vol. i., p. 228), "I mean the material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a faculty. The muscles and the bones are the material condition of movement, but are not the faculty which causes movement; the whole organization of the eye is the material condition of sight, but it is not the faculty of seeing. By the term '*organ* of the soul,' I mean a material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a moral quality, or an intellectual faculty. I say that man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain; but if one concludes that the brain is the thing that thinks and wills, it is as if one should say that the muscles are the faculty of moving; that the *organ* of sight and the faculty of seeing are the same thing. In each case it would be to confound the *faculty* with the *organ*, and the *organ* with the *faculty*."

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"An *organ* of sense is an instrument composed of a peculiar arrangement of organized matter, by which it is adapted to receive from specific agents definite impressions. Between the agent that produces and the *organ* that receives the impressions, the adaptation is such, that the result of their mutual action is, in the first place, the production of sensation; and, in the second place, of pleasure."—Dr. Southwood Smith.

According to phrenological writers, particular parts of the brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular faculties of the mind. This is *organology*. It is further maintained, that the figure and extent of these parts of the brain can be discerned externally. This is *organoscopy*. Some who believe in the former, do not believe in the latter.

ORGANON or ORGANUM (ὄργανον, an instrument), is the name often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic; because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science rather than a science or part of science in itself. In the sixth century, Ammonius and Simplicius arranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called *logical* or *organical*. But it was not till the fifteenth century that the name *Organum* came into common use (Barthélemy St. Hilaire, *De la Logique d'Aristote*, tom. i., p. 19). Bacon gave the name of *Novum Organum* to the second part of his *Instauratio Magna*. And the German philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work under the title, *Das Neue Organon*.

Poste, in his translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, gives a sketch of the *Organum* of Aristotle, which he divides into four parts,—viz., *General Logic*, the *Logic of Deduction*, the *Logic of Induction*, and the *Logic of Opinion*; the third, indeed, not sufficiently articulated and disengaged from the fourth, and hence the necessity of a *Novum Organum*.

"The *Organon* of Aristotle, and the *Organon* of Bacon stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety; the one considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known. To compare them together, is therefore to compare together qualities of different species. Each proposes a different end; both, in

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different ways are useful; and both ought to be assiduously studied."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 712, note.

ORIGIN (*origo*) may be taken in two senses, essentially different from each other. It may mean the *cause* of anything being produced, or it may imply simply the *occasion* of its production.—Morell, *Specul. Phil.*, vol. i., p. 99.

ORIGINATE, ORIGINATION.—These words and their conjugates are coming to be used in the question concerning liberty and necessity. Does man *originate* his own actions? Is man a principle of *origination?* are forms of expression equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent?

"To deny all *originating* power of the will, must be to place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Divine nature. . . . . Whether as a matter of fact an *originating* power reside *in man*, may be matter of inquiry; but to maintain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of creation."—Thomson, *Christ. Theism*, book i., chap. 6. "Will, they hold to be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect; in other words, they attribute to it a power of absolute *origination*."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 595. See also Cairns, *On Moral Freedom*.

OSTENSIVE (*ostendo*, to show).—"An *ostensive* conception indicates how an object is constituted. It is opposed to the *heuristic* (*heuretic*) conception which indicates how, under its guidance, the quality and connection of objects of experience in general are to be sought. The conception of a man, a house, &c., is an *ostensive* one; the conception of the supreme intelligence (for theoretic reason) is an *heuristic* conception."—Haywood, *Explanation of Terms in the Crit. of Pure Reason*.

OUGHTNESS.—*V.* DUTY.

OUTNESS.—"The word *outness*, which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berkeley in his *Principles of Human Knowledge* (sect. 43); and at a still earlier period of his life, in his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (sect. 46). I mention this as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part i., essay 2.—*V.* EXTERNALITY.

PACT.—*V.* CONTRACT, PROMISE.

PANTHEISM (πᾶς, all; θεος, God).—"It supposes God and nature, or God and the whole universe, to be one and the same substance—one universal being; insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the Divine substance."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. viii., p. 81.

Pantheistæ qui contendunt unicam esse substantiam, cujus partes sunt omnia entia quæ existunt.—Lacoudre, *Inst. Philosoph.*, tom. ii., p. 120.

Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of God in nature, is atheism; and the doctrine of Spinoza has been so regarded by many. When explained to mean the absorption of nature in God—of the finite in the infinite—it amounts to an exaggeration of theism. But *pantheism*, strictly speaking, is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the finite and the infinite—of the absolute consubstantiality of God and nature—considered as two different but inseparable aspects of universal existence; and the confutation of it is to be found in the consciousness which every one has of his personality and responsibility, which *pantheism* destroys.

PARABLE (παραβολή, from παραβάλλω, to put or set beside), has been defined to be a "fictitious but probable narrative taken from the affairs of ordinary life to illustrate some higher and less known truth." "It differs from the *Fable*, moving, as it does, in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural; from the *Myth*, there being in the latter an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separable in the *Parable*; from the *Proverb*, inasmuch as it is longer carried out, and not merely accidentally and occasionally, but necessarily figurative; from the *Allegory*, comparing, as it does, one thing *with* another, at the same time preserving them apart as an inner and an outer, not transferring, as does the *Allegory*, the properties, and qualities and relations of one *to* the other."—Trench, *On the Parables.*

PARADOX (παρά δόξα, beyond, or contrary to appearance), is a proposition which seems not to be true, but which turns out to be true. Cicero wrote "*Paradoxa*," and the Hon. Robert

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Boyle published, in 1666, *Hydrostatical Paradoxes*, made out by new experiments.

PARALOGISM (παραλογισμός, from παραλογίζομαι, to reason wrong), is a formal fallacy or pseudo-syllogism, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises. We may be deceived ourselves by a *paralogism;* when we endeavour to deceive others by it, it is a *sophism—q. v.*

Paralogism of Pure Reason.—"The logical *paralogism* consists in the erroneousness of a syllogism, according to form, whatever besides its content may be. But a transcendental *paralogism* has a transcendental foundation of concluding falsely, according to the form. In such a way, a like false conclusion will have its foundation in the nature of human reason, and will carry along with itself an inevitable, although not an insoluble illusion."—Kant, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 299.

PARCIMONY (Law of) (*parcimonia*, sparingness).—"That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity;" in other words, "that a plurality of principles are not to be assumed, when the phænomena can possibly be explained by one." This regulative principle may be called the law or maxim of *parcimony*.—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 751, note A.

Entia non sunt multplicanda præter necessitatem. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. These are expressions of this principle.

PARONYMOUS.—*V.* CONJUGATE.

PART (μέρος, *pars*, part, or portion).—"*Part*, in one sense, is applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that which you take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is a *part* of that quantity. Thus two is a *part* of three. In another sense, you only give the name of *part* to what is an exact measure of quantity; so that, in one point of view, two will be a *part* of three, in another not. That into which you can divide a genus, animal, for example, otherwise than by quantity, is still a *part* of the genus. In this sense species are *parts* of the genus. *Part* is also applied to that into which an object can be divided, whether matter or form. Iron is *part* of a globe, or cube of iron; it is the matter which receives the form. An angle is also a *part*. Lastly, the elements of the definition of every

particular being are *parts* of the whole; so that, in this point of view, the genus may be considered as *part* of the species; in another, on the contrary, the species is *part* of the genus."—Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 25.

"Of things which exist by *parts*, there are three kinds. The first is of *things*, the *parts* of which are not *co-existent*, but *successive;* such as *time* or *motion*, no two parts of which can exist together.

"The next kind of things consisting of *parts*, is such where *parts* are *co-existent and contiguous.* Things of this kind are said to be *extended;* for *extension* is nothing else but *co-existence* and *junction of parts.*

"The third kind of things existing by *parts* is, when the *parts* are co-existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but separate and disjoined. Of this kind is *number*, the *parts* of which are separated by *nature*, and only united by the operation of the mind."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 13.

PASSION (*passio*, πάσχω, to suffer), is the contrary of action. "A passive state is the state of a thing while it is operated upon by some cause. Everything and every being but God, is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy—always active, but never acted upon; while everything else is liable to suffer change."—See Harris, *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, p. 86, note.

PASSIONS (The).—This phrase is sometimes employed in a wide sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the sensibility—every form and degree of feeling. In a more restricted psychological sense, it is confined to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-command. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which *passion* is opposed to reason.

Plato arranged the *passions* in two classes,—the concupiscible and irascible, ἐπιθυμία and θῦμος, the former springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil.

Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of orectic, and distinguished them into the appetite

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irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which had their origin in the body, and the appetite rational (βούλησις), which is the will, under the guidance of reason.

Descartes and Malebranche have each given a theory and classification of the *passions;* also, Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. Cogan, and Dr. Hutcheson.

PERCEPTION (*capio*, to take; *per*, by means of), apprehension by means of the organs of sense.

Descartes (*Princip. Philosoph.*, pars 1, sect. 32) says, "*Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt: quorum unus est* perceptio, *sive operatio intellectus; alius vero*, volitio, *sive operatio* voluntatis. *Nam* sentire, imaginari, *et* pure intelligere, *sunt tantum diversi modi* percipiendi; *ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi* volendi."

Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 6) says, "The two principal actions of the mind are these two; *perception* or *thinking*, and *volition* or *willing*. The power of thinking is called the *understanding*, and the power of volition the *will;* and these two powers or abilities of the mind are called faculties."

Dr. Reid thought that "*perception* is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." He says (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1), "The *perception* of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than *perception*. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; *perceiving* expresses that which is common to them all."

The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Reid, is to be found in the philosophy of Kant; and, as convenient, has been generally acquiesced in.

In note D* to *Reid's Works*, p. 876, Sir Will. Hamilton notices the following meanings of *perception*, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects:—

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1. *Perceptio*, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehension, notion, cognition in general.

2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. *Perception*, the Cartesians really identified with *idea*, and allowed them only a logical distinction; the same representative act being called *idea*, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation; and *perception*, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation.

3. *Perception* is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed by Reid, and thereafter by Kant.

4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Reid, is *perception* (proper), in contrast to *sensation* (proper).

He defines sensitive *perception*, or *perception* simply as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body,

a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an *animated* organism, it is contingently susceptible; and

b. Those *general relations of extension*, under which, as a *material* organism, it necessarily exists.

Of these *perceptions*, the former, which is thus conversant about a *subject-object*, is *sensation proper;* the latter, which is thus conversant about an *object-object*, is *perception proper*.

PERCEPTIONS (Obscure), or latent modifications of mind.

Every moment the light reflected from innumerable objects, smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of different bodies are affecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These are what Leibnitz (*Avant Propos de ses Nouv. Essais*) calls *obscure perceptions*—and what Thurot (*De l'Entendement*, &c., tom. i., p. 11) proposes to call *impressions*. But this word is already appropriated to the changes produced by communication between an external object and a bodily organ.

The sum of these *obscure perceptions* and latent feelings, which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which attaches us to life—even when our more defined *perceptions* and feelings are painful.

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The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to (*obscure*) *perceptions* is translated from Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 566:—

"*Confused* or *insensible perceptions* are without consciousness or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in themselves, but they must be, because the mind always thinks. A substance cannot be without action, a body without movement, a mind without thought. There are a thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity of *perceptions;* but the habit in which we are of perceiving them, by depriving them of the attraction of novelty, turns away our attention and prevents them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could we form a *clear perception* without the *insensible perceptions* which constitute it? To hear the noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which compose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though each of these little noises does not make itself known but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it. A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. And sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have not some feeble and confused feeling; one would not be wakened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not some *perception* of its commencement, which is small.

"It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the greatest questions of philosophy to these *insensible perceptions*, in so far as they imply the *law of continuity*. It is by means of these we can say that the present 'is full of the past and big with the future,' and that in the least of substances may be read the whole consequences of the things of the universe. They often determine us without our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of *indiscernibles*), and that their difference is always more than numerical, which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action,

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a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter. There is another consequence—that souls, being simple substances, are always united to a body, and that there is no soul entirely separated from one. This dogma resolves all the difficulties as to the immortality of souls, the difference of their states being never anything but that of more or less perfect, which renders their state past or future as explicable as their present. It also supplies the means of recovering memory, by the periodic developments which may one day arrive."

"Obscure ideas, or more properly, sensations with dormant consciousness, are numerous. It is through them, so far as they proceed from the nervous system of vegetative life, and thus accompany all its functions, digestion, secretion, &c., that the soul, according to Stahl, secretly governs the body. '*Animus est instar oceani*,' says Leibnitz, '*in quo infinita multitudo perceptionum obscurissimarum adest, et distinctæ ideæ instar insularum sunt, quæ ex oceano emergunt.*' It is they which are active throughout the whole progress of the formation of thought; for this goes on, though we are unconscious of it, and gives us only the perfect results, viz., ideas and notions. It is they which in the habitual voluntary motions, for instance, in playing on the piano, dancing, &c., set the proper muscles in motion through the appropriate motor nerves, though the mind does not direct to them the attention of consciousness. It is they which in sleep and in disorders of mind act a most important part. It is their totality which forms what plays so prominent a part in life under the name of *disposition* or *temper*."—Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, 1847, p. 169.

Lord Jeffrey had a fancy, or said he had it, that though he went to bed with his head stuffed and confused with the names and dates and other details, of various causes, they were all in order in the morning; which he accounted for by saying, that during sleep "*they all crystallized round their proper centres.*"—Cockburn, *Life of Jeffrey*, vol. i., p. 243, note.

PERFECT, PERFECTION (*perficio; perfectum*, made out, complete).—To be *perfect* is to want nothing. *Perfection* is *relative* or *absolute*. A being possessed of all the qualities

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belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called *perfect* in a *relative sense.* But *absolute perfection* can only be ascribed to the Supreme Being. We have the idea of a Being infinitely *perfect*—and from this Descartes reasoned that such a being really exists.

The *perfections* of God are those qualities which he has communicated to his rational creatures, and which are in Him in an infinitely *perfect* degree. They have been distinguished as *natural* and *moral*—the former belonging to Deity as the great first cause—such as independent and necessary existence—the latter as manifested in the creation and government of the universe—such as goodness, justice, &c. But they are all natural in the sense of being essential. It has been proposed to call the former *attributes*, and the latter *perfections.* But this distinctive use of the terms has not prevailed; indeed it is not well founded. In God there are nothing but *attributes*—because in Him everything is absolute and involved in the substance and unity of a perfect being.

PERFECTIBILITY (The Doctrine of) is, that men, as individuals, and as communities, have not attained to that happiness and development of which their nature and condition are capable, but that they are in a continual progress to a state of perfection, even in this life. That men as a race are capable of progress and improvement is a fact attested by experience and history. But that this improvement may be carried into their whole nature—and to an indefinite extent—that all the evils which affect the body or the mind may be removed—cannot be maintained. Bacon had faith in the intellectual progress of men when he entitled his work "Of the Advancement of Learning." Pascal has articulately expressed this faith in a preface to his "Treatise of a Vacuum." "Not only individual men advance from day to day in knowledge, but men as a race make continual progress in proportion as the world grows older, because the same thing happens in a succession of men as in the different periods of the life of an individual; so that the succession of men during a course of so many ages, ought to be considered as the same man always living and always learning. From this may be seen the injustice of the reverence paid to antiquity

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in philosophy: for as old age is the period of life most distant from infancy, who does not see that the old age of the universal man is not to be sought for in the period nearest his birth, but in that most remote from it." Malebranche (*Search after Truth*, book ii., part ii., chap. 4) expressed a similar opinion; and the saying of a great modern reformer is well known, "If you talk of the wisdom of the ancients, we are the ancients." It cannot be denied that in arts and sciences, and the accommodations of social life, and the extension of social freedom, the administration of justice, the abolition of slavery, and many other respects, men have improved, and are improving, and may long continue to improve. But human nature has limits beyond which it cannot be carried. Its life here cannot be indefinitely prolonged, its liability to pain cannot be removed, its reason cannot be made superior to error, and all the arrangements for its happiness are liable to go wrong.

Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible that the human race might reach a perfection of which we cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the doctrine of a *palingenesia*, or transformation of all things into a better state. In the last century the great advocates of social progress are Fontenelle, Turgot, and Condorcet, in France; Lessing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany; Price and Priestley, in England. Owen's views are also well known.—Mercier, *De la Perfectibilité Humaine*, 8vo, Paris, 1842.

PERIPATETIC (περιπατητικός, *ambulator*, from περιπατέω, to walk about), is applied to Aristotle and his followers, who seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum.

PERSON, PERSONALITY.—*Persona*, in Latin, meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which (*personuit*) he made himself heard by the immense audience. From being applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any character or station. Martinius gives as its composition—*per se una*, an individual.

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"Person," says Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 27), "stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive."

"We attribute *personality*," says Mons. Ahrens (*Cours de Psychologie*, tom. ii., p. 272), "to every being which exists, not solely for others, but which is in the relation of unity with itself in existing, or for itself. Thus we refuse *personality* to a mineral or a stone, because these things exist for others, but not for themselves. An animal, on the contrary, which exists for itself, and stands in relation to itself, possesses a degree of *personality*. But man exists for himself in all his essence, in a manner more intimate and more extensive; that which he is, he is for himself, he has consciousness of it. But God alone exists for himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God is entirely in relation to himself; for there are no beings out of him to whom he could have relation. His whole essence is for himself, and this relation is altogether internal: and it is this intimate and entire relation of God to himself in all his essence, which constitutes the divine *personality*."

"The seat of intellect," says Paley, "is a *person*."

A being intelligent and free, every spiritual and moral agent, every cause which is in possession of responsibility and consciousness, is a *person*. In this sense, God considered as a creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a *person*.

According to Boethius, *Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia.*

"Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, from some other being, is a *thing*. Whatever possesses a spontaneous action within itself, is a *person*, or, as Aristotle (*Nicom. Eth.*, lib. iii.) defines it, an ἀρχὴ πράξεως."—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, p. 152.

"*Personality* is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground."—Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 43.

"If the substance be unintelligent in which the quality

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exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelligent, we call it a *person*, meaning by the word *person* to distinguish a thing or substance that *is* intelligent, from a thing or substance that is *not* intelligent. By the word *person*, we therefore mean a thing or substance that is intelligent, or a conscious being; including in the word the idea both of the substance and its properties together."—Henry Taylor, *Apology of Ben Mordecai*, letter i., p. 85.

"A subsisting substance or *suppositum* endued with reason as man is, that is, capable of religion, is a *person*."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 319.

"*Person*, as applied to Deity, expresses the definite and certain truth that God is a living being, and not a dead material energy. Whether spoken of the Creator or the creature, the word may signify either the unknown but abiding substance of the attributes by which he is known to us; or the unity of these attributes considered in themselves."—R. A. Thompson, *Christian Theism*, book ii., chap. 7.—*V.* IDENTITY (PERSONAL), REASON, SUBSISTENTIA.

Personality, in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of rights and obligations which belong to an intelligent will.—Jouffroy, *Droit. Nat.*, p. 19.

PETITIO PRINCIPII (or *petitio quæsiti*, begging the question). —*V.* FALLACY.

PHANTASM.—*V.* IDEA, PERCEPTION.

PHENOMENOLOGY.—*V.* NATURE.

PHENOMENON (*Φαινόμενον*, from *Φαίνομαι*, to appear), is that which has appeared. It is generally applied to some sensible appearance, some occurrence in the course of nature. But in mental philosophy it is applied to the various and changing states of mind. "How pitiful and ridiculous are the grounds upon which such men pretend to account for the very lowest and commonest *phenomena* of nature, without recurring to a God and Providence!"—South, vol. iv., Serm. ix.

"Among the various *phenomena* which the human mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and active

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principle within us, and the material objects with which we are surrounded."—Stewart, *Elements*, c. 1, sect. 1.

In the philosophy of Kant, *phenomenon* means an object such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in opposition to *noumenon*, or a thing as it is in itself.

"According to Kant, the facts of consciousness, in their subjective character, are produced partly from the nature of the things of which it is conscious; and hence, in their objective character, they are *phenomena*, or objects as they appear in relation to us, not things in themselves, *noumena*, or realities in their absolute nature, as they may be out of relation to the mind. The subjective elements which the mind itself contributes to the consciousness of every object are to be found, as regards intuition, in the forms of space and time; and as regards thought, in the categories, unity, plurality, and the rest.* To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it neither in space nor in time; for these are furnished by the constitution of our perceptive faculties, and constitute an element of the *phenomenal* object of intuition only. To think of a thing in itself would be to think of it neither as one nor as many, nor under any other category; for these, again, depend upon the constitution of our understanding, and constitute an element of the *phenomenal* object of thought. The *phenomenal* is the product of the inherent laws of our own mental constitution, and, as such, is the sum and limit of all the knowledge to which we can attain."—Mansel, *Lect. on Phil. of Kant*, pp. 21, 22.

The definition of *phenomenon* is, "that which can be known only along with something else."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 319.—*V.* NOUMENON.

PHILANTHROPY (φιλανθρωπία, from φιλανθρωπεύω, to be a friend to mankind).—"They thought themselves not much

* I. *Categories of Quantity.*
Unity.
Plurality.
Totality

II. *Categories of Quality.*
Reality.
Negation.
Limitation.

III. *Categories of Relation.*
Inherence and Subsistence.
Casuality and Dependence.
Community, or Reciprocal Action.

IV. *Categories of Modality.*
Possibility, or Impossibility.
Existence, or Non-Existence.
Necessity or Contingence.

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concerned to acquire that God-like excellency, a *philanthropy* and love to all mankind."—Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., Serm. i.

This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from benevolence or a desire for the well-being of others. When our benevolence is purified and directed by the doctrines and precepts of religion, it becomes charity or brotherly love. When sustained by large and sound views of human nature and the human condition, it seeks to mitigate social evils and increase and multiply social comforts, it takes the name of *philanthropy*. But there is no incompatibility between the two. It is only when *philanthropy* proceeds on false views of human nature and wrong views of human happiness, that it can be at variance with true charity or brotherly love.

Philanthropy, or a vague desire and speculation as to improving the condition of the whole human race, is sometimes opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true charity or benevolence, while it begins with loving and benefiting those nearest to us by various relations, will expand according to the means and opportunities afforded of doing good. And while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of friendship, of family, and of society, and grasp in one benevolent embrace the universe of human beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of the earth; and although the sympathies of friendship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind—who are all children of one common parent, heirs of the same frail nature, and sharers in the same unbounded goodness:—

> "Friends, parents, neighbours, first it will embrace,
> Our country next, and next all human race.
> Wide and more wide, the o'erflowing of the mind,
> Takes every creature in of every kind.
> Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed,
> And heaven reflects its image in her breast."—Pope.

PHILOSOPHY (φιλοσοφία, φιλία, σοφία, the love of wisdom).—The origin of the word is traced back to Pythagoras, who did not call himself σοφός, like the wise men of Greece, but merely declared himself to be a lover of wisdom, φίλος σοφίας. *Philosophy* is not so much the love of wisdom, as the love of wisdom may be said to be its spring. The desire of knowledge is natural to man. Ignorance is painful; knowledge is agreeable. Surrounded with ever changing phenomena, he seeks to know their causes, and tries to bring their multiplicity to something like unity, and to reduce their variety to law and rule. When so employed he is prosecuting *philosophy*. It was defined by Cicero (*De Officiis*, lib. ii., c. 2), *Rerum divinarum et humanarum*,* *causarumque quibus hæ res continentur, scientia*. But what man can attain or aspire to such knowledge, or even to the knowledge of one of the several departments into which *philosophy* may be divided? "In *philosophy*," says Lord Bacon (*Of the Advancement of Learning*, book ii.), "the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, *Divine philosophy*, *natural philosophy*, and *human philosophy*, or humanity." Now the object-matter of *philosophy* may be distinguished as God, or nature, or man. But, underlying all our inquiries into any of these departments, there is a *first philosophy*, which seeks to ascertain the grounds or principles of knowledge, and the causes of all things. Hence *philosophy* has been defined to be the science of causes and principles. It is the investigation of those principles on which all knowledge and all being ultimately rest. It is the exercise of reason to solve the most elevated problems which the human mind can conceive. How do we know? and what do we know? It examines the grounds of human certitude, and verifies the trustworthiness of human knowledge. It inquires into the causes of all beings, and ascertains the nature of all existences by reducing them to unity. It is not peculiar to any department, but common to all departments of knowledge. Or if

* According to Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book i., chap. 5), the Romans had only the word *sapientia* for philosophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they adopted the Greek word *philosophia*.

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each department of knowledge may be said to have its *philosophy*, it is because it rests upon that knowledge of principles and causes which is common to them all. Man first examines phenomena, but he is not satisfied till he has reduced them to their causes, and when he has done so he asks to determine the value of the knowledge to which he has attained. This is *philosophy* properly so called, — the mother and governing science—the science of sciences.

"'*Philosophy* is the science of first principles,' that, namely, which investigates the *primary grounds*, and determines the *fundamental certainty*, of human knowledge generally."—Morell, *Philosoph. Tendencies of the Age*, 8vo, Lond., 1848, p. 13.

Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Lovan., 1840, sect. 107, proposes the following definition: — "Philosophia *est scientia rerum per causas primas, recto rationis usu comparata.*"

By this definition it is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge. 1. From simple *intelligence*, which is *intuitive*, while *philosophical* knowledge is *discursive*. 2. From *natural sciences*, which do not always reach to *first causes*. 3. From *arts*, which do not proceed by causes or principles, but by rule. 4. From *faith* or *belief*, which rests not on evidence but authority. 5. From *opinion*, which is not certain knowledge. And from the common love of knowledge and truth, which does not prosecute and acquire it *scientifically*.

"*Philosophy* is the attainment of truth by the way of reason." —Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 2.

PHRENOLOGY (φρήν, mind; λόγος, discourse).—This word ought to mean Psychology, or mental philosophy, but has been appropriated by Craniologists, on account of the light which their observations of the convolutions of the brain and corresponding elevations of the skull are supposed to throw on the nature and province of our different faculties. According to Dr. Gall, the founder of Craniology, "its end is to determine the functions of the brain in general, and of its different parts in particular, and to prove that you may recognize different dispositions and inclinations by the protuberances and depres-

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sions to be found on the cranium. The cranium being exactly moulded upon the mass of the brain, every portion of its surface will present dimensions and developments according to the corresponding portion of the brain. But individuals in whom such or such a portion of the brain is largely developed, have been observed by phrenologists to be remarkable for such or such a faculty, talent, or virtue, or vice; and the conclusion is, that the portion of the cranium corresponding to that development of the cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, or vice—is its *special organ*."—See writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe.

"If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combination of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same faculty in the same process of ratiocination, then *phrenology* is so far true; and if the action of these fasciculi has the effect of elongating them, so as to produce pressure on the corresponding internal surface of the cranium, and if the bony case make a corresponding concession of space to the elongation of these specific fasciculi, then *cranioscopy* is true also; but there are so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving at such a result, that a vastly greater mass of evidence must be brought forward before phrenologists and cranioscopists have a right to claim general assent to their doctrine."—Wigan, *Duality of Mind*, p. 162.

The British Association, established several years ago, refused to admit *phrenology* as a *section* of their society.

PHYSIOGNOMY (Φύσις, nature; γνώμων, an index) is defined by Lavater to be the "art of discovering the *interior* of man from his *exterior*." In common language it signifies the judging of disposition and character by the features of the face. In the Middle Ages, *physiognomy* meant the knowledge of the *internal* properties of any corporeal existence from *external* appearances.

> "They found i' the *physiognomies*
> Of the planets, all men's destinies."—*Hudibras.*

It does not appear that among the ancients *physiognomy* was extended beyond *man*, or at least beyond animated nature.

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The treatise on this subject ascribed to Aristotle is thought to be spurious. But all men, in the ordinary business of life, seem to be influenced by the belief that the disposition and character may in some measure be indicated by the form of the body, and especially by the features of the face.

"Every one is in some degree a master of that art which is generally distinguished by the name of *Physiognomy*, and naturally forms to himself the character or fortune of a stranger from the features and lineaments of his face. We are no sooner presented to any one we never saw before, but we are immediately struck with the idea of a proud, a reserved, an affable, or a good-natured man; and upon our first going into a company of strangers, our benevolence or aversion, awe or contempt, rises naturally towards several particular persons before we have heard them speak a single word, or so much as know who they are. For my own part, I am so apt to frame a notion of every man's humour or circumstances by his looks, that I have sometimes employed myself from Charing Cross to the Royal Exchange in drawing the characters of those who have passed by me. When I see a man with a sour, rivelled face, I cannot forbear pitying his wife; and when I meet with an open, ingenuous countenance, I think of the happiness of his friends, his family, and his relations. I cannot recollect the author of a famous saying to a stranger who stood silent in his company,—'Speak that I may see thee.' But with submission I think we may be better known by our looks than by our words, and that a man's speech is much more easily disguised than his countenance."—Addison, *Spectator*, No. 86.

Young children are physiognomists—and they very early take likings and dislikings founded on the judgments which they intuitively form of the aspects of those around them. The inferior animals, even, especially such of them as have been domesticated, are affected by the natural or assumed expression of the human countenance. As to their taking likings or dislikings to particular persons, this is probably to be ascribed to the great acuteness not of the sense of sight, but of scent.

The taking a prejudice against a person for his looks is

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reckoned among the smaller vices in morality, and is called by More in his *Enchiridion Ethicum, Prosopolepsia.*

See Lavater, Spurzheim. J. Cross, *Attempt to Establish Physiognomy upon Scientific Principles*, Glasg., 1817.

PHYSIOLOGY and PHYSICS were formerly used as synonymous. The *former* now denotes the laws of *organized* bodies, the *latter* of *unorganized.* The former is distinguished into *animal* and *vegetable.* Both imply the *necessity* of *nature* as opposed to *liberty* of *intelligence*, and neither can be appropriately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, however, entitled the first part of one of his works, the *Physiology* of mind.—*V.* PSYCHOLOGY.

Physiology determines the matter and the form of living beings. It describes their structure and operations, and then ascends from phenomena to laws; from the knowledge of organs and their actions it concludes their function and their end or purpose; and from among the various manifestations it seeks to seize that mysterious principle which animates the matter of their organization, which maintains the nearly constant form of the compound by the continual renewal of the component molecules, and which at death, leaving this matter, surrenders it to the common laws, from the empire of which it was for a season withdrawn.

. . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can touch and see—matter and its modifications.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

PICTURESQUE "properly means what is done in the style and with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am not much mistaken, that the word was commonly employed when it was first adopted in England. . . . But it has been frequently employed to denote those combinations or groups or attitudes of objects that are fitted for the purposes of the painter."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part i., chap. 5.

"*Picturesque* is a word applied to every object, and every kind of scenery, which has been or might be represented with good effect in painting—just as the word *beautiful*, when we speak of visible nature, is applied to every object and every kind of scenery that in any way give pleasure to the eye—and

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these seem to be the significations of both words, taken in their most extended and popular sense."—Sir Uvedale Price, *On the Picturesque*, ch. 3.

"The two qualities of *roughness* and of *sudden variation*, joined to that of *irregularity*, are the most efficient causes of the *picturesque*."*—*Ibid.*

"*Beauty* and *picturesqueness* are founded on opposite qualities; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness; the one on grandeur, the other on sudden variation; the one on ideas of youth and freshness, the other on those of age, and even of decay."—Chap. 4.

PNEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means that department of it which treats of the mechanical properties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used as synonymous with *pneumatoloy*.

PNEUMATOLOGY (πνεῦμα, *spirit;* λόγος, discourse).—The branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and operations of mind, has by some been called *pneumatology*. Philosophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our own mind and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evidence for the existence of orders of minds intermediate. Popular opinion is in favour of the belief. But philosophy has sometimes admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has found a place, however, in all religions. There may thus be said to be a *religious pneumatology*, and a *philosophical pneumatology*. In *religious pneumatology*, in the East, there is the doctrine of two antagonistic and equal spirits of good and evil. In the doctrines of Christianity there is acknowledged the existence of spirits intermediate between God and man, some of whom have fallen into a state of evil, while others have kept their first estate.

Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socrates had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did not discountenance the doctrine, and the Neo-Platonicians of Alexandria carried *pneumatology* to a great length, and adopted

* "A *picturesque* object may be defined as that which, from the greater facilities which it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his art, is, as it were, a provocation to painting."—Sir Thos. L. Dick, note to above chap.

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the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scholastic ages, the belief in return from the dead, apparitions and spirits, was universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxony, Emanuel Swedenborg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez Pasqualis and his disciple Saint Martin, have all given accounts of orders of spiritual beings who held communication with the living. And in the present day a belief in *spirit rapping* is prevalent in America.

Bp. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge,* sect. 81, and throughout, admits the existence of orders of spirits.

Considered as the science of mind or spirit, *pneumatology* consisted of three parts, treating of the Divine mind, Theology —the angelic mind, Angelology, and the human mind. This last is now called Psychology, "a term to which no competent objection can be made, and which affords us, what the various clumsy periphrases in use do not, a convenient adjective—*psychological.*"—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 219, note.

POETRY or POESY.—"However critics may differ as to the definition of *poetry*, all competent to offer an opinion on the subject will agree that occasionally, in prose, as well as in verse, we meet with a passage to which we feel that the term *poetry* could be applied, with great propriety, by a figure of speech. In the other arts also we find, now and then, what we feel prompted from within to call the *poetry* of painting, of statuary, of music, or of whatever art it may be. The fact that books have been written under such figurative titles, and favourably received, proves that the popular mind conceives of something in *poetry* besides versification—of some spiritual excellence, most properly belonging to compositions in verse, but which is also found elsewhere. When Byron said that few poems of his day were half *poetry*, he evidently meant by *poetry* something distinguishable from rhythm and rhyme. True, such may be only a figurative use of the word; but the public accept that figurative use as corresponding to some actual conception which they entertain of *poetry* in its best degrees. And when they speak of the *poetry* of any other art, it is evident from the use of the same word that they believe themselves perceiving the same or similar qualities. To such conceptions, then, without

regard to whence they spring, I think, with Coleridge, that it would be expedient to appropriate the word *poesy*, thereby avoiding the ambiguity which now exists in the use of the word *poetry;* though popular choice, which always prefers a figurative application of a common word, has not adopted the suggestion." —Moffat, *Study of Æsthetics*, p. 221.

POLLICITATION.—*V.* PROMISE.

POLYGAMY (πολύς, many; γάμος, marriage) means a plurality of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various forms in all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, to be contrary to the light of nature; and has been condemned and punished by the laws of many nations. About the middle of the sixteenth century, Bernardus Ochinus, general of the order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Protestant, published Dialogues in favour of *polygamy*, to which Theodore Beza wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled *Polygamia Triumphatrix* appeared under the name of Theophilus Aletheus. The true name of the author was Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 1780, Martin Madan published *Thelyphthora*, or *a Treatise on Female Ruin*, in which he defended *polygamy*, on the part of the male. See some sensible remarks on this subject in Paley's *Moral* and *Political Philosophy*, book iii., ch. 6.

POLYTHEISM (πολύς, many; θεός, god).—"To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more (though in their nature good), is to be a *polytheist*."—*Shaftesbury*, b. i., pt. i., sect. 2.

Three forms of *polytheism* may be distinguished. 1. *Idolatry*, or the worship of idols and false gods, which prevailed in Greece and Rome. 2. *Sabaism*, or the worship of the stars and of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in Chaldea. 3. *Fetichism*, or the worship of anything that strikes the imagination and gives the notion of great power, which prevails in Africa and among savage nations in general.

E.—*V.* MORAL, TERM.

I.—"One man affirms that to him the principle of all certitude is the *testimony of the senses;* this is *positivism*."—Morell, *Philosoph. Tenden.*, p. 15.

