

D.O. 619-B-11

Extracts from Interrogation of

SATO, Kenryo

(Ex.2238)

27 April 1946 - p. 2

\* \* \* \* \*  
Q. How long have you known General TOJO?

\* \* \* \* \*  
A. At one time I was not very close to him, this being the period when I was a professor at the War College, until I became spokesman, the reason being that Maj. Gen. OBATA, who was the head of the college, was not very close to TOJO, and, being a member of his staff, I also became the same way.  
\* \* \* \* \*

27 April 1946 - pp. 3 & 4

Q. Did you use your influence to have Gen. TOJO made Premier?

A. No, that is a mistake. There was nothing like that.

Q. Did you ever talk with senior statesman ABE about his appointment, or with HAYASHI, Senjuro? (Q. by Interpreter: Is he also a senior statesman? A. by Interrogator: They are both senior statesmen.)

A. No, however, there is something I would like to explain with regard to that.

Q. Certainly, go ahead.

A. The Japanese politicians believe that I influenced ABE and HAYASHI in the appointment of TOJO. However, that is not the truth. The explanation is this: In October of

1941 Premier KONOYE resigned just at the time when the United States and Japanese negotiations were critical. This left the Army in a difficult position. In order to stabilize the political situation, TOJO had thought that some person like Prince HIGASHIKUNI would be the logical successor. However, since the appointment of a Prince to that position is not the usual thing, TOJO felt that his appointment would create more difficulty than even the international situation. I was sent by TOJO to see ABE and HAYASHI to explain this problem. Following my visit, which the news reporters know of, there was a meeting of the senior statesmen and the next day the appointment of TOJO to the position of Premier was announced. It was in this way that the public believed that I had influenced TOJO's selection. Unfortunately ABE and HAYASHI are from the same Prefecture as myself.

Accepting the story as the truth, I would like to add the following: When the newspapermen came to me telling me of the Imperial Decree for TOJO to form a new Cabinet, I had not known of it nor did I believe it. I told the newsmen that they must be mistaken.

- Q. General, will you please take a sheet of paper and draw a graph showing the relation of the Military Affairs Bureau to the War Ministry and to the other Bureaus of the War Ministry - just a graph or a diagram?
- A. (General SATO drew a chart "Draft of Organization of War Ministry" which is attached as Exhibit 1.)
- Q. Have you shown on the chart the Prisoners of War Information Bureau and the Prisoners of War Management Bureau?
- A. (General SATO made additions to the chart.)
- Q. Did all of the other Bureaus here deal directly with the Vice-Minister of War, or did their matters go through your Bureau?
- A. They were all able to go directly to the Vice Minister or Minister. However, when the matter concerned some other Bureau they maintained liaison with that Bureau concerned.

27 April 1946 - pp 3 & 4 (cont.)

Q. That is, your Bureau was the policy making Bureau of the Ministry. Wasn't that true?

A. Generally speaking, our department handled the policies of the following: Organization, budget, system, regulations, national defense, military administration of occupied territories, and finally domestic and foreign affairs which concerned the Army.

\* \* \* \* \*

29 April 1946 - p. 7

\* \* \* \* \*

Q. Weren't you in on the conference at which that matter was decided?

A. No, I was not there.

Q. Were you consulted about the matter?

A. No.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q. We have correspondence from the Commander of the China Expeditionary Force to the War Minister, asking for advice concerning the disposition of these fliers.

A. You have the correspondence?

Q. Yes, I have seen the correspondence and the direction came from the War Ministry.

A. I am not familiar with the directive. I do not know through what channels that directive had been presented. As far as I can remember, it did not come through me.

\* \* \* \* \*

29 April 1946 - p. 12

\* \* \* \* \*  
Q. Were you aware of the Imperial Conference which was held on the 6th day of September 1941?

A. I do not recall if there was one on that date, inasmuch as I did not attend them, but there may have been.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q. Were you ever a member of the Supreme War Council?

A. I was not a member. However, I was something like a Staff Secretary.

\* \* \* \* \*

29 April 1946 - p. 13

Q. You felt, did you not, during the fall of 1941 that war with the United States was inevitable?

A. No.

Q. Didn't you so advise General TOJO?

A. No, I have never told him that. I was always in opposition to becoming involved in any other war before settling the China affair. I was in earnest about finishing the China affair.

\* \* \* \* \*

29 April 1946 - p.15

\* \* \* \* \*

Q. It is further stated that normally it was not the duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to order other Bureau Chiefs, but technically the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the superior officer to the Chiefs of Bureaus such as the Prisoners of War Information Bureau.

