

ISHII, Akiho

Request by MUTO, Akira

- a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Nagano Prefecture.
- b. He was formerly Chief of a Division of the Military Affairs Section under Muto and was thoroughly familiar with United States-Japanese negotiations. He will give relevant testimony regarding said negotiations and Muto's connection therewith.

ISHII, Akiho

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Nagano Prefecture

b. He was formerly chief of a division of the Military Affairs Section under MUTO and was thoroughly familiar with United States-Japanese negotiations. He will give relevant testimony regarding said negotiations and MUTO's connection therewith.

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: ISHII, Akiho

Address: A resident of Nagano Prefecture

Was formerly chief of a division of the Military Affairs
Section under MUTO.

File No. 319, Serial 67, states that MUTO believes Subject
was in charge of diplomacy in Military Affairs Section.

COPIES: 3 File No. _____
1 Mr. Prout

ISHII, Akiho

Request by: MUTO, Akira

Address: Resident of Nagano Prefecture. At present
believed to be in hospital.

He was formerly chief of a division of the Military
Affairs Section under Muto.

(1 of 1)

ISHII, Akiho

Request by: MUTO, Akira.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: ISHII, Akiho

Date of Birth: 2 November 1900

Address: Nagano Prefecture

23 March	1920:	Graduated from the Central Military Preparatory School
28 July	1922:	Graduated from the Military Academy
25 October	1922:	Appointed Sublieutenant assigned, to the 42nd Infantry Regiment
26 October	1925:	Promoted to Lieutenant
13 December	1928:	Ordered to enter the Military Staff College
27 December	1928:	Assigned to the 42nd Infantry Regiment
1 August	1931:	Promoted to Captain, assigned to Battalion adjutant of the 42nd Infantry Regiment
20 December	1933:	Assigned to the Staff of the 16th Division
1 August	1935:	Assigned to the Headquarters of the 16th Division
2 December	1935:	Assigned to the General Staff Office
2 April	1936:	Appointed Judge of the Tokyo Court-martial
2 August	1937:	Promoted to Major, Commissary Staff of the Japanese Forces stationed in China
26 August	1937:	Assigned to the Commissary Staff of the Japanese Forces stationed in China
9 March	1939:	Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel
1 August	1939:	Assigned to the Technical Headquarters and concurrently to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Department

5 September	1939:	Appointed secretary of the Planning Board
16 December	1939:	Relieved of the post
27 December	1939:	Assigned to a chief-member of the Sino Incidence Damage Investigating Committee
15 Octover	1941:	Promoted to Colonel

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33675 * Exhibit 3480, the affidavit of ISHII, Akiho, stated that the affiant was a Staff member of the Military Affairs Section when MUTO was Chief of the MAB and took charge mainly of diplomatic problems affecting the ministry. He knew MUTO's view on international problems and was aware of his difficult position. MUTO felt that early settlement of the China Incident was the first requisite and always advocated peaceful cooperation with other countries. At least three times the witness heard him oppose aggressive policies.

33676 In the autumn of 1939, immediately after his arrival at his post as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he ordered the affiant to study a draft of a plan of opening the Yangtze Kiang and Chu-kiang Rivers to comply with U.S. wishes. *As the affiant concurrently was secretary of the China Affairs Board, he was in conference several times with those concerned. The Chu-kiang River was opened, but various difficulties were encountered with regard to the Yangtze, which remained closed to the last. During this time, the affiant was urged at least twice by MUTO to make further efforts. MUTO never insisted personally on participating in the Tripartite Alliance. MATSUOKA had the whole field to himself in the conclusion of it and the affiant read its text for the first time after its conclusion.

33677 None except those especially concerned had participated in the negotiation. About mid April, 1941, when a report was made from Ambassador NOMURA on the draft of an understanding with America, MUTO was much pleased and said, "Hereby has Japan been served!" In May, 1941, a telegram was received from a military attache to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin to the effect that he was against the * negotiations with the U.S. as long as they were dependent upon the secession from the Tri-Partite Alliance.