Of late years the name *positivism* has been appropriated to

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the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. This philosophy is thus described by an admirer (G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosoph. of Sciences*, 1853, sect. 1):—"This is the mission of *positivism*, to generalize science, and to systematize sociality; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social doctrine is the *aim of positivism*, a scientific doctrine the *means;* just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and interpreter of life.

"The leading conception of M. Comte is:—There are but three phases of intellectual evolution—the *theological* (supernatural), the *metaphysical*, and the *positive*. In the *supernatural* phase, the mind seeks *causes*, unusual phenomena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or displeasure of some god. In the *metaphysical* phase, the supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the *positive* phase, the mind restricts itself to the discovery of the *laws* of phenomena."

POSSIBLE (*possum*, to be able).—That which may or can be. "'Tis *possible* to infinite power to endue a creature with the power of beginning motion."—Clarke, *On Attributes*, prop. 10.

Possibilitas est consensio inter se, seu non repugnantia partium vel attributorum quibus res seu ens constituatur.

A thing is said to be *possible* when, though not actually in existence, all the conditions necessary for realizing its existence are given. Thus we say it is *possible* that a plant or animal may be born, because there are in nature causes by which this may be brought about. But as everything which is born dies, we say it is impossible that a plant or animal should live for ever. A thing is *possible*, when there is no contradiction between the idea or conception of it and the realization of it; and a thing is *impossible* when the conception of its realization or existence implies absurdity or contradiction.

We apply the terms *possible* and *impossible* both to beings and events, chiefly on the ground of experience. In proportion as our knowledge of the laws of nature increases, we say it is *possible* that such things may be produced; and in proportion as our knowledge of human nature is enlarged, we say it is

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possible that such events may happen. But it is safer to say what is *possible* than what is *impossible*, because our knowledge of causes is increasing.

There are three ways in which what is *possible* may be brought about; *supernaturally*, *naturally*, and *morally*. The resurrection of the dead is *supernaturally possible*, since it can only be realized by the power of God. The burning of wood is *naturally* or *physically possible*, because fire has the power to do so. It is *morally possible* that he who has often done wrong should yet in some particular instance do right. These epithets apply to the causes by which the *possible* existence or event is realized.

"*Possible* relates sometimes to *contingency*, sometimes to *power* or liberty, and these senses are frequently confounded. In the first sense we say, *e. g.*, 'It is *possible* this patient may recover,' not meaning that it depends on his *choice*, but that *we* are *not sure* whether the event will not be such. In the other sense it is '*possible*' to the best man to violate every rule of morality; since if it were out of his *power* to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness in the case, though we are quite sure that such never *will* be his choice."—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

POSTULATE (αἴτημα, *postulatum*, that which is asked or assumed in order to prove something else).—"According to some, the difference between axioms and *postulates* is analogous to that between theorems and problems; the former expressing truths which are self-evident, and from which other propositions may be deduced; the latter operations which may be easily performed, and by the help of which more difficult constructions may be effected."—Stewart, *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 2, sect. 3, From Wallis.

There is a difference between a *postulate* and a *hypothesis*. When you lay down something which may be, although you have not proved it, and which is admitted by the learner or the disputant, you make a hypothesis. The *postulate* not being assented to, may be contested during the discussion, and is only established by its conformity with all other ideas on the subject.

In the philosophy of Kant, a *postulate* is neither a *hypothesis*

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nor a *corollary*, but a proposition of the same binding certainty, or whose certainty is incorporated with that of another, so that you must reject that other, all evident as it is in self, or admit at the same time what it necessarily supposes. He has three *postulates*.

1. I am under obligation, therefore I am free.

2. Practical reason tends necessarily to the sovereign good, which supposes an absolute conformity with the moral law; such conformity is holiness; a perfection which man can only attain by an indefinite continuity of effort and of progress. This progress supposes continuity of existence, personal and identical, therefore the soul is immortal, or the sovereign good is a chimera.

3. On the other hand, the sovereign good supposes *felicity*, but this results from the conformity of things with a will, and has for its condition, obedience to the moral law; there must then be a harmony possible between morality and felicity, and this necessarily supposes a cause of the universe distinct from nature,—an intelligent cause, who is at the same time the Author of the moral law, and guarantee of this harmony of virtue and happiness, from which results the sovereign good; then *God exists*, and is himself the primitive sovereign good, the source of all good. Kant's *postulates* of the practical reason are thus freedom, immortality, and God.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 420.

POTENTIAL is opposed to *actual*—*q. v.* This antithesis is a fundamental doctrine of the Peripatetic philosophy. "Aristotle saith, that divided they (*i. e.*, bodies) be in infinitum *potentially*, but actually not."—Holland, *Plutarch*, p. 667.

"Anaximander's infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or *potentially* contained all manner of qualities."—Cudworth, *Intell. System*, p. 128.

POTENTIALITY (δύναμις).—*V.* CAPACITY.

POWER (*possum*, to be able; in Greek, δύναμις), says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 21), "may be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power." Dr. Reid, in reference to this distinction, says

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(*Act. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 3), "Whereas he distinguishes *power* into active and passive, I conceive *passive power* to be no *power* at all. He means by it the possibility of being changed. To call this *power* seems to be a misapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met with the phrase *passive power* in any other good author. Mr. Locke seems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deserves not to be retained in our language." "This paragraph," says Sir W. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 519, note), "is erroneous in almost all its statements." The distinction between *power* as active and passive, is clearly taken by Aristotle. But he says that in one point of view they are but one *power* (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 12), while in another they are two (*Metaphys.*, lib. ix., cap. 1). He also distinguishes *powers* into rational and irrational—into those which we have by nature, and those which we acquire by repetition of acts. These distinctions have been generally admitted by subsequent philosophers. Dr. Reid, however, only used the word *power* to signify *active power*. That we have the idea of *power*, and how we come by it, he shows in opposition to Hume (*Act. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 2, 4).

According to Mr. Hume, we have no proper notion of *power*. It is a mere relation which the mind conceives to exist between one thing going before, and another thing coming after. All that we observe is merely antecedent and consequent. Neither sensation nor reflection furnishes us with any idea of *power* or efficacy in the antecedent to produce the consequent. The views of Dr. Brown are somewhat similar. It is when the succession is constant—when the antecedent is uniformly followed by the consequent, that we call the one cause, and the other effect; but we have no ground for believing that there is any other relation between them or any virtue in the one to originate or produce the other, that is, that we have no proper idea of *power*. Now, that our idea of *power* cannot be explained by the philosophy which derives all our ideas from sensation and reflection, is true. *Power* is not an object of sense. All that we observe is succession. But when we see one thing invariably succeeded by another, we not only connect the one as effect and the other as cause, and view them under

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that relation, but we frame the idea of *power*, and conclude that there is a virtue, an efficacy, a force, in the one thing to originate or produce the other; and that the connection between them is not only uniform and unvaried, but universal and necessary. This is the common idea of *power*, and that there is such an idea framed and entertained by the human mind cannot be denied. The legitimacy and validity of the idea can be fully vindicated.

"In the strict sense, *power* and agency are attributes of mind only; and I think that mind only can be a *cause* in the strict sense. This *power*, indeed, may be where it is not exerted, and so may be without agency or causation; but there can be no agency or causation without *power* to act and to produce the effect. As far as I can judge, to everything we call a cause we ascribe power to produce the effect. In intelligent causes, the *power* may be without being exerted; so I have *power* to run when I sit still or walk. But in inanimate causes we conceive no *power* but what is exerted, and, therefore, measure the *power* of the cause by the effect which it actually produces. The *power* of an acid to dissolve iron is measured by what it actually dissolves. We get the notion of *active power*, as well as of cause and effect, as I think, from what we feel in ourselves. We feel in ourselves a *power* to move our limbs, and to produce certain effects when we choose. Hence we get the notion of *power*, *agency*, and *causation*, in the strict and philosophical sense; and this I take to be our first notion of these three things."—Dr. Reid, *Correspondence*, pp. 77, 78.

"The liability of a thing to be influenced by a cause is called *passive power*, or more properly susceptibility; while the efficacy of the cause is called *active power*. Heat has the *power* of melting wax; and in the language of some, ice has the *power* of being melted."—Day, *On the Will*, p. 33.—*V.* CAUSE.

It is usual to speak of a *power* of resistance in matter; and of a *power* of endurance in mind. Both these are *passive power*. *Active power* is the principle of action, whether immanent or transient. *Passive power* is the principle of bearing or receiving.

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Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. viii., cap. 1; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., chap. 21; Hobbes, *Opera*, tom. i., p. 113, edit. by Molesworth.

PRACTICAL (German, *praktisch*).—The strict meaning of this word in the philosophy of Kant, is immediate will-determining, and the Critick of Practical Reason is nothing else but the critick of that faculty of reason which immediately determines the will.—Haywood, *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 401.

PRÆDICATE, PRÆDICABLE, and PRÆDICAMENT, are all derived from *prædico*, to affirm. A *prædicate* is that which is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A *prædicable* is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A *prædicament* is a series, order, or arrangement of *predicates* and *prædicables* in some summum genus, as substance, or quality.

What is affirmed or denied is called the *prædicate;* and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the *subject.*—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. v., p. 152.—*V.* ATTRIBUTE, CATEGORY, UNIVERSAL.

Prædicables.—"Whatever term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their *whole essence*, which is called the *species*; or a *part* of their essence (viz., either the *material* part, which is called the *genus*, or the *formal* and distinguishing part, which is called *differentia*, or in common discourse, *characteristic*), or something joined to the essence; whether *necessarily* (*i. e.*, to the *whole* species, or in other words, *universally*, to every individual of it), which is called a *property;* or contingently (*i. e.*, to *some* individuals only of the species), which is an *acccident.*



PRÆDICATE—

"Genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called the *five classes of predicates;* but use has determined them to be called the *five predicables.*"—Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic.*

Prædicament.—These most comprehensive signs of things (the categories), are called in Latin the *prædicaments*, because they can be said or *prædicated* in the same sense of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning."—Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, c. 2.

Præ-prædicamenta and Post-prædicamenta.—"The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three sections, calling the first section *τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the second, *τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the third, *τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας.*—*Ammon. in Prædic.*, p. 146. The Latins adhering to the same division, coin new names: *ante-prædicamenta*, or *præ-prædicamenta*, *prædicamenta* and *post-prædicamenta.*"—Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxon., 1672.

PREJUDICE (*præjudico*, to judge before inquiry).—A *prejudice* is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an opinion concerning anything, before the grounds of it have been fairly or fully considered. The opinion may be true or false, but in so far as the grounds of it have not been examined, it is erroneous or without proper evidence. "In most cases *prejudices* are opinions which, on some account, men are pleased with, independently of any conviction of their truth; and which, therefore they are afraid to examine, lest they should find them to be false. *Prejudices*, then, are unreasonable judgments, formed or held under the influence of some other motive than the love of truth. They may therefore be classed according to the nature of the *motives* from which they result. These motives are, either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and social; or, 2, They are malignant."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 8) has treated of *prejudices* or the causes of error, according to the classification given of them by Lord Bacon, under the name of *idols*—*q. v.* Mr. Locke has treated of the causes of error (*Essay on Hum.*

Understand., book iv., chap. 20). And some excellent observations on the *prejudices* peculiar to men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, *Search after Truth*, book ii., part 2.

(*propositiones præmissæ*, propositions which go before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred).—A regular syllogism consists of two *premisses* and a conclusion. The two *premisses* are sometimes called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the *consequent*.

PRESCIENCE (*præscio*, to know before it happens).—"The *prescience* of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, accurately representing the natures, powers, and properties of the thing it does foreknow."—More, *Immortality of Soul*, b. ii., ch. 4.

The *prescience* of God may be argued from the perfection of his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to conceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our obscure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not to be likened to his clear and direct* beholding of all things. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the *prescience* of God with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon its own proper evidence.—St. Augustin, *On the Spirit and the Letter;* Bossuet, *Traité du Libre Arbitre;* Leibnitz, *Theodicée;* Fenelon, *Existence de Dieu.*

PRESENTATIVE.—*V.* KNOWLEDGE.

PRIMARY (*primus*, first) is opposed to *secondary*. "Those qualities or properties, without which we cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are called *primary* qualities. Extension and solidity are called *primary* qualities of matter—colour, taste, smell, are called *secondary* qualities of matter."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

* When the late Sir James Mackintosh was visiting the school for the deaf and dumb at Paris, then under the care of the Abbé Sicard, he is said to have addressed this question in writing to one of the pupils,—"Doth God reason?" The pupil for a short time appeared to be distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, the following answer:—"To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire: it is the highest attribute of a *limited* intelligence. God sees all things, foresees all things, knows all things; therefore God doth not reason."—Gurney, *On Habit and Discipline*, p. 138.

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Descartes, Locke, Reid, Stewart, *Phil. Essays*, ii., chap. 2, Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D.—*V.* MATTER.

PRINCIPIA ESSENDI or PRINCIPLES OF BEING are distinguished into the *principle* of *origination* and the *principle* of *dependence.*

The only proper *principle* of *origination* is God, who gives essence and existence to all beings.

The *principle* of *dependence* is distinguished into that of *causality* and that of *inherence*, or *effective dependence*, as the effect depends upon its cause, and *subjective dependence*, as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance.

PRINCIPLE (*principium*, ἀρχή, a beginning).—"A principle is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing. '*Principio autem nulla est origo*,' said Cicero, '*nam ex principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nulla ex re; nec enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.*'"—Sir Will. Drummond, *Acad. Quest.*, p. 5.

Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 1) has noticed several meanings of ἀρχή, which is translated *principle*, and has added —"What is common to all first *principles* is that they are the *primary source from which anything is, becomes, or is known.*"

The word is applied equally to thought and to being; and hence *principles* have been divided into those of being and those of knowledge, or *principia essendi* and *principia cognoscendi*, or, according to the language of German philosophers, *principles formal* and *principles real. Principia essendi* may also be *principia cognoscendi*, for the fact that things exist is the ground or reason of their being known. But the converse does not hold; for the existence of things is in no way dependent upon our knowledge of them.

Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with *principles of being*, investigating the origin and elements of all things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy has been chiefly devoted to *principles of knowledge*, ascertaining the laws and elements of thought, and determining their validity in reference to the knowledge which they give.

PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE are those truths by means of

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which other truths are known. They have been distinguished into *simple* and *complex*, that is, they may be found in the form of ideas, as substance, cause—or in the form of propositions, as in the affirmation that every change implies the operation of a cause, or in the negation that qualities do not exist without a substance. *Complex principles* have been arranged in three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, and axioms. Hypotheses and definitions have been called θετικά, that is, conventional principles or truths assumed or agreed on for the purpose of disputation or teaching, and are confined to the department of knowledge to which they peculiarly belong. Axioms are *principles* true in themselves, and extending to all departments of knowledge. These were called φυσικά or ἔμφυτα, and are such as the mind of man naturally and at once accepts as true. They correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, or principles of common sense of the Scottish philosophy.—*V.* COMMON SENSE, AXIOM.

"The word *principle*," says Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. i., chap. 1, sect. 2), "in its proper acceptation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether resting on fact or on hypothesis) upon which, as a *datum*, a train of reasoning proceeds; and for the falsity or incorrectness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent process can compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity of the air are *principles of reasoning*, in our speculations about the barometer. The equality of the angles of incidence and reflection, the proportionality of the sines of incidence and refraction, are *principles of reasoning* in catoptrics and in dioptrics. In a sense perfectly analogous to this, the *definitions* of geometry (all of which are merely *hypothetical*) are the first *principles of reasoning* in the subsequent demonstration, and the basis on which the whole fabric of the science rests."

Lord Herbert, *De Veritate;* Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths;* Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi.

Principles as **Express** or as **Operative** correspond to *principles* of *knowing* and of *being*. An *express principle* asserts a proposition; as, truth is to be spoken. An *operative principle* prompts to action or produces change, as when a man takes

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food to satisfy hunger. An *express principle* asserts an original *law* and is *regulative*. An *operative principle* is an original *element* and is *constitutive*.

PRINCIPLES OF ACTION may either mean those *express principles* which regulate or ought to regulate human action, or those *operating* or *motive principles* which prompt human action. The latter, which is the common application of the phrase, is its psychological meaning.

When applied to human action psychologically, the word *principle* is used in the sense of the *principle* of *dependence*; and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its being produced. It may signify the dependence of *causality*, that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, as its efficient cause; or it may signify the dependence of *inherence*, that is, that the action depends for its production on some power or energy which inheres in the agent as its subject. Hence it has been said that a *principle of action* is twofold—the *principium quod*, and the *principium quo*. Thus, man as an active being is the *principium quod* or efficient cause of an action being produced; his will, or the power by which he determines to act, is the *principium quo*.

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself; and in this view may be regarded as the *principium quod*, while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded as the *principium quo*. Before we act, we deliberate, that is, we contemplate the action in its nature and consequences; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise of will is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is called into exercise by certain influences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or displacency, of liking or disliking, of satisfaction or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disapprobation are experienced. We pronounce some things to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclination or aversion; and under the influence of these states and affections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The

forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination or tendency to or from an object, may assume, are many and various; arising partly from the nature of the objects contemplated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But they are all denominated, in a general way, *principles of action.*

PRIVATION (στέρησις, *privatio*).—"A *privation* is the absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called *privations.*"—Watts, *Log.*, pt. i., c. 2.

The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. "To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls στέρησις or *privation*, an addition that he has thought proper to make to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in order to give his system the appearance of novelty; but without any necessity, as I apprehend; for it is not a cause, as he himself admits, such as *matter* and *form*, but is only that without which the first *matter* could not receive the impression of any *form;* for it must be clear of every *form*, which is what he calls *privation*, before it can admit of any.

"Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of *matter;* for as it has the *capacity* of all *form*, so it has the *privation* of all *form.* In this way, Aristotle himself has explained the nature of matter (*Physic*, lib. i., cap. 8). And Plato, in the *Timæus*, has very much insisted upon this quality of matter as absolutely necessary, in order to fit it to receive all forms; and he illustrates his meaning by a comparison:—Those, says he, who make unguents or perfumes, prepare the liquid so, to which they are to give the perfume, that it may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, those who take off an impression of anything upon any soft matter, clear that matter of every other impression, making it as smooth as possible, in order that it may better receive the figure or image intended. In like manner, he says, *matter*, in order to receive the specieses of all things, must in itself have the species of nothing."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 2. Hence *pri-*

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vation was defined—*Negatio formæ in subjecto apto ad habendam talem formam:*

According to Plato, *privation*, in the sense of limitation, imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, and the necessary cause of evil.—Leibnitz, after Augustin, Aquinas, and others, held similar views. *Causa Dei*, sect. 69, 72. *Essais Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, 1, partie, sect. 29, 31; 3, partie, sect. 378.—*V.* NEGATION.

PROBABILITY.—*V.* CHANCES.

PROBABLE (*probabilis*, provable).—That which does not admit of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is *probable*, or admits of proof. "As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so *probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. . . . . The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between *probability* and *certainty*, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection; in belief, not so. That which makes us believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement, or disagreement, of those ideas that are under consideration.

"The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Second, the testimony of others, touching their observation and experience."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 15. Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vii., chap. 3.

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"The word *probable*," says Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, part ii., chap. 2, sect. 4), "does not imply any *deficiency* in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from another species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is *certain*, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the *manner of the mathematicians*. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to the same word in popular discourse; according to which, whatever event is said to be *probable*, is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. . . . . But although, in philosophical language, the epithet *probable* be applied to events which are acknowledged to be *certain*, it is also applied to events which are called *probable* by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more *comprehensive* than the popular; the former denoting that particular *species* of evidence of which contingent truths admit; the latter being confined to such *degrees* of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different degrees of *probability* the philosopher considers as a *series*, beginning with bare possibility, and terminating in that apprehended *infallibility*, with which the phrase *moral certainty* is synonymous. To this last term of the *series*, the word *probable* is, in its ordinary acceptation, plainly inapplicable."

PROBLEM (πρόβλημα, from προβάλλω, to throw down, to put in question).—Any point attended with doubt or difficulty, any proposition which may be attacked or defended by probable arguments, may be called a *problem*. Every department of inquiry has questions, the answers to which are problematical. So that, according to the branch of knowledge to which they belong, *problems* may be called Physical, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral, Mathematical, Historical, Literary, &c. Aristotle distinguished three classes,—the *moral* or *practical*, which may influence our conduct; as, whether pleasure is the chief good: the *speculative* or *scientific*, which merely add to our knowledge; as, whether the world is eternal: and the *auxiliary*, or those questions which we seek to solve with a view to other questions.

PROGRESS.—*V.* PERFECTIBILITY.

PROMISE and POLLICITATION. *Promittimus rogati—pollicemur ultro.*—A *pollicitation* is a spontaneous expression of

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our intention to do something in favour of another. It does not necessarily imply the presence of the party in reference to whom it is made; and it does not confer upon him a right to exact its performance. But in so far as it has become known to him, and has awakened expectations of its being performed, we may be brought under a moral obligation to perform it, especially if its performance is seen to be highly beneficial to him, and in no way prejudicial to ourselves.

A *promise* is made in consequence of a request preferred to us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the request, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect moral right to have it fulfilled, and brings us under a moral obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a *promise*, three things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or intention of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward signification of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the *promise* by the party to whom it is made.

A *promise* implies two parties at least—the *promiser* and the *promisee*. A *pact* implies two or more. In this it agrees with a *contract*—*q. v.*

It is a dictate of the law of nature, that *promises* should be fulfilled,—not because it is expedient to do so, but because it is right to do so.

The various questions concerning the parties competent to give a valid *promise*, the interpretation of the terms in which it may be given, and the cases in which the obligation to fulfil it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what may be called the *Casuistry of Ethics*, and *Natural Jurisprudence.*—*V.* CONTRACT.

PROOF.—"To conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, *proofs*, and probabilities. By *proofs*, meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition."—Hume, *On the Understand.*, sect. 6, note. Whately says that proving may be defined "the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a *given* proposition," and *inferring* "the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. In the one case our *conclusion* is *given*, and we have to *seek* for *arguments*; in the other

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our *premises* are *given*, and we have to *seek* for a conclusion. *Proving* may be compared to the act of *putting away* any article into the proper receptacle of goods of that description, *inferring* to that of *bringing out* the article when needed."—See EVIDENCE, INFERENCE.

PROPERTY may be distinguished from *quality* or *attribute*, and also from *faculty*.

Qualities are primary or secondary, essential or non-essential. The former are called *attributes*, and the latter *properties*. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and smell are *properties* of body.

Faculty implies understanding and will, and so is applicable only to mind. We speak of the *properties* of bodies, but not of their *faculties*. Of mind we may say will is a *faculty* or *property;* so that while all *faculties* are *properties*, all *properties* are not *faculties*.

PROPERTY (Generic) is the *property* of a subaltern genus, and which may be predicated of all the subordinate species. "Voluntary motion" is the *generic property* of "animal."

PROPERTY (Specific) is the *property* of an *infima species*, and which may be predicated of all the individuals contained under it. "Risibility" is the *specific property* of "man."

PROPOSITION.—A judgment of the mind expressed in words is a *proposition*.

"A *proposition*, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the *predicate*, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the *subject;* and these two are called the *terms* of the *proposition*."—Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 6.

As to their *substance*, propositions are *Categorical* (subdivided into *pure and modal*), and *Hypothetical* (subdivided into *conditional* and *disjunctive*).

A *Categorical proposition* declares a thing absolutely, as, "I love," or "Man is not infallible." These are *pure* categoricals, asserting *simply* the agreement and disagreement of subject and predicate. *Modal* categoricals assert the *manner* of

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agreement and disagreement between subject and predicate; as, "The wisest man may *possibly* be mistaken." "A prejudiced historian will *probably* misrepresent the matter."

A *Hypothetical proposition* asserts, not absolutely, but under a hypothesis. Such *propositions* are denoted by the conjunctions used in stating them. "If man is fallible, he is imperfect." This is called a *conditional proposition*, denoted by the conjunction "if." "It is either day or night." This is a *disjunctive* hypothetical, and is denoted by the disjunctive conjunction "either."

As to their *quality*, *propositions* are either *affirmative* or *negative*, according as the predicate is said to agree or not to agree with the subject. "Man 'is' an animal." "Man 'is not' perfect." As to their *quantity*, *propositions* are *universal* or *particular*, according as the predicate is affirmed or denied of the *whole* of the subject, or only of *part* of the subject. "All tyrants are miserable." "No miser is rich." "Some islands are fertile." "Most men are fond of novelty."

Another division of *propositions* having reference to their *quantity* is into *singular* and *indefinite*. A *singular proposition* is one of which the subject is an individual (either a proper name, a singular pronoun, or a common noun with a singular sign). "Cæsar overcame Pompey." "I am the person." "This fable is instructive." But as these *propositions* predicate of the *whole* of the subject, they fall under the rules that govern *universals*. An *indefinite* or *indesignate proposition* is one that has no sign of universality or particularity affixed to it, and its quantity must be ascertained by the *matter* of it, that is, by the nature of the connection between the extremes.

As to their *matter*, *propositions* are either *necessary*, or *impossible*, or *contingent*. In *necessary* and in *impossible* matter, an *indefinite* is understood as a *universal;* as, "Birds have wings;" *i. e.*, *all*. "Birds are not quadrupeds;" *i. e.*, *none*. In *contingent* matter, that is, where the terms sometimes agree and sometimes not, an *indefinite* is understood as *particular;* as, "Food is necessary to life;" *i. e.*, some kind of food. "Birds sing;" *i. e.*, some birds sing. "Birds are not carnivorous;" *i. e.*, *some* birds are not; or, *all* are not.—*V.* JUDGMENT, OPPOSITION.

PROPRIETY (τὸ πρέπον, that which is fit or congruous to the agent, and the relations in which he is placed).—This, according to some, is that which characterizes an action as right, and an agent as virtuous. "According to Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue consists in the *propriety* of conduct, or in the suitableness of the affection from which we act, to the object which excites it."

Adam Smith (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part vii., sect. 2, chap. 1) treats of those systems which make virtue consist in *propriety*.

PROPRIUM (The) or Property is a predicable which denotes something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species.—Whately, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3.

Proprium is applied,—1. To what belongs to some one but not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2. To what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as blackness in respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the species, and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary in respect of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of it, to it only, and always, as laughter in respect of man. This last is truly the *proprium*. *Quod speciei toti, soli et semper convenit.*—Derodon, *Log.*, p. 37.

"There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *whole* species, but not to the *sole* species, as sleeping belongs to man. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *sole* species, but not to the *whole* species, as to be a magistrate. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the whole species, and to the sole species, but not *always*, as laughing; and there is a *proprium* which *always* belongs to it, as to be risible, that is, to have the faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laughing when he represents to himself these poor things, uttered with a mouth made venerable by a long beard, or repeated by a trembling and respectful disciple?"—Crousaz, *Art of Thinking*, part i., sect. 3, chap. 5.

PROSYLLOGISM.—*V.* EPICHEIREMA.

PROVERB.—The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's *Proverbs* says, "A *proverb* is usually defined, an instructive sentence, or common and pithy saying, in which more is generally designed than expressed; famous for its peculiarity and elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as

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the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, which want such authority."

Lord John Russell's definition of a *proverb* is, "the wit of one, the wisdom of many."—Moore, *Diary*, vol. vii., p. 204.

Proverbs embody the current and practical philosophy of an age or nation. Collections of them have been made from the earliest times. The book of Scripture called the *Proverbs* of Solomon, contains more than one collection. They have always been common in the East. Burckhardt made a collection of Arabian *proverbs*, which was published at London in 1830. Seiler published at Augsburg, in 1816, *The Wisdom of the Streets*, or, the *Meaning and Use of German Proverbs.* Ray's *Proverbs*, Allan Ramsay's *Proverbs*, Henderson's *Proverbs*, have been published among ourselves.

Backer (Geo. de) has *Le Dictionnaire de Proverbes Francais*, 8vo, 1710; rare and curious. Panckouke published his *Dictionnaire des Proverbes* in imitation of it.

PROVIDENCE.—"What in opposition to Fate," said Jacobi, "constitutes the ruling principle of the universe into a true God, is *Providence.*"

Providence is a word which leads us to think of conservation and superintending, or upholding and governing. Whatever is created can have no necessary nor independent existence; the same power which called it into being must continue to uphold it in being. And if the beauty and order which appear in the works of nature prove them to be the effects of an intelligent designing cause, the continuance of that beauty and order argues the continued operation of that cause. So that the same arguments which prove the existence of God imply his *providence*. With regard to the extent of *providence*, some have regarded it as general, and reaching only to things regarded as a whole, and to great and important results, while others regard it as particular, and as embracing every individual and every event. But the same arguments which prove that there is a *providence*, prove that it must be particular; or rather, when properly understood, there is no inconsistency between the two views. The *providence* of God can only be called general from its reaching to every object and event, and this is

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the sense in which we are to understand a particular *providence*. But while the *providence* of God extends to every particular, it proceeds according to general laws. And while these laws are fixed and stable, they may be so fixed as to admit of what we think deviations; so that both what we call the law, and what we call the deviation from the law, may be embraced in the plan of *providence*. As to the way in which this plan is carried forward, some have had recourse to the supposition of a plastic nature, intermediate between the Creator and the creature,—others to an energy communicated from the Creator to the creature. But the true view is to regard all things and all events as upheld and governed by the continual presence and power of God. There is a difficulty in reconciling this view with the freedom and responsibility of man, but it is not impossible to do so.—Sherlock, *On Providence;* M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b. ii., ch. 2.

PRUDENCE (*prudentia*, contracted for *providentia*, foresight or forethought) is one of the virtues which were called cardinal by the ancient ethical writers. It may be described as the habit of acting at all times with deliberation and forethought. It is equally removed from rashness on the one hand, and timidity or irresolution on the other. It consists in choosing the best ends, and prosecuting them by the most suitable means. It is not only a virtue in itself, but necessary to give lustre to all the other virtues.

"The rules of *prudence* in general, like the laws of the stone tables, are for the most part prohibitive. *Thou shalt not* is their characteristic formula: and it is an especial part of Christian *prudence* that it should be so. Nor would it be difficult to bring under this head all the social obligations that arise out of the relations of the present life, which the sensual understanding (*τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. viii. 6) is of itself able to discover, and the performance of which, under favourable circumstances, the merest worldly self-interest, without love or faith, is sufficient to enforce; but which Christian *prudence* enlivens by a higher principle and renders symbolic and sacramental (Ephes. v. 32)."

"*Morality* may be compared to the consonant; *prudence* to

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the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to practice) but by means of the latter.

"The Platonic division of the duties of morality commences with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose proceeding from enlightened self-interest (*qui animi imperio, corporis servitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui commodum et sibi providus utitur, hunc esse prudentem statuimus*); ascends to the moral, that is, to the purifying and remedial virtues; and seeks its summit in the imitation of the divine nature. In this last division, answering to that which we have called the spiritual, Plato includes all those inward acts and aspirations, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godlikeness for their immediate purpose, and the union of the human soul with the supreme good as their ultimate object."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., pp. 13, 21, 22.—*V.* MORALITY.

PSYCHISM (from ψυχή, soul) is the word chosen by Mons. Quesne (*Lettres sur le Psychisme*, 8vo, Paris, 1852) to denote the doctrine that there is a fluid, diffused throughout all nature, animating equally all living and organized beings, and that the difference which appears in their actions comes of their particular organization. The fluid is general, the organization is individual.

This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held that the soul of a man passed individually into the body of a brute. He (Mons. Quesne) holds that while the body dies the soul does not; the organization perishes, but not the psychal or psychical fluid.

PSYCHOLOGY (ψυχή, the soul; λόγος, discourse).—The name may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the saying ascribed to Socrates—Know thyself. The recommendation is renewed in the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes; and in the writings of Malebranche, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, psychological inquiries held a prominent place. Still further prominence was given to them by the followers of Kant and Reid, and *psychology*, instead of being partially treated as an introduction to Logic, to Ethics, and to Metaphysics, which all rest on it, is now treated as a separate department of science. It is that knowledge of the mind and

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its faculties which we derive from a careful examination of the facts of consciousness. Life and the functions of our organized body belong to *physiology;* and, although there is a close connection between soul and body, and mutual action and reaction between them, that is no reason why the two departments of inquiry should be confounded, unless to those who think the soul to be the product or result of bodily organization. Broussais said, he could not understand those philosophers who shut their eyes and their ears in order to hear themselves think. But if the capacity of thinking be anterior to, and independent of, sense and bodily organs, then the soul which thinks, and its faculties or powers of thinking, deserve a separate consideration.—See *Memoire*, par Mons. Jouffroy, *De la Legitimité et de la Distinction de la Psychologie et de la Physiologie* (published in his *Nouveaux Melanges*, and also in the 11th vol. of *Memoires de l'Acad. des Sciences Morales et Politiques*).

Mr. Stewart (Prelim. Diss. to *Philosoph. Essays*, p. 24) objects to the use of the term *psychology*, though it is sanctioned by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie, as implying a hypothesis concerning the *nature* or *essence* of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with our conclusions concerning its phenomena and general laws. The hypothesis implied is that the sentient or thinking principle is different in its nature or essence from matter. But this hypothesis is not altogether unconnected with its phenomena. On the contrary, it is on a difference of the phenomena which they present that we ground the distinction between mind and matter. It is true that the reality of the distinction may be disputed. There are philosophers who maintain that there is but one substance—call it either matter or mind. And the question, when pushed to this extremity, cannot be solved by the human intellect. God only knows whether the two substances which we call matter and mind have not something which is common to both. But the phenomena which they exhibit are so different as to lead us to infer a difference in the cause. And all that is implied in using the term *psychology* is, that the phenomena of the sentient or thinking principle are differ-

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ent from the phenomena of matter. And, notwithstanding the objection of Mr. Stewart, the term is now current, especially on the continent—to denote the science of the human mind as manifested by consciousness.

Dr. Priestley at one time maintained the materiality of mind, and at another the spirituality of matter. The apostle speaks of a spiritual body. A body which is spirit sounds to us contradictory.

Coleridge, in his *Treatise upon Method*, employs the word *psychological*, and apologizes for using an *insolens verbum*. "Goclenius is remarkable as the author of a work, the title of which is ψυχολογία (Marburg, 1597). This I think the first appearance of *psychology*, under its own name, in modern philosophy. Goclenius had, as a pupil, Otto Casmann, who wrote *Psychologia Anthropologica, sive animæ humanæ doctrina* (Hanau, 1594)."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.*, translated by Wright, vol. ii., p. 45.

Psychology has been divided into two parts—1. The *empirical*, having for its object the phenomena of consciousness and the faculties by which they are produced. 2. The *rational*, having for its object the nature or substance of the soul, its spirituality, immutability, &c.

Rational psychology, which had been chiefly prosecuted before his day, was assailed by Kant, who maintained that apart from experience we can know nothing of the soul. But even admitting that *psychology* rests chiefly on observation and experience, we cannot well separate between phenomena and their cause, nor consider the cause apart from the phenomena. There are, however, three things to which the psychologist may successively attend. 1. To the phenomena of consciousness. 2. To the faculties to which they may be referred. 3. To the Ego, that is, the soul or mind in its unity, individuality, and personality. These three things are inseparable; and the consideration of them belongs to *psychology*. Subsidiary to it are inquiries concerning the mutual action and reaction of soul and body, the effect of organization, temperament, age, health, disease, country, climate, &c.

Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis;* Buchanan (David), *Historia*

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Animæ Humanæ; Casmannus, *Psychologia;* Carus, *History of Psychology*, 8vo, Leipsig, 1808, in German.

