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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: ENERGY,
MARITIME SECURITY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES**

by

Kağan Ilter

December 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Victoria Clement
Robert Looney

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**THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: ENERGY, MARITIME SECURITY AND
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Energy and maritime-history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey has played a pivotal regional role in all these matters. This study examines the role of Turkey as it explores the Middle East more generally, from World War II to the present day, asking how dynamic strategic alliances and regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been regulated in terms of energy and maritime-security issues. The thesis has five chapters:

Chapter II discusses the geographic, political, military, and especially economic importance of the region.

Chapter III provides a historical review of energy and maritime-related crises and case studies that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and their effect on the alignments of strategic alliances.

Chapter IV presents the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of energy and maritime security and examines Turkey's increasing strategic role in the region. This chapter provides information about the importance of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources, the geopolitical importance of Turkey as an energy hub, probable energy problems in default of delimitation of the maritime area, strategic-alliance problems and the militarization of energy security.

Chapter V summarizes the main analyses and presents the importance of the current geostrategic alignment of alliances in terms of energy and maritime security, and Turkey's key role in the settlement of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	1
C.	PROBLEMS, HYPOTHESIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW	4
D.	METHODS AND SOURCES	9
E.	THESIS OVERVIEW	10
II.	IMPORTANCE OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.....	11
A.	HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE	11
B.	STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE	15
III.	CASE STUDIES.....	21
A.	THE SUEZ CRISIS	21
1.	Historical Context	21
2.	The 1956 Crisis.....	27
3.	Consequences of the Crisis.....	30
B.	THE 1973 OIL CRISIS	35
1.	Historical Context	35
2.	1973 War and Consequences	36
3.	Oil Crisis	38
C.	THE CYPRUS DISPUTE.....	46
1.	Historical Context	46
2.	Great Power Perceptions and Interventions	50
IV.	CURRENT SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND TURKEY'S EMERGING ROLE.....	57
A.	TURKEY AS AN ENERGY HUB.....	57
B.	ENERGY SECURITY AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN	59
1.	Militarization of Energy and Maritime Security	59
C.	DELIMITATION OF MARITIME AREAS AND PROBABLE CRISIS IN THE REGION.....	62
V.	CONCLUSION	69
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	73
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	81

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	NATO Members, Invited Countries around the Mediterranean and Mediterranean Dialogue Countries.	17
Figure 2.	Borders of the EU after the membership of GCASC (The EU recognizes as Cyprus).	18
Figure 3.	Crude Oil Prices after the 1973 Crisis	41
Figure 4.	Effects of the crisis over GDP in the U.S.	42
Figure 5.	Natural Gas Pipeline Projects of Turkey	58
Figure 6.	GCs' Blocks Overlapping with Turkish Continental Shelf and EEZ	66

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
BFC	British Forces Cyprus
BTC	The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
CS	Continental Shelf
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUJUST LEX	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GCASC	Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus
GCs	Greek Cypriots
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NM	Nautical Miles
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SNMG2	Standing NATO Maritime Group 2
TANAP	Trans Anatolian Pipeline
TAPline	Trans Arabian Pipeline
TCs	Turkish Cypriots
TMFA	Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
U.S.	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

A long history of energy and maritime-security related events in the Eastern Mediterranean have demonstrated that the region will remain an important arena for determining strategic relations and cooperation in world politics. Energy and maritime-history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and international relations in the region. Turkey has played a pivotal regional role in all these matters. This study examines the role of Turkey as it explores the Middle East more generally, from World War II to the present day, asking how dynamic strategic alliances and regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been regulated in terms of energy and maritime-security issues.

B. IMPORTANCE

The Eastern Mediterranean region, which today attracts international interest in hydrocarbon exploration and production, has been one of the world's most strategic regions. Major historical events as the Cold War, the Arab–Israeli Conflict (related to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and energy crisis of 1973, for example), Turkey's Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974, Israel's blockade of Gaza, and the Arab Spring, contributed to the alignment of regional and global alliances. As a result of such events, the region has witnessed great power rivalries and significant crises that have had broader application in our understanding of the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, historically and currently.

Historically, the Eastern Mediterranean, in which early maritime trade began, was at the center of many great conflicts and important events because of its geostrategic location between civilizations. Since the region lies at the axis of movement, both north–south and east–west, it has been at the juncture of the land and maritime trade, energy transportation, and naturally, great conflicts and crises. Many groups have tried to conquer Cyprus, for example, in order to control maritime trade and security. Another example is the Suez Canal, one of the most strategic gateways between Europe, Asia and

Africa. Moreover, some of the holiest places of major religions are located in the region. All of these contributed to the mobilization of civilizations in this area.

In the 19th century, maritime trade in the Eastern Mediterranean gained even more strategic importance after the opening of the Suez Canal, the shortest link between the east and the west. The transportation of trade goods and energy resources among Asia, the Middle East, and Europe increased dramatically after the opening of the canal. By 1955, approximately two-thirds of Europe's oil passed through the canal.¹ Another more recently developed strategic aspect of the Eastern Mediterranean is pipelines. For example, The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a long crude-oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, is one of the most strategic energy routes from the Southern Caucasus to Europe.² These maritime and energy-related issues have played an important role in international relations.

Historical events demonstrate that energy and maritime-related crises and conflicts in the region have had an important effect on the alignment of the alliances in the region. After World War II, many events such as Arab–Israeli conflict, United Kingdom's role in Cyprus and Turkey's Peace Operation, the Cold War, and the Arab Spring have led to the realignment of alliances in the region. For example, during the Arab-Israel Conflict, oil-producing Arab members of OPEC, along with Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, proclaimed an oil embargo in response to the U.S. decision to resupply the Israeli military during the Yom Kippur war in 1973.³ As a result, a global energy crisis occurred. Another example of the realignment of alliances was the Cyprus dispute. Cyprus has been at the heart of the strategic defense of the great powers' Middle Eastern concerns. Energy and maritime security were the most important among these concerns. Troubled by ethnic problems, Cyprus was an important alliance factor among the powers in the region, which affected the aligning of alliances. The Cyprus conflict was not only an intergroup conflict, but an international conflict. Similarly, after the discovery of huge

¹ Alan B. Mountjoy, *The Suez Canal*, Geography, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1957), pp. 186

² Graham E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 86

³ Bernard Reich, *The Powers in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 8

reserves, an oil and gas bonanza in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is attracting international interest in hydrocarbon transportation, exploration, and production. A probable realignment of alliance in the region is on the horizon. After relations between Israel and Turkey shifted because of Israel's blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the Flotilla Crisis (2010), Israel sought alternative allies in the Mediterranean region, courting Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) to cooperate in strategic issues such as energy exploration and transportation, even though Greece and GCASC have long been known as supporters of the Palestinians in the historical Israeli–Palestinian conflict.⁴

Turkey is itself a major “energy-bridge” for oil and gas transportation from the Middle East and Caspian Sea area to the lucrative markets of Europe. This brings to mind another problematic issue: the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) proclamation and delimitation of maritime areas in the region. For instance, Israel is also currently engaged in drilling for gas in the Tamar field within the EEZ, agreed upon with GCASC.⁵ Reciprocal agreements between states on EEZ issues cause important international problems regarding the energy and maritime security of each state. Thus, conflict among regional states in the Eastern Mediterranean could reemerge as a global source of instability as a result of conflicts over energy supply, and, as Moran and Russell argue, “energy resources may become *casus belli* in themselves, or they may be viewed as alternatives to the use of force by governments, who persuade themselves that wielding the energy weapon will somehow obviate or substitute for the use of real ones.”⁶

The Eastern Mediterranean has been an important strategic region regarding energy and maritime-related occurrences. As events since World War II illustrate the region will remain an important determiner of strategic relations and cooperation of states

⁴ Alexander Murinso, Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, *BESA Center Perspectives Paper* No. 159, January 9, 2012, p:1

⁵ Alexander Murinso, Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, *BESA Center Perspectives Paper* No. 159, January 9, 2012, p:3

⁶ James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management* (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 2008).

in world politics. Turkey, as a rising international player and influential regional power, is likely to play an important role in shaping the future of the Eastern Mediterranean.

C. PROBLEMS, HYPOTHESIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis considers several questions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean: (1) why do we see the realignment of so many strategic alliances in the post-World War II era (2) are the energy and maritime-security-related events in the region so important for these dynamic alignments, (3) is Turkey an influential arbiter that can act in current and future regional and international alignments in the region?

The strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean begins with the three monotheistic religions, each spreading their influence globally, that have had their origins there. Moreover, the region is strewn with battle fields that chronicle the rise and fall of empires built upon the wealth of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.⁷ Bernard Reich emphasizes the cultural aspect of Western interests in the region noting that the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western civilization provides a link between the U.S., Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁸ This link has an enormous effect on most corners of today's world. He illustrates how World War II also played a major role in shaping concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. That is, oil became a political, and then military concern, thus making the strategic value of the area more obvious for the U.S. and then the Soviet Union. Moreover, Reich argues that Israel's independence and the Arab-Israel War, which were instruments of U.S. involvement, made the Eastern Mediterranean one of the most strategic arenas of the world.⁹

World War II changed the great-power game in the Middle East. Bruce Kuniholm analyzes the situation from the perspective of the British Empire's buffer zones such as Iraq, Syria, Iran or Cyprus.¹⁰ Although Britain had controlled the buffer states in the

⁷ Bernard Reich, *The Powers in the Middle East*, (Newyork: Praeger Publishers, 1987),3

⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁹ Reich, *The Powers in the Middle East*, (Newyork: Praeger Publishers, 1987),57

¹⁰ Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1994). 4.

region, World War II changed the nature of great-power influence resulting the British decline with the British turning to the United States to protect her line of communications in the Eastern Mediterranean. This led to the rise of the Soviet-American rivalry.¹¹ According to Reich, the 1967 War was a turning point for the U.S. influence in the region and her arms supply policy. The U.S. sought to ensure a military balance and provided Israel with the equipment essential to balance Soviet arms supplies to the Arab states, Egypt and Syria.¹² He mentions two energy crises (1967 and 1973) and their effects on the global economy as examples of religions' strategic influence. According to Reich, OPEC's oil as a foreign policy instrument, in 1967 after the outbreak of hostilities among Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, aimed to force the Western governments to end their support for Israel.¹³ This created minor dislocations in the market and had a temporary adverse effect on international currencies because most important members of OPEC did not act in unity. On the other hand, the second attempt of Arab members of OPEC in 1973 was more successful according to Reich, because major oil companies negotiated a new set of pricing agreements.¹⁴ It is obvious that energy related crisis in the region had severe global effects and changed the alignments in the region.

For understanding the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea, the author Frank Gervasi analyzes great-power confrontations and the changing nature of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War era. He criticizes these dynamic alignments of alliances depending on the Soviet-American rivalry and their plans for controlling the natural resources of the region.¹⁵ He argues that, these confrontations achieved little beyond a criminal waste of people's lives.¹⁶ He presents the Soviet interests in the Mediterranean as 1) a sphere of secure political influence, 2) locations for naval and air bases, 3) firm military alliances with countries of

¹¹ Ibid., 5.

¹² Ibid., 71.

¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴ Ibid., 9.

¹⁵ Frank Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, (Newyork: Mckay Publication, 1975), 4

¹⁶ Ibid.

the area, 4) favorable trade terms and 5) access to Middle Eastern oil.¹⁷ To support his argument, he gives an example of the changing character of USSR relations with Turkey comparing the relations between the 1950s and 1960s. He mentions that, in the 1960s, the Soviet Union abandoned hostile confrontation with neighbors in favor of large scale economic cooperation, credits and technical aid. One significant consequence of the Russian rapprochement with Turkey and several Arab states was the growing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸ He criticizes the consequences of those power confrontations in the region such as global energy crisis of 1970s, calling these “energy weapon” operations “Operation Blackmail”¹⁹. He argues that, alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean have been economic rather than political. He illustrates this with the example of Egypt during the Cold War. He emphasizes Soviet effects on Egyptian politics and mentions Egypt’s ironic overtures to the Western world. He suggests that, during the liberalization period of the Sadat regime in Egypt, ambitious plans were announced for reopening and widening the Suez Canal.²⁰ There were plans for building a new Suez–Cairo–Alexandria oil pipeline with western money and American engineering.²¹ This exemplifies the Sadat’s strategy to exchange Washington for Moscow and realign relationships according to strategic concerns.

Energy resources and the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean as a maritime junction have had important influences on the regions’ states. Regarding those historical events, Turkey, located in the junction of energy resources, has always been a key player and an important buffer state in great power confrontations. As Russell and Moran argue, “control of energy resources, or the rights of buyers and sellers in the energy marketplace, may become explicit objects or tools of strategic coercion, either by governments or by others who may be able to seize control of them.”²² Graham Fuller

¹⁷ Ibid., 331.

¹⁸ Frank Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, (Newyork: Mckay Publication, 1975), 330

¹⁹ Ibid., 409.

²⁰ Ibid., 436.

²¹ Ibid.