MUTO ordered the affiant to send a telegram of reproof, and the affiant made out a draft stating anyone abroad must act according to the government's policy. The negotiations with the U.S. were based upon policies of the government and Supreme Command. When this draft was finally brought to TOJO through the Director of the MAB and the Vice Minister, TOJO revised it personally into a more severe one. In the spring of 1941, America considered the western Atlantic safe and was helping England and appeared to show keen interest in the negotiations. In early May, reliable information was received that America would in the end enter the European War, upon which the War Minister asked the MAB what should be done if this occurred. They answered that in such case they should

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33678 not let the war spread to the Pacific in conformity with the principles of the * Tri-Partite Pact, regardless of Article III of it. MUTO said he agreed and reported it to War Minister TOJO and Vice Minister KIMURA, and the affiant was told by MUTO that both TOJO and KIMURA were of the same opinion.

At the beginning of June, 1941, when the expectation for war between Germany and the Soviet came to their knowledge, MUTO submitted a question as to how they estimated the progress of that war, if it really broke out. The affiant then gave as his judgment that although Germany would maintain superiority during the earlier period of the war, it would ultimately end the same as the China Incident. MUTO told the affiant he was of the same opinion and in case of war, Japan should fall back upon the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact.

33673 About mid June, 1941, MUTO was bewildered with the intention of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who advocated an aggressive policy against the Soviet at one time and proposed an advance toward the south at another. MUTO was ill and did not attend the liason conference * at the end of June and the Council in the Imperial presence on July 2. Directly after the Council in the Imperial presence of 6 September 1941, MUTO returned to the War Ministry reporting the proceedings of the Council to the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, the Chief of the Military Administration Section, and other senior members.

He said that the phrase, "For the sake of self-existence and self-defense" meant in Article I, "in order to live." Before their assets were frozen, they were to be a self-sufficient state in spite of economic pressure. The phrase, "try every diplomatic means" appearing in Article II meant that every possible means of diplomacy should be tried and Article II should precede Article I from the point of real necessity. MUTO said they must try to succeed in diplomatic negotiations at any cost.

33680 * Japan conceded step by step from the first to latter part of September and at last an exploring proposal was made to realize the KONOE-Roosevelt conference as soon as possible. As for their duties under the Three Power Alliance, it was suggested they could not commit themselves in writing but expected to arrive at an understanding by conferring. MUTO, together with Chief of the NAB OKA cooperated with the Foreign Ministry most enthusiastically in making these supplicating overtures.

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As for withdrawing troops from China, it was settled at a Council in the presence of the Emperor on September 6 to withdraw them in accordance with a new agreement with China. There was discussion as to whether this meant to make a new agreement or follow the provisions of the Sino-Japanese basic treaties concluded on 30 November 1940. MUTO read this to mean an agreement to be newly concluded after further negotiations and tried to wire to that effect to America in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry.

33681

The General Staff made a * strong protest against this interpretation, but MUTO refused it vehemently saying he detested the war. The affiant clearly recalled MUTO made strenuous efforts to avert war with the United States. Informed he was scheduled to be a member of KONOYE's suite for the talks with Roosevelt, he made preparations for it. At the end of September they received the news from Washington that the negotiations were not likely to succeed. MUTO said this was critical and war should be averted at all costs because it endangered the State.

About 20 October 1941, immediately after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, TOJO asked for MUTO's opinion and he replied that the people are tired of the China Incident and if TOJO, as Premier, succeeded in the American negotiations and settled the China Incident, the nation would be heartily grateful. TOJO ought to do everything to accept diplomatic negotiations. TOJO heartily assented to MUTO's views.

33682

* The A and B plans for the negotiations with the US were discussed in the liason conference on the night of 1 November 1941. The B plan was introduced in that conference fresh from the portfolio of Foreign Minister TOGO without being exhibited beforehand to the Supreme Command of the army and navy. There was a heated discussion between Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA and TOGO. MUTO, who acted as a mere secretary to the conference and had no vote, met SUGIYAMA during the recess and told him unofficially that it might be unreasonable for the Chief of Staff to raise a flat objection to any plan drafted by the Foreign Minister and to prevent him from taking diplomatic means. When the conference resumed, SUGIYAMA agreed to plan B and thus it was decided on.

