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left ^{for} ~~to~~ the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal to confer with.

Before long the third KONOE Cabinet resigned, and the same steps were taken. Asked to answer to an Imperial question as to the incoming Cabinet, Marquis KIDO again called a meeting of ex-premiers to consult with. Taking their views into consideration, he had made up his mind to recommend General TOSO as the head of the succeeding Cabinet. ~~By this way and~~ By that time a political usage that, at the change of the government, the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal recommends the head of the next government on his responsibility after consulting with the

~~conference~~ of ex-premiers had been established,

a gist of the chapter, "the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal"

from "Research of the Cabinet System" by Tanisho

YAMAZAKI, councillor of the Legislative Bureau.

(p. 315-p. 326)

translator

KUME Ai

Mar. 1,
T. H. H. H.

Cabinet 3

In relation to Imperial Rule Assistance Association. (Jan. 7)

1. re Enacting of Regulations for Local Planning Committee of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. (Report) (Jan. 7)

1. re ~~the~~ matters to be thoroughly understood in the February Ordinary Assemblies.

Regular Meetings (of various Assemblies such as Town Assembly, Village Assembly and Neighbourhood Assembly) (Jan. 11)

1. re Renewal of Officials attached to ^{a certain} organization (Jan. 21)

1. re ~~the~~ matters to be thoroughly understood in March Regular Meetings (Feb. 15)

1. re ~~the~~ matters to be thoroughly understood in the April Regular Meetings (Mar. 13)

1. re Temporary Setting up of Labour Section under the National Exercise Bureau, and also re Amendment of ^{the General Affairs Bureau} Rules for allotting Duties of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. (Mar. 18)

Temporary

- 1. re Setting up of Importance Movement Drive Group (Mar. 16)
- 1. re Unifying the Japan Aerial Ladies' Society into the Japan Ladies' Society (Report) (Apr. 1)
- 1. re ~~the~~ matters to be thoroughly understood in the May Regular Meetings (Apr. 13)
- 1. re National Celebration of the Emperor's Birth Day (Apr. 13)
- 1. re Dispatch of Asia Development Mission (May 2)
- 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the June Regular Meetings. (May 8)
- 1. re Partial Amendment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Movement Regulations as well as the Office Rules for allotting duties (Apr. 5)
- 1. re Enacting of Regulations for the Training Hall of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Apr. 6)
- 1. re Officials' Office Routine (Apr. 15)
- 1. re ~~Amendment of Office Regulations as well as its Training Hall Regulations.~~ (Apr. 21)
- 1. re Partial Amendment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association's Office Rules for allotting duties as

I.R.A.A.

Paraph

Rules for allotting duties

(Apr. 21)

- well as of its Training Hall Regulations (Apr 21)
1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the July Regular Meetings (June 14)
 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the August Regular Meetings (July 11)
 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the September Regular Meetings (Aug. 9)
 1. re Partial Amendment of Regulations of Asia Development Headquarters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (June 8)
 1. re Partial Amendment of the I. R. A. A's Planning Committee Regulations as well as Local Planning Committee Regulations (June 13)
 1. re Setting up of the I. R. A. A's Emergency Measures Headquarters (July 4)
 1. re Partial Amendment of the I. R. A. Movement Regulations, re Amendment the I. R. A. A's Office Rules for allotting duties (Sept. 19)
 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the October Regular Meetings (Sept. 8)
 1. re Time for Worshipping the Grand Shrine at Ise

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- from distance on the day of the Harvest Festival (Sept. 18)
1. re National Prayer on the occasion of the Movement intensifying Soldiers Protection (Sept. 21)
 1. re Matters to be understood in the November Regular Meetings (Oct. 16)
 1. re Celebration of the Anniversary of the Birthday of the Emperor Meiji (Oct. 23)
 1. re Addition to Matters to be thoroughly understood in the November Regular Meetings (Oct. 25)
 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the December Regular Meetings (Nov. 14)
 1. re Outline of effecting the Whole National Worshiping at Shrines (Obeying the Imperial Command) (Nov. 29)
 1. re Matters to be thoroughly understood in the January Regular Meetings (Dec. 14)
 1. re Outline of Movement for Returning Holidays at the beginning ^{to} the end of the year (Dec. 23)
 1. re New Year Celebration in the year 1945 (Dec. 26)

By Kentaro
Mirakami

RECORD (II)

Revised
Perf. retrans. labels
J. Nishikawa

Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel
Sakichi Mitsui
(born on March 5, 1893)

The ~~said~~ ^{above} person made the following
statement before me ~~at~~ the Tokyo Military
garrison Prison on ~~the 16th of~~ May 16, 1936:

1. "My name is Sakichi Mitsui."

2. "The relation between General
Masaki and ~~me~~ ^(M.E.): ~~Since~~ ^{After} I took office
in the ^{Investigation} ~~Legal~~ Section of the Ministry of
War ^{in 1933} I visited General Masaki some
two times, Besides which I ~~did not~~ ^{did not}
talk ~~with~~ with him on important matters till
the Aizawa trial was held.

~~From that time~~ ^{From that time} I ~~became~~ ^{agreed to} become a ~~defense~~ ^{pleader} attorney
~~for~~ ^{in the} Aizawa trial;

(1) ~~At the end of the~~ ^{toward the} last year I visited
General Masaki and reported ^{to} him that I
~~had complied with the advocacy for Aizawa.~~ ^{agreed} ~~to become~~ ^{to become} a pleader

case. The ^(details) ~~contents~~ of our conversation, ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{during} that interview ^{are} ~~was~~ the same as ^{that which} ~~have~~ I ~~have~~ ^{related to} ~~referred in the inquiry to~~ Captain Toyonaga ^{in the} ~~last time,~~ ^(examinations) though I made a mistake ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ saying that I visited him ^{during} ~~at the beginning~~ ^{the latter part} of ~~the~~ ~~end of~~ the last year. ^(In January, this year)

(2) Adjutant officer Fujiwara came for me, ^{being ordered to do so by General Masaki, therefore,} ~~the general's adjutant Fujiwara who was~~ ~~ordered by the General Masaki and sent~~ for me on one of the days of last January. I visited the general ^(at) his residence on the following day (11 January). In that interview the general ^{did some explaining concerning} ~~explained~~ about ~~the~~ the Three ^{Army} ~~Chiefs~~ ^{fs} ~~Conference~~ and the ^{Shifting} ~~change in~~ ^(of personnel) ~~staffs~~ under Masaki's Personal Administration. ^(In short) ~~The point of his story was~~ ^(consisted of) the gist of ~~these~~ ^{the} conversations ^(that took place in the) ~~the~~ Three ^{Chiefs} ~~Conference~~ ^(explained according to the succession) ~~of events,~~ ^{of events,} the contents of which, as a whole, corresponds to that of the ^{Chief retainers} ~~clique of Treachery and~~ ^{lawlessness} ~~found in the "Mysterious Document,"~~ ^{the} ~~Reprehensible Document.~~

(The General took occasion to say, "I did not consent then the general said, I have never agreed until lately. Since things turned out that way, it never could have been a conference.")
happened in such way, our deliberation was not set'."

3. Question: "What does ~~it~~ ^{that} mean?"

Answer: "It means: 'As I ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~depositioned~~ ^{depositioned} compelled to ~~do so~~ ^{do so} in my office ~~lately~~ ^{lately} regardless of the fact that I refused to ~~do so~~ ^{do so} until ~~recently~~ ^{recently}, it cannot be termed a Three Chiefs' ~~with the so-called three chiefs deliberation conference by the regulations governing the military organizations~~ ^{with the so-called three chiefs deliberation conference by the regulations governing the military organizations} under the stipulation of the regulation concerning the military organization'."

4. Question: "What is your impression of the trespass against the Supreme prerogative in ~~the violation of the prerogative of supreme command in connection with the Inspector's preceding story?~~ ^{the Masaki resignation case as told in the preceding story?} ~~General of Military Education Masaki's resignation?~~"

Answer: "(It is not for us to discuss anything in the nature of trespass against the prerogative of supreme command, ~~the Supreme prerogative~~ ^{the Supreme prerogative} it is not within) the limit of our affairs to discuss, but I can understand Aizawa's conduct, too. And I felt that the so-called 'Reproach'

"(Mysterious) ~~Sensible~~ Document' ^{is telling the truth.} ~~might have been~~ True."

5. Question: "What facts ^(became) clear to you when General Masaki was discharged ~~apprehended~~ ~~in connection with General~~ ~~from the post of (Director Chief of Military Education?)~~ ~~Masaki's dismissal from the office of~~ ~~Inspector-General of Military Education?~~"

Answer: "It ^(became clear to) ~~made me~~ clear to me that the General's dismissal involved a one-sided ~~united~~ ~~evidently~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~general~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~dismissed~~ ~~unilaterally~~ ~~regardless~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~regulation~~ ~~of~~ ~~military~~ ~~organization~~"

6. Question: "What was the purpose of his invitation on ^{the} ~~1st~~ ~~of~~ ~~last~~ ~~January?~~"

Answer: "I think ^(wanted to tell me) the general ~~had~~ ~~wanted~~ ~~to~~ ~~suggest~~ ~~me~~ ~~what~~ ~~I~~ ~~might~~ ~~keep~~ ~~in~~ ~~mind~~ ~~as~~ ~~an~~ ~~Uzawa's~~ ~~deputy~~ ~~attorney~~ ^(he wanted me to) ~~pleader~~ ~~for~~"

(3) I visited ^(The) ~~General's~~ ~~Masaki's~~ ~~residence~~ ^(during the early part) ~~at the beginning~~ of last February, and ^(Told) ~~reported~~ him that I had expressed my opinion to some ^(of the leaders) ~~chief~~ ~~staffs~~ of the ~~(Ministry of War)~~ on ~~27~~ ~~January~~, ⁽²⁷⁾ ~~and~~ ^(without success) ~~failed~~ ~~to~~ ~~make~~ ~~them~~ ~~understand~~ ~~my~~ ~~view~~."

I solicited him to ^(join) shake hands with them ^(by some means) ~~in any way.~~ I think the general answered that ~~it is not an antagonism of feelings~~ ^(it was not a case of antagonism of feelings) ~~emotional had feeling against them.~~

7 Question: "Then, how did you ^(view) feel the general's attitude toward this problem?"

Answer: "I ^(thought) ~~felt~~ ^(though) that the general's ~~notion was that, though he was not~~ ^{yet he felt that he} against the conciliation with them, ~~his~~ ^{should not act contrary to his conscience,} ~~conscience would be maintained in any~~

^(he did not want to) 8. Question: "What ^(do you) ~~does it~~ mean by ~~acting~~ ^{acting} contrary to his conscience? ~~that his conscience would be maintained in any case?~~"

Answer: "There are ~~rumors~~ ^(rumors) ~~going around~~ ^{I think it means,} meaning as though the General ~~his conscience would not admit him~~ ^{was contented (did not object to)} ~~if he would be soothed with~~ ^{his} dismissal and I am of the opinion that his ~~leaving the rumors pending, which was~~ ^{conscience would not permit him to affect a} ~~making people believe as if the general~~ ^{conciliation without clarifying that point,} ~~was approved by his dismissal.~~

9. Question: "Did not ^(you) refer

(some definite actions)
to ~~the tangible movement~~ of the 'younger officers' in that talk?

answer: "No, ~~not a single word, out of~~
to it at all. ~~As a whole I said no more than what I~~
told the military leaders." ~~the content of the letter~~
was no more than what I reported
to a military chief staff."

10. The relation between General Masaki and me during ~~this case~~ ^(the present incident).

I think it was on the night of February 26 ~~at night on 26, February, 1936~~ happened in the corridor in front of the ~~old-de-camp's~~ room at the Army Minister's official residence. ~~That~~ ~~me on the corridor in front of the Minister's~~ I met General Masaki, who came towards ~~subsidiary room in the official residence~~ me from a distance. ~~of the War Minister, though I hardly~~ remember the place. Then the General

asked me, "I have been looking for my ~~old-de-camp and you. Where have you been?~~ ~~adjutant and you have not seen him?~~" And he said something to ~~and he made some~~

this effect: "I went to the Imperial Court to ~~talk to me, meaning, I went to the~~ see what could be done but things are not going ~~on so smoothly in the Court, so I wish you would~~ ~~would not go as far as to~~ ~~try to calm them down, (as I had expected)~~ ~~please soothe them.~~ I hardly

"I don't remember the words the ~~general's speech,~~ ^{wordily} but

General used on that occasion but at any

rate he ~~used~~ words meaning I made some
~~he meant that though he had made~~
~~efforts at the Imperial Court but things are not~~
~~going on as I thought it would.~~
~~would go as hoped at first.~~ The inter-
view ^(did) ^{last} not more than four or five
minutes. ~~long.~~ I think Colonel

Teiichi Suzuki ^(was there at that time) ~~would have been~~
~~in the room at that time, nevertheless~~
^(Nevertheless) I cannot remember ^(to have met him in)
in the ^(aid-de-camp) ^(I still think)
Ministers' subsidiary room. ~~he~~
^(he spoke to me standing in the corridor.)
~~all the while.~~ Even just now I

think we had a talk standing on that
~~corridor.~~ ^(I do not remember whether I said)
~~and I cannot remember~~
^(or not)
if I said him answering his speech,

We must reform ^(effect a) ^(of) state politics
by ^(in answer to the general's speech)
~~setting up a~~ Yamamoto Cabinet. ~~But I~~

^(It is more likely I said that)
~~may have said~~ in the presence
of His Excellency ^(the) Vice-Minister
attended by Colonel Suzuki ^(low) the
evening of the same day ^(previous to my)
^(meeting) ~~encounter~~ with General Masaki).

I ^(did not meet) ~~had never~~ met with the adjutant
Fujiwara ~~before I met~~ General Masaki
^(previous to my meeting with)

on the night of the 26th

11. Question: (From The Time) you became Aizawa's ~~defense~~ ^{pleader} attorney, what impressions have you ^{received from} had of General Masaki ^(in relation to) ~~concern~~ with regards to the trespass against the supreme prerogative ~~of the violation of the prerogatives of~~ ^{question of} the supreme command in connection with the staff change of the Inspector-General of the Director General of Military Education?

Answer: (speak to) "He did not ~~show~~ me ~~such~~ much indignance about the ~~matter~~ ^{appearance}, but I ~~could~~ ^{could} easily see that he ~~had~~ ^{was} mortified. At any rate, I was clearly aware by his attitude ^{anyhow}, it was not a satisfied attitude of that he was ~~not~~ ^{very} happy about it. ^{of his feeling, I felt from his appearance.}"

12. Question: "Who else beside the Army Leaders you expressed your opinion to on the 27th of January did you acquaint your ~~own~~ ^{opinion} ~~of~~ ^{to} Chief Staff whom you advised on 27th January?"