²² James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., *Energy Security and Global Politics: The*

argues that Turkey has been affected by this 'energy weapon' both as consumer and as an East-West transit node for regional energy flows.²³ Fuller notes the strategic relations between Turkey and regional resource-rich countries such as Iran. He mentions that Turkey is now becoming a major hub for the consumption of Iranian gas and oil, as well as for its transport to the West despite the strong opposition of the U.S.²⁴ Additionally, Turkey's relations with Caucasian countries as a bridge for their energy resources transported to the West via BTC oil pipeline ending in the Eastern Mediterranean, seems an independent strategic act not similar to the Cold War policies of Turkey as a buffer state. Fuller also suggests that Russia now views Turkey as an independent competitor to Moscow and no longer an instrument of the U.S. policies.²⁵

Regarding the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Alexander Murinson, recent discoveries of substantial natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean challenge Turkey's claim as the central energy hub for Europe and create problems regarding the delimitation of maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. Murinson argues that Turkey is threatening to deter and harass Cypriot, Israeli and Greek alliances on natural gas exploration efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁶ He presents bilateral relations of Israel, GCASC and Greece regarding energy issues and problematic EEZ agreements. He mentions that in recent years, Israel and GCASC have increasingly sought independent sources of energy on their Mediterranean marine shelves. He argues that the clarification of the borderline is essential in protecting Israel's rights to oil and underwater gas reservoirs. He criticizes Turkish naval activities and naval demonstrations near the Israeli gas installations in the alleged EEZ of Israel and GCASC²⁷, and concludes that Israel, GCASC and Greece should pursue a diplomatic campaign to

3. *Militarization of Resource Management* (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 2008),

²³ Graham E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 84.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 112.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.

²⁶ Alexander Murinson, *Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean*, *BESA Center Perspectives Paper* No. 159, (January 9, 2012), 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

maintain their hold on their EEZs on par with other countries. Moreover, he asserts that they should increase naval presence in their alleged EEZs in order to protect their access to resources.²⁸

On the other hand, Cihat Yayci argues that Turkey should effectively advocate for and safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of international law and bilateral agreements.²⁹ He mentions that Turkey has the longest coastline in the region and has the right to claim the EEZ by making treaties on the delimitation of maritime zones with Egypt, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Syria, Libya, Israel and Lebanon with which they share coasts facing one another.³⁰ He concludes that through such treaties Turkey and other actors in the region will be able to assert a new map of maritime areas in Eastern Mediterranean in accordance with its own rights and interests enshrined in international law.³¹ Similarly, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA) argues that this provocative policy compromises and prejudices the Turkish Cypriots' (TCs) existing equal rights over the natural resources of the island and the sea areas of the Island of Cyprus.³² Besides, Turkey suggests that this issue should be a part of the comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots (GCs) should benefit equally from the Island's natural resources. The GCs unilateral actions do not only disregard TCs existing rights but also challenge Turkey's maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean in the west of the Island. Finally, TMFA mentions that Turkey will not allow under any circumstances foreign oil companies to conduct unauthorized hydrocarbon exploration in

²⁸ Ibid., 5.

²⁹ Cihat Yayci, The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, *Bilgesam Journal, Bilge Strateji*, (No: 6, Spring 2012), 1.

³⁰ Cihat Yayci, The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, *Bilgesam Journal, Bilge Strateji*, (No: 6, Spring 2012), 2.

³¹ Ibid., 57.

³² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa> (accessed November/12, 2012).

the disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, and will protect its legal rights and interests in these maritime areas.³³

At first glance it may seem that EEZ problems and delimitation of maritime zones for energy issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are independent from great power politics. However, the energy companies of great powers, such as Russia's Gazprom and the U.S.'s Noble Energy are important participants of this energy game. Besides, this region is an important alternative to Russia in providing Europe's energy needs. Indirectly, the U.S., Russia and Europe are key players of this energy game on this historic battlefield, the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy concerns raise a new set of questions: Is a new Cold War era, concerning the militarization of energy, starting in the Eastern Mediterranean? Is Turkey an independent player in this new era, or again a buffer state between great powers? How does the role of economics in the region compared with the influence of politics, religion, or culture on strategic relations? And finally, is Turkey paying as much attention to this region today as other states do?

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

Examining events related to energy and maritime security in the Eastern Mediterranean since World War II, this thesis intends to accomplish three major goals: (1) to give historical information about three major events that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean, (2) to assess and analyze these energy and maritime security-related events in terms of the realignment of alliances, (3) to analyze the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in light of historical events, and assess Turkey's emerging role regarding regional energy and maritime-security-related issues.

First, this thesis attempts to give historical information energy security related events: the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Oil Crisis, Cyprus Dispute. These crisis and their consequences are used as case studies to assess the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

³³ Cagatay Erciyes, "Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments," Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/maritime_delimitation.pdf (accessed November/03, 2012).

Second, the thesis seeks answers to the question how seemingly local crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean have resulted in a great power game and new state alignments.

Finally, to analyze the current situation and probable strategic alignment in the region, the thesis examines certain maritime and energy-related disputes in the region in light of case studies and Turkey's emerging role as a potential power in the region.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis has five chapters: (1) Introduction, (2) Strategic Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, (3) Historical Review of Certain Events as Case Studies (4) Current Energy and Maritime Security Situation in the eastern Mediterranean and Turkey's Role, (5) Conclusion.

Chapter II discusses the geographic, political, military, and especially economic importance of the region. It analyzes the struggles to control the world's most important junction point of maritime trade and natural resources and civilizations.

Chapter III provides a historical review of the energy and maritime-related crises, and case studies that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and their effect on the alignments of strategic alliances. Those events are the Arab-Israeli Conflict (related Suez Crisis and 1973 Energy Crisis) during the Cold War's great-power confrontations, and the struggle for Cyprus.

Chapter IV presents the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of energy and maritime security, and examines Turkey's increasing strategic role in the region. This chapter provides information about the importance of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources, the geopolitical importance of Turkey as an energy hub, probable energy problems in default of the delimitation of maritime areas, strategic-alliance problems and the militarization of energy security.

Chapter V summarizes the main analyses and presents the importance of the current geostrategic alignment of alliances in terms energy and maritime security, and Turkey's key role in the settlement of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

A. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE

The Eastern Mediterranean Region, which today attracts international interest in hydrocarbon exploration and production, has been arguably one of the world's most strategic regions. Since the region lies at the axis of movement, both north-south and east-west, it has been at the juncture of the land and maritime trade, energy transportation and, naturally, great conflicts and crises due to its geostrategic importance.

Since ancient times, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a significant role in cultural, commercial, and military history.³⁴ Culturally, the southeastern crescent of the Mediterranean has been an important schoolroom of most of the human race. This region was the birthplace of two important monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, and is a significant holy land for another monotheistic religion, Islam. Jerusalem, for instance, is perhaps the only city in the world that is considered historically and spiritually significant to Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. For Jews, the land was thought holy even before they occupied it, because they believe that God had promised the land to them. For Christians, Jerusalem is holy because the passion and resurrection of Jesus took place on this land. Visiting the Holy Land has been very important for Christians in terms of pilgrimage. For Muslims, Jerusalem is *Al-Quds* "the holy city" because it was the first direction of prayer *qible*, and is the third holy city after Mecca and Medina.

Commercially, the Eastern Mediterranean has always been an important highway for trade between the East and the West, or the Occident and Orient.³⁵ For the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean was the heart of the empire and the artery of transportation. They named it *Mediteraaneo* the "middle of the earth" or *mare nostrum*, "our sea."³⁶ The Roman Empire was the first empire using the Mediterranean's utility as a strategically

³⁴ Frank Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean* (New York: Mckay Publication, 1975), 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 9.

indispensable seaway for military operations.³⁷ With the help of the Mediterranean, the Roman Empire lasted more than half a millennium. As Roman unity came to an end with German and Slav invasions from the north and Muslim conquests from the south, this strategic sea faced a series of wars. One of the first was the Crusades, undertaken by Western European Christians, with the authorization of the papacy, to take the holy lands back from the Muslim world. Although these bloody wars negatively affected the stability of the region, the Mediterranean benefitted commercially from the Crusades. The Eastern Mediterranean seaports gained their historical importance during the Crusades and were revived after the wars.³⁸

The Crusaders started to retreat after the victories of the Turks. They yielded Jerusalem, then Rhodes, Cyprus, and finally, after a long defense, their final stronghold, Malta.³⁹ The Ottoman Empire took over the role of the Roman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, who built the walls of Jerusalem and battlements that stand to this day, the sea power of the Ottoman Empire was unchallenged from Syria to Spain.⁴⁰ This ancient Latin sea was facing its second golden age of being the most important highway of trade and communication. Although the Mediterranean retained its importance as a strategic waterway in this period, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, an alternative route to the East, by Vasco de Gama decreased the commercial importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. This route was longer than the Mediterranean, but it was much safer and easier. The simultaneous decline of Turkish naval power resulted in a power shift in the Mediterranean. From the end of the 18th century, after the radical downturn of Ottoman naval power among the oceanic world powers, the Napoleonic French started to dominate in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the British entered the Mediterranean to maintain the balance of power.⁴¹

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Masoumeh Banitalebi, "The Impact of Islamic Civilization and Culture in Europe during the Crusades," *World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization* 2 (2012), 182-187.

³⁹ Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, 9.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.13.

Another great power from the north, the Russian Empire, tried to expand its naval presence to the Mediterranean. After the historic defeat of a large Ottoman fleet in Navarino in 1827, a great power game started in the region. In this battle, for the first time, the British and the French navies fought on the same side after the 16th century.⁴² After the defeat, the Russian Empire declared war against the Ottoman Empire, and Britain and France repaired their relations with the Ottoman Empire and became a virtual ally with the Ottomans in order to prevent the Russians from reaching the Mediterranean.⁴³ This power game intensified after the French cut a canal across the Suez in 1869, a shortcut between the Orient and Occident, and revived the historical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁴ After the opening of the Suez Canal, the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean was greater than it had ever been.

After the opening of the Suez Canal and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire's power in the Mediterranean, the British Empire upon which "the sun never set," controlled strategic points such as Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Suez Canal. The main reasons for British expansion were the radical growth of trade and finance, military finance, and technical developments in warfare.⁴⁵ This era was revolutionary for the British Empire in more ways than one. Britain had made itself a center of redistribution of goods, arriving not only from its colonies, but from many parts of the world. Controlling the strategic points in the Eastern Mediterranean allowed the British to control the region and its colonies, both in the east and west.

The American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean dates back to the 18th century. After American independence, the Royal Navy was no longer responsible for the protection of American merchant ships in the Mediterranean and Levant. The young

⁴² Lawrence Sondhaus, *Naval Warfare, 1815-1914* (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2000). <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10017797&ppg=26>, 17.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, 14.

⁴⁵ Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, eds., *Empires in World History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 235.

American republic tried to create alliances with other powers, such as France, Algerian *deys*, or Barbari pirates.⁴⁶

However, France refused to provide naval protection against the pirates, and offered instead to negotiate with the Barbary states on behalf of the United States. These negotiations with the regional *pashas* would cost to this young nation nearly \$1 million, which was impossible to for the U.S. to pay, as its national budget was lower than \$6 million.⁴⁷ This triggered the creation of a transoceanic naval force. Thomas Jefferson proposed to the European powers the formation of a kind of “League of Maritime Nations” for creating a joint military force against piracy in the Mediterranean.⁴⁸ However, the European powers, distrusting and fighting each other, did not cooperate with this young and weak nation. Thomas Jefferson decided to use the U.S. Navy to defeat the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean. After naval attacks against the pirates and deterrence strategies against the local *deys* of the Barbary coast, the centuries of piracy in the Mediterranean came to an end, resulting in the birth of a strong United States Navy.⁴⁹

During the 19th century, British dominance in the region continued. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, with rising nationalism inspired by the Western principles of self-determination and anti-imperialism, the British hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean started to fade. This only intensified after the World War II.⁵⁰ In the post–World War II period, the aim of U.S. foreign policy in the region was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, protect Middle East oil and help create and maintain a Jewish state in Palestinian territories.⁵¹ The U.S. and the Soviet Union were pitted against one another around the world, and no less so in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁴⁶ Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, 20.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Bruce A. Elleman and Andrew Forbes, eds., *Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies* (Newport, R.I: Naval War College Press, 2010), 159.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 174.

⁵⁰ Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, 14.

⁵¹ William Quandt, *Diplomacy in the Middle East : The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*, ed. L. Carl Brown (London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 5.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10132964&ppg=5>.

Russia wanted to control the Turkish Straits and Suez Canal in order to benefit from the strategic importance of the region, to control oil resources, and to achieve its historic goals, such as obtaining free access to the Mediterranean and controlling the resources in the Middle East.⁵² Having played a critical role in world history for centuries, the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean continued in the modern era, reflected in the continued struggle for domination over its dominion.

As Frank Gervasi argues, “one of history’s most important lessons is that whoever controlled the Mediterranean dominated Europe, Africa, Asia, and controlled half the Atlantic and wielded great power in the Pacific.”⁵³

B. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The Eastern Mediterranean joins the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean. It also joins much of the Middle East with the West; the Suez Canal is the shortest way between the East and West. It is also an important international navigation canal linking the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said and the Red Sea at Suez. For international maritime trade, the canal is vital in terms of saving distance, cost, and time. After the opening of the Suez Canal by the French and Egyptian governments, it was operated by an Egyptian company. In only a few years, the canal proved important by providing the shortest link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the canal enabled Western colonial powers to control and govern their colonies.

The Island of Cyprus has also remained an important geostrategic location in the Mediterranean for centuries. The island kept its strategic importance under the control of the Venetian maritime empire, the Ottoman Empire, Napoleonic France, the British Empire, and the U.S and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, shipping routes for oil and competition for the control of potential chokepoints make international actors very involved with that island country. ⁵⁴ Cyprus is located on the sea lane of the great

⁵² Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean*, 15.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ J. Leigh and P. Vukovic, "A Geopolitics of Cyprus," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 15(4) ((2011)), 64.

maritime highway that connects the Mediterranean Sea through two sea gates, the Suez and Bab al-Mandab, with the Indian Ocean.