33683

This was what MUTO told the affiant the next day. His staff, as well as General Staff authorities, were anxious as to whether plan B could insure national defense. * But MUTO said he had told the Chief of Staff what he believed to be the best. If the plan should bring bad results, he knew

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what he ought to do. The affiant knew that most readers of the national policy expected the US to take a compromising attitude toward plan B and when MUTO asked his staff how America would deal with it, the affiant said **America will surely agree.** Leading Japanese circles, including the army, detested war in general, although some irresponsible men maintained a positive attitude and the affiant and MUTO were criticized as being weak-kneed. MUTO told his staff that TOJO was desirous of success in the negotiations.

33684 The affiant often took documents to TOJO when he was intent on studying the negotiations. The affiant left for Saigon on the morning of 27 November 1941. Toward evening of the previous day, MUTO told the affiant that the question of war or peace was not yet decided and asked him to struggle hard if war came. * Those whom the affiant visited in the navy and foreign affairs ministries on that day were still expecting success in the negotiations and were impatient for a favorable reply.

If it please the Tribunal, with regard to the ISHII affidavit in the MUTO phase I am now informed that although cross-examination could be conducted during the first of the week by dividing time between a morning and an afternoon session, the witness is prepared for a serious operation on Tuesday or later. We have reconsidered the matter and under all the circumstances the prosecution does not desire to insist on its right to cross-examine or take further testimony by means of interrogatories. In this situation, it is suggested that the MUTO phase be completed by the reading of the affidavit at this time.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
SITTING AT TOKYO, JAPAN

Case No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)	COMMISSION
)	TO TAKE THE
- vs -)	DEPOSITION OF
)	ISHII, Akiho
ARAKI, Sadao, et al)	

The defense having offered in evidence the affidavit of ISHII, Akiho, and it appearing to the Tribunal that said ISHII, Akiho is now suffering from tuberculosis and is confined in the Komoro Branch of the First Tokyo National Hospital at Komoro, Japan, and because of said illness he is unable to attend this trial and give his testimony in person, and the prosecution objecting to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the said ISHII, Akiho without opportunity to cross-examine him at this time, it is therefore duly considered by this Tribunal that the affidavit of the said ISHII, Akiho should be taken by deposition before one of the members of this Tribunal as Commissioner; and it is

ORDERED: That the deposition of the witness ISHII, Akiho, be taken before the Honorable Mr. Justice Northcroft, a member of this Tribunal, as Commissioner so to do at such

time and place as said Commissioner may hereafter determine; that a sufficient number of reporters of this Tribunal and assistants and interpreters of this Tribunal shall record the testimony, and that said deposition when taken, translated and transcribed shall be filed with the Secretariat of this Tribunal; and is further

ORDERED: That the Secretariat of this Tribunal make the necessary arrangements for the taking of the deposition of the witness ISHII, Akiho as ordered by this Tribunal.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan, this 13th day of November 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

(Signed) Myron C. Cramer
Acting President

ERRATA SHEET

11/17



4 Nov. 1947

Def. Doc. 2786, Affidavit of ISHI, Akiho:

Page 12, first line should read: "for a year at least as from this date.
Therefore,"

Def. Doc. 2579, Affidavit of Bishop J. E. Walsh:

Page 2, Para. 4, Line 1, "It had been ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to us" should read:
"It had been represented to us"

Def. Doc. 2685, Page 1, Deponent: KUMAGAWA, Yoshiharu should be:

Deponent: KUMEGAWA, Yoshiharu

Page 3, Para. 11, Line 11, between "the officers" insert
the word "staff" to read "the staff officers"

Def. Doc. 2785, Affidavit of MIKI, Yoshihide:

Page 1, Para. 2, Line 4, "The gist (plan) of appellation for making war on
the United States and Britain" should read: "Principal reasons alleged for
the commencement of hostilities against the U. S. A. and Britain,"

[Handwritten signature]

Def. Doc. # 2786

Exh. No.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

Subject (9) opinion p 5-6
SR 32973-6

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

*nothing of value
which could not be
sent & made*

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: ISHII, Akiho

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

*Ex 3466
Def Doc 2860
has document
referred to in
this
affid.*

I was a Lt. Colonel and Senior staff member of the Military Affairs Section when MUTO Akira was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. I took charge mainly of the business of diplomatic problems as they affected the War Ministry. I know very well MUTO's views on international problems and am well aware of his difficult position as the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. MUTO felt that early settlement of the China Incident was the first requisite and always advocated maintaining peaceful cooperation with other countries. Three times at least I heard him oppose aggressive policies.

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In the autumn of 1939, immediately after his arrival at his post as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he ordered me to study a draft of a practical plan of opening of the Yangtze Kiang and Chu-kiang Rivers in order to comply with American wishes. This was a matter of discussion at that time. As I held the concurrent post as secretary in the China Affairs Board, I sat in conference several times with those concerned and studied plans. The Chu-kiang River was opened by the consent of parties concerned, but various difficulties were encountered with regard to the opening of the Yangtze, which remained closed to the last. During this time I was urged at least two times by MUTO to make further efforts on this matter.

MUTO never insisted personally on our participation in the Triple Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had the whole field to himself in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. I read the text of the treaty for the first time after its conclusion. None but those specially concerned even among the officials of the Foreign Ministry had participated in that negotiation. About the middle of April 1941, when a report was made from Ambassador NOMURA on the draft of an understanding between Japan and America, MUTO was very much pleased and said, "Hereby has Japan been saved!"

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On a certain day in May 1941, a telegram was received from a military attaché to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin to the effect that he was against the negotiations between Japan and U.S.A., so long as they were dependent upon the secession from the Tri-Partite Alliance. MUTO ordered me to send a telegram of reproof. I made out a draft which stated, "Anyone who holds a post abroad must act according to the government's policy. The negotiations with U.S.A. are proceeding well, based upon policies of the government and the Supreme Command. Don't complain of it." When this draft of the telegram was finally brought to TOJO through the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Vice-Minister, TOJO revised it in person into a more severe one to admonish the attaché strictly

amended
In the spring of 1941, America considered the western half of the ~~Pacific~~ ^{Atlantic} as safe waters and was carrying on operation of helping England, and appeared to show keen interest in the Japanese-American negotiations. But at the beginning of May reliable information was received to the effect that America would, in the end, enter the European War, upon which the War Minister put a question up to the Military Affairs Bureau as to what should be done in case America should participate in the War. We made answer to the effect that in such case we should try not to let the war spread to the Pacific in conformity with the fundamental principles

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of the Tri-Partite Pact, regardless of Article III of that Pact.

MUTO said, "I am also of the same opinion", and reported it to War Minister TOJO and Vice-Minister KIMURA. I was told by MUTO that both TOJO and KIMURA were of the same opinion as he.

At the beginning of June in 1941, when the expectation for the outbreak of the war between Germany and Soviet Union was brought to our knowledge, MUTO submitted a question to us as to how we estimated the progress of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, supposing that it really broke out. After a few days' careful consideration, I gave as my judgement that although the German Army would maintain superiority during the earlier period of the war, it would ultimately end the same as the China Incident. Different opinions against this judgement of mine were propounded, but MUTO said to me, "I am of the same opinion as you. In case of war, Japan should fall back upon the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact and remain indifferent." About the middle of June in 1941, MUTO was bewildered with the real intention of Y. MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister, who advocated an aggressive policy against the Soviet Union at one time and proposed Japan's advance towards the south at another. About that time MUTO was taken ill, and so he did not attend the Liaison

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Conference at the end of June and the Council in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd.