Answer: "Around the 9th or 10th of February, I related in detail to Vice-Minister FURUSHO from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. for about two hours over the telephone for about two hours, 1:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m., to this effect: ~~and~~ "If the matter ~~is~~ ^{is} left to drift along in the present state, we ~~are~~ ^{are} afraid that they may take the will be in danger because they might resort to force."

practical action if the thing would go
~~in this way.~~ I think the situation is
~~now in danger.~~ I was in bed from illness
at that time. I read ~~and~~ in the evening paper
~~called him up by telephone for which a~~
that day an article saying that Lieutenant-General Hashi-
~~moto would be summoned to take the witness stand. He is~~
~~being called, and read in the evening paper~~
not a good choice as a pleader and considering
~~of the same day that Lieutenant-General~~
this decision from the standpoint of "time", I ~~could not~~
~~Hashimoto would be summoned who~~
began to think whether it was not the intention of
~~as a witness, while that was against~~
the Army leaders to place the responsibility entirely
~~myself as an attorney, and further~~
on the Lieutenant-General Hashimoto. On the
~~was afraid that the military chief~~
other hand, I had heard rumours at that time
~~staff might have intended to turn~~
saying that the generals were carrying out secret
~~plans to try them by~~
plans to try them by
responsible, if the Lieutenant-General
Court-martial by assuming that there non-existence
Hashimoto had been summoned in connection
of a trespass against the Supreme prerogative,
~~with them.~~ On the other hand
I was greatly distressed because I did not know
~~what the situation would lead to if a~~
~~some generals had been devising~~
trial by court-martial was to be held and ~~the~~
schemes to enforce the court-martial
so much check was placed upon the pleader, I
to recognize that the prerogative of
couldn't bear the thought, so I got up and made
~~supreme command had never been~~
the long speech over the telephone
~~was much afraid that~~

~~the situation might turn hopeless if
the court martial or the attorney were
oppressed in such way. I could not help
getting up boldly and called him up
by telephone for a long while. Then his
His Excellency^{the} Vice-Minister answered,
(as follows:)~~

a. The summon of Lieutenant General
Hashimoto ~~has not been made through the Dietates
of the Army. ~~It is the doing of the Military Court, ^{is}~~
Only the court martial
was concerned.~~

b. ~~I~~ ^(Told) ~~be requested me~~ ^(to rest at ease) ~~to feel easy,~~
because there will not be a trial by court martial
~~as they would never oppress the court
or a check placed on the pleader.
martial or the attorney.~~

c. ~~He further stated that he was is on
the watch regarding the dangers involving the
about the standing dangerous situation
young officers.
of the younger officers.~~

~~I told the Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau, when I visited him on the 5th or 6th of
February, when I visited him on some
February, to talk to him on the question as to how
the trials should be handled, the frame of mind,
the problem of dealing with the trial,
of the young officers is preventing meneluz,
I reported that the situation
The Chief of the Bureau said he was on
of the younger officers~~

Translator's Note

insert a word here.

the watch that they will not resort to force.

I don't remember the date but I reported the same to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, though I did not refer to the matter in concrete form. I just said that if things went on this way we might become involved in some complications and that we must bring the army together as soon as possible.

To Colonel Nishimura, I referred only a few points just before I met the army leaders on the 27th of January.

13. Question: "Did you meet Lieutenant-General Kashii immediately before the outbreak of the incident?"

Answer: "No, no such fact exists."

Translator's Note

Col. Mitsui used a word here which has a definite meaning in ~~his own a different meaning, the~~

After the outbreak of the incident, that is, about ~~the~~ martial law at about 11 a.m. on the 28th of February, I called upon the ~~28~~ ~~February~~ after that trouble, and Commander of the Headquarters of the forces enforcing ~~offered~~ ~~him~~ that ~~it~~ was afraid ~~the~~ martial law. I was afraid that if we should ~~situation~~ ~~might~~ ~~have~~ ~~more~~ ~~confused~~ initiate an attack we would cause confusion ~~through~~ ~~the~~ ~~commencement~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~charge~~, and in order to prevent that confusion I told ~~and~~ ~~therefore~~ ~~he~~ ~~had~~ ~~better~~ ~~consult~~ him that I thought it best save the situation ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~advice~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~throne~~ to settle by ~~acting~~ ~~in~~ ~~consultation~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~Court~~ ~~advisers~~. ~~the~~ ~~situation~~ ~~so~~ ~~as~~ ~~to~~ ~~prevent~~ ~~the~~ ~~con~~

Col. Mitsui used words here

~~fusion~~ ~~previously~~. Beside this ~~visit~~ ~~talk~~ ~~with~~ ~~him~~ I have never seen him even ~~during~~ ~~this~~ ~~case~~ while the incident was going on.

14. Question: "What do you mean Court the Advisors? ~~To the Throne?~~"

Answer: "at that time, I was thinking ~~about~~ ^(of) the petition to the Emperor ^(requesting His Majesty to set up) a new cabinet, ~~and~~ ^(and) the ^(promulgation) ~~publication~~ ^(of) ~~any~~ ^(rescript) ~~order~~ ^(on) ~~concerning~~ the general reorganization of the state to achieve the Restoration of Showa, therefore, requested ~~it~~, ~~their~~ ~~advice~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Throne~~ ~~in~~ ~~such~~ ~~way~~." ~~that they should advise~~

That they advise the Throne
in this regard on the one
hand while carrying the situation on the other.

15. Question: "What was Lieutenant
~~General Kashi's attitude towards this request?~~
~~General Kashi answering to your request?~~"
answer: "He did not speak
at all, ~~he only listened to my~~
~~but only he listened in my opinion.~~"

~~Orally stated by~~
Deponent, Sakichi Mitsui
I ~~had~~ recorded the above and read it
to ~~to~~ the above person who testified
~~the above record was read out~~
it to be true and correct and ~~have~~
~~before the person, who confirmed it and~~
and ~~have~~ therefore set his signature
made his signature and seal impression
and seal upon it.

~~On the day of~~ May 16, 1936
at the Tokyo Military Garrison Prison

Gendamerie Captain
Keijiro Otani
Military Judicial Police Officer

Checked by
Mitoichi SADAYASU

AFFIDAVIT

Teiichi Suzuki, Colonel, ^{Infantry} ~~IJA~~ (aged 49)
Inspector of the
Inspector

~~The~~ Investigation ^{Bureau} Section of the Cabinet

The afore-mentioned person ^{made} ~~presented~~ the following statements to me at the Investigation ^{Bureau} Section of the Cabinet on 2 May 1936:

1. On ~~the day of~~ 26 February I was stationed at the War Minister's official residence. At about 6 p.m. all ^{the} supreme war councillors assembled. So I went to the conference room, opened the door, and entered ~~inside~~. His Excellency Mazaki, who was seated ^(directly facing the door) ~~in the front~~, got up and came straight up to me, and said, "Something terrible has happened. We've got to stop this bloody killing somehow or other. I've got something to tell you and Mitsui." So he and I went to the Minister's ante-room and met Lt.-Col. Mitsui, who was ⁱⁿ the official residence ~~already~~. Then we three talked.

Why His Excellency Mazaki specially called me I have of course no way of knowing.

Means: " - - before it gets really serious." 2

because ~~that~~ ^{was} ~~is~~ ^a ~~matter~~ ^(which belonged to) his own mind. But I imagine he might have thought that there was some connection between the young officers and me.

1. I don't fully remember now what the content of the conversation was. But I recall vaguely that His Excellency Mazaki ~~was~~ repeatedly ~~saying~~ ^{said} something like, "We've got to stop this matter somehow or other without ~~putting fire~~ ^{setting it afire} on it." and "Can't ^{some} anything be done to it?"

I also recall that Lt. Col. Mitsui ~~was~~ insisted ^{on} something like, "We've got to ~~do~~ ^{do} the ~~renovation~~ ^{reformation} of ~~the~~ ^{our} national polity with Admiral Yamamoto at the head."

I remember I said something ~~which~~ ^{to the following effect:} "Besides settling this problem, we've got ~~to do~~ ^{to carry out} the ~~renovation~~ ^{reformation} of ~~our~~ ^{our} national ~~polity~~ ^{Government}. ~~And~~ It is not proper for civilians alone to ~~change~~ ^{change} the government, ~~has been~~ ^{which has been} the case heretofore ~~practised~~ ^{practised} only by ~~officials~~ ^{officials} up to now. Hereafter we should ~~was~~ ^{we should} better solicit the views of the War Minister, the ^{Navy} Minister ~~of~~ the ~~Navy~~ ^{the} Chief of Army General Staff, and ~~the~~ ^{the} Chief of the Navy ~~Navy~~ ^{of} and ~~NO~~ ^{NO} as well ~~on~~ ^{on} the

General Staff on the occasions of recommending ^{the succeeding Premier} ~~Minister~~ members; ^{whereby} ~~and by doing so~~ let the restoration of ^{our} the national ^{Government} ~~polity~~ ^{be} started "fairly under way."

As I left the place, after having stayed there for about five minutes, and went back to the room where ^{the} Supreme war councillors ^{were} assembled, I have no knowledge of what the remaining two talked about ~~afterwards~~ thereafter.

As to the time of our conversation, I cannot tell you exactly, as I did not look at ~~the~~ watch then. But I think it was some ^{time} ~~where~~ between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m.

Question: While ^{the} those three ^{of you} ~~persons~~ were talking, didn't you hear Gen. Mozaki ~~talk~~ ^{say} something ^{to the effect} ~~implying~~ that the ^{aroused} ~~excited~~ young officers were saying: "we'll ~~we're~~ going to make Gen. Hayashi write ^{the} resignation paper, and, if he doesn't, we'll ~~going to~~ kill him"?

Answer: No, I did not hear him ^{say} ~~talk~~ anything ^{to that effect} ~~like that~~ then. But I remember

that ^{during} ~~is~~ the same evening (before our talk) Lt.-Col. Harada of the Military ^{Recruiting} Service Section came to tell me, "the ~~WMAA~~ ^{aroused} officers are saying that they ^{will} ~~are going~~ to kill Hayashi, Mutō, and Nemoto", and that I told him to take strict precautions against emergencies lest anything serious should happen by any chance ~~on~~ ^{to} these persons.

^{Deponent:} ~~Stater:~~ Teiichi Suzuki

As the deponent declared the above statements ~~upon recording the above statement~~ ^{as recorded herein were true and correct, he} ~~was offered for the stater's perusal.~~ ^{As} ~~he declared that there was no mistake,~~ ^{the stater} was asked to ^{place his signature and seal thereon} sign his name,

2 May 1936

Masake Akōzu, Captain (MP)
 Military judicial police officer
 Tokyo MP Headquarters

AFFIDAVIT

Tetsuya Kamekawa (aged 46)

The afore-mentioned person ^{made} presented the following statements to me at the Tokyo IMP Headquarters on 9 April 1936:

1. I visited Gen. Mazaki at his residence for the first time in December 1935. The ~~reason~~ ^{purpose} for my visit was to tell him in detail ~~of~~ our opinions ^{for} the Aizawa trial and to obtain his consent. The content of the interview ^{was} being the same as that of the one I had with Gen. Hayashi. ~~Its substance~~ ^{Its substance} was as follows:

(1) It ~~doesn't~~ ^{isn't} do anybody any good ~~as long as~~ ^{for rivalries to exist} we are set up in opposition within the Army. Therefore, ~~the Army~~ must be unified making ~~use of this~~ ^{use of this} opportunity, ~~of the~~ ^{the Army} must be unified. ~~trial~~ For this purpose Ishihara, Hashimoto and Mitsui are ~~carrying~~ ^{working} on the matter in close cooperation with each other ~~one another~~.

(2) ~~To reduce~~ The sentence for Aizawa ^{should be} as light as possible.

(3) ~~Not to bring out~~ The March Incident and the October Incident ^{should not be brought out} at the trial.

Thereupon, Gen. Mazaki said to me, "I've heard you're a philosopher. If you could settle the matter from the standpoint of a scholar, ~~it would be very splendid~~ ^{it would be very splendid}." But ^{as regards} ~~for~~ the Aizawa trial, he didn't ~~state~~ ^{express} his opinion.

1. Again in the early part of February I ~~paid~~ ^{my} visited ~~to~~ the residence of Mazaki.

But this time I went there for the purpose of ~~making a~~ reporting on the progress of the trial (an explanation of ^{the} three propositions ^{made} by Mitsui and the wishes of the young-officers concerning the ~~application~~ ^{petition for summoning} witnesses, etc).

Although Gen. Mazaki approved of the plan ~~to~~ ^{for} reducing the sentence for Aizawa he was of opinion that ^{restraint should be exercised in} ~~the matter of~~ ^{regard} ~~petitioning for~~ ^{to} ~~application~~ ^{petitioning for} of witnesses ^{in a too blunt manner} ~~had better not be too~~ ^{overly} done. On the other hand, having fully ~~agreed~~ ^{agreed} with the idea of ^{unifying} ~~making~~ the

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Army ~~unified at this opportunity of the~~ ^{by using this trial as an opportunity} ~~trial~~, he said; "It must be ~~done that way~~ ^{so} by all means."

I am ~~am~~ reminded ~~me~~ in this connection of what Colonel Hashimoto told me when I ~~looked~~ ^{visited} him up at Mishima in January of this year. He talked of the unification of the Army with a ~~certain~~ tone of confidence and at the same time, ~~apparently~~ ^{apparently} hinted ~~at~~ ^{that he had} ~~having~~ some understanding with ^{the} higher stratum of the Army. So I feel that Col. Hashimoto and others may have been already ^{conducting a movement for understanding among} ~~canvassing them among~~ the people of the higher stratum of the Army.

1. On the occasion of my visit to Gen. Mazaki on the night of 22 February, the main points of my talk were as follows:

- (1) ~~The~~ matter of the appearance of witnesses in court.
- (2) ~~The~~ matter of ^{dropping} ~~withdrawing~~ the trial.
- (3) ~~The~~ matter of ~~bringing~~ giving him a hint suggestion.

~~On~~ the second point, that is the ~~withdrawing~~ ^{dropping}

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of the trial, Gen. Mazaki was fully in favor; and he said "If that ^{could} be done, ~~it would be very fine~~ ^{it should be like nothing better.} ~~it would be like nothing better.~~"

1. The visit ~~on~~ ^{made} 24 February was to ascertain whether or not he had received a notice requesting ~~an information concerning~~ ^{the} his appearance ~~of~~ ^{as} witness, ~~had been received~~ and also whether or not an Imperial sanction ~~for~~ ^{it} had been obtained. ~~So~~ I did not repeat the ~~allusion~~ ^{hint} which I ^{had} given him on the night of 22nd, ~~because~~ ⁱⁿ ~~one of the purposes of talking~~ ^{in hinting} ~~him~~ ^{to him} that matter ~~(the allusion)~~ ^{was} to find out what sort of ~~a~~ man he was. And so when I dropped in to see Nishida on my way home that day, I even told him that Gen. Mazaki was a man of good sense and discretion.

