

extra Jan

2349

INTERROGATION OF

General (Baron) Sadao Araki

Date and Time: 22 January, 1946, 1015-1200 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General (Baron) Sadao Araki
Colonel Thomas H. Morrow, Interrogator
Mr. Edward M. Dell
Mr. Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter
Miss Jewel E. Newman, Stenographer

Questions by : Colonel Morrow

Oath given to interpreter by Colonel Morrow

"Do you solemnly swear (affirm), by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding."

- Q. How long were you on the Supreme War Council and what are the dates? At any rate the body you belonged to when the 2-26 incident took place and you resigned right after that?
- A. I think it was after that. After the opening of the war I was never a member of the Supreme War Council.
- Q. What was the body you resigned from right after the assassination February 26? You were in some council or body then, what was it?
- A. All the members of this Supreme War Council resigned by request.
- Q. About the 10th of March, 1936?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who requested them to resign?
- A. This was from the War Minister but I think there was somebody behind the War Minister to push this.
- Q. In other words the War Minister asked them to resign?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who do you think was behind the War Ministry?

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- A. I was not concerned with military matters at the time and was not in the Government at the time and I have no ideas but there were several matters that seemed to have disrupted the whole organization.
- Q. What I want to know is who was behind the War Minister, if you know, and asked you for your resignation?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. And who was the War Minister that asked for the resignation?
- A. General Senjuro HAYASHI who resigned after the assassination of General Nagata. General Hayashi stated that he was not responsible for requesting these resignations. General Hayashi had asked for the resignation of General Masaki, a very good friend of his, and when requested to state the reason for demanding General Masaki's resignation he replied that he was not responsible.
- Q. At the same time General Abe, Masaki, Nyeda, Nishi and Terauchi were asked to resign?
- A. Three generals were named as members, Terauchi, Nishi and Ueda. There are many peculiar circumstances connected with this matter.
- ✓ Q. I understand, also, that after that resignation the General became a member of what in English is called the Cabinet Advisory Council which was established by an ordinance, an Imperial Ordinance of October 14, 1937?
- A. I became a member of this Cabinet Advisory Council at the request of Prince Konoye who came to me for advice in connection with the China incident.
- Q. And that council was set up to advise concerning the situation in China?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How often did it meet?
- A. Once a week.
- Q. That was in 1937 that you were appointed, I believe?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And did you remain a member of that until you were made Minister of Education by Prince Konoye?
- A. Yes, I was a member until I was appointed.
- Q. Do you remember what date it was you became a member of the Advisory Council?

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- A. Almost immediately after the formation of the Cabinet Council.
- Q. And then after you were Minister of Education you were again appointed to the same council in 1940?
- A. I left the Education Ministry in 1939.
- Q. And when were you made a member of the Advisory Council again?
- A. I think in September, 1939, I am not sure.
- Q. Did you attend most of these meetings when you were a member of this Council?
- A. It was compulsory ~~to attend~~ and I attended all the meetings once a week.
- Q. Whom did the Council advise concerning the China situation?
- A. There is a lot connected with it and I would like to make some statements.
- Q. Yes. I would like to know if there are any records of what this Council did or advised, whom they advised and where those records could be found if there are such records?
- A. The sole purpose of this Advisory Council was to hear the progress of the China incident and not actually to give advice. They received information about conditions in China and that was all. This became a useless organization owing to opposition from Cabinet members, especially Admiral Yonai.
- Q. What did Admiral Yonai object to?
- A. He said that the Cabinet could attend to all matters without interference from the Advisory Council and, therefore, it was an unnecessary organization, a superfluous organization. And as a result the members just received information on the progress of the China incident and were in no position to tender advice any where.
- Q. Who were the members of this advisory council besides yourself?
- A. From the Army, Generals Ugaki and Araki; from the Navy, Admirals Abo and Suetsugu; Industrialists Dada and Baron Goh; Party Members Machida and Akita, and some others that I do not remember. Matsuoka, President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, was also a member but did not attend meetings.

