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S & C FILES
3D MARINES
002066

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGINAL



DECEMBER 1-31 1965

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3d Marines
Copy 1 of 6

24:66

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco Calif, 96601

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3/JAM/lws
5750
10 Jan 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-31 December 1965
Ref: (a) 3d MarDiv O 5750.1

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.


T.H. FISHER

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96601

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 December through 31 December 1965

Part I - Organizational Data Sheet

Part II - Significant Events

Part III - Supporting Documents

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PART I

1. Reporting Unit. 3d Marines (-) (Rein).
2. Command Post. DA NANG, RVN, coordinates (AT 943763).
3. Period Covered. 1 December - 31 December 1965.
4. Date of Submission. 10 January 1966.

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5. <u>Average Monthly Strength.</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	133	12
Enlisted	3233	167

6. Commanding Officer. Colonel T.H. FISHER

7. Regimental Staff.

S-1	Captain J.G. MARSH
S-2	Captain W.M. COOMBES
S-3	Major H.J. CONLIN
S-4	Major F.P. TURNER

8. Subordinate Units.

Hq Co, 3d Marines	Captain C.E. TAYLOR
1st Bn, 1st Marines	Lieutenant Colonel H.A. HATCH
1st Bn, 3d Marines	Lieutenant Colonel R.R. DICKEY III
3d Bn, 4th Marines	Lieutenant Colonel S.A. VALE
	1-24 December 1965
2d Bn, 1st Marines	Lieutenant Colonel R.T. HANIFIN
	24-31 December 1965

9. Mission. 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR, defends DA NANG vital areas in sector; occupies and defends the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR to protect and defend the HUE-PHU BAI vital area; conducts unilateral search and destroy operations within the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols throughout assigned sectors; prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with GVN Armed Forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; prepared to provide one (1) mobile reserve company for deployment as directed; prepared to conduct counter attacks to restore the integrity of assigned sectors.

10. Background. To accomplish the assigned mission, the Regiment employed the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines on line in the DA NANG TAOR. At HUE-PHU BAI, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines defended the airfield and 8th RRU and their ancillary facilities with a perimeter defense until relieved by 2d Battalion, 1st Marines on 24 December 1965. An active defense was maintained through ~~existence~~ ^{extended} patrolling, search and clear operations, and ambush operations to provide early warning, surveillance, prevent infiltration and to deny the enemy access into our forward area.

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SECRETPART IISignificant Events1. Personnel.

a. Rotation and Replacement. During the period this Regiment rotated four officers and one-hundred twenty-nine enlisted to CONUS. Four officers and ninety-four enlisted replacements were received. During the period 20-22 December 1965 Third Battalion, Fourth Marines was relieved by Second Battalion, First Marines. The Third Battalion, Fourth Marines returned to Okinawa for personnel and equipment rehabilitation. All personnel of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines with January 1966 rotation tour dates were transferred to Headquarters Company, Third Marines to be processed for later rotation to CONUS. Forty members of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines volunteered to remain in the Phu Bai area with the Second Battalion, First Marines. Most were members of the Combined Action Company. All personnel scheduled for rotation during December departed Vietnam prior to 20 December. Sergeants and above who were scheduled for rotation and not in receipt of CMC orders were flown out of Vietnam and were to receive permanent change of station orders at Camp Butler or El Toro.

b. Casualties. The Third Marines suffered sixty-two casualties during the period. Thirty-five were battle casualties and twenty-seven were non-battle casualties. Of the thirty-five battle casualties five were killed in action and thirty were wounded in action, two of the WIA's later died of wounds. The circumstances to all non-battle casualties were investigated. When the battle status of a casualty is in doubt the report is initially non-battle. All casualties evacuated from Vietnam are dropped from the rolls of their respective units. Those returning are considered replacements and are normally reassigned to their former parent unit.

c. Dilution Program. This regiment continues to participate in the dilution of personnel program. This program is designed to spread personnel with like rotation tour dates evenly throughout the division. One rifle company and elements of Headquarters and Service Company of First Battalion, Third Marines were exchanged for a like number from the Fourth Marines.

d. Transfers. This Headquarters processed one request for Humanitarian Emergency transfer to CONUS during the period.

e. Discharges. This Headquarters processed three recommendations/requests for administrative discharges.

f. R&R T/D Trips. R&R trips were afforded to one hundred nineteen members of the regiment. One hundred ten were out-of-country and nine were in-country. R&R trips were to Hong Kong, Bangkok, Okinawa, Taipei, and Saigon. Transient facilities at DaNang Marine Air Freight have been greatly improved.

Enclosure (1)

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SECRET2. Administration.

a. All battle casualties have been recommended for the Purple Heart Medal. Other recommendations for awards processed through this Headquarters are as follows: Navy Cross - One; Legion of Merit - one; Navy and Marine Corps Medal - one; Bronze Star Medals - eleven; and Navy Commendation Medals - three. Purple Heart Medals are now being processed directly from Division Awards Section/ Casualty Reporting Section thereby relieving lower units of the administrative responsibility.

b. Promotions. Promotion list to First Lieutenant was published. Staff Sergeant selections were announced. Quotas for meritorious combat promotions to Corporal and Lance Corporal were allocated to subordinate units.

c. Postal. Regular mail was slower than normal due to the holiday season. Mail to Company F, Second Battalion, First Marines operating under First Battalion, First Marines has been delayed several days beyond normal due to the fact that all mail for Second Battalion, First Marines is sorted at Phu Bai. Mail for Company F is then sent by courier to their position in the DaNang TAO. However mail service was considered satisfactory under existing conditions.

d. Special Services. Miss Martha Raye provided entertainment for members of the Third Marines. The recreation department of the American Red Cross continues to provide entertainment programs for the troops. Recreation facilities are being constructed throughout the Regiment. Operational commitments has delayed some previously scheduled intramural sports programs.

e. Liberty. Local liberty became authorized after an extended cancelled period. Liberty was again cancelled through Christmas due to suspected Viet Cong activity.

f. Post Exchange. A newly constructed branch exchange at the Seventh Engineers compound now services the First Battalion, Third Marines among other adjacent units. A well stocked exchange has been established at Division Headquarters. With a mobile exchange still in operation the exchange services are considered very satisfactory.

g. News Media. Distribution of the Okinawa Morning Star was discontinued. The "Star and Stripes" and the "Sea Tiger" are now the primary military news publications.

h. Christmas Cards and Packages Program. Christmas packages and cards addressed generally to servicemen in Vietnam were received and distributed by a committee headed by the Regimental Chaplain. Many of the packages contained items for children and were used to promote the Civil Affairs program.

i. Ceremonies. All units observed Christmas with simple ceremonies and the traditional holiday meal. A cease fire was in effect for a short period. Units of the Third Marines conducted Christmas parties for Vietnamese children in their areas.

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3. Intelligence

a. The enemy situation at the beginning of the period was one marked by intelligence gathering, rapid and elusive small unit harassment, closely akin to that consistently exhibited by the enemy throughout the tenure of this Regiment in Vietnam. Both through overt/covert encounter and reconnaissance observation, enemy forces appear to be of minimum operational and tactical size and widely dispersed, although, no doubt, centrally controlled and coordinated.

b. Viet Cong Initiated Incidents -- 54 (28 at night)

(1) Small Arms/Sniper Fire -- 31 (15 at night) (including 4 directed at aircraft).

(a) 1st Bn, 1st Marines -- 21 (10 at night)

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines -- 3 (1 at night)

(c) 3d Bn, 4th Marines (*) -- 7 (5 at night)

(d) Number of rounds fired by the VC during each incident.

1-5 rounds -- 9

6-15 rounds -- 5

16-25 rounds -- 3

26 or more rounds -- 14

(2) Grenades -- 5 (4 at night)

(a) 1st Bn, 1st Marines -- 3 (all at night)

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines -- 1 (at night)

(c) 3d Bn, 4th Marines -- 1

(3) Booby Traps and Mines -- 13 (2 mines) (including 8 which were discovered and disarmed)

(a) 1st Bn, 1st Marines -- 12 (1 mine) (including 8 which were discovered and disarmed)

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines -- none reported

(c) 3d Bn, 4th Marines -- 1

(*) 2d Bn, 1st Mar assumed responsibility from 3d Bn, 4th Mar for the HUE PHU BAL TAOR on 23 December 1965. Entries are captioned under the latter organization.

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(4) Assassination of Civilians -- one (1) (a friendly informant known to 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.)

(5) Movement or probing action where VC did not fire or return fire -- 4 (all at night)

(a) 1st Bn, 1st Marines -- 1

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines -- none reported

(c) 3d Bn, 4th Marines -- 3

(6) Communication Interference -- 2 (both telephonic and in the DANANG TAOR.)

c. Enemy Losses

(1) Casualties

(a) KIA -- 6

(b) WIA -- 4

(c) VGC -- 9

(2) Captured enemy Equipment and Material

(a) Weapons

1 - CHICOM 7.62 Carbines

2 - MAT-49's

1 - CHICOM 7.62 rifle

2 - MAS-36's

2 - US Carbines

9 - US Fragmentation Grenades

1 - Illumination Grenade

4 - CHICOM Grenades

a number of spears, steel punji stakes, knives and a dart gun

(b) Weapons Accessories

5 - US Carbine pouches with magazines

3 - Cartridge belts

(c) Ammunition

64 - Cal. .30 rounds

2 - 7.62mm rounds

66 - 9mm rounds

4 - Cal. .45 rounds

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(d) Food

240 lbs. rice
 5 lbs. sugar
 5 lbs. peanuts
 6 cans condensed milk
 5 packages noodles

(e) Miscellaneous

10 lbs. tobacco
 25 lbs. medical supplies (estimated)
 35 lbs. clothing (estimated)
 1 gallon kerosene
 25 lbs. assorted documents, photos and papers (estimated)
 2 maps
 2 flashlights
 9 flashlight batteries
 6 pieces of plastic
 5 pair sandals
 10 hats (including 2 berets)
 1 medical kit (small)
 6 bear traps
 5 MK 244 primers (live)
 30 BA 298/u
 8 BA 270/u
 1 BA 414/u
 18 BA 30
 1 EE-8 Telephone (broken)
 1 jungle kit
 2 canteen covers
 1 plastic canteen
 2 haversacks
 1 pack
 1 helmet
 1 poncho
 1 M-14 Stock
 3 "C" ration boxes of brass
 MEI Course on 106mm RR
 USMC Stock list
 1 gas mask (broken)
 1 U.S. Shelter half
 1 WP bag
 1 USMC Guide Book

(3) Destroyed Enemy Positions, Fortifications and Obstacles -- 15

11 - punji traps
 1 - Bunker
 2 - tunnels
 1 - cave

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d. Weather. Precipitation within the DA NANG TAOR totaled 10.72 inches -- HUE PHU BAI, 16.3 inches. There were 19 days with rain, the heaviest occurring through the 14th to the 19th (5.18 inches), in the DA NANG TAOR. Although there were several days of restricted traffic, in 1/1 and 1/3 areas, the condition of the road network within the TAOR remained generally good. The overall effect of the weather upon tactical operations throughout the month is considered negligible.

e. Enemy Units Reported and/or sighted during the period

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>
Co	AT974712	3Dec
184th Bn	AT8777	3Dec
1 Plt	AT848778	3Dec
1 Plt	AT915805	3Dec
Staff Hq	AT921820	3Dec
Co	AT865707	4Dec
Co	AT885697	4Dec
Guerrilla Co	AT8969	5Dec
Q-16-B Co	AT9767	6Dec
Co	AT889601 to AT947625	7Dec
Co	AT968665	8Dec
Plt	AT973671	8Dec
Co	BT030678	9Dec
Bn	AT872707	12Dec
2 PAVN Co's	AT8777	12Dec
Co	AT957677	14Dec
51st Regt	AT964602, AT975605, BT004605	14Dec
2 Co's	AT875725	15Dec
42d Bn	AT836798 to AT847789	15Dec
344th Bn	BT043680, BT077666, BT056645	15Dec
MF Co	AT865836	

f. Trends.

(1) The number of Viet Cong initiated incidents has decreased for December. The proportional drop similar to that between October and November. The number of incidents, however, remains within the confines of that experienced and expected, i.e., not varying a great deal from the preceding monthly totals. The two (2) main considerations appear to be the westward shift 2000 to 3000 meters, of the eastern TAOR borderline, thereby removing an area which had, heretofore, produced a number of such incidents, and the cease fire of 24-25 December.

(2) Periods of rain have not determined the time of enemy's initiative-- the instances being scattered throughout the period. Also, the small number of cases does not lend itself to absolute deductions. Darkness, however, is a determining factor. Even though the incidents appear equally divided between night and day, when indirect measures such as booby traps and mines are discounted and it is noted that many of the daylight action was a result of USMC offensive posture, the trend is apparent.

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3. The fact that eight (8) booby traps were discovered and disarmed while five (5) (including two (2) mines) were detonated is not necessarily an indication of increased friendly perception or of enemy carelessness. Four (4) booby traps were discovered in the immediate vicinity where one (1) had been detonated, inflicting USMC casualties.

4. The strength or amount of firepower utilized by the VC during incidents of small arms/sniper activity has also remained consistent with that previously experienced. The familiar pattern is further evidenced by the amount of captured enemy material, number of VC casualties, and the number of reported enemy units, also relatively stable. Consequently, the enemy situation continues unchanged from that at the beginning of December.

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4. Training.

a. Objective. To improve and maintain the high states of combat efficiency of the Regiment, training was conducted on a formal school and individual basis.

b. Highlights.

(1) At HUE - PHU BAI the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and, later, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines conducted training for the Vietnamese Popular Forces in that area on a continuing basis. All Popular Forces were thoroughly schooled in basic infantry subjects.

(2) Emphasis on techniques of night firing continued in all units.

(3) The Division Sniper team instructed four Marines from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines during December giving that Battalion an effective Sniper capability.

(4) Training continued in the employment and use of Siesmic Intrusion Detectors in all units.

(5) Newly joined personnel received training in weapons familiarization firing of their individual weapons. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines conducted familiarization firing of all personnel on a weekly basis.

(6) All units continue to indoctrinate their personnel in the purposes of being in Vietnam.

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5. Special Operations. None.

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6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and other Special Types of Warfare.
During the reporting period the only instance of operations in this category was on 6 December 1965, when Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines used two CS grenades on a suspect cave in the village of GIAO TRI (3) (AT 887701). The cave was uninhabited.

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7. Command and Control.

a. During the month of December the 3d Marine Regiment was task organized as follows. The troops list as of 31 December 1965, is as follows:

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
<u>3d Marines (-) (Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	168	3827	10	174	4179
<u>Hq Co (Rein) (DA NANG)</u>	17	219	1	5	242
Det, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv	0	3	0	0	3
<u>1st Bn, 1st Mar (DA NANG)</u>	37	983	3	57	1080
<u>1st Bn, 3d Mar (DA NANG)</u>	39	1023	3	53	1118
<u>2d Bn, 1st Mar (Rein)(PHU BAI)</u>	75	1602	3	59	1739
2d Bn, 1st Mar	40	999	3	50	1091
Det, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div	1	6	0	0	7
2d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st AT Bn	1	19	0	0	20
2d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Engr Bn	1	44	0	0	45
2d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st TK Bn	1	27	0	0	28
2d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Recon Bn	1	23	0	0	24
4th Bn, 12th Mar (-)(Rein)(PHU BAI)	30	484	0	9	523
Hq Btry (-) (Rein)	14	161	0	3	178
Btry M, 4th Bn	4	120	0	2	126
Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Mar	8	124	0	2	134
107mm Mortar Btry, 1st Bn, 11th Mar	4	79	0	2	85

b. On 24 December, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and assumed responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR. Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines replaced Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 21 December 1965, and came under operational control of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines which had previously been under operational control of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, during the period 1 December to 21 December returned to operational control of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 21 December.

c. Command Post Locations.

(1) DA NANG

3d Marines	(AT 941672)
1st Bn, 1st Marines	(AT 953723)
2d Bn, 3d Marines	(AT 958783)

(2) PHU BAI

3d Bn, 4th Marines	(YD 884138)
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2d Bn, 1st Marines
4th Bn, 12th Marines

(YD 884138)
(YD 883142)

d. The primary means of control with the 3d Marines continues to be through wire land lines. The radio relay links to Division Headquarters were replaced with metallic wire lines. Telephone and teletype communication are now over these lines and have improved accordingly. At present the one exception to wire is the radio relay link between this headquarters and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. This link employs an AN/MRC-62 which has provided reliable telephone and teletype communications.

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8. Communications-Electronics.

a. Wire. No major changes in the regimental wire system during this period. Wire remains the primary means of communications to senior and subordinate commands. Lateral lines exist to the 9th Marines, 12th Marines and all other battalion sized units within the immediate area of the regimental command post. Continuous difficulties exist in maintaining land lines to the 1st Bn, 1st Marines. Most outages on these circuits are the result of misguided friendly activity. Rerouting these lines is underway and expected to eliminate a large portion of this problem. Nine men from the Wire Section participated in Operation Harvest Moon during the period 8-21 December 1965. These men provided wire communications for Task Force Delta Headquarters. Use of an integrated wire radio relay system in a headquarters inaccessible by surface means proved to be both feasible and highly desirable. A dismantled Radio Terminal Set, AN/MRC-62 was helilifted to the command post site for this system.

b. Radio. Radio provides back-up communications from regiment to subordinate and higher headquarters. Continuous and adequate coverage throughout this regiment's TAOR is possible by establishing relay stations on critical terrain features. Two such stations are required. One is manned on a continuous basis. One is established as required. Eight men from the Radio Section participated in Operation Harvest Moon. Radio was the primary means of communications from Task Force Delta Headquarters to maneuver elements. Radio set, AN/PRC-25 proved to be highly reliable and satisfactory throughout this operation under extremely adverse conditions.

c. Radio Relay. The radio relay link to the 2d Bn, 1st Marines at PHU BAI employing Radio Terminal Equipment, AN/MRC-62 is the only continuously operating system within this regiment. It has provided exceptionally reliable voice and teletype communications for a period of four (4) months. One link employing Radio Set, AN/TRC-27 is maintained in a stand by status between this headquarters and the 1st Bn, 1st Marines. This link has been barely satisfactory as a result of continuing generator problems.

d. Message Center. Message Center operations remain normal with a covered teletype circuit to 3d Marine Division Headquarters and a circuit to each battalion headquarters. Three-thousand two-hundred ninety-three (3293) messages, incoming and outgoing were processed over the covered teletype circuit. Communications guard for the 7th Engineer Bn has been assumed by this headquarters. The 7th Engineer Bn provides one message center man to assist in the comm center. Helicopter and vehicular courier service is employed on an as required basis. Six Message Center Men/Teletype Operators participated in Operation Harvest Moon. The use of "covered" teletype circuits on operations of that nature proved to be feasible and reliable and a highly satisfactory means of transmittance of classified traffic under difficult field conditions.

e. Maintenance/Supply. Continued problems exist in maintaining SSB radio equipment. Maintenance Float items not available in some instances. Power Supply PP-2352/UR is one example. Most radio vehicles have suffered mechanical break downs which can be attributed to age and resulting wear. The supply of maintenance parts in other areas has improved. As a result the number of items deadlined awaiting parts has been reduced. Radio Sets, AN/PRC-25 proved to be exceptionally reliable during Operation Harvest

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Moon under very difficult operating conditions. A shortage of replacement handsets H-186 deadlined some AN/PRC-25. None are available in the supply system.

f. Problems Encountered. A major problem still exists in the field of primary power supplies: i.e. Storage Battery, BB-451, Generator Sets PU 278, PU 422, PU 348. The inability of these power supplies to provide sustained operating power places an entirely unatisfactory burden upon operating and maintenance personnel. The employment of Radio Set AN/PRC-25 is seriously hindered by lack of a remote control unit. Such a unit exists as the Radio Set Control Group AN/GRA-39.

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9. Glose Combat.

a. The following operations were conducted during the month of December:

(1) Platoon Size	127
(2) Company Size	15
(3) Battalion Size	0
(4) Regimental Size	0

b. The month of December was characterized by continued patrolling into the deep western portion of the DA NANG TAOR and placement of numerous night ambushes along likely avenues of approach. At HUE PHU BAI, patrolling and ambush activities continued with particular emphasis placed in the reconnaissance/ambush areas of responsibility to the east and west of the TAOR, where enemy movement has been confirmed.

c. Significant Events.(1) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

1 December Company I patrols conducted their sweeps of the villages of PHU AUI (1), AN MY (1), AN MY (4), and (1). They found and destroyed two 81mm mortar duds and apprehended one VCS without an ID card when the patrol checked him at (AT 927610). The third platoon of Company D completed a psychological warfare presentation at 011630H. There were about 200 people from the village of KHUONG MY (3) in attendance. During this period there was one platoon search and clear operation, four squad and two platoon patrols, six squad and one fire team night ambushes and twenty-nine listening posts.

2 December - Company I reported that at 020010H the second squad of the first platoon received automatic small arms fire and one grenade at (AT 928674). Rifle fire was returned and a grenade thrown with negative results. Two marines received very minor wounds from the grenade fragments but neither required evacuation. At 022135H and again at 022140H Company B received inaccurate long range sniper fire from an undetermined location. No casualties resulted. During the day, the battalion commenced execution of Frag Order 10-65 (see supporting documents Part III). On this date the battalion conducted eight squad and one platoon patrols and placed 11 squad ambushed and 30 listening posts into effect.

3 December - At 030451H a returning squad ambush from Company B was fired on with 10 rounds of automatic fire by two VC vicinity of (AT 924601). The patrol leader was wounded in the chest and medically evacuated by helicopter. The patrol returned fire with 20 rounds and report wounding one VC who escaped. At 031045H a Company B platoon patrol picked up four males and one female VCS at KHUONG MY (1) (AT 926686). The suspects had improper identification. At 031415H Company I witnessed an explosion at (AT 927653). Upon checking, it was discovered that some Vietnamese children had been playing with either a dud or VC booby trap which detonated wounding one child and killing another. At 031600H, the new boundaries between the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines became effective. There were

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four squad and two platoon patrols with eight squad ambushes and twenty-five listening posts out on this date.

4 December - At 040900H a squad patrol from the first platoon of Company B picked up two VCS, without ID cards, in the vicinity of KHUONG MY (2). At 041100H an aerial observer reported receiving small arms fire from the vicinity of HOI VUC (AT 872704), while at about the same time a patrol from Company B destroyed a tunnel capable of holding six to eight people vicinity of (AT 909696). Six squad patrols, seven squad ambushes and twenty-eight listening posts were in effect.

5 December - At 050800H Company D moved out in execution of Frag Order 11-65. (See after action report #4 in Part II, Supporting Documents). At 051215H Company D found and destroyed a booby trapped M-26 grenade at (AT 919690), and at 052050H the third platoon of Company D received three rounds of ineffective sniper fire from the vicinity of (AT 919690). There was one platoon and one company search and clear operation, while six squad ambushes, two squad and two platoon patrols and twenty-six listening posts were in operation.

6 December - At 060730H Company D was executing Frag Order 11-65 as modified by verbal instructions, issued when the company was unable to cross a swollen tributary of the SONG TUY LOAN River. During their sweep of GIAO TRI (3) (AT 887701), the third platoon of Company D discovered a cave and received permission to use two CS grenades which they did with negative results. The cave was then destroyed and later at 061001H the platoon found a bear trap at coordinates (AT 889704). At 061100H the platoon received three rounds of sniper fire from the vicinity of (AT 895703). One 3.5 WP rocket was fired in response with no confirmed results. At 061300H, a platoon of PFs operating in the area made contact with eight VC near the village of KHUONG MY (2) in GS (9169). One VC was killed, one captured and six escaped. At 061330H, the third platoon of Company C requested a medical evacuation for two WIAs wounded by an electrically detonated mine vicinity (AT 905710). A subsequent search of the area failed to locate any V.C. During this day there were two platoon and one company search operation two squad and four platoon patrols, eight squad ambushes, and thirty listening posts.

7 December - At 072025H, the second platoon of Company C observed, illuminated and fired on two men on a raft at (AT 913727) with negative results. On this date the battalion conducted eight squad patrols, nine squad ambushes and twenty-six listening posts.

8 December - At 081345H a psychological warfare/civil action patrol was conducted at TUY LOAN (2) grid square (AT 9269). About 150 people attended. In addition there were six squad patrols, nine ambushes and thirty listening posts out.

9 December - The first platoon of Company B conducted a search of DONG BICH (1) (AT 898681) in an attempt to correlate a reconnaissance patrol report received the day before concerning four bodies that were sighted hanging in the village. The patrol found no confirmation of any hangings or hangings or terrorist activity in the area but did see lifelike scarecrows which could have been mistaken for hanging bodies. Six squad patrols and ten squad night ambushes were active while twenty-five listening posts were put out.

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10 December - The third platoon of Company A designated to provide convoy security under operational control of the Task Force Delta Commander for operation HARVEST MOON. At 100725H, while enroute to the Third Motor Transport Battalion one of the M-35 trucks in which part of the platoon was riding left the muddy road and rolled over into a ditch, crushing one marine to death and injuring two others. The remainder of the third platoon continued on its mission. At 101005H a squad patrol from Company I apprehended two VCS without identification cards. At 101330H a psychological warfare/civic action operation was conducted in the village of PHUOC NINH (2) (AT 928668). Approximately 100 people watched the films and listened to the loudspeaker team. During this period there were seven squad patrols and eight squad ambushes in addition to twenty listening posts.

11 December - No significant events or contacts developed on this day during which the battalion conducted six squad patrols, nine squad ambushes and twenty-nine listening posts.

12 December - At 121203H Company D was committed, as the regimental reserve, to participate in operation HARVEST MOON under operational control of the Commander Task Force Delta. Company C was designated as the new regimental reserve. At 121315H Company B reported that a single VC had made his way through the brush to a concealed position from which he dashed toward an OP located at (AT 919690). The OP was momentarily manned by one man, whom the VC engaged with two five-rounds burst and a grenade. The marine was immediately killed, and a second marine, a short distance away, went for help. Patrols were immediately diverted to sweep the area. Two M-14 magazines were found near KHUONG MY (2) (AT 910690) and later, six VC suspects including the wife of the VC who killed the marine, were picked up. At 121735H, the first platoon of Company A found one buried M-26 grenade at (AT 943680). During the reporting period, one platoon operation and four squad and two platoon patrols were conducted. Additionally, there were eight squad ambushes and twenty-eight listening posts.

13 December - At 130900H a Company B patrol picked up one VCS without proper identification at KHUONG MY (1). Later in the day, at 131010H, a patrol from Company B attempted to apprehend a suspicious looking VCS in the vicinity of TUY LOAN (2). When the man attempted to evade the patrol he was pursued and after failing to heed appropriate warnings and continuing to run, the man was shot and apprehended in the vicinity of (AT 932697). He was subsequently evacuated for medical treatment and interrogation. At 131240H a small cave was destroyed at (AT 929687) and at 131545H the patrol from Company B apprehended five more VCS in the vicinity of (AT 896685) and then checked out a Vietnamese sign indicating mines and booby traps in the area. No mines or booby traps were found. Operations on this date included one platoon and seven squad patrols, five squad ambushes and twenty-three listening posts.