Politically and militarily, the Eastern Mediterranean is the eastern border of the world's most powerful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. The region has also become the border of the European Union after the membership of the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus. During the Cold War, NATO focused on enlargement in Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean received secondary attention as regards security issues.⁵⁵ During the Cold War, the main focus of NATO in the Mediterranean had been to limit Soviet influence in the area.⁵⁶ It is obvious that the Soviet Union sought to strengthen political relations with Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Libya in that period. Despite these threats, the Eastern Mediterranean was never as important as the Central Front, which was concentrated in central Europe to counter an anticipated Warsaw Pact assault.⁵⁷ With the end of the Cold War, the center of risks and challenges moved to the southern and eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁸ In this era, NATO became freer to operate out of this new Central Front, and security issues concerning the Middle East and Gulf began to have increasing impact on the security and stability of the region in particular and the global economy in general.⁵⁹ Thus, new approaches to security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean are likely to become an important part of reform and adaptation within the alliance.⁶⁰ For both NATO and the EU, energy issues have appeared as a security concern, and with the growth of new lines of communication for energy in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the interests of these two

⁵⁵ Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges & New Strategies in the Mediterranean* (Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 2000), iii.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004600&ppg=1>.

⁵⁶ Gareth Mark Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean : The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative* (London, GBR: Garland Science Publishing, 2000), 49.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10054163&ppg=8>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges & New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, iii.

⁵⁹ Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean : The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, 121.

⁶⁰ Ian O. Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee and Jerrold Green, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative : Policy Issues & Dilemmas* (Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 1998), 2.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=5002311&ppg=19>.

giant political and military organizations regarding energy security are now more broadly shared.⁶¹

As a result of the increasing importance of the region, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. With the help of this initiative, NATO has relations with seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.⁶² This dialogue reflects the alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.




Figure 1. NATO Members, Invited Countries around the Mediterranean and Mediterranean Dialogue Countries.⁶³

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Official Web Page." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_60021.htm (accessed October/10, 2012).

⁶³ NATO Official Web Page, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/icons/map/b_nato_overview.jpg (accessed October/20, 2012).

For the European Union (EU), the 2004 expansion (its fifth), in which the EU grew from 15 to 25 member state, was the largest in its history.⁶⁴ Even though Cyprus Island was divided and the 2004 UN referendum for the reunification of the island was rejected by the GCs, the EU paradoxically accepted the membership of the island as United Cyprus Republic, claiming that the TRNC is void, and confirming that the Greek part of the Island represents the entire island⁶⁵ Thus, the borders of the EU extended to the Eastern Mediterranean, with the problematic membership of the GCASC, which the EU recognizes as the Cyprus Republic.



Figure 2. Borders of the EU after the membership of GCASC (The EU recognizes as Cyprus).⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *International Library of Twentieth Century History : Island in Europe : The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus*, eds. James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen (London, GBR: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 13. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10504528&ppg=21>.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ <http://cordis.europa.eu/regions/> (accessed November 1, 2012)

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean appeared as the alternative route for transportation of Central Asian energy and commercial items to Europe. As Cyprus is located at the center of this alternative energy and maritime route, membership of the island was vital for the future of the EU. The island is also vital for the new global and regional security strategy of the EU.

The EU, primarily an economic bloc, opened its doors to many countries once in the Soviet orbit. NATO, a military alliance, accepted the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary as members.⁶⁷ The boundaries of the West moved east and south. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean became the outer limit of the West.

Most analysts believe that the EU, such as NATO, needs to be revised, and that today's period of urgent crisis requires a revised security strategy.⁶⁸ The new European Security Strategy (ESS) argues that in the 21st century, the EU should have a new security strategy that should fulfill three functions: it should have political appeal and thus potential to inspire, it should serve as a guideline for daily bureaucratic work, and it should serve as a way of communicating the EU and its views to a broad audience, within the EU as well as outside.⁶⁹ Thus, a new strategy concerning timing, institutional flux, new threats, and shifting geopolitics is seen vital.⁷⁰ The Eastern Mediterranean, which is at the axis of shifting geopolitics, new threats and institutional flux, has an enormous effect on the new ESS. There is widespread agreement that the EU must now show leadership and determination at a particularly acute moment of crisis in the region which undermines its geopolitical relevance and concerns.⁷¹ The threats mentioned in the 2008 ESS continue to loom. These threats are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional conflict, state failure, organized crime, energy security, and climate change.⁷²

⁶⁷ Inbar, E., & Sandler, S., "The Importance of Cyprus," *Middle East Quarterly* 8(2) (2001), 55.

⁶⁸ J. Andersson, "European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise Or Reinvent?" *The Swedish Institute of International Affairs* no. 7 (2011), 5.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 13.

Considering the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past century, the revision, reinvigoration, or even reinvention of NATO and the EU are inevitable. J. Anderson argues that the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) revealed a lack of strategic thinking in the EU's past and showed its weaknesses in preparing for quickly changing events.⁷³ He also argues that the recent NATO action in Libya clearly shows that the U.S. wants the EU to increase responsibility for its neighborhood.⁷⁴ It is likely that in the near future, these political and military alliances will take greater responsibility and initiative in the region, due to its continued importance.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 15.

III. CASE STUDIES

A. THE SUEZ CRISIS

1. Historical Context

After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the European maritime powers signed a convention to secure free transit through the Suez Canal, which was opened by the French and Egyptian governments in 1869.⁷⁵ The goal of the British occupation of Egypt and maritime agreements was not to conquer the Egyptian land; it was to restore political stability in Egypt, which had an important role in its colonial interests. The Britain possessed thirty-five colonies, ranging from Nigeria and the Solomons to tiny Malta and Ascension.⁷⁶ Britain did not plan a longstanding occupation; however, nearly three-quarters of a century later, as the decade of the 1950s dawned, they were still there.⁷⁷ Till World War II, Britain was the major power in the Middle East, and Egypt had vital strategic importance for British interests. As J.C. Hurewitz argues, the Suez Canal was “the jugular vein” of the British Empire. Nearly 70 per cent of the total ships passing from the canal were British-flagged, and the canal was tying the metropole to India, East Africa, and Australia.⁷⁸ In the interwar years, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was the leading producer in the world market, producing nearly two-thirds of the region’s total. The AIOC also built the world’s largest refinery, which fueled the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. British and French leaders knew that the control of navigation was a key strategic issue for their interests in the region. For the French, while the distance of the maritime route to India from the Cape of Good Hope was 10,400 nautical miles (NM), from the Suez Canal it was only 4,900 NM.⁷⁹ Britain took over the hegemonic control of the canal after the decline of Napoleonic France.

⁷⁵ J. C. Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, ed. W.M. Roger Louis, Roger Owen (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 19.

⁷⁶ Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez* (New York: The Lindon Press, 1981), 18.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 22.

⁷⁹ Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 12.

The global rise of nationalism and the process of decolonization decreased the global power of the British Empire. Once being an empire spanned a quarter of the world's land and a quarter of its people, the British Empire on which the sun never set was the victim of two disastrously destructive world wars and the rise of nationalism that created independent states.⁸⁰ In this “realignment of great powers” process, the Suez Crisis had a key importance regarding its consequences. The American opposition to colonialism caused the dissolution of two colonial powers, France and Britain, and their foreign-policy thinking turned away from acting as a great imperial powers.⁸¹

During the first and second quarter of the 20th century, the British Empire was controlling strategic energy fields in the region. After the Second World War, the Suez Canal regained its status as a strategic waterway, and by 1953 the traffic was 30 per cent greater than it was in 1939.⁸² There were not only oil tankers to and from the Persian Gulf, but liners, aircraft carriers, warships, troopships and store ships connected with various military campaigns in the Far East.⁸³ The AIOC in the Shatt al-Arab region, the Iraq Petroleum Company, an international consortium in the Kirkuk in which British companies were entitled to a half-share, and British-owned pipeline terminals at Haifa and Tripoli supported the power of the British Empire and its powerful military.⁸⁴ This colonial and imperial character necessitated strategic bases that would enable the empire to control its interests. The Suez base was the most appropriate location for these purposes. The base lying at the pivot of the Eastern Hemisphere was uniquely located at the center of Asia and Africa, and close to south-east Europe.⁸⁵ It was accessible from land, air and sea (the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean). Britain was controlling the main institutions of the Egypt, such as the government and economy. The Egyptian nationalists were uncomfortable by this control and military presence in their country.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² *Reassessing Suez 1956 : New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. Simon C. Smith (Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008), 25.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10250462&ppg=30>.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 23.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Meanwhile the post-war situation, increasing nationalist demands, and the U.S.'s increasing concerns in the region lead to a reduction in Britain's commitment to the Zionist cause in Palestine.⁸⁶ Instead, the U.S. tended to favor Zionism. Similarly, Britain wanted the U.S. to take over a protective role in the Middle East. The emergence of American interests in the region could be a life buoy for Britain with joint military planning and economic support.⁸⁷ In 1947, Britain formally notified the U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall, that she could no longer carry that burden.⁸⁸ The Truman Doctrine, an American commitment to prevent Soviet expansion, came in as a response to Britain's call.⁸⁹

The U.S. was hesitant to deploy military forces in the region because of its commitments in Europe and Korea.⁹⁰ Besides, the U.S. was still worried about the colonial character of Britain. After Iran's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, Britain threatened war over Iran's behavior.⁹¹ Within Egypt, the resistance against the Britain increased radically. In 1952, rioters in Cairo burned many British-owned buildings and killed some Europeans.⁹² During this time in Britain, Winston Churchill, a conservative wartime leader who was elected in 1951, was in power. Churchill was the wartime colleague of Eisenhower and a new hope to some people for a return to the historic imperial character of Britain.⁹³ Many believed that, as in the old days, Britain and the U.S. could revive the shiny Western empire with their special relationship; however, the U.S. did not believe that a dual power in the region would dispose of the Soviet threat and bring peace.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Scott Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 8.

⁸⁸ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 27.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*, 9.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 10.

The anti-colonial character of the U.S., with the help of increasing nationalism, accelerated the decolonization process after the World War II.⁹⁴ British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd expressed this character of the U.S. in his memoirs. “The Americans were, on the face of it, loyal and dependable allies but underneath there was in many Americans’ hearts a dislike of colonialism, a resentment of any authority left to us from the great days of our empire, and pleased smile, only half concealed, at seeing us go down.”⁹⁵

The Arab defeat after the first Arab–Israeli War (1948) strained the already bad relations between Egypt and Britain. The insult of the defeat intensified the nationalist character of the Egyptians. Before the war, the Egyptian government demanded ten days’ notice from any power wishing to send a warship through the canal.⁹⁶ This was a sign of evolving Egyptian nationalism against the global powers. During the Arab–Israeli war, Egypt inspected and searched the vessels transiting the canal, as the British did during World War II.⁹⁷ Egypt argued that the Suez Canal and Port Said were as Egyptian as other parts of the country and should be controlled by Egyptians. After the outbreak of the Arab–Israeli war, Egypt started to inspect Israeli-bound cargo ships, despite international protests from the UN, France, Britain, and the U.S.⁹⁸

Despite the increasing Egyptian opposition to colonialism and willingness to evacuate, the British forces in the canal zone exceeded the limits set by the 1936 Anglo–Egyptian treaty.⁹⁹ In addition, Iranian opposition to British oil hegemony in their own land inspired the Egyptians.

During this period, many Iranians considered the AIOC exploitative, and its nationalization plan constituted a critical element of the Iranian reform program under the

⁹⁴ Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 19.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Reassessing Suez 1956 : New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, 26.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Mosaddegh government.¹⁰⁰ After the nationalization of AIOC, its British personnel left Iran and as a result, operations in the oil fields ceased.¹⁰¹ The nationalization process turned out to be an exclusion process that removed Iran from the world oil market. Iranian workers were unable to manage professional oil production, and the British-imposed naval embargo made it impossible for Iran to find tankers to export its oil.¹⁰² The oil-dependent Iranian economy suffered from this self-imposed crisis. Great powers such as the U.S. and Soviet Union did not support Iran with its conservationist strategy. The U.S. refused to grant financial support and the Soviet Union declined to repay its wartime debts to Iran; thus, budget and balance-of-payments deficits increased radically.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, the Egyptians were inspired by the Iranian nationalism and continued their willingness to nationalize the Suez Canal and evacuate British forces from their lands.

While Britain was awaiting support from the U.S., the U.S. was developing a northern-tier defense system of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran on the southern border of the Soviet Union, called the Baghdad Pact.¹⁰⁴ Ray Takeyh argues that in this period, under U.S. Cold War objectives, Egyptian pan-Arabism and the British Imperialism were a triangular dilemma.¹⁰⁵ The U.S. was trying to balance regional interests according to its national-security interests. On one hand, the U.S. was trying to alienate the potential pan-Arabic character of Egypt in order to prevent an Arab-dominated pact near the Israeli borders; on the other hand, it was trying to consolidate a northern tier in cooperation with the friendly states of Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to protect the Middle East from further Soviet dominance and encircle the Soviets by strategic pro-Western alliances.¹⁰⁶ It was obvious that American support for Britain in the Middle East was no

¹⁰⁰ R. Ghasimi, "Iran's Oil Nationalization and Mossadegh's Involvement with the World Bank. .," *The Middle East Journal* 65(3) (2011), 443.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 444.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Lucas, *Britain and Suz: The Lion's Last Roar*, 10.

¹⁰⁵ Ray Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine* (New York, NY USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 49. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004495&ppg=3>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

longer assured, even though they had mutual interests. While the U.S. was in cooperation with Britain regarding the Soviet threat and energy issues in the Middle East, Britain was forced to sign a new Anglo–Egyptian agreement with Egypt in 1954, requiring British troops to leave the country by 1956.