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- Q. Ask the General what it was that offended Admiral Yonai or made him take this position against the Council?
- A. The Cabinet Council was considered a superfluous organization.
- Q. Was there not any particular thing that offended Yonai or made him take this position?
- A. To the best of my knowledge there was not. There was one incident on January 16, 1938. The Cabinet stated that they would not deal with Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Generalissimo, as they did not recognize him as the head of the Government. The Cabinet Advisory Council was definitely against this incident of the Cabinet and ~~this~~ may have had something to do with the Cabinet's opposition to the Advisory Council.
- Q. Was that during the Cabinet of Prince Konoye and was Prince Konoye also offended at the Council?
- A. Prince Konoye took the side of the Cabinet as a member of the Cabinet. However, I consider that Prince Konoye did advocate cooperation with the Advisory Council. The China incident was originally called the North China incident and it was hoped that it could be restricted to North China but as a result of the Cabinet not heeding and opposing the Advisory Council it was considered by the Advisory Council that it expanded and became the China incident.
- Q. Well, then, do I understand that the Advisory Council was opposed to the policy of the Cabinet with reference to the China incident which was a war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was General Sugiyama's attitude concerning the council?
- A. I do not know because General Sugiyama never told me.
- Q. How did the General and the Advisory Council find out that the Cabinet resented their attitude concerning the China incident?
- A. Because at the meetings of the Advisory Council each member would express his views and opinions. In November 1937 the first peace feelers were received and were approved of by the Cabinet Advisory Council and Prince Konoye as a member of the Council was aware of the stand taken. And Prince Konoye as a member of the Cabinet would have also advocated this stand in the Cabinet but he does not know just how matters went in the Cabinet.

Q. I understand, then, that Prince Konoye was a member or sat with this Cabinet Advisory Council while he was Premier?

A. He attended the meetings but not as a member.

Q. And were any minutes kept of these meetings, if you know?

A. This Cabinet Advisory Council seemed to be more of an informal meeting than anything else and the members of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister were requested when necessary to be present and to state their views or to receive the advice of the Advisory Council members.

Q. And did they have a Secretary?

A. There was no Secretary.

Q. Did they ever send written advice to the Cabinet?

A. He thinks not. He thinks this is more of Prince Konoye's private organization than anything else.

Q. But the Advisory Council did last through the Hiranuma Cabinet?

A. Until the end of the Yonai Cabinet. I think until the time of the second Konoye Cabinet.

Q. Was it abolished at that time?

A. I think it was abolished at the time of the Tojo Cabinet.

Q. Was he on the Cabinet at the time it was abolished?

A. No. When the Yonai Cabinet was being formed I was requested to take the post of Home Minister but I refused. As Admiral Yonai had opposed the Cabinet Advisory Council Admiral Suetsugu, Mr. Matsuoka and General Matsui resigned from the Council. General Araki was requested by Admiral Yonai to remain in the Advisory Council and I stayed on.

Q. Do I understand that Admiral Yonai wanted or favored the aggressive movements in China and he was, therefore, displeased with the advice of the Cabinet Advisory Council which did not want the war to spread in China?

A. I think Admiral Yonai was also opposed to the spread of the China incident.

Q. Well, then, just what was it that Admiral Yonai objected to about the advice of the Cabinet Advisory Council?

A. He considers Admiral Yonai to have been a very simple straightforward man opposed to complicated matters and perhaps the Admiral considered the Advisory Council as merely added complication. He thinks Admiral Yonai was opposed as a navy man to expansion on the continent.

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Q. Do I understand that after the Council was told that their advice was not wanted any more that all the Cabinet did was get information and compile it? I understand you to say that the Cabinet did not ask and advise any more after this displeasing of YCHAI and after that must I understand that the Advisory Council did nothing but compile information; gave no advice?

A. All the Cabinet Council did was to receive information and reports and the meetings would break up.

Q. Did they still meet once a week regularly?

A. Usually once a week.

Q. And it was during this time that the Navy planes sunk the United States Ship Panay? I wonder if that matter was discussed in the Advisory Council?

A. This caused great consternation, both in the Advisory Council and the Cabinet and the general view was that the matter should be settled to the satisfaction of all parties as soon as possible. Indemnity was paid.

Q. Do you think that a mistake made by the naval officers who were in those planes or had they got out of hand and done it deliberately?