14 December - At 141035H a reinforced squad patrol from Company C was moving up a narrow draw at (AT 896735) when the point was charged by eight unattended water buffalo. The patrol was forced to shoot all of the buffalo to prevent injury to themselves. At 141420H a patrol from the first platoon of Company B apprehended one VCS at (AT 901681). In the evening at 141845H, a squad from the first platoon of Company I had a meeting engagement with one VC, vicinity of (AT 939679). The patrol and the VC spotted each other simultaneously and the VC fired about 10 rounds of submachine gun fire while the point returned fire with one magazine from his M-14 and reported that one tracer round hit the VC's hip and weapon, causing him to fall down. The VC got up and moved rapidly into a nearby tree line from which he

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fired one more burst at the pursuing patrol. The area was searched with negative results. There were four squad and four platoon patrols in addition to six squad ambushes and twenty-three listening posts in position this date.

15 December - The only incident during the day occurred about 152000H when Company I reported an AN/TPS 21 contact about 10 degrees in width and 1000 meters South of Hill 41, vicinity of coordinates (AT 928653). The target appeared to be a column of about 15 troops moving toward Hill 41. Fire missions were called and executed with 81mm mortars, 105mm howitzers and 90mm tank gunfire. The size of the column appeared to tighten up and the AN/TPS 21 showed the target reversing direction and moving out of sight of the hills to the southwest. A patrol was immediately dispatched to check out the area for damage assessment, and although spotter on Hill 41 reported the rounds on target, no indication of casualties inflicted were found. Of the six patrols run on 15 December, one was a platoon and the other five squad size, while six squad ambushes were emplaced along with twenty-three listening posts.

16 December - There were no contacts in the battalion TAOR on 16 December. A patrol sent out to make a daylight check of the impact area of the target picked up by the AN/TPS 21 the previous night found many footprints and one straw hat with a hole in it at the target area. At 161340H one female VCS without ID card was picked up and taken to the district chief for interrogation. There was one platoon and five squad patrols plus eight squad ambushes and twenty-three listening posts out this date.

17 December - There were no significant events in the battalion TAOR this date although the battalion ran one platoon search and clear operation of KHUONG MY (2) while six squad and one platoon size patrols were active. There were squad ambushes and twenty-seven listening posts in effect in the TAOR the First Battalion, First Marines.

18 December - At 181915H, while getting into ambush position at (AT 943677), the leader of the third platoon, Company I ambush tripped an explosive device (probably a booby trapped 81mm Mortar round) in the center of the ambush site and the resulting explosion killed one Marine and wounded four who were immediately medically evacuated. The ambush was moved to a new location and the next morning, an engineer sweep of the same site located four booby trapped M-26 grenades. At 182130H, Company D listening post # 1 (AT 928717) fired two M-79 rounds and 8-10 rounds of small arms fire at suspected V.C. movement while, at about the same time, listening post # 2 (AT 933718) sighted two V.C. several hundred meters away and fired 10-12 rounds after having received one incoming round of small arms fire. There were no confirmed casualties on either side. On this date, the battalion conducted seven squad patrols and six ambushes while twenty-four night listening posts were out.

19 December - This was a relatively quiet day during which a patrol from the second platoon of Company B apprehended one male VCS at 191000H vicinity of (AT 900684). At 191400H Company I held a civil action operation at the base of hill 41, where gifts and medical care were given. About 80 persons attended the highly successful activity. There were five daylight squad and one platoon patrols in operation while nine ambushes and 24 listening posts were in effect.

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20 December - At 201020H the first platoon in Company I patrol was taken under fire by approximately 10 V.C. with a light machine gun. One Marine was wounded and medically evacuated. A fire mission was called on the V.C. (AT 920603) with unconfirmed results. At 201105H the third platoon of Company B destroyed a booby trapped gate at (AT 903705). At 201215H the first platoon of Company I received sporadic sniper fire from two V.C. vicinity of (AT 925606). Fire was returned with negative results. The village of AN MY (3) had recent fortifications, including fires, punji stakes, and was flying an NLF flag which was taken by the Marines. At 201400H the first platoon of Company I picked up 9 VCS in the area of (AT 920603) and 9 more VCS 1000 meters North of AN MY (3). The suspects were taken to the district chief for evaluation. At 202150H an ambush from the third platoon of Company B fired on four V.C. and received fire from their position vicinity of woodland (AT 911701). There were no friendly casualties and no confirmed V.C. casualties. During this period there were six squad and one platoon patrols, nine squad ambushes and twenty-four listening posts. Company D returned to Opcon of 1/3 202250H.

21 December - At 210905H a patrol from the second platoon of Company B received four rounds of sniper fire from KHUONG MY (2). Fire was returned and one V.C. was fatally wounded. The V.C., who later died of wounds, was captured at (AT 909694) along with a hard hat, grenades and cartridge belt that he had discarded. At 211110H the second platoon of Company B picked up a VCS at (AT 909689). A scout/sniper team was employed during daylight hours to cover a spot where artillery communications wire had been repeatedly cut for several days. The team found no targets. There were also five squad and two platoon patrols along with ten squad ambushes and twenty-four listening posts.

22 December - This was an uneventful day during which the battalion conducted six squad and two platoon patrols along with eight squad ambushes and twenty-two listening posts. There was one exchange of small arms fire at 222330H when post # 15 in the battalion GP reported movement and 3 incoming rounds of sniper fire from about 300 yards away. Fire was returned with negative results.

23 December - At 230700H Company D commenced execution of Frag Order 12-65 (See Part III supporting documents). At 231155H a Company B patrol picked up two VCS without proper identification at (AT 895675). At 231310H the patrol found a VC flag 28x34 at (AT 985705). At 231313H the third platoon of Company D received two bursts of automatic fire consisting of approximately 15 rounds and fired from the vicinity of coordinates (AT 888752), fire was returned with small arms and M-79 rounds and the enemy ceased fire. At 231700H, first platoon of Company D discovered a Chinese grenade rigged as a booby trap (AT 870715), which was destroyed in place. Enemy sniper fire was received at this time and the second platoon of Company C became engaged in a fire fight with about four or five V.C. across the river vicinity of (AT 874713). The VC were wearing helmet-type head gear, khaki uniforms and carried carbines. CHARLIE Two commenced firing

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with all organic weapons. One VC was killed, and one VC was wounded. There were no Marine casualties. In addition to the Company D search and destroy operation (see after-action report #5 in part III, Supporting Documents) there were seven squad and two platoon patrols with eight squad ambushes and twenty-two listening post employed.

24 December - At 241545H the second platoon of Company C suffered nine WIAs (none serious) vicinity (AT 898770) caused by a home made booby trap thought to consist of about two and a half pounds of TNT and wrapped with barbed wire. A temporary "cease fire" was placed into effect at 241800H and offensive operations were terminated during the period of the cease fire. However, at 241845H, the first platoon of Company D received approximately 30-35 rounds fired simultaneously from several locations in the vicinity of HOI VUC (AT 8770). The platoon was forced to defend itself and returned fire with all weapons organic to the company in addition to requesting an artillery fire mission. The unfordable river prevented the Marines from closing with the enemy and there were no confirmed casualties on either side. In addition to the continuing Delta Company search and destroy operation there were seven squad and one platoon patrols with seven ambushes and twenty-two listening posts.

25 December - At 250800H a helilift commenced to extract Company D from the area of operations. There were eight to ten exchanges of sporadic small arms fire coming from HOI VUC area, and directed to the helicopters during the lifts. Fire was returned with all organic company weapons and with unconfirmed results. Several helicopters were hit by small arms fire causing one crew member to be wounded in the arm and one Marine from Company D to be superficially wounded in the leg. The lift was completed at 250855H. There were no other significant events on this Christmas day during which a cease fire remained in effect until 252400H. Offensive operations were cancelled during the period but 24 listening posts were in effect.

26 December - At 261155H Company F diverted one platoon from a civil action patrol to sweep PHUOC NINH (1) (AT 943675) in response to a report by a small Vietnamese man that some VC were located in the area. The sweep was conducted with negative results. An aerial observer was on station coordinating the sweep and he received small arms fire at coordinates (AT 960573) and (AT 972573). At 261649H the patrol from the third platoon of Company B picked up one VCS with false identification at (AT 898695). At 261930H Bravo Company received 30-40 rounds of ineffective small arms fire from several hundred meters South of their CP but were unable to determine the location. There were two platoon search and destroy operations, four squad and two platoon patrols, eight squad ambushes and twenty-six listening posts on the 26th of December.

27 December- At 270945H the first platoon of Company B, while on patrol, picked up a confirmed VC. There were no other significant events during this day on which the battalion conducted one squad and one platoon patrol, eight squad ambushes, twenty-eight listening posts and one scout/sniper team.

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28 December - At 281325H the squad reconnaissance patrol of Company D sighted three VC in the distance moving from (AT 870706) to (AT 875707). Due to the distance involved and the mission of the patrol, additional information could not be determined, nor aggressive action taken. A squad reconnaissance patrol each from Companies C and D have been helilifted into the HOI VUC area in order to maintain observation over the landing zone in preparation for the execution of Frag Order 13-65. There were one platoon and ten squad patrols while ten squad ambushes and twenty-eight listening posts were active this date.

29 December - At 290935H a patrol from Company B picked up two VCS caught cutting communications wire vicinity (AT 916697). Both had improper ID cards and were thought to be VC. At 291430H the patrol from the third platoon of Company B apprehended a VCS at (AT 908696). At 292050H a patrol from the third platoon of Company C received about 20 rounds of small arms fire from an undetermined position about 300 meters south of their position at (AT 867719). Execution Battalion Frag Order 13-65 was delayed until 30 December 1965, due to inclement weather which caused a cancellation of the helilift. The two squads from Companies C and D continue to maintain surveillance over the landing zones. During this day there were six patrols and eleven ambushes of squad size and twenty-six listening posts in position.

30 December - 030930H Commenced helilift in execution of Battalion Frag Order 13-65. There was no contact in the landing zone however, helicopters received scattered small arms fire when leaving the landing zone and flying over the HOI VUC complex (AT 8770). At 301200H the first platoon of Company C destroyed an unoccupied cave and two tunnels in the vicinity of (AT 873706). A bear trap was found in one of the caves. Company C reported a booby trapped grenade was set off, slightly injuring two Marines. At 301255H the second platoon of Company D found about 4,000 pounds of rice at coordinates (AT 878705). Arrangements are being made to evacuate the rice, via helicopter to District Headquarters. At 301315H four more unoccupied caves were destroyed by the second platoon of Company D. No enemy contact was developed in the HOI VUC complex during the sweep and destroy operation which will continue on 31 December. In addition to the two-company search and destroy operation there were one platoon and three squad size patrols. Seven squad ambushes, twenty-six listening posts and two scout/sniper teams were also employed.

31 December - Execution of Frag Order 13-65 continued at first light. At 310915H, Company D found another 1500 pounds of rice at (AT 873705). By 311110H CHARLIE Three had destroyed several caves and a tunnel at vicinity (AT 894709), (AT 887710) and (AT 890705). One Marine from Company C who had a fever was evacuated at 311450H. At 311600H, Company D completed its sweep of HOI VUC, Company C proceeded to return to its CP, and to Sierra began. Two platoons of Company D were helilifted at 311700H back to Company D C.P. Delta 2 is to remain in the operation area until 1 January. No VC contact was made during the operation. In addition to the operation, the battalion conducted 11 squad size ambushes, 26 fire team listening posts, 6 squad and 1 platoon sized patrols. Scout sniper teams were used 3 times. No contact was made by any patrol although Bravo 3 patrol

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picked up a VCS at 311515H (AT 922699) who had 2 I.D.'s and was taken to Sierra. Foxtrot 1A ambush had a grenade explode near its position (AT 925673) at 312000H which was not thrown or tripped by the patrol. In addition, about 20 villagers from PHU SON (4) (AT 945637) came to Hill 41 to complain about H&I fires. They were referred to Sierra and Swain was informed.

(2) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

1 December - At 011830H Company D apprehended an unarmed VCS vicinity (AT 942789). Suspect was loitering near protective wire of 1/3 CP perimeter. VC delivered to 3d Marines for processing. Acting on information volunteered by VCS that he had two friends in the area armed with grenades, a squad from D Co searched the area near point where VCS was apprehended. Tank illumination was used, results of the search were negative. At 012210 A small boat containing 2 persons approached NAM O Bridge, vicinity coord (AT 929839). Five warning shots were fired from M-14's by the squad from A Co defending the position. The boat then turned away.

2 December - At 020800H Co C carried out a search and destroy operation of hamlets located vicinity coord (AT 913759) and (AT 916759), with a force of one platoon (rein). No enemy contact was made. At 021815H 1 platoon of Co A carried out a search and destroy mission at coord (AT 915803), commencing at 1815 and terminating at full darkness, approximately 1900. No enemy contact was made. At 022336H A non-battle casualty, who was a member of an ambush squad from A Co who fell into a ravine, was evacuated by helicopter. Evacuation successfully completed at 022300H.

3 December - From 031400 - 031545H 1 platoon of C Company conducted a search and destroy mission at AP AN NGAI BONG, vicinity coord (AT 917790). Miscellaneous US property was recovered, no enemy contact was made. At 031700 a platoon of Regional Forces troops were attached to this battalion. The platoon was billeted with the reserve Co, Company D.

4 December - From 040700 - 041700H one squad from Company A provided cover for attempted recovery of AmTracs and bodies of USMC personnel lost in accident 22 Nov 65, at coord (AT 938835). At 041926H a squad size ambush from 2d platoon Company C captured 2 VCS armed with carbines. VCS were delivered to ITT, DA NANG, coord (AT 938835). At 041900H one squad from B Co and 7 Popular Forces personnel searched AP TRUNG SAN coord (AT 915805) in attempt to capture VC Official reported hiding in village, with negative results.

5 December - From 050715 - 050810H 1st platoon of Company D conducted search and destroy mission at AP XUAN THIEU at coord (AT 927813), no enemy contact was made. From 050700-051310H a platoon of Company A conducted a search and destroy operation in AP THUY TU at (AT 918828). Two VCS were apprehended and delivered to 3d Marines for processing.

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6 December - From 061040H - 061629 two squads from Company A supported a road reconnaissance conducted by 7th Engr Bn from (AT 898822) to (AT 850850). This patrol was also supported by 2 Ontos from 2d Plat, CoA, 3d AT Bn, and was without incident. From 060300-061100H one platoon (rein) of Company B conducted a search and destroy operation in hamlet located at (AT 918814). Medical assistance was also rendered to approximately 50 adults and 150 children. No enemy contact was made. At 061400H the American Ambassador to Japan, Ambassador REISCHAUER, visited LE MY, accompanied by MajGen WALT, Col FISHER, and escorted by LtCol DICKEY. Gen WALT and Col FISHER subsequently visited Company B's position. At 062100H one squad of D Company and one squad of Popular Forces laid an ambush in an attempt to capture a VC official reported by intelligence likely to visit a house at (AT 948782). Suspect did not appear and mission was secured at 070418H.

8 December - At 081030H LtGen KRULAK visited Company C, proceeded to orphanage at (AT 905765) at 081400H Dec. He was accompanied by Col FISHER and LtCol DICKEY. At 081400H a patrol from D Company collected items of intelligence interest from a house at (AT 918793) and at (AT 921816). Items included punji stakes, a mock-up rifle of bamboo, 8 pictures of Mar Corps Officers, 8 rounds of .30 cal rifle and carbine ammunition, and 4 rounds of .45 cal ammunition.

9 December - At 090030H a civilian was wounded in village in grid square (AT 9078) by mortar fire which was identified by shell fragment analysis as VC. VN National was treated at 1/3 BAS and subsequently was taken to ARVN Hospital in DA NANG. At 091930H notification was received by this Headquarters that Company D would be committed as part of Divisions Reserve to OPERATION HARVEST MOON, and would be prepared for deployment by helicopter by first light 10 Dec 65.

10 December - From 100600H - 101030H Company D helilifted to area of operation OPERATION HARVEST MOON. From 100700H-101335H Company G conducted search and destroy mission in THAN HOA TRUNG with 2 platoons, reinforced by 1 platoon of Company B. The village was deserted, no enemy contact was made, 4 tunnels were discovered. They were destroyed by demolitions.

11 December - At 110755 a patrol from Company A discovered a grenade with a trip wire attached to a pole used to support comm wire at coord (AT 898815). At 111400H Commanding Officer, 3d Marines visited NAM O Bridge 121700H Dec. The body of a VC killed by artillery or mortar fire was found by villagers and reported to USMC forces at NAM O Bridge. The body was floating in the CA DE River near the Bridge. Papers found on the body were turned over to District Headquarters by the hamlet police chief.

13 December - At 132140H 1/3 OP located at (AT 917782) received one round of small arms fire. An illumination grenade was thrown and 5 rounds were fired by friendly forces, with unknown results. At 130315H two VCS claiming to be fishing were apprehended by a squad patrol from A Company at coord (AT 920828). VCS were questioned, their identity verified by the village chief, and were released after being warned of consequences of curfew violation.

14 December - From 140945H - 141700H one plat (-) from Company A, supported by two AmTracs, conducted search and destroy operation at DAP HOI DUA, coord (AT 912836). Sixteen VCS were apprehended and delivered to

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3d Marines for processing.

16 December - From 160930 - 190920 Company A (rein) conducted search and destroy operation (see Special Operation, b. Combined Operations, to this report.)

17 December - A fire team size ambush force from A Company, at coord (AT 892818), while moving into ambush position, engaged 3 VC with automatic rifle fire. One VS observed to fall. Area was illuminated and searched, with negative results.

19 December - Two Vietnamese children who claimed to have been bringing a grenade found in a rice paddy to USMC personnel at K Btry, 12th Marines were injured when the grenade exploded. They received treatment at 1/3 BAS.

20 December - At 202400H a squad patrol from A Co sighted a VCS coord (AT 889818) who escaped in the darkness and vegetation.

21 December - At 211200H village officials from HOA VIHN dined with LTCOL DICKEY and his staff at 1/3 CP. From 210900 - 231300H Co A conducted search and destroy operations previously described in River Operations, (4). At 211540H a badly decomposed body was found on the North bank of the CA DE River near NAM O Bridge. Body believed to be that of SSgt TABOR, D-1-3, missing since AmTrac sinking at mouth of GA DE River on 22 Nov 65. Body was taken to C Med for identification.

22 December - At 221240H a patrol from 3d Recon Bn sighted 7 men in khaki uniforms, armed with rifles, at coord (AT 857786) Co B dispatched a patrol to investigate, but was unable to make contact. At 221920H Regional Forces North of NAM O Bridge requested assistance of Marine forces from A Co at the Bridge to effect capture of a VCS. Assistance was dispatched, VCS had escaped prior to their arrival. At 222240H the Bn S-2 Officer headed a psychological operation/civil action patrol to KIM LIEN, composed of one squad reinforced by two Ontos. Patrol used loudspeakers upon arrival, disseminated propaganda leaflets, remained in place until the following day, carried out Civic Action and medical assistance program, secured operation at 231500H Dec.

23 December - At 231000 Company D, redesignated as C-1-4, departed 1/3 CP by motor convoy for DA NANG for further transportation by air to new positions, occupied by C-1-4, which is being transferred to 1/3 and will be re-designated D -1-3. At 231620 a working party in the vicinity of coord (AT 933733) engaged in filling sandbags, received a burst of 5-6 rounds of automatic rifle fire. A sniper from S-2 Section armed with scope-equipped M-70 was dispatched to the scene, however, no more enemy fire was received. No casualties were incurred by USMC forces.

24 December - At 240005H a squad patrol from Company A, vicinity of coord (AT 904833) fired on suspected enemy position upon hearing noise of movement. Three rounds of enemy fire were received by the patrol, resulting in two WIA, one of which later DOW. The enemy immediately broke contact and fire could not be brought upon him. The wounded were evacuated

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by helicopter. At 241250H MajGen WALT arrived at 1/3 CP, conducted briefing for all hands not on watch on results of OPERATION HARVEST MOON, and delivered CG Christmas message to troops. At 241700H this Headquarters was notified by 3d Marines that a moratorium on offensive operations would be in effect from 241800H to 252400. All units were notified. Amplifying instructions were received and passed to all units at 242225H Dec and 242315 H Dec.

25 December - At 251745H 3d Marines notified this Headquarters that the moratorium would remain in effect until further notice. At 251940H message received by this Headquarters from 3d MarDiv extending the moratorium under the same conditions as those applying to 24 Dec until further notice. All subordinate and supporting units were notified. At 252138H an ambush from A Co, at coord (AT 916828) observed 6 saucer shaped boats containing 7-8 occupants in the river at coord (AT 916829). Boats were challenged and told to halt in Vietnamese. Occupants then scuttled their boats and started swimming in an attempt to escape. The patrol, after repeated commands to halt had no effect, fired on the VCS, with unknown results. The patrol subsequently searched an area on the river bank after seeing lights there, and heard a number of persons running away. The patrol did not fire on these persons. The patrol was instructed to take no further offensive action unless actually fired upon.

26 December - At 260753 3d Marines ordered this Headquarters to prepare to resume offensive operations within the hour. At 260900H 3d Marines informed this Headquarters that offensive operations were to be resumed effective immediately.

30 December - At 300718H 3d Marines notified this Headquarters that D Co would maintain itself on 30 minute alert status for possible deployment to vic (AT 8757). At 300855H 3d Marines instructed this Headquarters to check on firing reported in vicinity HOA MINH, grid square (AT 9778). Regional forces with S-2 Scouts dispatched in two AmTracs, it was ascertained that shooting was test firing from ARVN 11th Ranger Bn, located near HOA MINH, coord (AT 967783). At 301135H alert status of Company D changed from 1/2 hour to two(2) hours. At 301235H medical evacuation for non-battle casualties from C Company patrol vicinity coord (AT 827774). One member of patrol with injured knee, another with snakebite. Med Evac completed 301330H Dec to C Med. At 301600H Company D removed from alert status. At 302050H ARVN forces at NAM O Bridge engaged in 5 minute fire fight with small group of VC near their defensive perimeter. Artillery illumination was fired at their request, supplemented by illumination from USMC Tanks at the South end of the Bridge.

31 December - At 310930H Company D commenced relief of Company A on position. Company A assumes role of Bn/Regt/Div Reserve as of this date. Relief was completed at 311330H Dec.

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(3) 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.

23 December - 2d Battalion, 1st Marines assumed control of TAOR relieving 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. There were 8 squad and 1 platoon size patrols conducted. Four ambushes and twelve listening posts were employed. Negative contact.

24 December - At 2030H CAC-2 made contact with estimated 2 VC. Illumination was fired in support with CAC-2 taking VC under fire. After contact was broken a sweep of the area was conducted with negative results. At 2215H message was received from CG, 3d Marine Division as follows: "Do not respond to minor prepetrations or harassment as long as they do not pose a threat to security. Eight squad size patrols were conducted. Three Ambushes and twelve listening posts were employed.

25 December - Seven squad patrols were conducted. Four squad size ambushes and fourteen listening posts were employed. All units were again instructed not to fire unless fired upon. No unusual incidents happened.

26 December - At 0930H 2d Battalion, 1st Marines received orders to resume normal operations from Regiment. Eight squad size patrols were conducted, five squad size ambushes and fourteen listening posts were employed. Negative contact.

27 December - At 0130, 2d Platoon, Company E, in the GIA LE area had contact with two VC with possible one VC WIA. Eight squad size patrols were conducted. Four squad size ambushes and fifteen listening posts were employed.

28 December - CAC-5 at 2130 made contact with four VC, patrol physically pursued VC with no results. No friendly casualties. One mechanized, motorized patrol at 1000 to 1400. Purpose of patrol to perform road reconnaissance and to get actual time/space factor for possible future operation. Route from 844173 to 808103 and return. Eight squad size patrols were conducted, three squad size ambushes and fourteen listening posts were employed.

29 December - Reconnaissance patrol at 1715 made contact with five VC. Pursued them approximately 800 meters, did not pursue further because of heavy foliage and village. Not enough men in patrol to pursue further. No friendly casualties. No VC casualties. Ten squad size patrols were conducted, three squad size ambushes and fourteen listening posts were employed.

30 December - Eleven squad size patrols were conducted, four squad size ambushes and fourteen listening patrols were employed. Negative contact.

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31 December - At 2145H, 2d Platoon, Company G at 819182 received fire from four (4) or five (5) VC's. One friendly KIA. VC casualties unknown. 1 Platoon size patrol and ten squad size patrols were conducted. Eight squad size ambushes and fifteen listening posts were employed.

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10. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination (S-3/FSCC).

a. Significant Events. There were no significant events in the area of Fire Support Coordination. No difficulties were encountered in providing sufficient fire support for the operational requirements of the Regiment. Defensive Fire Plans were revised to support current deployment of forces.

b. Artillery Units Providing Support. The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein) with reinforcing fires from the 12th Marines (-) (Rein) provided direct and general support throughout the 3d Marines TAOR at DA NANG. The 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein) provided support in the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines/2d Battalion, 1st Marines TAOR at HUE-PHU BAI.

c. Naval Ships Providing Naval Gunfire Support. Naval Gunfire was not utilized in support of the 3d Marine Regiment during the reporting period.

d. Artillery Missions Delivered.

Harassing, and Interdiction	7287
Illumination	37
Neutralization	252
Registrations	12
LZ Preps	2
Marking	2
Time on Target	3

e. Naval Gunfire Missions Delivered. None.

f. Artillery Ammunition Expended.

	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>Illum</u>	<u>Smoke</u>
105mm	11367	222	96	66
107mm	1161	227	32	
155mm	1814	91	109	

Ammunition Expenditure for Operation Harvest Moon.

105mm	1723	78
107mm	127	14

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g. Naval Gunfire Ammunition Expended. None.

h. 81mm Mortar Missions Delivered. One-thousand three hundred forty-nine Harassing and Interdiction missions were fired in the 3d Marine TAGR at DA NANG during the reporting period.

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11. LOGISTICSa. Supply

(1) During December, combat tropical boots with spike resistant insoles were issued by units as follows:

HqCo. 41 prs.
 1stBn, 1stMar 20 prs.
 1stBn, 3rdMar 960 prs.

(2) CG, 3dMarDiv published a more restrictive criteria for recommending items for the "Red Ball" program. Effective 7 December, no item could be placed on "Red Ball" by a unit unless the item requested was essential to maintain or attain combat serviceability of an end item which would place the unit in a REDOPS category C-3 (marginally ready for combat) or C-4 (not ready for combat).

(3) The November "Critipaks" were received by units as follows:

HqCo. 11 Dec
 1stBn, 1stMar 4 Dec

(4) The December "Critipaks" were received by units as follows:

HqCo. 31 Dec
 1stBn, 1stMar 20 & 27 Dec
 1stBn, 3rdMar 22 Dec

(5) The 15-foot Vietnamese boats for use in tactical or logistical missions were issued as follows:

1stBn, 1stMar. 1
 1stBn, 3rdMar. 1
 2ndBn, 1stMar. 1 (awaiting shipment to
 PHU BAI)

(6) The Regiment continued to redistribute assets of items which were in short supply.

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(7) Since pallets, material handling (FSN 3990-271-1880) are now Class II, Type 2 items, CG, 3dMarDiv directed each battalion to requisition 25 on priority 05 requisitions.