A. No, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau could never order any other Bureau.


\* \* \* \* \*

DRAFT OF ORGANIZATION OF WAR MINISTRY

(EXHIBIT 1)

MINISTER OF WAR

VICE MINISTER OF WAR



DD#①  
619-13-11

翻譯者 藤井忠太郎

佐藤賢了に宛する訊問書より抜粋

昭和二十一年四月二十七日 二頁

質問、貴下は東條大将と知合つてからどの位になりますか。

答、私が陸軍の代辯者となる位の或る時期—それは私

が陸軍大学教官たる時期でした。—私は東條大将と極く親密であつたこと、決してありません。その理由は陸軍

大学校長であつた小畑少将が軍務と極く親しい関係であつたからで、そして私は小畑少将の部下であつたので私も同じ方向を歩んだのであります。

昭和二十一年四月二十七日 三—四頁

質問、貴下は東條大将を首相とするために運動しましたか。

答、いゝえ、それは向違ひです。そんなことは全然ありません。

質問、貴下は軍務を任命することに就て政界の長老の阿部

又は林<sup>銑</sup>十郎と話合つたことがありますが。(阿部の

質問、彼も政界の長老ですか。訊問者の答、二人とも政界の長老です。)

Combined Fleet Headquarters submitted the following demands to the central authorities.

(a) Select highly trained air crew members from both carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron to fill vacancies in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons, thereby increasing the number of carrier planes on both air force squadrons and particularly the number of fighter planes.

(b) Fill the vacancies in the Fifth Air Force Squadron with trained personnel, experienced in service on carriers, from land air force units.

Concerning the two above items, there was no other way to supply men for item (b) other than to pull out training officers and enlisted men instructors from the training corps. The Personnel Bureau Naval Aviation Board showed great reluctance to do this because it would inconvenience the training and supplying of future air crew personnel. The demands of the Combined Fleet, however, were strong enough to enforce its wishes and it was finally done.

6. The Pearl Harbor Attack was thus conducted by a temporarily organized task force consisting of the First Air Force Fleet as its main body. It was mid October 1941 when the shifting of necessary personnel and the formation of the First Air Force Fleet was completed. Because the Pearl Harbor Attack was not thought possible unless rigid training be enforced, it was necessary to carry out practice schedules until late November. But as the embarkation date was around the middle of November, it left port without even a month's training.

As a result of studies made on the Pearl Harbor Attack Operation, daylight, or if possible, before daybreak, as the time of attack was desirable. But due to such circumstances as the insufficient training of air crew personnel, the accompanying lack of confidence in taking off from the carriers and flying in formation, together with navigating before daybreak, were problems which caused a change in the schedule of the attack so that it

答、い。詰合つたことはありませぬ。併しその件は就し  
私は説明したいことが少しあります。

答、どうぞ、説明して下さい。

答、軍條の任命に關し、私の所部及林を動かさ  
なと日本の政治家達は信じてゐますが、それは事實  
ではありませぬ。事情は次の通りです。アメリカ合衆国  
と日本との交渉が危機に瀕した昭和十六年十月に

近衛首相は辞職しました。その結果、陸軍は苦境に

立ちまゐりました。政局を安定させるために東久衛宮

殿下のやうな人が當然後継者となつたやうに

東條は考へました。併し皇族が首相の地位に就くの

は慣例ではありませぬから、殿下の任命されれば

国際情勢よりも一層困難な情勢を誘致する

たうらうと軍條は考へました。私は軍條の命令に

よりこの問題を説明するため、阿部、林に会ひました。

新聞記者は知つてゐます。私のこの訪問に引續して



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重臣

政界の長老諸氏の會合が行はれ、その翌日東條の首相に任命されたことが発表され、東條の起用に就し私が運動したと一般に信じられたのは、この意味に於ては不幸にして阿部と村とは私と同縣人です。

以上の話を事實であると認めるとして、私は次の事實を附け加へて置きたいのです。即ち新聞記者達が私を訪向して東條が新聞記者組織すべしとの勅令が發せられ、右ことを告げられたとき、私はそのことを知りませんでした。又それを信じさせられた。私は新聞記者達にそれ君達の考違ひに相違ないと申しました。