A. I remember the incident very well but I do not remember any details and I have no ideas.

Q. Well, all I meant was your information that the aviators who had done the bombing had exceeded their authority or had made a mistake as to the identity of the ship?

A. I am not in a position to judge.

Q. About what time was it that the Advisory Council was told that their advice was no longer requested; approximate date?

A. I think about 1938 after the Chiang Kai-shek affair.

Q. Was that in the summer or in the fall?

A. I think it was in the spring of 1938.

Q. Well, do I understand then that after the spring of 1938 the Cabinet Advisory Council had nothing to say and gave no advice as to what was to be done in China?

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- A. After the spring of 1938 matters were merely discussed and opinions given at the meetings but these were merely opinions and were not transmitted as advice any where. The newspapers referred to the Cabinet Advisory Council as merely an ornament. An attempt was made to remedy this but no results were obtained.
- Q. Although it had been appointed especially by the Emperor, I assume at the instance of the Premier, for the purpose of helping to solve the China incident?
- A. Actually the thing was Prince Konoye's private scheme and was without power. In an attempt to remedy this Prince Konoye had General Ugaki, a member of the Advisory Council, replace Mr. Hirota as Foreign Minister hoping that he would be able to obtain more cooperation between the Cabinet and the Advisory Council.
- Q. It was before this time that they quit giving advice that the Panay incident occurred, i. e., December 12, 1937? Were you asked to give any advice as to the Panay incident?
- A. No request was received for any advice although matters in connection with the Panay were discussed in the Advisory Council. I repeat that it caused great consternation and cite the instance of Japanese schoolgirls calling on the American Ambassador with apologies from the Nation.
- Q. Also during that time the occupation of Shanghai on November 10, 1937, was made by Japanese joint naval and army forces, primarily naval, was your advice asked?
- A. Advice was tendered to the Cabinet at the time as the Advisory Council still had some power.
- Q. Do you remember what this advice was and was it written or not?
- A. I am not quite sure about that date although it was December.
- Q. My records show that Shanghai was occupied November 10.
- A. I was opposed to these operations as I considered it would merely spread the war in China. I think, generally, the other members of the Advisory Council were of the same opinion. I am pretty sure they were all of the same opinion.
- Q. Did they so advise the Cabinet?
- A. I consider that the Cabinet held the same views. It was just about this time that the peace feelings had originated and the Cabinet favored peace moves.

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- Q. Do I understand then that the occupation of Shanghai, which involved a landing, was done by the Navy, and later the Army, of their own volition and not at the instance of the Cabinet?
- A. I am unable to form a judgment but I am sure that a landing of this description could not be effected without collaboration between the Army and the Navy Ministers and Ministries. In 1932 landings were made in Shanghai. This was during the Manchurian incident. This was done entirely on the initiative of the Navy without orders. The Navy found itself in trouble in Shanghai and requested help from the Army. This was referred to the Government and orders were issued for the general operations that followed.
- Q. You are talking about 1932?
- A. Yes. I know of this instance well but not in connection with the second incident in Shanghai.
- Q. Well, what I meant was that is why I asked the question. According to you then, General, General SUGIYAMA, who was the War Minister, and MITSUMOSYANI, the Naval Minister, must have been responsible for this occupation of Shanghai in November 1937 or December?
- A. Yes, the General Headquarters, Naval General Staff and the General Staff of the Army.
- Q. It was your idea from what information you have that the occupation of Shanghai in 1937 was done with the concurrence of the staff and War Ministries but you know that the one that took place in 1932 was not accomplished with the concurrence of Tokyo ministers and staff. Do I so understand?
- A. Naturally.
- Q. Do you know who the naval officer was that was responsible for moving into Shanghai in 1932 without authority from Tokyo?
- A. I do not remember but it must have been the Vice Admiral or a Rear Admiral. Later Admiral NOMURA went to Shanghai in 1932 and General SHIRAKAWA for the army. And from the Foreign Ministry MR. SHIGEMITSU.
- Q. But, at any rate, whoever was in immediate command when Shanghai was first occupied in 1932, whether the Army or Navy, or both, Commander or Commanders, was responsible for that aggression and without authority of Tokyo?
- A. At the outset the Navy went into Shanghai without orders but the Army followed on orders from Tokyo to save the Navy forces from total destruction.