1. I did not make ^{beforehand} a previous telephone call ~~when~~ ^{before} I went to the residence of Mazaki early on the morning of 26 February. And I recall that Gen. Mazaki ^{appeared to be} was quite upset ^{at the time of my visit,} ~~as he appeared to me then.~~

Stater: Tetsuya Kamekawa
Deponent:

No. 2. Affidavit

~~HEARING~~ (the second)

Tetsuya Kamekawa (aged-47) ~~presented~~ ^{given up} ~~at the~~ ^{at the} ~~first~~ ^{first} ~~hearing~~ ^{hearing}
 Samurai class.

Writer

Permanent Address: 317 Shirogane-sanko-cho, Shibaku, Tokyo

Present Address: 67 Ryudo-~~machi~~^{cho}, Azabu-ku, Tokyo

The afore-mentioned person ^{made} ~~presented~~ the following statements to me at the Tokyo garrison penitentiary on 27 April 1936:

1. ~~I admit the truth of my statement concerning~~
 my name, age, ~~and both~~ ^{address} permanent, ~~and~~ present addresses as stated above are true and correct.

Q. State in detail the situations at the time of your visit to Gen. Mazaki ~~early~~ in the ^{early} morning of 26 February.

A. (1) I think the time of my visit to Gen. Mazaki was between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m.

(2) The person who answered at the door was a maid. I think she appeared in her night-gown.

(3) After ~~having~~ ^{retiring} to the interior for about two or three minutes, the maid

As the deponent declared the above
~~when the above statement having been~~
~~statements as recorded herein were true and correct~~
~~read to him, the stater declared that there~~
~~was no mistake;~~ he was then asked to sign
 his name and seal with his thumb.

9 April 1936

Keijiro Otani, Captain (MP)
 Military judicial police officer
 Tokyo MP Headquarters

servant came back to the entrance, and ushered me into the drawing room,

(4) Then about three or four minutes afterward His Excellency appeared. I think he wore HAORI ^{over} ~~on top of~~ his ~~Japanese~~ ^{right-gown} pyjama.

(5) The content of the conversation was as follows:

Komekawa: "I'm awfully sorry that I came here so early in the morning, but I have something very important to tell you, Sir. ^{In regard to} ~~About~~ the ^{dropping} ~~withdrawing~~ of the Aizawa trial, we ~~had been~~ ^{have worked} hard ~~at work~~ ^{with} on the understanding of Gen. Kawashima and Gen. Hayashi; but ~~was~~ failed. As things have come to ^{such a pass} ~~this~~ turn, I think there is no other way but to appeal to the ^{"Genro"} ~~elder~~ statesman. So this morning Dr. Uzawa is going to visit the elder statesmen ^{on} ~~about~~ this matter. I would like to ask your opinion about that."

Gen. Mazaki: "That's very good. I ^{would} like to have you ~~do~~ ^{done} that, by all means."

Kamekawa: "Further I should like to tell you ~~that~~ ^{I understand that} the 1st Regiment and the 3rd Regiment ~~will~~ ^{will} rise up in arms early this morning and attack the ~~elder~~ ^{senior} statesmen. In case of emergency I wish you ~~will use your~~ ^{would do your best} influence ~~to prevent its~~ ^{to prevent its} ~~aggravation~~ ^{aggravation} ~~should get worse.~~ "

Gen. Mazaki: "If that happens, all that we ~~we~~ ^{have} worked up to now would become naught." So saying, Gen. Mazaki was much startled and was at his wit's end, it seemed.

Kamekawa: "Furthermore ~~all~~ ^{the} young-officers seem to ~~entertain the wish to have~~ ^{entertain the wish to have} ~~you to save the situation.~~ ^{you to save the situation.} So please be prudent."

Kamekawa (at the front-door when leaving): "If this matter turns out to be a fact, I'll ~~report myself~~ ^{come} again ~~to~~ ^{to} report it."

Gen. Mazaki: "I'm praying that ~~it~~ ^{such} is not ~~so~~ ^{the} case."

The conversation between Gen. Mazaki and me at ~~the~~ ^{his} residence ~~of Gen. Mazaki~~ was as mentioned above; we talked about ten or fifteen minutes, I think.

Q. As to the time of your visit ~~at~~ ^{to} Gen. Mazaki's home, have you anything concrete to prove ~~of~~ its accuracy?

A. At the time of ~~my~~ retiring ~~in~~ the previous night, I planned out my activities of that morning, ~~such as an~~ ^{including the} interview with Gen. Mazaki, etc., on the basis of Dr. Uzawa's departure from Shimogawa at 6:50 a.m. And I remember ~~as~~ setting the alarm-clock at 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. I was awoken by the clock, and then hurried to get ready (without taking breakfast). So it must be about four o'clock, I imagine.

Considering this, I ~~was~~ ^{was} thinking that it must have been between 4:30 and 5:00 ~~that~~ ^{that} I visited at Gen. Mazaki's residence. About the matter of time, ~~if you examine the chauffeur~~ ^{if you examine the chauffeur,} the whole thing will be clear, I'm sure.

Q. What was the real purpose of your visit to Gen. Mazaki early in the morning of 26th? ^{Did it refer to} ~~Was it~~ (1) the matter of Dr. Uzawa's visit to the ^{"Genro"} elder statesman, or ~~was it~~ (2) the matter of the young officers' rising ^{up} to action?

A. To obtain Gen. Mazaki's opinion about Dr. Uzawa's visit to the elder statesmen was the real purpose of my visit. The other, that is, the matter of the young officers' rising^{up} to action was more or less an incidental talk; I mentioned it merely with ~~a notion~~ ^{the idea} of asking him to save the situation.

Q. At any rate, they are very important problems, are they not? Why is it that you didn't tell him about these important matters in the previous night?

A. Because I had so many things to do ~~in~~ the previous night, ~~that~~ I didn't have ~~that~~ ^{to do it} chance. On top of that, I thought it better to call on him early in the morning rather than ~~that~~ ^{very} late at night so as not to put him to too much trouble.

Q. And the time of your retiring in the previous night?

A. About 11:00 p.m., I remember.

Q. In the beginning of your conversation with Gen. Mazaki, you said "I'm awfully sorry

that I came here so early in the morning. But I have something very important to tell you, Sir." Precisely, what did you mean by "---something very important to tell ---"?

A. ^{I meant} Both Dr. Uzawa's visit to the elder statesmen and the young officers' rising ^{up} to action; ~~and I have mentioned accordingly.~~

Q. ^{Arrhen} As you were about to leave, you said at the front-door: "If this matter turns out to be a fact, I'll ^{come again to report it} ~~report myself again~~." Did you ^{go} ~~present yourself~~ thereafter to Gen. Mazaki ~~again to report?~~

A. Yes, I did between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. I went there from Kuhara's. I couldn't see him, because Gen. Mazaki was not in.

Q. According to Gen. Mazaki's statement, you visited ~~at~~ his residence at 5:50 a.m. Describing the situation in which the young officers were rising to action, you begged him with a tearful voice: "Please ~~save this situation!~~ ^{help} ~~situation!~~" ^{When} to Gen. Mazaki ~~asked~~ ^{asked} ~~question of~~ "Is that true?" you answered: "Yes, it is

true, because I ~~just~~ followed them up to
o o o o." Can you verify this statement?

A. (1) So far as the time is concerned, I can tell
you this much; ~~that is, that~~ I went to Dr.
Uzawa's right after I left Gen. Mazaki's
residence in order to make arrangements
~~to~~ ^{for} the visit to the ^{"Genro"} ~~elder~~ statesmen;
that from there I once went back to
my home and made a telephone call to
Dr. Uzawa's house; and that I went to
the Shinagawa station by 6:50 a.m., ~~at~~
which time Dr. Uzawa was to catch the
train, and I met him there. So ~~after all~~
~~these~~ ~~statements~~ the ~~meeting~~ time ~~was~~ ^{remembered}
~~very~~ ^{by me} is more accurate, I think.

(2) Next, the content of the conversation
is entirely different from ~~what~~ ^{the facts} ~~had~~ really
~~happened~~ then. You see, after I left
Gen. Mazaki's residence I visited ~~at~~ Dr.
Uzawa's; and on my way ~~to~~ home I
saw a bunch of soldiers with fixed bayonets
right in front of the residence of ~~the~~
Finance Minister Takahashi, at Omote-cho,

Akasaka-ku. I said to myself: "At last they ~~they did~~ ^{have done it!}" And that was the first time when I really came to know that the ~~trouble~~ ^{incident} had ~~finally set afoot~~ ^{really occurred}. Later when I went to the residence of Kuhara I ~~was told of~~ ^{learned about} the incident in detail. So I had no way of knowing it at the time of my visit to Gen. Mazaki's residence.

At the time of our conversation, Gen. Mazaki was ~~much~~ ^{so} upset ~~and~~ ^{that he} acted like a man in a trance. So I think he must have been under ~~a hallucination~~ ^{an illusion}.

Q. Have you anything else to state in regard to the situation at the time of your visit ~~at~~ ^{to} Gen. Mazaki's residence ~~early~~ ^{early} in the morning of 26th?

A. I have ~~nothing~~ ^{nothing} else, Sir.

Deponent: Tetsuya Kamekawa

As the deponent declared the above statements ~~as recorded herein to be true and correct he~~ ^{upon recording the above statement} was ~~offered for the stater's perusal~~ ^{As} he ~~declared that there was no mistake,~~ ^{the stater} was asked to sign his name and seal his thumb.

27 April 1936

Yae Hoyashi, Captain (MP)

Military judicial police officer

Tokyo MP Headquarters

Checked
by M. Sudayama

Matters concerning ~~the urgent completion of measures for~~ ^{the} ~~establishment of an~~ ^{irrevocable} ~~irrevocable~~ ^{structure} ~~to cope with~~ ^{the} ~~immediately~~ ^{comping} decisive battle. (July 15, 1945)

No. 1.

Anticipated situation:

A. A decisive battle ^{against United States} will be fought ^{between} ~~by~~ ^{the} ~~United States~~ ^{and} ~~Japan~~ ⁱⁿ August and November.

B. ^{The area between the} ~~North of~~ ^{on the one hand} Formosa and Okinawa Island, ^{and} ~~the vicinity of~~ ^{and its vicinities on the other will} Japan proper ~~will be~~ ^{be} the battle field for the ^{which is or not} ~~comping~~ ^{decisive} battle.

C. ~~Regardless of~~ ^{whether or not} ~~these~~ will be a decisive battle ~~or not~~, we must expect that bombing of Japan proper will be steadily ~~expanded in scope~~ ^{increased} ~~after August~~, and ~~also that~~ ^{bombing} will be carried out ⁱⁿ continuously ~~and on a~~ ^{large} scale after August.

D. ^{the} Supply of war materials from ^{the} various parts of ~~the~~ ^{the} Far East ~~will become~~ ^{increasingly} ~~difficult~~ ^{difficult}. Especially, from ^{September onwards} ~~August~~ ^{the} ~~supply~~ ^{of} materials and ~~goods~~ ^{from} ^{the} various parts of ^{the} South Sea Regions will be ~~practically~~ ^{practically} ~~stopped~~ ^{stopped}.

No. II. ~~The~~ ^{strategic} demands based upon the ~~foregoing~~ ^{foregoing} situation above anticipated situation:

A We must immediately ^{concentrate ~~all~~ our efforts in the} ~~gather all the~~ production of ~~power and accumulation of~~ ^{fighting strength} war materials, also to accumulate them, which ~~will be~~ the nucleus of the coming decisive battle.

Therefore ~~to this end~~, all production activities other than those ^{mentioned} ~~above~~ should be ~~discontinued~~ ^{suspended} and mobilized to achieve the object of the ~~preceding paragraph~~ ^{preceding paragraph} must be mobilized in order to reach the objective.

B. The amount of ~~main~~ fighting power ^{to be} ~~concentrated~~ ^{required} in the decisive battle must be ~~enough~~ sufficient enough to annihilate the enemy's main force in the final battle.

C. ~~Must make the~~ ^{to or attrition} ~~maximum~~ consumption and ~~damages~~ ^{replenishing fighting strength} of the sources of ~~supply~~ ^{supply} from air attacks, and ~~maintain the~~ ^{to the minimum} ~~minimum~~ ^{it should be kept down to the minimum}. At the same time the ~~maximum~~ ^{maximum} degree of resiliency for the production of fighting strength ^{in the} ~~nucleus of decisive battle~~ ^{should be maintained}.

~~Therefore from the strategic point of view,~~ ^{To this end,} the whole production system must be ~~systematically transferred or reorganized~~ ^{from a strategic viewpoint} by the end of October.

D. ~~To prepare~~ ^{The reserves against decisive weapons in preparation} for the decisive battle, especially for the second decisive battle, the reserves of

of the new weapons must be completed by October, and immediately after the first decisive battle, ^{this} mass production must be ~~put in effect~~ ^{immediately started, it}.
Furthermore ~~these above~~ new weapons must ~~possess~~ ^{be} scientifically annihilative weapons, capable of being produced in large quantities, ~~and operated simply but effectively~~ ^{effectively and simply}, also ~~should be able to~~ ^{be} produced in sufficient amount ~~in numbers~~ regardless of our diminished productive capacity.

II Prior to the decisive battle with the United States, we must ~~undertake some fundamental~~ ^{undertake some fundamental} ~~measures~~ ^{measures} toward Soviet ~~Russia~~ ^{Russia}, or at least ~~the~~ ^{established} ~~foundational~~ ^{foundational} base for it.

III ~~Articles~~ ^{matters} which must be carried into effect.
I. Executing articles in order of ~~no order~~ ^{no order} (off demand of above 1st and 2nd request.)

A. Decide the item and the characteristics of the nuclear weapon which will be used in the "first decisive battle" and which we must produce and accumulate. (To execute the action, the situation ~~and~~ of the battle field and position must be considered.)