質問、將軍、軍務局と陸軍省との關係及その他陸軍省の組織の關係を云ふ圖表を一枚の紙に書き下さうませんか。圖表が宜しいのです。

答、佐藤將軍は書證第一として添附されてある

「陸軍省の組織の圖表」を書く。

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「陸軍省の組織の圖表」を書く。

質問 書下は圖表に戦時後援情報局及び戦時後援の管理局を記載しなすか。

答 佐野の將軍は圖表にこれらを加へる。

質問 上の圖表に示されてゐる他のすべての局は陸軍次官と直接交渉して事務を処理しなすか、又はこれらの局の事務は軍務局を経由してゐるか。

答 これらの局は直接陸軍次官又は陸軍大臣と交渉することかゝるまいか。併し、事務局が他の局と密接があつたときは、これらの局はその局と連絡を保ちまいか。

昭和二十一年四月二十七日 三―四頁

質問 即ち軍務局は政策の樹立をその職務としてゐるが陸軍省自体の局がたの心はありませぬか。

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答、一般的に申し上げますと、陸軍省は次の事項に關する  
 政策を取扱つて居りました。即ち、組織、豫算、  
 制度、軍律、國防、占領地域の軍政、最後に  
 陸軍に關係するあつた国内問題及對外問題です。

昭和三十一年四月二十九日 七頁

質問、貴下はその問題が決定されたその會議に出席  
 して居ませんか。

答、はい、私は出席して居ません。

質問、貴下はその問題に就て相談を受け居ませんか。

答、いえ、受けません。

質問、それらの飛行士の処分は閣下と意見をおめた  
 支那派遣軍總司令官より陸軍大臣宛  
 の書翰を吾々は持つて居ます。

答、その書翰をお持ちです。

質問、さうです。私はその書翰を見ました。そして陸軍  
 省の指示命令が發せられたのです。

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答、私はその指令のことはよく知りません。ごしな経路  
 を通してその指令が送られたか私は知りません。  
 私の記憶してある範囲内ではその指令は私を  
 通して送られたうちはありません。

昭和十一年四月二十九日 十三頁

質問、昭和十六年九月一日に行はれた御前会議  
 を貴下は御存知でしたか。

答、私は出席しませんでした。たうが  
 その日に御前會議が行はれたかどうか  
 思ひ出すことが出来ません。併し、御前會議  
 は行はれたのも知れません。

質問、貴下は最高戦争指導會議の一員でしたか。

答、私は一員ではありません。たうが、  
 貴下は戦時体制のやうな  
 役を務めたか。

昭和十一年四月二十九日 十三頁

質問、貴下は対米戦は不可避であると昭和十三年  
 の秋に考へておられたか。



sporadic.

It was the northeastern monsoon period and we knew that the aircraft carriers AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU, as well as the destroyers, would not have sufficient cruising range if refueling en route was impossible due to the strong winds and high waves. As for refueling destroyers on the high seas, we had had considerable training and experience and in the event refueling was impossible, these ships could turn back and the operation be carried on by cruisers and heavier type ships.

The problem was different in regard to aircraft carriers. If three out of six participating were omitted, the operation could not be performed. Consequently, after many studies were made, it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottomed sections and stacking fuel drums outside the storage rooms. Then, in case refueling was impossible, these ships would be able to return to a point at  $160^{\circ}$  east longitude.

However, loading fuel into the double bottomed sections of the aircraft carrier AKAGI and also the reserve fuel tanks was prohibited by naval regulations considering the strength of the ship's structure. I therefore entered into negotiations with proper officials, attempting to neutralize this naval regulation, but achieved no success. Whereupon the Commander in Chief of the Fleet was forced to take full responsibility regarding the possibility of an accident occurring and the decision was made to load fuel in the reserve fuel tanks and double bottom sections, although not in compliance with regulations.

The Task Force which was temporarily organized for the Pearl Harbor Attack was to embark from their port either alone or in small groups around 15 November 1941 in accordance with Combined Fleet Headquarters orders, and rendezvous at Takan Bay by 22 November. After refueling, the Task Force left the bay at 0600 hours 26 November to the next stand-by point at  $42^{\circ}$  north latitude,  $170^{\circ}$  west longitude.

During this operation, there were two important problems which

答、はい、さうは思ひませんでした。

質問、貴下は軍務大將に對してさう忠告をせられたか。

答、はい、~~はい~~、私はさうは軍務大將に申ませ  
んてした。支那軍變を解決する前に他の  
戦争に捲き込まれることに就て私は常に支那  
へのためを考えた。私は支那軍變を終息させるに  
ては就て真剣でした。

昭和十一年四月二十九日 十五頁

質問、普通軍務局長が他の局長達に命  
令するのはその職務であつたと陳述され  
るますが、技術的に言つて軍務局長は戦  
争情報局のやうな局の局長達より  
先任者であつたか。

答、いゝ、軍務局長は他の局に對して命令するこ  
とが出来ませんでした。

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陸軍者の組織の圖表

(書證一)

陸軍大臣

陸軍次官

大臣官房

人事局

軍務局

兵務局

管理局

動員計畫局

医務局

法務局

戦時保身管理局

戦時保身情報局

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