PSYCHOPANNYCHISM (ψυχή, soul; and πᾶν, all; νύξ, night —the sleep of the soul) is the doctrine to which Luther, among divines, and Formey, among philosophers, were inclined —that at death the soul falls asleep and does not awake till the resurrection of the body.

PYRRHONISM.—*V.* SCEPTICISM, ACADEMICS.

QUADRIVIUM.—*V.* TRIVIUM.

QUALITY (ποῖος, ποιότης, *qualis*, *qualitas*, suchness) is the difference which distinguishes substances.

"There may be substances devoid of *quantity*, such as the intellective and immaterial; but that there should be substances devoid of *quality*, is a thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized and distinguished from one another."—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

"Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea;* and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call the *quality* of the subject wherein that power is."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 8, sect. 8.

"We understand by a *quality* that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing—what it is—what belongs to it permanently, as an individual, or in common with others like it—not that which passes, which vanishes, and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an accident: it is heavy, that is a *quality*. Every fact, every accident, every phenomenon, supposes a *quality* by which it is produced, or by which it is undergone: and reciprocally every *quality* of things which we know by experience manifests itself by certain modes or certain phenomena; for it is precisely in this way that things discover themselves to us."—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Descartes (*Princip. Philosoph.*, pars prima, sect. 56) says,—"*Et hic quidem per* modos *plane idem intelligimus, quod alibi*

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per attributa *vel* qualitates. *Sed cum consideramus substantiam ab illis affici, vel variari, vocamus* modos; *cum ab ista variatione talem posse denominare, vocamus* qualitates; *ac denique, cum generalius spectamus tantum ea substantiæ inesse, vocamus* attributa. *Ideoque in Deo non proprie* modos *aut* qualitates *sed* attributa *tantum esse dicimus, quia nulla in eo variatio est intelligenda. Et etiam in rebus creatis, ea quæ nunquam in iis diverso modo se habent, ut existentia et duratio in re existente et durante, non* qualitates *aut* modi, *sed* attributa *dici debent.*"

"As *qualities* help to distinguish not only one soul from another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more general way) every soul from every body, it follows that *qualities*, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into *corporeal* and *incorporeal.*"—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

Hutcheson also (*Metaphys.*, part i., cap. 5) reduces all *qualities* to two genera. Thought,—proper to mind. Motion,—proper to matter.

Qualities are distinguished as *essential*, or such as are inseparable from the substance—as thought from mind, or extension from matter; and *non-essential*, or such as we can separate in conception from the substance—as passionateness or mildness from mind, or heat or cold from matter.

"With respect to all kinds of *qualities*, there is one thing to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always requisite; else they are not so properly *qualities* as incidental affections. Thus we call not a man passionate, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone to frequent anger; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise or pale by sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness may be called constitutional."—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

On the question, historical and critical, as to the distinction of the *qualities* of matter as primary or secondary, see *Reid's Works*, by Sir W. Hamilton, note D.

"Another division of *qualities* is into *natural* and *acquired.* Thus in the mind, docility may be called a natural *quality;* science an acquired one: in the human body, beauty may be

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called a natural *quality;* gentility (good carriage) an acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a *quality* natural to crystal; but to enlarge them while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the same *quality* may be *natural* in one substance, as attraction in the magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar."—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.—*V.* ATTRIBUTE, PROPOSITION.

Quality (Occult).—"It was usual with the Peripatetics, when the cause of any phenomena was demanded, to have recourse to their *faculties* or *occult qualities*, and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive *faculty* (*quality*); and senna purged by its purgative."—Hume, *Dial. on Nat. Relig.*, part iv.

"Were I to make a division of the *qualities* of bodies as they appear to our senses, I would divide them first into those that are *manifest*, and those that are *occult*. The *manifest qualities* are those which Mr. Locke calls *primary;* such as Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity. The nature of these is manifest even to sense; and the business of the philosopher with regard to them is not to find out their nature, which is well known, but to discover the effects produced by their various combinations; and, with regard to those of them which are not essential to matter, to discover their causes as far as he is able.

"The second class consists of *occult qualities*, which may be subdivided into various kinds; as *first*, the secondary *qualities; secondly*, the disorders we feel in our own bodies; and *thirdly*, all the *qualities* which we call powers of bodies, whether mechanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable; or if there be any other powers not comprehended under these heads. Of all these the existence is manifest to sense, but the nature is *occult;* and here the philosopher has an ample field."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 18; Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 611.

QUANTITY (*πόσον*, *quantum*, how much) is defined by mathematicians to be "that which admits of more or less."

"Mathematics contain properly the *doctrine of measure;*

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and the object of this science is commonly said to be *quantity;* therefore, *quantity* ought to be defined, *what may be measured.* Those who have defined *quantity* to be *whatever is capable of more or less*, have given too wide a notion of it, which, it is apprehended, has led some persons to apply mathematical reasoning to subjects that do not admit of it. Pain and pleasure admit of various degrees, but who can pretend to measure them?"—Reid, *Essay on Quantity.*

"According to the common definition, *quantity* is that which is susceptible of augmentation or diminution. But many things susceptible of augmentation or diminution, and that even in a continuous manner, are not *quantities.* A sensation, painful or pleasing, augments or diminishes, and runs through different phases of intensity. But there is nothing in common between a sensation and *quantity.*"—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

"There are some *quantities* which may be called *proper*, and others *improper.* . . . . That *properly* is *quantity* which is *measured by its own kind;* or which, of its own nature, is capable of being doubled or tripled, without taking in any *quantity* of a different kind as a measure of it. *Improper quantity* is that which *cannot be measured by its own kind;* but to which we assign a measure by the means of some proper *quantity*, that is related to it. Thus velocity of motion, when we consider it by itself, cannot be measured." We measure it by the space passed in a given time.—Reid, *Essay on Quantity.*

Quantity (Discrete and Continuous).—"In magnitude and multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and comprehensive species, into which the *genus* of *quantity* is divided; magnitude, from its union, being called *quantity continuous;* multitude, from its separation, *quantity discrete.* Of the *continuous* kind is every solid; also the bound of every solid; that is, a superficies; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a line; to which may be added those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and place. Of the *discrete* kind are fleets and armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c."—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

"Discrete *quantity* is that of which the parts have no continuity, as in number. The number, *e. g.*, of inches in a foot

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rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain continuous, or are cut asunder and flung about the world; but they do not constitute a foot length (which is a continuous *quantity*), unless they are so joined together that the bounding lines of one coincide with those of another. Of *continuous quantities* there are two kinds; one, of which the parts are co-existent, as in extension; another, in which the parts are successive, as in duration. Discrete and continuous *quantities* are sometimes called *multitude* and *magnitude*."—Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle's Ethics*, 8vo, Dublin, 1850, p. 151.—See Aristotle in *Categor.*, c. 6.

According to Derodon (*Phys.*, pars 1, cap. 5) *quantity* is either—1. *Permanent*, when its parts are together; or 2. *Successive*, when they exist some after others. Time and motion are *quantity successive*. *Permanent quantity* is—1. *Continuous*, as a *line* which is length; *superficies*, which is length and breadth; and *mathematical body*, which is length, breadth, and depth. 2. *Discrete*, as *number* and *speech*.

Hutcheson notices magnitude, time, and number, as three genera of *quantity*.—*Metaphys.*, part i., cap. 5.

Quantity is called *discrete* when the parts are not connected, as number; *continuous*, when they are connected, and then it is either *successive*, as time, motion; or *permanent*, which is what is otherwise called space or extension, in length, breadth, and depth; length alone constitutes lines; length and breadth, surfaces; and the three together, solids.—*Port Roy. Log.*, part i., ch. 2.—*V.* PROPOSITION.

QUIDDITY or QUIDITY (*quidditas*, from *quid*, what).—This term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent to the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of Aristotle, and denotes what was subsequently called the *substantial form*. It is the answer to the question, What is it? *quid est?* It is that which distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it is, and not another. It is synonymous with essence, and comprehends both the substance and qualities. For qualities belong to substance, and by qualities substance manifests itself. It is the known essence of a thing; or the complement of all that makes us conceive of anything as we conceive of it, as different from any or every other thing.

QUIETISM (*quies*, rest) "is the doctrine that the highest character of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation and love of supreme excellence."—Sumner, *Records of Creation*, vol. ii., p. 239.

The two following propositions from Fenelon's *Maxims of the Saints*, were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699. 1. There is attainable in this life a state of perfection in which the expectation of reward, and the fear of punishment have no place. 2. Souls may be so inflamed with love to God, and so resigned to his will, that if they believed that God had condemned them to eternal pain, they would absolutely sacrifice their salvation.

Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by which souls might be carried to such a state of perfection that a continual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for all other acts of religion.

A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, *De la Controversé de Bossuet et Fenelon, sur le Quiétisme*, 8vo, Macon, 1850; Upham, *Life of Madame Guyon.*

RACE.—*V.* SPECIES.

RATIO.—When two subjects admit of comparison with reference to some quality which they possess in common, and which may be measured, this measure is their *ratio*, or the rate in which the one exceeds the other. With this term is connected that of *proportion*, which denotes the *portions*, or parts of one magnitude which are contained in another. In mathematics, the term *ratio* is used for *proportion;* thus, instead of the *proportion* which one thing bears to another, we say, the *ratio* which one bears to the other, meaning its comparative magnitude.

In the following passage *ratio* is used for *reason* or *cause*. "In this consists the *ratio* and essential ground of the gospel doctrine."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. ix., serm. i.—*V.* REASON.

RATIOCINATION.—"The conjunction of images with affirmations and negations, which make up propositions, and the conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of conclusions upon them, is *ratiocination* or discourse.

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"Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently connexed to, or found in, the premises, that the conclusion is attained *quasi per saltum*, and without anything of *ratiocinative* process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately and without any previous discourse."—Hale, *Prim. Orig. of Mankind*, pp. 50, 51.

"The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they call *ratiocination*, and we may style it the generation of a judgment from others actually in our understanding."—Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. i., part i., c. 11, sect. 13.

"When from a general proposition, by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process is *ratiocination* (or syllogism)."—Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 223.—*V.* REASONING.

RATIONALE.—"The chairs of theology and philosophy (during the scholastic ages) were the oracular seats, from which the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the *rationale* of theological and moral truth."—Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. i., p. 9.

"There cannot be a body of rules without a *rationale*, and this *rationale* constitutes the science. There were poets before there were rules of poetical composition; but before Aristotle, or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could write their arts of poetry and criticism, they had considered the reasons on which their precepts rested, they had conceived in their own minds a theory of the art. In like manner there were navigators before there was an art of navigation; but before the art of navigation could teach the methods of finding the ship's place by observations of the heavenly bodies, the science of astronomy must have explained the system of the world."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 19, sect. 2.

Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a work entitled, *A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer*, 12mo, Lond., 1668.—*V.* SCIENCE, ART.

RATIONALISM, in philosophy, is opposed to *sensualism*, *sensuism*, or *sensism*, according to all which, all our knowledge is derived

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from sense. It is also opposed to *empiricism*, which refers all our knowledge to sensation and reflection, or experience. According to *rationalism*, reason furnishes certain elements, without which experience is not possible. The philosophy of Condillac is of the former kind,—that of Royer Collard of the latter. The philosophy of Locke and Reid have been contrasted in the same manner, but not quite correctly.—*V.* SENSISM, SENSUISM, SENSUALISM.

RATIONALISM, in religion, as opposed to *supernaturalism*, means the adoption of reason as our sufficient and only guide, exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, tried to explain all that is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in modern Germany have carried this line of speculation much farther.

RATIONALISTS.—"The *empirical* philosophers are like pismires; they only lay up and use their store. The *rationalists* are like the spiders; they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue."—Bacon, *Apophthegms.*

REAL (The).—"There is no arguing from ideal to *real* existence, unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must have their objective *realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass within, except it be by supposing such and such *real* existences, *ad extra*, to answer them."—Waterland, *Works*, vol. iv., p. 435.

The term *real* always imports the existent. It is used—

1. As denoting the *existent*, as opposed to the *non-existent*, *something*, as opposed to *nothing*.

2. As opposed to the *nominal* or *verbal*, the *thing* to the *name*.

3. As synonymous with *actual*, and thus opposed—1. To *potential*, and 2. To *possible*, existence.

4. As denoting the *absolute* in opposition to the *phenomenal*, things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear to us, relatively to our faculties.

5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to a representation in thought, *ens reale*, as opposed to *ens rationis*.

6. As opposed to *logical* or *rational*, a thing which in itself,

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or *really*, *re*, is one, may logically, *ratione*, be considered as diverse or plural, and *vice versa*.—Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note B.—*V.* VIRTUAL.

REALISM, as opposed to *idealism*, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while according to *idealism* our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, *i. e.*, by means of *ideas*.—*V.* IDEA, and IDEALISM.—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note C; *Edin. Rev.*, vol. lii., pp. 175-181.

REALISM, as opposed to *nominalism*, is the doctrine that *genus* and *species* are *real things*, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions; and that as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is something corresponding to each; which is the object of our thoughts, when we employ the term.—Whately, *Log.*, book iv., ch. 5, § 1.

Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development of a phrase of Porphyry (*Isagoge*, ch. 1), which has been thus translated by Boethius—*Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et citra hæc consistentia, dicere recusabo.*—*V.* CONCEPTUALISM, NOMINALISM.—See Chretien, *Log. Meth.*, ch. 3; Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, part i., sect. 23.

REASON (*Ratio*, from *reor*, to think).—"The word *reason* in the English language has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from these principles; and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts,* and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 17.

* La Raison, dans sa definition la plus simple, est la faculté de comprendre, qu'il ne faut pas a confondre avec la faculté de connaitre. En effet les animaux connaissent, ils ne paraissent pas comprendre, et c'est là qui les distingue de l'homme.—Jouffroy, *Droit. Nat.*, tom. i., p. 38.

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"All the operations of the mind when it thinks of the qualities of things separately from the things to which they belong; or when it forms general notions, and employs general terms; or when it judges of the agreement or disagreement of different things; or when it draws inferences; are comprehended under the term *reason*. *Reason* seems chiefly to consist in the power to keep such or such thoughts in the mind; and to change them at pleasure; instead of their flowing through the mind as in dreams; also in the power to see the difference between one thought and another, and so compare, separate, or join them together afresh. Though animals seem to have some little power to perform these operations, man has so much more of it, that he alone is said to be endowed with *reason*."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

"This word is used to signify—1. All the intellectual powers collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from brutes. 3. The faculty of carrying on the operation of *reasoning*. 4. The premiss or premises of an argument, especially the minor premiss; and it is from *reason* in this sense that the word *reasoning* is derived. 5. A cause, as when we say that the *reason* of an eclipse of the sun is,* that the moon is interposed between it and the earth."—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

"In common and popular discourse, *reason* denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends."—Stewart, *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 1.

"*Reason* is used sometimes to express the whole of those powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers; sometimes to express the power of deduction or argumentation."—Stewart, *Outlines*, part ii., chap. 1, sect. 6.

Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement

* The idea of the *reason* is higher than that of cause. The ground or *reason* of all existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, nothing could ever have existed. But God is the cause only of such things as He has created in time; while he is the ground or *reason* of everything possible.

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of faculties, Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, says, "*Reason* has been employed to denote—

"1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including —1. Conception; 2. Judgment; 3. Reasoning; 4. Intelligence; νοῦς.

"2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties.

"3. The dianoetic and noetic functions of *reason*, as by Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 2.

"4. The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in his *Inquiry*, Introd., sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7.

"5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending the other functions of thought."

REASON (Spontaneity of).—"I call *spontaneity of reason*, the development of *reason* anterior to reflection, the power which *reason* has to seize at first upon truth, to comprehend it and to admit it, without demanding and rendering to itself an account of it."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.*, vol. i., p. 113.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.—"Pure *reason* or *intuition* holds a similar relation to the *understanding* that perception holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only *subjective* facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the objective world around us; so with regard to higher truths and laws, the *understanding* furnishes *merely* the subjective forms, in which they may be logically stated, while *intuition* brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of truth itself." —Morell, *Philos. of Relig.*, p. 19.

"The faculty of thought manifests itself both as *understanding* and *reason*. By the *understanding* we inquire after and investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions of our representations, feelings, and desires, and of those objects standing in immediate connection with them; by *reason* we inquire after *ultimate* grounds, causes, and conditions. By the *understanding* we evolve rules for the regulation of our desiring faculty; by *reason* we subordinate these rules to a higher law, to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest end of

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acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge, both theoretical and practical, is comprehended in unity, connection, and in being."—Tenneman, *Grundriss*, sect. 41.

"By the *understanding*, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming *judgments* on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure *reason*, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (*n. b.*, not images), as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics; and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion."—Coleridge, *Friend*, pp. 150, 151.

"The definition and proper character of man—that, namely, which should contradistinguish him from other animals, is to be taken from his *reason* rather than his *understanding;* in regard that in other creatures there may be something of *understanding*, but there is nothing of *reason*."—Harrington, quoted in *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 162.

In the philosophy of Kant the *understanding* is distinguished from the *reason*—

1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the *understanding* is coincident with the *sensible* world, and cannot transcend it; but the *reason* ascends to the super-sensuous.

2. By the *objects* and results of their exercise. The *understanding* deals with *conceptions*, the *reason* with *ideas*. The knowledge obtained by the *understanding* is particular and contingent, the product of the *reason* is necessary and universal knowledge or truth.

Crit. of Pure Reason, see English translat., pp. 7, 20, 57, 268, 7, 277, *Prolegomena*, sect. 59. See also Morell, *Philos. of Relig.*, chap. 2; and *Philos. Tendencies*, p. 71; Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection.*

"The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, and so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has been called the *understanding*. It is an energy of the mind as intelligent. It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, that the mind is conscious

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of itself as unity, of the world as diversity. The outward world is seen as diverse through the various sensations, but is bound in certain relations—those of space—which are independent of the perceiving subject. The mind requires a cause external to itself, of the constant representation of unity in diversity, no less than of the representation of different qualities. The *reason*, therefore, in virtue of its causal principle, refers these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelligence refers the single perception to an external cause, so it refers the combination of perceptions to one object. The *understanding* is thus the same faculty with the *reason*, but in certain particular applications."—R. A. Thomson, *Christian Theism*, book i., chap. 3.

"The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it apprehends truth, which faculty is higher than the discursive *reason*, as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere demonstrative truth, agrees with the doctrine taught and insisted on by the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so far as he was the means of inculcating this doctrine, which is the doctrine of Plato, and, I might add, of Aristotle, and of many other philosophers, let him have due honour. But in his desire to impress the doctrine upon men's minds, he combined it with several other tenets, which will not bear examination. He held that the two faculties by which these two kinds of truth are apprehended, and which our philosophical writers call the *intuitive reason*, and the *discursive reason*, may be called, and ought to be called respectively, the *reason* and the *understanding;* and that the second of these is of the nature of the *instinct* of animals, so as to be something intermediate between *reason* and *instinct*. These opinions, I may venture to say, are altogether erroneous. The intuitive *reason* and the discursive *reason* are not, by any English writers, called the *reason* and the *understanding;* and accordingly, Coleridge has had to alter all the passages, viz., those taken from Leighton, Harrington, and Bacon, from which his exposition proceeds. The *understanding* is so far from being especially the discursive or reasoning faculty, that it is, in universal usage, and by our best writers, *opposed* to the discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus

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this is expressly declared by Sir John Davies in his poem 'On the Immortality of the Soul.' He says of the soul:—

> 'When she *rates* things, and moves from ground to ground,
> The name of *reason* (*ratio*) she acquires from this;
> But when by *reason* she the truth hath found,
> And standeth fixt, she *understanding* is.'

"Instead of the *reason* being fixed, and the *understanding* discursive, as Mr. Coleridge says, the *reason* is distinctively discursive; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from one point to another. This is what is meant by *discursus;* or, taking the full term, *discursus rationis*, *discourse of reason. Understanding* is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one view of a subject, and not upon the steps by which that view is obtained. The verb to *reason* implies the substantive, the *reason*, though it is not co-extensive with it; for, as I have said, there is the intuitive *reason* as well as the discursive *reason.* But it is by the faculty of *reason* that we are capable of reasoning; though undoubtedly the practice or the pretence of reasoning may be carried so far as to seem at variance with *reason* in the more familiar sense of the term; as is the case also in French. . . Moliere's Crisale says (in the *Femmes Savantes*)—

> 'Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison
> Et le raisonnement en bannit la *Raison.*'

"If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true that the *understanding* is the discursive and the *reason* the fixed faculty, we should be justified in saying that *the understanding is the faculty by which we reason, and the reason is the faculty by which we understand.* But this is not so. . . .

"Mr. Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning; and also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain fundamental doctrines of morality. Among these Mr. Coleridge places the authority of conscience, and Plato the supreme good. Mr. Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the *reason* of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, is a portion of a supreme and universal *reason;* and leads to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature.

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"The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first principles, will enable us to explain some expressions which might otherwise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the concluding part of the Sixth Book of the *Republic*, says, that this kind of knowledge is 'that of which the *reason* (λόγος) takes hold,* *in virtue of its power of reasoning.*' Here we are plainly not to understand that we arrive at first principles by *reasoning;* for the very opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first principles are not what we *reason to*, but what we *reason from.* The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles are those of which the *reason* takes hold in *virtue of its power of reasoning;* they are the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible; they are the propositions which the *reason* must involve implicitly, in order that we may *reason* explicitly; they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power.

"Plato's views may be thus exhibited:—

	Intelligible World, νοητόν.		Visible World, ὁρατόν.	
Object,....	Ideas. ἰδέαι.	Conceptions. διάνοια.	Things. ζῶα, κ.τ.λ.	Images. εἰκόνες.
Process,..	Intuition. νόησις.	Demonstration. ἐπιστήμη.	Belief. πίστις.	Conjecture. εἰκασία.
Faculties,.	Intuitive Reason. νοῦς.	Discursive Reason. λόγος.	Sensation. αἴσθησις.	

From a paper by Dr. Whewell, *On the Intellectual Powers according to Plato*, in the Cambridge *Philos. Trans.*, 1855.—*V.* UNDERSTANDING.

Reason (Impersonal).—*Reason*, according to Cousin and other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is *impersonal.*

"*Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet*

* τῇ τοῦ ἐ

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universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intellectu. . . . Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium, non recipiens individuationem ab anima."

These words are quoted from Averrhöes, by Mons. Haureau, in his *Examen de la Philos. Scolastique,* tom. i., p. 69, who exclaims. "Voila la thèse de l'intelligence ou de la *raison impersonelle!*" But the truth is, that the root and germ of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that human *reason* is a ray of the Divine *reason.*

"He the great Father! kindled at one flame
The world as rational—one spirit pour'd
From spirit's awful fountain, poured Himself
Through all their souls, but not in equal stream:
Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God,
As His wise plan demanded; and when past
Their various trials in their common spheres
(If they continue rational as made)
Resorbs them all into himself again,
His throne their centre, and His smile their crown."—YOUNG.

"In truth," observes Fenelon, "my *reason* is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it; but the higher *reason* which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may seem most our own, and to be the foundation of our being, I mean our *reason*, is that which we are to believe most borrowed. We receive at every moment a *reason* superior to our own, just as we breathe an air which is not ourselves. There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire outwardly for himself, nor learn of other men who live by alms like himself."—*Existence of God*, chap. iv., sect. 3.

"While we reflect on our own idea of *reason*, we know that our souls are not it, but only partake of it; and that we have it κατὰ μέθεξιν, and not κατὰ οὐσίην. Neither can it be called a faculty, but rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated *mine.*"—John Smith, *Posthumous Tracts*, 1660. See Coleridge, *Liter. Rem.*, vol. iii., p. 464.

"*Reason* is impersonal in its nature," says Cousin (*Expos.*

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of Eclecticism, translated by Ripley, p. 69), "it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, viz., universality and necessity; since it is to *reason* that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but obey." . . . . "It descends from God and approaches man; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If *reason* were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject. . . . . *Reason* is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. *Reason* is the necessary mediator between God and man, the λόγος of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race."—*Ibid*, p. 79.

"*Reason* or intelligence is not individual, is not ours, is not even human; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and not voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth; truth as necessary and universal is not the creature of my volition; and *reason*, which, as the subject of truth is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours; and *reason* is a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are conscious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8, giving the views of Cousin.

This doctrine of the impersonal *reason* is regarded by Bouillier (*Theorie de la Raison impersonelle*, 8vo, Paris, 1846) and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit the personality of *reason* and man becomes the measure of all

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things—truth is individual. But the truths of *reason* are universal. No one, says Malebranche, can feel the pain which I feel; but any one or every one can contemplate the truth which I know. The scepticism of Kant, as to the relative nature of our knowledge, is thus demolished.

REASON (Determining or Sufficient).—"There are two great principles of reasoning: the one is the *principle of contradiction*, which means that of two contradictory propositions, the one is true, the other false: the other is the principle of *raison determinante*,-which is that nothing happens without a cause, or at least a *reason* determining, that is, something which may serve to render a *reason à priori*, why that thing is as it is rather than otherwise."—Leibnitz, *Theodicée*, partie 1, sect. 44.

"Nothing is done without a *sufficient reason*, that is, nothing happens without its being possible to him who knew things sufficiently to render a *reason* which is sufficient to determine why it is so, and not otherwise."—Leibnitz, *Principes de la Nat. et de la Grace*, sect. 7.—*V.* SUFFICIENT REASON.

REASONING, "in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted: and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be called *reasoning* as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the term; the latter and more extensive signification is that in which I mean to use it."—Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 3.

"*Reasoning* is that operation of the mind through which it forms one judgment from many others; as when, for instance, having judged that true virtue ought to be referred to God, and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him, we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not true virtue."—*Port Roy. Log.*

"Some appear to include under the title of *reasoning* every case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of his believing another thing, however far he may be from having any grounds to warrant the inference: and they accordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants

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and of brutes; which are apt to *associate* with the appearance of an object before them the remembered impression of something that formerly accompanied it. Such a process is attended to in the familiar proverbs that 'a burnt child dreads the fire;' or as it is expressed in another form, 'the scalded cat fears cold water;' or again in the Hebrew proverb, 'he who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope.' Most logical writers, however, have confined the name of *reasoning* to *valid* argument; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed."—Whately, *Log.*, Introd. 4.

Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end is to *reason.*

RECOLLECTION.—*V.* REMEMBRANCE.

RECTITUDE.—"*Rectitude* of conduct is intended to express the term κατόρθωσις, which Cicero translates *recta effectio:* κατόρθωμα he translates *rectum factum*, *De Fin.*, lib. iii., cap. 4. Now the definition of κατόρθωμα was νόμου πρόσταγμα, 'A thing commanded by law' (that is, by the law of nature, the universal law). Antoninus, speaking of the *reasoning* faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own energies, adds, 'for which reason are all actions of this species called *rectitudes* (κατορθώσεις, κατὰ ὀρθός, right onwards), as denoting the directness of their progression right onwards." —Harris, *Dialogue on Happiness*, p. 73, note.

"Goodness in actions is like unto *straightness;* wherefore that which is done well we term *right*, for as the *straight* way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end: so in action, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use."—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, b. i., s. 8.

If a term is to be selected to denote that in action and in disposition of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is *rectitude* or *rightness.* Dr. Adams has remarked (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*), "The man who acts *virtuously* is said to act *rightly.* This appears more proper than to say that he acts *according to truth;* and more clear and distinct than to say that he acts

according to the nature and reason of things; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only this—that he acts according to what reason, in the present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right." In like manner, Dr. Reid has said (*Act. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 5), "Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every other virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the *rectitude of such conduct and turpitude of the contrary*, which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter." *Rectitude*, then, is that in action and in disposition of which the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is *right* is *wrong*. *Rightness* and *wrongness*, then, are the characteristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the *foundation of morals*, the ground upon which moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is *right* and what is *wrong*.

"There are other phrases which have been used, which I see no reason for adopting, such as, *acting contrary to the relations of things—contrary to the reason of things—to the fitness of things—to the truth of things—to absolute fitness.* These phrases have not the authority of common use, which, in matters of language, is great. They seem to have been invented by some authors with a view to explain the nature of vice; but I do not think they answer that end. If intended as definitions of vice, they are improper; because, in the most favourable sense they can bear, they extend to every kind of foolish and absurd conduct, as well as to that which is vicious."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 7.

But what is *rectitude* or *rightness* as the characteristic of an action? According to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, what is *truth*, as the characteristic of a proposition? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowledge truth; but we cannot define what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things.

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But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain *rectitude* by saying that it consists in a congruity between an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an action, when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circumstances, and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perform it. Now, the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from his nature and from the nature of things in general: and hence it has been said, that *rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things;* that is, an action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circumstances of the agent; and of this fitness conscience or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason does not constitute the relations; these must arise from the nature of man and the nature of things; but conscience or reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to these relations; and these relations arising necessarily from the very nature of things, the conformity with them which constitutes *rectitude, is said to be eternal and immutable.*—*V.* RIGHT.

REDINTEGRATION.—*V.* TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

REDUCTION IN LOGIC.—The first figure of syllogism is called *perfect;* because, 1. It proceeds directly on the *Dictum*, and, 2. It arranges the terms in the most natural order. All arguments may be, in one way or other, brought into some one of the four moods in the first figure: and a syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced (*i. e.*, to the first figure). These four are called the *perfect moods*, and all the rest *imperfect.* The mood to be reduced is called the *reducend*, and that to which it is reduced the *reduct.* Reduction is of two kinds. 1. *Direct or ostensive*, which consists in bringing the premisses of the reducend to a corresponding mood in the first figure, by transposition or conversion of the premisses, and from the premisses thus changed deducing either the original conclusion, or one from which it follows by conversion. 2. *Indirect*, or *reductio per impossibile* or *ad absurdum*, by which we prove (in the first

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figure) not, directly, that the original conclusion is *true*, but that it *cannot be false; i. e.*, that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false.—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 3, §§ 5, 6.

REFLECTION (*re-flecto*, to bend back).—"By *reflection* I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. Those two, viz.,—external material things, as the objects of *sensation;* and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of *reflection*, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as in the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 1.

"When we make our own thoughts and passions, and the various operations of our minds, the objects of our attention, either while they are present, or when they are recent and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called *reflection.*"—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 2. Also chap. 5, and essay vi.

He gives a more extensive (but less proper) signification to *reflection.—Intell. Pow.*, essay iii., chap. 5. Also essay vi., chap. 1.

Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards things present. *Reflection* has to do with things past and the ideas of them. *Attention* may employ the organs of the body. *Reflection* is purely a mental operation. It is not a simple act. In *reflection* we may analyze and compound, abstract and generalize. These operations of mind so arranged as to gain some end, constitute a method. And a method is just the act of *reflecting* or properly employing the energies of the mind on the objects of its knowledge.

"*Reflection* creates nothing—can create nothing; everything exists previous to *reflection* in the consciousness, but everything pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity; it is the work of

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reflection in adding itself to consciousness, to illuminate that which was obscure, to develop that which was enveloped. *Reflection* is for consciousness what the microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight: neither of these instruments makes or changes the objects; but in examining them on every side, in penetrating to their centre, these instruments illuminate them, and discover to us their characters and their laws." —Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. i., p. 275.—*V.* OBSERVATION, SPECULATION.

REFLEX SENSES.—*V.* SENSE, IDEA.

REGULATIVE (German, *Regulativ*) does not *à priori* determine how something must be or is to be, but how something must be sought.—*V.* CONSTITUTIVE.

RELATION (*re-fero*, *relatum*, to bear back).—"When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, *relation* and *respect;* and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call *relatives;* and the things so brought together, *related.* Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; *v. g.*, when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing; in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 25. The two things thus brought into consideration are called *relatives* or *correlatives*, as father and son, husband and wife.

"In all *relation* there must be a subject whence it commences, as *snow;* another where it terminates, as a *swan;* the *relation* itself, *similitude;* and lastly, the source of that *relation*,

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whiteness; the swan is related to the snow by both of them being *white.*"—Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 10.

This is called predicamental *relation*, and forms one of the categories (πρὸς τί) of Aristotle.

"Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things; or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a *relation.* When we look at these two lines ═══ we do not merely think of them separately, as *this* straight line, and *that* straight line; but they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes place in the mind as soon as they meet the eye. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are both straight; and we call the notion that is formed by the comparison, the *relation* of *sameness.* We may then think of them as the same in length; this comparison gives us the notion which we call the *relation* of *equality.* We think of them again as equally distant from each other, from end to end, and then we say they are *parallel* lines; this word *parallel* represents nothing existing in the lines themselves, but only the notion formed by measuring the distance between them. All these notions spring up in the mind from the comparison of the two objects; they belong entirely to the *mind*, and do not exist in the things themselves."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

"Another way," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 2), "in which we get the notion of *relations* (which seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke), is when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain *relation* to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain *relation* between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a substance; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be qualities, I should never have had any notion of their subject, or of their *relation* to it. By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there must be something which

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thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment informs us that there must be a cause of this change which had power to produce it; and thus we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the *relation* between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without space; hence we got the notion of space (which is neither an object of sense nor of consciousness), and of the *relation* which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, as their place."—See also Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 1, sect. 7. Buffier calls *relation*, in this view, *Occasio quam præbet objectum cogitandi de alio.*—*V.* SUGGESTION.

Although *relations* are not real entities, but merely mental modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our ideas of *relation* are not vague nor arbitrary, but are determined by the known qualities of the related objects. We cannot at will see *relations* for which there is no foundation in the nature of the related objects. Of all *relations*, the *relations* of number are the clearest and most accurately appreciated.

RELATIVE is opposed to *absolute*—*q. v.*—*V.* TERM.

RELIGION (*relego*, *religo*).—This word, according to Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum*, ii., 28), is derived from, or rather compounded of, *re* and *legere*, to read over again, to reflect upon or to study the sacred books in which *religion* is delivered. According to Lactantius (*Div. Instit.*, 4), it comes from *re-ligare*, to bind back—because *religion* is that which furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. Augustine (*De Vera. Relig.*, c. 55) gives the same derivation of the word. But he gives another origin of it (*De Civit. Dei*, lib. x., c. 3), where he says, "*Deum, qui fons est nostræ beatitudinis, et omnis desiderii nostri finis, eligentes, immo potius* religentes, *amiseramus enim negligentes; hunc, inquam*, religentes, *unde et* religio *dicta est, ad eum dilectione tendamus, ut perveniendo quiescamus.*"

"As it is natural for man to review the train of his past actions, it is not incredible that the word *religion* is derived from *relegere;* and that its primary reference is to that activity of conscience which leads us to review the past actions of our lives."—Gellius, *Noct. Attic.*, No. 9.

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"*Relligio*, according to its primary signification, is perpetually thoughtful, save in regard to some object affecting the conscience."—Donaldson, *Varronianus*, p. 407, 2d edit.

Müller, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a *Dissertation* on this word in 1834.

Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or that knowledge of God and of our duty which is derived from the light of nature or reason—and that knowledge of God and of our duty which comes to us from positive revelation.

The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as applied to *religion*, inasmuch as all knowledge of God is supersensuous.—*V.* THEOLOGY.

In all forms of *religion* there is one part, which may be called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by faith; and the *cultus*, or worship, which is the outward expression or mode of manifesting the religious sentiment.

REMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOLLECTION (*recolligo*, to gather together again; or *reminiscor*, to remember). —"The perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is *remembrance;* if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found and brought again into view, it is *recollection;* if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is *contemplation*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 19.

"In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are *recalled* in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name (memory), but is more properly distinguished by the word *recollection*."—Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 6, sect. 1.