B. Clearly designate the number and the strength of war material.

C. Decide upon ^{the} war material producing power and supplying capacity of plant.

Translated by T. Ogino

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Special News (2) 1

November 27, 1945

◎ From the Mukden incident to Signing of Peace on board of "Missouri" (6)

— Pacific Ocean War Record
as related by SCAP —

Chapter 3

Political Uneasiness within the Country (1)

At that time the Manchurian Incident ~~narrowly~~ ^{was} seen its third year, but the political uneasiness brought by the invasion to this peace country had begun burst into flames like wild-fire. The fact that the candidates backed by the government were ~~crushed~~ ^{scattered} in the general election obviously made a disclosure of indignation of Japanese nation, and at the same time it ~~showed~~ ^{revealed} plainly ^{the} nation's unpopularity against Manchurian Incident. On the other hand, ^{written by the military circles} the military circles who were worried about

(the military factions)

little progress in the victory in Manchuria had begun to make ~~an activity~~ ^{only but the} ~~of~~ ^{the} ~~most violent and~~ ^{most fearful kind to be found in} ~~terrible activity ever had in the Japanese history.~~

Δ Economical repercussions

~~the reflection in the country~~ ^{the questions within} ~~the Manchurian~~ ^{incident} ~~widely differed from a reckoning~~ ^{of the military authorities} ~~of the military authorities~~ ^{had} ~~of the military authorities~~

The development ~~in~~ ^{to} Manchuria by Japan ~~was regarded~~ ^{though it was from} ~~from a capital point of view,~~ ^{but it did not} ~~but it did not produce as much effect~~ ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ ^{overcoming the difficulties of Japanese agriculture,} ~~as raised abroad.~~ ^{Not one} ~~of the large scale coloniza-~~ ^{tion policies announced by the military leaders} ~~with a colonial policy on a large scale,~~ ^{was carried out satisfactorily.} ~~for instance, none of a bit was carried out~~ ^{could see no visible profit in it} ~~could see no visible profit in it~~ ^{of the planning announced by the leading circle} ~~of the planning announced by the leading circle~~ ^{of the proposals and yet had to} ~~of the proposals and yet had to~~ ^{of the army.} ~~of the army.~~ ^{On the contrary that the farmers} ~~an immense share of the~~ ^{was not given any visible profit, they were} ~~was not given any visible profit, they were~~ ^{condemned to bear the burden of} ~~condemned to bear the burden of~~ ^{share disproportionate allotment of a big} ~~share disproportionate allotment of a big~~ ^{amount of expenditure due to the incident.}

The military and navy expenses of ¥ 442,800,000.⁰⁰
The war expenses of the Army and Navy which

was $\yen442,800,000.00$ for the fiscal year 1930-1931 (5th-6th year of Showa) for the fiscal year 1930-1931 (5th-6th year of Showa) was increased to $\yen937,300,000.00$ for the fiscal year 1934-1935 (9th-10th year of Showa), and the budget for 1935-1936 (10th-11th year of Showa) was further increased in amount.

~~Repeated increase~~ A raise was again requested for the following fiscal year 1936-1937 (11th-12th year of Showa). For instance, a requisition for ^{and} increase in the Navy budget was due to the abolition of ^{of the} ~~the~~ ^{eventually} ~~the~~ ^{limitation treaty} ~~on arms-~~ ~~ment~~ ~~limitation~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Navy~~. However, these increased amounts ^{had} ~~had~~ a direct or indirect connection with a new role Japan was ^{about} ~~going~~ to perform in the Far East, ~~after~~ all.

The ^{percentage} ~~proportion~~ of the taxation paid by the farmers ^{was made clear through the following} ~~was made clear through the following~~ fact. Namely; ^{35%} ~~In~~ ~~case~~ ~~for~~ ~~those~~ ~~whose~~ ~~annual~~ ~~income~~ ~~stood~~ ~~under~~ ~~¥300~~, ^{35% on independent farmers} ~~35%~~ ~~on~~ ~~independent~~ ~~farmers~~, ^{and 12.5%} ~~and~~ ~~12.5%~~ ~~on~~ ~~those~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~trading~~ ~~business~~ ~~farmers~~, ^{against which 1.5%} ~~against~~ ~~which~~ ~~1.5%~~ ~~on~~ ~~manufacturers~~ ^{12.5% on traders} ~~and~~ ~~for~~ ~~those~~ ~~whose~~ ~~annual~~ ~~income~~ ~~stood~~ ~~above~~ ~~¥500~~, ^{5%} ~~5%~~ ~~on~~ ~~landlords~~, ^{1.5%} ~~1.5%~~ ~~on~~ ~~manufacturers~~, ^{and 37.5%} ~~and~~ ~~a~~ ~~new~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ^{37.5% on independent farmers} ~~18%~~ ~~on~~ ~~merchants~~,

traders business paid a 14% tax. ~~facturers and 14% on traders.~~ Thus ^{the} a heavy burden of taxation ^{to set off against the} on the side of "liabilities" ^{created} of ~~high~~ high-handed ~~disponatic~~ diplomatic policy, which ~~lasted~~ ^{has during the} several years ^{in the past} was most severely imposed upon the shoulders of the farmers who were scarcely ^{favoured by any} granted a special favour of profits.

△ Political retaliation

The ~~proach~~ ^{resentment} against the political monopolization of the "militarists" ^{aggravated} was ~~heaped~~ severely as the ~~military circles were going to set about~~ ^{military} ~~toppling into~~ ^{launched forth an attempt} a civil administration. During the period the ~~press at last lost~~ ^{from} since 1931 (6th year of Showa) ^{up to the time when} until the press at last lost ^{the} freedom of speech, the ^{Japanese newspapers} ~~press circles of Japan~~ ^{had been} strongly opposed ^{to} the despotic ^{temptation} ~~inclination~~ of the Kwantung Army, ~~interests~~. And Sogoro Tanaka, ^{the} ~~a~~ ^{man} ~~writer~~ ^{incident}, contributed an interesting article ^(Kaijo) to the "Reconstruction" published in 1935 (10th year of Showa) as follows "The ^{military} ~~stair~~ ^{are} were gradually flying up ~~up~~ into air,

high above the blue vault of heaven of ^{the} Japanese nation, Taking advantage of ^{the} wide spread social ~~unconsciousness~~ ^{unrest} due to the crisis ⁱⁿ party politics, and ~~also taking~~ ^{grasping} ~~the~~ ^{critical} ~~situation~~ ^{international} ~~under~~ which Japan was confronted with, an international crisis, the ~~military circles~~ ^{militarists} succeeded at last in extending their influence over the life of our nation. - - - - - Now ^{it is} the military circles are regarded ~~at present~~ ^{to be} even interested in the ~~problem~~ ^{question} whether ~~the~~ economic control ~~in Japan~~ should be ~~put into effect~~ ^{practised in Japan or not.}

It ~~was~~ ^{it became} ~~still more~~ ^{still more} ~~apparent~~ ^{apparent} that ~~the~~ ^{the} military circles were ~~planning~~ ^{planning} to do away ~~with~~ ^{with} the ~~previous~~ ^{previous} ~~Finance Minister~~ ^{Finance Minister} ~~when~~ ^{when} the ~~former~~ ^{former} Finance Minister ~~was~~ ^{was} assassinated several days before ~~the~~ ^{the} general election ^{was carried} in February 1932 (7th year of Showa) that the military circles were ~~planning~~ ^{planning} to destroy the party politics. The extremists in the military ~~circles~~ ^{circles} ~~continued~~ ^{continued} their ~~tenacious~~ ^{tenacious} activities without ~~losing~~ ^{losing} any regard ~~at~~ ^{at} the denial of the policy ~~the~~ ^{the} Manchurian policy ~~and~~ ^{and} the re-appearance of Premier

Inukai. Although the ^{Japanese police had} ~~Police of Japan~~ ^{left} ~~leaved~~, ^{during the latter part of} ~~at the end of~~ March, ^{of the fact that} the "Ketsu-meidan" or the blood-brotherhood was ^{making a planning} ~~making~~ to assassinate some twenty ^{opponents of} ~~the~~ military ~~circles~~, which included ^{noted} politicians, financiers and industrialists, ^{this intrigue} ~~was nothing~~ ^{counted for nothing} as compared ^{with the} ~~incident~~ ^{incident of} ~~occurred~~ on May 15th 1932 (7th year of Showa.) ^{On this very day} Premier Inukai was assassinated and bombs were ^{dropped on} ~~dropped on~~ ^{the} Metropolitan Police Court ^{Board} Makino's residence, the Metropolitan Police, The Mitsubishi Bank and ~~also~~ ^{on} some executive members of the Seiyun-kai. ^{Power-generating} ~~Power-generating~~ ^{plants in the metropolis} ~~were also about to be~~ ^{blown up.} ~~blown up.~~ These actions were carried out by several groups of terrorists consisting chiefly of young naval officers, army cadets and ^{young men from the farming villages} ~~agrarian young men~~, and the Ketsu-meidan (blood-brotherhood), ^{some members of} the Seiyun-kai and the Aikyō-juku ^{were also among them.} ~~were also among them.~~ ^{also took part.}

These groups ^(factories) participated in a part of the ^(intrinsic) ~~which~~ ^(much) ~~included~~ some high army officers ^(the) ~~plan~~ to seize the metropolis ^(the) ~~by~~ an ~~intrigue~~ ~~advice~~ of more large scale including some military high officers, namely a military coup d'état. Thus the 5-15 incident rang the funeral bell of party politics, as everybody saw it.

It was, however, on February 26 1936 ^(the) ~~that~~ the strongest force was ^(the) ~~used~~ ^(to carry) ~~out~~ a movement which ~~made~~ ^(to) ~~a plan~~ aimed at ~~the~~ ~~appearance~~ of political confusion and ~~the~~ ^(a) ~~reign~~ of terror.

△ 2.26 Incident

On February 26, ^(some) ~~a certain~~ part of the Imperial forces ^(laid) ~~plotted~~ an ~~intrigue~~ ^(which) ~~describing~~ ^(marked) ~~the~~ ~~most~~ ~~dark~~ ~~pages~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~history~~. ^(After) ~~Having~~ assassinated several ~~political~~ ^(of) ~~leaders~~ ^(of) ~~Japan~~, these officers ~~occupied~~ a small part of ~~city~~ ^(of) ~~Tokyo~~ ^(with) ~~commanding~~ a ~~corps~~ ^(of) ~~which~~ ~~consisted~~ of some 500 soldiers. H.I.M. the Emperor,

Supreme Command of these men, ordered them to surrender, the general commandant of these soldiers, ordered them to give in to ^{most of the ordinary} ~~the~~ ^{soldiers submitted to His Majesty's} ~~most part of~~ ^{general} soldiers obeyed his command, but the officers, who had fulfilled their role of assassins even ~~dared~~ ^{acted against His Majesty's} ~~to behave~~ ^{order} ~~fully~~ ^{against his} ~~order~~.

The Giji Shimpo of Tokyo criticized this ^{rebellion} ~~rebellion~~ of the militarists as an open ^{defiance} ~~challenge~~ against the august virtues of His Majesty, ^{and censuring them} ~~and censuring them~~ ^{stated in its} ~~stated in its~~ editorial ^{and editorially approved the incident in the} ~~as following~~ ^{following words:}

"The most regretful ^{point} ~~point~~ ^{with reference} ~~with reference~~ ^{regarding the rebellion} ~~to the rebelled army~~ is the fact that they ~~had~~ ^{had refused to} ~~obeyed~~ ^{obeyed} the Emperor's command, ^{and} ~~had~~ ^{had to be} ~~branded~~ ^{branded} with ~~infamy~~ ^{infamy} as rebels. Not only have they committed murder and a breach of military discipline, but ^{have acted against} ~~run counter to~~ the Emperor's order."

△ ~~Censure~~ ^(Censure came on the) ~~Adverse criticism concentrated on~~ "War Business" of the military ^(Clique) ~~circles~~

The military ^(Clique) ~~circles~~ ^(blamed) ~~approached~~ some other countries for ^(warlike) ~~their bellicose~~ intentions, and concentrated their efforts in stirring up the anti-foreignism.

But the "Hokkai Times" ^(clearly indicated in an) ~~Such advocacy was, however, disclosed to be~~ editorial that this contention ~~was~~ ^{was} obviously wrong in the editorial of the Hokkai Times"

It may be ^(added) ~~said~~ in this connection that the paper is a local one having a ^(liberal) ~~tendency~~ in favour of the liberalism, and ^(that it) ~~possesses~~ enough courage to ^(speak) ~~tell~~ the truth ^(fearlessly) ~~even~~ during the time ^(when) ~~a~~ ^{was most fierce} ~~oppression had been~~ prevailing.

The following is ^(the) ~~the~~ gist of the editorial:

"The nation ^(has never) ~~must not~~ ^(be involved in any sort of a war) ~~go to war~~ with any foreign countries, ~~whatever it may be.~~ Notwithstanding ^(the) ~~a~~ ^(pro-war propaganda) ~~rash demonstration of war~~ which is at present being ^(impelled) ~~propelled~~ by a certain influential quarters, we cannot ^(say no reasons for) ~~find any grounds to~~ entertain such concern.

Some ^{of them are running} ~~these persons~~ ^{are} after an illusion of ^a ~~the~~ bellicose party consisting of lunatics. At the time ^{the Manchurian incident} ^(broke out) occurred, this party ^(did) ~~do~~ ^{that was possible for them to do} ~~as far as possible~~ ^{in order to strike} ~~striking~~ ^{and beating} the alarm bell ^{for war} ~~bell of war~~ ^{violently}. ~~The ignorant masses~~ ^(calling) ~~were obliged to dance~~ ^{and as a matter of fact, the public who knew} ~~nothing about the matter~~ ^{actually danced to its tune,} ~~and the situation had taken a more serious~~ ^{turn} ~~after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations~~ ^{as Japan seceded from the League of Nations} ~~the situation grew still worse,~~ ^{afterwards.}

~~From~~ ^(ringing) The alarm-bell is still ~~striking~~ ^{ringing} violently and the bellicose party is ^(trying) ~~about~~ ^{trying} to persuade the nation that Japan must fight ~~with~~ ^(with) the whole world. Another radical class in the military ^(sphere) ~~circles~~ ^{propose} ~~is~~ ^{to} ~~propose~~ ^{to} tell the people that ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~strong navy~~ ^{strong navy} is ~~preparation~~ ^{preparation} for an occasion ~~on which the naval disarmament conference~~ ^{on which the naval disarmament conference} ~~is to be held~~ ^{is to be held} for the time when the ~~Five Powers~~ ^{Five Powers} of the five powers is ~~disregarded~~ ^{disregarded}, under the ~~demonstration~~ ^{demonstration} that the ~~option~~ ^{option} ~~is suffering~~ ^{is suffering} ~~menace~~ ^{menace} from the sea. ^(the people to form a party) These disturbers of public ~~feeling~~ ^{feeling} are ~~stirring up~~ ^{stirring up} the national ~~harmonious cooperation~~ ^{harmonious cooperation} against the whole world.

Moreover, they are spreading their dangerous
and propagating their dangerous war fever,
but the aim is nothing but for satisfying their
own interest. The chief means ^{available} ~~available~~

for their irresponsible propaganda is that in
Japan is situated still ^{in the} ~~in the~~ very
middle of the so-called "emergent era".

However, educated people as well as ~~persons~~
common sense persons are respectively aware
that the "emergency" ~~is not~~ ^{does not} exist.
It should be said of Unpatriotic and un-
constitutional that they decide the nation
and compel their cooperation by means of
such way."