Directly after the Council in the presence of the Emperor on September 6th, 1941, MUTO returned to the War Ministry and reported the proceeding of the Council to the Chief of Military Affairs Section, the Chief of Military Administration Section, and the senior members of both these sections as follows:

"The phrase, 'For the sake of self-existence and self-defense' that appears in Article I means, as it is literally expressed, 'in order to live'; that is, before our assets were frozen, to be prepared as a self-sufficient state on a planned basis in spite of the increase of economic pressure by U.S.A. and Great Britain, especially the abrogation of Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. It, however, has a more urgent and critical meaning today. Secondly, the phrase 'try every diplomatic means' that appears in Article II means that every possible means of diplomacy in our power should be tried, and this Article II ought to precede Article I from the point of real necessity although it follows the first as a matter of literary composition." Then he added as follows: "We must try to succeed in diplomatic negotiations no matter at what cost."

[Japan conceded step by step in order to obtain U.S.A.'s

object
of

consent during the period from first to the latter part of September, and at last an imploring proposal was made to realize the Komoe-Roosevelt conference as soon as possible. As for the duty under the Three Power Alliance Treaty, it was suggested that we could not commit ourselves in writing but expected to arrive at an understanding by meeting and conferring. MUTO, together with OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, cooperated with the Foreign Ministry most enthusiastically in the making of these supplicating overtures.

As for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China, which was a difficult point in the negotiations between Japan and America, it was settled at a council in the presence of the Emperor on September 6th to withdraw the Japanese troops from China in accordance with a new agreement settled between Japan and China. There was considerable discussion as to whether this meant to make a new agreement or to follow the provisions of the Sino-Japanese basic treaties concluded on November 30, 1940. MUTO read this to mean an agreement to be newly concluded after further negotiations, and tried to wire to that effect to America in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. The General Staff made a strong protest against this interpretation. On this occasion MUTO refuted it vehemently by saying in a loud voice, "I detest the war".

copy
of memo

Report ?

From the above-mentioned incidents, I clearly recall that he made strenuous efforts, as the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, to avert war between Japan and America. Informed that he was scheduled to be a member of Prince Konoe's suite at the time of the Konoe-Roosevelt talks, he was making preparations for it. At the end of September it was telegraphed from Washington that Japanese-American negotiations were not likely to succeed. MUTO said to us, "This is critical! War should be averted at all costs because it endangers the State." On or about October 20, 1941, that is to say, immediately after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, TOJO, Premier and War Minister, asked for MUTO's opinion. MUTO replied, "The people are tired of the Chinese Incident. Therefore, if you, as the premier, succeed in the Japanese-American negotiations and can settle the Chinese Incident the nation will be heartily grateful to you. You should do everything in your power as a leader of the new cabinet to accomplish Japanese diplomatic negotiations." TOJO wholeheartedly assented to his views, (P) over

It remains still vividly in my memory that the Plans A and B for the negotiations with U.S.A. were discussed in the Liaison Conference in the middle of the night of about November 1, 1941 (the 16th year of Showa). The said Plan B was introduced in that conference fresh from the portfolio X

of Foreign Minister TOGO without being exhibited beforehand to the Supreme Command of the Army and Navy. So there was a heated discussion between Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA and Foreign Minister TOGO and the situation was said to have become very serious. Therefore MUTO, who acted as a mere secretary to the Liaison Conference and had no vote in it, met Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA in the corridor during a recess and told him, unofficially saying, "It may be unreasonable for the Chief of the General Staff to raise a flat objection to any plan drafted by the Foreign Minister and to prevent him from taking possible diplomatic means." Then, when the conference was resumed, Chief SUGIYAMA agreed to Plan B and thus the plan was decided on. //

The above was what MUTO told me firsthand on the next day at the room of the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. We, his staff, as well as the General Staff authorities were all anxious about whether or not this Plan B could insure the national defence of Japan. However, MUTO said, "I told the Chief of the General Staff what I believed to be the best. In case this should bring bad results to our nation, I know what I ought to do." [I know through the talks with those of various circles that most of the readers of this national policy expected the U.S.A. to be likely

Obeyed

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to take a compromising attitude toward Plan B. For instance, when MUTO asked us. his staff, how America would deal with Plan B, I said, "To such a plan, America will be sure to agree", in reply to which, no objection was made by those present.