"*Reminiscence* is the act of recovering, and *recollection* the act of combining *remembrances*. Those eminences to which we attach the subordinate parts of an object come first into

reminiscence; when the intervening portions present themselves in order, the *recollection* is complete."—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

REMINISCENCE.—Memory is knowledge of some former consciousness. *Reminiscence* is the act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite former states of consciousness. It is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. It is peculiar to man, while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by the brutes. "When we have a *reminiscence,*" said Aristotle (*De Mem. et Reminiscentia*, c. 2), "we reason to the effect that we formerly experienced some impression of such or such a kind, so that in having a *reminiscence* we syllogise."

"There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward, from thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came last; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called *reminiscence.*"—Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap. 4.—*V.* CONTEMPLATION, MEMORY, RETENTION.

REMINISCENCE according to Plato.

"Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain *reminiscence*, and that when we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state."—Bolingbroke, essay ii., *Presumption of Philosophers.*

The term employed by Plato was ἀνάμνησις, which may be translated "knowing up." He did not apply it to every kind or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous movement of the mind by which it ascended from mere opinion (δόξα) to science (ἐπιστήμη). On such occasions the appearances of truth and beauty suggested or evolved the ideas of the true and the beautiful; which seemed to belong to the soul and to have been formerly known. There was a stirring up or calling into act what was in the soul potentially. That they had been known in that former state of existence which Plato, in a

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myth, represented the soul to have enjoyed, and were now merely recalled or remembered, is the view commonly given (Cicero, *Tuscal.*, i., 24). But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by the use of this word was, that all science or certainty is intuitive, and belongs to the reason, which gives knowledge in the last and highest degree. Conjecture (εἰκασία), belief (πίστις), which, when conjoined, give opinion (δόξα), and reasoning (διάνοια), which are the other degrees of knowledge, according to Plato, being unable to give ground for science or certainty."—Heusde, *Init. Philosoph.*, *Platon.*, 8vo, 1827, tom. i., pp. 33, 34.

Olympiodorus, in a Commentary on the *Phædo* of Plato, quoted by Harris (*Hermes*, p. 232), says:—"Inasmuch as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense it recollects those principles which it contains within, and brings them forth."

"Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of *reminiscence* as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the mind has to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, universal ideas, and the manner in which it rises to them resembling the manner in which is awakened all at once within us the remembrance of what we have dreamed."—*Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 139.

It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a midwife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth truths with which the mind was big and in labour. He unfolded what was infolded.

Boethius, *De Consol.*, says, the mind by teaching is only excited to know. And Aquinas, *De Magistro*, says, "*Omnis disciplina fit ex pre-existenti cognitione. . . . Ex homine docente certitudinem scientiæ non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum.*"

According to Mons. Chastel (*Les Rationalistes et les Traditionalistes*, 12mo, Paris, 1850, p. 150), Thomas Aquinas in his treatise, *De Magistro*, maintains the following points:—

1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pre-existent in us the knowledge of general principles, evident of

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themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames immediately to itself by the aid of the first sensations; for all teaching supposes, in him who learns, some anterior knowledge.

2. But these first truths, conditions pre-requisite for all teaching, these general principles, these principles which are native and not taught, are known to us by that light of reason which God hath put in us, as the image of that uncreated truth which is reflected in our mind. They are given to us by nature as the germ of all the cognitions to which we ultimately attain.

There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a man to be ignorant.

3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other truths connected with these. His teaching consists in showing us this connection. Properly speaking, it is the knowledge of these principles and not teaching which gives us secondary knowledge, although teaching is the mediate cause. It would be impossible for us to learn of a man the knowledge which he wishes to teach us, if there were not in us beforehand those principles to which he connects his knowledge; and all the certainty of that knowledge comes to us from the certainty of those principles, and ultimately from God who has given us the light of reason to know them.

4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from teaching, although teaching may give secondary truths connected with them.

5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject according to their conformity with the truth that is in us.

6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there are many which the mind may discover by its own force, as there are many diseases which cure themselves.

Augustine also has a treatise, *De Magistro*, in which, from a different point of view, he comes to conclusions substantially the same. "The certainty of science comes to us from God who has given to us the light of reason. For it is by this light that we know principles, and it is from principles that we

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derive the certainty of science. And yet it is true, in a certain sense, that man produces in us knowledge. The pupil, if interrogated before teaching, could answer as to those principles by aid of which all teaching proceeds; but he could not answer upon those things which are taught, which are the consequences of those principles. So that he does not learn principles but only the consequences of them.

D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart (vol. ii., p. 23), says, "It should seem that everything we learn from a good metaphysical book is only a sort of *reminiscence* of what the mind previously knew.

Sir Walter Scott and others have alluded to a mental affection which they designate the sense of pre-existence. When the mind is in this state the scenes and events which are present and passing appear to have formerly been objects of consciousness. See quotations and references on this curious phenomenon in *Notes and Queries*, 17th January, 1857, p. 50.

On the *Reminiscence* of Plato, see Piccolomineus, *Philosoph. De Moribus*, Francof., 1583, p. 450.

REPRESENTATIVE.—*V.* KNOWLEDGE.

RESERVATION or RESTRICTION (as it is called by casuists) has reference to the duty of speaking what is true; and is distinguished as *real* and *mental.*

Real Restriction takes place when the words used are not true if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from truth if the circumstances be considered. One man asks another, Have you dined? and the answer given is, No. The party giving this answer has dined, times without number. But his answer is restricted by the circumstances to *to-day;* and in that sense is true.

Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying so far what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor asked by his creditor for payment of his debt, says,—"I will certainly pay you to-morrow" adding to himself—"in part," whereas the words audibly uttered referred to the whole amount.

There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, *A Treatise of*

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Equivocation, from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, written about 1600. It was referred to in the trials on the Gunpowder Plot.

The following occurs at p. 17:—"A farmer hath come to sell corn. He selleth all that he can sell, because he reserveth the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh one and desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and swear (if it be needful) that he hath none; for the circumstance of the person interpreteth the meaning to be that he hath none to sell."—This is *Reservation* or *Restriction*, rather than *Equivocation*.

At p. 29:—"If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin 'Non *est* hic,' meaning he doth not *eat* in my house."—This is *Equivocation—q. v.*

RETENTION (*retineo*, to keep hold of).

"The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes a power of *retention* (out of consciousness). To this conservative power I confine exclusively the term Memory."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 912.

"There seems good reason for confining the appellation of memory to the simple power of *retention*, which undoubtedly must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irresolvable into any other. The power of recalling the preserved impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to be only a modified exercise of the suggestive or reproductive faculty."—Dr. Tulloch, *Theism*, p. 206.—*V.* MEMORY.

RIGHT.—"*Right* and *duty* are things very different, and have even a kind of opposition; yet they are so related that the one cannot even be conceived without the other; and he that understands the one must understand the other. They have the same relation which credit has to debt. As all credit supposes an equivalent debt, so all *right* supposes a corresponding *duty*. There can be no credit in one party without an equivalent debt in another party; and there can be no *right* in one party, without a corresponding *duty* in another party. The sum of credit shows the sum of debt; and the sum of men's *rights* shows, in like manner, the sum of their *duty* to one another.

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"The word *right* has a very different meaning, according as it is applied to actions or to persons. A *right* action (*rectum*) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we speak of the *rights of men* (*jus*), the word has a very different, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other person.

"We can be at no loss to perceive the *duties* corresponding to the several kinds of *rights*. What I have a *right* to do, it is the *duty* of all men not to hinder me from doing. What is my property or real *right*, no man ought to take from me; or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And what I have a *right* to demand of any man, it is his *duty* to perform. Between the *right* on the one hand, and the *duty* on the other, there is not only a necessary connection, but, in reality, they are only different expressions of the same meaning, just as it is the same thing to say, I am your debtor, and to say, you are my creditor; or as it is the same thing to say, I am your father, and to say, you are my son."

"As there is a strict notion of justice, in which it is distinguished from humanity and charity, so there is a more extensive signification of it, in which it includes those virtues. The ancient moralists, both Greek and Roman, under the cardinal virtue of Justice, included Beneficence; and in this extensive sense, it is often used in common language. The like may be said of *right*, which in a sense not uncommon, is extended to every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the claims of strict justice. But, as it is proper to distinguish these two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natural jurisprudence have given the name of *perfect rights* to the claims of strict justice, and that of *imperfect rights* to the claims of charity and humanity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfect *rights* corresponding to them, as those of strict justice have perfect rights."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 3.

"The adjective *right* has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conform-

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able to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is *a right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no *right* to relief, but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be *right*.

"To a *right*, on one side, corresponds an *obligation* on the other. If a man has a *right* to my horse, I have an *obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are *obliged* to respect each others' rights.

"My *obligation* is to give another man his *right;* my *duty* is to do what is *right*. Hence duty is a wider term than obligation; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *right* the substantive.

"Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the correlative *right*. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is *right*, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the discharge of our duties, as having a *moral claim* upon us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our duty to relieve him.

"The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *perfect obligation* and *imperfect obligation* for *obligation* and *duty* respectively: and the terms *perfect right* and *imperfect right* for *right* and *moral claim* respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our duties arose from the rights of others; and as if duties were only legal obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force."—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, book i., § 84-89.—*V.* JURISPRUDENCE, RECTITUDE.

ROSICRUCIANS, a name assumed by a sect of Hermetical philosophers, who came into notice in Germany towards the close of the fourteenth century. Christian Rosenkreuz, from whom, according to some, the name is derived, was born in 1378, travelled to the East, and after keeping company with magi-

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cians and cabalists, returned to Germany with their secrets, which he communicated to three of his friends, or sons, and shutting himself up in a cave, died at the age of 106 in 1484. The secrets of the fraternity of the Rosy Cross, which gradually increased in numbers, had reference to four points—the transmutation of metals, the prolongation of life, the knowledge of what is passing in distant places, and the application of the Cabala and the science of numbers to discover the most hidden things. They assumed the signature F.R.C., or *Fratres Roris Cocti*, it being pretended that the matter of the philosopher's stone was dew concocted. Or, according to Mosheim, the name is compounded of *Ros*, dew; and *crux*, the cross. In the language of alchemy, the figure of the cross signifies light, and dew was reckoned the most powerful dissolvent of gold; so that a *Rosicrucian* meant one who, by the assistance of dew, sought for light or the philosopher's stone.—Mosheim, *Eccles. Hist.*, vol. iv.; Louis Figuier, *L'Alchimie et Les Alchimistes.* Par., 1856.

RULE.—"Rectitude is a *law*, as well as a *rule* to us; it not only *directs*, but *binds* all, as far as it is perceived."—Price, *Rev. of Morals*, chap. 6.

A *rule* prescribes means to attain some end. But the end may not be one which all men are to aim at; and the *rule* may not be followed by all. A *law* enjoins something to be done, and is binding upon all to whom it is made known.

"A *rule*, in its proper signification, is an instrument, by means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to another, which for this very reason is called a straight line.

"In a figurative and moral sense, a *rule* imports nothing else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes." Burlamaqui, *Principles of Nat. Law*, part i., chap. 5.

(from צבא, signifying a host, or from *tsaba*, in Syriac, to adore; or from *Saba* the son of Cush, and grandson of Seth) means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, which

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prevailed from an early period in the East, especially in Syria, Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia. The Sabæans are not mentioned by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the Arabian authors they are called Nabatheans, as if descendants from Nebaioth, son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are expounded by Moses Maimonides in the third part of his work, *De More Nevochim.* There was a popular and a philosophic creed with them. According to the former the stars were worshipped; and the sun, as supreme God, ruled over heaven and earth, and the other heavenly bodies were but the ministers of his will. According to the philosophic creed, the stars consisted of matter and mind. God is not the matter of the universe, but the spirit which animates it. But both are eternal, and will eternally exist, for the one cannot pass into, or absorb the other.

Pocock, *Specimen Hist. Arab.*, 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. 138; Hyde, *Veterum Persarum Historia*, 8vo, Oxf., 1766; Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum*, 2 vols., fol., Camb., 1727.

SAME, in its primary sense, denotes *identity*—*q. v.*

In a secondary sense it denotes great *similarity*, and in popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two things being *nearly* the *same*. To this ambiguity, Whately refers much of the error of *realism*; of Plato's theory of *ideas;* of the personification and deification in poetical mythology, &c. —Whately, *Log.*, App. i.

SANCTION (*sancio*, to ratify or confirm).—"I shall declare the *sanction* of this law of nature, viz., those rewards which God hath ordained for the observation of it, and those punishments He hath appointed for its breach or transgression."—Tyrell, *On the Law of Nature*, p. 125.

"The *sanctions* of rewards and punishments which God has annexed to his laws have not, in any proper sense, the nature of obligation. They are only motives to virtue, adapted to the state and condition, the weakness and insensibility of man. They do not make or constitute duty, but presuppose it."—Adams, *Sermon on Nature and Obligation of Virtue.*

The consequences which naturally attend virtue and vice are the *sanction* of duty, or of doing what is right, as they are intended to encourage us to the discharge of it, and to deter

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us from the breach or neglect of it. And these natural consequences of virtue and vice are also a declaration, on the part of God, that He is in favour of the one and against the other, and are intimations, that His love of the one and His hatred of the other may be more fully manifested hereafter. By Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the term *sanction*, or enforcement of obedience, is applied to reward as well as to punishment. But Mr. Austin (*Province of Jurispr. Determined*, p. 10) confines it to the latter; perhaps, because human laws only punish, and do not reward.

SAVAGE and BARBAROUS.—Ferguson (*Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, part ii., sect. 2) states that the history of mankind, in their rudest state, may be considered under two heads, viz., that of the *savage*, who is not yet acquainted with property, and that of the *barbarian*, to whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care and desire.

The distinction here made between the *savage* and the *barbarous* states of society, resolves itself into the absence or presence of political government; for without political government, property cannot exist. The distinction is an important one; and it would be convenient to apply the term *savage* to communities which are permanently in a state of anarchy, which ordinarily exist without government, and to apply the term *barbarous* to communities, which, though in a rude state as regards the arts of life, are nevertheless subject to a government. In this sense, the North American Indians would be in a *savage*, while the Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic nations, would be in a *barbarous* state. Montesquieu's distinction between *savages* and *barbarians* (*Esprit des Lois*, xviii. 11), is different in form, but in substance it is founded on the same principle. Hugh Murray (*Enquiries respecting the Character of Nations, and the Progress of Society*, Edin., 1808) lays it down (p. 230) that the *savage* form of society is without government.

According to many ancient and modern philosophers, the *savage* state was the primitive state of the human race. But others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, having maintained that the nations now found in a *savage* state have accidentally

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degenerated from the primitive state, which was a state of knowledge and civilization.

SCEPTICISM (σκέπτομαι, to look, to seek) is used as synonymous with *doubt*—*q. v.* But doubt may be removed by evidence, and give way to conviction or belief. The characteristic of *scepticism* is to come to no conclusion for or against—ἐποχή, holding off, and consequent tranquillity—ἀταραξία. Absolute objective certainty being unattainable, *scepticism* holds that in the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other—οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. It was first taught by Pyrrho, who flourished in Greece about 340 B.C. Hence it is sometimes called Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a bad sense, as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the following passages it means, more correctly, the absence of determination.

"We shall not ourselves venture to determine anything, in so great a point; but *sceptically* leave it undecided."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 806.

"That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley's) are, in reality, merely *sceptical*, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement, and irresolution, and confusion, which is the result of *scepticism*."—Hume, *Essays*, note, p. 369, 4to edit.

Scepticism is opposed to *dogmatism*—*q. v.*

"The writings of the best authors among the ancients being full and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost they will. He that I am reading seems always to have the most force; and I find that every one in turn has reason, though they contradict one another."

This is said by Montaigne, book ii., chap. 12, in the true spirit of *scepticism*.

"*Que scais-je?* was the motto of Montaigne,
As also of the first academicians;
That all is dubious which man may attain,
Was one of their most favourite positions.
There's no such thing as certainty, that's plain
As any of mutality's conditions;
So little do we know what we're about in
This world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting."

Byron, *Don Juan*, Canto ix., xvii.

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Glanvill (Joseph) has a work which he entitled *Scepsis Scientifica, or the Folly of Dogmatising;* Stäudlin wrote the *History and Spirit of Scepticism*, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1794-5; Sanchez (Fr.) or Sanctius wrote a *Tractatus de multum nobili et prima universali scientia, quod nihil scitur*, 4to, Lyons, 1581; Crousaz has *Examen du Pyrrhonisme Ancienne et Moderne.*

SCHEMA (σχῆμα, shape), "termed by Mr. Semple *effigiation*, is the representation of a universal proceeding of the imagination to procure for a conception its image. To all conceptions an object must be given, and objects are given to us only through the modification of the sensibility. Pure conceptions *à priori* must contain *à priori* formal conditions of the sensibility (of the internal sense especially), under which alone the pure understanding-conception *à priori* can be applied to any object *à priori.* This formal and pure condition of sensibility, and to which the pure understanding-conception is restricted in its use, is termed by Kant the transcendental *schema* of this understanding-conception. The procedure with these *schemata*, or the sensible conditions under which pure understanding alone can be used, he also termed the *schematismus* of the pure understanding. The *schema* is only in itself a product of the imagination, but it is still to be distinguished from an image in this respect, that it is a single intuition. Five dots in a line, for example, are an image of the number five; but the *schema* of a conception, for instance, of a number in general, is more the representation of a method of representing a multitude according to a certain conception, for instance a thousand, in an image, than this image itself."—Haywood, *Explan. of Terms in Crit. of Pure Reason.*

SCHOLASTIC.—*Scholasticus*, as a Latin word, was first used by Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to the rhetoricians in his day: and we read in Jerome, that Serapion, having acquired great fame, received as a title of honour the surname *Scholasticus.* When the schools of the Middle Ages were opened, it was applied to those charged with the education of youth.

"We see the original sense of the word *scholastic*," says Dr. Hampden (*Bampton Lect.*, i., p. 7), "in the following passage:

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—*Omnes enim in scriptis suis causas tantum egerunt suas; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utilitatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres et salutiferi, sed ut* scholastici *ac diserti haberentur.*"—Salvianus, *De Gubern. Dei, Præfat.*

Scholastic Philosophy.—This phrase denotes a period rather than a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the sixteenth century. What has been called the Classic Age of the *scholastic philosophy*, includes the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of Aristotle were introduced into France by Latin translations, and terminates with the Council of Florence and the taking of Constantinople. The only philosophy that was taught during that period, was taught by the clergy; and was therefore very much mixed up with theology. The only way of teaching was by lectures or dictates; and hence the phrase, *legere in philosophia.* There was no one system uniformly taught; but different and conflicting opinions were held and promulgated by different doctors. The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was taught by prælections on *Donatus* and *Priscian*, and rhetoric by prælections on some parts of *Cicero* or *Boethius.* But logic shared most of their attention, and was taught by prælections on such of the works of Aristotle as were best known. The *Timæus* of Plato also occupied much of their attention; and they laboured to reconcile the doctrines of the one philosopher with those of the other.

Mr. Morell says (*Phil. of Religion*, p. 369), "It has been usual to divide the whole *scholastic* periods into three eras.*—1. That which was marked by the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, that is, authority. 2. That which was marked by the friendly alliance of philosophy with dogmatic theology. 3. The commencement of a separation between the two, or the dawn of the entire independence of philosophy.

The first years of *scholastic philosophy* were marked by *authority.* In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigena

* Tenneman makes four periods of *scholastic philosophy*, according to the prevalence of Realism or Nominalism.

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attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred years after, the first era was brought to a close by Abelard. The second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Roger Bacon, followed by Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third and declining era.

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the invention of printing, and the progress of the Reformation, put an end to the *scholastic philosophy.* Philosophy was no longer confined to the schools and to prælections. The press became a most extensive lecturer, and many embraced the opportunities offered of extending knowledge.

In addition to general histories of philosophy, see Rousselot, *Etudes sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Age*, 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1840-2; Haureau, *De la Philosophie Scholastique*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1850; Cousin, *Fragmens Philosophiques*, tom. iii., Paris, 1840. Also his *Introduction* to *Œuvres inédites d'Abelard.*

SCIENCE (*scientia*) means knowledge, emphatically so called, that is, knowledge of principles and causes.

Science (ἐπιστήμη) has its name from bringing us (ἐπὶ στάσιν) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of particulars; for it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable. This etymology given by Nicephorus (Blemmida), and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in his *Cratylus.*

"Ὅτι *scientiæ fundamentum est*, διότι *fastigium.*"—Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, *p.* 76.

"Sir Will. Hamilton, in his *Lectures on Logic*, defined *science* as a 'complement of cognitions, having, in point of form, the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter, the character of real truth.'"—Dove, *Political Science*, p. 76.

Science is knowledge certain and evident in itself, or by the principle from which it is deduced, or with which it is certainly connected. It is *subjective* as existing in a mind—*objective*, as embodied in truths—*speculative*, as resting in attainment of truths, as in physical *science*—*practical*, as leading to do something, as in ethical *science.*

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Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater, *On Hermogenes*, apud Rhet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Walz, as follows:—

Science consists in an infallible and unchanging knowledge of phenomena.

Art is a system formed from observation, and directed to a useful end.

Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of previous practice.

Art is of three kinds—theoretic, practical, and mixed.

"No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. The examples given are of *science*, not art. It is a part of grammatical *science* to say that all words with a certain termination have a certain accent. When this is converted into a rule, it becomes part of an art."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Methods of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 19, sect. 2.

"In *science*, *scimus ut sciamus;* in art, *scimus ut producamus*. And, therefore, *science* and art may be said to be investigations of truth:* but one, *science*, inquires for the sake of knowledge: the other, art, for the sake of production:† and hence *science* is more concerned with the higher truths, art with the lower: and *science* never is engaged as art is in productive application.‡ And the most perfect state of *science*, therefore, will be the most high and accurate inquiry¶ the perfection of art will be the most apt and efficient system of rules: art always throwing itself into the form of rules."§—Karslake, *Aids to Log.*, b. i., p. 24.

"*Science* and art differ from one another, as the understanding differs from the will, or as the indicative mood in grammar differs from the imperative. The one deals in facts, the other in precepts. *Science* is a collection of truths; art a body of rules, or directions for conduct. The language of *science* is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not happen. The language of art is, Do this, Avoid that. *Science* takes cogniz-

* This is, speaking logically, "the Genus" of the two.

† These are their *differentia*, or distinctive characteristics.

‡ These are their specific properties.

§ This distinction of science and art is given in Aristotle.—See *Poster. Analyt.*, i., 194, ii., 13.

ance of a *phenomenon*, and endeavours to discover its *law;* art proposes to itself an *end*, and looks out for means to effect it." —J. S. Mill, *Essays on Pol. Econ.*—*V.* ART, DEMONSTRATION.

SCIENCES (The Occult) are so called (from *occulto*, to hide or conceal) because they have reference to qualities or powers which are not such as are common or commonly known. The belief in beings having superhuman powers, as fairies, familiars, dæmons, &c., in augury, oracles, witchcraft, &c., in dreams and visions, &c., in divination and astrology, &c., and in talismans and amulets, &c., leads to the prosecution of what has been called the *Occult Sciences.*—See a vol. under this title in the cabinet edition of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana.*

SCIENTIA (Media).—"According to Molina, the objects of the divine knowledge are the *possible*, the *actual*, and the *conditional.* The knowledge of the *possible* is *simple intelligence;* of the *actual*, *scientia visionis;* and of the *conditional*, *scientia media*, intermediate between that of *intelligence* and *vision.* An example of *scientia media* is that of David asking the oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon David took a different course."—Leibnitz, *Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, partie 1, sect. 40.

In *La Cause de Dieu*, &c., sec. 17, Leibnitz has said, "*Scientia media* might rather be understood to mean the science not only of future conditionals, but universally of all future contingents. Then science of *simple intelligence* would be restricted to the knowledge of truths possible and necessary; *scientia visionis* to that of truths contingent and actual. *Scientia media* would thus have it in common with the first that it concerned truths *possible;* and with the second, that it applied to truths *contingent.*"—See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 11.

SCIOLIST (*sciolus*, one who thinks he knows much and knows but little).—"Some have the hap to be termed learned men, though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge here and there, though they be but smatterers and mere *sciolists.*"—Howell, *Letters*, b. iii., let. 8.

σκιά, a shadow; and μάχη, a fight).—"But pray,

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countryman, to avoid this *sciomachy*, or imaginary combat with words, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name of tyrant." —Cowley, *On the Government of Oliver Cromwell.*

SECULARISM is the Latin for *this-world-ism*, and means, "attend to the world that you are now in, and let the next alone."—Arnot, *Illust. of Proverbs*, p. 368.

Its capital principles are—1. That attention to temporal things should take precedence of considerations relating to a future existence. 2. That science is the providence of life, and that spiritual dependency in human affairs may be attended with material destruction. 3. That there exist, independently of scriptural religion, guarantees of morality in human nature, intelligence, and utility.

The aim of *secularism* is to aggrandize the present life. For eternity, it substitutes time; for providence, science; for fidelity to the Omniscient, usefulness to man. Its great advocate is Mr. Holyoake.

SECUNDUM QUID (*τὸ καθ' ὅ*) is opposed to *Secundum ipsum* (*τὸ καθ' αὐτο*) as the *relative* to the *non-relative* or the *limited* to the *unlimited.* Mr. Maurice illustrates *Secundum quid* by a passage from "As you like it:" "In *respect* that it is of the country it is a good life, but in respect it is not of the court it is a vile life."—Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 20.—*V.* FALLACY.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS—*V.* APPERCEPTION.

SELFISHNESS "consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding, for the sake of *any* kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a *negative* quality; that is, it consists in *not* considering what is due to one's neighbours, through a deficiency of justice or benevolence. And *selfishness*, accordingly, will show itself in as many different shapes as there are different dispositions in men.

"You may see these differences even in very young children. One *selfish* child, who is greedy, will seek to keep all the cakes and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is idle, will not care what trouble he causes to others, so he can save his own; another, who is vain, will seek to obtain the credit which is due to others; one who is covetous, will seek to gain at another's

expense, &c. In short, each person 'has a *self* of his own.' And, consequently, though you may be of a character very unlike that of some *selfish* person, you may yet be, in your own way, quite as *selfish* as he. And it is possible to be *selfish* in the highest degree, without being at all too much actuated by self-love, but unduly neglectful of others when your own gratification, of whatever kind, is concerned."—Whately, *Lessons on Morals*, p. 143.

Selfishness exists only in reference to others, and could have on place in one who lived alone on a desert island, though he might have, of course, every degree of *self-love;* for selfishness is not an excess of self-love, and consists not in an over-desire of happiness, but in placing your happiness in something which interferes with, or leaves you regardless of that of others. Nor are we to suppose that selfishness and want of feeling are either the same or inseparable. For, on the one hand, I have known such as have had very little feeling, but felt for others as much nearly as for themselves, and were, therefore, far from selfish; and, on the other hand, some, of very acute feelings, feel for no one but themselves, and, indeed, are sometimes among the most cruel."—Whately, *On Bacon*, p. 221.

SELF-LOVE is sometimes used in a general sense to denote all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good, just as those principles which lead us to seek the good of others are all comprehended under the name of benevolence. All our desires tend towards the attainment of some good or the averting of some evil—having reference either to ourselves or others, and may therefore be brought under the two heads of benevolence and *self-love*.

But besides this general sense of the word to denote all those desires which have a regard to our own gratification or good, *self-love* is more strictly used to signify "the desire for our own welfare, as such." In this sense, "it is quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities," says Dr. Whately (*Lessons on Morals*, p. 142), "though it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water because he is *thirsty;* and another may, without thirst, drink—suppose from a mineral spring, because

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he believes it will be *good for his health.* This latter is impelled by *self-love*, but not the other.

"So again, one person may pursue some course of study in order to qualify himself for some *profession* by which he may advance in life, and another from having a *taste* for that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not acting from *self-love.* For as the object of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest."

Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cherished and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. But within due bounds it is allowable and right, and by no means incompatible with benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of others. And Dr. Hutcheson, who maintains that kind affection is what constitutes an agent virtuous, has said, that he who cherishes kind affection towards all, may also love himself; may love himself as a part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings; may promote his own happiness in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of his love; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely benevolent towards all.—*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. iii.

The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim is to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is any antagonism between *benevolence* and *self-love.* So long as *self-love* does not degenerate into *selfishness*, it is quite compatible with true benevolence.

In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish school of philosophers, see Butler, *Sermons*, *On Hum. Nat.*, *On Compassion*, &c.; Turnbull, *Nature and Origin of Laws*, vol. ii., p. 258; Hume, *On General Principles of Morals*, sect. 2; Hutcheson, *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 2; Hazlitt, *Essay on Principles of Hum. Action*, p. 239; Mackintosh, *View of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 192.

SEMATOLOGY (σῆμα, a sign; and λόγος, discourse), the doctrine of *signs—q. v.*

SENSATION.—"The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes perceptible is *corporeal sensation.*

"Without this general innate *sensation* we should not possess the certainty that our body is *our* body; for it is as much an *object* for the other senses as anything else that we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general innate *sensation* is necessary to the existence of all other particular sensations, and may exist independently of the nervous system. Polypi, animals of the simplest structure, without a nervous system distinct from the rest of the organic mass, show traces of innate *sensation.* The light by means of which we see, acts not only on the visual nerves, but also on the fluids of the eye, and the *sensations* of sight partly depend on the structure of the eye. *This sensibility*, therefore, appears to be a necessary attribute of animated organic matter itself.

"All the perceptions of sense are rooted in the general *sensation.* The child must be conscious of his senses before he applies them. This *sensation*, however, is very obscure; even pain is not clearly felt by it at the place where it exists. Equally obscure is the notion which it entertains of an object. Though Brach, therefore, is right in ascribing something objective, even to the general *sensation*, since conditions cannot communicate themselves, without communicating (though ever so obscurely) something of that which produces the condition—nay, strictly speaking, as even in the idea 'subject,' that of an 'object' is involved, yet it is advisable to abide by the distinction founded by Kant, according to which, by innate *sensation*, we *especially* perceive our own personality (subject), and by the senses we *specially* perceive objects, and thus in the ascending line, feeling, taste, smell, hearing, and sight.

"The next step from this obscure original innate *sensation* is particular *sensation* through the medium of the nervous system, which, in its more profound, and yet more obscure sphere, produces common *sensation* (CŒNESTHESIS), and in a higher manifestation, the perceptions of the senses. *Cœnesthesis*, or common feeling, is referred to the ganglionic nerves. It may be called subjective, inasmuch as the body itself gives

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the excitement to the nerve concerned.* By the Cœnesthesis, states of our body are revealed to us which have their seat in the sphere of the vegetative life. These states are—

"1. *General:*—corporeal heaviness and buoyancy, atony, toniety.

"2. *Special:*—hunger, thirst, sexual instinct, &c.

"The *sensations* of pain, titillation, itching, &c., which are generally cited here, belong, in their more common acceptation, to the general corporeal feeling; in their more local limitation, with distinct perception of the object exciting, to the sense of touch; but when they arise from the nervous system allotted to the vegetative sphere of the body, they certainly belong to the Cœnesthesis in the more limited sense of the word.

"To this class belongs especially the anxiety arising from impediment in respiration, and from nausea.

"In the analysis of the psycho-physical processes proceeding outwards from *sensation* to perception, we encounter after the organs of the Cœnesthesis, the organs of sense."—Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, 1847, p. 83.

Sensation and Perception.—"A conscious presentation, if it refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of our own being, is = *sensation*. The same if it refers to an object, is = *perception*."—Coleridge, *Church and State*—quoted by Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 104.

Rousseau distinguished *sensations* as *affectives*, or giving pleasure or pain; and *representatives*, or giving knowledge of objects external.

Paffe (*Sur la Sensibilité*) distinguishes the element *affectif* and the element *instructif*.

In like manner Dr. Reid regards *sensation* not only as a state of feeling, but a *sign* of that which occasions it.

Bozelli (*De l'Union de la Philosoph. avec la Morale*) calls *sensations*, in so far as they are representative, in their *philoso-*

* However subjective this sensation is, there is always in it the indication of an object, as Brach shows: hence illustrating the instinct of animals. Presentiment, too, chiefly belongs to this system.

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phical form, in so far as they give pleasure or pain, in their *moral* form or character.

"To *sensation* I owe all the certainty I have of my existence as a sentient being, to *perception* a certainty not less absolute, that there are other beings besides me."—Thurot, *De l'Entendement*, &c., tom. i., p. 43.

Sensation properly expresses *that change in the state of the mind* which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects): *perception*, on the other hand, expresses the *knowledge* or the *intimations* we obtain, by means of our *sensations*, concerning the qualities of matter; and consequently involves, in every instance, the notion of *externality* or *outness*, which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word *sensation*.

Sensation has been employed to denote—

1. The process of sensitive apprehension, both in its subjective and its objective relations; like the Greek *æsthesis*.

2. It was limited first in the Cartesian school, and thereafter in that of Reid, to the subjective phasis of our sensitive cognitions.—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D*.

"*Sensation* proper, is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism. This description may at first sight appear to be at variance with the facts of the case, inasmuch as every severe affection of the body produces pain, quite independently of any knowledge we may possess of the cause or of any operation of the will being directed towards it. Facts, however, rightly analyzed, show us, that if the attention of the mind be absorbed in other things, no impulse, though it amount to the laceration of the nerves, can produce in us the slightest feeling. Extreme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of any kind, can make us altogether insensible even to physical injury. For this reason it is that the soldier on the field of battle is often wounded during the heat of the combat, without discovering it till exhausted by loss of blood. Numerous facts

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of a similar kind prove demonstrably, that a certain application and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to the existence of *sensation*, as the occurrence of physical impulse, on the other."—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 107; Stewart, *Phil. Essays*, note F (it is G in last edit.); see also *Outlines*, sect. 14; Reid, *Essays*, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1; Morell, *Phil. of Religion*, p. 7.

SENSE, in psychology, is employed ambiguously—1. For the faculty of sensitive apprehension. 2. For its act. 3. For its organ.

Sense and Idea.—In the following passage from Shaftesbury (*Moralists*, part iii., sect. 2), *sense* is used as equivalent to *idea;* "Nothing surely is more strongly imprinted on our minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls than the *idea* or *sense* of order and proportion."

In like manner Dr. Hutcheson has said, "There is a natural and immediate *determination* to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them; or a natural *sense* of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our *senses* or by reasoning." We speak of a *determination* of blood to the head. This is a *physical* determination or tendency. Now, there may be a mental tendency, and this, in Dr. Hutcheson's philosophy, is called *determination* or *sense.* He defined a *sense* in this application of it "a determination to receive *ideas*, independent of our will," and he enumerates several such tendencies or determinations, which he calls *reflex senses.*

SENSES (REFLEX).—Dr. Hutcheson seems to have been in some measure sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke's account of the origin of our ideas, and maintained, that in addition to those which we have by means of sensation and reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers of perception, which he called internal and *reflex senses.* According to his psychology, our powers of perception may be called *direct* or *antecedent*, and *consequent* or *reflex.* We hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which operate directly on their objects; and do not suppose any antecedent perception. But we perceive the harmony of sound, and the

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beauty of colour, by means of faculties which operate reflexly, or in consequence of some preceding perception. And the moral sense was regarded by him as a faculty of this kind. Reflection, from which, according to Mr. Locke, we derive the simple ideas of the passions and affections of mind, was considered by Hutcheson as an *internal* sense or faculty, operating *directly*. But that faculty by which we perceive the beauty or deformity, the virtue or vice, of these passions and affections, was called by Hutcheson, a *reflex*, *internal* sense.—*Illustrations of the Moral Sense*, sect. 1; *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 1; *Mor. Phil.*, book i., chap. 4, sect. 4, and also sect. 5.