(their wide range of application)

Special News (5) /

© From ^{the} Mukden incident ^{up to the time of the} signing of ^{the} Truce on board of "Missouri" (5)

△ Japan's invasion ^(into) North China (2)

△ "Secret protocol" disclosed ^(secret protocol of the Tangku Truce)

The numerous items ^(demanded by Japan) ~~demanded at Dairen~~, ~~by Japan~~ was held in suspicion for a long time as a "secret protocol" ^(of the Tangku Truce). Japan's demands ~~had~~ had direct ^(pressure) ~~pressure~~ on the numerous items of the Tangku Truce, ^{but according to an investigation} ~~but the formally confirmed~~ ~~made later, the items of the formal agreements had~~ ~~items had not appeared on the surface, according~~ ~~not been laid open.~~ ~~to an investigation made afterward.~~ The Chinese delegate could not ^(object to) ~~approve~~ the first item of Japan's demand ^(demanded by Japan), due to ~~an~~ ^{an} understanding ^(in respect) of the fourth item, and consented to it without ~~and~~ deliberation. The remaining three items, however, were not agreed upon, because of ~~its~~ ^{its} probability to raise new problems ^(over wide range of application).

and because of their political and economical nature capable of giving rise to new problems ~~having political and economical significance~~

which had ample range to apply to. As a result of ~~the~~ the Japanese authorities' ^{beginning} ~~abuses~~ ^{beginning in the summer of} on the North-China authorities ^{up to the autumn of the same year} ~~during from~~ ^{September to Autumn} 1933 (8th year of Showa)

and on June 10 the Japanese army ~~set about~~ ^{began} ~~evacuating~~, leaving ^{the} pro-Japanese ^{Chinese people} ~~Chinamen~~ ^{left behind} as it was.

The railway ^{railway line} between Peking and Mukden ^{lawlessness continued} was not opened until the end of July. In ~~a~~ demilitarized zones, ~~the~~ ^{legal status} continued, and when the Chinese army ⁱⁿ of Tientsin ^{was mobilized to restore order} ~~were~~ called out, they were ~~disarmed and turned away by the Japanese~~ ^{they were dispersed and turned home by the} ~~Jap. forces.~~ ^{Army}

△ Managing political expediency policy

(Direct Japanese military intervention in China showed a marked decline in 1934 (9th year of Showa))

~~It was~~ ^{The year} 1934 (9th year of Showa) in which ~~showed a marked decline in direct Japanese~~ indicated an enormous ~~decline of~~ ^{decline of} military ~~intervention in China~~ ^{intervention in China} a direct military invasion by Japan into China. There ~~was~~ ^{has been some} reason for this "truce"

~~It was that~~ Foreign Minister Hirota ^{had exercised} ~~obtained an~~ ^{with} influence ~~over~~ his China-policy.

The three points known as Hirota's 'Three Principles' are ^{prepared to set up a} ~~an establishment of~~ ^a bloc China bloc, ~~suppression of the anti-Japanese move-~~ ^{ment in} ~~ment in~~ ^{China,} ~~and the formation of a~~ ^{an} ~~anti-Japanese movement in~~ ^{China,} and a ~~formation of~~ ^{front} common anti-communism ^{of} Japan and China. The ~~restoration~~ ^{re-establishment} ~~of~~ ^{of} normal relations between the republic of China and the various provinces situated north of the Great Wall did much towards the realization of the first principle. ~~Having~~ ~~been~~ pleased with the success in the Tangku Truce, the Kwantung Army party ^{had not} ~~retired~~ ^{satisfied} ~~by~~. The third object, the suppression ~~of~~ ^{of} the communist movement, ^{was turned into a} ~~succeeded~~ ^{by the} ~~in the~~ ~~arrests~~ ^{of} ~~anti-Japanese~~ ~~high~~ ~~officials~~ and ~~the~~ ~~suppression~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Chinese~~ ~~character~~ ~~which~~ ~~had~~ ~~newspapers~~ ~~of~~ ~~nationalism~~ ~~leaning~~.

In the spring of 1935 (10th year of Showa).

the Japanese military circles ^{of them made} ~~made~~ a fresh preparation ^{for a new invasion into North China,} ~~preparation~~ again for a new attack, and several elements obtained practical power ^{to take part} ~~to~~ in the movement. The ^(fruits) ~~successful~~

~~result~~ of the Tangku Truce was entirely forgotten, and the military circles ^(factions, stand) ~~turned~~ in high spirits over the new field ^(of) ~~of~~ this conquest in the north China. At that time in Japan

the moderatist elements ^(again contending for) ~~were~~ about ~~meeting~~ on political supremacy ^{again,} but the military circles, it might be understood, ^{gained the} ~~gained~~ the fittest opportunity ^{of a golden opportunity to cope with} ~~to cope with~~ the expansion of influence ^(on the part of the moderatists) ~~on the part of the moderatists.~~

In the international situation, ^(offered advantages to) ~~it is profitable~~ for Japan ^{(but she had no time to them?) (first blow)} ~~had no time to look others~~ by disturbances caused by ^(new proposals for) ~~repeal~~ of conscription, and the Japanese-Soviet relations ^(had already) ~~were~~ improved owing to the ^(reached with success) ~~purchase~~ agreement of the ~~Chinese~~ East China Railway ^(and) ~~which was~~ signed in Tokyo on March 23rd.

~~...~~ was established in the "demilitarized

△ ~~Deadlock~~ 1926-1937

~~During~~ From 1935 (10th year of Showa) until 1936 (11th year of Showa) Japan's economical and political invasion made a big progress in ~~the~~ North China.

~~In accordance with the~~ According to ~~Umegaki~~ Ho Ying-chin Agreement and Doihara-Taitokijun Agreement, ~~the latter included in~~ June 1935, (10th year of Showa) ~~both of which were~~ acquired by backing of military actions, ~~the~~ central army ~~and~~ the various organs of the central government were driven out of ^{provinces} Hupeh and Chahar.

This development, ~~it~~ ^{was} ~~continued~~ ^{aim of the} "self-government" movement, ~~advocated~~ by major-general Doihara ~~of the 5 provinces~~

in September 1935 (10th year of Showa).

The aim was not completely ~~accomplished~~ ^{accomplished}, but the movement resulted in ~~the~~ ^{the} formation of ~~the~~ ^{the} Kishaten Political Commission.

~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~half~~ ~~self~~ ~~governing~~ ~~which~~ ~~looked~~ ~~up~~ ~~to~~ Japanese ~~advisors~~ on military, political and economic ~~advice~~ ^{advice}. ~~Moreover~~ ~~the~~ ~~self~~ ~~governing~~ ~~regime~~, ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~form~~ ~~of~~

~~the~~ ~~self~~ ~~governing~~ ~~regime~~ was established in the "demilitarized

Zone" ^{with} ~~being~~ Qin Yucheng, a Japanese puppet, as ~~the~~ head. In this ^{and the coastal territories} ~~territory and the sea~~ zone ~~Territory~~, the Chinese customs ~~officers~~ were abolished, and a large ~~scale~~ smuggling of Japanese commodities ^{which had increased} was carried out ~~more remarkably than before~~, in a certain sense, legally, with a low tariff imposed ^{upon them} by the new Kihitung régime authorities.

Following the ~~investigation~~ ^{autonomous government} against the establishment of the various ~~self-governing régime~~ in December 1935 (10th year of Showa), the ~~important~~ ^{important} ~~territory~~ in Chakou was occupied by the puppet army of China and Mongolia, but was checked ^{when the attempt} ~~on~~ entering ~~the~~ Inner Mongolia.

In November 1936 (11th year of Showa) a similar puppet army invaded ^{province} Suiguan, but was defeated by a local army ^{General} under Fu Tso-i's command.

On the other hand, ^{in spite of} ~~separately~~ from the extension of Japanese influence in Tientsin, an economic invasion such as ^{the} taking over ^{the} spinning mills of bankrupt China was hastened by the various agreements ^{pushed on questions concerning} a railway, aviation,

~~The attack upon Pearl Harbor~~

mining rights and encouragement of cotton growing. But ^{as} these agreements were all acquired by ~~a~~ threats, and ^{They} ~~was~~ proved to be difficult in ^{the practice} ~~the practice~~. And we cannot say that Japan ~~has~~ ^{is} ~~exercising~~ ^{exercising} complete control over north China either in the political or economic field. ~~He~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~successful~~ ~~either~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~political~~ ~~territory~~ ~~or~~ ~~economic~~ ~~one~~. Namely, this is an indisputable ^{which} ~~fact~~ ^{gradually came to light} ~~that~~ ~~has~~ ~~turned~~ ~~gradually~~ clear ^{in 1936} ~~in 1936~~ (11th year of Showa) and ~~at~~ the ~~beginning~~ of 1937 (12th year of Showa).
 - end -

The attack upon Pearl Harbor

ICHIRO IWANAGA

~~Independent~~ (self-initiated)
~~Initiative~~ Investigation of Those
Responsible for ~~the~~ Outbreak of the War

(A San Francisco dispatch)
~~The cable news~~ entitled "Discovery of Some
Facts Relating to the Outbreak of the War
Between ^{the} U. S. A. and Japan" which ~~was~~ dis-
patched from San Francisco and appeared ⁱⁿ
the newspapers on the 1st ^{of this month} ~~just~~ has been
~~valuable enough~~ to draw the attention of the
people here in Japan. (October 31st issue of the
It says that, according to the New York Times,
published on the 31st October, Mr. Forrester,
Secretary of ^{the} Navy, revealed the details of
Japan's war plans, which had been dis-
covered on board the Japanese cruiser
Nache, and with the discovery of ^{these} ~~this~~ new
facts the following two points were made
clear:

The first is ~~the truth~~ ^{that} Imperial Rescript
~~regarding~~ ~~the~~ ~~declaring~~ ~~of~~ war against U. S. A.
and other Allied Powers had ~~already~~ been
~~properly~~ signed by the Emperor long before
the ~~attack~~ ^{attack} upon Pearl Harbor ~~launched~~.

(2)

The second is the ~~fact~~ ^{all-} that the important decision to start the ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~beginning~~ of a war was made at the ^{imperial} council in the ~~Imperial presence~~ which ~~was~~ ^{was} held and ~~presided~~ ^{conducted} by the Emperor himself on July 2nd, 1941.

Of course, as the above cable news is too ^{brief} simple, and even by analyzing the ~~second fact~~, it would be hard ^{even by July 2nd of the second case} ~~thing~~ to know whether ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~was~~ ^{was} the ~~great~~ ^{great} decision for ~~waging~~ ^{waging} ~~war~~ ^{war} whether the said ^{imperial} council on July 2nd ^{became} ~~meant~~ ^{meant} a start for ~~waging~~ ^{waging} war against America, or whether ^{to demand that} ~~it meant~~ the ^{should be made} ~~completion~~ ^{completion} of necessary preparations for war by the Japanese Government and the Army ^{and Navy} ~~leaders~~ ^{anticipation} in ~~case~~ of the rupture of American-Japanese negotiations then going on. But, as Secretary of Navy Forrestal disclosed, it ^{may be} ~~is~~ supposed that there was a fact from which we can judge that the July 2nd ^{imperial} council in ~~Imperial~~ ^{created} ~~presence~~ ^{moment} made a very important ~~moment~~ ^{moment} which causing the outbreak of ^{the} American-Japanese War.

July 2nd, 1941 ~~was~~ ^{happened to fall during the} ~~in the time of Hiroo~~

(3)

^{Konoe} second Cabinet. The Japanese people had not been informed ~~nothing~~ at all concerning the highest policies or war plans of the Government, ^{which were kept} under the veil of secrecy even before the war broke out, ^{let alone} ~~needless to say~~ during the war. But, with the termination of the war, the outlines of the ^{policy} ~~tracks~~ ^{prevailing} ~~around~~ ^{toward} ~~the~~ ^{time} ~~of~~ ^{beginning} of the war have gradually become known to them, ^{from the interviews of the allied} ~~no talking with~~ ^{pressmen} of the Allied ~~press~~ ^{with Japanese} war leaders, senior statesmen and ^{other influential figures} ~~big heads~~ in political circles. ^{These revelations} ~~show~~ ^{that} the people could know that the Government under Prince Konoe was opposed, as a whole, to ~~stage~~ ^{the} a war against America, that ~~with only one exception~~ ^{opposing the American proposal} of War Minister Tojo, ~~who strongly stood against the request~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, which was made by America in the course of American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations, ^{and it was known to them that} ~~Tojo emphasized the necessity of~~ ^{insisted on declaring war against} America. ~~It became so clear to the majority of the Japanese people~~ ^{and} that ^{the} Konoe Cabinet was ^{thereby} compelled to

(4)
resign en bloc, ~~entirely due to General Tojo's~~ ^{to be replaced by} ~~peace-breaking attitude and that the new~~
Cabinet ~~was~~ organized by General Tojo
himself, who ^{thoroughly} ~~made~~ ^{reluctantly declared} a thoughtless attempt for
~~waging a war against America.~~

~~We now face a big problem requiring very~~
~~prompt solution.~~ That ~~is~~ although there is
apparently a ~~big~~ discrepancy between what
was discovered on board the cruiser Hachi
and what was ~~learned~~ ^{learned} by the Japanese
people ~~in their talking~~ ^{from the revelations of the Allied prisoners} ~~mentioned,~~ ^{those above} it would never ^{do} ~~be~~ a good
~~thing~~ for Japan to depend upon the
efforts of the Allied Powers only for
discovering and baring ^{out the} concealed facts
regarding all political circumstances and
causes which brought this country to
the war.

Of course, the examination of ~~those~~ ^{the} responsibility
for the outbreak of the war and the investigation
of the war criminals are ~~going on~~ ^{being carried out meticulously} by the
Allied Powers ~~under~~ ^{with} their own scientific
method, ^{especially} and it is ~~too~~ ^{plain} natural that the ~~right~~
~~criminals~~ ^{as efforts}

of ~~the~~ ~~punishment~~ ^{ing} ~~of~~ the war criminals rests ^{is in the} only
~~on the hands~~ of the Allied Powers. But, in
 order to ~~make~~ ^{for} Japan ~~fulfill~~ ^{to realize} faithfully and
 swiftly all the provisions of ^{the} Potsdam Declaration,
~~it is~~ ^{it is} the most desirable ~~thing~~ ^{for} ~~that~~ Japan
~~should~~ ^{to} concentrate her efforts ^{to} ~~on~~ ^{to} ~~examining~~
 and ~~clarifying~~ all the causes for war without
 any fear or hesitation, ~~making~~ ^{and} thorough
 investigations ^{of} those people responsible for
 the outbreak of the war, thus ~~Japan can~~
 positively co-operate with the Allied Powers
 in the ~~important~~ ~~task~~ ~~of~~ ~~investigating~~ ~~and~~
~~trying~~ ~~the~~ ~~war~~ ~~criminals~~ ~~of~~ ~~war~~ ~~crimes~~.
 But, quite ~~contrary~~ ^{to} ~~our~~ ~~desire~~, It is
 a matter of great regret that no machinery
 has yet been organized by the Japanese
 Government for the purpose of ^{making} such self-
 initiated investigation of ~~those~~ ~~people~~
 the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. In
 fact, ~~they~~ ^{actually} ~~wasted~~ Three months and half ^{from} ~~since~~
 the war ended. The ^{is} ~~strong~~ ^{strong} opinion that a direct
 political cause which brought about the
 Greater East ~~Asian~~ War could be traced
~~to~~ ~~our~~ ~~efforts~~

(6)

⊕ which was sure to cause the Greater Eastern Asia War

And the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, is so ~~weighty~~, and it has already become common sense of the Japanese people that the Kono Cabinet showed its self-contradictory character and played very inconsistent part in concluding Tripartite Alliance ⊕ on ^{the} one hand and trying to prevent ^{the rupture of} the American-Japanese negotiations ~~from going to rupture~~ on the other hand. ~~It is now said~~ that ~~the~~ new facts ^{that} proving the final decision ^{was} made at the time of ^{the} Kono Cabinet ~~for~~ waging a war against America have been discovered, Prince Kono ought to ~~publicly~~ ^{on his own initiative} ~~try to~~ reveal every thing and clear away all doubts prevailing in the country. Otherwise the doubts ^{would} be more and more deepened. Those people with some knowledge of the political history after the China ^{since} ~~incident~~ believe that Prince Kono ^{is the best qualified} ~~man~~ ^{man to assume} the more suitable ~~man~~ for a task of investigation and clarification ^{of the historical circumstances of} ~~of~~ war responsibilities ^{surrounding the outbreak of war, rather than engage in} ~~rather than a draft~~ ^{the drafting of a revised Constitution for Japan} ~~whether~~ ^{whether} he is ^{and} ~~concerned~~ ^{concerned} his efforts

(7)

a war criminal, ^{it is his duty toward Japan's} ~~or not, the most important~~
task) Prince Konoe has to take for Japan's
political circles ~~must be~~ to make public
~~all the facts before and after the outbreak~~
~~of war's~~ ~~circumstances and truths, and only by so~~
doing ~~can~~ ^{can} unnecessary confusion ~~can~~ be
prevented and unnecessary doubts ~~can be~~
~~settled~~ ^{dissolved thereby}, enabling the people to trace
the ~~whoreabouts~~ ^{sources} of war responsibility.