In this period, Arab–Israeli conflict was worsening and tensions between Egypt and Israel were rising. For the first time, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden met President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1955 in Cairo.¹⁰⁷ The meeting was sincere and friendly. However, four days after the meeting, Britain signed the Baghdad Pact with Turkey and Iraq, which jeopardized Nasser’s dream of being the leader of the Arabs. Moreover, only eight days after the Eden–Nasser meeting, Israeli armed forces attacked the Gaza Strip and killed thirty-eight Egyptians.¹⁰⁸ This was a retaliation for Egypt’s seizure of Israeli ships because of the Suez blockade and execution of Israeli spies in Egypt.

On the Israeli side, a new coalition government was formed after the 1955 elections, and Ben Gurion, who resigned in 1954 and served as the minister of defense, returned to office as prime minister.¹⁰⁹ He continued his old practice of combining government issues with the defense portfolio. In this coalition government, the three main partners had different opinions about their relation with Egypt. On the one hand, Moshe Dayan, an important figure in making national-security policies, wanted a preventive war against Egypt; on the other hand, Moshe Sharett, foreign minister, did not want war with Egypt.¹¹⁰ While Nasser of Egypt was a strong Arab nationalist and had strong anti-Israeli tensions, the majority in the Israel government was of the right-wing Herut Party and defenders of war for national security. Thus, the increasing tensions were inevitable. Ben-Gurion showed a neutral attitude for a war in his first period of office; but in 1956, after

¹⁰⁷ Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*, 11.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 2001), 143.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

the U.S. rejection of Israel's request for arms, Israel found a new arms supplier, France, and the idea of preventive war reemerged.¹¹¹

For Egypt's part, Nasser was not happy with the Baghdad Pact, and the two countries, Egypt and Britain, confronted each other again over the Baghdad Pact. The reason for Nasser's denunciation was that he felt the pact was another attempt at imperialist domination.¹¹² He also believed that this could prevent his united Arab league dream. Because of the increased tensions between Israel, Nasser wanted to strengthen his country's military power, as Israel was trying to do at this time. He tried to get arms from the Western powers, however, the U.S., Britain and France were discouraged from supplying arms by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 which required that a balance of power in the Middle East would be maintained by those powers.¹¹³ As a result of this controversial treaty, Nasser got closer to the Soviets and obtained military equipment Czechoslovakia. This Tripartite Declaration had problematic effects, because while Western powers were trying to limit the Soviet strategic expansion in the region, they forced Egypt to find alternative allies. Besides this, France, a participant of the Tripartite Declaration, would be a new arms supplier for Israel before and during the crisis. Thus, a realignment of alliances process started.

2. The 1956 Crisis

Despite his anti-Western policies, President Nasser knew that the economic development of Egypt was strongly tied with the West. Thus, he sent his ambassador Hussein to the U.S. to announce Egypt's intention to construct a dam, High Aswan Dam, with Western help.¹¹⁴ The U.S. and the U.K. rejected Nasser's invitation and withdrew their offer for constructing the dam. The U.S. and the UK explained their rejection in a formal statement mentioning that Egypt had not succeeded in securing the water rights

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Michael C. Shupe, "Nationalization of the Suez Canal A HYPERGAME ANALYSIS," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Pre-1986) 24 (3) (1980), 479.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Lawrence Wilsey, "Background of Suez," *World Affairs* 119, no. 3 (Fall, 1956),73.

agreements.¹¹⁵ Not only the Western powers, but the Soviet Russia indicated a loss of interest in financing the dam.

Nasser's diplomatic strive failed and he was alone. This was exactly the desired isolation strategy of the West for Nasser. However, they did not expect the next radical step that he took. In July 1956, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, thus taking the strategic trade control from Britain.¹¹⁶ This was a surprise action, and the world was shocked against such a step. Thus situation was also extraordinary for crisis analyzers. Micheal Shups argues that because the British and the Americans were taken by complete surprise when the Egyptians decided to nationalize the canal, this conflict constitutes a special type of hypergame.¹¹⁷ A hypergame is a situation where one or more of the players has a mistaken interpretation of any aspect of the conflict.¹¹⁸ Both the U.S. and Britain had a mistaken interpretation about the next step of Nasser. Nasser thought that if he nationalizes the canal, and the English launches an attack to take the canal back, this would take more than two months.¹¹⁹ Thus, he calculated that an international settlement could be reached within two months to pacify the crisis. This move shocked the West, and forced them to take immediate actions for the security of the canal. On the other hand, Nasser became a champion of Arab nationalism among the Arab states.¹²⁰

The canal was legally Egyptian, but in 1869 was granted a 99-year concession, and would not revert to Egyptian government till 1968. The 1888 Constantinople (Istanbul) Convention, a nine-nation agreement, provided that the canal would be open to all shipping both in peace and war.¹²¹ President Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal came after Britain and America's withdrawal of financial assistance to the Aswan

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Shupe, *Nationalization of the Suez Canal A Hypergame Analysis*, 478.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ P. G. Bennett and M. R. Dando, "Complex Strategic Analysis: A Hypergame Study of the Fall of France," *The Journal of the Operational Research Society* 30, no. 1 (Jan., 1979), 23.

¹¹⁹ Shupe, *Nationalization of the Suez Canal A Hypergame Analysis*, 482.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Wilsey, *Background of Suez*, 72.

Dam.¹²² In his speech during the nationalization ceremony, he mentioned that 120,000 Egyptians had died building the canal, but Egypt was receiving just a very small proportion of the company's £35m annual earnings.¹²³ He emphasized the centuries of insult that the Egyptians faced. These hostile decisions triggered British, French, and Israeli counter measures against Egypt. According to Eden, Egypt's seizure of the canal left Europe without choice: it had to fight for its place in the world and challenge the global order, which was started to be shaped by the U.S. ¹²⁴

In October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched the Sinai Campaign and dropped paratroops to the region. Britain and France gave an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt. The ultimatum for Israel was a symbolic one because they were in close relations with Israel and had common interests in Suez. However, Britain and France did not want an important Israeli advance towards the Suez to protect the canal. On 30 October, before the IDF reached the Canal, Britain and France began aerial bombardment of the Egyptian forces.¹²⁵ After days, although Nasser withdrew his forces from the Sinai and Gaza, the British and French forces had to stop because of the UN's and the U.S.'s economic and political pressures. Israel was also threatened by the U.S. because of its unwelcomed alliance with Britain and France. Israel was told that if it did not withdraw, all official and private aid from the U.S. government and American Jewry would be cut off.¹²⁶

On November 5, the British and French forces stopped their attack, and on 9 November, Israeli prime minister announced the withdrawal of IDF.¹²⁷ There were arguably different reasons for these three powers withdrawal. First, UN announced that it was ready to take over peacekeeping. Second, the Soviet Union had entered the stage,

¹²²"1956: Egypt Seizes Suez."BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm (accessed October/12, 2012).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ralph Dietl, "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (Apr., 2008), 261.

¹²⁵ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 179.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*,103.

giving notes to Britain, France and Israel.¹²⁸ The Soviet note to the Government of the United Kingdom read:

In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked by more powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon? And there are countries now which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain but could have used other means, such as rocket technique.¹²⁹

Finally, the domestic situations in those countries forced them to stop and withdraw. In Britain, the value of the pound was collapsing and the economy was in trouble. Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo to Britain and France. This meant that these oil-importing economies could face an important threat if the U.S. does not fill the gap. However, the U.S. did not fill their energy gap and they were forced to withdraw.

3. Consequences of the Crisis

The Suez Crisis had both regional and global consequences. Regarding the energy and maritime security, its consequences caused a radical realignment of alliances and a shift of power balances. The crisis of 1956 was a turning-point in global history that resulted in the emergence of a new international order.¹³⁰

For Israel, the crisis seemed to be an historic opportunity for its Zionist expansion ideology. Israel had many operational and political objectives during the crisis: to defeat the Egyptian army, to overthrow Nasser, to re-open the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, to guarantee and extend the borders, and to create a new political order in the Middle East.¹³¹ They achieved some of their objectives, such as defeating the Egyptian army, re-opening the Straits of Tiran and securing its Egyptian borders. Even though Israel could not achieve an expansion, its tactical victory and refusal of early withdrawal from Sinai, unlike Britain and France, forced Western powers to take Israel's security into consideration for the settlement in the Middle East.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid. Scott Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 104.

¹³⁰ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 171.

¹³¹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 183.

For Britain and France, this period was a radical decline of their historic colonial era. Virtually, they, especially Britain, handed over the leadership in the Middle East and other regions to the U.S..¹³² This was in the final removal of the British bases in Egypt and the termination of the Anglo-Egyptian agreements. Rather than removing Nasser's influence both in Egypt and in Arab world, the crisis increased his popularity not only in the Arab world, but in the third world.¹³³ This popularity would be proved by the strong ideology of Arab unity leading to the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1958. Besides, after the war, Syria broke diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, owned by Britain, France and the U.S., crossing Syria was blown up.¹³⁴ On the other hand, the entirely American-owned Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLine) was untouched. British and French oil supply sources were in danger. They were also losing prestige among Third World countries.

The crisis was a symbol of a power take over from Britain to the U.S.. British colonial existence in the region suffered deeply. The Suez Crisis exposed British inability to act without the approval of the U.S..¹³⁵ This means that alliance was controlled by the U.S. Five years later in 1961, Harold Macmillan, prime minister of Britain after Eden, made the first (unsuccessful) attempt to join the recently formed European Economic Community.¹³⁶ The decision, like Suez, again divided public opinion, but for the political elite (on the left as on the right), the lesson of Suez was that Britain was no longer a world power.¹³⁷ Britain, who had been controlling the whole Middle East two decades ago, was reduced to only small tribal states like Abu Dhabi, Aden and Kuwait.¹³⁸

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 172.

¹³⁴ Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 398.

¹³⁵ Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*, 113.

¹³⁶ *British Culture of the Postwar : An Introduction to Literature & Society, 1945-1999*, eds. Alan Sinfield and Alistair Davies (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2000), 2.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2002695&ppg=14>.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Lucas, *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*, 114.

For the U.S., the crisis altered the political alignments in the Middle East. The Eisenhower doctrine, after the Suez Crisis, constituted a direct American intervention in the ensuing Arab Cold War.¹³⁹ The U.S. not only passivized the British, but also created a U.S.-led Arab block against Soviet influence. Since 1953, the U.S. was seeking to incorporate the Middle East in its containment alliances network, and after the Suez, the U.S. started to achieve its goal in conjunction with the conservative monarchies.¹⁴⁰

In terms of Turkey, during the Cold War, Turkey served as a barrier against the expansion of Soviet power into the Mediterranean and Middle East.¹⁴¹ Similarly in Suez Crisis, Turkey was doing its historical responsibility of being a buffer state to prevent Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁴² Before the crisis, the U.S. was developing a northern tier defense system of Turkey, Pakistan and Iran on the southern border of the Soviet Union, called the Baghdad Pact. Turkey became a buffer zone between Soviet Russia and the Mediterranean. This was a mutual-benefit game. While the U.S. prevented Russian access to the Mediterranean, NATO membership helped Turkey to secure its borders against a Soviet threat. On the other hand, this was also a two-edged knife for Turkey, because she was risking its lands to be a sacrifice against a Soviet (nuclear) attack to the U.S. as being a satellite state for the U.S. and NATO. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 would be a good proof for this two edged game. During the missile crisis, Turkish land, such as Cuba, was threatened to become a nuclear-confrontation arena of the great powers.

Beside Turkey's pro-Western policies in this period, Turkey also wanted to strengthen its relations with many Arab countries. Since it was an important regional player in the Baghdad Pact and NATO, Turkey signed Friendly Cooperation treaties with

¹³⁹ Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, 142. Ray Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine* (New York, NY USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 142. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004495&ppg=3>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Ray Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine* (New York, NY USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 143. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004495&ppg=3>.

¹⁴¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, *Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner* (Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 1. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10227038&ppg=16>.

¹⁴² Nicole Johnson, "Turkish Reactions to the Arab Spring: Implications for the United States Foreign Policy," *Global Security Studies* Volume 3, Issue 4 (2012), 2.

Iraq and Pakistan. Turkey also wanted to strengthen relations with Egypt; however, Egypt wanted to struggle to become a political leader of the Arab nationalism. Similarly, Turkey wanted to be the leader of the pro-Western countries in the Middle East. Thus, Middle Eastern countries split into two camps: one camp consisted of pro-Western states led by Turkey, the other camp of states under the leadership of Egypt seeking to defend their political and economic independence against Western exploitation.¹⁴³ After the Suez War, Turkey adopted a balanced but ambiguous position. While considering the Anglo-French attack to be a breach of international law, Turkey accused Egypt of having responsibility of escalating the conflict.¹⁴⁴ Turkey argued that, the Middle Eastern countries would have been secured from the Soviet threat if they had joined the Baghdad Pact. However, some of the Middle Eastern countries did not perceive Soviet intervention as a threat. Another reason for the Arab countries' opposition to Turkey was that Turkey announced that the UN's 1947 partition plan, which had been rejected by the Arab states, could serve as a basis for peace talks.¹⁴⁵ In short, Turkish policy during and after the Suez Crisis did not have certain borders. On the one hand, while Turkey had severe criticism for Israel and recalled its envoy from Israel (which was designed to appease public opinion and strengthen the Baghdad Pact), it accepted that relations with the West were of paramount importance under all circumstances.

After the crisis, the interest in European integration grew radically. The formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which were created after the signing of the Rome Treaties in March 1957, were the symbols of this European integration process.¹⁴⁶ By the late 1960s, increasing oil dependence to the Middle East had contributed to a growing pro-Arab strategy by the European governments. Thus, this caused disagreement with the U.S. because of its strong commitment to Israel.

¹⁴³ Baskin Oran, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, trans. Mustafa Aksin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 372.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses, Inc., 1980), 16.