(8) The 18 "Mity Mite" agricultural backpack spray dusters were distributed on a basic of 6 per battalion. This item weighs 25 lbs, (empty) and displaces 450 cu.ft. of air per minute. The fuel tank capacity (1 qt. of gasoline and oil mixture) permits operation in excess of 30 minutes. It is equipped with a 2 ft. long flexible tube which has a metal nozzle on the end. The polyethylene agent tank capacity is either 10 lbs. of powder agent or 2 gals. of liquid agent. This piece of equipment has been successfully employed to trace and flush VC tunnel systems using smoke grenades or smoke pots and can be used as a sprayer in malaria control programs.

(9) In July, CG, 3dMarDiv authorized each infantry battalion to requisition 13 shotguns, 12 gauge, M-1912 as a special allowance. The shotguns were received in December by FLSG. Both 1stBn, 1stMar and 1stBn, 3rdMar were issued their shotguns by FLSG, but 2ndBn, 1stMar has not been issued any by FLSU #2 to date.

(10) Directives were issued by both CG, III MAF and CG, 3dMarDiv for the handling and disposition of personal effects and baggage in RVN.

(11) The Regiment furnished 75 cans, water, 5-gallon on temporary loan to units involved in Operation "HARVEST MOON".

b. Maintenance

(1) The average daily rate of vehicles on deadline for the Regiment was:

- (a) M-274 (Mechanical Mules) 27% (24 of 90).
- (b) M-422 (Mighty Mites) 19% (13 of 71).

(2) A continued shortage of repair parts for communication-electronics equipment has kept many items on deadline.

c. Food Services

(1) Mess halls served a special meal on Christmas Day.

(2) Meals served in mess halls during the month were about 50% "A" rations and 50% "B" rations.

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d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities. The camp site cantonment program in the Regimental CP accelerated rapidly during December after construction materials became available. Personnel of the 3d Engineer Battalion supplemented MCB-5 in assisting HqCo personnel to construct strongbacked tents. The galley and enlisted mess have been completed and the officers' and staff NCO's messes are partially completed. The program is progressing satisfactorily in the battalions.

c. Transportation and Roads

(1) During periods when sections of the MSR were impassable to other vehicles due to heavy rains, the 1stBn, 1stMar used four to six Cargo Carriers, amphibious, M-76, "Otters" daily for resupply missions with satisfactory results. These vehicles have a capacity of 8 personnel or 1,400 lbs. supplies (combat load); however, palletized cargo cannot be carried. It's two 35-gallon gasoline tanks give it a range of 420 miles. Due to its vulnerability to small arms fire, "Otters" will not be tactically employed, but will be utilized as emergency logistical support vehicles only.

(2) 1stBn, 1stMar and 1stBn, 3rdMar are now provided only 6 trucks, 5-ton, M-54 on a daily basis for resupply and housekeeping runs in lieu of the 8 previously furnished.

f. Financial Management

(1) Based upon the information contained in the Unit Code Reports and Unit Management Reports (adjusted for non-recurring costs), the Regiment submitted its estimated Operating Budget (OpBud) requirements for the remainder of FY-66 as follows:

3rd Qtr - \$250,633.00

4th Qtr - \$251,149.00

(2) The Secretary of the Navy designated the period 27Sep-26Nov as "Open Season" on wasteful and inefficient practices throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. In December units submitted reports on their achievements in this area.

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g. Embarkation. During December BLT 3/4 was relieved by BLT 2/1. A resume of embarkation/debarkation operations is as follows:

- (1) Ships involved:
 - (a) USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
 - (b) USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)
 - (c) USS MONTROSE (APA-212)
- (2) BLT 2/1 debarkation:
 - (a) Time. 211400H - 230900H Dec
 - (b) Personnel. 40 Off & 984 Enl
 - (c) Supplies. (All Classes) - 93,017 cu.ft. & 2,457,707 wt.
 - (d) Vehicles. 207 weighing 12,823 tons
- (3) BLT 3/4 embarkation:
 - (a) Time. 211500H - 231730H Dec
 - (b) Personnel. 42 Off & 1,266 Enl
 - (c) Supplies. (Class I) - 44 cu.ft. & 2,750 wt.
 - (d) Vehicles. 159 weighing 18,856 tons

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12. Air Defense. There were no significant events.

13. Combat Air Support

a. During December Marine aviation provided air support in the areas of medical evacuation, logistic supply, liaison, aerial reconnaissance and observation. Requirements for vertical assault lifts by elements of the Regiment were performed by the designated ready-alert-helicopters. The short response time of this alert unit permitted the battalion to employ combat units rapidly and in sufficient depth to effectively control their respective TAOR's. In all cases, the response time for tactical air requests have been satisfactory. Medical evacuations have all been accomplished with the alert time frame established. It is significant to note that in spite of adverse weather conditions during this period response times have not been adversely effected. Extensive helicopter resupply missions were conducted again during the month due to poor road conditions caused by the monsoon season.

b. Overall combat air support provided 3d Marine Regiment consisted of the following summarized missions.

- (1) One hundred fifty-five (155) resupply missions.
- (2) Twenty-five (25) medical evacuation missions.
- (3) Nineteen (19) tactical priority troop lifts were executed.
- (4) Ten (10) administrative missions were run for all units of this command.
- (5) Five (5) close air support missions.

c. Highlights

(1) 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and 2d Bn., 1st Marines continue the airborne combat reconnaissance patrol. This tactic effectively increases the units daylight patrol capability.

(2) Adverse weather during this period denied fixed wing support required for one (1) helicopter assault into an unsecure zone and one helicopter withdrawal from an unsecure zone. During the month overall helicopter support was reduced by ten per-cent (10%) due to prevailing weather conditions.

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14. Medical And Dental Support.

a. Unit Surgeons.

- (1) HqCo. 3rd Mar - LT R.C. MILSOVIC (MC) USNR
- (2) 1stBn, 1st Mar - LT J.E. BOCKER (MC) USN
LT R.H. REID (MC) USNR
- (3) 2ndBn, 1st Mar - LT A.D. COLBY (MC) USN
LT G.M. BRENNOCK (MC) USN
- (4) 1stBn, 3rd Mar - LT J. WILKERSON (MC) USN
LT E. SHAHADY (MC) USNR

b. Significant Events.

- (1) On 8 Dec 1965 Regimental Surgeon received TAD orders to "D" Co., 3rd Med Bn for operation "Harvest Moon."
- (2) 20 Dec, Co. 3rd Mar advised of probable increase in Scrub Typhus.
- (3) 23 Dec. B.A.S. 2/1/ Established.
- (4) 28 Dec. B.A.S. 1/3 opened a pediatric ward as part of their Civil Affairs program.

c. Medical Trends.

- (1) In the month of December there has been an increase of Gastric Enteritis.
- (2) There has been a significant increase in upper respiratory infections due to the cold, wet weather.
- (3) Troops in the field have had increased difficulty with immersion foot.

d. Number of Battle Casualties Treated at Aid Stations.

- (1) HqCo.....0
- (2) 1stBn, 1stMar.....1
- (3) 2ndBn, 1stMar.....0
- (4) 1stBn, 3rdMar.....0

e. Number of Non-Battle Patients Treated at Aid Stations.

- HqCo.....347
- 1stBn, 1stMar.....861
- 2ndBn, 1stMar.....477 (since 23 Dec. 65)
- 1stBn, 3rdMar.....240

f. Preventive Medicine and Sanitation.

- (1) Inoculations were carried out according to current directives.
- (2) HqCo. began cutting the brush down in and around the camp to alleviate the rodent and snake problem.
- (3) Field Sanitation techniques were followed stringently throughout the Regiment.

g. Civil Affairs Medical Support Rendered.

(1) Number Treated.

- (a) HqCo.....265
- (b) 1stBn, 1st Mar...2,889
- (c) 2ndBn, 1st Mar...900 (since 23 Dec. 65)
- (d) 1stBn, 3rd Mar...10,881
- TOTAL.....12,035

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(2) Amount of Medication Dispensed.

(a)	Bacitracin Ointment	100 tubes
(b)	Antibiotic Eye Ointment	100 tubes
(c)	Aspirin (1,000 per bottle)	25 bottles
(d)	Sodium Salicylate Tablets (1,000's)	5 bottles
(e)	Tedral Tablets	= 5 bottles
(f)	Penicillin in Oil (5 per packet)	45 packets
(g)	Procaine Penicillin	210 bottles
(h)	Tetracycline Tablets	35 bottles
(i)	Penicillin G Tablets	15 bottles
(j)	Cough Syrup	6 gallons
(k)	Erythromycin Oral Suspension Pediatric	230 bottles
(l)	Tetracycline Oral Suspension	190 bottles
(m)	Charocol Peppermint Tablets	10 bottles
(n)	Brown's Mixture	9 cans
(o)	Piperazine Citrate Tablets	10 cans
(p)	Piperazine Citrate	11 bottles
(q)	Antiseptic Solutions	10 gallons
(r)	Band Aids	50 packs
(s)	Gauze Bandage	200 rolls
(t)	Compress B andages	100 packages
(u)	Vitamins	200 bottles

(3) Schooling Conducted. BAS 1st Bn, 3rd Marines in conjunction with the opening of its pediatric ward has started the training of two Vietnamese nationals as nurses. The nurse training program at Lie My is continuing.

h. Problem Areas.

(1) Transportation continues to be a problem due to the shortage of vehicles.

(2) There has been a shortage of certain Medical supplies but this has not yet become critical.

CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. General. During December the Regimental Civic Action program accelerated in areas of medical assistance and construction assistance projects. The relief of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines by the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was accomplished with minimal loss of effectiveness in civil affairs activities during the transfer period. Immediate and continual contact was established by the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines with civilian officials to prevent a communications break down between U.S. Marine units and the local population.

b. Unit Activities.

(1) Headquarters Company. Construction of Khanh Son Hamlet Marketplace at (AT957763) began under the supervision of the Hamlet Chief. All members of the hamlet will participate in the construction and operation of the marketplace which is expected to commence operation during the latter part of January. The Civil Affairs Officer and the Medical Team continued the weekly medical assistance to Khanh Son Hamlet.

(2) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. During December 2,889 Vietnamese civilians were treated at MEDCAP sickcalls. Five (5) Psychological Warfare/Civil Action Patrols were conducted. Two (2) concerts were presented by the 3rd Marine Division Band in Hoa Hung Village (AT945699) on 15 and 28 December. The performances were well received by a large audience. Materials provided by USOM enabled villagers at Thach Nham Hamlet (AT950717) to construct a well and construction was started on Hieu Duc District Dispensary Annex (20 bed unit) which is expected to be completed by 1 March 1966.

(3) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines. The Battalion has taken a firm grasp of the Civil Affairs program within it's tactical area of responsibility during the units first month in Vietnam. Ten (10) hamlets were visited weekly during December where 12,777 individuals received medical aid. Much time and effort have been devoted by Company "A" to repaint and refurbish the school and initiate English instruction at Hoa Lac (AT906756). Company "B" purchased desks for the school in Hoa Vinh (AT899795). Four (4) libraries are being established within the area for local population.

(4) 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. The Battalion commenced operation in the Phu Bai area during the last week of December. During this short period of time, the Combined Action Company treated 611 civilians at sick calls in Thuy Phu (YD912118), Loc Bon (YD925104) and Thuy Tan (YD911149). On 28 December "A" Company, Dental Detachment, 3d Medical Battalion provided dental treatments to 94 patients at the Buddhist Orphanage in Hue. Marines and Popular Forces constructed a head at Loc Bon Village Headquarters (YD925104).

STATISTICAL REPORT

A. Medical Assistance.	Medical	Dental
(i) No. female adults assisted.....	<u>2,477</u>	<u>43</u>
(ii) No male adults assisted.....	<u>2,123</u>	<u>26</u>
(iii) No children under 18 assisted.....	<u>10,492</u>	<u>18</u>
(iv) Total persons assisted.....	<u>15,092</u>	<u>87</u>

B. Construction Assistance.	
(i) No. projects initiated.....	<u>20</u>
(ii) No projects under construction.....	<u>0</u>
(iii) Total No. projects completed.....	<u>10</u>

C. Personal Assistance.	
(i) No. pounds food distributed.....	<u>1,194</u>
(ii) No. persons receiving food.....	<u>3,743</u>
(iii) No. pounds clothing distributed.....	<u>1,370</u>
(iv) No. persons receiving clothing.....	<u>2,111</u>
(v) No. bars soap distributed.....	<u>3,106</u>
(vi) No. persons receiving soap.....	<u>2,533</u>

D. Evacuation Assistance.	
(i) No. adults evacuated medically.....	<u>4</u>
(ii) No. children under 18 evacuated medically.....	<u>6</u>
(iii) No. adults evacuated operationally.....	<u>0</u>
(iv) No. children evacuated operationally.....	<u>0</u>
(v) No. of persons above returned to hamlet.....	<u>3</u>

E. Contacts with local persons.	
(i) No. of initial contacts.....	<u>11</u>
(ii) No. of follow-up contacts.....	<u>107</u>

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PART III

- Sited ref*
1. Daily Situation Reports, 1-31 December 1965, # 258-268
 2. Weekly Operations Overlay Reports, 271800H November - 251800H December 1965
(4, 11, 18, & 25 Dec)
 3. Journals, 1-31 December 1965
 4. Operation Order 326-65
 5. Change No. 1 to Operation Order 326-65
 6. CO, 3d Marines Msg 010120Z (1st Bn, 3d Mar execution of Div oper. plan 353-65)
 7. CO, 3d Marines Msg 011518Z (Frag Order 31-65)
 8. CO, 3d Marines Msg 260350Z (Readdressal of C.G. 3d Mar Msg 250740Z M-14 modified rifles)
 9. CO, 3d Marines Msg 020615Z (Boundry Change)
 10. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw dtd 1 Dec 1965
 11. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw over 1556 dtd 1 Dec 1965 "Track Orig. Correction of"
 12. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/REZ/hlw over 03433 dtd 2 Dec 1965
 13. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw over 3000 dtd 3 Dec 1965
 14. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw over 3000 dtd 4 Dec 1965
 15. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw over 3000 dtd 28 Dec 1965
 16. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/JAM/hlw dtd 29 Dec 1965
 17. CO, 3d Marines Ltr 3/HJC/hlw dtd 29 Dec 1965
 18. 1st Endorsement on CO 3d Bn (Rein) 4th Mar (-) (Rein) ltr 3/JPS/ree over 3480 dtd ~~2 Dec~~ 28 Dec 1965
 19. 1st Endorsement on CO 1st Bn, 3d Mar AA Form dtd 23 Dec 1965
 20. Traffic Diagram
 21. Circuit Diagram
 22. Command Chronologies 1/1, 1/3, 2/1

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010001 Dec65

IN	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0005	1	Fr 1/3: Change B-2-A ambush for tomorrow to (882803) and cancel C-2-B ambush.	S, Div
0410	2	Fr 1/3: A, B, C, negative contact.	S
0610	3	Fr 1/3: A, B & C all secure.	S
0710	4	Fr 1/1: I-6 has departed.	S
0820	5	Fr 1/1: I-6 at checkpoint #3, negative contact. C-1 will have a 2 squad patrol, will be advised on the area, patrolling at 010830 vice this afternoon.	S
1005	6	Fr 1/1: I-6 is at Checkpoint #5. negative contact.	S
1037	7	Fr 1/1: A-3 departed CP 0915H, passed checkpoint #2 1035H.	S
1125	8	Fr 1/3: SPOT REPORT: (a) A-1 (b) 011100H (c) 931837 (d) at approx 010415H, the tank crew at NAM O bridge spotted a man through infra red scope. Seen with blanket around him setting near a bush at coord (926844). Tank also saw small light blinking in general vicinity. Tank illuminated man with search light; he did not move. Tank fired 10 rd. burst .30 caliber. Man jumped up and ran east past old French bunker and went out of sight. Tank fired approx 35 rd. burst where they suspected man to be. 10 minutes later A-1 received word that an ARVN troop was wounded. Time of shooting 010415H. Naked eye visibility was poor. Tank distance 300 meters from man. (e) Wounded ARVN troop treated at Bn BAS. Investigation being conducted. (f) - (n) None.	S
1355	9	Fr 1/1: I-6 is at checkpoint #6 and have one VCS without ID.	S
1415	10	A. Crowd 2 B. 011302 C. AT864865 D. St. Joe A found one (1) Div 8"mm HOW "HE" rd at above coord. E. St Joe A unable to detonate dud, rd under heavy canopy and can not be seen from air. E-N Neg.	Div
1705	11	Fr 1/1: D-3 returned at 1630 from Psy Operations. 200 people attended movie, 40 people for sic call, village of KHUONG MY (3).	S
1748	12	Fr 1/3: All C ambushes are out. 9	S
1935	13	A. 3/4, THUA THIEN sector (A/2) B. 30 Nov 65 C. Unk D. It is reported the VC are badly short of K-44 ammo therefore VC units were told to limit the expenditure of ammo. They were also told to return the ammo shells to VC engr factory for reproduction. E-N None.	Div
2000	14	Fr 1/3: C & A negative contact. Spt Report: B-2 at 011950H at coord 889796 found the following miscellaneous equipment: 1 sack poison; 1 wooden stake; 1 bottle used ink; 1 helmet liner, 1 tennis shoe. 1 dungree jacket.	S, Div
2015	15	Fr 1/3: B Co ambushes have departed.	S
2210	16	Fr 1/3: A, B and C all secure.	S
2225	17	Fr 1/3: Spot Report 1/3: A-1 at 012210H at coord 929839, Spotted boat at coord 929839 moving towards A-1 position. Fired illum and 1 warning shot. Boat headed for shore. Five rounds expended. ARVN troops fired auto wpns at boat from north of bridge.	S, S-2, Div
2250	18	Fr 1/3: At 1945H a tank was parked on road close to RR tracks at coord 928840. Train came from north at greater speed than usual, overshot watchman at A-1 position and side swiped tank. No damage to train. Long scratch made along track of tank, minor dent in fender.	S, S-2, Div Encl# 3
2340	19	Fr 3/4: On Company Search request start at 1000 and on 3 Dec 65 be completed by 1600 and the 1st lift to start at Chu Lai.	S
2359	20	JOURNAL CLOSED.	

020001 Dec 65

(TIME OPENED)

IN	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0010	1	Fr 1/3: A, B, and C Companies SITREP, Neg Contact.	S, Div
0055	2	Fr 1/1: I-1 020010 H at coord 928679. I-1 was moving into position when they were taken under fire by one (1) automatic rifle and one (1) grenade. I-1 returned small arms fire and one grenade. They will search area for VC and will continue their mission. (F) None. (G) two (2a) Minor from grenade fragmentations. Med Evac not requested will remain with patrol, (N) None (I)-(J) NONE Confirmed.	S, S-2, Div
0145	3	Fr 1/1: Reports 020036H - I-1 searched area with neg results continuing mission.	S, Div
0200	4	Fr 1/1: I-1 reports 020043H will run a additional search at first light.	S, Div
0210	5	Fr 1/1: I-1 is now in night time position.	S, Div
0355	6	Fr 1/1: All secure, negative contact.	S, Div
0405	7	Fr 1/3: Neg SITREP all units.	S
0845	8	Fr 1/3: D-3 at CP#5, setting up patrol ban,	S
0945	9	Fr 1/3: D-3 CA patrol has departed.	S
1010	10	Fr 1/3: B-3 patrol departed.	S
1200	11	Fr 1/3: A-1 any movement on water after 1900 between 928839 and 929835 is OK. Any movement after 1900 going up river S.W. is V.C. This was verified by Village Chief.	S
1259	12	Fr 1/3: B-3 has returned.	S
1555	13	Fr 1/3: D-3 is back.	S
1850	14	Fr 1/3: Add to Co, A: Ambush at (AT918834). Change 3d Plt ambush from (AT901820) to (AT920932) on 3 Dec 65.	S, Div
1924	15	Fr Div G-3: Col Fisher asked if we had anything from NAM C Bridge. Said he could see illumination and what appeared to be mortar shells detonating.	S
1932	16	Fr S-3: Called 1/3 was told land line is out and no radio contact. Then 1/3 said wait a minute. Radio contact had been made and a report would be forth coming. Said they too could see illumination and what appeared to be mortar shells landing. A SITREP would be made as soon as possible.	S
1937	17	Fr 1/3: A-1 at NAM C Bridge reports negative contact, situation normal.	Div, S
2220	18	Fr 1/3: D-1-3 conducted search of village (AT915803). USMC movement was west. No rds were fired by friendly forces and no VC contact. Lasted from 1830-1845. Terminated because of darkness.	Div S
2050	19	Fr 1/3: All Companies - negative contact.	S
2255	20	Fr S-3: Based on an intelligence report received through artillery channels, 1/3 with 2 plts will conduct a detailed search AP VAN DUONG (AT9179) at 031400H. The time of search is set to alter the normal pattern of first light searches. ARNV troops will be included in the operation.	Div
2310	21	Fr 1/1: B Co. reports 1 incoming grenade in the vicinity of (AT922691) at 2305. Returned 1 grenade with negative results. No casualties. It was one of B LP's. Will check out area in morning.	S-2, S
2359	22	JOURNAL CLOSED.	

030001 Dec 65
(TIME OPENED)

LN	SER	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0015	1	Fr 1/3: A, B, & C negative contact.	S
0607	2	Fr 1/1: Capt KERR reported the B Co marine was wounded by Marine when an ambush was returning to their position. Med evac not completed at this time	RegtExO Div
0620	3	Fr RegtAO: Med evac requested 030450, was airborne 030507H: Helo crashed, med evac completed at 030610.	RegtExO Div
0630	4	Fr 1/1: Capt KERR - The previous message entry 26 is wrong and said this is what happened: At approx 030420H, an ambush was returning to B Co CP and was fired upon by 2 VC (AT921694). The VC opened fire with automatic weapons at approx 20 meters distance and fired about 10 rds wounding the patrol leader. The patrol returned fire with approx 20 rds and believed they wounded 1 VC	RegtExO Div
0726	5	Fr 1/3: A, B ambushes are in position. C-2 patrol is departing CP.	S
0945	6	Fr 1/3: C-2 is at checkpoint #3.	S
1004	7	Fr 1/3: At 0935 C Co. med evac (AT912745) SWINDLE, JD shot in ankle with .45 pistol. 1/3 is handling med evac. More info to follow.	Div S
1215	8	Fr A Recon: Spt Report: (a) A-2 (b) 031138H (c) AT855865 (d) Engaged in fire fight with approx 10 VC wearing brown uniforms, helmets, cartridge belts and at least 1 automatic automatic weapon. 1 VC tried to throw grenade, but blew himself up. 2-A thinks they are hard core. At 1155H, VC broke contact and moved towards NAM YEN (AT850858) (e) - (h) None (i) 1 VC (j) - (n) None.	S
1520	9	Fr 1/1: I Co. has found 2 Vietnamese boys. One is badly wounded and the other one is dead. Apparently injuries caused by a VC booby trap. Wounded boy taken to Hill 41 and an air med evac requested. Dead boys parents are trying to be located. Location of incident is (AT935632).	Div S
1835	10	Fr 1/3: Cancel ambushes for C-2A and C-2C (AT 895747) and (AT 904747).	S Div
2020	11	Fr 1/3: A, B, and C SITREP Neg contact.	S Div
2105	12	Fr 3/4: 2d Plat Co M at 032011H at coord (YD 908089) : 15 VC approaching ambush. Ambush opened fire; VC then broke contact. Ambush saw 3 VC fall. Fired Arty on concentration around contact. Searched contact area with negative results (F) - (M) NONE (N) Unknown.	S, S-2, DIV
2235	13	Fr 1/3: A, B and C SITREP Neg Contact for 2000H.	S, DIV
2359		Journal closed.	

040001 Dec 65
(TIME OPERATED)

IN	SER	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001	1	Fr 1/3: Neg contact all companies.	S Div
0210	2	Fr 1/3: A-1 at 040010-040115H direction of ARVN movement steady - ARVN fired 200 rds coord (926844) - No wpns used by VC - 2 VC seen - direction of movement south. Marines didn't support ARVN's - Not requested by ARVN - No action taken by A-1. Other than comm by land line to ARVN - no friendly KIA's - No friendly WIA's - No enemy KIA or WIA - No VC, wpns, equipment or documents captured	S
0245	3	Fr 1/3: C-2 - 040030 - 1 grenade was thrown at patrol coord (894757) - Patrol was deployed along trail facing West - patrol leader and corpsmen at rear providing security - Patrol was on 50 percent alert. Patrol leader was asleep at the time. Corpsman was on watch, saw dark shadow on trail throw something - Corpsman shouted grenade and threw his body across patrol leader to protect him. No return fire - exact location of VC unknown - Patrol leader ordered hold fire until location of VC was known - VC withdrew - It was reported by radio to plat. Commander of C-2 at 040037H - C-2 requested 81mm fire in area- Patrol moved out of area to allow firing. Area will be searched at first light. WIA Ser No 4401393 Corpsman MONDA - grenade fragment in arm - not serious - no need for MedEvac. Minor injury Enemy KIA and WIA unknown. No enemy wpns, documents, or VC captured.	S Div
0407	4	Fr 1/3: A, B, C reported neg contact.	S
0444	5	Fr 1/1: Delta #1 ambush returned, negative contact.	S
0720	6	Fr 1/3: A-1 sqad has just left to provide security for salvage work on AMTRAC.	S Div
0805	7	Fr 1/1: B-1 and B-3 have departed.	S
0809	8	Fr 3/4: In reference to entry 032105 - A patrol was sent to area of contact (YD 908089) found 1 WIA, VC who attempted to throw grenade. VC was KIA - recovered one rifle.	S Div
1050	9	Fr 1/1: B-1 at 0900 took 2 VCS (NID) one (1) man and one (1) boy, drove then to B-1's C.P. near the village of KHOUNG MY # 2. (9169).	S Div
1430	10	Fr 3/4: Village chief of Loc Bon says there are 100 VC located in vic (YD 9207). AO is looking area over. Sees many civilians, looks as if they are digging graves. Hunter-Killer team has been dispatched to check area out.	S, S-2 Div
1530	11	Fr 3/4: Hunter-Killer team checked out (YD 9207) with neg results.	S, S-2 Div
1845	12	Fr 1/1: A 1/1 Sierra (agent report). B. 041735H C. at 840729 D. agent reports that 2 VC Co moved from the above coord along stream and separated. 1 company at AT865707. 1 Company at AT 885697. Co area VO XUAN LAM and LAM QUANG THOUNG. Weapons between both CO are 1 81mm Mortar, 2 60mm Mortars 2 PRC-10's. Co Commanders are requesting local guerrillas to join them. Action taken Arty fired battery 12 rds in each area.	S, Div
2000	13	Fr 1/1: All units, all secure.	S
2015	14	Fr 1/3: Future plans - C Co for period 061800 - 071800 Amb all Sqd size - C-1-A (897745) C-1-B (904754) C-2-A (864760) B-2-B (880764) C-3-A (873773) C-3-B (874777). C Co (-) will conduct a search of 856771. C, A-1, A and B negative contact. B Co - all ambushes are out.	S

050001 Dec 65
(TIME OPENED)

IN	SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0005	1	Fr 1/3	Reports all units neg contact.	S, Div
0200	2	Fr 1/1	I-2 is in night time position.	S, Div
0345	3	Fr 1/1	All quiet.	S
0712	4	Fr 1/1	B-1-1, B-2-3 ambushes have returned neg contact	S
0830	5	Fr 1/1	B-1 patrol has started their sweep.	S
1017	6	Fr 1/3	A Co has completed its search and clear operation	S
			Spot report to follow apparently no significant contact.	S
1055	7	Fr 1/1	D-2 found 1 mine at coord (AT 924693). M-79 rd	S, S-2, DIV
			with head pointing up uncovered with its face covered.	
1228	8	Fr 1/1	D Co reports that of patrol bound 1 booby trap	
			(M-26 w/trip wire at (919690). Engr have already detonated	
			it. No one was hurt. It was found at 1215.	S, Div
1515	9	Fr 1/3	C-1 patrol has returned also B-1 patrol has	
			returned.	S
2015	10	Fr 1/3	All units negative contact.	S
2030	11	Fr 1/1	D Co. cannot get across river to sweep HOI VUC.	
			Must change its mission to sweep GIC TRI (3) instead, (AT	
			888702)	S, Div
2130	12	Fr 1/3	Change Company A's future plans for tomorrow from	
			061000H to 061800H duration to read in para 3.b and	
			3.c. Size 32 men O2, Ontos, O2 Engr, Truck, FO, O1 60mm	
			tube duration 061000H to 061800H. Para 3c. CkPts: #1	
			#2 (861836), #3 (842855), #4 (816855) #5 (802846) #6 (816855)	S, Div
			#7 (861836).	A Co Recon
2230	13	Fr 1/3	SITREP all units negative contact.	S
2350	14	Fr 1/3	Request that the OP on DONG-DEN come up on D-201	
			tomorrow at 0900 to be a relay station for A-3 patrol.	DONG DEN
2359			Journal closed.	