Setting above mentioned new facts aside
for a while, the truths about the attack on
Pearl Harbor ^{revealed} ~~talked~~ to an A.P. correspondent
on ^{the} 25th ^{of this month} ~~past~~ by Fleet Admiral Shishin
Nagano, the Chief of Naval General Staff
at the outbreak of the war, are rich
~~enough~~ in suggestions for ^{since they also} ~~knowing~~ the
^{touch upon the secrets} ~~secrecy~~ of the planned attack and
the exact time of war declaration ~~published~~.
The Fleet Admiral said:

"Japan had not decided ^{any} definite attitude
toward war till the time when General
Tojo's Cabinet was organized on October
17~~th~~, 1941. The Navy concentrated its efforts

on preparations for war, ^{while at the same time} expecting it should
 be possible to withdraw ^{the forces} ~~all naval~~ forces
~~from the front~~ at any time ^{should} if the
 American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations
~~proved~~ successful. ~~Just~~ Before the attack
 on Pearl Harbor was launched ^{His Majesty the} Emperor,
^{and the} Navy and Foreign Ministers ^{held} ~~had~~ maintained
 the opinion that the ~~planned~~ attack upon
 Pearl Harbor should be carried out
 immediately after the ~~official publication~~
~~of~~ war declaration. But, for some
 reason, the attack was made before the
 war ~~officially~~ declaration. ~~For this reason~~, the
 A.P. correspondent seems to have ~~taken such~~
 interpreted ^{that "for some reason" meant "Tajō"} as Fleet Admiral Nagano,
 pointing out General Tajō's opinion ~~by~~
~~saying~~ "for some reason". Fleet Admiral
 Nagano added that it was quite impossible
 for any body to ^{check the} cool war-fever, which ^{had} ~~was~~
 prevailed in this country since the Manchurian
 Incident and that the real cause of the
 American-Japanese War ^{lay} ~~existed~~ in the
 China ^{affair} ~~incident~~. He declared that every

the China affair developed from the Army's idea, ^{and not the Navy's}
~~thing was progressed and pushed by~~
~~the Army but not by the Navy along the~~
~~line of waging a war against America.~~
In conclusion ~~of~~ his talks to the A.P.
correspondent, the Fleet Admiral ^{further} said that,
although it was not the wishes of the Navy
to wage a war against America, all
necessary preparations were ~~underway~~ ^{made so long} ~~ago~~
the outbreak of the war, ^{was} regarded inevitable,
and that on December 2nd, 1941, just a
few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets
Yamamoto promised Nagano that he
would ~~direct~~ ^{order} the fleet, ^{which was preparing} ~~then~~ ready for
an attack on Hawaii, to ~~make~~ ^{immediately} ~~immediate~~
return to home bases in case there is any
prospect ~~of~~ success in ^{the} American-Japanese
negotiations at Washington. ~~soon~~. Nagano
~~stated~~ ^{stated} to the correspondent that he was
~~perfectly~~ ready to be punished by the
Allied Powers as a war criminal.

^{Since} ~~the~~ ^{trunk} about the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the final decision for waging ~~a~~ war against

America and the exact time of the ^{promulgation in} official ~~publication~~ of the Imperial Rescript ~~regarding~~ ^{the} ~~declaration~~ of war are ~~the~~ most delicate ^{matters} ~~nature~~, and consequently, these must be most vital points ~~on which~~ the Allied Powers will ^{probably} ~~should~~ make very precise and thorough ^{examinations} ~~investigations~~ at the ~~war~~ trials of war criminals and all those ^{politically} responsible for the war.

Prince Higashikuni stated, some time ago, that ^{His Majesty} the Emperor had no connection with the ~~matters~~ of planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it was at 11:30 A.M. on December 8~~th~~, 1941 that ^{His Majesty} ~~he~~ ^{personally} signed the ^{Imperial Rescript declaring} ~~Declaration~~ of war. We are told that ~~in an interview with allied reporters~~ ^{His Majesty} the Emperor ~~himself~~ severely condemned Tojo's method of carrying out a surprising attack prior to the ~~official~~ declaration of war, ^{published} at an interview given to ~~the~~ Allied newspapermen ^{by him}. These delicate points ^{will be} ~~shall~~ gradually ~~be~~ revealed with the

progress of ^{the} trials of war criminals by
 the Allied Powers, but we ^{very much} regret
~~much~~ that those ^{Gemelya, and} admirals ^{who participated}
~~in~~ the War Council ^{which made} ~~and playing some~~
~~part in making~~ the final decision for
 starting the war, no longer possess the
 Bushido spirit with which they ~~used to~~
 should positively try to clear up the
 truths and circumstances at that important
 moment, ~~instead of leaving the matter to the~~
~~left only to that Admiral Nagano who~~
^{consequently} ~~made~~ disclosure of the truths ^{by Admiral}
~~his own only~~. Speaking of ~~the~~ Navy,
 we can hardly think it was the Chief of the
 Naval General Staff ^{alone} ~~only~~ that held the
 key for starting the war. It can easily be
 conjectured that at least ^{the} Vice-Chief of the
 Naval General Staff, all ^{the} Chiefs of ^{the} Sections
 concerned in naval operations, the Minister
 and Vice-Minister of Navy and ^{the} ~~Chief~~ ^{President} of the
 Naval Affairs Bureau ^{participated in} ~~at~~ the War
 Council. ~~The deep doubts of the people~~
~~are now concentrated to where they are~~
 entertain a great many ^{suspensions regarding}

single
with the point of where (12)
and what ~~the~~ ~~are~~ ~~doing~~, those ^{leaves} ~~big~~
heads of ^{the Army} ~~Military~~ General Staff and the
War Office, who actually took ^{the} initiative
to start the war ~~under Premier and War Minister~~
~~Premier~~ ~~then~~ ~~consequently~~ ~~War Minister~~ who, as Fleet Admiral
Nagano pointed out, ~~consequently~~ tried
to delay the official publication of
war declaration by some means.

Speaking ^{bluntly} candidly, the trial and punishment
of the Japanese war criminals ~~are~~ ^{are} quite
natural ~~as a~~ result of ^{the} crimes committed
by the militarists who misled the people
into a reckless war. ~~but it is~~ ^{nevertheless,} needless to
say ~~that~~ the Japanese people, ^{from their national feeling, do not feel} ~~shall~~ ~~never~~
~~any pleasure in seeing~~ their fellow
countrymen or ~~the~~ people of the same race
being tried by the Allied Powers ^{before}
their ^{very eyes} ~~presence~~. It must be a national
or racial feeling. But, as a result of
the complete defeat in the war, the investigation
and trial of all the political crimes
which brought the country and its people
to such a miserable condition, should be

~~Thorough, and strict.~~

Now the Government seems to have the intention to establish a war causes investigation ^{commission} ~~council~~. At this opportunity, we must ~~warn~~ ^{point out} that the most important task for them is to find out the reason why the war was ~~started~~ ^{started} rather than the causes ~~for the war~~ ^{of defeat}, by thorough investigation of those people politically responsible for the war. It is ~~must be absolutely necessary to see that~~ ^{for those people} ~~responsibly~~ ^{responsible for the war to} ~~manfully take~~ ^{to} full responsibility; ~~for the war~~ ^{this should precede} and that they do this ~~first~~ ^{as} ~~all other policies to be~~ ^{measures} ~~carried out~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ reconstruction of Japan.

We ~~now~~ believe that it is the duty of the present Government ~~that~~ ^{to} they immediately start ~~their~~ thorough investigations of the problem and give decisive blow upon the sneaky and coward minds of those militarists who, dared to make the surprising attack, (fooling the Emperor) who ~~to be placed,~~

and also some of ⁽¹⁴⁾ the
of course, ~~other~~ senior statesmen and
war leaders ^{who are responsible for the} ~~whose~~ political activities
^{political development which} brought about the American-Japanese
War, ^{taking advantage of the fact} ~~should be severely reprimanded~~. They,
thinking it favorable for themselves that the
Allied Powers have not yet pointed
out their crimes, ^{these men} still keep silence
or fool the people by tricky words.
Only by giving such decisive blows
upon these responsible men, ^{can} the Government
~~can~~ facilitate the Allied Powers'
investigation of the war criminals and
clear away the gloomy atmosphere
now prevailing in this country, baring
out all the truths and circumstances ^{surrounding} ~~around~~
the time of the outbreak of the war.

(End)

Checked:
B. Nishikawa

First Lecture

November 16th

"Prologue and the
German-Japanese Alliance"

The Manuscript of the Broadcast of ^{NO. 1}
Mr. Hiroo Sasa.

The Secret ^{Political} History of ^{the} Showa Era
First Lecture Broadcasted on
November 16th. (Friday) 6.30. P.M.

The prologue and the German-Japanese
Alliance.

1. The two premises.

No age ^{has been} more painful and sorrowful
than the present. We are apt to
lead our lives ^(and in a state of atrophy) vaguely, but if Japan
is to be truly reconstructed as a member of
~~we want to reconstruct our Japan~~ a peaceful world,
~~in order to contribute to the universal~~
~~peace~~ ^{each and} every Japanese must ^{seriously consider} ~~be conscious~~
~~of what~~ ~~should~~ ~~be~~ ~~done~~ ~~and~~ ~~then~~
practise it faithfully, not vacantly or
flatteringly.

If Japan ^{is} ^{gradually} ~~want~~ to be trusted, though we
~~may not attained stage of~~ ~~being~~ ~~respected~~
as a ^{peaceful} ^{and} ^{cultured} ^{people} ~~and~~ ~~nation~~,
it is not enough for us to ^{merely} effect a
hastily planned ~~re-~~ reorganization ~~and~~ ~~re-~~ ~~organize~~

of the political system and economic structure. ^{No. 2}
~~system ^{is} ~~existing~~~~ We must undergo thorough
 self-reflection, ~~not down to the depth of our~~
 faiths and beliefs. Otherwise, such
~~the~~ organizations or ^{even if complete in form,} systems are likely to
 immediately collapse and return to their previous
~~be~~ ~~destructured~~ and get back as before,
 even if their form only is ^{status}.
 Reaction against reaction will only result in
~~completeness~~. If we repeat ~~the same~~ ~~only~~,
 in the return
 we ~~cannot~~ ~~come~~ ~~back~~ to the original
 primitive reaction.

We must ^{sincerely} accept, ^{act in unison with,} ^{and digest as our own} ^{and faithfully carry out} the good advices
 and ^{directives} ~~and~~ ~~order~~ of the Allied powers
 and their headquarters, and agree
 with it, ~~then we should make~~
 these advice and ~~order~~ ~~the~~ ~~problem~~
 of ourselves and practice it faithfully,
 not flatteringly. This problem, ^{although it,} ^{is an}
 heteronomous, ~~but I think this~~
 is, in fact, ^{an} ^{self-initiating} autonomous problem
 for us Japanese. To cheat others
 and to cheat ^{ourselves} ~~themselves~~ is such a
 shameful act
 that ~~and~~ we Japanese cannot do any more.

~~such a shameful thing.~~

How can we ^{self} reflect and attain
~~our~~ complete enlightenment? There is no
~~nothing is better for~~ ^{way other} ~~than to~~ ^{to look back on}
~~history.~~ An old Chinese saint
 said, "We ^{can} know but little if we
 do not learn." ^{At least} ~~In the first place~~
 it is necessary for us to ^{thoroughly study of} understand the
~~at least~~ German-Japanese Alliance, the
 China ^{affair} ~~incident~~, the Greater East ^(Asiatic) War
 and ^{our country's} ~~the~~ internal politics during that
 period. ^{Unless} ~~If we do not~~ understand ^{in a concrete way} ~~definitely~~
^{what we have done} ~~these our place in the world of politics~~
 and the historical facts, the basis of
 our ^{self} reflection ^{would be} ~~becomes~~ weak and
 our spiritual enlightenment ~~becomes~~
 abstract, ^{and that our foundation would remain} ~~and finally ends in failure~~
^{shaky till the end.}
 But it is not sufficient ~~only~~ to just
 learn. An old Chinese saint said,
 "It is dangerous unless we ^{ponder} ~~to~~
 think."

We must meditate deeply and think over what we know. In order to do this, ~~the~~ ~~two~~ ~~attitudes~~ ~~of~~ ~~mind~~ ~~appear~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~as~~ ~~premises~~ ~~in~~ ~~it~~. One ~~thing~~ ^{of them} is as follows.

✱ Criticisms of and ~~reference~~ ^{allusion} to others should be permitted ~~only~~ ^{when they are made} for the ~~world~~ ^{state}, ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~whole~~ ~~race~~, ~~and~~ ~~not~~ ~~merely~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~benefit~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~individual~~ ~~only~~. For that reason, I ~~do~~ ~~not~~ ~~wish~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~ ~~to~~ ~~imitate~~ ~~the~~ ~~fashion~~ ~~of~~ ~~being~~ ~~grossed~~ ~~by~~ ~~trying~~ ~~hard~~ ~~to~~ ~~censuring~~ ~~others~~. Such an ~~that~~ ~~attitude~~ ~~is~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~said~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~egoism~~ ~~very~~ ~~annoying~~ ~~to~~ ~~and~~ ~~others~~, ~~and~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~ ~~neither~~ ~~true~~ ~~individualism~~, ~~which~~ ~~respects~~ ~~others~~ ~~equally~~ ~~as~~ ~~one~~ ~~self~~, ~~nor~~ ~~different~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~true~~ ~~liberalism~~, ~~which~~ ~~enables~~ ~~the~~ ~~society~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~world~~ ~~to~~ ~~develop~~ ~~freely~~. Therefore, ~~being~~ ~~conscious~~ ~~of~~ ~~our~~ ~~mutual~~ ~~responsibilities~~ ~~and~~ ~~duties~~, I wish ~~to~~ ~~study~~ ~~our~~ ~~history~~.