This crisis was a watershed for shifting take overs among great powers, regional powers and other states. It was also the first major international test of non-alignment for many states after World War II.¹⁴⁷ India, for instance, had cautiously taken care not to be involved in the dispute with Britain, France, Israel or the U.S.; and kept other major non-aligned nations informed.¹⁴⁸ In short, in terms of realignment of alliances, the Suez Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean was a major energy and maritime-security-related event after World War II.

¹⁴⁷ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 173.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

B. THE 1973 OIL CRISIS

1. Historical Context

After the Suez Crisis, despite the existence of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to ensure security between the parties, there were numerous border clashes and guerilla attacks from both sides. As a result of these incidents and Israel's threat assessment, Israeli armed forces launched a preemptive attack against Egyptian and Syrian forces in 1967. Political alignments after the Suez Crisis were more distinctive during this crisis. The Soviet Union supported Egypt, Syria, and Iraq militarily and economically in order to gain access to the Arab world;¹⁴⁹ Ideologies did not play such a great role in shaping strategic relationships.. The security of the Suez Canal was crucial for the Russians, as it once had been for Britain, since it became a strategic gate for Soviet arms and oil transit to its allies.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, China sought to extend its influence in the region with the goal of creating an anti-imperialist bloc among those progressive Third World Arab countries, such as Syria and Egypt.

The U.S. backing of Israel increased drastically after the Suez Crisis and in seeming contrast, except for pro-Soviet Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the U.S. was also continuing to support its Arab allies in the region. President Johnson, personally felt great affinity with Israel because of his religious background and saw the Jewish people in Israel as "modern day version of the Texans fighting with Mexicans."¹⁵¹ Similarly, during the peace process after the 1967 War, the U.S.'s side was closer to Israel's. There are many examples of America's tendency to side with Israel during the peace negotiations. The United States played a key role in the abortive peace efforts that followed the Six Day War, as well as the talks that ended the War of Attrition in 1970.¹⁵² During the peace process, Kissinger was never able to bring much pressure to bear on

¹⁴⁹ Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 7th ed. (New York: Bedford/St. Martin, 2010), 278.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, *The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: London Review of Books, 2007), 46.

Israel during his conduct of the “step-by-step” diplomacy that followed the October War. Kissinger complained at one point during the negotiations: “*I ask Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can’t because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and then he says he doesn’t need to make concessions because Israel is strong.*”¹⁵³

Thus, the Middle East became a Cold War battleground and primary area of attention for great powers.¹⁵⁴ Even though the U.S. was trying to continue strong relations with its Arab allies, her strong support of Israel created a public reaction against the U.S. among the Arab states. Unlike the Suez Crisis, the U.S. took the Israeli side and the USSR took the Arab states’ side during the 1967 War and peace processes after the war. Similarly, starting with the 1967 War, superpowers became ever more deeply involved in their support of the warring sides, the U.S. supporting Israel, the Soviet Union backing the Arabs.¹⁵⁵ These alignments also exacerbated the rising Arab unification and inter-Arab alliances. Inter-Arab politics thus played an important role resulting in an important Arab-Israeli war in 1973.

2. 1973 War and Consequences

On Yom Kippur on 06 October 1973, a holy day for the Jewish people, Egypt and Syria made a surprise attack from two fronts to Israel. The war moved through several stages, from Arab victory at first to total Israeli victory at the end.¹⁵⁶ The war officially ended on October 22 following a cease fire agreed by all participants.

During the war, the Nixon administration assumed a quick Israeli victory once Israel recovered from the Arab attack. On October 12, Nixon proposed a cease fire to both sides, to preserve some Egyptian gains and set the stage for talks.¹⁵⁷ Although Israel accepted the cease fire, Egypt rejected it since Sadat believed that Egyptian soldiers could

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis : The Cold War and American Hegemony in the Middle East* (Boston, MA, USA: Beacon Press, 2009), 83.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10271878&ppg=2>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 320.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 321.

regain some more territories. The U.S. wanted to regain the trust and win the confidence of the Egyptians, but Sadat, who was supported by Soviet power, rejected this initiative. After this, the U.S. decided to release major arms supplies to Israel.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, the Soviets tried to prevent Egyptian losses against Israelis. Sadat was determined to regain Sinai with Soviet support.

The War of 1973 was a surprise attack from Israeli analysts' point of view. They were aware of Syrian and Egyptian war plans. However, they did not think the Arabs were serious about going to war. Great-power alignments during this war, encouraged the Arabs to carry out a preemptive attack against Israel. Similarly, after the attack, the U.S.'s airlifted tons of weapons allowed Israel to re-attack and not withdraw easily from the lands it occupied. The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert, and an airlift was organized to transport them to the region, and they deployed many amphibious warfare crafts in the Mediterranean to help the Arabs.¹⁵⁹ The U.S. continued to supply Israel with military equipment. The super power rivalry was intensified the conflict.¹⁶⁰

During the pre-war period, some Arab regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, remained closer to the U.S. seeking their protection against the Communist threat. They agreed with Kissinger that the Soviets should be excluded from the region,¹⁶¹ but after the U.S.'s clear support to Israel during the war, many Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, decided that the U.S.'s main goal was not to bring an end to the historic Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the Saudis started to threaten to cut back their oil production, which could seriously affect the global economy in general but American energy concerns in particular.¹⁶² With the super powers' intervention in the crisis, a local Eastern Mediterranean problem would turn into a global crisis.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ian J. Bickerton, *Arab-Israeli Conflict : A History* (London, GBR: Reaktion Books, 2009), 135. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10430645&ppg=4>.

¹⁶⁰ Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis : The Cold War and American Hegemony in the Middle East* , 83.

¹⁶¹ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 317.

¹⁶² Ibid.

The U.S. wanted to repair the broken relations with Egypt to exclude the Soviet intervention in post-war peace agreements. Kissinger worked on military disengagement and resolution of territorial problems over a two-year period with a series of meetings with both Arab and Israeli leaders.¹⁶³ Kissinger's satellite diplomacy convinced Sadat that the U.S. was a key country for settlement of the conflict, and turning to Americans, rather than Soviet Union, was vital for Egypt's future. The 1978 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, which was mediated by Jimmy Carter and, provided the return of Sinai to Egypt, would be an indicator of a new, cemented U.S.-Egypt alliance.¹⁶⁴

Although Israel was the victor in the final stage, the impressive performance of the Arab armies in the initial phase of the war restored Arab pride, honor and self-confidence after the defeat of 1967.¹⁶⁵ After the war, the foundations of peace agreements were laid because of this performance of Arabs against the U.S. backed Israel. While the U.S. had supported Israel, after it understood the Arab insistency and the prospective change in Arab political alignment it quickly tried to restore the relations with Arab countries. However, these diplomatic and seemingly controversial maneuvers could not convince many oil producing Arab countries

3. Oil Crisis

In 17 October 1973, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, plus Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, announced an embargo on oil exports to selected countries that supported Israel during the war.¹⁶⁶ This embargo resulted in a dramatic increase in oil prices, radical changes in the strategies of oil dependent countries and stagflation of some economies. Many Western European countries and Japan quickly changed their alignment from pro-Israeli to pro-Arab. In a

¹⁶³ David S. Painter, *Cold War : An Interdisciplinary History* (London, GBR: Routledge, 1999), 80. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10054904&ppg=90>.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 2001), 320.

¹⁶⁶ James Hamilton, *Historical Oil Shocks* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,[2011]).

U.S. memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Japan's Finance Minister, this alignment was assessed by ministers from both sides:

Aichi called particular attention to the problem posed for Prime Minister Tanaka by the Middle East conflict and the developing oil crisis. He explained quite frankly that because of the great reliance of Japan on oil imports from the Middle East, a number of voices are calling for Japan to exercise a "free hand" by undertaking a diplomatic move in favor of the Arabs.¹⁶⁷

In this meeting with Japanese leaders, Kissinger tried to convince the finance minister that intervening in this conflict on the side of the Arabs could be risky for Japan. He argued that Japan, European countries and the U.S. were being blackmailed by the OPEC countries.¹⁶⁸ Japanese officers were speaking cautiously, because oil consumption in Japan increased rapidly during the 1960s as a result of economic growth and decline in the real price of oil.¹⁶⁹ By 1965, Japan became the largest individual importer of oil. Therefore, the Japanese Finance Minister did not want to accept an anti-Arab strategy after the crisis. At this point, Kissinger continued his arguments about the problem:

...However, we might resolve the long-term problem, the immediate problem is what action would be effective for Japan to go it alone, or to cooperate with the United States? That is a matter of judgment. I recognize frankly that the temptation might be great to act alone and take a dramatic pro-Arab position, but once that process starts what could Japan do that would be more dramatic if after three months it still got no oil? ... What the Arabs really want is a peaceful settlement, and only the U.S. can get them a peaceful settlement. Japan can't, the European countries can't, only we can.¹⁷⁰

In Kissinger's judgments, Japan and other Western nations would lose more if they choose to follow their own policies. Besides, he argued that the U.S. was not

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State Declassified Documents Archive, *Implications of Oil Crisis for Japan's Domestic and International Economic Policies* (Washington: U.S. Department of State-01829,[1973]).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 17.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State Declassified Documents Archive, *Implications of Oil Crisis for Japan's Domestic and International Economic Policies*, 3.

vulnerable to this kind of pressure; Japan and European countries were.¹⁷¹ However, contrary to Kissinger's judgments, U.S. economy would suffer severely from this crisis and it also led to the realignment of strategic alliances regarding the region. Although the U.S. was a large exporter of fossil fuels, both coal and oil before the 1950s; by the early 1970s, declining U.S. domestic oil production, together with increasing demand, pushed importation of Arab oil to more than one million barrels per day.¹⁷² Thus, suffering from this oil shock was inevitable.

In Western Europe, imports of crude oil from the area of the Middle East rose accordingly in order to satisfy Western Europe's total energy consumption from 13.4% in 1956, to 36% in 1967, and to 45% in 1973.¹⁷³ Before the oil crisis, the dominant players of the European oil market were multinational oil companies, known as the Seven Sisters. The Seven Sisters consisted of Exxon, Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), Chevron (Standard Oil of California), the Mellon's Gulf Oil, Shell, Texaco and British Petroleum (Anglo-Iranian). These companies controlled the majority of crude-oil exports to world markets by controlling every important pipeline in the world, such as the 753-mile Trans-Arabian Pipeline from Qaisuma in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea, which was co-owned by Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, and Mobil.¹⁷⁴ After the 1950s, nationalization in the Middle East altered the situation in the oil market. Western European countries sought to reestablish their relations with Arab countries. De Gaulle of France, for instance, wanted to establish a role in the Arab world to strengthen France's international position and limit the Anglo-Saxon energy powers' influence on France.¹⁷⁵ The growth of national Arab oil companies and independent oil companies of the West made an important impact on the global oil market and reduced the influence of the Seven Sisters. In

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 15.

¹⁷³ Giargou Yiangou, "European Energy Security, the Mediterranean Dimension," *Euro Mediterranean Observatory* 15 (2009), 136.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 16.

addition, OPEC increased its power ,due to the accession of eight new Members by 1973.¹⁷⁶ Thus, Western Europe became increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil.

After the oil shock, the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan suffered several major policy issues and problems. Assuring stability of supply after the OPEC production cutbacks, coping with sharply increased oil prices, and dealing with national concerns became major problems for those states.¹⁷⁷ Its macroeconomic consequences influenced both global and local economies By January 1974, world oil prices were four times higher than they were at the start of the crisis.




Figure 3. Crude Oil Prices after the 1973 Crisis¹⁷⁸

This radical increase in oil prices triggered a recession in the U.S. economy. The growth rate decreased and the crisis left persistent economic effects both on the global and the U.S. economy.

¹⁷⁶ Yiangou, *European Energy Security, the Mediterranean Dimension*, 6.

¹⁷⁷ Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 19.

¹⁷⁸ David L. Greene and Paul N. Leiby, 2008, *Driving the Future of Energy Security*, The Lugar Energy Initiative, http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/links/commentary/08_greene_full.cfm, (Date Accessed: 08 November 2012)




Figure 4. Effects of the crisis over GDP in the U.S.¹⁷⁹

The effect of the oil shock on the U.S. economy was immediate and unexpected. The oil prices quadrupled and economic problems left inflationary and deflationary impacts on domestic economy. After this oil shock, the U.S. understood that Middle Eastern oil mattered in the macro economy. Most of the recessions since 1972 were preceded by political events in the Middle East, resulting in a subsequent increase in the price of oil, which in turn caused a recession.¹⁸⁰ After the oil shock, economists concluded that oil shocks had a major effect on movements in output, consumption, investment, and employment in the U.S. economy. Luis Aguiar argues that non-oil shocks have been mainly responsible for all of the business cycles in the United States from 1950 to 1973; starting from 1974, however, non-oil shocks were no longer able to explain the movement in output, consumption, investment, and employment.¹⁸¹

There are many reasons that OPEC caused such a dramatic economic effect on the U.S. economy. David L. Greene argues that the U.S. economy suffered three kinds of

¹⁷⁹ "FRED Graph." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/> (accessed November/10, 2012).

¹⁸⁰ Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian, "Oil and Macroeconomy since 1970s," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 4 (2004), 116.