060001 Dec 65
(TIME OPENED)

IN	SER NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0236	1	Fr 1/1: CP security at 060105H received 3 to 4 rounds carbine fire 400 meters SE of Post #1 at (955719). Returned fire with 4 to 5 rounds SA fire, negative casualties.	S-2 Div
0405	2	Fr 1/1: All units report all secure.	S
0605	3	Fr 1/3: A, B, C - negative contact.	S
0807	4	Fr 1/1: D sweep at (890704) has nothing to report at this time.	S
0815	5	Fr 1/1: D Co. found cave at coord (887701). Think people are in it. Requested to use RCA; CO, 1/1 approved its use.	Div S-2
0820	6	Fr 1/3: C-2 patrol has departed.	S
0835	7	Fr 1/1: Co. B used tear gas on the cave but no VC's were found in the cave. A tunnel was found with a dud grenade in it. Engineers destroyed it. There were no men in the village and the interpreters could not get any information from the remaining villagers.	S
0921	8	Fr 1/3: C-2 is at checkpoint #1.	S
1000	9	Fr 1/3: C-2 is at checkpoint #2.	S
1015	10	Fr 1/1: D will complete sweep in about 1 hour, then move to (900670) and establish a patrol base. D-3 found a bear trap at (889704). They are bringing it back with them.	S-2 Div
1515	11	Fr 1/1: At 1330 C-3 had 2 WIA's from a mine vic (AT905710). Med evac completed no VC were spotted. C-3 has searched area with negative results. C-3 picked up buried cord from mine. Cord ran south across river and showed mine was electrically detonated.	S-2 Div
1921	12	Fr 1/3: Spot Report: A 24 Operator B 061840H C. 9963 D. 1/3 spotted 16 small craft congconguated at BY 0182. Spotted 6 boats 9983 moving n. to s. heading towards the 16 boats. Later flashing lights from 1 of the 16 boats towards shore.	S-2 Div
2210	13	Fr 1/1: D Co. sighted 3-5 men vic French Fort Coord 935717. H&S Co. is sending 1 Plat of 25 men to D Co and will patrol area and remain at Fort overnight.	S-2 Div
2215	14	Fr 1/3: A, B, C Negative contact.	S
2359		Journal closed.	

070001 2 Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

IN	SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0005	1	1	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B", "C" report negative contact.	S
0208	2	2	Fr 1/1: All secure negative contact.	S
0400	3	3	Fr 1/1: All secure, negative contact.	S
0405	4	4	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B", "C" report negative contact.	S
0710	5	5	Fr 1/1: All "B" patrols have returned, negative contact.	S
0755	6	6	Fr 1/3: All "C" ambushes have returned.	S
0801	7	7	Fr 1/3: All "B" ambushes have returned.	S
1320	8	8	Fr Shove: 4 VC moving across road at (AT837855) at 07115H. "A" Recon reported VC had packs and light colored panchos. Shove 3 requests what action will be.	S
1724	9	9	Helo resupply reports sighting 10 VC at (AT849849) at 071715H. A-1 ReconBn located at 853849. VC location passed to A-1 Recon.	S
1827	10	10	Fr 1/1: At 1400 to 1600 "C" conducted a SA patrol in village (Than Kuan Loc) (9074). C-5 (Lt MCCLURE) and CY war team showed movies, gave out pamphlets and candy to approximately 300 people, medical team treated approximately 300 persons. Mr. KWA as SAA Chief in charge of about seven villagers was very impressed.	S
2020	11	11	Fr 1/3: A Company negative contact, all ambushes out. B Co reports negative contact.	S
2235	12	12	Fr 1/3: 1/3 OP at 2112H observed flashing light from vicinity AT909789. Answered by flashing light from vicinity 898774.	S
2205	13	13	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B" and "C" report no contact.	S
2400	14	14	Fr 1/1: All units report negative contact.	S
2400	15	15	Journal Closed.	

080001 Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

IN	SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001	:	1	Fr 1/3: All units report negative contact.	S
0056	:	2	Fr 1/3: B-3 will patrol from 1000 to 1400 tomorrow. Squad size Checkpoint #1 (894797), Checkpoint #2 (887794) Checkpoint #3 876789), Checkpoint #4 (890792) Checkpoint #5 (898798).	S
0200	:	3	Fr 1/1: All units report all secure.	S
0635	:	4	Fr 1/3: All units report negative contact.	S
1005	:	5	Fr 1/3: A-2 patrol had departed.	S
1145	:	6	Fr 1/3: A-2 at Checkpoint #2.	S
1200	:	7	Fr 1/3: A-2 at Checkpoint #3.	S
1217	:	8	Fr 1/1: B-3 patrol has returned, negative results.	S
1221	:	9	Fr 1/3: A-2 is at Checkpoint #4.	S
1428	:	10	Fr 1/1: B-3 reports possible river crossing at (905709). Trail looks well used. Stakes along trail east to west in grid square 9070. People seem friendly, all trails in area seem well used.	S
1750	:	11	Fr 1/3: B-2 patrol has returned.	S
1801	:	12	Fr Recon: "D" found four people possible VC hanging by the neck at (AT898680) at 080623H. White tops, black bottoms, straw hats.	S-Div
1809	:	13	Fr Recon: "D" observed 15 men moving about, appear to be doing tactics (902685) time 081730. Wearing black tops, black bottoms and straw hats.	S-Div
1915	:	14	Fr 1/3: Spot report. Village chief of (Quan-Nam) (897815) reports that the night of 1 December, five VC were killed by two rounds of 81mm or H&I while in a tunnel at (857866). Name of two VC as follows: (Dung-An and Dang-Cu), others unknown. Chief suggest that H&I be fired starting at 1600 throughout the night at 851866 and 895850 nightly.	S
2350	:	15	Fr 1/1: All units report all secure.	S
2400	:	16	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B" and "C" report negative contact.	S
2400	:	17	Journal Closed.	

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S-1
3d Marines

090001 Dec 1965

0203	1	Fr 1/1: All units report all secure.	S
0204	2	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B" and "C" report negative contact.	S
0600	3	Fr 1/3: Companies "A", "B" and "C" report negative contact. C-3-C and B-3-A ambushes have returned.	S
0801	4	Fr 1/1: I-1 has left Command Post.	S
0806	5	Fr 1/1: I-1 has reached Checkpoint #1.	S
0807	6	Fr 1/3: Checked out tunnels reported by Kilo Battery. They are bomb shelters.	S
0828	7	Fr 1/1: I-1 is at checkpoint #2.	S
0910	8	Fr 1/1: I-1 has reach checkpoint #4.	S
1755	9	Fr Div G-3: DaNang Special Sector reports one VC Company at (AT870908) and two VC Companies at (AT890875).	1/3 - S
2015	10	Fr Shove: Major RINGLER called to alert us to prepare Division Reserve (Company "D", 1stBn, 3dMarines) to be helilifted to QueSan prior to sunrise tomorrow.	S- 1/3
2045	11	Fr Shove 3: LtCol CUNDIFF called to lay on security. 1/1 to provide convoy security. The platoon will be picked up at Bound Command Post at 100630H. "A" Company will provide.	S - 1/1
2210	12	Fr 1/3: "A", "B" and "C" Companies report all secure.	S
2300	13	Fr Div G-3: Local Indigenous personnel: Information from ARVN source indicated little children will be induced to destroy unattended vehicles at 15,000 piastres each, with smaller bounty for weapons and other items. Also oldsters and children will be asked to direct terrorism acts against military personnel. For example, they will take a break in front of a billeting area and leave explosives behind. Within the next 48 hours in DaNang, and surrounding area, reason is step up terrorist activities.	All units
2400	14	Journal Closed.	

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3d Marines

100001 Dec 1965

0020	1	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : "A", "B" and "C" Companies report negative contact.	S
0405	2	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : All units reports negative contact.	S.
0720	3	<u>Fr 1/1</u> : A-3 platoon picked up in two M-35's for convoy security duty. One M-35 ran off road, personnel injured, no further word at this time.	S-Div
0745	4	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : Company "C" 0658 blocking for in position 0701 started encirclement of village.	S
0755	5	<u>Fr 1/1</u> : In truck accident, there was one dead and two hurt.	S-Div
0900	6	<u>Fr 3/4</u> : Gia platoon in conjunction with an ARVN company are searching area around Huong Thuy District Headquarters. Crater analysis team is accompanying and operation is controlled by 3/4. Last night's attack was 32 rounds in lieu of 40. One round landed in civilian housing area and rice paddies. One civilian WIA at this time. 3/4 has a company sized operation southwest of this area tonight.	S
1000	7	<u>Fr 3/4</u> : Spot report, while mortar attack wound going on, VC set up a road block, consisting of one mine, three saw horses, two five gallon cans and straw spread throughout it. The road block was approximately sixty feet long. Popular Forces cleared the road block.	S
1815	8	<u>Fr 1/1</u> : Information recieved that a VC company is located at (YD7909). Have artillery fire being placed on that position.	S
1850	9	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : All "C" Company ambushes have departed.	S
2045	10	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : "B" Company ambushes changed from (AT917801) to (AT943823).	S
2212	11	<u>Fr 1/3</u> : "A", "B" and "C" Companies report no contact.	S
2400	12	Journal Closed.	

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S-2
3d Marines

110001 Dec 1965

110001 Dec 1965

0325	1	Fr 3/4: MCompany at 0150 had contact with two VC at coord (YD78714). Fired illumination and had more contact at 0253. Thus far M Company has five VC KIA, one VC WIA and two VC POW's. Contact still going on, have one Marine WIA, will not need medical evacuation.	S-Div
0455	2	Fr 3/4: At 110150 2nd Platoon M Company made contact with unknown number of VC at (792150). After initial contact second platoon moved against VC using small arms and grenades and fired five rounds of 60mm mortar as blocking force action resulted in one USMC WIA (Minor), 3 VC KIA 3 VCC captured and one automatic weapon and five semi-automatic weapons. VCC indicated there were 9 VC in area.	S-2 Div
0745	3	Fr 1/3: "C" Company reports all ambushes returned.	S
0810	4	Fr 1/3: "A" Company reports all ambushes returned.	S
1130	5	Fr 3/4: One VCS captured last night had begun to talk. He stated that he was from a local guerrilla unit and the others were hard core tropps. He said there were eight men in his unit.	S
1300	6	Fr 3/4: "Operation Tucker Bag" is completed. Searched area thoroughly with negative results.	S
1845	7	Fr 1/1: B-3 completed search of AnHon(1). Found two bear traps at coordinates 902805), no nales of military age. Treated ten civilians. No booby traps. Negative contact.	S
1900	8	Fr 1/3: C-1 ambushes has departed.	S
2035	9	Fr 1/3: A Company Operation Post observed a pattern of flashing lights for part of 45 minutes. There hasn't been any of this activity for quite a while. String of five lights at 925823. Middle one flashing.	S
2215	10	Fr 1/3: C-2-B ambush on way to position, spotted five VC with rifles at 893775. Fired approximately 300 rounds of M-14 and six rounds M-79. No enemy fire was returned. VC withdrew in southerly direction. Wearing brown uniforms and wearing berets. No known casualties. Checked area with negative results.	S-2 Div
2400	11	Journal Closed.	

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S-1
3d Marines

121800H Dec 65

0001		Journal Opened	
0205	1	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact	S
0403	2	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact	S
0809	3	Fr 1/3: All C ambushes are in	S
1158	4	Fr Div: Have 1 rifle CO ready to be picked up by truck at a point designated by 3d Marines. Have at least one days supply and basic load. Call div where and when to be picked up.	S
1350	5	Fr 1/1: At 1305 BCo reported 1 VC came over a hill at 919690 and fired 25 rds bursts and threw one grenade at a BCo killing PFC R. C. BRIX 2032885 and getting away with two M-14 rifles. The second man in the OP was about fifty meters away making a head call. BCo immediately commanded a thorough search of the area.	S, Div
1820	6	Fr S-2: "B" 1/1 completed sweep and picked up 8 women, 5 men and 1 gril. Tehy are presently located at Seirra. They suspect that one (1) of the women is the wife of the VC who affected the KIA today. Interrogation contunues at Sierra. More info will follow. They were picked up in vic of KHUONG MY- 2. The women was at 910690.	S
2100	7	Fr 1/3; A,B,C negative contact	S
2210	8	Fr 1/3: A,B,C all secure. negative cpntact	S
2353	9	Fr 1/1: I,B,C all secure negative contact	S
2359	10	Journal Closed	

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S-1
3d Marines

131800H Dec 1965

0001		Journal Opened	
0308	2	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact	S, Div
0730	2	Fr 1/3: All C ambushes are in.	S
0815	3	Fr 1/3: All ambushes have returned.	S
1030	4	Fr 1/1: At 131010H at (AT920692) C6B sighted suspicious personnel. Squad pursued these people and are running in village of TUYLOAN. Man ran and was shot after he was told to halt and after several warning shots had been fired over his head. Man is severely wounded and was taken to HIEU-DUC District Headquarters.	S, Div
1245	5	Fr 1/3: Received 2 rds carbine fire, from (923762). E. fired 200 rds small arms fire in direction which fire came. VC fire ceased. No of VC unk.	S, Div
1250	6	Fr 1/1: B-6 belw a small cave at 131240H (929697) cave was rein with bambos. A hut 20 meters away caught fire for the explosion and burned down. Cave was a 3 or 4 man size.	S
1600	7	Fr 1/1: B-1 returned at 1540 at (894684) at 1816 cardboard sign was found with Viet. words saying KEEP AWAY MINES and PUNJI STICKS. Area was checked out and no mines or punji sticks found. (896685) patrol apprehended 2 women. One was married to a VC she had a letter from him on her. The other woman was VCS. (895682) 5 VCS spotted patrol and ran north up trails through brush. VCS had no wps. Patrol persued by fire and gave chase. Searched area negative results at DONG BINCH # 2 (903684) 2 men ran when patrol spotted them. They ran north into dense vegetation. Patrol fired on them. Negative results. 1 woman was apprehended in DONG BINCH # 2. The six men VCS had 3 women VCS are at Seirra being questioned by district chief. No friendly KIA or WIA, no known enemy KIA or WIA.	S
1805	8	Fr 1/3: All A ambushes have departed	S
1913:	9	Fr 1/3: A-C-2 131735 (919755) D fire team checking out area that small arms fire believed to have come from as reported on (Spot report #15-131215) Discovered freshly dug holes approx. 1 ft deep with large rocks placed along ised. Patol leader said this could be new mortar base plate position. Area search thoughly no other evidence found except old path into area. No overhead canopy at this position; only tall grass. Patrol will check position tonight. C patrol returned to PB at 911763.	S, S-2
2015	10	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
2250	11	Fr Shove 3: Based on earlier info from Bound on possible attack on Hill 22 and 41. Shove has placed an AO on station all night. In addition 2 platoons from Marble Mt. have been alerted to act as blocking force in case of an attack.	S
2359	1	Journal Closed	

141800H Dec 1965

0001		Journal Opened	
0015	1	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
0210	2	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
0350	3	Fr 1/3: A-2 patrol moving from check point #3 to #4 picked up two VCS, 1 male and 1 female at coord 920828.	S, Div
0400	4	Fr 1/3: A-B negative contact.	S
0720	5	Fr 1/3: A-C ambushes are in.	S
0815	6	Fr 1/3: All "B" ambushes are in.	S
1045	7	Fr 1/3: C-2 (896735) moving up a drwa when 8 water buffalo charged their point. Patrol killed the 8 water buffalo. Patrol continued on mission. Investigating officer will investigate the matter and full report will follow.	S
1200	8	Fr 1/1: B-1 has departed, B-2 has returned, negative contact	S
1655	9	Fr 1/3: A Co as of 141630 squad OP of Co. size size has returned A-2 search patrol has captured 12 VCS who are being screened.	S
1700	10	Fr 1/3: C-A-2 and C-2-B ambushes have departed.	S
1921	11	Fr 1/1: ICo 1st Plt B patrol at 141845H (AT939679) Point I-B patrol was fired on by one VC. VC fired 10 rds, returned 15 rds small arms fire. One tracer hit the VC saw VC fall. As patrol moved towards VC he ran into tree line. Pursued VC VC fired one more round. VC last seen moving towards Sierra.	S, S-2
1951	12	Fr 1/3: A-C Cp time: 141900 Location: 871761. Some caves were new, some old. Some were recently lived in. Bits of clothing were also found. No one was in the area. There were approx 15 caves.	S
2015	13	Fr 1/3: A-C-B negative contact. Burke A, all ambushes are in.	S
2200	14	Fr 1/3: Burke A-B-C negative contact.	S
2359	15	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
2359		Journal Closed	

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3d Marines

151800H Dec 1965

0001 Journal Opened

0145 1 Fr 3/4: CAC-3 made contact. 2 known possible groups of 10 S, Div
VC moving down trail carrying supplies (YD906109) Fired blocking
forces at (905105) and (905099) received incoming grenade I
Btry 6 rds each coord. Got 2 bags of rice. CAC fired 200
M-14 rds 2 M-79 rds. CAC still in position.

0155 2 Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact. S

0815 3 Fr S-2: 3/4 150050: 3dPlt CAC made contact with unk no of VC S
at YD906109. Moving south, carrying rice, found 2 bags of rice
search this morning 2 more bags. At 0250 recon made contact
with 7 VC at YD86127. Searched area at 1st Light found
foot prints. Requested arty at 794125.

1225 4 Fr 3/4: A night patrol from 3dPlatoon CAC consisting of 14 S, Div
Marines and SVietnamese (PFs) at 150115H at YD906109 Made
contact with at least two VC. The patrol fired SA at the VC
who were carrying bags of rice. The VC dropped the rice, threw
a grenade at the patrol and fled to the Northeast. The patrol
pursued but could not reestablish contact. Blocking arty
fires were called in. A search of the area by the patrol
at 1st light netted only the two bags of rice (120 lbs) No
casualties were reported on either side.

2013 5 Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact. S

2020 6 Fr 1/1: Sending 20 man patrol to try to make contact with S
estimated 20 VC and check area where arty fired. Movement
was picked up on a TPS-21 moving 400 meters south of Hill
41.

2020 7 Fr 1/1: At 2005 recieved call that some VC were trying to S
penetrate defense of bridge. Some rds were fired by AICVN.
All is quiet now.

2055 8 Fr 1/1: ACo received 4 or 5 rds small arms fire northeast of S, Div,S-2
bridge sight (747700). VC tyred to penetrate PF line at
948803. Returned approx 10 rds SA fire. No friendly causties
All secure at this time.

2212 9 Fr S-2: A,3/4 CAC-3 B. 152120 C. YD 908101 D. VC attempted to S
ambush CAC-3 while on patrol. Patrol was moving south. E.
VC opened fire and Marines returned fire. Number of MC and
9USMC rds fired unk at this tiem. Atry blocking fire was
placed at YD 895095; 4 rds HE, 105 at each coord. VC
scattered in all directions. Area will be checked at first
light. F-N None

2359 Journal Closed

160001 Dec 65

0405	1	Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact.	S
0600	2	Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact.	S
0605	3	Fr 1/3: B-1 patrol has returned. Negative contact.	S
0925	4	Fr 1/1: I patrol searched area south of hill 41 found 1 straw hut with a hole in it. It looked like it got hit with fragments. No blood was found, marks were found made of sticks and stones pointing up the hill. Also found footprints some of them bare footed.	S
1431	5	Fr 1/3: B-A commenced search of PHO NAM at 1230 from west to east. Search completed, found some food & rice they were destroyed. Found two tunnels which were also destroyed at Coord 857855.	S
1435	6	Fr Shove 3: Set road Condition B essential Admin Vehicle only. CO must auth dispatch. No track vehicle traffic except for tactical employment.	1/3, 1/1 S-S-1/2/4 Tanks, AT's
1850	7	Fr 1/3: C-1-A, C-1-B ambushes have left.	S
1900	8	Fr 1/3: C-2-B ambush is out. C-2-B patrol has departed.	S
1915	9	Fr 1/3: Searched approx 35 huts, numerous small tunnels were found in and around huts. Five caves were destroyed with demolition. 25 lbs of B used on one cave, Reinforced with rocks and sheet metal approx 10 ft in diameter. Destroyed several boxes of food. The material found has been taken via truck to "a" position.	S
1947	10	Fr 1/3: All B ambushes are out. B-3 patrol has left.	S
2102	11	Fr 1/3: A Co SITREP no change.	S
2207	12	Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact.	S
2355	13	Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact.	S
2359		Journal Closed.	

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S-1
3d Marines

170001 Dec 65

0400	1	Fr 1/3: A, B, C neg contact.	S
0612	2	Fr 1/1: All Secure.	S
0805	3	Fr 1/3: A will have 2 patrols, 1 to search objective A and 1 to search objective C. Est time of departure 0800 back by 1300.	S
1130	4	Fr 1/3: Found a bunker at 855856, 5ft high 5ft wide 4ft long. Entrance was 3x3. Reinforced with logs and dirt. Engineers estimated it could withstand 1 HE light round. Destroyed bunker with two 1/2 lb charges of C-4. Secondary explosion followed initial burst. The smoke was black grayish white. Force was equal to primary charge. Two engineers were injured, 1 minor, one possible broken knee cap. Evacuated to "A" CP. Both men were from Ax handle. SerNo. and first initial of man with possible broken knee cap. B. 1877817. A-1 patrol found classroom at 855855. Instructed patrol to pick up any material and destroy classroom.	
1213	5	Fr Bound Sierra: There will be one RF squad ambush from 1900 to 2400 17 Dec. (943679)	S
1315	6	Fr 1/1: 18 man patrol in two others is proceeding to vic HAI CHUA (AT9362) to check on an intelligence report of enemy activity in that area. H&I fires are being planned for that area after the patrol returns.	S, Div
1720	7	Fr 1/1: The patrol that went out from I Co to GS 9362 is back; they did not find any VC or grenades, the CIF said there had not been any new grave dug in that GS. However in GS 9461 at coord 940618 there is wood line the Civ said the VC told them to stay out of wood line. They said there was no VC now but had been there about 10 days ago and moved south.	S
1820	8	Fr 1/1: B Co changes to positions LP 1-1 (923685) LP 1-2 (924683) LP 1-3 (926686) LP 2-1 (919691) LP 2-2 (923689) LP 2-3 (926686) LP 3-1 (958706) LP 3-2 (917703) LP 3-3 (922704)	S
1834	9	Fr 1/3: All C ambushes are out.	S
2105	10	Fr 1/4: NAM HOA sub sector is being hit by mortar. Red'd 4 81mm mortars. At (YD76123) which fell 700 meters short. No casualties.	S, Div
2110	11	Fr 1/3: A. A-3 1/3 B. 172120 C AT 892818, Fdy AT892818 D 3 VC jumped in front of scout E Marine opened fire.	S, Div
2359		Journal Closed.	

STAFF JOURNAL

S-1
3d Marines

, 180001 Dec 65

0001	1	Fr 1/3: C-2-A at Ckpt #3.	S
0905	2	Fr 3/4: One 6X6 truck from 4/12 hit a mine believed to be pressure type of 1 to 10 lbs of explosive causing crater 3' Dia and 3' deep, no measurable casualties	S
1015	3	Fr 1/3: C patrol at Ckpt #3. 1005. B-A-2 negative contact. 1015.	S
1245	4	Fr 3/4: Found a Anti-Tank mine 50ft away from the one they found yesterday. US AT mine with 10lbs of CHI-CON TNT set off by pressure. Picked up 181200 it has been placed for 2 months. Found at YD819179.	S
1700	5	Fr 3/4: 1st Platoon, M Co 3/4 discovered foot prints of people at 181545H at coord 844074, foot prints were discovered while M-1 was on a local patrol of Hill 225, many arty H&I's will be fired in area of foot prints and trail they were near.	S
1800	6	C patrol negative contact.	S
1830	7	Fr 1/3: All Co C ambushes are out.	S
1925	8	Fr 1/1: Initial report I patrol moving to ambush at LA Chau bridge, hit a mine at (AT943674) and had 3 Casualties. No further details will follow w/complete report.	S-Div
2035	9	Fr 1/1: A, I Co, 3d Plt B, 181935H Coord (AT943677) a patrol leader of a reinforced squad tripped a mine. Mine went off and wounded four men. Men were evacuated. A fifth man was slightly wounded, he stayed with the patrol. The Patrol secured an LK for evacuation of wounded and searched area locating 5 more mines. The ambush sight will be changed, but moved to a position where it will serve same purpose. More info will follow.	S-Div
2145	10	Fr 1/1: B rear LBP-1 at coord 939718, sighted 12 possible VC at 928717. Fired 2 M-70's and 8-10 rds SA fire. LP-2 at 923378 sighted 2 VC at 933717, fired 10 rds SA fire. Received 1 incoming round. No FDY casualties, no confirmed VC casualties. LP is checking area. All quiet now.	S-Div-S-2
2211	11	Fr 3/4: CAC-1 fired on 2 boats 100 meters from their position. PF's challenged boats but no answer. CAC-1 fired 30 rds SA fire. Boats too far in rice paddies to check out. Fired illum but couldn't see anybody.	S-Div-S-2
2322	12	Fr 3/4: CAC-3 fired 150 rds SA fire at 3-5 VC. VC didn't return fire. 2 rds 105mm illum fired while searching area of contact. Negative results E. Continued on patrol.	S-Div-S-2
2359		Journal closed.	