SENSIBILITY or SENSITIVITY (*τὸ αἰσθητικόν*) is now used as a general term to denote the capacity of feeling, as distinguished from intellect and will. It includes sensations both external and internal, whether derived from contemplating outward and material objects, or relations and ideas, desires, affections, passions. It also includes the sentiments of the sublime and beautiful, the moral sentiment and the religious sentiment; and, in short, every modification of feeling of which we are susceptible. By the ancient philosophers the *sensibility* under the name of appetite was confounded with the will. The Scotch philosophers have analyzed the various forms of the *sensibility* under the name of active principles: but they have not gathered them under one head, and have sometimes treated of them in connection with things very different.

SENSIBLES, COMMON and PROPER (*sensile* or *sensibile*, that which is capable of affecting some sense; that which is the object of sense).

Aristotle distinguished *sensibles* into *common* and *proper* (*De Anima*, lib. ii., c. 2; lib. iii., c. 1. *De Sensu et Sensili*, c. 1). The *common*, those perceived by all or by a plurality of senses, were magnitude, figure, motion, rest, number. To these five, some of the schoolmen (but out of Aristotle) added place, distance, position, and continuity.—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 124, note. Aristotle admitted, however (*De Anima*, lib. iii., chaps. 1, 4), that the *common sensibles* are not properly objects of sense; but merely con-comitants or con-sequents of the per-

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ception of the *proper sensibles.* This is noticed by Hutcheson (*Mor. Phil.*, book i., chap. 1), commended by Price (*Review*, p. 56, first edit.), by Mr. Stewart (*Philosoph. Essays*, pp. 31, 46, 551, 4to), and by Royer Collard (*Œuvres de Reid*, tom. iii., p. 431).

"Sensibile commune *dicitur quod vel percipitur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel imaginatione desumitur* occasio, *ex variis sensibus; ut sunt figura, motus, ubicatio, duratio, magnitudo, distantia, numerus,*" &c.—Compton Carleton, *Phil. Univ. De Anima.*, diss. 16, lect. ii., sect. 1.

The *proper sensibles* are those objects of sense which are peculiar to one sense; as colour to the eye, sound to the ear, taste to the palate, and touch to the body.

SENSISM, SENSUALISM, or SENSUISM, is the doctrine that all our knowledge is derived originally from sense.

It is not the same as *empiricism*, though sometimes confounded with it. *Empiricism* rests exclusively on experience, and rejects all ideas which are *à priori.* But all experience is not that of sense. *Empiricism* admits facts and nothing but facts, but all facts which have been observed. *Sensism* gives the single fact of sensation as sufficient to explain all mental phenomena. Locke is *empirical*, Condillac is *sensual.*

Sensuism, "in the emphatic language of Fichte, is called 'the dirt-philosophy.'"—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 38, see also p. 2.—*V.* EMPIRICISM, IDEOLOGY.

SENSORIUM (*αἰσθητήριον*), is the organ by which, or place in which, the sensations of the several senses are reduced to the unity of consciousness. According to Aristotle it was in all warm blooded animals the heart, and therefore so in man. According to modern philosophers the central organ is the brain, the pineal gland according to Descartes, the ventricles or the *corpus callosum* according to others.

Sensorium signifies not so properly the *organ* as the *place* of sensation. The eye, the ear, &c., are organs; but they are not *sensoria.* Sir Isaac Newton does not say that space is a *sensorium;* but that it is (by way of comparison), so to say, the *sensorium*, &c.—Clarke, *Second Reply to Leibnitz.*

Leibnitz adopted and defended (*Answer to the Second Reply of Clarke*) the explanation of Rudolphus Goclenius, who, in his *Lexicon Philosophicum*, under *Sensitorium*, says, "Barbarum scholasticorum, qui interdum sunt simiæ Græcorum. Hi dicunt Αἰσθητήριον. Ex quo illi fecerunt *sensitorium* pro *sensorio*, id est, organum sensationis."

SENSUS COMMUNIS (κοινὴ αἴσθησις).—This latter phrase was employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics "to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 757, note.

This faculty had an organ which was called *Sensorium Commune—q. v.*

Mr. Stewart (note D, to part ii. of *Elements*) says:—The *sensus communis* of the schoolmen denotes the power whereby the mind is enabled to *represent* to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensation which it has formerly experienced. Its *seat* was supposed to be that part of the brain (hence called the *sensorium* or *sensorium commune*) where the nerves from all the organs of perception terminate. Of the peculiar function allotted to it in the scale of our intellectual faculties, the following account is given by Hobbes:—"Some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy; and the fancy to the memory; and the memory to the judgment—like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood."—*Of Man*, part i., chap. 2.

Mr. Stewart says the *sensus communis* is perfectly synonymous with the word conception, that is, the power by which we represent an object of sense, whether present or absent. But it is doubtful whether *sensus communis* was applied by the schoolmen to the reproduction of absent objects of sense.

SENTIMENT implies an idea (or judgment), because the will is not moved nor the sensibility affected without knowing. But an idea or judgment does not infer feeling or *sentiment*.—Buffier, *Log.* ii., art. 9.

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"The word *sentiment*, in the English language, never, as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but *judgment accompanied with feeling.** It was wont to signify opinion or judgment of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an opinion or judgment that strikes, and produces some agreeable or uneasy emotion. So we speak of *sentiments* of respect, of esteem, of gratitude; but I never heard the pain of the gout, or any other severe feeling, called a *sentiment*."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 7.

"Mr. Hume sometimes employs (after the manner of the French metaphysicians) *sentiment* as synonymous with *feeling;* a use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, last ed., note E.

"There are two sensibilities—the one turned towards nature and transmitting the impressions received from it, the other hid in the depths of our organization and receiving the impression of all that passes in the soul. Have we discovered truth—we experience a *sentiment.* Have we done a good deed—we experience a *sentiment.* A *sentiment* is but the echo of reason, but is sometimes better heard than reason itself. *Sentiment*, which accompanies the intelligence in all its movements, has, like the intelligence, a spontaneous and a reflective movement. By itself it is a source of emotion, not of knowledge. Knowledge or judgment is invariable, whatever be our health or spirits. *Sentiment* varies with health and spirits. I always judge the Apollo Belvidere to be beautiful, but I do not always feel the *sentiment* of his beauty. A bright or gloomy day, sadness or serenity of mind, affect my *sentiments*, but not my judgment.

"Mysticism would suppress reason and expand *sentiment*."—See Cousin, *Œuvres*, tom. ii., p. 96.

Those pleasures and pains which spring up in connection with a modification of our organism or the perceptions of the senses, are called *sensations.* But the state of our mind, the exercise of thought, conceptions purely intellectual, are the occasion to us of high enjoyment or lively suffering; for these

* "This is too unqualified an assertion. The term *sentiment* is in English applied to the *higher feelings*."—Sir William Hamilton.

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pleasures and pains of a different kind is reserved the name of *sentiments.—Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 142.

"The word *sentiment*, agreeably to the use made of it by our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very happily those complex determinations of the mind which result from the co-operation of our rational powers and our moral feelings. We do not speak of a man's *sentiments* concerning a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, or concerning any speculative question whatever, by which the feelings are not liable to be roused or the heart affected.

"This account of the meaning of the word corresponds, I think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr. Smith in the title of his *Theory* (*of Moral Sentiments*)."—Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, note D.

Sentiment and Opinion.—Dr. Beattie (*Essay on Truth*, part ii., chap. 1, sec. 1) has said, "that the true and the old English sense of the word *sentiment*, is a formed *opinion*, notion, or principle." Dr. Reid, in his *Essays on the Intell. Powers*, speaks of the *sentiments* of Mr. Locke concerning perception; and of the *sentiments* of Arnauld, Berkeley, and Hume concerning ideas.

The title of chap. 7, essay ii., of Reid on *Intell. Powers*, is *Sentiments of Philosophers*, &c., on which Sir W. Hamilton's note, p. 269, is, "*Sentiment*, as here and elsewhere employed by Reid, in the meaning of *opinion* (*sententia*), is not to be imitated."

"By means of our sensations we feel, by means of our ideas we think: now a *sentiment* (from *sentire*) is properly a judgment concerning sensations, and an *opinion* (from *opinari*) is a judgment concerning ideas: our *sentiments* appreciate external, and our *opinions* internal, phenomena. On questions of feeling, taste, observation, or report, we define our *sentiments*. On questions of science, argument, or metaphysical abstraction, we define our *opinions*. The *sentiments* of the heart. The *opinions* of the mind. It is my *sentiment* that the wine of Burgundy is the best in the world. It is my *opinion* that the religion of Jesus Christ is the best in the world. There is more of instinct in *sentiment*, and more of definition in *opinion*.

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The admiration of a work of art which results from first impressions, is classed with our *sentiments;* and when we have accounted to ourselves for the approbation, it is classed with our *opinions.*"—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

SIGN (*signum*, a mark).—The definition of a sign is "that which represents anything to the cognitive faculty." We have knowledge by sense and by intellect, and a *sign* may be addressed to either or to both—as smoke, which to the eye and to the intellect indicates or signifies fire; so that a *sign* has a twofold relation—to the thing signified and to the cognitive faculty.

"*Signs* are either to represent or resemble things, or only to intimate and suggest them to the mind. And our ideas being the *signs* of what is intended or supposed therein, are in such sort and so far right, as they do either represent or resemble the object of thought, or as they do at least intimate it to the mind, by virtue of some natural connection or proper appointment."—Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

Signs are divided into *natural* and *conventional.* A *natural sign* has the power of signifying from its own nature, so that at all times, in all places, and with all people it signifies the same thing, as smoke is the sign of fire. A *conventional sign* has not the power of signifying in its own nature, but supposes the knowledge and remembrance of what is signified in him to whom it is addressed, as three balls are the conventionally understood *sign* of a pawnbroker's shop.

In his philosophy Dr. Reid makes great use of the doctrine of *natural signs.* He arranges them in three classes,—1. Those whose connection with the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience, as natural *causes* are *signs* of their *effects;* and hence philosophy is called an interpretation of nature. 2. Those wherein the connection between the *sign* and thing signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle without reasoning or experience. Of this class are the *natural signs* of human thoughts, purposes, and desires, such as modulations of the voice, gestures of the body, and features of the face, which may be called natural language, in opposition to that which is spoken or written. 3. A third class of *natural signs* compre-

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hends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it and at once give us a conception and create a belief of it. In this way consciousness, in all its modifications, gives the conception and belief of a being who thinks—*Cogito ergo sum.*

"As the first class of natural *signs* is the foundation of true philosophy, so the second is the foundation of the fine arts or of taste, and the last is the foundation of common sense."—Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 5, sec. 3.

The doctrine or science of *signs* has been called *Sematology.* And as the *signs* which the mind makes use of in order to obtain and to communicate knowledge are words; the proper and skilful use of words is in different ways the object of—1. *Grammar;* 2. *Logic;* and 3. *Rhetoric.*—Smart, *Sematology*, 8vo, Lond., 1839.

See Berkeley, *Minute Phil.*, dial. iv., sect. 7, 11, 12; *New Theory of Vision*, sect. 144, 147; *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, sect. 38-43. Hutcheson, *Synopsis Metaphys.*, part ii., chap. 1; *Mor. Phil.*, b. i., ch. 1, p. 5. De Gerando, *Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser;* Adam Smith, *On the Formation of Language.*

SIMILE.—*V.* METAPHOR.

SIN.—*V.* EVIL.

SINCERITY implies singleness and honesty.—The Latin word *sincerum* signifies what is without mixture, and has been thought to be compounded of *sine cera*, without wax, as pure honey is.

"*Sincerity* and *sincere* have a twofold meaning of great moral importance. *Sincerity* is often used to denote 'mere reality of conviction;' that a man actually believes what he professes to believe. Sometimes, again, it is used to denote 'unbiassed conviction,' or, at least, an earnest endeavour to shake off all prejudices, and all undue influence of wishes and passions on the judgment, and to decide impartially."—Whately, *Log.*, Append. i.

SINGULAR.—*V.* TERM.

SOCIALISM.—In the various forms under which society has existed, private property, individual industry and enterprise, and

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the rights of marriage and of the family, have been recognized. Of late years several schemes of social arrangement have been proposed, in which one or all of these principles have been abandoned or modified. These schemes may be comprehended under the general term of *socialism*. The motto of them all is *solidarité*.

Communism demands a community of goods or property. *Fourierism* or *Phalansterism* would deliver men over to the guidance of their passions and instincts, and destroy all domestic and moral discipline. *Saint Simonism* or *Humanitarianism* holds that human nature has three great functions, that of the priesthood, science, and industry. Each of these is represented in a College, above which is the father or head, spiritual and temporal, whose will is the supreme and living law of the society. Its religion is pantheism, its morality materialism or epicurism, and its politics despotism.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

SOCIETY (Desire of).—"God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of *society*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 1.

That the *desire of society* is natural to man, is argued by Plato in the Second Book of his *Republic*. It is also hinted at in his dialogue entitled *Protagoras*. The argument is unfolded by Harris in his *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, sect. 12. Aristotle has said at the beginning of his *Politics*,—"The tendency to the social state is in all men by nature." The argument in favour of *society* from our being possessed of speech is insisted on by him, *Polit.*, lib. i., cap. 2. Also by Cicero, *De Legibus*, lib. i., cap. 9; *De Officiis*, lib. i., cap. 16; *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. ii., cap. 59.

In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally an enemy to his fellow-men, and that *society* is a device to defend men from the evils which they would bring on one another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in

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opposition to Hobbes, *De Naturali Hominum Socialitate*, 4to, Glasg., Typis Academ., 1730.

Man is a *social animal*, according to Seneca (*De Clem.*, i., 3). Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature (*Div. Inst.*, vi., 10), in which he follows Cicero (*De Offic.*, i., 14). "Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies."—Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, p. 26. See also Lord Kames, *Hist. of Man*, book ii., sketch 1; Filangieri, *Scienza della Legislazione*, lib. i., c. 1. "La nature de l'homme le porte à vivre en société. Quelle qu'en soit la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout où l'on a rencontré des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut-être est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur sûreté commune; peut-être afin de pourvoir plus aisément à leur besoins; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nature de l'homme de se reunir en société, comme font les abeilles et plusieurs espèces d'animaux; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du monde qu'ils habitent."—Say, *Cours d'Econ. Polit.*, tom. vi. Compare Comte, ibid, tom. iv., p. 54.

This *gregarious propensity* is different from the *political capacity*, which has been laid down as the characteristic of man.

Society (Political, Capacity of).—Command and obedience, which are essential to government, are peculiar to mankind. Man is singular in commanding not only the inferior animals, but his own species. Hence men alone form a *political community*. It has been laid down by Aristotle and others, that this difference is owing to the exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating between justice and injustice (*Polit.*, i., 2). Animals, says Cicero, are unfitted for *political society*, as being "*rationis et orationis expertes.*" *De Offic.*, i., 16. *Separat hæc nos a grege mutorum.* Juvenal, xv., 142-158.

SOMATOLOGY.—*V.* NATURE.

SOPHISM, SOPHISTER, SOPHISTICAL (Σόφισμα, from σοφία, wisdom).—"They were called *sophisters*, as who would say, Counterfeit wise men."—North, *Plutarch*, p. 96.

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"For lyke wyse as though a *Sophyster* woulde with a fonde argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two egges were three, because that ther is one, and that ther be twayne, and one and twayne make three; yt symple unlearned man, though he lacke learnying to soyle hys fonde argument, hath yet wit ynough to laugh thereat, and to eat the two egges himself, and byd the *Sophyster* tak and eat the thyrde."—Sir T. More, *Works*, p. 475.

"*Sophism* is a false argument. This word is not usually applied to *mere errors* in reasoning; but only to those erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who maintains them is, in some degree, conscious; and which he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty, and by some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of words."—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

According to Aristotle, the *sophism* is a *syllogismus contentiosus*, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving the truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to seem to warrant the conclusion, but does not, and is faulty either in form or argument.—Trendelenburg, *Lineamenta Log. Arist.*, sect. 33, 8vo, Berol., 1842.

See Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 5, sect. 3.

On the difference of meaning between φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής, see Sheppard, *Characters of Theophrastus*, 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 81, and p. 269. See also Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. viii., pp. 434-486, and the *Cambridge Journal of Philosophy*, No. 2.—*V.* FALLACY.

SORITES (σωρός, a heap) is an argument composed of an indeterminate number of propositions, so arranged that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and so on till you come to a conclusion which unites the subject of the first with the predicate of the last. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E, therefore A is E.

This is the Direct or Common form of the Sorites. The Reversed form is also called the Goclenian, from Goclenius of Marburg, who first analyzed it about the end of the sixteenth century. It differs from the common form in two respects.

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1. Its premises are reversed; and, 2. It begins with the premise containing the two terms which have the greatest extension, while the common form starts with the premise containing the terms which have the greatest comprehension. Thus—D is E, C is D, B is C, A is B, therefore A is E.

SOUL (ψυχή, *anima*, soul).

This word had formerly a wider signification than now. In the Second Book of his Treatise Περὶ ψυχῆς, Aristotle has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he calls it "the Entelechy, or first form of an organized body which has potential life." The word Ἐντελέχεια, which Dr. Reid begged to be excused from translating, because he did not know the meaning of it, is compounded of ἔντελες, perfect; ἔχειν, to have; and τέλος, an end. Its use was revived by Leibnitz, who designated by it that which possesses in itself the principle of its own activity, and tends towards its end. According to his philosophy, the universe is made up of monads or forces, each active in itself, and tending by its activity to accomplish its proper end. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the word Entelechy, or first form, had a similar meaning, and denoted that which in virtue of an end constituted the essence of things, and gave movement to matter. When the *soul* then is called the Entelechy of an organized body having potential life, the meaning is, that it is that force or power by which life develops itself in bodies destined to receive it.

Aristotle distinguished several forms of *soul*, viz., the *nutritive* or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had growth and reproduction. The *sensitive*, which was the cause of sensation and feeling. The *motive*, of locomotion. The *appetitive*, which was the source of desire and will; and the *rational* or *reasonable*, which was the seat of reason or intellect. These powers or energies of *soul* exist all in some beings; some of them only in other beings; and in some beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses all; brutes possess some; plants one only. In the scholastic philosophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded as simple powers or energies—and only the *nutritive* or *vegetative soul*,

the *sensitive* or *animal*, and the *rational* or *human* were recognized.

In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of *soul* were assigned to man. The *rational*, which had its seat in the head and survived the dissolution of the body—the *irascible*, which had its seat in the heart and was the spring of activity and movement, and the *appetitive* or *concupiscible*, which was the source of the grosser passions and physical instincts, and which died with the bodily organs with which it was united. A similar distinction between the forms or energies of the *soul* has been ascribed to Pythagoras, and traces of it are to be found in several of the philosophical systems of the East.

Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction is taken between ψυχή (Seele) and πνεῦμα (Geist), or *soul* and *spirit*. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at Munich, and a follower of Schelling, the *soul* is the inferior part of our intellectual nature—that which shows itself in the phenomena of dreaming, and which is connected with the state of the brain. The *spirit* is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, and divine. The doctrine of the *natural* and the *spiritual* man, which we find in the writings of St. Paul, may, it has been thought, have formed the basis upon which this mental dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been maintained that the dualism of the thinking principle is distinctly indicated by the apostle when he says of the Word of God that it is able to "divide asunder *soul* and *spirit*." The words in the original are ψυχή and πνεῦμα, and it is contended that by the former is meant the *sentient* or *animal soul*, and by the latter the higher or *rational soul*. A similar distinction has been traced in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where one word is employed to denote the life that is common to man with the inferior animals, רוח, and another word, נשמה, to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which giveth him understanding, and makes of him *a rational soul*. It may be doubted, however, whether this distinction is uniformly observed, either in the Scriptures of the Old or of the New Testament. And it may be better for us, instead of attempting to define the soul *à priori* by its essence, to define it rather

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à posteriori by its operations. This also has been done by Aristotle, in a definition which has been generally adopted. He says, "The *soul* is that by which we live, feel, or perceive [will], move and understand." This is a full enumeration of all the energies which Aristotle assigned to the *soul*, and they are all manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of them, however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the psychologist. At the same time, life and movement are not properties of matter; and therefore they were enumerated by Aristotle as the properties of *soul*—the *soul nutritive*, and the *soul motive*. "The animating form of a natural body is neither its organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities; but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure, nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to employ them." —Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, p. 279. This is what is now called the principle of life, and the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist—for, although in the human being life and soul are united, it is thought they may still be separate entities. In like manner some philosophers have contended that all movement implies the existence of a *soul*, and hence it is that the various phenomena of nature have been referred to an *anima mundi*, or *soul* of the universe. A modern philosopher of great name (Jouffroy, in his *Cours Professé à la Faculté des Lettres* in 1837) enumerated among the energies of the human *soul* a special faculty of locomotion, and the power of originating movement or change is ascribed to it when we call it active. The same view is taken by Adolphe Garnier in his *Traité des Facultés de l'ame*, iii. tom., 8vo, Par., 1852. Still, life and locomotion are not usually treated of as belonging to the *soul*, but rather as belonging to the bodies in which they are manifested. Hence it is that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the human *soul*, does not enumerate the special energies by which we live and move, but calls it that by which we think. "By the mind of a man," says he (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1), "we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. . . . We are conscious that we think, and

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that we have a variety of thoughts of different kinds—such as seeing, hearing, remembering, deliberating, resolving, loving, hating, and many other kinds of thought—all which we are taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle; and *this principle of thought we call the mind or soul of man.*"* It will be observed that Dr. Reid uses the word *soul* as synonymous with *mind*. And, perhaps, no very clear nor important distinction can be taken between them. The plainest and most common distinction taken in the use of these words is, that in speaking of the *mind* of man we refer more to the various powers which it possesses, or the various operations which it performs: and in speaking of the *soul* of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny of the human being. Thus we say the *immortality* of the *soul*, and the *powers* of the *mind*.† A difference of meaning is more observable in our language between the terms *spirit* and *mind* than between *soul* and *mind*. Both the latter terms may be and are applied indifferently to the mental principle as living and moving in connection with a bodily organism. But the term *spirit* properly denotes a being without a body. A being that never had a body is a *pure spirit*. A human soul when it has left the body is a *disembodied* spirit. Body is animated matter. *Mind* or *soul* is incorporated *spirit*.

Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary to enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries the term *mind* is commonly employed to denote that by which we feel, know, will, and reason—or in one word the principle of

* Dr. Reid's is the psychological definition. But the *soul* is something different from the *ego*, from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have placed its essence in thought, as the Cartesians—in sensation, as Locke and Condillac—or in the will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, distinguished from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. The soul then is a force, one and identical. It is, as defined by Plato (*De Leg.*, lib. 10), a self-moving force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aristotle has argued against this definition.—*De Anima*, lib. i., cap. 3. But Plato probably meant self-active to be the epithet characteristic of the mind or *soul*.—κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κίνουσα.

† Mind and the Latin *mens* were probably both from a root which is now lost in Europe, but is preserved in the Sanscrit *mena*, to know. The Greek νόος or νοῦς, from the verb νοέω, is of similar origin and import. *Mind* is more limited than *soul*. *Soul*, besides the rational principle, includes the living principle, and may be applied to animals and vegetables. Voluntary motion should not be denied to *mind*, as is very generally done.

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thought. We know this inward principle as manifested through a system of bodily organization with which it is united, and by which it is in many ways affected. But "we are taught by nature," says Dr. Reid, "or it is a primitive belief, that the thinking principle is something different from the bodily organism, and when we wish to signalize its peculiar nature and destiny, we call it *soul* or *spirit*."

Spirit, Mind, and Soul.—"The *first* denoting the animating faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, the spring of energy and the prompter of exertion; the *second* is the recording power, the preserver of impressions, the storer of deductions, the nurse of knowledge, and the parent of thought; the *last* is the disembodied, etherial, self-conscious being, concentrating in itself all the purest and most refined of human excellences, every generous affection, every benevolent disposition, every intellectual attainment, every ennobling virtue, and every exalting aspiration."—*The Purpose of Existence*, 12mo, 1850, p. 79.

"*Animus*, *Anima*, πνεῦμα and ψυχή are participles. *Anima* est ab *Animus*. Animus vero est a Græco Ἄνεμος quod dici volunt quasi Ἄεμος, ab Ἀω sive Ἄεμι, quod est πνέω; et Latinis a Spirando, Spiritus. Immo et ψυχή est ψύχω quod Hesychius exponit πνέω."—Vossius—quoted from Horne Tooke in Stewart's *Philosoph. Essays*, essay v.

> "Indulsit mundi communis conditor illis
> Tantum *Animas;* nobis *Animum* quoque."—Juv., *Sat.* 9, v. 134.

Anima, which is common to man and brutes, is that by which we live, move, and are invigorated; whilst *Animus* is that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we reason.

The triple division of man into νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα, occurs frequently in ancient authors. Plato, *Timæus;* Aristotle, *Pol.* 1. The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term πνεῦμα to denote what the Greeks called νοῦς, with an allusion to Gen. ii. 7. Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, i., c. 2. Thence in the New Test. we have, 1 Thess. v. 23, πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα.—Heb. iv. 12, and Grotius, *Note on Matthew* xxvi. 41.—Fitzgerald, *Notes on Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 197.

Ψυχή, soul, when considered separately, signifies the prin-

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ciple of life; Νοῦς, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, according to Plutarch, *soul* is the cause and beginning of motion, and *mind* of order and harmony with respect to motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul (ἔννους ψυχή) which is sometimes called a rational soul (ψυχή λογική). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in question, the word ψυχή is used to express both. Thus in the *Phædo* the soul (ψυχή) is said sometimes to use the body for the examination of things; at which times, according to Plato, it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by itself, it arrives at what is pure and always existing, and immortal, and uniform, and is free from error. Here the highest operations of νοῦς "mind" are indisputably attributed to ψυχή, "soul." Aristotle describing ψυχή (*De Anima*, lib. i., cap. 1), says that during anger, confidence, desire, &c., it participates with the body; but that the act of understanding belongs peculiarly to itself."—Morgan, *On Trinity of Plato*, p. 54.

SOUL OF THE WORLD.—ANIMA MUNDI—*q. v.*

SPACE (*spatium*).—"*Space*, taken in the most general sense, comprehends whatever is extended, and may be measured by the three dimensions, *length*, *breadth*, and *depth*. In this sense it is the same with *extension*. Now, *space*, in this large signification, is either occupied by *body*, or it is not. If it be not, but is void of all matter, and contains nothing, then it is *space* in the strictest signification of the word, and as it is commonly used in English philosophical language, being the same with what is called a *vacuum*."—Monboddo, *Anc. Metaphys.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

Mr. Locke has attempted to show that we acquire the idea of *space* by sensation, especially by the senses of touch and sight—book ii., ch. 4. But according to Dr. Reid, "*space* is not so properly an object of sense as a *necessary* concomitant of the objects of sight and touch."—*Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., ch. 19. It is when we see or touch body that we get the idea of *space;* but the idea is not furnished by sense—it is a conception, *à priori*, of the reason. Experience furnishes the occasion, but the mind rises to the conception by its native energy.

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This view has been supported by Cousin, *Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie au* xviii. Siecle, 2 tom., 17 leçon; and by Royer Collard, in Jouffroy's *Œuvres du Reid*, tom. iii., fragmen 4, p. 424; tom. iv., fragmen 9, p. 338.

"In the philosophy of Kant *space* and time are mere forms of the sensibility. By means of the external sense we represent to ourselves everything as in *space;* and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of time."—Analysis of Kant's *Critick of Pure Reason*, 8vo., Lond., 1844, p. 9.

According to Kant, *space* is a subjective condition of the sensibility, the form of all external phenomena; and as the sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real intuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is in the mind *à priori.* There can, then, be no question about *space* or extension but in a human or subjective point of view. It may well be said of all things, in so far as they appear existing without us, that they are enclosed in *space;* but not that *space* encloses things absolutely, seen or not seen, and by any subject whatsoever. The idea of *space* has no objective validity, it is real only relatively to phenomena, to things, in so far as they appear out of us; it is purely ideal in so far as things are taken in themselves, and considered independently of the forms of the sensibility.—Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 142.

"Space (German, *Raum*) is a pure intuition which lies at the foundation of all external intuitions, and is represented as an infinitely given quantity. It is the formal condition of all matter, that is, without it, no matter, and consequently no corporeal world, can be thought. *Space* and time have no transcendental objectivity, that is, they are in themselves non-existing, independent of our intuition-faculty; but they have objectivity in respect of the empirical use, that is, they exist as to all beings that possess such a faculty of intuition as ourselves."—Haywood, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 603.

"According to Leibnitz, *space* is nothing but the order of things co-existing, as time is the order of things successive—and he maintained, 'that, supposing the whole system of the visible world to be moved out of the place which it presently

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occupies, into some other portion of *space*, beyond the limits of this universe, still it would be in the same *space*, provided the order and arrangement of the bodies, with respect to one another, was continued the same.' Now, it is true, that bodies placed in any kind of order, must necessarily be in *space;* but the order in which bodies are placed, and the *space* in which they are placed, must necessarily be distinct."—Monboddo, *Anc. Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 1. *Letters of Clarke and Leibnitz.*

"1. *Space* is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capacity; but *space* has the capacity of receiving body.

"2. It is not an *ens rationis*, for it was occupied by heaven and earth before the birth of man.

"3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, *i. e.*, body, for body changes its place, but *space* is not moved with it.

"4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding another, because superficies is an accident; and as superficies is a quantity it should occupy *space;* but *space* cannot occupy *space.* Besides, the remotest heaven occupies *space*, and has no superficies surrounding it.

"5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the whole world were round, bodies would change place and not their order, or they may change their order and not their place, if the sky, with the fixed points, were moved by itself.

"6 and 7. It is not body, nor spirit.

"8. It may be said with probability that *space* cannot be distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore from God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. He is the place of all being, for no being is out of Him. And although different beings are in different places externally, they are all virtually in the divine immensity."—Derodon, *Physic.*, pars. 1, ch. 6.

Bardili argued for the reality of time and *space* from the fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of them. Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, are not subject to the forms or laws of the human mind.

But if *space* be something to the mind, which has the idea

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of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it? "Perhaps," says Dr. Reid (*ut supra*), "we may apply to it what the Peripatetics said of their first matter, that whatever it is, it is potentially only, not actually." This, accordingly, is the view taken of it by a great admirer of the Peripatetic philosophy. "*Space*," says Lord Monboddo (*Anc. Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 2), "is but a *relative;* and it is relative to *body*, and to *body* only, and this in three respects, *first*, as to its capacity of receiving *body; secondly*, as to its connecting or limiting *body;* and *lastly*, as to its being the distance between *bodies* that are separated. . . . *Place* is *space* occupied by body. It is different from body as that which contains is different from that which is contained. . . . *Space*, then, is *place, potentially;* and when it is filled with body, then it is *place, actually.*

Space, as containing all things, was by Philo and others identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) which says that "in God we live, and move, and have our being," was interpreted to mean that *space* is an affection or property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained that God by existing constitutes time and *space.* "*Non est duratio vel spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper et ubique, spatium et durationem constituit.*" Clarke maintained that *space* is an attribute or property of the Infinite Deity. Reid and Stewart, as well as Cousin and Royer Collard, while they regard *space* as something real and more than a relation, have not positively said what it is.

As *space* is a necessary conception of the human mind, as it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality, Dr. Clarke thought that from these views we may argue the existence of an infinite substance, to which this quality belongs.—See his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, with Butler's *Letters* to him and the *Answers.*

Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.;* Pownall, *Intellectual Physics;* Brougham, *Nat. Theology.*

(from the old verb, *specio*, to see) is a word of different signification, in different departments of philosophy.

In *Logic*, *species* was defined to be, "*Id quod predicatur de pluribus* numero *differentibus, in quæstione quid est?*" And *genus*

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was defined to be, "*Id quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus* specie, *in quæstione quid est?*" According to Derodon (*Log.*, p. 293), the adequate definition of genus is, "*Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incommunicabili distinctis.*" And of *species*, "*Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et omnes proprietates ita similes habentibus, ut quodlibet possit habere attributa aliorum, nullum tamen habeat actu idem sed tantum simile.*"

In the process of *classification* (*q. v.*), the first step is the formation of a *species*. A *species* is a group of individuals agreeing in some common character, and designated by a common name. When two or more *species* are brought together in the same way, they are called a *genus*.

"In Logic, *genus* and *species* are relative terms; a conception is called in relation to its superior, *species*—to its inferior, *genus*. The *summum genus* is the last result of the abstracting process, the *genus* which can never in turn be a *species*. The *infima species* is the *species* which cannot become a *genus;* which can only contain individuals, and not other *species*. But there can only be one absolute *summum genus*, whether we call it 'thing,' 'substance,' or 'essence.' And we can scarcely ever ascertain the *infima species*, because even in a handful of individuals, we cannot say with certainty that there are no distinctions on which a further subdivision into smaller classes might be founded."—Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, second edition, sect. 27.

In *Mathematics*, the term *species* was used in its primitive sense of *appearance;* and when the form of a figure was given, it was said to be given in *species*.

Algebra, in which letters are used for numbers, was called, at one time, the *specious notation*.

In *Mineralogy*, *species* is determined by perfect identity of composition; the form goes for nothing.

In the *organized kingdoms* of nature, on the contrary, *species* is founded on identity of form and structure, both external and internal. The principal characteristic of *species* in animals

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and vegetables, is the power to produce beings like themselves, who are also productive. A *species* may be modified by external influences; and thus give rise to races or varieties; but it never abandons its own proper character to assume another.

In *Natural History*, *species* includes only the following conditions; viz., separate origin and distinctness of race, evinced by a constant transmission of some characteristic peculiarity of organization.—Dr. Prichard.

"*Species*," according to Dr. Morton (author of *Crania Americana*), "*is a primordial organic form.*" See a description of *species* in Lyell's *Geology*, chap. 37.

"By maintaining the unity of the human *species* (says A. v. Humboldt, *Cosmos*, vol. i., p. 355, Engl. trans.), we at the same time repel the cheerless assumption of superior and inferior races of men." "This eminent writer appears in the passage quoted to exaggerate the extent of uniformity implied in a common *species*. It is unquestionable that mankind form one *species* in the sense of the natural historian; but it does not follow from this fact that there are no essential hereditary differences, both physical and mental, between different varieties and races of men. The analogy of animal *species* would make it probable that such essential differences do exist; for we see that, although all horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, &c., form respectively one *species*, yet each *species* contains varieties or races, which possess certain properties in different degrees,—which are more or less large, active, gentle, intelligent, hardy, and the like. If we are guided by the analogy of animal *species*, it is as probable that an Englishman should be more intelligent than a negro, as that a greyhound should be more fleet than a mastiff, or an Arabian horse than a Shetland pony."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Politics*, chap. 27, sect. 10.

Species in Perception.

In explaining the process of external perception, or how we come to the knowledge of things out of and distant from us, it was maintained that these objects send forth *species* or *images* of themselves, which, making an impression on the

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bodily organs, next imprinted themselves on the mind and issued in knowledge.

The *species* considered as the vicarious representative of the object, was called *intentional.* And as it affected both the intellect and the sense, was distinguished as *sensible* and *intelligible.*

Species, as *sensible*, was distinguished as *species impressa*, as making an impression upon the sense—and *species expressa*, in consequence of the sense or imagination, from the impression, elaborating another *species* of the object.