The leading circles of Japan, including the Army, detested war in general, though some irresponsible men maintained their positive opinion. As a result, I, one of MUTO's staff, not to speak of him, was criticized as being weak-kneed. MUTO told us, his staff, "War Minister TOJO is desirous of success in the negotiations between Japan and America." I often took the documents concerned to War Minister TOJO, when he was intent on studying the Japanese-American negotiations.

I left for Saigon early on the morning of November 27, 1941 (Japanese time). Toward the evening of the previous day, namely, November 26, I reported my departure to MUTO, when he said, "The question of war or peace is not yet decided on. I ask you to struggle hard if war comes, otherwise we may soon meet again." I visited on that day both the Ministries of Navy and Foreign Affairs to report my departure. Those whom I saw there were still expecting success in the Japanese-American negotiations, impatient for a favorable reply from America.

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On this 12th day of February, 1947
At Komoro, Nagano Prefecture

Deponent: /S/ ISHII, Akiho (Seal)

We, Roger F. Cole and HARA, Seiji, hereby certify that
the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of these
Witnesses.

On the same date

At Komoro, Nagano Prefecture

Witnesses: /S/ Roger F. Cole (Seals)
HARA Seiji

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ISHII Akiho (Seal)

DIAGNOSIS

Permanent Domicile: Kichimo, Toyonishi Village, Toyoura District, Yamaguchi Pref.

Present Address: 6-99, Asagaya, Suginami Ward, Tokyo
Now in Hospital.

Former Colonel: Akiho Ishii

Birth Date: Nov. 24, 1900

1. Name of Disease: Pulmonary Tuberculosis

(1) Causes and Progress

On Nov. 30, 1942, infiltration was observed at the upper lap of the left lung on X-rays at Singapore. In Feb. 1943, he suffered from left wet pleurisy. Leaving hospital on July 30 of the same year, was under medical treatment at home. But the disease progressing unfavourably, entered hospital again on June 8, 1944. Now he is there.

(2) Present Condition.

Medium built; malnutrition; frequent slight fever of 37.5 degrees. Short bronchum-sound and wet R-sound can be heard at the hollows about the collar bones and blades in the breast; non-resounding wet R-sound at the lower right part of the front and the lower left part of the back. In the inspection through X-rays, cloud-like shadow is observed at the right lower lap of the lung the left apex part and the left middle and lower lap of the lung. Lung capacity, 2500. Senkungs reaction der Blutkörperchen 40 mm. per hour. Tuberculous bacilli in expectorated phlegm, positive. Coughing, expectoration, languor all over the body, poor appetite, restless, and frequent hemoptysis.

Because of the above mentioned progress and the present condition, it is considered necessary for him to be in hospital and be kept in tranquil repose

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as from this date.
for a year at least. Therefore, he is diagnosed
to be unable to present himself at the Court of
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
as a witness during the above-mentioned period.

Sep. 27, 1947

Komoro Town, Kita Saku District, Nagano Pref.
The 1st Tokyo National Hospital, Komoro
Branch.

Physician, Shizuo Ogawa (seal)

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: ISHII, Akiho (MUTO)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u> X </u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u> X </u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	_____	<u> X </u>
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	_____	<u> X </u>
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	_____	<u> X </u>
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u> X </u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Pedro Lopez
Capt. James J. Robinson
William E. Edwards

By

P. Lopez

ISHII, Akiho

Request by MUTO, Akira

- a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Nagano Prefecture.
- b. He was formerly Chief of a Division of the Military Affairs Section under Muto and was thoroughly familiar with United States-Japanese negotiations. He will give relevant testimony regarding said negotiations and Muto's connection therewith.