STAFF JOURNAL

S-1
3d Marines

190001H Dec 1965

(7100 0110)

0001		Journal Opened	
0105	1	Fr 3/4: A 3/4 CAG-3 spotted 2 VC moving east along RR tracks. Marines opened fire and fired 6 small arms rds. VC fired 10 small arms fire.	S, S-2, Div
0907	2	Fr 1/3: All of ACe has returned from Operation.	S
1115	3	Fr 1/1: Beeby traps found last night were located at (AT943678). 4 grenades used with trip wired. One was exploded last night that injured the man and one was a dud. 2 were located by Engr and Destroyed.	S
1205	4	Fr 1/1: B-2 patrol has returned. Captured 1 male VCS at coord 900684.	S
1847	5	Fr 1/3: C-1-A, C-1-B ambushed have departed.	S
1915	6	Fr 1/3: C-2B, C-3-B patrols have departed.	S
1930	7	Fr 3/4: A. L-2 B. 191820H C. YD805175 D. PF's reported 20 VC in area. E. L-2 positioned 1000 meters away was ordered to make contact, with VC. L-2 moved into area but failed to make contact due to darkness L-2 continuing search of area which populated. F-N None.	S, S-2
1940	8	Fr 1/3: C-3-B patrol at ckpt #1.	S
2001	9	Fr 1/3: B ambushed and patrols have departed.	S
2005	10	Fr 1/3: A,B,C, negative contact. All A ambushes in position.	S
2030	11	Fr 1/3: C-3-B patrol at ckpt #1.	S
2100	12	Fr 2/3: C-3-B patrol at ckpt #3.	S
2200	13	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
2250	14	Fr 1/3: C-3-B ckpt #4.	S
2330	15	Fr 1/3: C-3-B at ckpt #5.	S
2359	16	Journal Closed	

201800H Dec 1965

(TIME OPENED)

TIME	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGE, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0120	1	Fr 1/1: C-3 and I-1 ambushes are back.	S
0205	2	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	S
0400	3	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	S
0715	4	Fr 1/3: C ambushes are in.	S
0717	5	Fr 1/1: All B ambushes are in. Negative contact.	S
0726	6	Fr 1/1: All I and C ambushes returned, negative contact.	S
0747	7	Fr 1/3: B-3-A has returned.	S
0825	8	Fr 1/3: All ACe ambushes are in.	S
1021	9	Fr S-2: 3dPlt Recon B, 200900 C, AF930639 D. 25 people moving south along side of hill at above coord. They are wearing a mixture of black and white P.J.'s Baskets and hees.	S
1052	10	Fr 1/1: I-3 recieved fire from estimated 10-15 VC at coords 920603 and 201025H. SA fire returned and arty requested. VC broke contact shortly afterwards. 1 friendly WIA, 1VC WIA	S, Div
1055	11	Fr S-2: Recon D-3: 1 man walking on trail at (831720) wearing green utilities and beets. Possibility of pack on back. 201020H	S
1120	12	Fr 1/1: B-2 has returned. The patrol destroyed a beebie trap and ped gate at (AT903705).	S
1207	13	Fr 1/1: B-1 patrol has returned at 1130. Coord (915687) picked up 1 man with out ID card brought back for questions.	S
1214	14	Fr 1/1: I patrol made contact again in the same vic are now in fire fight. As seen as we can get more details we will send them.	S, S-2, Div
1315	15	Fr 1/1: AN-MY-1 and AN-MY-3 found nothing of significance found VC flags. Found 4 women who are considered VCS who will be turned over to HIEU#DUC Hdqts.	S, Div
1414	16	Fr 1/1: I-1 is at ckpt#8. I-1 is returning with 4 females and 5 children picked up in area of fire fight. Picked up 9 adult males, 1000 meters north of AN-MY-3. VCS are going to be taken to Sierra at 201400H.	S, S-2, Div
1730	17	Fr 1/1: DCe., 2dplt has been helo lifted to D CP. D-6 is coming back by truck convey, escort for LSA D-3 will come back by helo. Beth 2d and 3d plt will stay in DA NANG tonight.	S
1847	18	Fr 1/3: C-3-B, C-1-A ambush have departed.	S
1905	19	Fr 1/3: B-1 and all ambushed are out.	S
1955	20	Fr 1/1: C will have ambush at (904717) from 1900 to first light.	S
2009	21	Fr 1/1: All BCe patrols have departed.	S
2155	22	Fr 1/1: All companies are secure	S
2205	23	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact.	S
2359	24	Journal Closed	

SCAFF JOURNAL

S-1
3d Marines211800H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

TIME	NO.	INCIDENT, MESSAGE, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0208	1	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	: S
0405	2	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	: S
0535	3	Fr 1/3: C-1-B is back negative contact.	: S
0745	4	Fr 1/3: B ambushes are set in.	: S
0825	5	Fr 1/3: C-3 has departed.	: S
0832	6	Fr 1/3: B-3 has departed.	: S
1912	7	Fr 1/3: A-1 patrol has split up into 3 groups sq size each. A-1 moving to ckpt #1. A-1-B moving to ckpt #3. A-1-C moving to ckpt #2.	: S
0933	8	Fr Recon: D-2 1 VC KIA. No friendly KIA, VC was approaching out point leading east, 103 rifle, letters and documents. Request instructions. Have established hasty defense. (832659) VC KIA.	: S
0943	9	Fr 1/3: B-3 at ckpt #1.	: S
1005	10	Fr 1/3: B-3 at ckpt #2.	: S
1113	11	Fr 1/3: B-3 at ckpt #3.	: S
1500	12	Fr 1/3: BCe landed in LZ and started sweep.	: S
1516	13	Fr 1/3: C-2 returned at 1400. C-3 has returned at 1515.	: S
1605	14	Fr Shove 3: Frost Call: Set condition normal for all roads.	: S, S-1, 2/4, 1/1
1630	15	Fr 1/1: F-2 patrol for 230730 to 231730 (929643)(924627)(919613)(918602)(927609)(936633)	: 1/3, 3/4, Tk, AT's
1745	16	Fr 3/4: M-2 will have ambush in G.S.9109.	: S
1847	17	Fr 1/3: C-3-B, C-1-A ambush have departed.	: S
1905	18	Fr 1/3: B-1 and all ambushes are out.	: S
1955	19	Fr 1/1: C will have ambush at (904717) from 1900 to first light.	: S
2009	20	Fr 1/1: All B Co patrols have departed.	: S
2155	21	Fr 1/1: All companies are secure.	: S
2205	22	Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact.	: S
2359	23	Journal Closed	

230001H Dec 1965
(TIME OFF) (D)

TIME	NO.	DESCRIPTION, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0015	1	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	S
0110	2	Fr 1/3: Two Marines Med Evac from AT 903833 at 240045H from gunshot wound. Men were from CoA 1/3. No details at this time as to whether this was from friendly or enemy action.	S
0230	3	Fr 1/3: ACo at 240025 in vic 904833 Patrol was moving on a trail made by LVT's. Had just cleared a trap that was marked with the usual 3 markers. Patrol leader was direction he relocating himself and was moving in a S.W. direction he saw movement off to his right and fired one rd into bushes. He then received 3 rds. small arms fire. Leader heard his 2 men cry out. 1 was shot in the back coming out through the chest. The other was shot in left side of back coming out at the waist. Patrol was in column formation and didn't return fire. E Med Evac. F None G-2 H-N None.	S, Div, S-2
0600	4	Fr 1/3: Neg SIT RESP all units. C-3-B has returned.	S
0742	5	Fr 1/3: All B,C patrols and ambushes are in.	S
0935	6	Fr 1/1: "AR 2/1 at 240900H in vic (YD772078) 5 VC by trail 155s fired two rounds WP 18 rds HE (Fuse VT) and 12 rds HE (Fuse Delay).	S
1121	7	Fr 1/1: C-2 at 885715 all secure have received SA fire from vic of (HOI VOC) between 0800 and 1000 this morning.	S, Div
1248	8	Fr 1/3: B will have PF on an ambush at (932814) from 241900H to 250700H.	S
1614	9	Fr 1/1: 6 marines from CoC 1/1 WIA from booby trap at (AT898711) Medevac in progress at this time. Time of incident was 241608H. 4 marines were stracher cases and two were walking wounded.	S, S-2, Div
1651	10	Fr 1/1: The patrol was moving along a trail and the point man tripped a booby trap that was placed in a tree trunk along side the trail. The blast was a large one estimated at four pounds TNT.	Div
1830	11	Fr 1/3: At 1820 DCo requested a fire mission at 872709 the request went to the Btry and they fired 2 WP 105 H rds, in the mean time DCo was firing 81mm. results unknown.	S
1935	12	Fr 1/1: DCo was returning to friendly lines and the lead platoon was at 874711 when at 1820H they received intensive small arms fire from 872709 of at least 40 rds or small arms rds on the area. They also returned 60mm mortar and organic rifle company small arms on the area of the firing. No casualties were reported.	S, Div
2001	13	Fr 1/3: ABC, Negative contact. C,B patrol and ambushes have departed.	S
2130	14	Fr 2/1: At 1720H A CAC patrol spotted a mighty mite driving south on Hwy #1. Reported same and it was discovered this was a mite that had been turned into FLSU earlier in the day by 2/1.	S
2145	15	Fr 1/3: A5 2140 vehicle No 234466 going south across NAM-0 bridge on Kube #1. Vehicle was taken from LSU by a Sgt. As vehicle passed south end of bridge driver fired one shot at ARVN. The driver was very drunk according to ARVN.	S
2214	16	Fr Div: Do not respond to miner provocations or harrassment as long as they do not pose a threat to security.	1/1, 1/3, 2/1
2359		Journal Closed	

STAFF JOURNAL

S-1
3d Marines

240001H Dec 1965

(TIME OPENED)

TIME	NO.	INCIDENT, MESSAGE, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0020	1	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	S
0210	2	Fr 1/3: Negative contact all units.	S
0410	3	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact C-1-B ambush is back.	S
0500	4	Fr 1/3: C-1-A has returned.	S
0530	5	Fr 1/3: C-3 has returned.	S
0545	6	Fr 1/3: C-2-B has returned.	S
0626	7	Fr 1/3: C-3-A has returned.	S
0635	8	Fr 1/3: C-2-A has returned.	S
0840	9	Fr 1/1: Delta Co lift, helo's receiving small arms fire from coord 872707. Estimated to be 3-4 VC - Marines returned fire, 1 weapon blew up in Marines hand - Evac on helo	S, S-2, Div
0900	10	Fr 1/1: DCo has completed its lift.	S
0949	11	Fr 1/3: A will have an ambush at (898828) to night.	S
1019	12	Fr Recon: C at 0945 2 VC moving south vic of ckpt#19 (855599) 1 auto-weapon.	S
1041	13	Fr 3/4: At 242030 E-2 ambush at (818179) received 1 grenade from 2 VC. Ambush opened fire, results found cartridge belt, knapsack, with blood on it.	S
1150	14	Fr 3/4: 242030 a 4 man security patrol 3 marines and 1 PF encountered 2 VC in the vic of (814179) Point saw 1 man in bush at side of trail about five feet away. VC threw a frag grenade and patrol hit the deck. Another patrol member saw VC about 10 ft away. Patrol fired at both VC. VC threw 1 more grenade. Patrol regrouped and returned to the rally point. The PF could not be found at 250730H. Plat Co. returned to scene of incident with patrol members. 2d plt PHUG interepeted 2 women from house near scene of contact and revealed the following soon after the shooting. 2 VC wounded came in the hours.e lman died and the other carried him off during the night. A search of the house was made and the following was found. Must blood, a map, note book, papers pack, cartidge belt, 1 mans sandel, and 1 U.S. frag grenade. 2dPlt PHUG to the 2 women to district HQ. The captured material has been turned over to Bearmat -2. Lost PF turned up in early morning at Base Camp with punji stick wounds in leg. 2 marines received very light scratches and were treated by Plt compman.	S
1855	15	Fr 1/3: CCo's patrols and ambushes have all departed.	S
1955	16	Fr 1/3: B all patrols are out.	S
2025	17	Fr 1/3: A all patrols and ambushes are out. Co's A,B and C negative contact ckpt #2.	S
2221	18	Fr 1/1: All secure.	S
2359		Journal Closed	

SEMP JOURNAL

3-1
3d Marines250001H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001	Journal Opened	
0120	1 Fr 1/3: B 1/3/ in the vic 916828 patrol 3 observed six insecure shaped boats moving north east 100 meters in front of its position. Patrol leader challenged boats in english 6 times and 6 times in Vietnamese. The 7 or 8 occupants did not halt, turned boats over and scattered and swam in the general direction of Northeast. The patrol illum w/2 land held illum and opened fire w/M-14 and one M-60 and one M-79 in direction of boats. A search was made of area of activity w/negative results. No boats on discovered subsequent to the above incident. Shortly after the patrol observed a light in area and moved to investigate. An undetermined number of persons ran off. No fire was delivered. Personnel ashore area 916828 and moved in unknown direction. Patrol searched area. Time of first engagement was 2138 lasted about four minutes. (Ashore 200 to 2220.) Upon receipt of first incident the Company was directed to comply with current order and not fire unless security was threatened.	S, S-2, Div
0525	2 Fr 1/3: C-3-A has returned.	S
0925	3 Fr Div 3: Resume normal operations.	1/1, 1/3, 2/1
1210	4 Fr 1/1: The Engr team that makes a sweep of road reported at 1230 that at 0900 this morning the heard 2 rifle shots, they hit the deck while there trying to find out where the shots came from a small boy came up and said there is 25 VC in trees 1200 meters north of here. The engr team was at coord 943675. The boy said they had rifles. The Engr team started their sweep again, a ARVN troop came down the road and said there were 25 VC in trees. F Co 1/1 is sending a platoon patrol out there to check it out.	Div
1240	5 Fr 1/1: Specific action patrol has departed designated area hidden to coord 942677. Possible VC there.	S, S-2
1330	6 Fr 1/1: F-3-A patrol swept G-L 68 to GL 67, 300 meters on west side of road. Patrol now at road junction picked up 3 Vietnamese (wounded) coming from north direction from LA CHAU #2.	S, Div
1346	7 Fr 1/1: B-1 has returned negative contact very few people in village of Dong - Bich #1.	S
1458	8 Fr 1/1: B-3 has returned at 1445 at (904708) found home made trap (will send) at (906708) found a sniper nest made out of Bamboo 10 feet from bank of river.	S, S-2
1510	9 Frost Call road condition normal.	All units.
1529	10 Fr 1/1: F-3-A has returned negative contact. Villagers said that there were 15 VC in the village 3 days ago with rifles. No VCS picked up by patrol.	S
1910	11 Fr 1/3: C-3-A and C-1-A have departed.	S-3
1955	12 Fr 1/1: B-1 received 30 to 40 rds of SA fire on the position at (927684) from somewhere about 250-400 meters south of their position. Returned four rds SA fire. They were unable to get a fix on the exact area the fire came from.	S-3, Div, G-3
2029	13 Fr 1/3: C-3-A is at ckpt #3.	S-3
2121	14 Fr 1/3: Negative contact, all units.	S-3
2240	15 Fr 1/3: All units negative contact.	S-3
2319	16 Fr 2/1: CAC patrol 3 received 20 rounds fire from 2 VC w auto weapons at (910100) at 2220 patrol returned fire, contact lost patrol swept area negative results. Hours burnign in area were fire came from, patrol put out fire. no friendly CAS no known VC Cas.	S-3, G-3
2359	17 Journal Closed	

SUPPORT JOURNAL

3d Marine

260001H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

TIME	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0005	1	Fr 1/3: Nam O Bridge at 262335H at coord 929840, E-923839 Tanks noticed 2 saucer shaped boat by small island moving west with 2 men in each boat. Tanks called Sgt Price for instructions. Sgt Price then observed the boats being moved around by Vietnamese Civilians without any one in them with the apparent attempt to cancel boats He gave orders to fire waring shots if boats reappeared. Engagement lasted 3 min. Fired 10 rds of machine gun fire.	S-2, G-3
0010	2	Fr 1/1: Firing going at Bridge (AT 9469) over MSR. PF's reports 10-15 VC in village just to south of bridge who are squad of VC. PF's fell back to bridge. Bridge is all quiet now. Being illuminated with Arty now. Squad at Bridge has not fired around. Will report any further detail.	S-3, G-3
0315	3	Fr 1/3: A-2 at ckpt #4, C-3-A at ckpt #6.	S-3
0410	4	Fr 1/3: A,B,C negative contact. C-3-A at ckpt #7.	S-3
0435	5	Fr 1/3: Patrol C-3-A at ckpt #8 and returning.	S-3
0610	6	Fr 1/3: Negative contact. All C ambushes and patrols are in.	S-3
1034	7	Fr Recon: 19 woodcutters doing much work appear to be working around 878679 wearing black clothing 271000H.	S-3
1043	8	Fr 1/1: CoB at 270840H at coord 913692 picked up one VCS this VCS has been turned over to Sierra for interrogation. B-6 was just told that the VCS is a different VC. Sierra states that the VC is the political administrator for HUA THUONG.	S-3, Div, G-3
1050	9	Fr 1/1: F-2-A at 932633 negative contact. civilians at bridge #9 said that bridge at 947699 was attacked last night by VC. No VC in area.	S-3
1645	10	Fr 2/1: E-2 fired upon 2 VC at 270100H at (YD818178). Intelligence report indicates 1 VC wounded. A search of the area immediately following the incident had revealed negative results.	S-3, G-3
1910	11	Fr 1/3: C-3-A and C-1-A have departed.	S-3
1955	12	Fr 1/1: B-1 received 30 to 40 rds of SA fire on the position at (927684) from somewhere about 250-400 meters south of their position. Returned four rds SA fire. They were unable to get a fix on the exact area the fire came from.	S-3, Div, G-3
2029	13	Fr 1/3: C-3-A is at ckpt #3.	S-3
2121	14	Fr 1/3: Negative contact, all units.	S-3
2240	15	Fr 1/3: All units negative contact.	S-3
2319	16	Fr 2/1: CAC patrol 3 received 20 rds fire from 2 VC w/auto weapons at (910100) at 2220 patrol returned fire, contact lost patrol swept area negative results. House burning in area were fire came from, patrol put out fire. No friendly CAS no known VC cas.	S-3, G-3
2359		Journal Closed	

270001H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

ON	SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001			Journal Opened	
0005	1		Fr 1/3: Nam O Bridge at 262335H at coord 929840, E-923839. Tanks noticed 2 saucer shaped boat by small island moving west with 2 men in each boat. Tanks called Sgt Price for instructions. Sgt Price then observed the boats being moved around by Vietnamese Civilians without any one in them with the apparent attempt to conceal boats. He gave orders to fire waring shots if boats reappeared. Engagement lasted 3 min. Fired 10 rds of machine gun fire. PF's reports 10-15 VC in village just to south of bridge who are firing on the PF's fell back to bridge. Bridge is all quiet now. Being illuminated with Arty now. Squad at Bridge has not fired a round. Will report any further detail.	S-2, G-3
0315	2		Fr 1/3: A-2 at ckpt # 4. C-3-A at ckpt # 6.	S-3
0410	3		Fr 1/3: A, B, C negative contact. C-3-A at ckpt # 7.	S-3
0435	4		Fr 1/3: Patrol C-3-A at ckpt #8 and returning.	S-3
0610	5		Fr 1/3: Negative contact. All C ambushes and patrols are in	S-3
1034	6		Fr Kecon: 19 woodcutters doing much work appear to be wondering around 878679 wearing black clothing 271000H.	S-3
1043	7		Fr 1/1: Co"B" at 270840H at coord 913692 picked up one VCS this VCS has been turned over to Sierra for interogation. B-6 was just told that the VCS is a different VC. Serra states that the VC is the political administrator for HUA THUONG Village.	S-3, Div, G-3
1050	8		Fr 1/1: F-2-A at 932633 negative contact. Civilians at bridge #9 said that Bridge at 947699 was attacked last night by VC no VC in area.	S-3
1645	9		Fr 2/1: E-2 fired upon 2 VC at 270100H at (YD 818178). Intelligence report indicates 1 VC wounded. A search of the area immediately following the incident had revealed negative results.	S-3, G-3
1835	10		Fr 1/3: All C ambushes have departed.	S-3
1907	11		Fr 2/1: CAC # 4 captured 1 VCS 500 meters from IP coord 9225100 returning to CP to question VCS.	S-3, S-2, G-3
1910	12		Fr 2/1: CAC 4, 271715 request permission to set ahead time of departure 130 min. request TOR be extended 30 min. CAC-3 canceling operations due to current information from intelligence. Now night operations will be held in the following ckpts. Ckpt #1, Thrust line Delta add 28 right 13 ckpt #2 thrust line Delta add 37 right 14 ckpt #3 Thrust line Delta add 32 right 8. Time of departure 271830H time of return unk.	S-3
1921	13		Fr 2/1: PF troop reported to ARVN Liaison officer that 5 VC were moving from south asst to village, we are now in 923177 PF had informed towns people to move out of village we are now waiting to see if people leave.	S-2
1930	14		Fr 2/1: VCS captured is being held until morning village chief will come down to identify VCS.	S-2
1940	15		Fr 1/1: Sierra at 271920H at vic AT 946692 reported 1 PF sq. at AT 946692 attacked by unk number of VC approximately 271920. Fire fight still going on. Fired 2 rds illum. 1 rd was a dud.	S-2, S-3
2010	16		HUE LUC Dist indicates 1 sqd PF hit by 1 plt of VC. PF casualties 3 WIA, 1 KIA, VC casualites unk. PF requested that HUE LUC request fire.	S-2, G-3
2011	17		Fr 1/1: Co F interpreter (PHUC NIM #2) at AT 928668 heard from position what appeared to be VC propoganda from village AT 9218668 1 sq with interpreter to sweep village east to west; will use ambush site to west as blocking force. Interpreter indicates that local guerrillas will come back into village to conduct this type operation usually 2 or 3 VC to.	S-2, G-3

280001H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

IN	SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001	:	:	:Journal Opened	:
0105	:	1	:Fr 1/3: A-3 patrol at ckpt #3.	:S-3, G-3
0145	:	2	:Fr 1/3: A-3 patrol at ckpt #4.	:S-3
0518	:	3	:Fr 1/3: A-3 is at ckpt #6.	:S-3
0621	:	4	:Fr 1/3: C ambushes are in.	:S-3
0745	:	5	:Fr 1/3: A-3 patrol is back.	:S-3
0818	:	6	:Fr 1/1: Have added B-3 patrol they are going to AN-NHON #2.	:S-3, G-3
0930	:	7	:Fr 1/3: A-1 night patrol has returned to CP neg contact.	:S-3, G-3
1140	:	8	:Fr 1/1: Clarification on last nights list on Dong Lam (1) when a :approx 40 VC came from the east and were getting on line preparing :to attack Dong Lam (1) when a sq of PF opened fire and broke up the :attack. The VC broke contact and moved back to east. Results of :encounter 1 PF WIA 1 PF KIA and villagers reported 6 VC KIA were :carried off by VC.	:S-3
1315	:	9	:Fr Parchement 3 to C-3: The cheif of AP-THACH#NHAP Hamlet (SG(AT :9571)) NGUYEN-BE was arrested during operation HOA THUNH on 13Nov65; :Was taken to unknown destination. No news of him since reported de- :tained by 1/1 request details as soon as possible. Embassy interest;	:S-3, B 1/1
1325	:	10	:Fr 1/1: D-1 sighted hard core VC moving west to east from (870706) :to (875707) wearing camouflage uniforms and carrying weapons have :disappeared into HAN VUC village.	:Div
1340	:	11	:Informed 1/1: They do not have to defend north and south bridges :(AT 898812) and (AT900806). They can reduce DONG DEN security to PF :as long a responsible man is charge to assure proper security. Can :remove security from Btry K but inform Btry K.	:S-3
1435	:	12	:Fr 1/3: B-1 will patrol 281800H to 290600. Ckpt 1.903805 2. (915801) :3. (926612) 4. (922818) 5. (906807)	:S-3
1620	:	13	:Fr 1/1: 131110 Nov 65 from 1/1 B to 1/1-3 ref msg 131115 Nov 65. At :131105 Nov 65 B OP (960708) observed sniper fire directed at two :vehicles on bridge (AT 952711) rds appeared to be coming from vic :(AT 957709). Personnel on OP moved to apprehend sniper, as they app- :roached village a man came waling out. He was stopped and questioned :in French, He was only civilian in area. At first he denied hearing :the rds, but then claimed he did hear them but they came from across :the road several hundred meters away. He has an ARVN ID search was :continued w/neg results VCS taken to B CP and helo evac to HOA VUNG; :Dist HQ as directed by Capt TAYLOR Bn-S-2 VC was detained for total :of about two hours.	:Div
1711	:	14	:Fr 1/1: At 281650H D R con sq received fire from carbines in vic of :location (AT 867697) location of VC not known throught within 200 :meters. Sq is secure and did nbt return fire all secure now. Sq :will relocate after dark.	:S-3, G-3
1845	:	15	:Fr 1/3: C-2-A amd C-2-B patrol have departed. All C CO ambushes are :out. The B patrol is out.	:S-3
2000	:	16	:Fr 1/3: A Co patrols and ambushes are out.	:S-3
2007	:	17	:Fr 1/3: A, B, C and C Co report negative contact.	:S-3
2008	:	18	:Fr 1/1: B-1-1, B-2-1 are in position.	:S-3
2025	:	19	:Fr S-2,1/1: HIEU DUC Dist at 281930H. Friendly at AT 951689. Brief :950690 enemy AT 951689. PF Suadd size ambush at above coord engaged :unk no. of VC located at (AT 951689). Brief fire fight. HIEU DUC :Dist fired 1 rd 60mm HE enemy KIA.	:S-3
2107	:	20	:G-3 informed their recommendation of L-Hour 1100H acceptable and :will be used for 1/1's opns.	:Air, Arty, 1/1
2150	:	21	:Fr 2/1: CAC #5 had contact with VC moving into ambush site VC moving :to south west VC had auto weapon Searched area :with negative results coord (915063) - 282140	:S-3, S-2, G-3
2354	:	22	:Fr 2/1: Patrol fired on VC approx 50 rds VC returned approx 15 rds :automatic fire.	:S-3
2359	:	:	:Journal Closed	:

300001H Dec 1966
(TIME OPENED)

SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		:Journal Opened	
0155	1	:Fr 1/3: All secure.	S-3
0355	2	:Fr 1/3: All units neg contact.	S-3
0600	3	:Fr 1/3: All units report neg contact.	S-3
0630	4	:Fr Shove 3: DIA LOC District Headquarters and Hill (658757) under :attack by estimated VC battalion. No communications with either.	S-3
0700	5	:Fr Shove 3: Put a Company on Stand-by for reaction force to Hill 65	S-3
0702	6	:To 1/1: Instructed 1/1 to put a company as alert for reaction force :to Hill 65. Lt. Gans said that Col Hatch has named "D"Co as stand- :by force.	S-3
0720	7	:To 1/3: Regt Div reserve placed on laert.	S-3, G-3
0725	8	:Fr 1/3: "A" ambushes have returned.	S-3
0740	9	:Fr 1/1: Co "B" taken off alert but told keep in mind the present :situation.	G-3, Div
0820	10	:Requested radio frequency for Dai For Dis Hqs in event of employment.	G-3
0855	11	:Fr Shove 3: Maj Mattimoe informed us (1) No decision yet as to what :action to take concerning DAI LOC -Hill 65 situation (2) ARVN are :moving off of Hill 65 at this time (3) ARVN radio frequencies are :being worked on an will be forwarded.	S-3
0905	12	:Fr Shove 3: A.O. over Hill 65 states that previous report of ARVN :moving off of Hill 65 was eunaneous. What is happening is the vill- :agers surrounding Hill 65 are moving toward DAI LOC Dist Hqs. No VC :appear to be on Hill 65 at this time.	S-3
0941	13	:Helos commenced lift into LZ #1. Lift drew small arms fire from 100 :meters north of LZ #1 and along river bank to the south small arms :fire is light.	G-3, Div
1010	14	:Fr 1/1: Co C in LZ #1 and CoD in LZ #2 & #3. Bn having comm difficul :at this time. Helo's report receiving small arm fire over HO VUC.	S-3
1015	15	:To Shove 3: Lift of D&D Companies 1/1 completed 1015H Reveived spor- :adic S/A fire from HO VUC river bank, north of HO VUC, moving in on :area of firing.	S-3
1206	16	:Fr 1/1: D-1 discovered 1 cave and two tunnels at (873706) started to :blow up cave, found bear trap in cave D-2 on way to position. D-3 :in vicinity LZ #1 awaiting availability for Helo's to move to LZ. :D-2 cannot cross river by foot.	S-3, G-3
1308	17	:Fr 1/1: D-1 contacted 7 villagers in one hut of the village HOI VIC :villagers said there were 15 to 20 VC in village last night. VC ran :in all directions when helo's flew over this morning. VC were carrying :a weapon that took 3 men to carry.	S-3, G-3
1310	18	:Fr 1/1: D-2 found 4,000 lbs of rice they will bring it back with :them.(878705)	S-3
1655	19	:Fr 1/1: No change in oper, D-Co is still searching HOI VUC, neg cont	G-3
1810	20	:Fr 1/3: Operation with R.F. has been Cancelled	G-3
1900	21	:Fr 1/1: C Co has 2 plt's in same area as the FRAG order shows C-3 :ambush (894710) C-2 ambush (870708) D-3 ambush (874710). D 1&2 has :completed their sweep. Bound is trying to get "D" night position now.	G-3
1918	22	:Fr 1/1: D-1 (869706) D02 (882707) D-1 will have 2 ambushes (866706) :& (871706) D-2 will have ambush at (887707)	S-3
2007	23	:Fr 1/3: All units report neg contact ambushes of A Co & B Co are out	S-3
2047	24	:Fr 1/1: C-2 & C-3 ambushes are in position, day time Mission 302043	S-3
2049	25	:Fr 2/1: Info via PF that bridge at AN NONG & PHU BAI bridge will be :attacked tonight. Recomend you contact HOUNG THUY Dist and verify.	S-3
2100	26	:Fr 1/3: ARVN at NAM O Bridge requested illum. They said that they :are in a fire fight. Burk will send more info just as soon as they :get it.	S-3
2124	27	:Fr 1/3: The fire fight at NAM-O Bridge lasted 5 min. Tanks tried to :help, 4 rds of illum were fired ARVN trying to prusuit a small :group of VC.	G-3
2359		:Journal Closed	

310001H Dec 1965
(TIME OPENED)

SER	NO	INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION
0001		Journal Opened	
0020	1	Fr 1/3: All units report neg contact.	S
0300	2	Fr 2/1: CAC-2 is cancelling night operations due to activities around CP.	S
0430	3	Fr 1/3: C-3-A patrol has returned.	S
0530	4	Fr 1/3: C-2-B patrol has returned.	S
0735	5	Fr 1/3: B-2 patrol has returned.	S
0748	6	Fr 1/3: A-1 has returned.	S
0750	7	Fr 1/3: C-2-A has returned.	S
0754	8	Fr 1/1: All B ambushes are in B-2 has departed.	S
0817	9	Fr 1/1: D-1 & D-2 continuing search, D-3 patrolling PPB, C-1 is moving last along north side of Sang-Tuy-Long river.	S
30	10	Fr G-3: 3d MAF-Thanh-Quit (ATO43621) was hit by 9 rds 60mm mortar. No friendly casualties. Qunnag NAN Specific sector request no one use road in that area until they have checked it for mines.	S
0920	11	Fr 3 Recon: Round Bin size 8ft by 8ft by 5ft filled with wheat also found 2 bundles of size 1/2 ft by 1 ft by 1 ft paper plain other bundle filled with documents. (823658)	S
1425	12	Fr D Recon: Patrol has spotted 54 VC at (813662) Base Camp spotted at (815651) Arty firing on base camp at this time. No communications with Recon patrol at this time. No arty fires on 54 VC because of lack of contact with patrol sighting was made at 311330H.	S
1500	13	Fr D Recon: New VC base camp spot in Grid Squard (AT8265) arty being fired on that position at this time.	S
1530	14	Fr 1/1: C Co blew caves at (887710) (890705) (890706).	S
1600	15	Fr 1/1: B-3 picked up 1 Vietnamese male age 19 at 1515 vic of (922699). Taken to Seirra for questioning.	G-3, S-2
1620	16	Fr 2/1: 4/12 reported that AO requested fire mission on suspected VC movement at (778085) 13 rds of 155 were fired, neg contact.	Div
1701	17	Fr 1/3: Two fire teams will accompany civilians to evacuated vill during the period 1-8 Jan to possessive such as animals. 1,2,3 of Jan 0800-1700 CAO SUNG (AT 878746) 4, 5, HOA TRUNG at (AT849778) on 6,7 and 8 Jan MY SON (AT 880769) and DONG SONG (AT859762). These people are New Life Hamlet near company C position. The NE life is located (AT 897774).	S-3
1830	18	Fr 1/1: B-3 ambushes are cancelled, new ambushes are B-1 (906685) B-2 (911687) B-3 (911706) also C Co is back at CP at 1800.	G-3, S-3
1905	19	Fr 1/1: Co C will have two ambushes to night at 914710 and 912714, from 312000 until first light.	S-3, G-3
1910	20	Fr 1/3: All C and D Cos ambushes have departed C-3 and D-3 patrols have dpearted.	S-3
1916	21	Fr 1/3: All B ambushes and patrols have departed.	S-3
2030	22	Fr 1/1: Reported 1 grenade exploded near F-1-A ambush (AT 936654) ambush reports 15-20 rds autom fire from some where between his position and B-CP. No B or F personnel have fired anyrdd.	G-3, S-3
2102	23	Fr 1/3: OP located (AT935778) observed movement fired 15 rds checked area unit. negative results.	G-3, S-3
2130	24	AKVN liaison off in COC reported HUONG THUNG PF company sweep from YD830178 to YD788200 commencing 2000.	S-3, G-3
2230	25	Fr 1/3: SITREP B, C, and D cos negative congate.	S-3
2255	26	Fr 2/1: OP on Hill 180 GS (8513) enemy contact with probably 3 to 4 VC Received 6 rd SA Fire. Returned fire with 8 rds of SA Fire contact broken by VC no casualties.	G-3, S-2
2315	27	Fr 2/1: Ref entry #15 area was not searched men on hill sitting tight.	S-3
2359		Journal Closed.	

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 3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020000H Dec 1965

Operation Order 326-65

- Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6659 II and III, 6559 II, 6558 I, 6658 I and IV
 AMS Series L005 1:50,000 Sheets 6560 III and 6559 IV
 (b) RegtO 3120.1 (OPERATIONAL REPORTS)
 (c) FOR/NCS/SA I CorpsO 00342.1A
 (d) Regt OpnD 329-65 (Counter-Attack Plan)
 (e) Regt OpnC 326-65 (Rear Area Defense)
 (f) RegtO 3000.6 (Rules of Engagement)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Current intelligence summaries and reports.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) I Corps continues operations against the VC.
- (2) 3d Marine Division defends the CHU LAI, DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI airfields and ancillary facilities from enemy attack; executes offensive operations in assigned TAORs; establishes and maintains a reconnaissance network in assigned TAORs and RZs; conducts vigorous civil affairs programs within TAORs; in coordination with GVN Forces, executes operations beyond the TAORs.
- (3) FMAW conducts air operations against DRV and Viet Cong by providing offensive air support, anti-air warfare, service support, aerial reconnaissance and control of assigned missiles and aircraft.
- (4) 9th Marines (-) (Rein) occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR, defends DA NANG vital area in sector, conducts unilateral search and destroy operations within assigned sector of the DA NANG TAOR; prepared to provide one (1) mobile reserve company for deployment as directed; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols and ambushes throughout assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR; prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with GVN Armed Forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG TAOR; prepared to conduct counter-attacks to restore the integrity of assigned sector of the DA NANG TAOR.

SECRET (encl # 4)

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- (5) 12th Marines (-) (Rein).
 - (a) 1st Bn (-) (Rein) - Direct Support 3d Marines.
 - (b) 1st 8th How Btry (-) (Rein) (SP), FMF - General Support DA NANG.
- (6) 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
- (7) 3d Engr Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
- (8) 3d AT Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
 - (a) Co A (-) direct support 3d Marines.
- (9) 3d Tank Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
 - (a) Co A (-) direct support 3d Marines.
- (10) 1st AmTrac Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
 - (a) 3d Plat Co B direct support 3d Marines.
- (11) 3d Motor Transport Bn - General Support.
 - (a) One Plat Co A direct support 3d Marines.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION. 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR, defends DA NANG vital area in sector; occupies and defends the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR to protect and defend the HUE-PHU BAI vital area; conducts unilateral search and destroy operations within the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols throughout assigned sectors; prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with CVN Armed Forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; prepared to provide one (1) mobile reserve company for deployment as directed; prepared to conduct counterattacks to restore the integrity of assigned sectors.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations).

b. Hq Co, 3d Marines.

- (1) Provide perimeter security for 3d Marines Command Post.
- (2) Be prepared to provide one platoon-size Mobile Reserve Force on 2 hours notice. (See Annex G(Reserve Employment Plan)).

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SECRETc. 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

- (1) Occupy and control assigned sector of TAOR.
- (2) Defend MLR in assigned TAOR and provide security for installations on Hill 327 (AT 971737).
- (3) Provide security force, in coordination with RF for bridge at (AT 946699).
- (4) Conduct unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR.
- (5) Conduct aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned TAOR.
- (6) Be prepared to conduct combined and coordinated operations with RVNAF within or beyond the boundaries of assigned TAOR.
- (7) Battalion reserve will not be committed without authority this Headquarters.

d. 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

- (1) Occupy and control assigned sector of TAOR.
- (2) Defend MLR in assigned TAOR and assist in the defense of the NAM O Bridge (AT 927842) in coordination with the RVNAF.
- (3) Conduct unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR.
- (4) Conduct aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned TAOR.
- (5) Be prepared to conduct combined and coordinated operations with RVNAF within or beyond the boundaries of assigned TAOR.
- (6) Battalion reserve will not be committed without authority this Headquarters.
- (7) Conduct minimum of one squad size patrol of RED Beach Area at least twice weekly.

e. 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines.

- (1) Defend PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU facilities.
- (2) Conduct unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR.

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- (3) Conduct aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned TAOR.
- (4) Conduct combined and coordinated operations with RVNAF within and beyond the boundaries of assigned TAOR on approval of this Headquarters.
- (5) Prepare defense and counter-attack plans to defend and restore integrity of PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU facilities.
- (6) Battalion reserve will not be committed without authority this Headquarters.

f. Regimental Reserve: Reserve Company, 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

- (1) Regimental Reserve is also Division Reserve.
- (2) To be committed only with the approval of the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
- (3) Maintain one-hour alert posture and be prepared for employment anywhere in the Division's Areas of Responsibility.
- (4) Annex G (Reserve Employment Plan).

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (2) Annex G (Reserve Employment Plan).
- (3) Annex H (Civil Affairs).
- (4) See Reference (e).
- (5) See Reference (f).
- (6) Annex I (Psychological Warfare).
- (7) Reports. Reference (b).
- (8) Submit concept of operations overlays for all operations and all planned patrols to this Headquarters for information and reporting to higher headquarters at least 52 hours prior to scheduled time of execution.
- (9) Every effort will be made to avoid incidents with civilians.
- (10) Minimal interference with HOA CAM Training Center is directed.
- (11) Maintain close and continuous contact with local government officials in whose villages/districts units operate.

SECRET

- (12) Requirement for access to or use of private property will be cleared with this Headquarters.
- (13) Body armor mandatory for personnel manning defensive positions. Body armor optional on patrols/operations. Any individual desiring to wear body armor may be permitted to do so.
- (14) Steel helmet or ballistic helmet liner mandatory for all patrols or operations and during the hours of darkness on defensive positions.
- (15) Patrols, and long term isolated positions will contain a minimum of eight (8) personnel.
- (16) Employment of Riot Control Agents will be within the scope of reference (c) with expressed approval of this Headquarters.
- (17) Contact Right to Left.
- (18) See Battalion Counter-Attack Plans.
- (19) See Reference (d).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Administrative Order 326-65.

5. COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

b. Command Posts.

- (1) 3d Mar Div AT 955749
- (2) 3d Marines AT 944762
- (3) 9th Marines AT 999726
- (4) 1st Bn, 1st Marines AT 953723
- (5) 1st Bn, 3d Marines AT 943783
- (6) 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines YD 884137
- (7) 1st Bn, 12th Marines AT 957758

- a. Alternate Regimental Command Post: 1st Bn, 3d Marines CP.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

S. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive OfficerANNEXES:SECRET

SECRET

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence (to be issued) *WIF*
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Fire Support Coordination (to be issued)
- F - Communications-Electronics
- G - Mobile Reserve Force Employment Plan
- H - Civil Affairs
- I - Psychological Warfare
- J - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution)

SECRET

3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 326-65

Time Zone: H

(All Attachments Effective on Receipt)

<u>3d Marines (-) (Rein)</u>	Col FISHER
<u>Hq Co, 3d Marines</u>	Capt NICHOLS
Det, Hq Bn	
<u>1st Bn, 1st Marines</u>	LtCol HATCH
<u>1st Bn, 3d Marines</u>	LtCol DICKEY
<u>3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines</u>	LtCol VALE
3d Bn, 4th Marines	
Det, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div	
4th Bn (-) (Rein), 12th Mar	
Hq Btry, 4/12	
Btry M, 4/12	
107MM Howtar Btry, 2/12	
Btry I, 2/12	
SMR Tm, Hq Btry, 11th Mar	
3d Plat, Co C, 3d Recon Bn	
3d Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Tank Bn	
3d Plat (Rein), Co L, 3d AT Bn	
3d Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn	
<u>Regimental Reserve: Reserve Co 1/3</u>	

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

[Signature]
 W. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
 Operation Order 326-65

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 326-65

- Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6659 II and III,
 6559 II, 6658 I and IV
 AMS Series L005 1:50,000 Sheets 6560 III and 6559 IV
 (b) Regt Opn 329-65
 (c) Regt Opn 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR, defends DA NANG vital area in sector; occupies and defends the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR; protects the HUE-PHU BAI vital area; conducts unilateral search and destroy operations within the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols throughout assigned sectors; prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with GVN Armed Forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; prepared to provide one (1) mobile reserve company for deployment as directed; prepared to conduct counter-attacks to restore the integrity of assigned sectors.

2. CONCEPT

- a. General. The concept of operations for accomplishment of the 3d Marines' assigned mission is to conduct a mobile defense at DA NANG within assigned sector and a perimeter defense at HUE-PHU BAI in order to defend the vital areas of both enclaves. In conjunction with these defenses search and clear operations, and deep, aggressive patrols to locate and destroy the enemy's offensive capabilities will be conducted; frequent search and clear operations will be conducted of designated areas for pacification employing all available civil affairs and psychological units and facilities. Concurrently, forces will be maintained in a state of readiness to conduct coordinated and combined operations beyond the Regiment's TAORs and to provide limited reserve forces to counter-attack, block, relieve or reinforce units within the Regiment's TAORs.
- b. Defense. Defensive positions will be constructed consisting of deliberately prepared and mutually supporting strong points. Maximum use will be made of connecting trenches, and protective and tactical wire. Mines may be employed as approved by this Headquarters. These latter positions will be used primarily for defense against a major attack. Additional defensive measures will provide for a minimum of 75% of personnel employed at night in listening posts, ambushes, and night patrols both laterally and forward of the prepared positions.

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- (1) The concept of defense is designed to defeat the three basic courses of action which are open to the enemy.
- (a) Infiltration. Application of the action described in the preceding paragraphs will effectively limit the enemy's capability to infiltrate.
 - (b) Limited Objective Attack. Ambushes, patrols and listening posts will disrupt enemy attacks against strong points. During limited objective attacks, against one or more strong points, the force occupying the strong point will hold the position. The attacking force will be reduced through maneuver and maximum use of supporting arms. Every effort should be made to deploy forces and employ fire support means in such manner as to prevent the enemy's withdrawal and to lead to his defeat in detail.
 - (c) Major Attack. Should a major enemy attack be launched, positions will be occupied by all available forces and the enemy engaged from prepared positions. The Regimental Reserve, other supporting forces and/or forces not engaged will be employed to counter-attack, reinforce units in contact, or to occupy blocking positions as indicated by the situation.
 - (d) Regimental Counter-Attack Plan. (Reference (b)).
 - (e) Rear area defense. (Reference (c)).
- c. Offense. Aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrols, search and clear operations will be conducted on a continuous basis to locate, fix and destroy the enemy using all available means. Offensive operations effectively increase control of the TAORs and the populations within the TACRs. Units conducting offensive operations will include RF or PF personnel and an interpreter. If interpreters are not available for all operations, RF or PF forces will be briefed on the operation to enhance success of the operation through communications with civilians encountered during the operation. When consistent with the mission, civil affairs and psychological warfare operations will be included in the participating unit's capabilities. See Annex H (Civil Affairs). See Annex I (Psychological Warfare).
- d. Fire Support.
- (1) Fire support plans will be developed in conjunction with, and in support of defense plans. Plans will provide for maximum employment of preplanned fire on likely avenues of approach and withdrawal. Unit Leaders at all levels will be familiar with all fire plans in their area and be capable of calling fire in support of their defense plans.


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- (2) Fire plans will be developed for support of all offensive operations including patrols. Full advantage will be taken of pre-planned defensive fires by incorporating these into fire support plans for search and clear operations, patrols and ambushes.
- (3) Care will be exercised when requesting helicopter evacuation to assure that the request is not premature, thus interfering with fire support, when evacuation by helicopter is not warranted by the nature of the wounds. MEDEVAC by helicopter will not be accomplished during heavy and continuous combat.
- e. During all operations, continuous coordination and liaison will be maintained with RF, PF and civilians. Where possible, Vietnamese defenses will be considered and included in unit defense planning and every effort will be made to gain their cooperation in providing early warning of enemy in the area. Whenever possible, telephone or radio communication links will be established with RF, PF and local government officials. Defensive fire plans will include concentrations, mutually agreed upon, that support the Vietnamese. Coordinated patrols and ambushes will be planned and conducted.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER


E.H. MICKELLieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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Operation Order 326-65

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
3d Marines (-) (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
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Annex D (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6559 II and III, 6559 II,
6558 I, 6658 I and IV
AMS Series 1005 1:50,000 Sheets 6560 III and 6559 IV

Time Zone: H

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER


E. H. MACKEL
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Operation Overlay, DA NANG Enclave 3 copies
- 2 - Operation Overlay, HUE-PHU BAI Enclave

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Operation Order 326-65

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Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65

- Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series 1701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II
6658 I and IV, 6659 II and III
(b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
(c) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
(d) FMFM 7-3, Air Support
(e) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
(f) RegtO P3000.2C (SOP for Operations and Training)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Current Intelligence Summaries and Reports.

b. Friendly Forces. See Basic Order.

2. MISSION. 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR, defends DA NANG vital area in sector; occupies and defends the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR to protect and defend the HUE-PHU BAI vital area; conducts unilateral search and destroy operations within the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols throughout assigned sectors; prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with GVN Armed Forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAORs; prepared to provide one (1) mobile reserve company for deployment as directed; prepared to conduct counter-attacks to restore the integrity of assigned sectors.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept.

(1) Separate Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) are established at the HUE-PHU BAI and the DA NANG enclaves.

(a) Within the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR/RZ, the senior infantry Battalion Commander is responsible for the control and coordination of all supporting fires in that TAOR/RZ, including coordination of fires with local GVN Armed Forces Commander. Fires delivered in support of GVN Armed Forces will be reported to this Headquarters.

(b) Within the DA NANG TAOR/RZ, Division FSOC exercises overall coordination of supporting fires, including coordination of fires with local GVN Armed Forces Commander.

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TAOR

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1. Within 3d Marines portion of the TAOR/RZ, coordination of fires of supporting arms will be exercised by the Regimental Commander through his FSCC, in accordance with the coordination instruction contained in sub-paragraph 3.b. below.

2. Subordinate infantry Battalion Commanders will coordinate the fires of all organic and attached units through their FSCC's and will submit requirements for naval gunfire, artillery and air support through the FSCC to the Regimental FSCC.

3. Fire Support coordination measures will be based upon references (b) through (e). Coordination will be accomplished at the lowest echelon capable of executing all coordination requirements.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Reference (f) to Regimental Opn O 326-65.
- (2) Fire Plans. Fire plans will be prepared for all operations, including patrols, and will be submitted to this Headquarters for review and approval. These plans will accompany the basic operation order or overlay.
- (3) Changes to fire plans will be submitted as they occur.
- (4) Targets of Opportunity. Coordination of targets of opportunity will be initiated by Battalion FSCCs simultaneously with the initial request. Supporting arms may prepare to attack such targets, but must receive positive clearance from the Regimental FSCC before firing, except in emergency situations provided for in reference (f) to Regimental Opn O 326-65.
- (5) Fire Coordination Line (FCL).
 - (a) All fires west of the FCL (see Appendix 1) (Defensive Fire Plan Overlay) will receive positive clearance from the Regimental FSCC before firing; except in emergency situations provided for in reference (f) to Regimental Opn O 326-65 and paragraph (6) below.
 - (b) All fires east of the FCL will receive positive clearance from the Division FSCC before firing, except in emergency situations provided for in reference (f) to Regimental Opn O 326-65 and paragraph (6) below.
- (6) Emergency Fire Missions.
 - (a) Emergency fire missions approved by the Battalion

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Commander will be communicated directly to the supporting artillery battalion. No other clearance is necessary.

- (b) The following format will be used for emergency missions approved by the Battalion Commander:

"Fire mission; Emergency; Call sign 6 sends."

- (c) Battalion FSCC will immediately notify the Regimental FSCC upon passage of an emergency mission to the supporting artillery battalion.
- (d) The Regimental FSCC will notify Division FSCC immediately of fire missions within the 3d Marines TAOR/RZ.
- (7) Restricted Targets. Reference (f) to Regimental Opn O 326-65.
- (8) Aircraft Safety.
- (a) A restrictive fire plan will be employed whenever artillery or naval gunfire trajectories might endanger friendly aircraft. Thorough planning of restrictive fires will enable all supporting arms to be brought to bear. "Cease firing" is not a restrictive fire plan and will not be used except in an emergency.
- (b) Helicopter approach and retirement lanes will be planned to avoid artillery and naval gunfire trajectories and will be strictly adhered to.
- (c) Medical evacuation will utilize designated helicopter approach and retirement lanes unless otherwise requested by the unit requesting medical evacuation. In the latter case, the Regimental FSCC will coordinate the evacuation to interfere as little as possible with fire support agencies.
- (d) Units requesting an air support mission will recommend a restrictive fire plan if required. Reference (b) refers.
- (e) Air sentries will be positioned at all artillery firing units and will check fire if aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (f) Unsecured helicopter landing zones will be prepared by supporting arms prior to their use, unless otherwise dictated by the tactical situation.

SECRET(9) Safety of Ground Forces.

- (a) In accordance with references (b) through (e).
- (b) No supporting arms will be fired without prior approval of the ground commander in whose zone the fire is to be delivered.
- (c) Ground commanders will notify FSCCs of unit locations; FSCCs will inform the supporting arms.
- (d) Artillery fire missions within 600 meters of friendly troops will include the word "close" in the classification-of-fire element of the initial fire request.
- (e) Naval gunfire missions within 1500 meters of friendly troops will include the word "danger" in the danger-to-friendly-troops element of the initial fire request, followed by the direction and distance of friendly troops from the target. Naval gunfire missions within 600 meters of friendly troops will be further classified by adding the word "close" after "danger".
- (f) Artillery missions classified "close" and naval gunfire missions classified "danger" will be observed. Such missions will be under the positive control of the U. S. observer/spotter nearest the target and capable of observing both the target and the nearest troops.
- (g) All close air support missions will be under the control of a TACP, TAC(A) or ASRT. The FAC or the TAC(A) will recommend a direction of attack. Whenever possible, the direction of attack will be parallel to front lines. Positive identification of front lines is essential; frontline panels will be displayed prior to conducting an air strike.

4. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Communications-Electronics).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive OfficerAPPENDIX:

- 1 - Defensive Fire Plan Overlay N/F
- 2 - Fire Support Communications-Electronics

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 326-65

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
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Appendix 2 (Fire Support Communications-Electronics) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Artillery and Naval Gunfire Communications. Artillery and naval gunfire communications within the 3d Marines portion of the DA NANG TAOR/RZ will be established and maintained by 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Continuous coordination of communications with supported infantry units is essential and will be accomplished by Artillery and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers. Although artillery and naval gunfire communications circuits are designed primarily to conduct and coordinate fire support, they may be used to disseminate intelligence or other operational information.

a. Radio.

- (1) Call signs and frequencies. Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to 3d MarDiv Operation Order 343-65.
- (2) Artillery Conduct of Fire Nets will be guarded continuously at the Artillery Battalion FDC, Battalion FSCCs, and as required at the Regimental FSCC. Artillery Forward Observers and Liaison Teams will be prepared to act as relay stations. When Forward Observers and Naval Gunfire Spot Teams are co-located, their respective circuits may be used as alternate means of communications for either supporting arm, if required.
- (3) Close coordination between infantry and supporting arms is required to facilitate the common use of communications facilities within infantry command posts.

b. Wire. Wire is the primary means of artillery and naval gunfire communications.

- (1) Artillery units will install and operate a switchboard and local phones in the FSCCs of supported units.
- (2) Lines will be laid by Forward Observer and Naval Gunfire Spot Teams to the appropriate Battalion FSCC switchboard.
- (3) Trunk lines will be installed from the Battalion FSCCs to the Artillery Battalion FDC and the Regimental FSCC. The Regimental FSCC will have a trunk line to the Artillery Battalion FDC and the Division FSCC.

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2. Air Support Communications. The Division FSCC exercises overall responsibility for planning and coordinating air support missions within the DA NANG TAOR/RZ.

a. Radio.