Species, as *intelligible*, was also distinguished into *species impressa* and *species expressa.* The *species intelligibilis* was called *impressa*, as it determined the faculty to the apprehension of this object, rather than of that. And it was called *expressa*, as in consequence of the operation of the faculty, knowledge of the object was attained to.

According to some, the *species* as intelligible were congenite, and according to others they were elaborated by the intellect in the presence of the phantasms.

The process of perception is thus described by Tellez (*Summa Phil. Arist.*, Paris, 1645, p. 47).

Socrates by his figure, &c., makes an impression upon the eye, and vision follows—then a *species* is impressed upon the phantasy, *phantasma impressum;* the phantasy gives the *phantasma expressum*, the *intellectus agens* purifies and spiritualizes it, so that it is received by the *intellectus patiens*, and the knowledge of the object is elicited.

"The philosophy schools teach that for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible *species* (in English), a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen, the receiving of which into the eye is seeing. . . . . Nay, for the cause of understanding also the thing understood sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is, an intelligible being seen, which, coming into the understanding, makes it understood."—Hobbes, *Of Man*, part i., chap. 1.

For the various forms under which the doctrine of *species* has been held, see Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 8, with notes by Sir W. Hamilton, and note D.

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The doctrine was not universally received during the Middle Ages.

"Scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior bodies, placed before us, and the mind of man, there are images which belong to the exterior bodies, and make more or less a part of them, as the εἴδωλα of Democritus, images or sensible forms which represent external objects by the conformity which they have with them. So the mind was supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the medium of intelligible *species*. Occam destroyed these chimeras, and maintained that there is nothing real but spiritual or material beings, and the mind of man, which directly conceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam (born at Spire, and died 1495), exhibited with much sagacity and clearness the theory of his master. Occam renewed, without knowing it, the warfare of Arcesilas against the Stoics; and he is in modern Europe the forerunner of Reid and of the Scotch school."—Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. ii., p. 26.

Mons. Haureau (*Exam. de Phil. Scolast.*, tom. i., p. 416) says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he not only rejected *intelligible species*, but that he would not admit *sensible species*. To feel, to think, said he, are simple acts which result from the commerce of mind with an external object; and this commerce takes place directly without anything intermediate.

SPECIFICATION (The Principle of) is, that beings the most like or homogeneous disagree or are heterogeneous in some respect. It is the principle of variety or difference.

Specification (Process of) "is the counterpart of *generalization*. In it we begin with the most extensive class, and descend, step by step, till we reach the lowest. In so doing we are thinking *out* objects, and thinking *in* attributes. In generalization we think *in* objects and think *out* attributes."—Spalding, *Log.*, p. 15.

SPECULATION (*speculor*, to regard attentively).—"To *speculate* is, from premisses given or assumed, but considered unquestionable, as the constituted point of observation, to look abroad upon the whole field of intellectual vision, and thence

to decide upon the true form and dimension of all which meets the view."—Marsh, *Prelim. Essay to Aids to Reflection*, p. 13.

"*Speculation* stands opposed to *reflection*, a method of thought which has to do with something given, and appropriates the same by continued analysis and synthesis of its elements. If *speculative* stand thus opposed to *reflective* thinking, it must necessarily belong to the former not to set out from anything given as its subject, but from determinations which thought finds in itself as the necessary and primary ground of all being as of all thinking. In this sense, all *speculative* thinking is of an *à priori*, and all *reflective* thinking of an *à posteriori* nature."—Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, Introd.

It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical nor experimental. The *speculative* part of philosophy is metaphysics. The *speculative* part of mathematics is that which has no application to the arts.

SPIRITUALISM (*spiritus*, spirit) is not any particular system of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded on reason, sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or beings which are not cognizable by the senses, and which do not reveal themselves to us by any of the qualities of matter, and which we therefore call immaterial or *spiritual*. *Materialism* denies this. But *spiritualism* does not deny the existence of matter, and, placing itself above materialism, admits both body and spirit. Hence it is called dualism, as opposed to the denial of the existence of matter. The idealism of Berkeley and Malebranche may be said to reduce material existences to mere phenomena of the mind. Mysticism, whether religious or philosophical, ends with resolving mind and matter into the Divine substance. Mysticism and idealism tend to pantheism, materialism to atheism. *Spiritualism*, grounded upon consciousness, preserves equally God, the human person, and external nature, without confounding them and without isolating the one from the other.—*Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

SPONTANEITY.—Leibnitz (*Opera*, tom. i., p. 459) explains "*spontaneity* to mean the true and real dependence of our actions on ourselves." Heineccius calls it "the faculty of

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directing one's aim to a certain end."—Turnbull, *Trans.*, vol. i., p. 35. It is a self-active causality.

SPONTANEOUS is opposed to *reflective*. Those operations of mind which are continually going on without any effort or intention on our part are *spontaneous*. When we exercise a volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our mental energy in any particular way, or towards any particular object, we are said to *reflect*, or to *observe*.

STANDARD OF VIRTUE.—*Standard* is that by which other things are rated or valued. "Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real *standard* by which commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared."—Smith, *Wealth of Nat.*, b. i., c. 5.

A *standard* is something set up by which to measure the quantity or quality of some other thing. Now rectitude is the foundation of virtue. The *standard* of virtue is some law or rule by which rectitude can be measured. To the law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened conscience, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor rightness in them. Now the will of God, as declared by the constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His Word, is a *standard* by which we may measure the amount of rectitude, in action or disposition. According as they agree, in a greater or less degree, with the indications of the divine will, in the same proportion are they right, or in accordance with rectitude. The *standard* of virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared in His Word, or some law or rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course of providence. The foundation of virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule rests.—*V.* CRITERION.

STATE (States of Mind).—"The reason why madness, idiotism, &c., are called *states** of mind, while its acts and operations are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind to be passive in the former and active in the latter."—Reid's *Correspondence*, p. 85.

* "The term *state* has, more especially of late years, and principally by Necessitarian philosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently."—Sir William Hamilton.

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Such were the views of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a change has passed over the language of Scottish psychology. No change of phraseology, because no change of doctrine, is to be found in the writings of Mr. Stewart. But in those of Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speaking of the mind as *operating*, or as *acting*, or as *energizing*, he delights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, and as passing through, or existing in, different *states*. This phraseology has been by many accepted and applauded. It is thought that by adopting it, we neither affirm nor deny the activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its manifestations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the way in which these manifestations are brought about. But it may be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question, as to the activity of the mind, entire and untouched.

If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he would not, probably, have disturbed the language that was previously in common use; although it must be admitted that he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all events, the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the mind in all its manifestations as passive—the mere recipient of changes made upon it from without. Indeed, his system of philosophy, which is sensational in its principles, may be said to take the bones and sinews out of the mind, and to leave only a soft and yielding mass, to be magnetized by the palmistry of matter. That the mind in some of its manifestations is passive, rather than active, is admitted; and in reference to these, there can be no objection to speak of it as existing in certain *states*, or passing into these *states*. But in adopting, to some extent, this phraseology, we must not let go the testimony which is given in favour of the activity of mind, by the use and structure of language. Language is not the invention of philosophers. It is the natural expression of the human mind, and the exponent of those views which are natural to it. Now, the phrase *operations of mind*, being in common use, indicates a common opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion may be erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show, if they can, that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Reid is, that "until

it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely passive, the common language with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its being merely passive."

And in another place (*Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1), he says, "There may be distinctions that have a real foundation, and which may be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in common language, because not necessary in the common business of life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinction made in all languages, which has not a just foundation in nature."

If any change of phraseology were expedient, the phrase "*manifestations of mind*" would touch less upon the question of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid—"The mind is from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs."

One proof of the mind being active in some of its operations is, that these operations are accompanied with effort, and followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of effort; and the result of long continued attention is languor and exhaustion. This could not be the case if the mind was altogether passive—the mere recipient of impressions made—of ideas introduced.—*V.* OPERATIONS OF MIND.

STATISTICS.—"The observation, registration, and arrangement of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the designation

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of *statistics.* Both the name and the separate treatment of the subject were due to Achenwall,* who died in 1772. Upon the nature and province of the science of *statistics*, see the Introduction to the *Journal of the London Statistical Society*, vol. i., 1839. This science, it is there remarked, does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which *alone* (?) can form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to social and political government. . . . Its peculiarity is, that it proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . The statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabular exhibitions."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Polit.*, chap. 5, sect. 10.

STOICS (from στοά, a porch).—Zeno opened a school at Athens, in the "variegated porch," so called from the paintings of Polygnotus, with which it was adorned, whence his adherents were called "philosophers of the porch"—Stoics.—Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 138.

"From the *Tusculan Questions*," says Bentham, "I learnt that pain is no evil. Virtue is of itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is disposed to possess it on these terms. . . .

"This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to amuse themselves with talking, while parading backwards and forwards in colonnades, called porches: that is to say, the *Stoics*, so called from στοά, the Greek name for a porch. In regard to these, the general notion has been, that compared with our cotemporaries in the same ranks, they were, generally speaking, a good sort of men; and assuredly, in all times, good sort of men, talking all their lives long nonsense, in an endless variety of shapes, never have been wanting; but that from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they or their successors have, in any way or degree, been the better, this is what does not follow."—*Deontol.*, vol. i., p. 302.

* Godefroy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, Halle, and Leipsic, established himself at Marburg in 1746, and in 1748, where he soon afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and Statistics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations.

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Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto assigned to them—*Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu.* Yet, along with this, they held that the mind had the power of framing general ideas, but these were derived from experience. Zeno compared the hand open to sensation; half closed upon some object to judgment; fully closed upon it to φαντασία καταληπτική, comprehensive judgment, or synthesis of judgment. And when the one hand grasped the other to enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal and definitive synthesis or science. In physics they said all things were made of cause and matter. In morals their maxim was "to live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to govern matter. And the great struggle of life was, to lift the soul above the body, and the evils incident to it. Their two great rules were ἀνέχου and ἀπέχου—*sustine, abstine.—Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

Heinsius (Dan.), *Philosoph. Stoica*, 4to, Leyd., 1627; Lipsius (Justus), *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosoph.*, 4to, Antw., 1664; Gataker (Thomas), *Dissertatio de Disciplina Stoica*, prefixed to his edition of *Antoninus*, 4to, Camb., 1643.

SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE.—"We frequently meet," says Dr. Reid, "with a distinction between things *in the mind* and things *external* to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Everything is said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the *subject*. . . . . Excepting the mind itself and things in the mind, all other things are said to be external."

By the term *subject* Dr. Reid meant substance, that to which powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. The distinction, therefore, which he takes between things in the mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to that which is expressed among continental writers by the *ego* and the *non ego*, or *self* and *not self*. The mind and things in the mind constitute the *ego*. "All other things," says Dr. Reid, "are said to be external." They constitute the *non ego*.

"In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the *ego*; *objective*, what belongs to the object of thought, the *non ego*."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, Lond., 8vo, 1852, p. 5, note.

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"The *subject* is properly, *id in quo;* the *object, id circa quod.* Hence, in psychological language, the *subject* absolutely is the mind that knows or thinks, *i. e.*, the mind considered as the *subject* of knowledge or thought — the *object*, that which is known or thought about. The adjectives *subjective* and *objective* are convenient, if not indispensable expressions."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 221, note.

In note B to *Reid's Works*, p. 108, Sir Will. Hamilton explains how these terms should have come into common use in mental philosophy.

"All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that which knows (in scholastic language, the *subject* in which knowledge inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic language, the *object* about which knowledge is conversant); and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its *object* and partly from its *subject.* Now, philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*—its first and most important problem being to determine, What can we know? that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the *object*, or in the nature of the *subject* of knowledge.

"But philosophy being the science of knowledge; and the science of knowledge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough going analysis, the distinction of the *subject* and *object* of knowledge; it is evident that to philosophy *the subject of knowledge* would be by pre-eminence, *the subject*, and the *object of knowledge*, *the object.* It was therefore natural that the *object* and *objective*, the *subject* and *subjective*, should be employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express."

For a disquisition on *subject*, see Tappan, *Log.*, sect. 4.—*V.* OBJECTIVE.

SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human knowledge is merely relative; or rather that we cannot prove it to be absolute. According to him, we cannot *objectify the subjective;* that is, we cannot prove that what appears true to

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us must appear true to all intelligent beings; or that with different faculties what now appears true to us might not appear true. But to call our knowledge relative is merely calling it human or proportioned to the faculties of a man; just as the knowledge of angels may be called angelic. Our knowledge may be admitted to be relative to our faculties of apprehending it; but that does not make it less certain.—*Reid's Works*, by Sir W. Hamilton, p. 513.

SUBLIME (The).—"In reflecting on the circumstances by which *sublimity* in its primitive sense is specifically distinguished, the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates."—Stewart, *Phil. Essays*, *Essay on the Sublime.*

A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized as one of the reflex senses belonging to man. It is different from the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied to it. Beauty charms, sublimity moves us, and is often accompanied with a feeling resembling fear, while beauty rather attracts and draws us towards it.

There is a *sublime* in *nature*, as in the ocean or the thunder—in *moral* action, as in deeds of daring and self-denial—and in *art*, as in statuary and painting, by which what is *sublime* in nature and in moral character is represented and idealized.

Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity and beauty in his *Critique du Judgment;* Cousin, *Sur le Beau, le Vrai, et le Bon;* Burke, *On the Sublime and Beautiful;* Addison, *Spectator*, vol. vi. Dr. Parr addressed an Essay on the *Sublime* to D. Stewart.

SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular nature, and constituting a *suppositum* along with it. It means, 1. The thing itself, the *suppositum;* hence we call the three persons of the Trinity three *hypostases* or *subsistences.* 2. The mode added to the singular nature to complete its existence; this is the metaphysical sense. 3. The act of existing *per se.*

"Subsistentia *est* '*substantiæ completio;*' *qua carent rerum naturalium partes a reliquis divulsæ.* Subsistens *dicitur* suppositum *aut* hypostasis. Persona *est suppositum ratione præditum.*"—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars. 1, cap. 5.

SUBSTANCE is "that which is and abides."

It may be derived from *subsistens* (*ens per se subsistens*), that which subsists of or by itself; or from *substans* (*id quod substat*), that which lies under qualities—the ὑποκείμενον of the Greeks. But in Greek, substance is denoted by οὐσία—so that which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper meaning of *substance*. It is opposed to *accident;* of which Aristotle has said (*Metaphys.*, lib. vii.) that you can scarcely predicate of it that it is anything. So also Augustine (*De Trinitate*, lib. vii., c. 4) derives *substance* from *subsistendo* rather than from *substando*. "*Sicut ab eo quod est esse, appellatur essentia; ita ab eo quod est* subsistere, substantiam *dicimus*." But Locke prefers the derivation from *substando*. He says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 23), "The idea, then, we have, to which we give the name of *substance*, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia;* which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding."

Dr. Hampden (*Bampton Lect.*, vii., p. 337), has said, "*Substance*, in its logical and metaphysical sense, is that nature of a thing which may be conceived to remain when every other nature is removed or abstracted from it—the ultimate point in analyzing the complex idea of any object. *Accident* denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes as not belonging to the mere being or nature of the object."

Substance has been defined, *ens per se existens;* and *accident*, *ens existens non in se sed in alio.*

Our first idea of *substance* is probably derived from the consciousness of *self*—the conviction that, while our sensations, thoughts, and purposes are changing, *we* continue the same. We see bodies also remaining the same as to quantity or extension, while their colour and figure, their state of motion or of rest, may be changed.

Substances, it has been said, are either *primary*, that is singular, individual substances; or *secondary*,* that is genera and

* Haureau (*Phil. Scholast.*, tom. i., p. 60), says that what has been called *second substance* is just one of its modes or a species.

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species of *substance*. *Substances* have also been divided into *complete* and *incomplete*, *finite* and *infinite*, &c. But these are rather divisions of *being*. *Substance* may, however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that which is extended and that which thinks.—*V.* ESSENCE.

Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred to a *substance*. In everything which we perceive or can imagine as existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities variable and multiplied, and a being one and identical; and these two are so united that we cannot separate them in our intelligence, nor think of qualities without a *substance*. Memory recalls to us the many modes of our mind; but amidst all these modes we believe ourselves to be the same individual being. So in the world around us the phenomena are continually varying; but we believe that these phenomena are produced by causes which remain, as *substances*, the same. And as we know ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and to be able to change the modes of our own mind, so we believe the changes of matter to be produced by causes which belong to the *substance* of it. And underlying all causes, whether of finite mind or matter, we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, *one substance*, in itself persistent and upholding all things.

SUBSUMPTION (*sub*, under; *sumo*, to take).—"When we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of consciousness, but a *subsumption* under the cognition or belief which affords its reason."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A.

To *subsume* is to place any one cognition under another as belonging to it. In the judgment, "all horses are animals," the conception "horses" is *subsumed* under that of "animals." The minor proposition is a *subsumption* under the major when it is placed first. Thus, if one were to say, "No man is wise in all things," and another to respond, "But you are a man," this proposition is a *subsumption* under the former. And the major being *assumed ex concesso*; and the minor *subsumed* as evidence, the conclusion follows, "You are not wise in all things."

SUCCESSION.—"By reflecting on the appearance of various ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the notion of *succession*."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 14. He traces our notion of *duration* or *time* to the same origin; or rather he confounds *succession* and *duration*, the measure with the thing measured. According to Cousin and others, the notion of time is logically antecedent and necessary to the notion of *succession*. Events take place in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philosophy of Kant, time is not an empirical notion, but like space, a form of the sensibility.—*V.* DURATION, TIME.

SUFFICIENT REASON (Doctrine of).—"Of the principle of the *sufficient reason*, the following account is given by Leibnitz, in his controversial correspondence with Dr. Clarke:—"The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of *contradiction* or *identity*; that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. But, in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my *Theodicœa*), I mean, the principle of the *sufficient reason*; or, in other words, that nothing happens without a *reason* why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And, accordingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book *De Equilibrio*, to take for granted, that if there be a balance, in which everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest. It is because no *reason* can be given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now by this single principle of the *sufficient reason*, may be demonstrated the being of a God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural theology; and even, in some measure, those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, such as the dynamical principles, or the principles of forces."—See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 9.—*V.* REASON (DETERMINING).

The principle of *sufficient reason* as a law of thought is stated by logicians thus—"Every judgment we accept must rest upon a sufficient ground or reason." From this law follow such principles as these:—1. Granting the reason, we must grant what follows from it. On this, syllogistic inference depends. 2. If all the consequents are held to be true, the

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reason must be true. 3. If we reject the consequent we must reject the reason. 4. If we admit the consequent, we do not of necessity admit the reason, as there may be other reasons or causes of the same effect.

Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 296. But according to Mr. Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 198, "The principle of *sufficient reason* is no law of thought, but only the statement that every act of thought must be governed by some law or other."

SUGGESTION (*suggero*, to bear or place under, to prompt).

"It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our notions of relations can only be got by comparing the related ideas: but it is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation and then comparing them together, that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation: on the contrary, one of the related things, viz., sensation, *suggests* to us both the correlate and the relation.

"I beg leave to make use of the word *suggestion*, because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief."—Reid, *Enquiry*, ch. 2, s. 7.

To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or inciples of common sense. Mr. Stewart has expressed surprise that Reid should have apologized for introducing a word which had already been employed by Berkeley, to denote those intimations which are the results of experience and habit (*Dissert.*, p. 167, second ed.). And Sir W. Hamilton has shown that in the more extensive sense of Reid the word had been used by Tertullian; who, speaking of the universal belief of the soul's immortality, has said (*De Anima*, c. 2), "*Natura pleraque* suggeruntur, *quasi de* publico sensu *quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.*"—Reid's *Works*, p. 3, note.

The word *suggestion* is much used in the philosophy of Dr. Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that assigned to association, by other philosophers. He calls judg-

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ment, *relative suggestion.* Hutcheson (*Log. Compend.*, cap. 1) says, "*Sensus est internus qui* suggerit *præcipue intellectiones puras; quæ conscientia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur.*" It is not so properly consciousness or reflection which gives the new ideas, but rather the occasion on which these ideas are suggested. It is when we are conscious and reflect on one thing, some other thing related to it, but not antecedently thought, is *suggested.*

Locke said, "Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are *suggested and furnished* to the mind only *by* those two ways mentioned above, viz., Sensation and Reflection.—*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 2. Cumberland had said before him, "*Utrobique intelligimus propositiones quasdam immutabilis veritatis. Hujusmodi aliquot veritates a rerum hominumque natura mentibus humanis* necessario suggeri, *hoc est quod a nobis affirmatur, hoc idem ab adversariis non minus diserte denegatur.*"—*De Legg. Nat.*, c. i., sect. 1.

SUICIDE (*sui* and *cædes*, self-murder) is the voluntary taking away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it was not wrong to do so, when the pains and inconveniences of our lot exceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But the command, "Thou shalt not kill," forbids *suicide* as well as homicide. It is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of our nature, that of self-preservation—and at variance with the submission which we owe to God, and the duties incumbent upon us towards our fellow-creatures. All the apologies that can be offered for it are futile.

Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 7, lib. v., cap. 11; Hermann, *Disputatio de Autocheiria et philosophice et ex legibus Romanis considerata*, 4to, Leips., 1809; Madame de Staël, *Reflexions sur le Suicide;* Stœudlin, *Hist. des Opinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide*, 8vo, Goetting., 1824; Tissot, *Manie du Suicide;* Adams, *On Self-murder*; Donne, *Biathanatos.*

SUPERSTITION (so called, according to Lucretius, *quod sit superstantium rerum*, i. e., *cœlestium et divinarum quæ supra nos stant, nimis et superfluus timor*, Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Attic.*, lib. 10), is not an "excess of religion" (at least in the ordinary sense of the word *excess*), "as if any one *could* have *too*

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much of true religion, but any *misdirection* of religious feeling; manifested either in showing religious veneration or regard to objects which deserve *none;* that is, properly speaking, the worship of false gods; or, in the assignment of such a degree, or such a kind of religious veneration to any object, as that object, though worthy of some reverence, does not deserve; or in the worship of the true God through the medium of improper rites and ceremonies."—Whately, *On Bacon*, p. 155.

"Superstition," says Dr. Hartley, "may be defined a mistaken opinion concerning the severity and punishments of God, magnifying these in respect to ourselves or others. It may arise from a sense of guilt, from bodily indisposition, or from erroneous reasoning."

SUPRA-NATURALISM (*supra*, above; *natura*, nature) is the doctrine that in nature there are more than physical causes in operation, and that in religion we have the guidance not merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus opposed to *Naturalism* and to *Rationalism*—*q. v.* In Germany, where the word originated, the principal *Supra-naturalists* are Tholuck, Hengstengberg, Guericke, &c.

SYLLOGISM (συλλογισμός, a putting together of judgments, or propositions or reasonings).

This word occurs in the writings of Plato, in the sense of judging or reasoning; but not in the technical sense assigned to it by Aristotle.

According to Aristotle (*Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 1, sect. 7), "a *syllogism* is a speech (or enunciation) (λόγος) in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, something different from what is supposed (the conclusion) follows *of necessity;* and this solely in virtue of the suppositions themselves."

"A *syllogism* is a combination of two judgments necessitating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation." —Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 61.

Euler likened the *syllogism* to three concentric circles, of which the first contained the second, which in its turn contained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and B of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C.

In a *syllogism*, the first two propositions are called the *premises;* because they are the things premised or put before; they are also called the *antecedents:* the first of them is called the *major* and the second the *minor*. The third proposition, which contains the thing to be proved, is called the *conclusion* or *consequent;* and the particle which unites the conclusion with the premises is called the *consequentia* or *consequence.**

In a *syllogism*, "the conclusion having two terms, a subject and a predicate, its predicate is called the *major term*, and its subject the *minor term*. In order to prove the conclusion, each of its terms is, in the premises, compared with the third term, called the *middle term*. By this means one of the premises will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and this premise is called the *major premise*, or the *major proposition* of the *syllogism*. The other premise must have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term; and it is called the *minor proposition*. Thus the *syllogism* consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of the *major*, the *minor*, and the *conclusion;* and although each of these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term never enters into the conclusion, but stands in both premises, either

"Every virtue is laudable;
Diligence is a virtue;
Wherefore diligence is laudable.

"The two former propositions are the *premises* or *antecedents*, the last is the *conclusion* or *consequent*, and the particle wherefore is the *consequentia* or *consequence*.

"The *consequent* may be true and the *consequence* false.

"What has parts is divisible;
The human soul has parts;
Wherefore the human soul is divisible.

"The *consequent* may be true although the *consequence* is false.

"Antichrist will be powerful,
Therefore he will be impious.

"His impiety will not flow from his power."

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in the position of subject or of predicate."—Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 3, sect. 2.

According to the various positions which the middle term may have in the premises, *syllogisms* are said to be of various *figures*. And as all the possible positions of the middle term are only four, the regular figures of the *syllogism* are also four; and a *syllogism* is said to be drawn in the first, second, third, or fourth *figure* according to the position of its middle term.

There is another division of *syllogisms* according to their *moods*. The *mood* of a *syllogism* is determined by the *quality* and *quantity* of the propositions of which it consists. There are sixty-four *moods* possible in every *figure*. And the theory of the *syllogism* requires that we show what are the particular *moods* in each *figure*, which do or do not form a just and conclusive *syllogism*. The legitimate *moods* of the first *figure* are demonstrated from the axiom called *Dictum de omni et de nullo*. The legitimate *moods* of the other *figures* are proved by reducing them to some *mood* of the first.—Christian Wolf, *Smaller Logic*, ch. 6.

According to the different kinds of propositions employed in forming them, *syllogisms* are divided into Categorical and Hypothetical. Categorical syllogisms are divided into Pure and Modal. Hypothetical syllogisms into Conditional and Disjunctive.

In the Categorical *syllogism*, the two premisses and the conclusion are all categorical propositions.

One premiss of a Conditional *syllogism* is a conditional proposition; the other premiss is a categorical proposition, and either asserts the antecedent or denies the consequent. In the former case, which is called the *modus ponens*, the conclusion infers the truth of the consequent; in the latter case, which is called the *modus tollens*, the conclusion infers the falsity of the antecedent. The general forms of these two cases are, "If A is, B is; but A is, therefore B is; and if A is, B is not; but B is, therefore A is not." "If what we learn from the Bible is true, we ought not to do evil that good may come; but what we learn from the Bible is true, therefore we ought not to do evil that good may come."

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In the Disjunctive *syllogism*, we commence with a disjunctive judgment, and proceed either by asserting the truth of one member of the division, and thence inferring the falsity of all the rest, which is called the *modus ponens*, or else by asserting the falsity of all the members but one, and hence inferring the truth of that one, which latter method is called the *modus tollens*. The general form of these two cases will be, "Either A is, or B is, or C is; but A is; therefore neither B is, nor C is." And "Either A is, or B is, or C is; but neither B is, nor C is; therefore A is." Either the Pope is infallible, or there is at least one great error in the Romish Church; but the Pope is not infallible, therefore there is at least one great error in the Romish Church.—Solly, *Syll. of Logic*.

Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., chap. 17; Aldrich, Wallis, Watts, and other authors on Logic.

SYMBOL.—*V.* MYTH.

SYMPATHY (συμπάθεια, fellow-feeling).

"This mutual affection which the Greeks call *sympathy*, tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone."—Holland, *Pliny*, b. xx., Proem.

"These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but *compassion* (sympathy) with the body."—Cudworth, *Immut. Mor.*, book iii., chap. 1, p. 18.

"Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. *Sympathy*, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever."—Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part i., sect. 1.

Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is *compassion*; *sympathy* with joy or prosperity is *congratulation*.—*V.* ANTIPATHY.

SYNCATEGOREMATIC.—*V.* CATEGOREMATIC.

SYNCRETISM (συνκρητισμός, from σύν, together, and κρητίζω, to behave like a Cretan).—"The Cretans are herein very observable, who, being accustomed to frequent skirmishes and fights, as soon as they were over, were reconciled and went together. And this was it which they commonly called a *Syncretism*."—Plutarch, *Of Brotherly Love*.

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Syncretism is opposed to *Eclecticism* in philosophy. *Eclecticism* (*q. v.*) while it takes from various systems, does so on the principle that the parts so taken, when brought together, have a kind of congruity and consistency with one another. *Syncretism* is the jumbling together of different systems or parts of systems, without due regard to their being consistent with one another. It is told of a Roman consul that, when he arrived in Greece he called before him the philosophers of the different schools, and generously offered to act as moderator between them. Something of the same kind was proposed by Charles V.* in reference to the differences between Protestants and Papists; as if philosophy, and theology which is the highest philosophy, instead of being a search after truth, were a mere matter of diplomacy or compromise—a playing at protocols. But *Syncretism* does not necessarily aim at the reconciling of the doctrines which it brings together; it merely places them in juxtaposition.

Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of *syncretism*, in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doctrines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theologian, attempted to set down in one common creed the belief of the Papists and the Protestants; but succeeded only in irritating both. To him and his partizans the name *Syncretist* seems to have been first applied.—See Walch's *Introduction to Controversies of Lutheran Church.* Similar efforts were made to unite the metaphysics of Aristotle with those of Descartes. And the attempts which have frequently been made to reconcile the discoveries of geology with the cosmogony of Moses deserve no name but that of *syncretism*, in the sense of its being "a mixing together of things which ought to be kept distinct." On the evils of *syncretism*, see Sewell (*Christ. Morals*, chap. 9), who quotes as against it the text, Deut.

* After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in constructing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of making their movements synchronous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to the attempt to reconcile Protestants and Papists, "How could I dream of making two great bodies of men think alike when I cannot make two clocks to go alike!"

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xxii. 9, "*Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds*," &c.

SYNDERESIS (σύν διαιρέω, to divide, to tear asunder) was used to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which the mind was when comparing what it had done with what it ought to have done.—Aquinas, *Summæ Theolog.*, pars prima, quæst. 79, articulus 12.

SYNEIDESIS (συνείδησις, joint knowledge; from σύν and εἶδω). —Conscience, as giving knowledge of an action in reference to the law of right and wrong, was called the Witness who accused or excused. The operations of conscience were represented by the three members of a syllogism; of which the first contained the law, the second the testimony of the witness, and the third the decision of the judge. But conscience not only pronounces sentence; it carries its sentence into effect.—*V.* SYNDERESIS.

He who has transgressed any of the rules of which conscience is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-approbation.—*V.* SYNTERESIS.

SYNTERESIS (συντήρησις, the conservatory; from συντηρέω).—Conscience, considered as the repository of those rules, or general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in morals, was called by this name among the early Christian moralists, and was spoken of as the law or lawgiver.

SYNTHESIS (σύνθεσις, a putting together, composition) "consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them and proving the explanation."—Newton, *Optics.*

"Every *synthesis* which has not started with a complete *analysis* ends at a result which, in Greek, is called *hypothesis;* instead of which, if *synthesis* has been preceded by a sufficient *analysis*, the *synthesis* founded upon that *analysis* leads to a result which in Greek is called *system.* The legitimacy of every *synthesis* is directly owing to the exactness of *analysis;* every system which is merely an hypothesis is a vain system; every *synthesis* which has not been preceded by analysis is a

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pure imagination: but at the same time every analysis which does not aspire to a *synthesis* which may be equal to it, is an analysis which halts on the way. On the one hand, *synthesis* without analysis gives a false science; on the other hand, analysis without *synthesis* gives an incomplete science. An incomplete science is a hundred times more valuable than a false science; but neither a false science nor an incomplete science is the ideal of science. The ideal of science, the ideal of philosophy, can be realized only by a method which combines the two processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*."—Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Phil.*, vol. i., pp. 277, 278.—*V.* ANALYSIS, METHOD, SYSTEM.

SYSTEM (σύστημα; from συνίστημι, to place together) is a full and connected view of all the truths of some department of knowledge. An organized body of truth, or truths arranged under one and the same idea, which idea is as the life or soul which assimilates all those truths. No truth is altogether isolated. Every truth has relation to some other. And we should try to unite the facts of our knowledge so as to see them in their several bearings. This we do when we frame them into a *system*. To do so legitimately we must begin by analysis and end with synthesis. But *system* applies not only to our knowledge, but to the objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak of the planetary *system*, the muscular *system*, the nervous *system*. We believe that the order to which we would reduce our ideas has a foundation in the nature of things. And it is this belief that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of things into systematic order. The doing so is attended with many advantages. At the same time a spirit of systematizing may be carried too far. It is only in so far as it is in accordance with the order of nature that it can be useful or sound. Condillac has a *Traité des Systemes*, in which he traces their causes and their dangerous consequences.

System, Economy, or Constitution.—"A *System*, *Economy*, or *Constitution*, is a one or a whole, made up of several parts, but yet that the several parts even considered as a whole do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which these parts have to

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each other. Every work, both of nature and of art, is a *system;* and as every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add to what has been already brought into the idea of a *system*, its conduciveness to this one or more ends. Let us instance in a watch—suppose the several parts of it taken to pieces, and placed apart from each other; let a man have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts brought together and any how united: neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view these several parts put together, or consider them as to be put together in the manner of a watch; let him form a notion of the relations which these several parts have to each other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other, the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the *system* or constitution of human nature. And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, *i. e.*, constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears that its nature, *i. e.*, constitution or *system*, is adapted to measure time."—Butler, *Preface to Sermons.*—*V.* METHOD, THEORY.

TABULA RASA (a tablet made smooth).—The ancients were in use to write upon tablets covered with soft wax, on which the writing was traced with the sharp point of the stylus, or iron pen. When the writing had served its purpose, it was effaced by the broad end of the stylus being employed to make the wax smooth. The tablet was then, as at first, *tabula rasa*, ready to receive any writing which might be put upon it. In opposition to the doctrine of *innate ideas* (*q. v.*) the mind of man has been compared to a *tabula rasa*, or a sheet of white paper—having at first nothing written upon it, but ready to receive what may be inscribed on it by the hand of experience. This view is maintained by Hobbes, Locke, and others. On the other hand, Lord Herbert of Cherbury compares the mind to a book all written over within, but the leaves of which are closed, till they are gradually opened by the hand of experience, and the imprisoned truths or ideas set free. Leibnitz, speaking of the difference between Locke and him, says:—"The question between us is whether the soul in itself is entirely empty, like a tablet upon which nothing has been written (*tabula rasa*), according to Aristotle (*De Anima*, lib. iii., cap. 4, sect. 14) and the author of the *Essay on Hum. Under.* (book ii., ch. 1, sect. 2); and whether all that is there traced comes wholly from the senses and experience; or whether the soul originally contains the principles of several notions and doctrines, which the external objects only awaken upon occasions, as I believe with Plato." Professor Sedgwick, instead of likening the mind to a sheet of white paper, would rather liken it to what in the art of dyeing is called a "prepared blank," that is, a piece of cloth so prepared by mordaunts and other appliances, that when dipped into the dyeing vat it takes on the colours intended, and comes out according to an expected pattern.

"The soul of a child is yet a white paper unscribbled with observations of the world, wherewith, at length, it becomes a blurred note-book."—Bishop Earle.

"If it be true that the mind be a blank apart from the external creation, yet how elaborately must that apparent blank be prepared, when by simply bringing it into the light and warmth of the objective, it glows with colours not of earth,

TABULA RASA—

and shows that from the first it had been written over with a secret writing by the hand of God."—Harris, *Man Primeval*, chap. 3.

TACT.—"By *tact* we mean an inferior degree of talent—a skill or adroitness in adapting words or deeds to circumstances, involving, of course, a quick perception of the propriety of circumstances. It is also applied to a certain degree of mechanical skill."—Moffat, *Study of Æsthetics*, p. 206.