I now turn to the ^{attitude of mind.} It is very strange that too much of ~~the~~ ^{the} other is that I ~~wondered why~~ ^{vague} idealism ~~is too far~~ ^{still prevails} in these days

in spite of the fact that ^{Japan} ~~and~~ Japanese are ~~now~~ ^{now} personally experiencing this ~~great~~ ^{great} tragedy of history.

I wish they would take ~~an~~ ^{an} attitude of mind which, in conformity with the realities, digests facts and experiences, ~~by~~ ^{by} ~~concludes~~ ^{concludes} the ~~present~~ ^{present} truth. Live theories and vigorous conceptions arise ~~from~~ ^{from} such an attitude. It is a matter of course to observe ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~prevalence~~ ^{prevalence} of the way of thinking which had been at a standstill during the past ten years or more, and ~~the~~ ^{the} also people ~~has~~ ^{has} been cut off now, I am the acceptances of political parties in the form they had ~~existed~~ ^{existed} heretofore ~~why?~~ ^{why?} ~~political party existed fifteen or sixteen~~

~~years ago~~ ^{years ago} will be ~~warrantable~~ ^{warrantable} today, because I find in it ~~great~~ ^{great} ~~weakness~~ ^{blankness and} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~faults~~ ^{faults}. Something real must come out of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~hands~~ ^{hands} of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~people~~ ^{people}, who ~~have~~ ^{have} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~facing~~ ^{facing} ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~harsh~~ ^{harsh} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~poor~~ ^{poor} ~~of~~ ^{of} the past ten or more ~~years~~ ^{years} and especially from the sincere self-reflection ~~of~~ ^{of} the young people who have undergone ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~type~~ ^{type} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~thinking~~ ^{thinking} ~~by~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~most~~ ^{most} ~~trying~~ ^{trying} ~~experience~~ ^{experience}, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~most~~ ^{most} ~~trusting~~ ^{trusting} ~~reflection~~ ^{reflection}.

Perhaps it takes ^{to attain this} some years, but without ^{this} it is difficult for us to reconstruct ^a a new Japan on a firm foundation. Because I ~~deeply~~ ~~re-estimated~~ ~~new~~ ~~Japan~~. ~~As I~~ think thus, I wish to say, "Reject ~~the~~ idealism and cling to ~~the~~ reality. The mechanical reaction ^(against reaction) is dangerous."

¶ To talk ^{only} about ~~only~~ others, ^{unmindful of} ~~not to~~ one's own faults and reflect upon ourselves, to display crude theories ^{difficult} reason or vague ^{conceptions} ~~is~~ a ^{grave} mistake. ^{in view of the fact that} especially we will have ^{stately} a general election ^{stately} in which many men and women ^{with little} ~~who~~ have no experience or knowledge about politics and ^{thoughts will participate} ~~do not take part~~ ~~in politics~~, and for that reason I think these two mental ^{of mind} attitudes are the most important essentials. Otherwise, ^{internally we will} ~~confusion~~ will ~~arise~~ ^{have confusion} in the country instead of ~~the~~ construction, and internationally ^{we will invite} it ~~get into the result~~ of ~~bringing about~~ contempt, instead of trust.

I beseech you all to ~~maintain~~ ^{cherish} the desire to be of service in this way. As you know, I should like to ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} my duties in such a thing.

~~For~~ My prologue has become too long. I should like ^{now} to proceed to the main issue and discuss ^{in their order} the German-Japanese Alliance, the China Incident, the Greater East ^{Asian} War, and the internal politics ^{of our country} ~~during~~ ^{during} this period.

II. German-Japanese Alliance - Ideological Illusions
~~Illusions~~ ~~of~~ ~~its~~ ~~thoughts~~ Illusions

Before the ^{Italian} German-~~Italian~~ Japanese Alliance we had the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. This was the prelude to the tragedy ~~of~~ ^{of} this century. It was ~~not~~ ^{not} brought about by the initiative of our diplomatic authorities, but ~~it was~~ ^{rather} ~~conducted~~ ^{conducted} by ~~our~~ ^{our} military attaché, ^{who took to himself the guiding} ~~of~~ ^{power} and concluded it.

In ~~the~~ diplomatic negotiations also.

A Japanese minister ~~was~~ ^{accredited to} ~~not~~
~~in~~ Germany, but ~~to~~ ^{the} neighborly ~~country~~
~~country~~, ^{huddled the matter} ~~in hand~~
~~consulting~~ ^{with} ~~the~~ Japanese ^{military} ~~attache~~
~~in~~ Germany. This minister, when ^{he} came back
to Japan ~~at that time~~, ^{proudly} ~~said to me:~~
~~proudly~~ ^{that} ~~there is~~ a secret item
in this agreement. ^{This item is,} "Japan and
Germany ~~should~~ ^{with Soviet Russia} not conclude any
agreement, ^{with Soviet Russia} which is ~~detrimental~~ ^{detrimental} to either of them!"
~~Said countries with Soviet Russia."~~
~~He subjectively claimed that,~~
~~the most important point in this promise,~~

Although ^{the part is on the surface an} ~~this~~ anti-comintern
agreement ^{and providing for} ~~the~~ ^{the} exchange
of ^{intelligence and} ~~intelligence~~ ^{cooperation} ~~and~~ ^{the}
~~most important point~~ ^{lies on this promise}
~~the mission.~~ ^{He decided by himself}
~~subjectively that~~ ^{is further expanded} ~~if~~ this agreement ~~may~~
it would have the ~~same~~ character of ~~an~~ ^{an}
~~offensive~~ ^{offensive} and ~~offensive~~ ^{offensive} alliance. ^{is further}
~~argued that~~ ^{war} will happen certainly between
Germany and Soviet Russia two years

Since in that event
 afterward, ~~on that occasion~~ Germany
 would fight ~~with~~ ^{single handed} ~~against~~ ^{70 per. cent} ~~of~~ ^{of the} Soviet ~~Russian~~ ^{army} ~~and~~ ^{it would be sufficient for} Japan
 is enough to fight ~~with~~ ^{against only} 30 per. cent
 of their Soviet army. Since ^{certainly} Japan will ~~win~~ ^{win} under
 such a condition ~~Germany~~ Japan must fight ~~with~~
 Soviet Russia. ~~We asserted this.~~

~~I made~~ I questioned ~~him as follows:~~ "You say that
 Germany ^{will} fight ~~with~~ Soviet Russia two years
 from now, ~~and~~ they ~~begin~~ ^{step} ~~fighting~~ ~~over~~ the
 Czechs, Slovakia and Poland in order to
 fight each other? Again, is there any basis to hastily
 conclude that ~~when~~ ^{Why do they decide on the spot}
 to start war ~~soon after~~ ^{the construction of the Nazi}
 state is achieved Germany will immediately resort
 to force? Moreover, even
 if Germany starts war, ^{is there any good reason} why Japan
 should fight on the ^{side of} Germany?"

He answered ~~for~~ ^{to} me; "Firstly, the fundamental
 idea ~~of~~ ^{underlying} 'Mein Kampf', written by
 Hitler, is anti-Bolshevism. Secondly,
 Hitler himself professed ~~to~~ ^{to} the Japanese
 Minister ~~to~~ ^{to} him. Thirdly,

The purpose of ~~the~~ ^{gold} project planned by General
Griichi Tanaka had war as its aim.

I remember that I was ~~astonished~~ ^{completely taken aback} by
~~his answer~~ ^{this reply}. At that time I could

not help ~~feeling~~ ^{feeling} indignant at his
attitude ~~of~~ ^{of} rebelliously ~~making~~ ^{making} the time measurement
~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~problem~~ ^{problem} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~time~~ ^{time} which is ~~the~~ ^{the} most

important ~~factor~~ ^{factor} in politics, ~~to~~ ^{at} his overly attachment
~~to~~ ^{to} Nazism, ~~and~~ ^{and} at his ~~degraded~~ ^{degraded} and ~~pride~~ ^{pride}

self-righteous arrogance and complete disregard of ~~the~~ ^{the}
the supreme power ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the hands of the people, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{the}
nation about such ~~an~~ ^{an} important matter

as war. ~~This~~ ^{It was this thought} ~~idea~~ ^{which} ~~led~~ ^{brought} ~~to~~ ^{about} the German-

Japanese Alliance. ~~The~~ ^{Then} Foreign Minister

~~at~~ ^{foolishly} ~~that~~ ^{judged} ~~time~~ ^{that} ~~he~~ ^{gave} ~~the~~ ^{impression} that if we
concluded this alliance, ~~England~~ ^{Britain} and

America ~~were~~ ^{would} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~scared~~ ^{scared} ~~down~~ ^{down} ~~and~~ ^{and} we could

thereby avoid war. ~~Of~~ ^{Of} ~~course~~ ^{course} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{the}
militarists ~~pushed~~ ^{pushed}

the Alliance, but ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~main~~ ^{main} ~~reason~~ ^{reason} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~mis-~~ ^{mis-} ~~judgment~~ ^{judgment}
which made this alliance ~~the~~ ^{the} natural

movement. ~~On~~ ^{And} ~~the~~ ^{we} ~~other~~ ^{we} ~~hand~~ ^{we} ~~the~~ ^{we} ~~government~~ ^{government} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~people~~ ^{people} ~~must~~ ^{must} ~~reflect~~ ^{reflect}

Especially, the coming European War ~~was~~ ^{would be} the
~~based on the consequence that the~~
 result of the extreme opposition
~~extreme opposition~~ ^{dictatorship} between ~~absolutism~~
 and democracy ^{and between} militarism and liberalism
 occurring ~~appeared~~ in ~~the~~ narrow ~~areas~~ ^{areas} as was
 the case in the closing ^{urgent}
~~as in the~~ ~~latest~~ period of ~~recognition~~

Moreover ~~the~~ purpose of war is the complete
 destruction of cities and factories,
~~the war~~ ^{would be} a serious matter ~~for~~ ^{to} the
 European civilization. ~~Consequently,~~ Unfortunately,
 our opinion ~~of~~ opposition ~~to~~ any action on the part of
 Japan which would ~~aggravate~~ ^{aggravate} the situation, particularly
 of the German-Japanese Alliance ~~by~~ ^{particularity}
 (the conclusion) ~~reason that the Alliance was~~ ^{which} ~~involved~~
 the danger ~~of~~ ^{of} making Japan ~~embroiled~~
 in war, ~~by its own will~~ ^{was not} heeded at all,
~~needless to say~~ ~~the danger~~
~~of promoting the war was denied~~
 regrettably.

We can learn two ^{lessons} ~~instructions~~ from
 this problem. ~~The~~ ^{of them} ~~one~~ is that we must
 always ~~have~~ a sound solid thought ~~and~~
~~is always~~ ^{is always} ~~missing~~ ~~as~~ the basis of
 philosophy ~~is the~~ ~~foundation~~ of politics

This perhaps and diplomacy. It may be said the insight into the ~~marked~~ ^{marked} transition of the march of world's civilization. It is ~~because of the lack of such a~~ ^{because of the lack of such a} ~~of this foundation~~ ^{of this foundation} that we are ~~being~~ ^{being} dazzled by the temporary splendid success of Nazism. If the other ^{lesson} ^{at least} is that ~~acting~~ ^{acting} for the sake of right cause and not for the ~~to act by the true relations of~~ ^{to act by the true relations of} ~~satisfaction of one's own selfish~~ ^{satisfaction of one's own selfish} and ~~impulsed~~ ^{impulsed} not to act by our desires constitutes ~~the~~ ^{the} important condition of judging the situation correctly, although ^{it may be difficult} ~~we cannot find~~ ^{we cannot find} to expect ~~it as in the past~~ ^{it as in the past} those ~~worthy~~ ^{worthy} ~~statesmen~~ ^{statesmen} and the military to be guided by such a motive. If we look at things from the standpoint of avarice, we ~~are sure to commit~~ ^{are sure to commit} an error, certainly, especially when we have the temperament like that of a speculator, we are apt to be cheated by others ^{or} ~~or~~ ^{our} ~~delusions~~ ^{delusions}. It is recalled that when the German ~~army~~ ^{army} swept everything before ~~it~~ ^{them} at the beginning of the War with Soviet Russia, ~~Germany~~ ^{Germany} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~country~~ ^{country} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~public~~ ^{public} ~~opinion~~ ^{opinion} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~starting~~ ^{starting} the

there prevailed within the Japanese military circles ^a very
 strong opinion favoring Japan's entrance into ~~the war~~ ^{the XIV}
 war ~~against~~ ^{so} Soviet Russia ~~was~~ ^{so} ~~propaganda~~
 at this opportune moment. It was argued that ^{in the military}
~~the~~ ^{they} ~~said~~ Soviet Russia
 would ~~not~~ be defeated in four or six weeks,
 and ^{the} German forces ^{might} carry all before
~~them~~ to the Far East, and so we must
 fight. Judging from the ~~fact that the~~
~~tenacity~~ ^{tenacity} of the Slavic racial spirit —
~~and the former~~ ^{previous} ~~compassion~~ ^{intrinsic} of ~~the state~~
~~affairs~~ ^{had} rather strengthened ^{than weakened} their union
~~the~~ ^{the} ~~attempts~~ ^{at} pogroms (according to the 1937 Soviet Year-book)
~~that the~~ ^{the} ~~construction~~ ^{of} ~~war~~
~~the~~ ^{the} ~~growth~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~industrial~~ ^{the} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~Ural~~
~~Kuznetsky~~ ^{districts as the base for eternal resistance}
~~incurred~~ ^{with Lenin's opinion (about 1919), the continental}
~~and this plan~~ ^{was} ~~succeeded~~ ^{pretty well,}
~~nature of Soviet Russia, its profound thought, and~~
~~that they are~~ ^{very} ~~profound~~ ^{ideas,}
~~ideas,~~ ^{philosophy, and religion,} ~~that,~~
~~on the~~ ^{on the} ~~contrary,~~ ^{contrary,} German people ~~have~~ ^{have} a
~~the~~ ^{the} ~~weakness~~ ^{of} ~~Germany~~ ^{due to its lack of understanding}
~~about~~ ^{about} ~~human~~ ^{human} ~~nature,~~ ^{nature,} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~seeing~~ ^{seeing} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~own~~ ^{own}
~~overestimation~~ ^{overestimation} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~value~~ ^{value} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~scientific~~ ^{scientific} ~~investigations,~~ ^{investigations,}
~~and~~ ^{and} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~contempt~~ ^{contempt} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Russian~~ ^{Russian} ~~people,~~ ^{people,}
 (although the German people ~~are~~

excelled in organization and researches, it seemed impossible to defeat Soviet Russia in only several weeks. I remember how we were nearly persecuted as "Red" or "Pro-Soviet" for advising prudence in this regard. No ~~fact~~ exhaustive comparative study ^{of it with} the China Affair, which even after five years of bitter experience had not been solved even though the difference of strength between Japan and China was far greater than that between Germany and Soviet Russia, had been made.