¹⁸¹ Lu Aguiar-Conraria and Y. I. WEN, "Understanding the Large Negative Impact of Oil Shocks," *Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Wiley-Blackwell)* 39, no. 4 (06, 2007), 938.

economic costs as a result of its oil dependence and the actions of the OPEC cartel: 1) transfer of wealth, 2) loss of potential to produce and, 3) disruption losses.¹⁸² The transfer of wealth was from oil-importing countries to oil-producing countries. The loss of potential to produce and disruption losses caused potential GDP losses in the U.S. economy. As a result, reallocations of labor and capital were observed throughout the U.S. economy in response to the oil-price shocks.¹⁸³

The October 1973 crisis resulted in a divergence between European and U.S. policy. The crisis demonstrated the unwillingness and inability of the Europeans to work together to assure the supplies of energy.¹⁸⁴ Within the European Community, there were different approaches to the U.S. policy and the crisis. In general, however, the Western Europeans looked with disdain upon U.S. policies in the Middle East. The problems of the oil-importing countries stemmed from the curtailment of supplies through the embargo (such as in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.S.). Because of this, Western European countries had different reactions to the oil shock, depending on their levels of Arab-oil dependence. Some of these European countries turned to alternative sources of indigenous energy, mainly for national use. France, for instance, turned to nuclear power for electricity production and the Netherlands looked towards imported coal.¹⁸⁵ The Europeans generally favored bilateral agreements to find immediate solutions both to short-term and long-term problems of the oil supply and oil price.¹⁸⁶ During this period, Turkey's foreign policy was more pro-American. However, Ankara supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the war of 1967 and 1973.¹⁸⁷ In the 1973 War, Turkey announced that Incirlik Base (an American air base located near Adana/Turkey)

¹⁸² David L. Greene and Paul N. Leiby, "Oil Dependence, Realistic Or Slogan?" The Lugar Energy Initiative, http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/links/commentary/08_greene_full.cfm (accessed November/08, 2012).

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 22.

¹⁸⁵ Yiangou, *European Energy Security, the Mediterranean Dimension*, 138.

¹⁸⁶ Pfaltzgraff, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan*, 20.

¹⁸⁷ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 480.

could not be used by the U.S. for the military supply of Israel while it allowed the Soviets to overfly its territory in order to supply the Arabs.¹⁸⁸ Turkey did not want to face a shortage of oil; on the other hand, it wanted to maintain its Western relations. During the initial phases of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Turkey tried to stay neutral. Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 and its pro-Western policies during the Suez Crisis affected its relations with some Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

After the 12 March 1971 military interlude, the new government of Turkey sought to maintain good relations with the Arab countries. Because of the worsening relations with the West after the Cyprus Peace Operation and the need for overcoming the energy shortage after the oil shock of 1973, Turkey tried to develop relations with the Middle East countries. An example of this change in relations was seen in the shift of migrant-labor destinations. When the 1973 oil crisis caused an economic downturn in Western Europe that led to a decline in Europe’s intake of migrant labor, oil-rich Arabian countries became destinations for Turkish workers who were looking for opportunities abroad. From 1967 to 1980, there was an increasing influx of Turkish migrants into Libya and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, and Jordan.¹⁸⁹ Another reward of developing relations with the Arab states was Turkey’s relative exemption from the oil embargo announced by OPEC members. On August 1973, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Iraq to construct a pipeline from the Kirkuk oil field to a terminal located in Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik.¹⁹⁰ This pipeline supplied two-thirds of Turkey’s oil requirements and provided an income from the flow of oil. Another positive result of the developing relations was seen during the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation of Turkey. As a result of good relations between Turkey and Libya, the Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi supplied fuel and tires for Turkish combat jets engaged in the operation.¹⁹¹ Until the oil crisis of 1973, seeking alternative energy was not a matter of

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ahmet Icduygu, "Historical Trends in Emigration and Immigration," <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/58650/historical-trends?p=all> (accessed 05 November 2012),

¹⁹⁰ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 481.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

foreign policy for Turkey. Turkey's increased dependence on Middle Eastern oil and changing strategic concerns caused a shift in Turkey's foreign policy from passive neutrality to a more active policy in the Middle East.

In short, the global effects of the 1973 Crisis were more devastating and strategic than its regional effects. The energy crisis after the war has been one of the most influential and complicated issues that has shaped the strategic alignments in the region in particular, and globally in general. The surprise move by the oil producing countries changed the dynamics of the global order after their realignments for an Eastern Mediterranean crisis.

C. THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

This section will give brief background information about the Cyprus dispute and analyze the dispute from the strategic-alignments perspective after World War II. While mentioning historical facts of the dispute, this section will not generally emphasize the historic, intercommunal conflicts on the island and their domestic effects on neighboring countries. It will present historical analysis about the strategic importance of this Eastern Mediterranean island in terms of dynamic alliances and great-power games.

1. Historical Context

The history of the struggle over Cyprus dates back to ancient times; however, the conflict in modern times started after the Ottoman Empire conquered the island in 1571. Because of its strategic position on the main routes between Europe, Asia, and Africa, Cyprus has long been the focus of political conflict and cultural interaction.¹⁹² After the Ottoman conquest of the island, the administrative system was changed from feudalism and serfdom to a *millet*¹⁹³ system. Thanks to its effective administrative system, the Ottoman era in Cyprus was fairly uneventful regarding minorities and citizens. However, a great power struggle for Cyprus continued, and external powers always tried to intervene in Cyprus. In 1605 the Duke of Savoy, in 1765 pro-Russian Dragomans, and in 1804 Napoleonic France intervened in Cyprus according to their ambitions.¹⁹⁴ In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and tsarist Russia was an important threat against its sovereignty. In the last quarter of the 19th century, tsarist armies were at the gates of Istanbul, and Britain was worried about this threat regarding its colonial

¹⁹² Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, 2nd ed. (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1.

¹⁹³ *Millet System*: Ottoman administrative system in which communities were institutionalized, had specific rights, privileges and own judicial system. A *millet* was an autonomous self-governing religious community, each organized under its own laws and headed by a religious leader, who was responsible to the central government for the fulfillment of *millet* responsibilities and duties, particularly those of paying taxes and maintaining internal security. (Encyclopedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382871/millet>) (Accessed 05 November 2012)

¹⁹⁴ William Mallinson, *Britain and Cyprus : Key Themes and Documents since World War II* (London, GBR: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 3. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10480625&ppg=1>.

interests. Britain did not want the strengthening of Russia, and wanted to support the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman War. There was secret diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Britain wanted the Ottoman Empire to rent them Cyprus in exchange for their military support against the Russians. As a result, Cyprus was under British administration and there was a shift in alliances regarding this strategic Eastern Mediterranean island. This is known to historians as the “Eastern Question.”

After the Eastern Question began, with the start of nationalization and Russian intervention in the European part of the Ottoman Empire (the Balkans), the Christians of Cyprus mounted serious pressures to unite with Greece, which had just gained independence from the empire. Britain had difficulty resisting these ideological pressures. After the Balkan Wars, Crete came under Greek administration, and the pressures of the Christians for unification re-started at the beginning of the 19th century.

For Britain, Cyprus was both a strategic land for its colonial interests and a valuable asset for bargaining with other powers during World War I. When the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany during the war, Britain annexed the island and offered it to Greece, if Greece joined the war with her. However, after Greece was dragged into the war, the offer was withdrawn. Britain did not want to lose control over Cyprus. The pressures for the union with Greece increased again after the war, and finally manifested in violence after 1931.¹⁹⁵ On October 1931, riots erupted in Cyprus and the ensuing events culminated in the burning down of the house of the British governor in Nicosia.¹⁹⁶ After this time, Cyprus became an area of tension, friction, and violence between local ethnic groups. Besides, Cyprus became a superpower game arena for the U.S., Soviet Union, and Britain, because of its strategic importance.

In addition to ethnic problems, Cyprus was an important alliance factor among the powers in the region, and affected the aligning of alliances. The Cyprus conflict was not only an intergroup conflict, but an international conflict. For Britain, after World War II,

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Bestami Sadi Bilgic, "The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's Reaction: The Place of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the Eyes of Greek and Greek Cypriot Leadership," *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law* 1 (2008), 91.

it was a key headquarters for their colonial empire. In a briefing note in 1950, British military chiefs of staff mentioned the importance of Cyprus:

If Britain wants to keep its position in the Middle East, Cyprus must remain British; moreover, even in peacetime the popular communist movement on the island must never be allowed to win control. It is the only way to ensure the future of Britain's military facilities there, and any weakening of this commitment will alarm Britain's key allies, since Cyprus is a vital link in the chain of British bases running through the Mediterranean to the Middle East and beyond. The effect on Turkey and other Middle East countries, and indeed the United States, of any abrogation of British sovereignty is likely to be so serious that it is strategically necessary for Cyprus to remain British,¹⁹⁷

In Britain, there were high-level calls for unifying Cyprus and Greece. The reason was that unifying Greece and Cyprus would strengthen the Greek government's position in its struggle against the Communist-influenced opposition.¹⁹⁸ However, when the Greek civil war ended with the defeat of the Communists, Britain still did not take action for unification. As argued above, Cyprus was a key bargaining asset for great powers, and they never wanted to give it up easily. Similarly, in the future, this island, a new member of the EU, also would be used as a bargaining chip in determining the course of Turkey's accession process to the EU.

Even though the British Empire wanted to keep its strategic island base, the third quarter of the 20th century brought many difficulties to this colonial power. Regarding Cyprus, the first serious Greek Cypriot anti-colonial resistance started during the 1950s and they wanted to achieve their historic goal, unification with Greece or "Enosis." Besides, anti-colonial movements and decolonization were shaking the region during the 1950s. For Britain, this period was a radical decline of their historic colonial era. Britain passed the torch of leadership in the Middle East and other regions to the U.S.¹⁹⁹ The U.S. exerted pressure on Britain, Greece, and Turkey to seek solutions for the problem,

¹⁹⁷ Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy : America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2001a), 1.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10132987&ppg=1>.

¹⁹⁸ Mallinson, *Britain and Cyprus : Key Themes and Documents since World War II*, 4.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

which was harming NATO's main objectives. These reasons forced Britain to deal with the Cyprus problem seriously. However, the British never thought of giving up its certain influence and privileges in the region, such as military bases on the island.

During the late 1950s, the Cyprus problem became a main issue for the prime ministers of three countries: Adnan Menderes of Turkey, Harold MacMillan of Britain and Constantine Karamanlis of Greece. After the creation of the violent group EOKA (the National Organization of Cyprus Fighters) and their ideology of Enosis (call for a union with Greece), the violence against Turkish-origin Cypriots increased dramatically. While GCs wanted enosis, and some of them appealed violence for this goal, TCs did not want enosis and supported the idea of *taksim*, partition of the island, because of the violence coming from Greek Cypriot EOKA organization. It is generally believed that the problem was a dispute among Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and Cyprus itself. However, the developments on the island in October 1931, and their reflections in Greece, revealed that in the eyes of the Greek elite and public opinion, the Cyprus dispute was a matter between Greece, GCs, and Britain.²⁰⁰ Being ignored was the reason why the Turkish Cypriots, who had lived peacefully with the GCs under the Ottoman rule for centuries, wanted partition of the island.

The tensions between Turkey and Greece would not contribute anything to the long-term Cold War goals of the U.S. The U.S. feared a serious conflict between Turkey and Greece, as it would only serve to benefit the Soviet Union by weakening NATO.

On 16 August 1960, after the Zurich and London Agreements between the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece, the independent Cyprus Republic was founded. These agreements gave the three mother-states guarantor rights over the island. The compromise agreement was that Britain, Greece, and Turkey would jointly guarantee an independent Cyprus. The president would be Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, with separate communal assemblies, but a joint national assembly, while 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops would be stationed on the island. Britain would retain

²⁰⁰ Bestami Sadi Bilgic, "The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's Reaction: The Place of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the Eyes of Greek and Greek Cypriot Leadership," *Uluslararası Hukuk Ve Politika* 1, no. 4 (2005), 92.

two military bases.²⁰¹ The Greek government never wished to see Turkey involved in the dispute. The British ambassador to Greece had written,

The Greeks are angry at the UK plan to involve the Turks [...] on the grounds that it introduced an element of Turkish governmental intervention [...] and since it must lead to further antagonism and eventually to partition.²⁰²

After the foundation of the Cyprus Republic, the interference of the Soviet Union increased, which was something the U.S. never wanted. The pro-Soviet Makarios, the new president of Cyprus, visited the pro-Soviet leader Nasser of Egypt and attended a conference of the non-aligned nations in Belgrade. Because of his government policies and proposal of “thirteen points” to break out the policies of London–Zurich Accords, most TCs in public office, including Vice-President Küçük, resigned. Turkish Cypriots moved out of ethnically mixed areas into villages and towns where the population was already largely Turkish Cypriot.

In 1963, violence between two groups increased again, and a serious reaction to the violence came from Britain. Leaders of all parties met in London and declared their thoughts about the dispute. It was a deadlock, because GCs wanted a completely independent state in which the Greeks would rule and the TCs would be safeguarded as a minority. From the Turkish Cypriot’s view, the violence after the 1931 and the nationalist ideology of enosis left no room for them to live under the safeguarding of the GCs. Thus, they supported partition of the island and self-administration by their own people.

2. Great Power Perceptions and Interventions

The Cold War strategies of the great powers dominated the Cyprus problem for many years. Britain was one of the major players in the Cyprus game. For Britain, Cyprus was at the heart of the strategic defense of its Middle Eastern concerns, and the oil was the most important among these concerns. The production of crude oil in the Middle East

²⁰¹ William Mallinson, *Cyprus : A Modern History* (London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 33.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10133002&ppg=53>.

²⁰² Ibid.

increased from six million tons in 1938 to 163 million tons by 1955.²⁰³ Other two important oil producers, the U.S. and Venezuela, were consuming their production in the Americas, and not exporting it. The Soviet Union was also producing its own oil, but exportable surplus was very little. Thus, Europe relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil supplies for its economic recovery. The region supplied two-thirds of Britain's needs and contained 65 percent of the world's known reserves, which implied that Western economies would come to rely on it still further as they expanded in the future. The oil was produced mainly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The oil was carried by pipeline (41 million tons a year by 1956) or by ship via the Suez Canal (77 million tons a year) and through the Mediterranean to Europe. ²⁰⁴ The production, transportation, and sale of Middle Eastern oil were important for Britain's economy and stability. Consequently, British assets in the region should have been safeguarded and the lines of communication should have been protected.