TALENT.—"By *talent*, in its distinctive meaning, we understand the power of acquiring and adroitly disposing of the materials of human knowledge, and products of invention in their already existing forms, without the infusion of any new enlivening spirit. It looks no farther than the attainment of certain practical ends, which experience has proved attainable, and the dexterous use of such means as experience has proved to be efficient.

"*Talent* values effort in the light of practical utility; *genius* always for its own sake, labours for the love of labour. *Talent* may be acquired. . . . *Genius* always belongs to the individual character, and may be cultivated, but cannot be acquired."—Moffat, *Study of Æsthetics*, p. 204.

"*Talent* describes power of acquisition, excellence of memory; *genius* describes power of representation, excellency of fancy; *intellect* describes power of inference, excellence of reason."—Taylor, *Synonyms*.

"*Talent* lying in the understanding is often inherited; *genius* being the action of reason and imagination, rarely, or never."—S. T. Coleridge.

TASTE (POWERS, OR PRINCIPLES OF).—

"His *tasteful* mind enjoys
Alike the complicated charms, which glow
Thro' the wide landscape."—Cowper, *Power of Harmony*, b. ii.

"That power of the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts, is called *Taste*. . . . . Like the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted with others; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious;

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and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. . . .

"By the objects of *Taste*, I mean those qualities and attributes of things which are, by nature, adapted to please a good taste. Mr. Addison (*Spectator*, vol. vi.) and Dr. Akenside (*Pleasures of Imagination*) after him, has reduced them to three —to wit, *Novelty*, *Grandeur*, and *Beauty*."—*q. v.*—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 1 and 2.

The best definition of *Taste* was given by the editor of Spenser (Mr. Hughes), when he called it a kind of *extempore judgment*. Burke explained it to be an instinct which immediately awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. Akenside is clear as he is poetical on the question:—

> "What, then, is *Taste* but those internal powers,
> Active, and strong, and feelingly alive
> To each fine impulse? a discerning sense
> Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust
> From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross,
> In species? This, nor gems, nor stores of gold,
> Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow,
> But God alone, when first his sacred hand
> Imprints the secret bias of the soul."
>
> *Pleasures of Imagin.*, b. iii., l. 523.

"We may consider *Taste*, therefore, to be a settled habit of discerning faults and excellencies in a moment—the mind's independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the picturesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature."—*Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, London, 1851, pp. 55, 56.

The objects of *Taste* have also been classed as the *Beautiful*, the *Sublime*, and the *Picturesque*—*q. v.* The question is whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities which may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing emotions by suggesting or recalling certain pleasing feelings formerly experienced in connection or association with these objects. The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Alison in his *Essay on Taste*, and by Lord Jeffrey in the article "Beauty" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Lord Jeffrey has said, "It appears to us, then, that objects

are sublime or beautiful—first, when they are the *natural* signs and *perpetual concomitants* of pleasurable sensations, as the sound of thunder, or laughter, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings; or secondly, when they are the arbitrary or *accidental concomitants* of such feelings, as ideas of female beauty; or thirdly, when they bear some *analogy* or *fancied resemblance* to things with which these emotions are necessarily connected." All poetry is founded on this last—as silence and tranquillity—gradual ascent and ambition—gradual descent and decay.

Mr. Stewart has observed that "association of ideas can never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentially different from all others."—*Elements*, ch. 5, part ii., p. 364, 4to.

Gerard, *Essay on Taste;* Sir Joshua Reynolds, *Discourses before Royal Society;* Burke, *On Sublime and Beautiful;* Payne Knight, *Enquiry into Principles of Taste;* Hume, *Essay on Standard of Taste;* Brown, *Lectures*, 77; Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part ii., *Relative to Taste;* Sir T. L. Dick, *Essay on Taste*, prefixed to Price on the *Picturesque*, 8vo, 1842. —V. ÆSTHETICS.

TELEOLOGY (τέλος, an end; λόγος, discourse) is the doctrine of *Final Causes*—*q. v.* It does not constitute a particular department of philosophy; as the end or perfection of every being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philosophy in which it is included. But *teleology* is the philosophical consideration of final causes, generally.

TEMPERAMENT (*tempero*, to moderate, to season).—"There are only *two* species of *temperament*. The four well known varieties, and the millions which are less known, are merely modifications of two species, and combinations of their modifications. These are the *active* and the *passive* forms; and every other variety may be conveniently arranged under them."*

* Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The author of the treatise on "Diet," included among the works of Hippocrates, takes the same view of *temperaments;* as likewise the Brunonian school, which maintained two antagonist, *sthenic* and *asthenic*, states.

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"As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated will, so *temperament* is nothing else than the sum of our natural inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the material of the will, developing itself, when *controlled*, into character, and when *controlling*, into passions. *Temperament* is, therefore, the root of our passions; and the latter, like the former, may be distinguished into two principal classes. Intelligent psychologists and physicians have always recognized this fact; the former dividing *temperaments* into active and passive, the latter classifying the passions as exciting and depressing.

"We would apply the same statement to the affections or emotions. The *temperament* commonly denominated sanguine or choleric is the same as our active species; and that known as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our passive one."—Feuchtersleben, *Dietetics of the Soul*, 12mo, Lon., 1852, p. 85.

Bodily constitutions, as affecting the prevailing bias of the mind, have been called *temperaments;* and have been distinguished into the *sanguine*, the *choleric*, the *melancholic*, and the *phlegmatic*. To these has been added another, called the *nervous temperament*. According as the bodily constitution of individuals can be characterized by one or other of these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or *disposition* of the mind; and there will be a bias, or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution, and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily *temperaments;* and these differences may give rise to a *disposition* or bias, in the one case, more directly than in the other. According as intellect, or sensitivity, or will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But, it is in reference to original differences in the *Primary desires*, that differences of *disposition* are most observable. Any *desire*, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies

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of the mind to its side; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.* *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

In the works of Galen (tom. iv., Leips., 1822) is an essay to show, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequuntur.*

See also Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychology.*

TEMPERANCE (*temperantia*) is moderation as to pleasure. Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 10) confined it chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of taste in a slight degree. Hence, perhaps, Popish writers in treating of the vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much on those connected with the senses of touch and taste. By Cicero the Latin word *temperantia* was used to denote the duty of self-government in general. *Temperantia est quæ ut in rebus expetendis aut fugiendis rationem sequamur monet.*

Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regulation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and affections, and may thus give birth to many virtues, and restrain from many vices. As distinguished from fortitude, it may be said to consist in guarding against the temptations to pleasure and self-indulgence; while fortitude consists in bearing up against the evils and dangers of human life.

TENDENCY (*tendo*, to stretch towards).—"He freely moves and acts according to his most natural *tendence* and inclination."—Scott, *Christ. Life*, pt. i., c. 1.

"But if at first the appetites and necessities, and *tendencies* of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be done when the body is miserable and afflicted."—Taylor, *Of Repent.*, c. 7, § 1.—*V.* INCLINATION.

ὅρος, *terminus*, a limit).—A *term* is an act of appre-

* The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's *natural temper*.—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part ii., chap. 8.

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hension expressed in language; also the subject or predicate of a proposition. "I call that a *term* into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated."—Arist., *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 1.

"As lines terminate a plane and constitute figure, so its *terms* are the limits of a proposition. A proposition consists of two *terms;* that which is spoken of is called the *subject;* that which is said of it the *predicate;* and these are called the *terms* (or extremes), because logically the subject is placed *first* and the predicate *last.* In the middle is the *copula*, which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied, of the subject."—Whately.—*V.* PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

Term (An Absolute or Non-Relative), one that is considered by itself, and conveys no idea of relation to anything of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. *Absolute terms* are also named *non-connotative*, as merely denoting an object without implying any attribute of that object; as "Paris," "Romulus."

Term (An Abstract) denotes the quality of a being, without regard to the subject in which it is; as "justice," "wisdom." *Abstract terms* are nouns substantive.

Term (A Common), such as stands for several individuals, which are called its *significates;* as "man," "city." Such *terms*, and such only can be affirmatively predicated of several others, and they are therefore called predicables.

Terms (Compatible or Consistent) express two views which *can* be taken of the same object at the same time; as "white and hard."

Term (A Complex) is a *proposition—q. v.*

Term (A Concrete) denotes the quality of a being, and either expresses, or must be referred to, some subject in which it is; as "fool," "philosopher," "high," "wise." *Concrete terms* are usually, but not always, nouns adjective.

Terms (The Contradictory Opposition of) is, when they differ only in respectively wanting and having the particle "not," or its equivalent. *One* or *other* of such *terms* is applicable to *every* object.

(**Contrary**) come both under some one class, but are the *most different* of all that belong to that class; as "wise" and "foolish," both coming under the class of mental qualities. There are some objects to which neither of such *terms* is applicable; a stone is neither wise nor foolish.

Term (A Definite), one which marks out an object or class of beings; as "Cæsar," "corporeal." *Positive terms* are *definite.*

Term (An Indefinite), one which does not *mark out*, but only *exclude* an object; as, "not-Cæsar," "incorporeal." *Privative and negative terms* are called *indefinite.*

Term (A Negative) denotes that the positive view *could not* be taken of the object; it affirms the absence of a thing from some subject in which it *could not* be present; as, "a dumb statue" (you would not say "a speaking statue"). "A lifeless corpse" (you would not say "a living corpse"). The same *term* may be *negative*, *positive*, or *privative*, as it is viewed with relation to contrary ideas. Thus "immortal" is *privative* or *negative* viewed with relation to *death*, and *positive* viewed with relation to *life.*

Terms (Opposite) express two views which cannot be taken of one single object at the same time; as "white and black."

Term (A Positive) denotes a certain view of an object, as being actually taken of it; as "speech," "a man speaking."

Term (A Privative) denotes that the positive view *might* conceivably be taken of the object, but *is not;* "dumbness," "a man silent" (you might say, "a man speaking"). "An unburied corpse" (you might say, "a buried corpse").

Term (A Relative), that which expresses an object viewed in relation to the whole, or to another part of a more complex object of thought; as "half" and "whole," "master and servant." Such nouns are called *correlative* to each other; nor can one of them be mentioned without a notion of the other being raised in the mind.

Term (A Simple) expresses a completed act of apprehension, but no more; and may be used alone either as the subject or predicate of a proposition. "Virtue is its own reward." Virtue is a simple term, and its own reward is also a simple term.

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Term (A Singular), such as stands for an individual; as "Socrates," "London," "this man," "that city." Such *terms* cannot be predicated affirmatively of anything but themselves. But *general terms*, as "fowl," "bird," may be truly affirmed of many.

TERMINISTS.—*V.* NOMINALISM.

TESTIMONY "is the declaration of one who professes to know the truth of that which he affirms."

"The difficulty is, when *testimonies* contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16.

If *testimony* were not a source of evidence, we must lose all benefit of the experience and observation of others. Much of human knowledge rests on the authority of *testimony*.

According to Dr. Reid, the validity of this authority is resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He maintains (*Inquiry*, ch. 6, sect. 24) that we have a natural principle of veracity, which has its counterpart in a natural principle of credulity—that is, while we are naturally disposed to speak the truth, we are naturally disposed to believe what is spoken by others.

But, says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 15, 16), "*Testimony* may be fallacious. He who declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive."

The evidence of *testimony* is, therefore, only probable, and requires to be carefully examined.

The nature of the thing testified to—whether it be a matter of science or of common life—the character of the person testifying—whether the *testimony* be that of one or of many—whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily, hastily or deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be attended to.

Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monument, and other material proofs have also been called *testimony*. So that *testimony* includes tradition and history.

Mr. Hume maintained that no amount of *testimony* can be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to him

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by Dr. Adams,* in his *Essay on Miracles*, and Dr. Campbell on *Miracles*, and Dr. Douglas on *Miracles*.

It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated English geometrician, and by Petersen, that the value of *testimony* decreases by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some measure, favoured this view. But if the matter of fact be well authenticated in the first instance, lapse of time and continued belief in it may add to the validity of the evidence.—*V.* EVIDENCE.

THEISM (Θεός, God) is opposed to atheism. It is not absolutely opposed, by its derivation, to *Pantheism*, or the belief that the universe is God; nor to *Polytheism*, or the belief that there are many Gods; nor to *Ditheism*, or the belief that there are two divine principles, one of good and another of evil. But usage, *penes quem est arbitrium et norma loquendi*, has restricted this word to the belief in one intelligent and free spirit, separate from his works. "To believe that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect *Theist*."—Shaftesbury, *Inquiry*, book i., pt. i., sect. 2.

"These are they who are strictly and properly called *Theists*, who affirm that a perfectly conscious, understanding being, or mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious, understanding being, self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called *Atheists*."—Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, book i., ch. 4, sect. 4.

"Though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only *Theists* who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of anything else; yet it seems reasonable that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it

* "Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to be introduced to as many of the persons who had written against him as could be collected; and requested Caddell to bring him and them together. Accordingly, Dr. Douglas, Dr. Adams, &c., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet Hume. They came; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assured me that they were all delighted with David."—Rogers's *Table Talk*.

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those also who assert one intellectual self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute *Atheists* merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things."—*Ibid*, sect. 7.

Theist and *Deist* both signify simply one who believes in God; and about the beginning of last century both were employed to denote one who believes in God independently of revelation. "Averse as I am to the cause of *Theism* or name of *Deist*, when taken in a sense exclusive of revelation, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is *Theism;* and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a *good Theist*."—Shaftesbury, *The Moralists*, part i., sect. 2. But from about the time of Shaftesbury, the term Deist has generally been applied to such as are indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Balguy's *First Letter to a Deist* was against Lord Shaftesbury. His *Second Letter to a Deist* was against Tindal. All the Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to revelation.

"The words *Deist* and *Theist* are, strictly speaking, perhaps synonymous; but yet it is generally to be observed that the former is used in a *bad*, and the latter in a *good* sense. Custom has appropriated the term *Deist* to the enemies of revelation and of Christianity in particular; while the word *Theist* is considered applicable to all who believe in one God."—Irons, *On Final Causes*, App., p. 207.

"Theistæ *generatim vocantur, qui Deum esse tenent, sive recte sive prave cæteroquin de Deo sentiant.* Deistæ *vocabantur præsertim sæculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui Deum quidem esse affirmabant, providentiam vero, revelationem, miracula, uno verbo, quidquid supernaturale audit, tollebant.*"—Ubaghs, *Theodiceæ Elementa*, p. 11.

THEOCRACY (Θεός, God; κράτος, rule).—Government under the Mosaic dispensation is called *theocracy.*

"It will easily appear," says Lowman (*On Civil Government of the Hebrews*, chap. 7), "that the general union of the tribes

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as one body may be conceived after this manner—that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people enacted by themselves or their representatives; that the great council advised, consulted, proposed; that the judge presided in their councils, and had the chief hand in executing what was resolved in them; and that Jehovah, by the oracle, was to assent to and approve what was resolved, and authorize the execution of it in matters of the greatest importance to the whole state, so that the general union of the whole nation may not improperly be thus expressed. It was by the command of the people and advice of the senate, the judge presiding and the oracle approving."

Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were regarded as the children of the sun. Mahomet, speaking in the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that of the Grand Lama in Thibet is similar.

"In the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, the sovereignty of number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental principle of the work. For a long time he follows out the consequences of it with inflexible rigour; a time arrives, however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great effect; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitution, to the rising society; his high intellect warned him that such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude: 'A God,' said he, 'must give laws to men.' It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. . . . . It is a particular and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire."—Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i, p. 387. *Contrat Social*, b. ii., ch. 8.

The term *theocracy* has been applied to the power wielded by the Pope during the Middle Ages; and Count de Maistre, in his work *Du Pape*, has argued strenuously in support of the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign pontiff. But the celibacy of the Romish priests is an obstacle to their theocratical organization. "Look at Asia, Egypt; all the great *theocracies* are the work of a clergy, which is a complete society within itself, which suffices for its own wants,

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and borrows nothing from without."—Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i., p. 182.

THEODICY (Θεός, God; δίκη, a pleading or justification), a vindication of the ways of God.—This word was employed by Leibnitz, who in his *Essais de Theodicée, sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, published in 1710, maintained that the existence of moral evil has its origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphysical evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in the essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of enjoying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection of the whole, which, of the many worlds that were possible, is the very best. On this account it has been called the theory of *optimism*—*q. v.*

In Manuals of Philosophy the term *theodicy* is applied to that part which treats of the *being*, *perfections*, and *government* of God, and the *immortality of the soul.*

In the *Manuel de Philosophie, a l'usage des Colleges*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, *Theodicée*, which is written by Emille Saisset, is called rational theology, or the theology of reason, independent of revelation. "It proposes to establish the existence of a being infinitely perfect, and to determine his attributes and essential relations to the world." It treats of the existence, attributes, and providence of God, and the immortality of the soul—which were formerly included under metaphysics.

According to Kant, the objections which a *theodicy* should meet are: 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his goodness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and the punishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He approves of the vindication adopted by Job against his friends, founded on our imperfect knowledge of God's ways.

"When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and endeavoured to produce dialectic proofs, its *theodicean* philosophy, or *justification of God*, stopped, in the book of Job, at the avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of mankind." —Bunsen, *Hippolytus*, vol. ii., p. 7.

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Butler, *Analogy*, part i., ch. 7, treats of the government of God; considered as a scheme or constitution imperfectly comprehended, part ii., ch. 4.

THEOGONY (Θεός, God; γονή, generation) is that part of Pagan theology which treats of the genealogy and filiation of their deities. It is the title of a celebrated Greek poem by Hesiod, which has been commented on by M. J. D. Guigniaut (*De la Theogonie d'Hesiode*, Paris, 1835). The *Works* and *Days*, and *Theogony* of Hesiod were translated from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas Cooke, 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728.

THEOLOGY (Θεός, God; λόγος, discourse).—"*Theology*, what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?"—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, b. iii., sect. 8.

"I mean *theology*, which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow-creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end, *i. e.*, the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which is every man's duty, and every one that is a rational creature is capable of." —Locke, *On the Cond. of the Understand.*, sect. 22.

The word *theology* as now used, without any qualifying epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to him which we derive from express revelation. In this restricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided into speculative or dogmatic—and moral or practical, according as it is occupied with the doctrines or the precepts which have been revealed for our belief and guidance. But the Greeks gave the name of (θεολόγοι) to those who, like Hesiod and Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than that of the poet, sang of the nature of the gods and the origin of all things. Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. xi., ch. 6) said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, mathematics, and *theology*—the last was the highest, as treating of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, from the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, the knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient to the interests of the state. So that, according

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to Augustin (*De Civitate*, lib. vi., c. 1), there were three kinds of *theology*—the *poetical*, or that of the poets—the *physical*, or that of the philosophers—and the *political*, or that of the legislator.

Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine revelation, the distinction between faith and reason was not taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any satisfactory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of the relations between Him and his creatures could be had independently of revelation. And it was not till after Descartes that the distinction of *theology*, as *natural*, and *positive* or *revealed*, was commonly taken. The distinction is rather obscured in the *Essais de Theodicée* of Leibnitz, but clearly expressed by Wolf in the title of his work, *Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*, 2 vols., 4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37. He thinks it is demonstrative, and calls it (*Prolegom.*, sect. 4) "The science which has for its object the existence of God and his attributes, and the consequences of these attributes in relation to other beings, with the refutation of all errors contrary to the true idea of God; in short, all that is now commonly included under *natural theology* or *theodicy*, or both.

Natural Theology.—This phrase has been very commonly employed, but it has been challenged.

"The name *natural theology*, which ever and anon we still hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the Divine Being and his existence, ought carefully to be avoided. Such a designation is based on a thorough misconception and total inversion of ideas. Every system of *theology* that is not supernatural, or at least that does not profess to be so, but pretends to understand naturally the idea of God, and regards the knowledge of the divine essence as a branch of natural science, or derives the idea simply from nature, is even on that account false. Missing and entirely mistaking its proper object, it must, in short, prove absolutely null and void. Properly, indeed, this inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special division, and scientific designation. The name generally of philosophy, or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly

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sufficient to designate the investigation into science and faith, and their reciprocal relation—their abiding discord, or its harmonious reconciliation and intrinsic concord." — Schlegel, *Philosoph. of Life*, &c., Bohn's edit., p. 194.

In Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, *natural* is opposed to *spiritual*, as *sensuous* to *super-sensuous* or *super-natural*.

This objection might be obviated by calling that knowledge of God and of his attributes and administration which the light of reason furnishes, *rational theology*. But this phrase has been of late years employed in a different sense, especially in Germany. *Natural theology* confines itself exclusively to that knowledge of God which the light of nature furnishes, and does not intermeddle with the discoveries or the doctrines of *positive* or *revealed theology*. It prosecutes its inquiries by the unassisted strength of reason within its own sphere. But *rational theology* carries the torch or light of reason into the domain of revelation. It criticises and compares texts—analyzes doctrines—examines traditions—and brings all the instruments of philosophy to bear upon things divine and spiritual, in order to reduce them to harmony with things human and rational.— V. RATIONALISM.

THEOPATHY (Θεος, Deity; πάθος, suffering or feeling).—A word used by Dr. Hartley as synonymous with *piety*, or a sense of Deity.

THEORY (θεωρία, contemplation, speculation). — *Theory* and *theoretical* are properly opposed to *practice* and *practical*. *Theory* is mere knowledge; *practice* is the application of it. Though distinct they are dependent, and there is no opposition between them. *Theory* is the knowledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes its end. Hypothetical and theoretical are sometimes used as synonymous with conjectural. But this is unphilosophical in so far as theoretical is concerned. *Theory* always implies knowledge—knowledge of a thing in its principles or causes.

"*Theory* is a general collection of the inferences drawn from facts and compressed into principles." — Parr, *Sequel to a Printed Paper*.

"With Plato, θεωρεῖν is applied to a deep contemplation of

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the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to πράττειν, and to ποιεῖν, so that he makes philosophy *theoretical*, *practical*, and *artistical*. The Latins and Boethius rendered θεωρεῖν by *speculari*. With us it means a learned discourse of philosophers of speculative use."—Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, p. 76.

"Theory denotes the most general laws to which certain facts can be reduced."—Mackintosh, *Prel. Diss.*, p. 61, Whewell's edit.; and at p. 367, the distinctions between *hypothesis* and *theory* are thus stated:—

1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the phenomena) should be known really to exist; in which consists the main distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory*. Gravity is a principle universally known to exist; ether and a nervous fluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles should be known to produce effects *like* those which are ascribed to them in the *theory*. This is a further distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory;* for there are an infinite number of degrees of *likeness*, from the faint resemblances which have led some to fancy that the functions of the nerves depend on electricity, to the remarkable coincidences between the appearances of projectiles on earth, and the movements of the heavenly bodies, which constitute the Newtonian system; a *theory* now perfect, though exclusively founded on analogy, and in which one of the classes of phenomena brought together by it is not the subject of direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority of them as to render it highly probable that means will in time be found of reconciling it to all. It is only on this ground that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title of a legitimate *theory* during that long period when it was unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the labours of a century and the genius of Laplace at length completed the *theory*, by adapting it to all the phenomena. A *theory* may be just before it is complete.

"*Theory* and *hypothesis* may be distinguished thus: a *hypothesis* is a guess or supposition, made concerning the cause of some particular fact, with the view of trying experiments or making observations to discover the truth. A *theory* is a com-

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plete system of suppositions put together for the purpose of explaining *all* the facts that belong to some one science. For example—astronomers have suggested many *hypotheses*, in order to account for the luminous stream which follows comets. They have also formed many *theories* of the heavens; or in other words, complete explanations of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies and their movements. When a *theory* has been generally received by men of science, it is called a *system;* as the Ptolemaic *system;* the Copernican *system;* the Newtonian *system.*"—Taylor, *Elements of Thought.*

See a paper on *Theory* in *Blackwood's Mag.* for August, 1830.

—*V.* HYPOTHESIS.

THEOSOPHISM or THEOSOPHY (Θεός, God; σοφία, knowledge).

"The *Theosophists*, neither contented with the natural light of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal supernatural light superior to all other illuminations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philosophy manifested only to the chosen favourites of heaven."—Enfield, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. ii.

See Tholuck (F. A. D.), *Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica*, 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App., 1838.

Theosophia seems at one time to have been used as synonymous with *theologia.* Thus in John Major's *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, published in 1510, Mr. David Cranston is styled *In Sacra* Theosophia *Baccalaureus.*

The *theosophists* are a school of philosophers who would mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form of mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus at the opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in Saint Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob Boehm, and Saint Martin, may be called popular, while Cornelius Agrippa, Valentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, and Van Helmont, are more philosophical in their doctrines. The Rev. Will. Law was also a *theosophist.* But they all hold different doctrines; so that they cannot be reduced to a system.

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"The *theosophist* is one who gives you a theory of God, or of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of his own for its basis."—Vaughan, *Hours with Mystics*, vol. i., p. 45.

"Both the politics and the *theosophy* of Coleridge were at the mercy of a discursive genius, intellectually bold, educationally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to bring conviction and speculation together, mooting all points as it went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights on many, ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding nothing."—Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*, 12mo, 1844, p. 276.

THESIS (θέσις, from τίθημι, to lay down) is a position or proposition, the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but requires evidence, or explanation, or proof. In the schools it was especially applied to those propositions in theology, philosophy, law, and medicine, which the candidates for degrees were required to defend.

THOUGHT AND THINKING "are used in a more, and in a less restricted signification. In the former meaning they are limited to the *discursive* energies alone; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness."—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 222, note.

Thinking is employed by Sir Will. Hamilton (*Discussions*, &c., Append. i., p. 578) as comprehending all our cognitive energies.

By Descartes, *cogitatio*, *pensée*, is used to denote or comprehend "all that in us of which we are immediately conscious. Thus all the operations of the will, of the imagination and senses, are *thoughts*."—*Resp. ad Sec. Obj.*, p. 85, Ed., 1663. Again, in reply to the question, What is a thing which thinks? he says, "It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, desires, wills, and does not will, which imagines, also, and feels."—*Medit.* ii., p. 11.

"Though *thinking* be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always *thinking*, always in action."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 1.

"*Thought* proper, as distinguished from other facts of con-

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sciousness, may be adequately described as the *act of knowing or judging of things by means of concepts.*"—Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 22.—*V.* TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

TIME (*tempus*).—Continuation of existence is duration; duration unlimited is eternity; duration limited is *time.*

By Aristotle, *time* was defined to be "the measure of motion, *secundum prius et posterius.* We get the idea of *time* on the occasion when we observe first and last, that is succession. Duration without succession would be timeless, immeasurable. But how are we to fix what is first and last in the motion of any body? By men in all ages the motions of the heavenly bodies have been made the measure of duration. So that the full definition of *time* is—'It is the measure of the duration of things that exist in succession, by the motion of the heavenly bodies.'"—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book iv., ch. 1.

"As our conception of space originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of space, so our conception of time originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called *time*, with which they are conceived to co-exist. *Time*, therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements; for as number ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, so *time* ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion performed."—Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, chap. 2.

According to Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 14), "Reflection upon the train of ideas, which appear one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any two parts of that succession, is that we call duration." Now by attending to the train of ideas in our minds we may have the idea of succession—but this presupposes the idea of duration in which the succession takes place. "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion or idea of duration must be

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antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured."—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iii., chap. 5.

See also Cousin (on Locke) *Cours de Philosoph.*, leçons 17, 18; Stewart, *Phil. Essays*, essay ii., ch. 2; see also the *Fragments* of Royer Collard, at the end of tom. iv. of *Œuvres de Reid.*

Dr. Reid (*ut supra*) says, "I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original than those of space and *time*. . . . . The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of extension, but the sense of touch discovers three; and *reason, from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an immensity that contains them.*

"In like manner, memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. *From the contemplation of these, reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an eternity which comprehends all things that have a beginning and an end.*" In another passage of the same essay, chap. 3, he says, "We are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to refer them. They are not beings, but rather the receptacles of every created being, without which it could not have had the possibility of existence. Philosophers have endeavoured to reduce all the objects of human thought to these three classes, of substances, modes, and relations. To which of them shall we refer *time*, space, and number, the most common objects of thought?"

In the philosophy of Kant, "*Time* is a necessary representation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. *Time* is given, *à priori*—it is the form of the internal sense, and the formal condition, *à priori*, of phenomena in general. Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we discover in *time* and *space*, and even *time* and *space* themselves, would disappear. What objects may be in themselves, separated from

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the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us."—*Analysis of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason.* By the Translator, 8vo, Lond., 1844, p. 10.

"One of the commonest errors is to regard *time* as an *agent.* But in reality, *time does* nothing, and *is* nothing. We use it as a compendious expression for all those causes which operate slowly and imperceptibly; but unless some positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of 1,000 years: *e. g.*, a drop of water encased in a cavity of silex."—Coplestone, *Remains*, p. 123.—*V.* SPACE.

TOPOLOGY.—*V.* MEMORIA TECHNICA.

TRADITION (*trado*, to hand down) "is any way of delivering a thing or word to another."—Bp. Taylor, *Dissuasive from Popery.* "Tradition is the Mercury (messenger) of the human race."—Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Humaines*, p. 50.

> "Tradition! oh tradition! thou of the seraph tongue,
> The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young."
>
> Adam Micklewitz.

Nescire quid antea quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum.—Cicero, *Orator.*, cap. 14.

When we believe the testimony of others not given by themselves directly but by others, this is *tradition.* It is testimony not written by the witness, nor dictated by him to be written, but handed down *memoriter*, from generation to generation.

"According to the principle of *tradition* (as the ground of certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted truth to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the paradisiacal state, and during the whole period from the first man down to the Christian era, it is said by these philosophers there was a channel of divine communication almost perpetually open between the mind of man and God. Here accordingly, it is thought we lay hold upon a *kind* of truth which is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and which coming down to us by verbal or documental *tradition* from the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis for all truth, and a final appeal against all error."—Morell, *Philosoph. Tenden.*, p. 17.

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See Molitor (J. F.), *Philosophie de la tradition*, 8vo, Paris, 1837.

On the necessity of *Tradition*, see *Irenæus*, i., 10.

TRAIN OF THOUGHT.—"The subject of the association of ideas," says Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. i., chap. 5), "naturally divides itself into two parts. The *first* relates to the influence of association in regulating the *succession* of our thoughts; the *second*, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissoluble *combinations* which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth."—*V.* COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the *con-sequence* or train of imaginations, the *train of thoughts* and mental discourse. He says it is of two sorts. The *first* is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The *second* is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design. That is, it is *spontaneous* or *intentional.*

In the *Train of Thought*, or the succession of the various modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they succeed in some kind of order. "Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently," says Hobbes. And it has long been matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect the law or laws according to which the train or succession of thought is determined.

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either *necessary* or *habitual.* By the *necessary* consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other; as cause and effect, means and end, quality and substance, body and space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say, that such is the constitution of the human mind.

The *habitual* consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals: but the general laws, according to which it is regulated, are chiefly three, viz.:—The law of *similars*, the law of *contraries*, and the law of *co-adjacents.* From the time of Aris-

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totle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all writers on the subject. But it has been thought that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his surprise (*Dissert.*, p. 348, Edit. Whewell) that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac.

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his *Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence*, has been explained as containing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts. (Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 897.) It is proposed to call this the law of *Redintegration*. "Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." In other words, "The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were constituent."

Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part i., chap. 3; *Human Nat.*, p. 17; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv.

TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENDENTAL (*transcendo*, to go beyond, to surpass, to be supreme).

"To be impenetrable, discerptible, and unactive, is the nature of all body and matter, as such; and the properties of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indiscerptible, and self-motive; yea, so different they are in all things, that they seem to have nothing but *being* and the *transcendental* attributes of that in common."—Glanvill, *Essay* i.

Transcendental is that which is above the prædicamental. Being is *transcendental*. The *prædicamental* is what belongs to a certain category of being; as the ten *summa genera*. As being cannot be included under any genus, but transcends them all, so the properties or affections of being have also been called *transcendental*. The three properties of being commonly enumerated are *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*. To these some add

aliquid and *res:* and these, with *ens*, make the six *transcendentals.* But *res* and *aliquid* mean only the same as *ens.* The first three are properly called *transcendentals*, as these only are passions or affections of being, as being.—*V.* UNITY, TRUTH, GOOD.

"In the schools, *transcendentalis* and *transcendens* were convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion which *transcended*, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under it, the categories or *summa genera* of Aristotle. Such, for example, is being, of which the ten categories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from each other. *Transcendent* (*transcendens*) he employed to denote what is wholly beyond experience, being neither given as an *à posteriori* nor *à priori* element of cognition—what therefore transcends every category of thought. *Transcendental* (*transcendentalis*) he applied to signify the *à priori* or necessary cognitions which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by experience. *Transcendental* is not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes a category of thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, has found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange the expression *principles of common sense*, for, among other names, that of *transcendental truths.*"—Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of knowledge which are original and primary, and which are determined *à priori* are called *transcendental.* They involve necessary and universal truths, and thus transcend all truth derived from experience which must always be contingent and particular. The principles of knowledge, which are pure and *transcendental*, form the ground of all knowledge that is empirical or determined *à posteriori.* In this sense *transcendental* is opposed to *empirical.*

"There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness* which lies

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beneath, or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem.* The latter is exclusively the domain of *pure* philosophy, which is, therefore, properly entitled *transcendental* in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and representation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned as *transcendent.*"—Coleridge, *Biograph. Liter.*, p. 143.

Transcendent is opposed to *immanent*—*q. v.*

Transcendental is opposed to *empirical*—*q. v.*

TRANSFERENCE and TRANSLATION are terms employed by the author of the *Light of Nature Pursued*, to denote the fact that our desires are often transferred from primary objects to those which are secondary or subservient; as from the desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secondary way, the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or power.—Tucker, *Light of Nature;* chapter on *Transference* or *Translation.*—*V.* DESIRE.

TRANSMIGRATION.—*V.* METEMPSYCHOSIS.

TRANSPOSITION.—*V.* CONVERSION.

TRIVIUM.—The seven *Liberal Arts* were Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music.

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra. *Grammar*, *Logic*, and *Rhetoric*, constituted the *Trivium*—*tres viæ in unum*, because they all refer to words or language. *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Music*, and *Astronomy*, constituted the *Quadrivium*—*quatuor viæ in unum*, because they all refer to quantity.

> "Gramm. loquitur, Dia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat;
> Mus. canit., Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. colit astra."

The Mechanical Arts were Rus, Nemus, Arma, Faber, Vul-

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nera, Lana, Rates; or, Agriculture, Propagation of Trees, Manufacture of Arms, Carpenters' work, Medicine, Weaving, and Ship-building.

TRUTH has been distinguished by most metaphysical writers, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into *veritas entis*, *cognitionis*, *et signi*. By others, *truth* has been distinguished as *entitative*, *objective*, and *formal*, the *truth* of signs being included under the last.

Veritas entis—Transcendental or Metaphysical Truth.

The pillar and ground of all *truth* is in *truth* of being—that *truth* by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but reality of being. Thus gold has *truth* of being, *i. e.*, is real gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there were no real being, that is, if *truth* could not be predicated of things, there could be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being known. They do not exist because they are known, nor as they are known. But they are known because they are, and as they are, when known fully.

Veritas Cognitionis.

Truth, as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our knowledge with the reality of the object known—for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the thing or object known with true knowledge. But there seems to be little difference whether we say that *truth* consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true knowledge.

Veritas Signi.

The *truth* of the sign consists in its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate it or represent it adequately or fully, so the *truth* of a representation or sign consists in its being

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adequate to the thing signified. The *truth* and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in logic.

"Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity of thoughts to things, called *scientific*—and of that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called *moral truth*—there is a *truth* called *logical*, depending on the self-consistency of thoughts themselves. . . . . Thought is valueless except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things; a higher *truth* than the merely logical, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions is, that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood, which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the *logical truth*, *subjective*, as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphysical *truth*, *objective*, because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that give rise to them." —Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 81, 82.

Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est."—Aquinas, *Contra. Gent.*, i., 49.

Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions and to nothing else; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of "a true" proposition—*vera est quæ quod res est dicit.*

In its etymological sense, *truth* signifies that which the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymology of the word ἀλήθεια, τὸ μὴ λῆθον, seems to be similar; denoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a *lie;* and may be called *moral*, as the other may be called *logical truth.*

"*Truth* is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccurate language, to *arguments;* when the proper expression would be 'correctness,' 'conclusiveness,' or 'validity.'

"*Truth* again, is often used in the sense of *reality*, τὸ ὄν. People speak of the *truth* or *falsity* of *facts;* properly speaking,

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they are either *real* or *fictitious:* it is the *statement* that is 'true' or 'false.' The 'true' cause of anything, is a common expression; 'meaning that which may with *truth* be assigned as the cause.' The senses of *falsehood* correspond."—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

"*Necessary truths* are such as are known independently of inductive proof. They are, therefore, either *self-evident* propositions, or deduced from self-evident propositions."—Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, chap. 7.

Necessary truths are those in which we not only learn that the proposition *is* true, but see that it *must* be true; in which the negation is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The relations of numbers are the examples of such *truths.* Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.

"A *necessary* truth or law of reason, is a truth or law the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical, impossible; more shortly, it is a truth, in the fixing of which nature had only *one* alternative, be it positive or negative. Nature might have fixed that the sun should go round the earth, instead of the earth round the sun; at least we see nothing in that supposition which is contradictory and absurd. Either alternative was equally possible. But nature could not have fixed that two straight lines should, in any circumstances, enclose a space; for this involves a contradiction."—Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 19.

Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say "Grass is green," "Socrates was a philosopher," I assert propositions which *are* true, but *need* not have been so. It might have pleased the Creator to make grass blue—and Socrates might never have lived.

"There are *truths* of *reasoning* (reason) and *truths* of *fact.* *Truths* of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is impossible—those of *fact* are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a *truth* is necessary you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and *truths* more simple, till

you come to what is primitive."—Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, iv., 2; *Monadologie*, sect. 33.

"Though the *primary truths of fact* and the *primary truths of intelligence* (the *contingent* and *necessary* truths of Reid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of our consciousness, there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 1, and his *Account of Reid*, supra, p. 27, b."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 743.

"*Truth* implies something really existing. An assertion respecting the *future* may be probable or improbable, it may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or imprudent, it may have any relation we please to the mind of the person who makes it, or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation at all to a *thing which is not*. The Stoics said, Cicero will either be Consul or not. One of these is true, therefore the event is certain. But *truth* cannot be predicated of that which is not."—Coplestone, *Enquiry into Necessity*, Preface, p. 15.

"*Truth* implies a *report* of something that *is; reality* denotes the existence of a thing, whether *affirmed* and *reported* of or not. The thing reported either *is* or is *not;* the report is either *true* or *false*. The things themselves are sometimes called *truths*, instead of *facts* or *realities*. And *assertions* concerning matters of fact are called *facts*. Thus we hear of *false facts*, a thing literally impossible and absurd."—Coplestone, *Remains*, p. 105.

"No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage-ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride." —*Bacon's Essay on Truth.*—*V.* FALSITY, REALITY.

TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. They carry evidence in themselves. They are assented to as soon as they are understood. The assent given to them is so full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize it, it can

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scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that no proposition contradicting them can be admitted as more clear. That a whole is greater than any of its parts; that a change implies the operation of a cause; that qualities do not exist without a substance; that there are other beings in the world besides ourselves; may be given as examples of *first truths*. These truths are and must be assented to by every rational being, as soon as the terms expressing them are understood. They have been called κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, *communes notitiæ*, natural judgments, primitive beliefs, fundamental laws of the human mind, principles of common sense, principles of reason, principles of reasoning, &c.

. . . "To determine how great is the number of these propositions is impossible; for they are not in the soul as propositions; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind awaking out of nothing into being, and presented with particular objects, would not fail at once to judge concerning them according to, and by the force of, some such *innate principles* as these, or just as a man would judge who had learnt these explicit propositions; which indeed are so nearly allied to its own nature, that they may be called almost a part of itself. . . . . Therefore I take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions as a *rasa tabula*, or white paper. . . . "Hence there may be some practical principles also innate in the foregoing sense, though not in the form of propositions."—Watts, *Philosoph. Essays*, sect. 4 and 3.

"From the earliest records of time, and following the course of history, we everywhere find the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandizements, and chequered features of states and kingdoms; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognize the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood

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of human nature; the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour subsist; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words."—Van de Weyer.

On the nature, origin, and validity of *first truths*, the following authors may be consulted:—Lord Herbert, *De Veritate;* Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths;* Reid, *Inquiry* and *Essays on Intell. Pow.;* Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, Appendix, note A.—*V.* COMMON SENSE, REMINISCENCE.

τύπος, *typus*, from τύπτω, to strike).

> "Great father of the gods, when for our crimes
> Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times,—
> Some tyrant king, the terror of his age,
> The *type* and true vicegerent of thy rage!
> Thus punish him."—Dryden, *Persius*, sat. 3.

"So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the *type* of his blood."—Bishop Taylor, *Of Real Presence*, sect. 6.

Among the Greeks the first model which statuaries made in clay of their projected work was called τύπος. *Type* means the first rude form or figure of anything—an adumbration or shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according to it was the *ectype*, and the *type* in contrast the *protype*. But *archetype* was applied to the original idea, model, or exemplar, not copied, but of which other things were copies.

"A *type* is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class."—Whewell, *Induct. Sciences*, viii., ii., 10.

For the meaning of a *type* in the arts of design, see Sir Edmund Head, *Hist. of Painting*, Preface, p. 39.—*V.* HOMOTYPE.

UBIETY (*ubi*, where) is the presence of one thing to another, or the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen distinguished *ubiety* as—

1. *Circumscriptive*, by which a body is so in one place that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, and exclude every other body.

2. *Definitive*, as when a human spirit is limited or defined in its presence to the same place as a human body.

3. *Repletive*, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through every portion of space.

This last is sometimes called *ubiquity*, and means the Divine Omnipresence.—Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, liv. ii., chap. 23, sect. 21.

UNCONDITIONED.—"This term has been employed in a twofold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all *restriction*, or more widely, the entire absence of all *relation*. The former we regard as its only legitimate application."—Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, p. 36.

In the philosophy of Kant it is that which is absolutely and in itself, or internally possible, and is exempted from the conditions circumscribing a thing in time or space.—*V.* ABSOLUTE, INFINITE.

UNDERSTANDING.—"Perhaps the safer use of the term, for general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as a percipient being, and reason as a power supervening."—Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual*, App. B, p. 264.

"In its wider acceptation, *understanding* is the entire power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensibility; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing them into wholes according to a law of unity; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the representing mind; that which puts together the multifarious materials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may consider the *understanding* in another point of view, not as the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and comes into play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind; but as a

power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, which does not simply *think* and reflect, but which examines its thoughts, arranges and compares them; and this for scientific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize upon religion, and to receive it by means of the *understanding* are two different things, and the common exertion of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement of them by exercise."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. ii., p. 38.

"The *understanding* is the medial faculty, or faculty of means, as *reason* on the other hand is the source of ideas or ultimate ends. By *reason* we determine the ultimate end; by the *understanding* we are enabled to select and adopt the appropriate means for the attainment of, or approximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not representable by the senses, and has no correspondent in nature, or the world of the senses. . . . . *Understanding* and sense constitute the natural mind of man, mind of the flesh, φρόνημα σαρκός, as likewise ψυχικὴ σύνεσις, the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, which St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, that is, the power resulting from the union and co-influence of the will and reason—σοφία or wisdom."—Coleridge, *Notes on English Div.*, vol. ii., p. 338.

"The *reason* and the *understanding* have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. . . . . To *understand* anything is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include in the meaning of the word an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules by reference to which we *understand* the thing. We *understand* a language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We *understand* the sense without *reasoning* about the etymology and syntax.

"Reasoning may be requisite to *understanding*. We may

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have to reason about the syntax in order to *understand* the sense. But *understanding* leaves still room for reasoning. Also we may *understand* what is not conformable to reason; as when we *understand* a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in reason.

"We reason in order to deduce rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we *understand*. We may *understand* the sense of a speech without thinking of rules of grammar.

"The reason is employed both in *understanding* and in reasoning; but the principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in *understanding*. The reason includes both the faculty of seeing first principles, and the reasoning faculty by which we obtain other principles. The *understanding* is the faculty of applying principles, however obtained."—Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, Introd., sect. 11.

Anselm considered the facts of consciousness under the fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and Intelligence; and showed that the two last are not identical.—Matter, *Hist. de la Philosoph. dans ses Rapports avec Religion*, p. 148. Paris, 1854.

"'There is one faculty,' says Aristotle (*Eth.*, lib. 6), 'by which man comprehends and embodies in his belief first principles which cannot be proved, which he must receive from some authority; there is another by which, when a new fact is laid before him, he can show that it is in conformity with some principle possessed before. One process resembles the collection of materials for building—the other their orderly arrangement. One is intuition,—the other logic. One νοῦς, the other ἐπιστήμη.' Or to use a modern distinction, one is *reason* in its highest sense, the other *understanding*."—Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

"I use the term *understanding*, not for the *noetic* faculty, intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the *dianoetic*, or discursive faculty in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparisons; and thus in the meaning in which

Verstand is now employed by the Germans."—Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 4, note.

"*Understanding*, *intellect* (*Verstand*) is the faculty which conjoins the diversity which is furnished us by the senses, and forms into a whole the sensible representations which are given to us. The word *Verstand* is used occasionally as being synonymous with *Vernunft* (reason), and is the faculty of cognition in general, and in this sense the critic of pure reason might be termed also the critic of pure *understanding*. The discursive *understanding* is the faculty of cognizing objects, not immediately, but through conceptions. And as intuition belongs to cognition, and as a faculty of a complete spontaneousness of intuition, or which perceives the intuition not passively, but produces spontaneously from itself, a cognition-faculty different from, and independent of, what is the sensibility, would be, consequently, *understanding* in the widest sense; we might think such an intuitive, envisaging *understanding* (*intellectus intuitivus*) negatively, as a non-discursive *understanding*. The *gemeiner Menschen Verstand* and the *Gemeinsinn* are *sensus communis logicus*, or common sense; and the *gesunder Verstand*, sound sense. Sir J. Mackintosh prefers the term *intellect* to that of *understanding* as the source of conceptions."—Haywood, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 605.—*V.* REASON, INTELLECT.

UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another as to form one being. *Unification* with God was the final aim of the Neo-Platonicians. And *unification* with God is also one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu.

UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in meaning as *Monotheist*. In this large sense it is applicable to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the Divine nature; and also to Jews and Mahommedans. It may even include Deists, or those who believe in God on grounds of reason alone. But the name is commonly opposed to Trinitarian, and is applied to those who, accepting the Christian revelation, believe in God as existing in one person, and acknowledge Jesus Christ as his messenger to men.

UNITY or ONENESS (*unum*, one) is a property of being. If anything is, it is one and not many. *Omne ens est unum.*

UNITY—

Unity is defined to be that property, *qua ens est indivisum in se et divisum ab omni alio.*

Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 16) makes *unity* synonymous with number. But Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 6, lib. x., cap. 1) more correctly makes *unity* the element of number, and says that *unity* is indivisibleness. That which is indivisible, and has no position, is a *monad.* That which is indivisible, but has a position, is a *point.* That which is divisible only in one sense is a *line.* That which is divisible in two senses is a *plane.* And that which is divisible in three senses is a *body* in respect of quantity.

According to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. x., cap. 1), the modes of *unity* are reducible to four, that of continuity, especially natural continuity, which is not the result of contact or tie—that of a whole naturally, which has figure and form, and not like things united by violence—that of an individual or that which is numerically indivisible—and that of a universal, which is indivisible in form and in respect of science.

Unity has been divided into *transcendental* or *entitative*, by which a being is indivisible in itself—*logical*, by which things like each other are classed together for the purposes of science—and *moral*, by which many are embodied as one for the purposes of life, as many citizens make one society, many soldiers one army.

Unity is opposed to plurality, which is nothing but *plures entitates aut unitates.*

Unity is *specific* or *numerical.* The former may rather be called *similitude*, and the latter *identity.*—Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars. 3, cap. 3.

"The essential diversity of the ideas *unity* and *sameness* was among the elementary principles of the old logicians; and the sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms have been ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on Wissowatius."—Coleridge, *Second Lay Sermon*, p. 367. See also *Aids to Reflection*, p. 157.—*V.* DISTINCTION, IDENTITY.

UNIVERSALS.—"The same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all

of that kind, and having given it the name of whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus *universals*, whether ideas or terms, are made."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 11.

Universal terms may denote, 1. A *mathematical* universality, as all circles (no exception) have a centre and circumference. 2. A *physical* universality, as all men use words to express their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 3. A *moral* universality, as all men are governed by affection rather than by reason.

Universal (*unum versus alia*) means, according to its composition, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle (*Lib. de Interpret.*, cap. 5), "that which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many." And (*Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 13) "that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in many." It implies unity with community, or unity shared in by many.

Universals have been divided into, 1. *Metaphysical*, or *universalia ante rem.* 2. *Physical*, or *universalia in re.* 3. *Logical*, or *universalia post rem.*

By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according to which all things were created. As existing in the Divine mind and furnishing the pattern for the Divine working, these may be said to correspond with the *ideas* of Plato.

By *universals* in the second sense are meant certain common natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or shared in by many—as *rationality* by all men.

By *universals* in the third sense are meant general notions framed by the human intellect, and predicated of many things, on the ground of their possessing common properties—as *animal*, which may be predicated of man, lion, horse, &c.

Realists give prominence to *universals* in the first and second signification. *Nominalists* hold that the true meaning of *universals* is that assigned in the third sense. While *conceptualists* hold an intermediate view.—Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 6.; Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., sect. 23.

In ancient philosophy the *universals* were called *prædicables*

(*q. v.*), and were arranged in five classes, *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*. It is argued that there can be neither more nor fewer. For whatever is predicated of many is predicated *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, either of the whole essence, and then it is a *species*; of a common part of the essence, and then it is a *genus*; or of a proper part of the essence, and then it is the *differentia essentialis*; if *accidentally*, it either flows from the essence of the subject, and is its *proprium*, or does not flow from its essence, and is its *accidens*.

Or it may be argued thus—*universality* is a fitness of being predicated of many, which implies identity or sameness, or at least resemblance. There will therefore be as many classes of *universals* as there are kinds of identity. Now, when one thing is said to be the same with another, it is so either *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, it is so either *completely* or *incompletely*; if *completely*, it gives a *species*; if *incompletely*, it is so in *form*, and gives the *differentia*, or in *matter* and gives the *genus*; if *accidentally*, it is the same either *necessarily* and *inseparably*, and constitutes the *proprium*—or *contingently* and *separably*, and is the *accidens*.—Tellez, *Summa*, pars. 1, dis. v., sect. 1. But the fivefold classification of *universals* is censured by Derodon, *Log.*, pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 37.

UNIVOCAL WORDS (*una*, one; *vox*, word or meaning) "are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing; the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called *univocal words*, for I know not that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are generally affixed."—Watts, *Log.*, b. i., c. 4.

"I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same word may be applied to different things in three ways: *univocally*, *analogically*, and *equivocally*. *Univocally*, when the things are *species* of the same *genus*; *analogically*, when the things are related by some similitude or analogy; *equivocally*, when they have no relation but a common name."—Reid, *Correspondence*, p. 75.

In Logic a common term is called *univocal* in respect of those things or persons to which it is applicable in the same significa-

tion, as the term "man." Whately observes that the "usual divisions of nouns into *univocal*, *equivocal*, and *analogous*, and into nouns of the *first* and *second intention*, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of the *manner of employing them*; the *same* word may be employed either *univocally*, *equivocally*, or *analogously*; either in the first intention or the second."—Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 1.

V. ANALOGOUS, EQUIVOCAL, INTENTION.

, said Kant (*Metaphys. des Mœurs*, p. 15), "is nothing scarcely but a frame or case which may serve to facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw to it the attention of those who are not connoisseurs; but cannot recommend it to true lovers of the art, or determine its price."

"What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives all its merit from the end for which it is useful."—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 5.

"*Utility* is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a higher term."—*Manuel de Philosoph.*, p. 344.

The doctrine of *utility* in morals is, that actions are right because they are useful. It has been held under various forms. Some who maintain that *utility* or beneficial tendency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous agent may be prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by benevolence (as Rutherforth), or partly by both (as Hume). And the beneficial tendency of actions has by some been viewed solely in reference to this life (as Hume and Bentham), while by others it has been extended to a future state (as Paley), and the obligation to do such actions has been represented as arising from the rewards and punishments of that future state, as made known by the light of nature and by revelation (as Dwight).

The fundamental objection to the doctrine of *utility* in all its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 5), viz., "that agreeableness and *utility* are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another principle in its room; and this

system is liable to the same censure." "*Honestum, igitur, id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis premiis fructibusve, per seipsum jure possit laudari.*"—*De Finibus*, ii., 14.

(*volo*, to will) is an indolent or inactive wish or inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic effort to obtain it, as when it is said, "The cat likes fish but will not touch the water."

"The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the *willing* it, but it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect *velleity*, and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency in, and *desire* of the end, without any consideration of the means." —South.

"A volition which cannot carry itself into execution."—Müller.—*V.* VOLITION.

VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conversation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr. Reid enumerates an instinct of *veracity* and a corresponding instinct of *credulity* as principles of human nature. Children do not distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or passion prompts men, that they conceal or disguise the truth. The means employed for this purpose are either saying what is *false*, or *equivocation* and *reservation*—*q. v.*

VERBAL is opposed to *real* (*q. v.*), 1. As *name* is opposed to *thing;* and 2. As *insincere* is opposed to *sincere.* "Great acclamations and *verbal* praises and acknowledgments, without an honest and sincere endeavour to please and obey him, are but pieces of mockery and hypocritical compliment."—Hale, *Cent. of Afflictions.*

"Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the *terms* employed; sometimes on the *things* signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by parties not differing in their *opinion of the matter in hand*, then that question

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may be pronounced *verbal;* or depending on the different senses in which they employ the *terms.* If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is *real*—that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the *things* or questions." —Whately.

VIRTUAL is opposed to *actual.*—" It is not, in this sense, the foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all; not only in general, but in special; not only *virtual*, but *actual;* not mediate, but immediate; for a few lines would have served for a foundation general, *virtual*, and mediate."—Bp. Taylor, *Dissuas. from Popery*, sect. 3.

A thing has a *virtual* existence when it has all the conditions necessary to its *actual* existence. The statue exists *virtually* in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The cause *virtually* contains the effect. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the distinction between δύναμις, and ἐντελέχεια, or ἐνέργεια, *i. e.*, *potentia* or *virtus*, and *actus* is frequent and fundamental.

" A letter of credit does not *in reality* contain the sum which it represents: that sum is only *really* in the coffer of the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, since it holds its place. This sum is in still another sense, contained; it is *virtually* in the credit of the banker who subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained *formally* in the coffer of the banker, *objectively* in the letter which he subscribed, and *eminently* in the credit which enabled him to subscribe; and thus the coffer contains the reality *formal* of the sum, the letter the reality *objective*, and the credit of the banker the reality *eminent.*"—Royer Collard, *Œuvres de Reid*, tom. ii., p. 356.

VIRTUE.—" For if *virtue* be an election annexed unto our nature, and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by reason, and that mean is the very myddes of two things vicious, the one is surplusage, the other in lacke," &c.—Sir T. Elyot, *The Governour*, b. ii., c. 10.

Virtus, in Latin, from *vir*, a man, and ἀρετή in Greek, from Ἄρης, *Mars*, give us the primary idea of manly strength. *Virtue* then implies opposition or struggle. In man, the struggle is between reason and passion—between right and wrong. To hold by the former is *virtue*, to yield to the latter is vice. According to Aristotle, *virtue* is a practical habit acquired by doing virtuous acts. He called those *virtues intellectual*, by which the intellect was strengthened, and *moral*, by which the life was regulated. Another ancient division was that of the cardinal *virtues*—which correspond to the moral *virtues*. The theological *virtues* were *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*.

The opposite of *virtue* is *vice*.

Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book *Of the Advancement of Learning*, as saying,

"As beasts cannot be said to have vice or *virtue*, so neither can the gods; for as the condition of the latter is something more elevated than *virtue*, so that of the former is something different from vice."—Moffet, *Trans.*, p. 200.

As *virtue* implies trial or difficulty, it cannot be predicated of God. He is holy.

Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between *virtue* and *holiness*. In a holy being, the will is uniformly and without struggle in accordance with the moral law. In a virtuous being, the will is liable to the solicitations of the sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of reason. This is the only state of which man is capable in this life. But he ought to aim and aspire to the attainment of the higher or holy state, in which the will without struggle is always in accordance with reason. The Stoics thought the *beau ideal* of virtue, or the complete subjection of sense and appetite to reason, attainable in this life.—*V.* DUTY, MERIT, OBLIGATION, RECTITUDE, STANDARD, NATURE OF THINGS.

LITION (*volo*, to will) "is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action."—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, sect. 15.

VOLITION—

"There is an error which lies under the word *volition*. Under that word you include both the *final perception* of the understanding which is passive, and also the *first operation* or exertion of the active faculty of self-motive power. These two you think to be necessarily connected. I think there is no connection at all between them; and that in their not being connected lies the difference between action and passion; which difference is the essence of liberty."—Dr. Sam. Clarke, *Second Letter to a Gentleman*, p. 410.

Things are sought as *ends* or as *means*.

The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, *circa finem*, *Velleity*, *Intention*, *and Fruition*. Gen. iii. 6:—When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise (this is *velleity*), she took thereof (this is *intention*) and did eat (this is *fruition*). There are also three acts, *circa*, *media*, viz., *consent*, approving of means—*election*, or choosing the most fit, and *application*, *use*, or employing of them.—*V.* ELECTION, WILL.

WELL-BEING.—"This is beyond all doubt, and indisputable," says Leighton in his *Theological Lectures*, "that all men wish well to themselves; nor can the mind of man divest itself of this propensity, without divesting itself of its being. This is what the schoolmen mean when in their manner of expression they say that 'the will (*voluntas*, not *arbitrium*) is carried towards happiness, not simply as will, but as nature.' 'No man hateth his own flesh.'"

"One conclusion follows inevitably from the preceding position," says Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 20, edit. 1848), "namely, that this propensity can never be legitimately made the principle of morality, even because it is no part or appurtenance of the moral will: and because the proper object of the moral principle is to limit and control this propensity, and to determine in what it may be, and in what it ought to be, gratified; while it is the business of philosophy to instruct

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the understanding, and the office of religion to convince the whole man, that otherwise than as a regulated, and of course therefore a subordinate, end, this propensity, innate and inalienable though it be, can never be realized or fulfilled."—*V.* HAPPINESS.

WHOLE (ὅλος).—"There are *wholes* of different kinds; for, in the *first place*, there is an *extended whole*, of which the parts lie contiguous, such as *body* and *space*. *Secondly*, There is a *whole*, of which the parts are separated or discrete, such as *number*, which, from thence, is called *quantity discrete*. *Thirdly*, There is a *whole*, of which the parts do not exist together, but only by succession, such as *time*, consisting of *minutes*, *hours*, and *days*, or as many more parts as we please, but which all exist successively, or not together. *Fourthly*, There is what may be called a *logical whole*, of which the several specieses are *parts*. *Animal*, for example, is a *whole*, in this sense, and man, dog, horse, &c., are the several parts of it. And *fifthly*, The different qualities of the same substance, may be said to be *parts* of that substance."—Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 12.

A *whole* is either divisible or indivisible.

Every *whole* as a *whole* is one and undivided. But though not divided, a *whole* may be *divisible* in thought, by being reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether *indivisible* even in thought. This latter is what metaphysicians call *Totum perfectionale*, and is only applicable to Deity, who is wholly in the universe, and wholly in every part of it.

A *divisible whole* is distinguished as *potential*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, as animal may be divided into man and brute, but is not constituted by them; and *actual*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is constituted, as man may be divided into soul and body.

An *actual whole* is either *physical* or *metaphysical*. A *physical whole* is constituted by physical composition, and is *integral* when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or *essential* when composed of matter and form. A *metaphysical whole* is constituted by metaphysical composition, which is

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fourfold: 1. A *whole* made up of genus and differentia is an *essential specific whole*—as man, in so far as he is a species of animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the differentia (rational). 2. A *whole* made up of the specific nature and the individual differentia, is an *essential numerical whole.* 3. A *whole of existence* contains a singular essence and existence added. 4. A *whole of subsistence* has subsistence added to existence.—Baronius, *Metaphys. Generalis*, sect. 15.

According to Derodon (*Log.*, 3 pars., p. 70), an *essential whole* is that from which if any part be taken the being perishes — as man in respect of his body and soul. An *integral whole* is that from which, if any part be taken, the being is not entire but mutilated. Man with all his members is an *integral whole;* cut off a limb, he is not an *integral*, but still an *essential whole.*

"A *whole* is composed of distinct parts. Composition may be *physical*, *metaphysical*, or *logical*

"A *physical whole* is made up of parts distinct and separate, and is *natural*, as a tree, *artificial*, as a house, *moral*, or *conventional*, as a family, a city, &c.

"A *metaphysical whole* arises from metaphysical composition, as potence and act, essence and existence, &c.

"A *logical whole* is composed by genus and differentia, and is called a *higher notion*, which can be resolved into notions under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. Thus, *animal* is divided into *rational* and *irrational*, *knowledge* into science, art, experience, opinion, belief.

"Of the parts into which a *whole* is divisible, some are *essential*, so that if one is wanting the being ceases, as the head or heart in man; others are *integral*, of which if one or more be wanting the being is not entire, as in man, an eye or arms; others are *constituent*, such as concur to form the substance of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen in water."—Peemans, *Introd. ad. Philosoph.*, p. 72.

?—As an interrogative, this word is employed in three senses, viz.,—"By what proof (or reason)?" "From what cause?" "For what purpose?" This last is commonly called the "*final cause*,"—*e. g.*, "*Why* is this prisoner guilty of the crime?" "*Why* does a stone fall to the earth?" "*Why*

did you go to London?" Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different inquiries.—Whately, *Log.*, Appendix 1.

WILL.—Some modern philosophers, especially among the French, have employed the term activity as synonymous with *will.* But the former is of wider signification than the latter. Activity is the power of producing change, whatever the change may be. *Will* is the power of producing acts of willing.—*V.* VOLITION.

"Every man is conscious of a power to determine," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, essay ii., ch. 1), "in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of *will.*"

"*Will* is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for the *faculty* of willing; sometimes for the *act* of that faculty, besides other meanings. But *volition* always signifies the *act of willing*, and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is opposed to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to do what he has no aversion to do, or what he has some desire to do, though perhaps he has not the opportunity; and I think this is never called volition."—*Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 79.

"By the term *will* I do not mean to express a more or less highly developed faculty of *desiring;* but that innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of our activity—a faculty which we are better able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of man."—Feuchtersleben, *Dietetics of the Soul.*

"Appetite is the *will's* solicitor, and the *will* is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject."—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i.

On the difference between *desiring* and *willing*, see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 21; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay ii., ch. 2; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, Append., p. 471.

By some philosophers this difference has been overlooked, and they have completely identified desire and volition.

"What is desire," says Dr. Priestley (*Philosoph. Necess.*, p. 35), "besides a wish to obtain some apprehended good? And is not every wish a volition? Every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz., a desire to accomplish some end, which end may be considered as the object of the passion or affection."

"Volition," says Mr. Belsham, "is a modification of the passion of desire." Mr. James Mill, in his *Analysis of the Hum. Mind*, holds that the *will* is nothing but the desire that is most powerful at the time. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his *Lectures on Mor. Philosophy*, has not spoken of the faculty of *will* or of acts of volition as separate from our desires. And in his *Essay on Cause and Effect*, sect. 3, he has said, "Those brief feelings which the body immediately obeys are commonly termed volitions, while the more lasting wishes are simply denominated desires."

The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the following passage:—"We regard it as of great moment that the *will* should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart from all other faculties; on the contrary, it blends itself with every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments on the other, but contains an important element which cannot be resolved into either the one or the other, or into both combined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, the reason, the conscience, may influence the will, but they cannot constitute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We have only by consciousness to look into our souls, as the *will* is working, to discover a power, which, though intimately connected with the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that there cannot be an undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philosophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the *will* into anything inferior to itself. In particular it may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man's nature."

According to Ritter (*Hist. of Anc. Philosoph.*, vol. iii., p.

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555), "it was a principle with the Stoics that *will* and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it." Hence their saying, *Omne actum est in intellectu.* And hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the *will* we determine to do or not to do, to do this or to do that.

Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto.—Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, ii., 1, quæst. 83.

Ea quæ sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quæ sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.—*Ibidem*, ii., 2, quæst. 7, art. 2.

In what sense the understanding moves the *will* is shown by Aquinas.—*Sum. Theol.*, ii., 1, quæst. 9, art. 1.

"Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the *will*, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the *will* as amiable."—South, *Sermon on Matt.* x., 37.

On the question, whether the connection between the intellect and the *will* be direct or indirect, see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. i., ch. 21; Jonathan Edwards, *Inquiry*, part i., sect. 2; Dr. Turnbull, *Christ. Philosoph.*, p. 196.

Will (Freedom of).—"This is the essential attribute of a *will*, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the *will* acquires this power from a previous determination of the *will* itself. The *will* is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a *will* under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 227.

"We need only to reflect on our own experience to be convinced that the man makes the motive, and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what determines the man to a good and worthy act, we will say, or a virtuous course of conduct? The intelligent *will*, or the self-determining power? True, in part it is; and therefore

the *will* is pre-eminently, the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man admit, that his own *will* is the only and sufficient determinant of all he is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which it belongs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the *will*, though, doubtless, with it likewise? a process which the co-instantaneous, yet reciprocal action of the air and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render intelligible."—Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 44.

"It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of self-determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of motives or impulses—my *will* may be moved; but this does not exclude the power of origination, for the consent even to the outward inducement or stimulus, still requires this unique act of self-determination in order to the energy requisite to the fulfilment of the deed. That it is so, who shall doubt who is conscious of the power? or if he believe that he has not this consciousness he belies his own nature. The actuation of the individual *will* not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies it—implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under the law of outward causation. How often do we not see that a stern resolve has produced a series of actions, which, sustained by the inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete achievement? Contrast this with the life and conduct of the wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impossible not to find the inward conviction strengthened and confirmed, that the *will* is the inward and enduring essence of man's being."—Green, *Mental Dynamics*, p. 54.

"The central point of our consciousness—that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man—that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is the *will*. *Will* expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently and for ourselves."—Morell, *Phil. of Relig.*, p. 3.

"*Will* may be defined to be the faculty which is apprehended in the consciousness, as the originating power of the personal

self. Not that it can be seen to be an absolute power of self-origination; it is possible that it may always be determined by subtile forces which do not fall within the sphere of consciousness. But so far as apprehension can reach, the phenomena of the *will* appear to have their origin in an activity of the personal self."—Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, book i., ch. 3. —*V.* NATURE, FREE-WILL, LIBERTY, NECESSITY.

, says Sir W. Temple, "is that which makes man judge what are the best ends, and what the best means to attain them."

"Wisdom," says Sir J. Mackintosh, "is the habitual employment of a patient and comprehensive understanding in combining various and remote means to promote the happiness of mankind."

Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and differs from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power or faculty differs from the power or faculty itself.

Proverbs ch. xv., v. 2, *The tongue of the wise useth knowledge aright.* Knowledge puffeth up. Knowledge is proud that he hath learned so much. Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.

The word corresponding to *wisdom* was used among the Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of the Scriptures, the word *wisdom* frequently denotes the religious sentiment, or the fear and love of God.

WIT (*wite*, to know) originally signified knowledge or wisdom. We still say, *in his wits*, *out of his wits*, for in or out of a sound mind. Mr. Locke says (*Essay*, b. ii., ch. 11), "*Wit* lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable visions in the fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of *wit*, which strikes so

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lively on the fancy, and therefore is so acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it."

"This," says Mr. Addison (*Spectator*, 62), "is, I think, the best and most philosophical account that I ever met with of *wit*, which generally, though not always, consists in such a resemblance and congruity of ideas as this author mentions. I shall only add to it, by way of explanation, that every resemblance of ideas is not that which we call *wit*, unless it be such an one that gives delight and surprise to the reader: these two properties seem essential to *wit*, more particularly the last of them. . . . Mr. Locke's account of *wit*, with this short explanation, comprehends most of the species of *wit*, as metaphors, similitudes, allegories, enigmas, mottoes, parables, fables, dreams, visions, dramatic writings, burlesques, and all the methods of allusion; as there are many other pieces of *wit*, how remote soever they may appear at first sight, from the foregoing description, which, upon examination, will be found to agree with it."

"It is the design of *wit*," says Dr. Campbell (*Phil. of Rhet.*, b. i., ch. 2, sect. 1), "to excite in the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising, not from anything marvellous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind. This end is effected in one or other of these three ways: first, in debasing things pompous or seemingly grave: I say *seemingly* grave, because to vilify what is *truly* grave, has something shocking in it, which rarely fails to counteract the end; secondly, in aggrandizing things little and frivolous; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects, by means not only remote but apparently contrary, in a particular and uncommon point of view."

Dr. Barrow (*Sermon against Foolish Talking*), speaking of *facetiousness*, says, "Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound; sometimes it is wrapped in a dress

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of humorous expression: sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude: sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it: sometimes an affected simplicity: sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being; sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting upon what is strange: sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how."

"True *wit* is like the brilliant stone
Dug from the Indian mine;
Which boasts two various powers in one—
To cut as well as shine.

"Genius, like that, if polished bright,
With the same gifts abounds,
Appears at once both keen and bright,
And sparkles while it wounds."—ANON.

WIT and HUMOUR commonly concur in a tendency to provoke laughter, by exhibiting a curious and unexpected affinity; the first generally by comparison, either direct or implied, the second by connecting in some other relation, such as causality or vicinity, objects apparently the most dissimilar and heterogeneous; which incongruous affinity gives the true meaning of the word *oddity*, and is the proper object of laughter."—Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, b. i., chap. 2, sect. 2.

"The feeling of the *ludicrous* seems to be awakened by the discovery of an unexpected relation between objects in other respects wholly dissimilar."—M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, b. iii., chap. 2, § 5.

Dr. Trusler says that *wit* relates to the matter, *humour* to the manner; that our old comedies abounded with *wit*, and our old actors with *humour*; that *humour* always excites laughter, but *wit* does not; that a fellow of *humour* will set a whole company in a roar, but that there is a smartness in *wit*, which cuts while

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it pleases. *Wit*, he adds, always implies sense and abilities, while *humour* does not; *humour* is chiefly relished by the vulgar, but education is requisite to comprehend *wit*.—Taylor, *Synonyms.*

Lord Shaftesbury has an *Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour*. *Characteristicks*, vol. i.

ZOONOMY (ζῶον, animal; νόμος, law).—That department of knowledge which ascertains the laws of organic life. Dr. Darwin published a well known work under this title, in which he classifies the facts belonging to animal life, and by comparing them seeks to unravel the theory of diseases.

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