There was no understanding of the difference in the ~~respective~~ people's psychology regarding the German-Soviet War, which, on the one hand, had aroused the indignation of the Russian people, who thought that they were forced to fight, and on the other hand astonished the German people, who could not understand why the war should have broken out between the two signatory partners of the non-aggression pact. Whereas ~~the Russians~~ ^{the Russians} ~~the Japanese~~ sympathized with ~~the~~ ^{the} their leaders in the belief that war was

unavoidable, ~~the~~ ^{Germans} cursed their leaders
for starting a war which ^{they believed} could have
been avoided.

We ~~can~~ ^{should} learn from the mistakes of this
alliance the need of sound thought
and conviction, ~~and~~ a pure spirit
unmotivated by avarice.

excellent in ~~the~~ organization and ~~the~~ ^{researches}
 it would seem impossible to defeat ~~the~~
~~Soviet Russia~~ ~~cannot~~ be defeated
 in several (weeks or so). I remember
 how we were ^{nearly} persecuted as socialist
 or pro-Soviet ~~for~~ ~~advising~~
~~that we should use greater prudence~~
~~on this point.~~ Even a comparative study of the
~~the two~~ ~~was~~ ~~of~~ ~~little~~ ~~importance~~
~~to settle the China Affair~~ even after five years of fighting
~~had been fully made.~~ The difference of strength between
~~Japan and China~~ was far greater than that between
~~Germany and Soviet Russia.~~ There was no understanding
~~of the difference in the Japanese peoples~~ ~~about~~ ~~the~~ ~~China~~
~~incident.~~ That which had ~~caused~~ ~~the~~
~~indignance~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Russian~~ ~~people~~ thought that they were
 forced to fight, and ~~became~~ ~~indignant~~
 and, on the other hand, German
 people ~~were~~ greatly astonished the German
 people ~~to~~ see ~~the~~ war ~~break~~ ~~out~~ ~~between~~ ~~the~~ ~~two~~
~~the~~ ~~nations~~ ~~who~~ ~~concluded~~ ~~the~~
 signatory powers of the ~~past~~
 (non-aggression ~~treaty~~)

was

Russian people sympathize with their government as they forced to start war, and German people hate their government to see the fact that the war was avoidable.

Japan did not recognize this difference of the mental state between the two nations.

Thus we can learn by our mistake of concluding the alliance that the idea and ^{the} belief is ^{most} necessary for us and ^{at least,} we must have the clear spirit not to be shaken by our wants.

Second Lecture

November 19 1901.

"The China Affair Incident."

Second Lecture

~~The 2nd time~~ Broadcasted on November

17th (Saturday) 6.30 P.M.

The China ^{Affair} Incident

I The China ^{Affair} Incident broke out on July 7, 1937.

~~7th, 10th year of showa~~ ^{Even} (At that time

it was anticipated ⁽¹⁾ that the China ^{Affair} Incident

could not be settled even

in five or ten years, ⁽²⁾ that it ~~would~~ ^{had all the}

^{possibilities of developing into an} ~~soon become~~ the international strife

or war, ⁽³⁾ ~~and~~ that it would lead to the

~~internal~~ revolutionary confusion in our ^{country}

Why? I ~~tell~~ ^{repeat here the contents of} you repeatedly ^{what}

I said in the interviews which I had with ^{the} ~~the story which was told me when~~

~~I visited~~ ^{the} statesmen, military,

scholars, and churchmen at that time

^{these included} ~~they were~~ the ministers of the Kōro

cabinet, General Ugaki, the late

Lt-General Yanagawa, Dr. Nankazu

Kano, ^I the late Reverend

Jōkan Chiketsudo.

My opinion was ^{as follows:} ~~that~~ China is ⁽¹⁾ a
 continental country, ⁽²⁾ ~~that~~ she still had
 so many ^{vestiges of the} feudal systems, ^{at that time} ~~and was~~ in other words,
~~she is~~ ^{so-called}, semi-feudalization, and (3)
 that she ^{is rapidly becoming a modernized country,} ~~has been~~ ^{suddenly,}
~~consequently it was~~ ^{the peculiar characteristics of a} semi-modernization.
~~The War~~ ^{against a} continental countries power
 has been ^{is} regarded ^{as} the most difficult, ~~and~~ ^{as} may
 be judged from ^{such} ~~its~~ precedents ^{as}
 Napoleon's invasion ^{of} Russia and
 the Hundred Year's War between Britain
 and France. ^{This is so because in such a war it}
~~is possible to withdraw~~ ^{In these kinds of war}
~~and retreat~~ ^{is possible to withdraw} ~~the~~ internal battle line,
~~and~~ ^{to the rear, thereby protracting}
~~the war~~ ^{making it} leading it ^{to a} ~~to~~ ^{to} a ~~war~~ ^{war} of attrition. Although
~~to become~~ ^{large and consuming,} ~~also~~ ^{also} ~~making the invading army exhausted.~~
~~Nowadays,~~ ^{as} the means of communications
 has ^{been} remarkably developed, we have
 not yet ^{completely} ~~completely~~ ^{overcome} ~~the~~ ^{various} ~~the~~ ^{conditions} ~~natural~~
 However, ^a ~~it may be that~~ the continental ~~countries~~ ^{power}
 , if ^{it is a completely} ~~they are~~ ^{perfect} modern countries,

may come out for a decisive battle in order to prove its strength or save its face, and it may be possible ~~to fight to the finish, conflicting of~~ ^{to obtain} ~~decisive~~ ^{victory or defeat, furthermore, by} ~~the proving themselves first.~~ capturing the key political and economic points ~~itally capable~~ ^{It may be} ~~of the enemy's territory, it may be possible to~~ ^{demoralize the} ~~political and economic organization by~~ ^{the occupation of the important part} ~~in politics and economy, and it will become~~ ^{to be defeated.} ~~to be defeated.~~ ^(their break down)

At that time ~~the military~~ ^{existed} ~~in~~ ^{China}, at the time of the outbreak of the affair, local military cliques ~~and as the law of house registration~~ ^{existed throughout the country.} ~~and the system of tax system was in~~ ^{confusion.} ~~China had~~ ^{no small number of} ~~elements~~ ^{of semi-feudalistic.} ~~Consequently,~~ ^{if} ~~the country is separated,~~ ^{the various} ~~every~~ ^{sections of the} ~~country~~ ^{will still possess power of} ~~existence,~~ ^{endurance} ~~the power of perseverance,~~ ^{and} ~~the also~~ ^{power} ~~power of recovery.~~ ^{Thus the a} ~~prolonged war~~ ^{may become} ~~inevitable.~~ ^{The} ~~feudal character~~ ^{possesses} ~~has an~~ ^{unusual} ~~strength~~ ^{of endurance} ~~and~~ ^{in the} ~~power~~ ^{of governing the public} ~~ability to withstand~~ ^{internal pressure,} ~~although~~ ^{in the interest,} ~~although~~ ^{for a} ~~long~~ ^{time}

2. It lacks the power of concentrating the national strength. Of course, in ~~the~~ a truly feudal country, ^{the} feudal lords or the military ~~cliques~~ ^{cliques} may be able to effect ~~any~~ ^{without lease} compromise and do other transactions, in their own territories or ~~in~~ spheres of influence. But as China is undergoing speedy modernization as may be seen from Reith's Ross's ~~as we can see~~ ^{Risuros's} reformation of the currency system, she will ~~never~~ ^{never} permit the selfish anti-national actions by powerful local interests. During the course of a war ~~in the process of war, China~~ ^{China} will surely liquidate the military cliques, reorganize the ~~various miscellaneous armies and push on the confused military in order, producing~~ ^{various miscellaneous armies and push on the} ~~proper~~ ^{proper} racial consolidation. By doing so, ~~China~~ ^{China} may be able to strengthen the foundation of ~~the~~ systematic resistance, while keeping patient in conformity with her feudalistic character. Thus the three special ^{characteristics of} ~~qualities of~~ China and their relations are quite peculiar ^{to China only}, but very little analytical and the people are very poor in

study of these peculiarities were made by the ~~last~~ Japanese military, government and people. Some ~~the analytical study of them.~~ Some of the Japanese, from their individual interest, sympathize with the young China movement. Others make light of China, saying that a bribe of say several million yen will easily cause Chinese leaders to join our ~~side~~ ~~by offering a bribe by the strategy~~ point of view. They looked the ~~straight at the affair,~~ and ~~training~~ ~~and knowledge~~ to look the ~~precedent~~ ~~the fact~~ to ascertain its ~~and to~~ ~~entire~~ character, and then carefully draw conclusions. It was similar to putting ~~a head of blindfolded~~ ~~three elephants~~ ~~out off from international relations,~~ ~~although~~ ~~three~~ ~~elements~~ ~~it is not necessarily~~ ~~Japan is not always~~ unfavourable if ~~Japan~~ ~~to fight with~~ China. But ~~China is~~ a country where for many centuries there has been ~~and rights and interests of the~~ complicated foreign interests, old spheres of influence ~~her~~ ~~stage~~. It ~~is~~ ^{was} natural that ~~at~~ the time when the anti-Imperial movement in China had for its purpose liberation of China ~~to release people from~~ ~~the colonial~~ point of view ~~its semi-colonial status~~

China held this special nature, ~~and~~ because she is a continental country ~~and has~~ ^{with} ~~so~~ many remote ~~villages~~ ^{regions}, ~~besides~~ the local ~~influence~~ ^{interests} were powerful.

Even her development ^{into a modern state} should be considered as the result ~~of China's~~ ^{of China's} now-fear ^{ground} ~~of her~~ ^{of the} ~~and~~ ^{accord}, ~~wanted~~ ^{employment of} foreign capital and techniques. Consequently, these foreign ~~consequently~~ ^{consequently} this nature will become her rights ~~and~~ interests or ~~the~~ spheres of ~~her~~ ^{influence} should be regarded as an element which is ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~indivisible~~ ^{indivisible} relation with ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~three~~ ^{three} ~~independently~~ ^{independently} related to the other three characteristics of China.

These four ~~conditions~~ ^{external} ~~were~~ ^{were} not fully ~~been~~ ^{understood} ~~not only~~ ^{not only} by our military and government, but also ~~un~~ ^{un} ~~political~~ ^{political} circles. But if ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Japanese~~ ^{Japanese} political change in Japan were complete ~~and~~ ^{and} if ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~unified~~ ^{unified} will possible, ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~were~~ ^{were} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the tendency of ~~un~~ ^{un} ~~ion~~ ^{ion}; I think it was not ~~difficult~~ ^{impossible} for us to ~~put~~ ^{without} ~~an~~ ^{when} ~~end~~ ^{it is}

~~to the incident regarding~~ ^{to the incident regarding} ~~as the unfavorable~~ ^{as the unfavorable} ~~circumstances~~ ^{circumstances} ~~is unfavorable~~ ^{is unfavorable}, ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~reflect~~ ^{reflect} upon our ~~own~~ ^{own} ~~misdeeds~~ ^{misdeeds} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~apologize~~ ^{apologize} to the enemy ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~close~~ ^{close} the ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~most~~ ^{most} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~give~~ ^{give} up the conflict ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~apologizing~~ ^{apologizing} to China ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~conflict~~ ^{conflict}.

But regrettably, our ^{countries} political condition was ^{such} like that, ~~of~~ like a paralyzed man with ~~no~~ ^{strong} arms, ~~and~~ ^{the} ~~will~~ ^{will} of the ^{central} government ~~was~~ ^{was} not extended to ~~by~~ ^{by} the government official the whole system. ~~The officials~~ Only the heads and feet ~~sacted~~ ^{sacted} in their own way. ^{Such being the} ~~and so~~ ^{case,} we could not easily put an end to the war ^{war} if we wanted to do so. ^{the} ~~China Incident~~ ^{China Incident} was caused ^{internally} ~~by~~ ^{by} the ~~disintegration~~ ^{split} in ~~the~~ ^{the} interior political will, ~~by~~ ^{by} the disharmony ~~of~~ ^{of} the ~~control~~ ^{control} of the State affairs, and ~~by~~ ^{by} the ~~remarkable~~ ^{deterioration} of the control machinery, ~~controlling~~ ^{controlling} function, ~~although~~ ^{although} ~~we~~ ^{externally} ~~had~~ ^{there} was the pressure of the Chinese racial movement, ~~extensively~~ ^{extensively} ~~for~~ ^{for} that reason I could not help ~~repeatedly~~ ^{repeatedly} asserting ^{at every opportunity} ~~that~~ ^{that} the China Incident was ~~an~~ ^{an} internal affair. ^{Records} ~~we~~ ^{we} must point out ^{element No. 5} ~~that~~ ^{that} internal political confusion

was the most important ~~cause of~~ ^{factor which} obstructing
 the settlement of the China Incident. ~~It~~
 Moreover, ~~we had~~ ^{there were} ~~the~~ ^{other obstacles.} ~~four~~ ^{It} ~~difficult~~
~~problems.~~ ^{was because} As we had this ~~trouble~~ ^{trouble} affliction
 internally, ~~I~~ ^{that I} could not help ~~guessing~~ ^{predicting} the
 the ~~protraction~~ ^{permanence} of war, the danger of ~~becoming~~ ^{becoming} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~an~~
 international war and the ~~possibility~~ ^{possibility} of
 of ~~the~~ ^{the} internal ~~reformation~~ ^{reformation} changes. Such
 an observation, although it may seem
~~that~~ ^{that} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~like~~ ^{like} to be ~~conceptional~~ ^{conceptional} at first,
 is ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~result~~ ^{result} ~~from~~ ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~minute~~ ^{minute} close
 observation of every aspect and ~~the~~
 from the faithful ~~ascertainment~~ ^{ascertainment} of ~~the~~ ^{the} various
~~kind~~ ^{kind} of indications.

Suppose that ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~intriguing~~ ^{intriguing} ~~device~~ ^{device} is taken to
 if we offer ~~a~~ ^a ~~strike~~ ^{strike} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} Chinese
 military clique ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~military~~ ^{military} ~~makes~~ ^{makes} ~~them~~ ^{them}
~~wish~~ ^{wish} ~~it~~ ^{it}, the young stratum of the
 military ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~oppose~~ ^{oppose} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~being~~ ^{being} ~~induced~~ ^{induced}
~~from~~ ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~racial~~ ^{racial} ~~consciousness~~ ^{consciousness}, will ~~oppose~~ ^{oppose} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~with~~ ^{with}
 Foreign countries will ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~opposed~~ ^{opposed} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~such~~ ^{such} a
 settlement towards that end.