Before the 1950s, Britain's overseas defense center for its Middle East concerns was the Suez. During this period, the military headquarters in Suez maintained up to 80,000 reserve troops that could rapidly redeployed and reinforce British garrisons in the Levant and Persian Gulf.²⁰⁵ After the Suez Crisis, Britain couldn't have maintained such a force in the Suez. As a result, Cyprus remained the only alternative for Britain to create and reserve an overseas defense base. In short, energy security and control of trade were the main concern for Britain regarding Cyprus.

The second important factor for both Britain and the U.S. was the threat of Soviet expansion. After World War II, pro-Soviet regimes were established all around the world. The British and Americans feared that the Soviet threat would next extend to southern Europe, and Greece, which dealt with a civil war between Communist forces backed by pro-Soviet powers and nationalist forces backed by Britain and the U.S.²⁰⁶ Turkey, which

²⁰³ O'Malley and Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy : America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 2.

²⁰⁴ Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2001b), 3.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10132987&ppg=1>.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ O'Malley and Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy : America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 3.

was controlling the strategic waterways of the Istanbul Strait and Canakkale Strait (the only sea passages between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean) was also a target of the Soviets. Therefore, Cyprus was a vital strategic base to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. For Turkey, Cyprus was important for two vital reasons. On one hand, there were TCs who were suffering from ethnic violence and awaiting help from their “motherland;” on the other hand, Cyprus had a strategic importance from being located just seventy miles to the south of Turkey’s “soft underbelly” in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁰⁷ For free access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the southern ports of Turkey, Cyprus had utmost importance. During this period, Turkey was surrounded by potential hostile neighbors such as Greece and Soviet Russia. If Cyprus became part of Greece as a result of the nationalist and violent ideology of enosis, Turkey would have been completely surrounded by potential enemies.²⁰⁸ As a result of these concerns, Turkey started to intervene in Cyprus after the 1950s.

In 1963, when violence intensified in Cyprus, Prime Minister Inonu met with army officers and diplomats to assess the situation. Inonu ordered jets to fly over the island as a warning and to launch bombs if violence continued.²⁰⁹ After a short time, Turkish jets were flying over the island, and the Turkish fleet was proceeding from Istanbul to Mersin. This was a warning from Turkey to Britain, Greece, the U.S., and also NATO. Turkey’s message was that if these groups did not take an action against the violence in the island, Turkey would intervene unilaterally. Finally, Turkey, Greece, and the TCs agreed to a NATO force of 10,000 men, under the command of a British officer stationed in Cyprus, for the security of both sides. On the other hand, the U.S. secretary of state could not convince the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios about this force. Makarios, who seemed to be trying to follow a non-aligned course, wanted a solution with the UN. This meant that Soviet Union could have intervened in the dispute and make its weight felt in this power game.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ James H. Meyer, *Policy Watershed: Turkey's Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974* (Princeton: Princeton University WWS Case Study 3/00,[2000]).

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 436.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

In March 1964 after the UN Security Council's preparations of many draft resolutions about the dispute, a UN peace force was established with the approval of the government of Cyprus. However, the UN forces could not bring the violence to an end. On April 1964, Prime Minister Inonu gave an interview to Time magazine:

While Turkey had done its best to preserve its alliance with the West, its allies had been competing with the enemies in destroying the Western alliance.[...] If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up, and then a new kind of world order will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place. I had faith in the leadership of America, which has responsibility within the Western alliance, I am suffering now as a result of this attitude.²¹¹

This interview was a message to the world that Turkish intervention against the violence in the Island could be expected according to Turkey's legal rights as a guarantor state of the 1960 agreement. After a month, U.S. president Johnson sent a warning letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu:

I am gravely concerned by the information that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in advance with the United States. [...] It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. [...] Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which

²¹¹ Melek M. Firat, "Kibris Sorunu Ve Inonu," Inonu Vakfi, <http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/index.php/27-mayis-ihtilali-ve-sonrasi/kibris-sorunu-ve-inonu> (accessed November/08, 2012).

results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.²¹²

This letter was a summary of the U.S. strategy and Cold War power game over Cyprus. Johnson's letter, even though it was not openly mentioned in Turkey so as not to negatively affect public opinion, forced Turkish leadership to question the basic assumptions on which Turkey's foreign policy rested.²¹³ Despite its tough tone, Turkish–American relations continued normally and Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus, thinking that the U.S. initiative would present a solution to the problem. Besides, this letter forced Turkey to realize that the interests of Turkey and the West could sometimes clash with each other, and Turkey should have sometimes thought individually for its national causes.

The Soviet Union was interested in the Cyprus dispute from the foundation of the Cyprus Republic in 1960. With its non-alignment policy, under the leadership of Makarios, Cyprus allowed the communist party AKEL and maintained good relations with pro-Soviet countries. For instance, in September 1969, when the U.S. was trying to force North Vietnam to the negotiating table to settle the war, it urged friendly nations to apply pressure on the North Vietnam government. However, the U.S. discovered that Cyprus, under the leadership of Makarios, was one of four non-communist countries still shipping to North Vietnam.²¹⁴ When Makarios refused to cut the trading link, Nixon cut off American aid to Cyprus.

The USSR's policy in Cyprus had two major effects after 1960s: supporting Makarios and thereby preventing the region from coming under the full control of NATO; and later, supporting both Turkey and Greece to take advantage of the fissure in the southeastern front of NATO.²¹⁵ Makarios did not totally follow the ideology of enosis or everything that the Greek government mentioned. As a result, in 1974, a coup against

²¹² Lyndon B. Johnson and Ismet Inonu, "President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu: Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as Released by the White House, January 15, 1966," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 3 (1966), 2.

²¹³ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 439.

²¹⁴ O'Malley and Craig, *Cyprus Conspiracy : America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 132.

²¹⁵ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 440.

Makarios took place under the Cypriot national guard and EOKA-B, which were led by a Greek junta.

Turkey considered this a violation of treaties and guarantees, and the prime minister of Turkey ordered the Turkish armed forces to prepare for military intervention in Cyprus to protect the TCs and maintain peace. Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, was a turning point for Turkey in terms of foreign policy and realignment. Turkey's relations with both the U.S. and European countries came to be increasingly affected by the Cyprus question.²¹⁶ The new de facto partition and unilateral declaration of the independence of TRNC was the beginning of a new era for the Cyprus question, and Cyprus would again be on the agenda of international powers in the future.

In short, rather than being an inter-communal dispute, the Cyprus Dispute has been one of the most influential and complicated issues that has shaped strategic alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece, the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and strategic organizations such as NATO and the UN. Today, the great-power game of the Cold War has changed, and the USSR has left the U.S. as the only superpower in the world. However, with the liquidation of the Soviet threat and European unification, a "United States of Europe" has emerged as a major actor on the global stage.²¹⁷ It is obvious that this major actor would want to take part in the new era of globalization and show itself in one of the most strategic points of the world, the Eastern Mediterranean, by enlarging its borders in this region. In addition, because of new offshore hydrocarbon resources and new geostrategic energy routes in the Eastern Mediterranean, European energy security would be under the tight controls of whichever entity emerged as most powerful in the region.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Eyup Ozveren, "Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects," Center For Strategic Research, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EyupOzveren.pdf> (accessed November/12, 2012).

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IV. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND TURKEY'S EMERGING ROLE

A. TURKEY AS AN ENERGY HUB

Geographically, Turkey is in the middle of the energy consumer and producer countries. It is located in close proximity to more than 70% of the world's proven oil and gas reserves.²¹⁸ Turkey is becoming an important energy hub in the region and standing as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and routes. Turkey is now becoming a major transportation center for the consumption of Iranian gas and oil, as well as for its transport to the West, despite strong opposition of the U.S.²¹⁹ Additionally, Turkey's relations with Caucasian countries as a bridge for their energy resources transported to the West via Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline ending in the Eastern Mediterranean, seems an independent strategic act not in keeping with Turkey's Cold War policies as a buffer state. Graham Fuller suggests that Russia now views Turkey as an independent competitor to Moscow and no longer an instrument of the U.S. policies.²²⁰

Similarly, the EU considers Turkey as a reliable partner in the oil and gas industry and as a strategic link for the transportation of gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Europe.²²¹ Historically, Turkey has been affected by the 'energy weapon' both as consumer and as an East-West transit node for regional energy flows.²²² For this reason, it seeks to diversify its energy supply sources and routes. Nabucco Pipeline, for instance, is considered as an alternative to Russia's energy dominance in Europe. Similarly, Turkey has energy agreements with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and Syria in order to

²¹⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Energy Strategy," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa (accessed November/11, 2012).

²¹⁹ Graham Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic* (Washington D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 112.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Eric Watkins, "Turkey Overplays its Hand," *Oil & Gas Journal*, Sep 26, 2011, 2011, , 2.

²²² Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic*, 84.

diversify its energy supply and create interdependence for its energy needs.²²³ Current Turkish energy policy suggests that major pipeline projects, realized and proposed, which will contribute to Europe's energy security, will also enhance Turkey's role as a reliable transit country on the East-West and North-South energy axis.²²⁴ From different energy source regions, such as the Greater Caspian and the Middle East, to the West; Turkey wants to establish a reliable flow of hydrocarbons east-west and north-south through pipelines such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC), the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Pipeline, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, the Kazakh-oil expansion to BTC, the Iraqi Gas and North-South of Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, the Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline, the Burgas-Alexandropulos Oil Pipeline-Bypass for straits, the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline and Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).²²⁵



Figure 5. Natural Gas Pipeline Projects of Turkey²²⁶

²²³ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkey's Energy Strategy*

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Erciyes, *Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments*, 39.

For Europe, BTC pipeline is a vital alternative energy transportation route. The BTC pipeline project was completed in 2006 and oil is currently being pumped from the Baku oil fields to Ceyhan port of the Eastern Mediterranean and finally Europe.²²⁷ Similarly, natural gas transportation projects have been agreed for transferring natural gas to Europe from Central Asian and Middle Eastern gas fields. Some of these regional and interregional projects are the Iran to Europe pipeline, the Turkmenistan to Europe pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey and Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Iran (or Armenia)-Turkey gas pipelines.²²⁸

In short, it is obvious that Turkey has become one of the world's largest energy hubs, and a key country ensuring the energy security in the region. The Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu commented on this importance in a journal article:

Turkey is patiently waiting for the EU to appreciate its indispensable position with regard to energy security, cultural politics and transit routes. When they acknowledge Turkey's value in these terms, they will realize that Europe's global power can only be attained through Turkey's full integration into Europe. Turkey shares common interests with Russia, Iran, and the United States for the successful operation of natural gas and oil pipelines that run in various directions through the Turkish territory. Hence, Turkish analysts try to combine all these interests in one single picture. This is a rational calculation, not an ideological account.²²⁹

B. ENERGY SECURITY AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

1. Militarization of Energy and Maritime Security

As Daniel Moran and James Russell argue, today, energy security is taken with the national security, and in a new world that suppressed and constrained territorial disputes, ideological competition, ethnic irredentism and even nuclear confrontation, actual use of military forces are limited.²³⁰ Thus, conflicts and sovereignty right claims

²²⁷ Yiangou, *European Energy Security, the Mediterranean Dimension*, 140.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008), 91.

²³⁰ *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*. Routledge *Global Security Studies*, eds. James A. Russell and Daniel Moran Taylor & Francis, 2.

over global energy supplies stand as one of the most important *casus belli* which enables the military forces to be used actively. Since World War II, there have been important military confrontations for controlling energy assets, strategic points or energy transportation instruments. Even if there was not a military conflict among the powers, their energy markets have been protected indirectly by their military powers, such as Britain and the U.S. to maintain free transit of goods across the high seas.²³¹ In that respect, the Eastern Mediterranean has encountered direct and indirect militarization of energy by many countries and strategic organizations (such as NATO and the UN) after the World War II.

Today, legitimacy and justification of such a militarization has vital importance. On the one hand, militarization of the energy should be legitimized and justified in domestic politics and the legal bases of the related country; on the other hand it must be legitimized and approved by international partners and organizations. These kinds of militarization of energy can be seen even in seemingly peaceful and democratic organizations, such as the European Union.

2012 Nobel Peace Prize recipient the European Union, an alternative global power committed to the pursuit of an international order based on good governance, democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, has engaged militarily on many occasions to manage conflicts in which natural resources have played a key role.²³² Within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, then called ESDP), the EU has launched civilian and military crisis management operations in other countries where natural resources are closely linked to conflicts, such as Moldova and Ukraine in 2005 (EUBAM), Iraq in 2005 (EUJUST LEX), Georgia in 2008 (EUMM) and Libya in 2011 (EUFOR).²³³

Similarly, the U.S., Russia, Turkey and many other countries and organizations engaged in militarily in many energy and maritime security related issues. Under

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Nicholas Garrett and Anna Piccinni, *Natural Resources and Conflict: A New Security Challenge for the EU* Resource Consulting Service, [2012].

²³³ Ibid.

NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, for instance, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect the maritime trade against terrorist activity.²³⁴ Russia, as in its old Soviet days, has many times wanted to show its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In August 2012, for instance, a Russian joint naval task force on a training mission in the Mediterranean conducted two-day tactical exercises with live-firing drills with more than ten warships.²³⁵ Turkey, which has the longest coast in the Eastern Mediterranean and has vital strategic concerns in the region, also initiated many naval operations both individually and collectively. According to the official mission of the Turkish Navy, these were designed to defend the homeland against probable maritime threats and consider country's related interests. Located in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf of İskenderun, terminal area for the pipelines of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Kerkuk-Yumurtalık, has annually 140 million tons of oil capacity which is an outstanding proportion regarding energy security. Because of this reason, the "Mediterranean Shield Operation" was initiated by the Turkish Naval Forces on 1 April 2006, in order to deter, disrupt and suppress terrorism, of weapons of mass destruction and other illegal acts.²³⁶ Similarly, Turkish, Italian and German naval ships, comprising the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), have been participating in maritime exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean.²³⁷

The boundaries of the West have moved eastward and southward. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean became the outer limit of the West. With the membership of the GCs, the EU extended its borders to this region. With many collective operations and cooperation initiatives, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative or Operation Active

²³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Official Web Page, "NATO Active Endeavour," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm (accessed November/03, 2012).

²³⁵ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, "Russian Navy Stages Mediterranean Drills," <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/140196/russian-navy-stages-mediterranean-drills-39-not-39-in-syrian-port.html> (accessed November/12, 2012).

²³⁶ "International Missions of Turkish Naval Forces." <http://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/english/DZKKULUSLARARASIGOREVLER.php?strAnaFrame=DzKKUluslarArasiGorevler&strIFrame=DzKKUluslararasiFaaliyetler> (accessed November/12, 2012).

²³⁷ "SNMG-2 Units Complete Complete Exercise Noble Mariner." NATO Allied Maritime Command Naples, http://www.manp.nato.int/news_releases/mcnaples/pressreleases12/NR_55_12.html (accessed November/20, 2012).

Endeavour, NATO shows its military presence in the region. After the 2006 Lebanon-Israeli Crisis, the UN Security Council deployed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) military forces to assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. The Russian naval presence in Tartus port Syria and Britain's BFC (British Forces Cyprus) Military Base have long been active in the region.

Ignoring some humanitarian reasons, military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean is one of the best examples of militarization of energy and maritime security. Even though a new world order has been established after the Cold War, the picture we see today resembles the Cold War's great power game in the region

C. DELIMITATION OF MARITIME AREAS AND PROBABLE CRISIS IN THE REGION

The Eastern Mediterranean region, which today attracts international interest in hydrocarbon transportation, exploration and production, has been one of the world's most strategic regions. It has been the center of many energy and maritime related crisis in history. Today, as a continuation and a result of old disputes, delimitation of maritime areas has become a major dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Cyprus question has long been an obstacle for the region's stability and security. In the 2004 expansion plan of the European Union (EU) (the fifth expansion), after which the EU expanded from 15 to 25 member state, Greek Cypriot Administration became a member of the EU. Even though the Cyprus Island was divided, and the UN referendum in 2004 for the reunification of the island was rejected by the GCs, the EU paradoxically accepted the membership of the island as 'United Cyprus Republic', claiming that TRNC spell out words is void, and problematically confirmed that the Greek part of the Island represents the entire Island.²³⁸ The Cyprus question has long been an obstacle for the region's stability and security. In the 2004 expansion plan of the European Union (EU) (the fifth expansion), after which the EU expanded from 15 to 25 member state, Greek Cypriot Administration became a member of the EU. Even though the Cyprus Island was divided, and the UN referendum in 2004 for the reunification of

²³⁸ Ibid.

the island was rejected by the GCs, the EU paradoxically accepted the membership of the island as 'United Cyprus Republic', claiming that TRNC spell out words is void, and problematically confirmed that the Greek part of the Island represents the entire Island.²³⁹

Beside the Cyprus question, there are also other problematic issues such as few and disputed 'delimitation of maritime areas' agreements, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Arab Spring, regarding the region. The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea consisting of multiple littoral states. Thus, achieving a maritime delimitation is a complex issue which should be on the basis of international law and should not infringe upon third parties' rights.²⁴⁰

In the last few years, potential offshore natural gas fields have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Energy companies argue that there are huge oil and gas reserves in the little-explored Mediterranean Sea between Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Syria and Lebanon. A U.S. energy company, Noble Energy, noted that the natural gas discovery in the Eastern Mediterranean Block-12 has estimated gross mean resources of 7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and Leviathan 17 Tcf of gross natural gas mean resources, representing the largest deep-water natural gas discovery in the world over the past decade.²⁴¹ As a result, the region has been attracting the global energy companies' interests today.

Although many disputed issues remain to be solved, the GCAC, which does not represent in law or in fact TCs and Cyprus as a whole, has been pursuing an adventurous policy in the Eastern Mediterranean through concluding maritime delimitation agreements and conducting oil/gas exploration and issuing permits for such activities

²³⁹ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*

²⁴⁰ Erciyes, *Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments*, 2.

²⁴¹ Noble Energy, "Recent Discoveries," Noble Energy Inc., <http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Exploration/Recent-Discoveries-130.html> (accessed November/12, 2012).

around the island.²⁴² Israel and GCAC signed an EEZ²⁴³ agreement in 17 December 2010, and announced this agreement to the UN in 12 July 2011.²⁴⁴

Turkey argues that this provocative policy compromises and prejudices the TCs' existing equal rights over the natural resources of the island and the sea areas of the Island of Cyprus.²⁴⁵ Besides, Turkey suggests that this issue should be a part of the comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, and Turkish and GCs should benefit equally from the island's natural resources.

After the deterioration of the relations between Israel and Turkey because of the Gaza Blockade and the Flotilla Crisis, Israel has alternative allies in the Mediterranean region, courting Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration.²⁴⁶ Paradoxically, GCs and Greece outwardly supported Palestinians in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Today, three non-Muslim community of the Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Greece and GCAC) are re-aligning their relations because of energy issues.

For the legal rights of the TCs, Turkey and TRNC signed a Continental Shelf (CS)²⁴⁷ agreement on 21 September 2011, and a licensed survey ship (R/V Piri Reis) conducted 2V seismic surveys in the CS of TRNC.²⁴⁸ Piri Reis started research in the

²⁴² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*

²⁴³ The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of the UN Convention .Source: The UN, "Conventions and Agreements (UNCLOS)," The United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm (accessed November/12, 2012).

²⁴⁴ Cihat Yayci, "The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey," *Bilgesam Journal, Bilge Strateji* 4, no. 6 (Spring 2012), 27.

²⁴⁵ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*

²⁴⁶ Alexander Murinson, "Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean," *BESA Center Perspective Paper*, no. 159 (2012), 2.

²⁴⁷ Continental Shelf: Part of the continental margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is approximately between 100 and 200 metres. Unlike EEZ, the continental margin could extend beyond 200 nautical miles. (Source: UN Oceans and Law of the Sea-http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/continental_shelf_description.htm)

²⁴⁸ Erciyes, *Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments*, 26.

areas some of which are overlapping with GCs blocks where GCs and other oil companies are exploring.




Figure 6. Agreed CS of TRNC and Licensed Blocks for Off-Shore Survey for TRNC, and GCs' Block Overlapping with TCs' Blocks ²⁴⁹

In order to maintain a settlement, after this agreement, Turkey proposed to UN Secretary General and Greek Cypriot Administration that off-shore activities of both sides should be ceased simultaneously and both sides should jointly determine energy activities, including revenue sharing and the funding of a possible settlement.²⁵⁰ After all settlement endeavors of Turkey and TRNC, Greek Cypriot Administration opened an international bid and called energy companies for a survey of the 12 blocks of disputed off-shore areas. This meant that, there would be international participation in this disputed energy game. American Noble Energy, Russian Gazprom, French and Italian energy giants Total and ENI, as well as the Korean Gas company and Gazprom-subsubsidiary Novatec were licensed to explore gas in the disputed blocks.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Financial Mirror, "Cyprus: Gazprom, ENI, Total Clinch Natgas," <http://www.financialmirror.com/news-details.php?nid=27969> (accessed November/12, 2012).

Besides the problem violating the legal rights of TCs, some blocks of the Greek Cypriot Administration's alleged exploration areas violate Turkey's CS and EEZ in the region.




Figure 6. GCs' Blocks Overlapping with Turkish Continental Shelf²⁵² and EEZ ²⁵³

Regarding Turkey's CS and EEZ areas to the west of longitude 32° 16' 18"E, Turkey has registered to the UN for its legal rights and Turkey is protecting its rights in its maritime jurisdiction areas. ²⁵⁴

²⁵² Erciyes, *Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments*, 33.

²⁵³ Yayci, *The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey*, 33.

²⁵⁴ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*

These problematic issues in the Eastern Mediterranean could lead a regional and global crisis unless certain measures are taken. To prevent future crisis in this fragile region, Turkey proposed to the UN that TCs and GCs should be encouraged to sit together to determine the future of the energy activities which could help a probable settlement of this historic problem.²⁵⁵ Otherwise, countries of the global energy companies (such as the U.S. and Russia), the EU (by its new Eastern Mediterranean member), Israel and Turkey will find themselves in a Cold War-like energy game in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, as a proposal to the dispute of delimitation of maritime zones in the region, Cihat Yayci suggests that Turkey can make treaties on delimitation of maritime zones not only with Egypt and TRNC, but also with Syria, Israel and Lebanon in the light of international law.²⁵⁶ If a settlement is achieved, the biggest and safest energy hub of the region, Turkey, would be a very feasible and profitable gateway to the Europe that has been seeking for alternative energy sources for its future energy security. This could also prevent new and dangerous alignments, which could lead to the militarization of the energy and countries' use of the energy weapon for their strategic interests.

²⁵⁵ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa> (accessed November/12, 2012).

²⁵⁶ Yayci, *The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey*, 2.

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V. CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the case studies, after World War II, energy and maritime history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the region lies at the axis of movement, both north-south and east-west, it has been at the juncture of the land and maritime trade, energy transportation and, naturally, great conflicts and crises. In these different crises involving the superpowers in the Eastern Mediterranean, sometimes they created quite different alignments depending on their strategic concerns.²⁵⁷

The Suez Crisis, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and took strategic trade control from Britain, was a surprise energy and maritime-related crisis in which Britain and the U.S. wrongly interpreted aspects of the conflict. With respect to energy and maritime security, the 1956 Crisis caused a radical realignment of alliances and a shift in balance of power. The Crisis was a turning-point in global history that resulted in the emergence of a new international order, in which the U.S. would be the leader.²⁵⁸ The British Empire, upon which the sun never (used to) set, devolved its imperial hegemony and handed over leadership in the Middle East to the U.S. In this power game, Turkey fulfilled her historical responsibility as a buffer state by preventing Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Similarly, in 1973 the Arab-Israeli War in the Eastern Mediterranean and the oil crisis following the war had shocking effects regarding the alliances and global economy. During this period, OPEC increased its power due to the accession of new members, and thus, the world became increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. After the oil embargo of the OPEC, by January 1974, world oil prices were four times higher than they were at the start of the crisis. Suffering from the crisis, European policy started to diverge from the U.S. policy in the Middle East. The Arab countries' use of energy as a weapon resulted in the realignment of alliances in the region. During this period, Turkey

²⁵⁷ Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis : The Cold War and American Hegemony in the Middle East*, 179.

²⁵⁸ Hurewitz, *Suez 1956, the Crisis and its Consequences*, 171.

followed a more pro-Western but well-balanced foreign policy. Though a powerful U.S. ally, Ankara supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the war of 1967 and 1973, and Turkey announced that Incirlik Base (an American air base located near Adana, Turkey) could not be used by the U.S. to supply Israel; yet it allowed the Soviets to overfly its territory in order to supply Arabs.²⁵⁹ Turkey, on the one hand, did not want to face a shortage of oil; on the other hand wanted to maintain its Western relations. It is obvious that Turkey has been one of the few countries that has worked to maintain its relations with both the West and the Middle East.

Cyprus, a strategic gate for the free access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, has been at the center of these energy and maritime related crisis. Therefore, it has been a key land for the strategic alliances after the World War II. During the Cold War, energy security and control of the trade was the main concern for the U.S., the Soviet Union and the other parities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus dispute was at the center of this power game. The USSR wanted to intervene in Cyprus to prevent the U.S.-led NATO intervention in the dispute, and to take advantage of the fissure in the southeastern front of NATO. Rather than being an inter-communal dispute, the Cyprus Dispute has been one of the most influential and complicated issues shaping strategic alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece, the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union and strategic organizations such as NATO, the UN and today the EU²⁶⁰. The great power game of the Cold War changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and set off in a new era in international relations that reinforced the world economic trends towards globalization.²⁶¹ In this new order, Turkey's strategic role as a buffer state declined. However, Turkey, located in the junction of energy resources, has now a much more critical role for the regional and global security with its stable position neighboring the most risky and unstable regions of the world. Turkey is viewed as an independent competitor in the global arena and no longer an instrument for the Western policies.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006*, 420.

²⁶⁰ The EU has extended its borders to the Eastern Mediterranean after the problematic membership of the GCASC.

²⁶¹ Ozveren, *Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects*, 6.

²⁶² Ibid.113

The Eastern Mediterranean, which today attracts international interest in hydrocarbon transportation, exploration and production, is witnessing severe energy related problems that challenge regional security and stability. Unless settled, energy and maritime security related problems will threaten Turkey's role as the most important and stable energy hub in the region in particular and could hinder global security and stability more generally. Either of these could result in a hostile realignment of alliances and militarization of energy as it was seen in case studies. If settled, however, the region could become an area of peaceful alignments that will revive the Eastern Mediterranean's historic mission of being the cradle of civilization, partnership and prosperity. In this settlement and realignment process; Turkey, with its emerging role for contributing to the regional and global stability, will participate as a global player and an international stake holder.

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