- (1) Call signs and frequencies. Annex G (Communications-Electronics) to 3d MarDiv Operation Order 343-65.
- (2) The Tactical Air Request Net will be guarded continuously at the respective Battalion and Regimental FSCCs. Requests for on call tactical air support will be passed from the FAC/En TACP to the DASCC direct, using the standard TAR format.
- (3) Preplanned Air Support mission requests will be forwarded through the chain of command to the Regimental FSCC. The standard TAR format will be used in requesting tactical missions. Locally reproduced forms are available from this Headquarters for all helicopter and observation missions.
- (4) Tactical Air Direction Nets will be utilized by FAC/TACP to control all fixed wing air support. Battalion and Regimental FSCC will guard the respective TAD net during conduct of all direct air support strikes.
- (5) Landing Zone Control Nets will be utilized by all units in the conduct of helicopter support missions.

b. Wire. All tactical air and helicopter support mission requests other than emergency or priority will be submitted by telephone to this Headquarters. Direct lines between the Battalion and Regimental FSCC will be utilized to submit these requests.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 326-65

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
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Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 326-65

- Ref: (a) ~~MFO~~ O2000.2C (3d MarDiv COI)
 (b) DivO P2000.4B (3d MarDiv CommSOP)
 (c) 3d MarDiv OpnO 343-65
 (d) RegtO P2000.1B (3d Mar CommSOP)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 326-65.
- (2) The enemy is capable of effecting disruption of all means of communications by sabotage, imitative deception, and jamming.
- (3) Wire lines, radio and radio relay sites remote from defended areas are highly susceptible to enemy activities.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) See Basic Order.

(2) Command Posts.

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| (a) 3d Marines (-) (Rein) | AT 942762 |
| (b) 1st Bn, 1st Marines | AT 953723 |
| (c) 1st Bn, 3d Marines | AT 942783 |
| (d) 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines | YD 884137 |

- (3) Report changes of command post locations to this headquarters.

2. MISSION. Communications elements of the 3d Marines (-) (Rein) will install, maintain and operate communications facilities to support the operations of this regiment in the DA NANG and PHU BAI enclaves in the Republic of Vietnam.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Communications Platoon, Hq Co, 3d Marines.

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- (1) Install, maintain and operate communications facilities in accordance with references (a) through (d) and this order.
- b. 1st Bn, 1st Marines.
- (1) Install, maintain and operate communications facilities in accordance with references (a) through (d) and this order.
- (2) Install, maintain and operate AN/TRC-27 radio relay equipment of link to 3d Marines in accordance with reference (d) and Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay Plan). Personnel and equipment to be provided by Communications Platoon, Hq Co, 3d Marines. This link to be maintained on a standby basis as back-up for metallic wire lines.
- c. 1st Bn, 3d Marines.
- (1) Install, maintain and operate communications facilities in accordance with references (a) through (d) and this order.
- d. 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines.
- (1) Install, maintain and operate communications facilities in accordance with references (a) through (d) and this order.
- (2) Install, maintain and operate AN/MRC-62 radio relay equipment of link to 3d Marines in accordance with reference (d) and Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay Plan). Personnel and equipment to be provided by Communications Co, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv.
- e. Naval Gunfire Support Communications. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65.
- f. Fire Support Coordination. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65.
- g. Air Support Communications. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65.
- h. Det, CommCo, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv.
- (1) Provide personnel and equipment capable of installing, maintaining, and operating an AN/MRC-62 Radio Relay link between this Headquarters and Headquarters, 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines. See Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay Plan).
- i. Reserve Force.
- (1) Be prepared to enter the tactical radio net of the designated supported unit employing FM radio equipment.

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- (2) Be prepared to enter the 3d Marines regimental Tactical Net # 1 when employed in the DA NANG enclave.
- (3) Call signs and frequencies (in megacycles) will be provided to committed units by this headquarters of organizations with which the committed unit must coordinate.

j. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) See references (a) through (d).
- (2) Maintain strict security of communications and cryptographic equipment.
- (3) Communications security will be strictly observed.
- (4) Communications Center.
 - (a) Use GMT (Zulu) time for all message Date Time Groups. Local time may be used in the text of the message. When other than GMT is used, it will be so indicated.
 - (b) CW calls will be used as teletype calls.
- (6) Messenger Service.
 - (a) Messenger service as required. All messengers will be accompanied by armed guards consistent with the danger involved. At no time will there be less than one (1) armed guard. Except in the case of an emergency, messenger service will not be employed during the hours of darkness. Delivery of a message by a messenger after dark must be approved by Regimental or Battalion Commanders or Executive Officers.
 - (b) Commanders will instruct liaison and visiting staff officers to report to the unit communications center for possible courier service.
 - (c) Guard mail is not courier service. Unclassified messages will not normally be ~~routed via~~ guard mail. Classified messages will never be routed via guard mail.
- (7) Radio.
 - (a) All units guard assigned nets and only assigned nets. Units wishing to enter an unassigned net must request permission from the net control station.

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- (b) Radio Frequency assignment. See reference (a).
 - (c) Requests for additional frequencies or changes to assigned frequencies will be submitted to this Headquarters.
 - (d) Radio Call Signs. See reference (a).
 - (e) Radio Plan. See Appendix 2 (Radio Plan).
 - (f) Whenever Battalion Commanders in the DA NANG area are absent from their CP to conduct field operations, they will enter Regimental Tactical Net # 1.
- (8) Wire and Radio Relay.
- (a) See Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay Plan).
 - (b) Wire will be used as the primary means of communication whenever possible.
 - (c) Commanding Officers will take steps to provide adequate physical security for all wiremen working outside their CP areas. At a minimum this security will consist of wiremen working in pairs or be accompanied by armed infantry or other personnel whose sole duty is to provide security. The size of the security detail will be consistent with the degree of danger in the area where the work is to be performed. Wiremen will be instructed to request security prior to leaving the CP area. Determination of the dangers involved and the security required will not rest with the wireman concerned.
 - (d) Submit line route maps and traffic diagrams in accordance with reference (d).
 - (e) Switchboard Code Names. See reference (a).
- (9) Cryptographic.
- (a) Authentication -KAA-60 has been designated as the in-country authentication system and may be used on all radio nets. Use of KAG-24 on intra-unit radio nets is encouraged.
 - (b) Operational codes -KAC-140 has been designated as the in-country operational code and will be used accordingly. This code may not be released to foreign nationals.
- 1 KAG-21/TSEC Operational Codes and Prearranged Message Codes.
This series contains uniform procedures for the local production and use of NSA approved and operations codes,

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pre-arranged message codes and map references and numerical cryptosystems. This series is approved for use by US Forces within RVN and may be used by units within the 3d Marines. Codes, map references, and numerical cryptosystems other than those listed in KAG-21/TSEC series will not be ~~produced~~ in RVN without prior approval of 3d MarDiv Headquarters.

- 2 ACP-165 Operational Brevity Codes. ACP-165 contains a compilation of operational brevity codes for use in the radio-telephone communications and is effective for joint use within RVN.
 - 3 KAC-1 Joint Operations Code. All portions of KAC-1 are effective for joint use within the Pacific Command except the authentication portion. KAA-60 will be used for authentication. The KAG-1/TSEC series is authorized for use by aircraft, surface vessels, submarines, and other forces for communications with aircraft. It shall not be used between shore or surface units when other suitable systems are held unless time prohibits.
 - 4 KAC-138 CINCPAC Numeral Code is effective for joint use within the Pacific Command.
 - 5 KAG-24/TSEC instructions for preparing local authentication systems is authorized for joint use within the Pacific Command and will be used as a guide in preparing local authentication systems. Type authentication systems other than those listed in KAG-24/TSEC will not be locally produced.
 - 6 Self-authentication will not be employed using any table used for challenge and reply authentication. Only system number 2 KAG-24/TSEC series will be used within RVN for self-authentication.
 - 7 KAA-57 is effective for joint/combined challenge and reply authentication only between US Forces and RVNAF.
- (c) Covered TT Circuits (KW-7). The effective edition of KAK-2641 will be used on all circuits below Division level.
- (10) Warning, Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics.
- (a) See Appendix 3 (Warning, Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

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a. Administrative Order 326-65.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E.H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive OfficerAPPENDIXES:

- 1 - Wire-Radio Relay Plan
- 2 - Radio Plan
- 3 - Warning, Visual, Sound and pyrotechnics *2 copies*

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
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Appendix 2 (Radio Plan) to Annex F (Communication-Electronics) to
 Operation Order 326-65

UNIT	CALL SIGN	FREQUENCY CIRCUIT					CIRCUIT DESIGN	
		EMISSION	PRI	SEC	TIME	PRI	DESIG	
CG, 3d Mar Div	VOICE CM	CW/TT	194.0	215.4	Div Cmd	D-34	D-2	
(COLL)	MONROE	SSB(V) CW/TT	392.5	224.4	Div Tac#1	D-27	D-4	
(NET)	MOTHERHOOD	FM(V)	43.1	45.9	Div Tac#2	D-208	D-231	
3d Marines	RADIANCE	SSB(V) CW/TT	811.4		Div (Tart)	D-66		
(COLL)	STAKROUT	SSB(V) CW/TT	24.52	677.0	Div Recon	D-6	D-52	
	MUTTER	SSB(V) CW/TT	115.40		Div Damage Control	D-85		
1/1	PISNER	SSB(V) CW/TT	431.4	925.4	NGE Support	D-31	D-72	
1/3	PRETEXT	SSB(V)	430.1	863.0	NGE Control	D-30	D-68	
3/4	MORTGAGE	SSB(V)	322.4		SFC Spot#1	D-16		
OP's	STAKROUT#	SSB(V)	339.6		SFC Spot#2	D-91		
		SSB(V)	512.0		SFC Spot#3	D-39		
		AM(V)	282.2		NGE Air Spot#1	D-300		
		AM(V)	318.6		NGE Air Spot#2	D-307		
		SSB(V)	799.5	219.6	TAR#1	W-431	W-452	
		SSB(V)	463.1	527.0	TAR#2	W-453	W-454	
		FM(V)	40.7		DAO	D-197		
		AM(V)	247.9		TAO#1	W-485		
		AM(V)	283.4		TAO#2	W-460		
		AM(V)	312.0		TAD#1	W-455		
		AM(V)	325.0		TAD#2	W-456		
		AM(V)	285.8		TAD#3	W-457		
		SSB(V)	506.9		HST Logistics	D-37		
		FM(V)	49.8		LZ Control	D-249		
		AM(V)	273.8		HD#1	W-459		

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
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Appendix 3 (Warning, Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics) to Annex F
 (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: (a) ACP 136
 (b) 3d MarDiv OpnO 343-65

Time Zone: H (In objective area)

1. General.

- a. See references (a) and (b).
- b. Visual signals are a supplementary means of communications and are transmitted by panels, flashing lights, signal flags, and pyrotechnics.
- c. Units tactical CW call signs will be used on all visual circuits.

2. Warning and Alert Signals.

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>HOW DISSEMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Air Defense Warning "Red"	Air Attack Imminent or taking place	Flash Message, Short repeated sound of sirens or word of mouth	Sirens will not be used for any other signal within objective area
"Yellow"	Air Attack is probable	Message, word of mouth	
"White"	Air Attack is improbable	Message, telephone word of mouth	May be declared before or after air defense warning "Yellow" or "Red"

3. Miscellaneous Visual Signals.

- a. Flag displayed from tank turret:

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
"Red"	Tank is in distress, require infantry assistance.

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- "Orange" Tank is low on fuel or ammunition, pulling back to replenish.
- "Green" Request contact on telephone at rear of tank.
- b. Aircraft Maneuver Signals:

<u>Aircraft Maneuver</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
360 Degree Left Turn	Display CP identification
360 Degree Right Turn	Mission Completed
*Alternate Dips and Climbs	Display Front Line Markings
Rock Wings	Message or displays understood
*Yaw right-left	Standby for message drop
Sharp S-Turn	Will support, you mark target
Circle right-rocking wings	Am trying to contact you by radio

*It is impractical for jet aircraft to execute these maneuver signals.

- c. The following illumination and smoke signals are effective. No others are authorized.

Illumination Signals

<u>Types</u>	<u>Meanings</u>
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (one signal is fired)	Encircle or attacked by enemy. Req for support (type of support must be affirmed by radio).
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (cont fire of 3 or more signals)	Req for ceasing of illuminating, firing and shelling.
Red Star Parachute M126 (hand held) (fire 1 signal)	We are withdrawing from this position.
Red Star Parachute M126 (fire 2 signals)	Area not secure, do not land/drop supplies.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (fire 2 signals)	Area secure safe to land/drop supplies.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (fire 1 signal)	Request for ammunition.

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Green Star Cluster M125
(hand held) (cont fire of 3
or more signals)

Req to wait, we are withdrawing from
this position.

Green Star Cluster M125
(hand held) (fire 1 signal)

Req for medical evacuation.

White Star Cluster M18A1
(fire 1 signal)

Req for radio comm on the air-ground
frequency.

White Star Parachute M125
(hand held) (fire 1 signal)

Radio breakdown.

Green Star Cluster M125 (one)
and White Star cluster M18A1
(one) (fired at same time)

Fire final protective fires (E.G. in
case prior to assault, advance of
observation, etc.)

Green Star Cluster M125 (one)
and Red Star Cluster M52A1 (one)
(fired at same time)

Patrol returning to friendly lines.

Smoke Signals

Yellow Smoke M64

or

Yellow Smoke M22A2

or

Yellow Smoke M18

Marking of friendly units position.

Violet Smoke M23

or

Violet Smoke M18

Objective taken.

Green Smoke M65

or

Green Smoke M15

or

Green Smoke M18

Inform us of the enemy direction or
position.

Red Smoke M2202

Marking of the enemy position. Used by
aircraft for liaison with ground units.

HC White (smoke) ANM8

or

White Star Cluster M18A1
(fire one signal)

Req for radio comm on the air-ground
frequency.

Green Smoke M18

Inform us of the enemy position.

Red Smoke M18

Marking of the enemy position.

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d. Panels.

- (1) See reference (a) and (b).
- (2) Panels are employed by ground forces as a means of recognition and identification. The panel sets VS-4/U and VS-6/U are normally used for identifying vehicles.
- (3) Use VS-4/U (Red) panels to identify vehicles and armor in forward areas on odd dates. Use VS-6/U (Yellow) panels on even dates.

4. Sound. Sound devices will be used in accordance with locally prepared SOP's.

5. Helicopter Landing Point Identification. See Tab A. (Reference (a) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Regimental OpnO. 326-65).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E.H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution)

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Appendix 3 (Warning, Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics) to Annex F
 (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: (a) ACP 136
 (b) 3d MarDiv OpnO 343-65

Time Zone: H (In objective area)

1. General.

- a. See references (a) and (b).
- b. Visual signals are a supplementary means of communications and are transmitted by panels, flashing lights, signal flags, and pyrotechnics.
- c. Units tactical CW call signs will be used on all visual circuits.

2. Warning and Alert Signals.

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>HOW DISSEMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Air Defense Warning "Red"	Air Attack Imminent or taking place	Flash Message, Short repeated sound of sirens or word of mouth	Sirens will not be used for any other signal within objective area
"Yellow"	Air Attack is probable	Message, word of mouth	
"White"	Air Attack is improbable	Message, telephone word of mouth	May be declared before or after air defense warning "Yellow" or "Red"

3. Miscellaneous Visual Signals.

- a. Flag displayed from tank turret:

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
"Red"	Tank is in distress, require infantry assistance.

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SECRET

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"Orange" Tank is low on fuel or ammunition, pulling back to replenish.

"Green" Request contact on telephone at rear of tank.

b. Aircraft Maneuver Signals:

<u>Aircraft Maneuver</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
360 Degree Left Turn	Display CP identification
360 Degree Right Turn	Mission Completed
*Alternate Dips and Climbs	Display Front Line Markings
Rock Wings	Message or displays understood
*Yaw right-left	Standby for message drop
Sharp S-Turn	Will support, you mark target
Circle right-rocking wings	Am trying to contact you by radio

*It is impractical for jet aircraft to execute these maneuver signals.

c. The following illumination and smoke signals are effective. No others are authorized.

Illumination Signals

<u>Types</u>	<u>Meanings</u>
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (one signal is fired)	Encircle or attacked by enemy. Req for support (type of support must be affirmed by radio).
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (cont fire of 3 or more signals)	Req for ceasing of illuminating, firing and shelling.
Red Star Parachute M126 (hand held) (fire 1 signal)	We are withdrawing from this position.
Red Star Parachute M126 (fire 2 signals)	Area not secure, do not land/drop supplies.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (fire 2 signals)	Area secure safe to land/drop supplies.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (fire 1 signal)	Request for ammunition.

SECRET

Green Star Cluster M125
(hand held) (cont fire of 3
or more signals)

Req to wait, we are withdrawing from
this position.

Green Star Cluster M125
(hand held) (fire 1 signal)

Req for medical evacuation.

White Star Cluster M18A1
(fire 1 signal)

Req for radio comm on the air-ground
frequency.

White Star Parachute M127
(hand held) (fire 1 signal)

Radio breakdown.

Green Star Cluster M125 (one)
and White Star cluster M18A1
(one) (fired at same time)

Fire final protective fires (E.G. in
case prior to assault, advance of
observation, etc.)

Green Star Cluster M125 (one)
and Red Star Cluster M52A1 (one)
(fired at same time)

Patrol returning to friendly lines.

Smoke Signals

Yellow Smoke M64
or
Yellow Smoke M22A2
or
Yellow Smoke M18

Marking of friendly units position.

Violet Smoke M23
or
Violet Smoke M18

Objective taken.

Green Smoke M65
or
Green Smoke M15
or
Green Smoke M18

Inform us of the enemy direction or
position.

Red Smoke M2202

Marking of the enemy position. Used by
aircraft for liaison with ground units.

HC White (smoke) ANM8
or
White Star Cluster M18A1
(fire one signal)

Req for radio comm on the air-ground
frequency.

Green Smoke M18

Inform us of the enemy position.

Red Smoke M18

Marking of the enemy position.

SECRET

d. Panels.

- (1) See reference (a) and (b).
- (2) Panels are employed by ground forces as a means of recognition and identification. The panel sets VS-4/U and VS-6/U are normally used for identifying vehicles.
- (3) Use VS-4/U (Red) panels to identify vehicles and armor in forward areas on odd dates. Use VS-6/U (Yellow) panels on even dates.

4. Sound. Sound devices will be used in accordance with locally prepared SOP's.

5. Helicopter Landing Point Identification. See Tab A. (Reference (a) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Regimental OpnO 326-65).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E.H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution)

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Annex G (Reserve Employment Plan) to Operation Order 326-65.

Ref: (a) Map: LMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6659 II and III
 6559 II, 6558 I, 6659 I and IV
 LMS Series L005 1:50,000 Sheets 6560 III and 6559 IV

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 326-65.
- b. Friendly Forces. See Operation Order 326-65.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None.
- d. Assumptions.

- (1) That any major attack against friendly positions will occur from a single direction and will not heavily engage all units positioned along the MLR or defensive perimeter.
- (2) That if employment of the Regimental Reserve is directed beyond the DA NANG enclave it will be employed via air; fixed or rotary, or embarked upon Naval shipping with minimal prior notice.

2. MISSION. To provide a Mobile Reserve Force capability for employment against a limited or major ground attack in a counter-attack or blocking force role within the 3d Marines TAORs.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) One company (rein) will be designated as Regimental Reserve and will be prepared for employment anywhere within the enclaves assigned to the 3d Marine Division as a counter-attack force or for employment in a blocking force role maintaining a one-hour alert posture.
- (2) Each battalion will maintain as a minimum, one platoon (rein) (Battalion Reserve Force) for employment within the battalions assigned TAOR against a limited or major ground attack. Actions against a limited ground attack shall consist of maneuvering into the enemy's routes of withdrawal and establishing blocking and/or ambush positions.

SECRET

Actions against a major ground attack shall include a limited counter-attack, restoration of positions, or in a support role in the employment of the Regimental Reserve Force.

b. Hq Co, 3d Marines.

- (1) Be prepared to provide a platoon sized Reserve for employment anywhere in the 3d Marines TAOR within the DA NANG enclave.

c. 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

- (1) Designate one platoon (rein) as Battalion Reserve for employment anywhere in the 3d Marines TAOR within the DA NANG enclave.
- (2) Submit plans to this Headquarters NLT 10 December for the employment of the Battalion Reserve Force within the battalions assigned portion of the 3d Marines TAOR.

d. 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

- (1) Designate one Platoon (rein) as Battalion Reserve for employment anywhere in the 3d Marines TAOR within the DA NANG enclave.
- (2) Submit plans to this Headquarters NLT 10 December for the employment of the Battalion Reserve within the battalions assigned portion of the 3d Marines TAOR.

e. 3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines.

- (1) Designate one platoon (rein) as Battalion Reserve for employment anywhere within the HUE-PHU BAI enclave.
- (2) Submit plans to this Headquarters NLT 10 December for the employment of the Battalion Reserve Force.

f. Regimental Reserve: Reserve Company 1/3.

- (1) Be prepared for employment anywhere within the enclaves assigned to the 3d Marine Division as a counter-attack force or as a blocking/ambush force.
- (2) Maintain a one-hour alert posture.
- (3) Prepare plans for movement via:
 - (a) Truck
 - (b) LVT

SECRET

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(c) Air

1 Fixed Wing (C-130)2 Rotary (H-34)

(d) Naval shipping

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 326-65.
- (2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 326-65.
- (3) All plans prepared in support of this annex will be submitted to this Headquarters prior to promulgation for approval.
- (4) Reference (d) to Regimental Operations Order 326-65.
- (5) Each Battalion Reserve Force shall, as a minimum, be task organized as follows:
 - (a) Rifle platoon.
 - (b) One (1) 60MM Mortar Squad
 - (c) One (1) MG Section
 - (d) One (1) 3.5" RL Squad
 - (e) One (1) Arty FO Team (when directed)
- (6) The Regimental Reserve shall, as a minimum, be Task Organized as follows:
 - (a) Rifle Company
 - (b) One (1) 81MM Mortar Section
 - (c) One (1) Arty FO Team
 - (d) One (1) TACP
 - (e) One (1) NGF Spot Team (when directed)
- (7) Maps required in support of this plan, if deployed in an area other than the units normal operating area will be provided by this Headquarters.

SECRET4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administrative control of units deployed in support of this plan remain with the parent unit.

b. The following supplies and equipment will be provided to the Reserve Force on deployment other than within the battalion TAOR.

- (1) CL I - one day of MCIs
- (2) CL II - as required
- (3) CL III - none
- (4) CL IV - none
- (5) CL V
 - (a) Plat (rein). A basic allowance plus ten (10) grenades, hand, smoke, yellow and five (5) grenades, hand, smoke, red.
 - (b) Company (rein). A basic allowance plus thirty-two (32) grenades, hand, smoke, yellow and sixteen (16) grenades, hand, red.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 326-65.

b. Parent units will provide the Mobile Reserve Force with sufficient radio communications to maintain contact with the designated supported unit and this Headquarters.

c. Call signs and frequencies will be provided to committed Reserve Forces by this Headquarters of units with which the committed unit must coordinate.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

E. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 326-65

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Annex H (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: (a) FM 41-10 (Civil Affairs Operations)
 (b) ForO 5800.7
 (c) ForO 5800.3
 (d) RegtO 5080.1

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 326-65

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) One Regional Force Company OPCON 3d Marines.

(2) One Political Action Team (PAT) OPCON, 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

(3) Popular Forces and Regional Forces available to provide assistance in all Civil Affairs programs.

(4) Civic Action (CA) Teams available from I Corps upon request.

2. MISSION. Conduct Civil Affairs programs designed to assist in the eradication of the Viet Cong influence and to support and assist the legally constituted government of the Republic of Vietnam.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept.

(1) The general concept of the Civil Affairs Program within the 3d Marines is based on the guidance provided by reference (a) and will be conducted in two phases.

Phase I - Those actions undertaken during the initial clearing and uncovering operations.

Phase II - Those actions undertaken during the security development of uncovered areas.

(2) Phase I

(a) During clearing and uncovering operations the Civil Affairs effort will be directed towards the destruction of the VC infrastructure, the elimination of VC propaganda opportunities, to initiate GVN support by the population

H-1

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and to provide military intelligence. This can best be accomplished by:

1. The provision of immediate medical attention, to include medical evacuation and material support, in the form of food, shelter and security from the VC influence, within the means of the unit.
2. Through coordination with and the supplementation of psychological operations.
3. Through the utilization of District and Village Officials to determine and meet the immediate specific needs of the people.
4. Through the inducement of the civilian population to accept and converse with the US and GVN officials.
5. Through the establishment of population control check points and immediate relocation areas with designated access routes in coordination with the GVN.

(3) Phase II

(a) During security development operations, the conduct of the Civil Affairs effort will be directed towards the improvement of the political, sociological and economic stature of the civilian population through programs initiated by the GVN while reinforcing the GVN infrastructure. This can best be accomplished by:

1. The establishment of medical teams providing aid to the population as established in references (b) and (d).
2. Through assistance of education restoration programs by providing construction materials, services and educational supplies in accordance with reference (c).
3. Through the arrangement of regular councils with district, village and hamlet officials.
4. Through the provision of maximum opportunities for face-to-face relationships between Vietnamese civilians and military personnel with US personnel.
5. By continuously evaluating psychological opportunities in coordination with CA projects and vice-versa.
6. Providing recreational opportunities for the civilian population utilizing reference (e).

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7. Through the utilization of engineer units to improve public communication, transportation and sanitation.
8. By maintaining standing reserves of food supplies in order to meet combat and seasonal needs.
9. By the provision of essential assistance as may be required by the GVN to establish order and population control.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) All units will develop specific programs based on the concept specified above.
- (2) Maintain continuous liaison with village and hamlet officials within assigned TAORs.
- (3) Available Supplies.
 - (a) Medical. Medical supplies are provided by a III MAF MEDCAP program and may be requisitioned monthly, from this Headquarters, in accordance with references (b) and (d).
 - (b) Foodstuffs. Foodstuffs, including current standing reserves of Bulgar wheat, rice, cooking oil, corn meal and powdered milk are available through Catholic relief and USOM. Units will requisition foodstuffs through this Headquarters as the need arises.
 - (c) Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous materials including school supplies, physical education supplies, carpentry and land clearing supplies, sewing kits, and midwifery kits are available through CARE, and will be requisitioned monthly through this Headquarters in accordance with reference (c).
- (4) Available Services. Light clearing, construction and excavation services are available from engineers and Naval Construction units. Transportation services, both motor and air are available for CA use. Submit requests to this Headquarters as the need arises.
- (5) It is imperative that all CA actions accomplished by all units be coordinated with local officials so that essential efforts are directed towards the most needy and necessary projects.

H-3

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- (6) All areas designated for CA operations should be visited at least weekly, with emphasis on instilling a general health and sanitation consciousness within the civilian population. Aid stations should be located, and nurse trainee programs initiated in order that the GVN can eventually assume control of health and sanitation facilities.
- (7) Respect and protection will be afforded for all arts, monuments, archives, places of worship, public institutions and private property at all times.
- (8) Whenever possible, units will establish communications with villages, hamlets or districts within their TAOR to aid in the defense of the respective village or hamlet.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER


 E. H. MACKEL

 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

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CONFIDENTIAL3d Marines (-) (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
020800H Dec 1965

Annex I (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: (a) FM 33-5

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 326-65.b. Friendly Forces.

(1) One Regional Forces Company OPCON 3d Marines.

(2) One Political Action Team (PAT) OPCON 1stBn, 3d Marines.