- Q. How do you know about this?
- A. I was War Minister at the time. As War Minister I ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Shanghai after the armistice had been arranged although the treaty stipulated for the retention of a certain number of Japanese troops in the vicinity of Shanghai. Not one soldier was left. I withdrew them all. I was questioned in the Diet about this.
- Q. That was in the INUKAI Cabinet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did the Navy go into Shanghai at that time?
- A. This landing was the result of an attack on a Japanese priest in Shanghai. The Navy landed forces in connection with this incident and they came into conflict with Chinese forces resulting in battles which finally necessitated in help being sent by the Army.
- Q. The 19th Chinese Army outnumbered the Naval forces and they were endangered after they got there?
- A. I think they outnumbered the Japanese forces. And at that time they considered the 19th Route Army their adversaries and not General Chiang Kai-shek. Their terms were arranged after conferring with the General.
- Q. Getting back to the time you were on the Cabinet Advisory Council in December 1937 there was a nine power conference at Brussels which was concerned with the Nine Power Treaty that the other members claimed Japan had violated. Was that discussed by this Advisory Council?
- A. I remember so little about it that it might not have been discussed.
- Q. Well, as a member of the Cabinet at one time and the Advisory Council, do you know in general about this Nine Power Pact?
- A. I do not remember the details but I know of the existence of this pact.
- Q. Well you know that Japan signed and agreed that she would confer with the other powers before she took any action of aggression in China after the signing of this treaty; did you know that?
- A. I do not remember the articles but I remember that the question of the integrity of China came up in several instances--such as the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty and the return of Tsingtau to China.

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- Q. How about the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928? Do you remember that?
- A. The names are familiar to me but I do not remember the details of this pact as I am not a diplomat.
- Q. When you were a member of the Cabinet was Japan's obligations under these treaties ever discussed in connection with the Chinese fighting and the Japanese troops occupying parts of China and Manchuria?
- A. I think the question did come up but after I became Education Minister I was not much concerned with these matters and no questions were referred to me.
- Q. How about the time you were War Minister?
- A. I became War Minister after the commencement of the Manchurian incident. I think that the matters concerning these questions were discussed but I was mostly concerned with the settlement of the trouble in Manchuria.
- Q. General, is it your attitude that Manchuria was a part of China or a separate country in 1931 and 1932?
- A. Manchuria has been the scene of considerable strife between different nations, e. g., the instance of Russia into Manchuria and as a result of which the Japanese-Russian War was fought. Also, the Boxer troubles. Japan has always wanted order in Manchuria owing to the proximity to Japan. For many years there was no peace in Manchuria but finally Japan achieved a certain amount of peace there and she has always considered Manchuria as special territory although there is no doubt that it is a part of China, for example, the case of Chang Tso-lin, the war lord, who was virtual ruler of Manchuria, is an example of the unrest and lack of order in Manchuria under the Chinese.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Denis Kildoyle, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 10 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Denis Kildoyle
(Interpreter's Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21 day of Feb. 1946

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Jewel E. Newman, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Jewel E. Newman
(Stenographer's Signature)

Certificate of Interrogator

I, Thomas H. Morrow, Colonel, ASN G-140286, certify that on _____ day of _____, 1946, personally appeared before me General Sadao ARAKI, and according to Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

(Place)

Thos H Morrow
(Name and Rank)

Col.

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE July 3

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2344

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 2217

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Stefanich
ROOM NO. 374

*Original presented
in Court*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2341-2353, inclusive

2 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Transcripts of Interrogations of
General ARAKI, Sadao

Date: (See Below) Original Copy Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao, et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression, Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Interrogations of ARAKI have been assigned following
document numbers: (All are from Document Division Exh.290)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2341	5 Feb 46
2342	18 Jan 46
2343	19 Jan 46
2344	22 Jan 46 (A.M.)
2345	22 Jan 46 (P.M.)
2346	6 Feb 46
2347	12 Feb 46
2348	14 Feb 46
2349	15 Feb 46
2350	18 Feb 46
2351	20 Feb 46
2352	23 Feb 46
2353	25 Feb 46

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2341-
2353,
inclusive.