2. MISSION. To create, build and maintain confidence in the government of Vietnam and to establish a climate of national and local unity behind the war effort. Additionally, to expose the true nature of Viet Cong objectives and to induce disaffection among the Viet Cong and their supporters and to insure that the people are aware that we are here at the request of the government and will depart when peace is restored.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept.

(1) The basic concept of Psychological Operations within the 3d Marines is founded on the principles constituted by reference (a).

b. 3d Marines.

(1) Conduct Psychological Operations to include Psychological activities and psychological warfare which will encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in the Viet Cong, other hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups, the emotions, attitudes and behavior favorable to the accomplishment of the Government of Vietnam's national and local policies and objectives.

(2) Psychological operations will be conducted through the development of objectives, tasks, themes and action as set forth herein.

CONFIDENTIAL(a) Objectives.

- 1 To create, build and maintain confidence in the government of Vietnam by convincing the people that a (VN/allied) victory is inevitable, and that the government is concerned with the welfare of the people and the best and fastest way to end the war is support of the government of Vietnam.
- 2 Establish an attitude of unity behind the war effort by convincing the people that all government efforts are directed toward the defeat of the Viet Cong and, to accomplish this they must have the effective support of all the population.
- 3 Expose the true nature of the Viet Cong objectives by convincing the people the Viet Cong are tools of international communism, not a patriotic Viet Cong victory will mean the end of individual freedoms and loss of personal dignity.
- 4 Induce disaffection among the Viet Cong and their supporters by convincing them they are fighting for international communism and not an independent Vietnam. Create distrust and fear of Viet Cong leadership and convince the people that a government of Vietnam victory is inevitable.
- 5 Insure that the people of Vietnam are aware that we are here at the request of their government and convince the local population that all allied forces will withdraw once peace is restored.

(b) Tasks and themes are to be originated in the battalion whenever possible, however, the following themes should be avoided.

- 1 No commitment regarding territorial boundaries will be made.
- 2 Only promises attainable within the purview of stated policies of the government of Vietnam and allied forces will be made.
- 3 No promises regarding ultimate disposition of Viet Cong captives.
- 4 No promises or statements will be made regarding specific time periods for withdrawal of allied forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 No promises will be made to any specific group or groups regarding autonomy or political power structure.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Psychological operation resources available to 3d Marines' units consist of printing facilities, loud speakers, aircraft, cultural teams, research and analysis and audio/visual aids teams. All of which may be requested in writing from the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: Psy Ops Off G-3) via the 3d Marines (S-3). For emergency/immediate targets request may be submitted by land line.

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E. H. MACKEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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3d Marines (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 020800H Dec 1965

Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

3d Mar Div	3
9th Marines	1
12th Marines	2
1st Bn, 1st Marines	5
1st Bn, 3d Marines	5
3d Bn, 4th Marines	5
1st Bn, 12th Marines	8
3d Recon Bn	1
3d Tank Bn	1
3d AT Bn	1
1st AmTrac Bn	1
3d MT Bn	1
Co A, 3d Tank Bn	1
Co A, 3d AT Bn	1
3d Engr Bn	1
7th Engr Bn	1
Hq Bn	1
3d SP Bn	1
1st 8" How Plat (SP)	1
Co C, 3d Med Bn	1
MCB-5	1

J-1

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Hq Co, 3d Marines

1

File

10

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 DA NANG, RVN
 300800H Dec 1965

Change No 1 to Operation Order 326-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes in Operation Order 326-65.

a. Basic Order.

- (1) Paragraph 3.e. Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines".
- (2) Paragraph 5.b.(6). Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines".

b. Annex A, page A-1.

- (1) In body change line 2 "Capt NICHOLS" to read "Capt TAYLOR".
- (2) In body change line 5 "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines", and "LtCol VALE" to read "LtCol HANIFIN".

c. Annex F, page F-1.

- (1) Paragraph 1.b.(2)(d). Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines".
- (2) Paragraph 3.d. Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines".

d. Annex F, Appendix I. Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines and change "BEAR MAT" to "CEDAR BIRD".

e. Annex F, Appendix 2, page F-2-1.

- (1) Under UNIT, line 8 change "3/4" to "2/1".
- (2) Under CALL SIGN, line 6 delete "MUTTER".
- (3) Under CALL SIGN, line 9, change "MORTGAGE" to read "MUTTER".

f. Annex F, Appendix 2, page F-2-2.

- (1) Under UNIT, line 8 change "3/4" to "2/1".

SECRET

(2) Under CALL SIGN, line 6 delete "MUTTER".

(3) Under CALL SIGN, line 9 change "MORTGAGE" to read "MUTTER".

g. Annex G, page G-2.

(1) Paragraph 3.e. Change "3d Bn (Rein), 4th Marines" to read "2d Bn (Rein), 1st Marines".

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL FISHER

Van D. BELL Jr
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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Operation Order 326-65

SECRET

SECRET

-IMMEDIATE

THIRD MARINES
COMM CENTER

IMMEDIATE 010120Z

FM: CO THIRD MARINES

TO: CO FIRST BN THIRD MARINES
CO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CO 12TH MARINES
CO THIRD BN FOURTH MARINES
CO THIRD ENGR BN

	ACTION	INFO	INITIALS
CP			
XC			
S-1			
S-2			
S-3			Wahm
S-4			
HQCO			
COMMO			
MTO			
SUPO			

SECRET
 DESIGNATION OF 1ST BN, 3D MARINES FOR EXECUTION DIV OPN PLAN
 353-65
 A. CO THIRD MARINES 300505Z
 1. IN FIRST SENTENCE REF A CHANGE "1ST BN, 1ST MARINES" TO READ
 "1ST BN, 3D MARINES".
 GP-4

COPY 5 OF 6 COPIES

TO: 01/1400H/NOV65/#01/SON/*[Signature]*
 DIST: ALL UNITS
 DIV
 S&C

~~H-A-S-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING COPY

SECRET

Cnel # 6

SECRET

THIRD MARINES
COMM CENTER

IMMEDIATE 020615Z

-IMMEDIATE

FM: CO, THIRD MARINES

TO: CG THIRD MARDIV

HAS BEEN SENT

INFO: CO FIRST BN, FIRST MARINES
CO TWELFTH MARINES
CO FIRST BN THIRD MARINES

	ACTION	INFO	INITIALS
CO			
XO			
S-1			
S-2			
S-3			<i>AK</i>
S-4			
HQCO			
COMMO			
MTO			
SUPO			

SECRET

IMPLEMENTATION OF BOUNDARY CHANGE

A. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 020315Z

1. ACKNOWLEDGE REF A.

2. RECOMMEND BOUNDARY CHANGE BE IMPLEMENTED 3 DEC CONTINGENT UPON ACCEPTANCE OF AREA BY 9TH MARINES AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED AND PLANNED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 9TH MARINES.

OP-4

ROUTING COPY

copy 3 of 8 copies

TOR : 02/1515H/DEC65/#01/ROW/*JM*

DIST: 1/1
S & G HAS BEEN SENT
1/3 VIA COURIER

SECRET

020615Z DEC 65

Encl #9

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, 96601

3dH3Cshlw
 1 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
 Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
 Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

Subj: Conduct of Operation

Ref: (a) CO, 3d MarDiv Secret ltr 3440.3 of 10 Nov 65 Defense of
 Vital Areas, November 1965

Encl: (1) Copy CO, 3d MarDiv ltr 3120.1, 31DPW:jfw, of 27 Nov 1965

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted for
 information.

H.J. CONLIN
 By direction

SECRET

Encl # 10

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FTO San Francisco 96601

3/HJC/hlw
1556
1 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Task Organization; correction of
Ref: (a) DivBul 005440 of 19 Nov 1965
Encl: (1) 3d Marines Task Organization and Personnel Troop List
1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

E.H. MACKEL
By direction

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 2/11

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
1. <u>3d Marines (-) (Rein) (DA NANG- PHU BAI)</u>	161	3737	13	178	4089
a. HqCo (Rein) (DA NANG)	17	197	2	5	221
(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	0	3	0	0	3
b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (DA NANG)	33	980	3	54	1070
c. 1st Bn, 3d Mar (DA NANG)	42	1029	3	52	1126
d. 3d Bn, 4th Mar (Rein) (PHU BAI)	159	1531	5	67	1672
(1) 3d Bn, 4th Mar	35	947	4	58	1044
(2) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	2	10	0	0	12
(3) 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 3d AT Bn (5 M50A1 Ontos)	1	23	0	0	24
(4) 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn	1	40	0	0	41
(5) 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 3d Tank Bn (5 M48A3 Tanks)	1	26	0	0	27
(6) 3d Plt (Rein), Co C, 3d Recon Bn	1	22	0	0	23
2. 4th Bn, 12th Mar (-) (Rein) (PHU BAI)	28	463	1	9	501
a. Hq Btry (-) (Rein) (CMR Team)	14	153	1	3	171
b. Btry M, 4th Bn (SP) (6-155How)	4	123	0	2	129
c. Btry I, 3d Bn (6-105How)	7	119	0	2	128
d. 107mm Mort Btry, 2d Bn (6-Mort)	3	68	0	2	73

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, 96601

3:REashlw
 03433
 2 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-3)
 Via: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Seismic Intrusion Detectors report on

Ref: (a) ForSul 03433, Ser 025965, 22 Oct 1965

Encl: (1) Headquarters Company, 3d Marines SID-150 Report
 (2) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, SID-150 Report
 (3) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, SID-150 Report
 (4) 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, SID-150 Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (4) are submitted.

H.J. DONLIN
 By direction

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl #12

CONFIDENTIALSEMI-MONTHLY SID-150 REPORT

From: Headquarters Company, 3d Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-3)
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FNE
 (2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FNE

1. Unit allowance	8
2. Average number of Seismometers assigned	24
3. Average number of Seismometers available	32
4. Type employment of Seismometers by number	
a. Patrols	0
b. Ambush	0
c. M.R. Defense	0
d. CP Defense	24
e. Interior Guard	0
f. Supply or storage area	0
g. Airfield Defense	0
5. Average number of seismometers down for maintenance.	0
6. Average number of control boxes down.	1
7. Number of Special Occasion reports submitted during period.	0

Enclosure (1)

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CONFIDENTIALSEMI-MONTHLY SID-150 REPORT

From: 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-3)
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 (2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

1. Unit allowance	20
2. Average number of Seismometers assigned	20
3. Average number of Seismometers available	20
4. Type employment of Seismometers by number	
a. Patrols	0
b. Ambush	0
c. MIA Defense	17
d. CP Defense	0
e. Interior Guard	0
f. Supply or storage area	0
g. Airfield Defense	0
5. Average number of seismometers down for maintenance.	1
6. Average number of control boxes down.	1
7. Number of Special Occasion reports submitted during period.	0

Enclosure (2)
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CONFIDENTIALSMEL-MONTHLY SID-150 REPORT

From: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-3)
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 (2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

1. Unit allowance	20	
2. Average number of Seismometers assigned	23	
3. Average number of Seismometers available	22	
4. Type employment of Seismometers by number		
a. Patrols	0	
b. Ambush	19	
c. MLE Defense	3	
d. CF Defense	0	
e. Interior Guard	0	
f. Supply or storage area	0	
g. Airfield Defense	0	
5. Average number of seismometers down for maintenance.		0
6. Average number of control boxes down.		1
7. Number of Special Occasion reports submitted during period.		0

Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSEISM-REPTLY SID-150 REPORT

From: 3d Battalion, 4th Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-3)
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 (2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

- | | | |
|--|----|---|
| 1. Unit allowance | 32 | |
| 2. Average number of Seismometers assigned | 34 | |
| 3. Average number of Seismometers available | 34 | |
| 4. Type employment of Seismometers by number | | |
| a. Patrols | 0 | |
| b. Ambush | 1 | |
| c. A&R Defense | 8 | |
| d. CP Defense | 4 | |
| e. Interior Guard | 0 | |
| f. Supply or storage area | 0 | |
| g. Airfield Defense | 5 | |
| 5. Average number of seismometers down for maintenance. | | 0 |
| 6. Average number of control boxes down. | | 0 |
| 7. Number on Special Occasion reports submitted during period. | | 0 |

Note: In addition to employment of Seismometers as indicated in paragraph 4, six were employed at Observation Post.

Enclosure (1)
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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/HJC/jdw
3000
3 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (SOI-3)
Subj: Tactical Employment of Popular Force Units with Marine Units
Ref: (a) Div Bul 3300 of 15 Nov 1965
Encl: (1) OO, 1st Bn, 1st Marines ltr 3/FWM/jwb over 3300 dtd 25Nov65
(2) OO, 1st Bn, 3d Marines ltr 3/RRD over 3300 dtd 26Nov65
(3) OO, 3d Bn, 4th Marines ltr 3/WOR/dur over 3400 dtd 29Nov65

1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Methods and procedures now being used to integrate Popular Forces and Marine actions.

a. At present there are two distinct methods and procedures being employed by this Regiment to integrate Popular Forces and Marine unit actions. The first method employed by the 1st Bn, 1st Marines and the 1st Bn, 3d Marines involves the coordination of Popular Force Units with Marine operations and employment of supporting arms. This technique requires direct liaison between U. S. Marine Battalions and Companies and District and Village Chiefs; usually in the form of a liaison team with a communications capability physically present at the Chief's Headquarters. This method coordinates activities of both forces for offensive and defensive operations. Participating by Popular Forces in offensive operations i.e., patrols, search and clear operations is usually limited to providing guides or specialists in techniques of search, since these operations go beyond the normal village security mission assigned to Popular Forces. The more notable participation of integrated and coordinated action takes place in planned defenses where Popular Forces Security Posts and defensive locations are in close proximity or adjacent to battalion's defenses. In these instances, close coordination is maintained for artillery and mortar fires, night ambushes, patrols and listening posts.

b. The second method employed by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Hue Phu Bai involves the integration of four Marine rifle squads into four Popular Force platoons commanded by a Marine lieutenant with a Vietnamese lieutenant executive officer. This method was initiated for two principal reasons: (1) The Popular Forces and their area of operations covered several districts and villages requiring liaison with several district and village agencies;

CONFIDENTIAL
Encl 413

HEADQUARTERS
 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), MAF
 FPO, San Francisco, California, 96601

3300
 3/RRD/dah
 28 Nov 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines

Subj: Tactical Employment of Popular Force Units with Marine Units

Ref: (a) IMvHul 3300 of 15 Nov 1965

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted:

a. Procedures to be used to integrate Popular Forces and Marine Units.

(1) The Battalion Commander and B-2 are in the process of meeting with each Village Chief in the TAOR to determine if the following procedures can be effected:

(a) Integrate the more reliable PF's into night ambushes down to the Fire Team level.

(b) Integrate the less reliable into daytime patrols and hamlet search operations only.

b. Recommended procedures to assist the Popular Forces in the conduct of training and operations:

(1) Assist each village Popular Force Unit to organize its defense of their village or hamlet.

(2) Where possible arrange for Popular Force Units to participate in rifle company training programs, especially those training periods directed toward developing the PF's tactical skills.

2. Prior to developing more ambitious plans for training Popular Forces Units the following action is being initiated:

a. Obtain from District Headquarters accurate figures on the number, pay scale, and command structure of Popular Forces in the TAOR.

b. Coordinate the night time functions of Popular Forces with the Village Chiefs to ensure that there is no interference with our operations.

R. R. DIOKEY III

ENCLOSURE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

S&C FILES
3D MARINES
61165

S&C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)
650308
HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion (Rein), 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force Copy 2 of 3 copies
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

3/WCR/dm
3480
29 Nov 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
Subj: Tactical Employment of Popular Force Units with Marine Units
Ref: (a) DivBul 3300 dtd 15Nov65
Encl: (1) Joint Action Company, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

1. To assist in the compliance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Methods and Procedures now being used to integrate Popular Force and Marine actions:

a. The essence of the success of this battalion's integration with PFs lies in the nature of that integration. As indicated in enclosure (1), the PFs and Marines here are part of a permanent team.

b. The PFs in this area are under the OP CON of this battalion and therefore are directly responsive to the overall requirements within our TAOR.

3. Recommended procedures to assist the Popular Forces in the conduct of training and operations:

a. Demonstration and application are the most effective methods of training for PFs. Marines and PFs should train together. The PF feels himself an equal this way and is more acceptive to the training (See Annex A to enclosure (1)).

b. On the job training, alongside Marines, is extremely valuable. The Marine sets the quiet example and the PF patterns himself after the Marine. This occurs by living in comradeship with the Marine and by patrolling and ambushing with Marines daily.

4. Additional Comments and Recommendations.

a. The PF is the key to security of village areas. When he is considered important and treated as such he will respond.

1

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

ENCLOSURE (3)

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b. Marines working with PFs have the opportunity of doing a great deal of good. They should be carefully selected, allowed to work on a permanent basis with PFs, and, if possible, attend a special school to prepare them for this mission. The school should explain the best methods of self-help in learning to speak Vietnamese, and should emphasize local customs, economics, politics, and the broad aspects of counterinsurgency. Such screening and training will result in a more effective program.

S. A. VALE
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT ACTION COMPANY, 3D BATTALION, 4TH MARINES1. Background

a. The original TAOR assigned this battalion was considered tactically undesirable as it did not include sufficient terrain to the north of our vital installations to insure the successful accomplishment of our mission. The enemy could invade the semi-circle of villages in this area at his leisure and bring our installation under mortar attack.

b. Negotiations were begun with the Vietnamese to secure this area, called the "A" Zone (see Annex C), and at the same time gain control of the local Popular Force Platoons. Due to our lack of interpreters, operational control of the Popular Force Platoons was considered essential for population control if we assumed responsibility for the "A" Zone with its 12,000 people.

c. As an interim measure we began to send in medical teams to hold sick call for the villages. This served a two fold purpose. First, it helped to win the trust and friendship of the villages. Secondly, it provided a much needed orientation and familiarization for our troops. We sent a different rifle company or platoon with each medical team as security on their visit to each village.

d. On 21 June 1965 our TAOR was increased by the addition of the "A" Zone. With this area we were given operational control of the Popular Force Platoons at Thuy Luong, Thuy Tan and Thuy Phu, plus the Popular Force Platoon at Phu Bai Bridge. The Commanding General of the 1st ARVN Division gave operational control of the Popular Forces to the Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion (Rein), 4th Marines (-) (Rein).

e. Upon assuming responsibility for the "A" Zone, we also established radio communications with each village headquarters. We surveyed in and registered, with smoke, artillery concentrations in each village so that the village chiefs could call for supporting fires as required. We also formed a "Civilian Military Advisory Council" with the villagers to meet and discuss problems of mutual interest.

f. At this time we had approximately a rifle company committed in securing this area. As an economy of force measure, it was decided that by using fewer Marines and assigning them to the villages on a permanent basis, we could achieve greater security and a better Vietnamese-American relationship. As a result of this decision the Joint Action Company (JAC) was formed, composed of Marines and the Popular Force Platoons.

g. Before describing the Joint Action Company and its operations, it might be noted that in August our TAOR was again enlarged to include two hamlets of LOC BON Village. With this increase, we received 2,000 more civilians and two more Popular Force Platoons. (One of which is the AN NONG River Bridge Platoon.)

2. Organization of the Joint Action Company

a. General. By agreement, operational control of six Popular Forces Platoons within the TAOR of 3d Battalion (Rein), 4th Marines (-) (Rein) was given to the Commanding Officer. These six Popular Forces Platoons were, and continue to be, assigned to four villages and two bridges. A plan to utilize these platoons properly was needed.

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b. Concept of the Joint Action Company. A plan was developed which created a Joint Action Company composed of Marines and Popular Forces personnel. A battalion officer and recent graduate of Vietnamese Language School, was named Company Commander. Under his leadership the program got under way.

c. 1st Provisional Platoon. One T/O squad of hand picked Marines from each Rifle Company was selected to become a permanently organized unit. These four squads were called the 1st Provisional Marine Platoon.

d. Popular Forces Company. The six Popular Forces Platoons were brought together in spirit by the appointment of an ARVN Lieutenant as Company Commander.

e. Joint Action Company. The 1st Provisional Marine Platoon and the Popular Forces Company became the Joint Action Company under the command of the Marine officer with the ARVN Lieutenant as Executive Officer. Each Marine squad was assigned to work with one of the four Popular Forces Platoons assigned to villages. The Joint Action Company Headquarters is small with a Marine Sergeant, three Marine drivers/radio operators/supply men, and three Popular Force radio operators composing the group.

f. Relationships. As indicated above, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines has operational control over the six Popular Force Platoons within the TAQt. This authority was delegated by the Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division. Administrative Control remains with the village-district-province-political channels. The battalion's op-con authority is exercised through the Commanding Officer of the Joint Action Company. In each village the Marine Squad Leader is responsible for the operations of the integrated unit. Operationally, his commands are passed through the Popular Force Platoon Commander to the Vietnamese members of the unit. Although Marines command and lead, they always consult their counterparts for approval, or a mutually satisfying solution to each situation. Their tact and personal leadership qualities are extremely important. All matters pertaining to the village other than tactical operations are accomplished through and in conjunction with the village chief. In tactical operations, the village chief is of course consulted and kept informed.

3. Training. See Annex A.

4. Operations. Counterinsurgency is a total effort to defeat subversive insurgency. The operations of the Joint Action Company are designed to approach that goal and tend to cover a wide spectrum of activities ranging from night ambushes to volley ball games.

a. Tactical Operations. The Joint Action Company has been able to conduct recon patrols, ambushes, and security patrols averaging about twenty per week in all four villages. It has conducted blocking operations in conjunction with ARVN and Marine units, led search operations, and has staked out suspected VC huts. The Company has also conducted two night raids by Sampan on an adjacent hamlet suspected of being a staging area for VC supplies. While no fire fights have resulted as yet, the Joint Action Company has been able to capture 21 VC and VC suspects of which 9 were found to be VC and 12 were VCS.

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b. Intelligence. Prior to the formation of the Joint Action Company no concrete or timely intelligence information was received from the villages adjacent to the Battalion TAOR. VC domination in the villages varied from 20% to 35%. This concentration was enough to intimidate the population to such an extent as to deny us pertinent information concerning VC activities. The advent of the Joint Action Company relieved the people of fear of VC retaliation and intelligence information has been freely offered since that time.

c. Counterintelligence. Since the inception of the Joint Action Company, VC activity in the villages has become almost non-existent. By being bordered on the North by the village area the Battalion was vulnerable to observation and attack by VC forces who mixed with the population. The presence of Marines in the villages has denied the VC the use of these areas. Propaganda leaflets are rarely if ever found in the villages and propaganda lectures by VC cadre have ceased altogether. VC propaganda lectures were common practice when the battalion first assumed responsibility for the TAOR. The greatest single advantage derived from the Joint Action Company is the denial of use of the population and village area as a base for guerrilla operations.

d. Economic Influences. Upon initial entry to the villages, prices of goods sold to Marines were double and triple the normal rate. So as not to disrupt the economic balance of the communities, the Joint Action Company refrained from buying anything for a period of time. After several weeks the villagers realized the Marines were present as members of the community with a job to do. All goods and food were then offered to the Marines at the proper price. Through civic action, the Joint Action Company is attempting to raise the economic status of the area by assisting in road repairs, maintenance of water wells, medical aid, etc.

e. Psychological Operations. Propaganda leaflets have been distributed several times, however, word of mouth appears to be the most effective means. Marines are trying to influence the people by offering friendship, civic aid and protection as representatives of the South Vietnamese Government. Some tricks have been taken from the VC handbook, such as putting out the word that the Joint Action Company is looking for a certain VC cadre, or verbally exploiting the successes of the Joint Action Company or other friendly units. Much of this work is through the Popular Forces as the Vietnamese to Vietnamese approach in this area is more effective than American to Vietnamese.

f. Civic Action. See Annex B.

g. Coordination and Liaison. Coordination between all levels, civil and military-American and Vietnamese are handled by the Company Commander and Executive Officer. Contact with the principle people was made early in the operation so lines of mutual support could be established. After initial liaison was made, close contact has been maintained with civil, military and police heads for mutual assistance in intelligence and operations. Close contact with counter-intelligence people and access to information from covert agents has also proven very important.

5. Conclusion

a. The Joint Action Company program has resulted in a feeling, on the part

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of all members of the Battalion, that our mission in Vietnam is truly worthwhile. We have developed a sense of responsibility toward the villages and their once strange names of Thuy Phu, Thuy Luong, Thuy Tan and Loc Bon are now part of our daily vocabulary. The Popular Forces are our friends. Whereas once they were looked upon as less than trustworthy and little more effective than armed civilians, they now have earned the respect of their Marine comrades-in-arms.

b. This program of sharing the work of defeating insurgency on a team basis has paid off. The village people can see, each day, the meaningfulness of the relationship. The Marines may be big, shoot well, and take care of their equipment well, but the Popular Forces know the area and people and can close the gap in military proficiency by hard work. The Marines are not advisors, and they certainly are not French.

c. The program can be enlarged to other areas. However, a key point, is that these Popular Force Platoons are under our operation control which is necessary for this program. Support in the way of uniforms, weapons and radios is required. Marines of high caliber are needed. The ratio of a Marine squad to a Popular Force Platoon is excellent.

d. One thought occurs as we examine this program and that is that the more successful this program becomes (the more Vietnamese villagers are impressed by the security and confidence of the Joint Action Company) the greater will be the VC attempts to destroy the program. In this regard all members of the Joint Action Company have been schooled and their alertness and preparedness are marks of their desire to succeed.

ANNEXES.

- A Training of the JAC
- B Civic Action
- C Sketch of TAO

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TRAINING OF THE JAC

1. The Marines involved in this program are selected volunteers from each rifle company in the Battalion. The necessary traits Marines must have for this program are intelligence, the ability to react quickly to a situation, a solid knowledge of tactics and general military subjects, the ability to get along with people, tact, and above all, patience.

2. Preliminary Training of the Marine Rifle Squads

a. General Counter-insurgency Operations. Marines have been taught concepts of counter-insurgency and the involvement of the people of the area in combating the effectiveness of the guerrilla.

b. Orientation to Political Military Structure of South Vietnam. It is important for Marines to understand the dual command and administrative structure of South Vietnam's political, military system in order to understand the position of various people in the hierarchy and how to act towards them. Marines must also understand their position in the military structure.

c. Viet Cong Tactics and Techniques. Marines are familiar with the way the enemy operates so as to effectively combat him and avoid his traps. The Joint Action Company frequently use the VC tactics themselves.

d. Communications. All Marines in the unit must know radio procedure and the operations of the AN/PnC-10

e. Artillery FO Procedure. Registered concentrations are plotted around each village along avenues of approach. Each man is familiar with these concentrations and able to adjust artillery fire from them.

f. Population Control. Marines have been taught to work population control techniques through the Popular Force element of the organization so as not to irritate the civilians or appear as an occupation force themselves.

g. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence. Marines must know how and what to look for and how to report the information in a usable form. Also, how to counter the enemies' intelligence collection efforts through psychological warfare operations, tactical operations, population control and acquisition of the people's trust in them through friendship and protection.

h. Language. Vietnamese language training is continuous and is very important. So few Americans can speak Vietnamese that the people are surprised and pleased that someone will try to learn their language. Besides the communication aspect, learning the language is a means of extending bonds of friendship.

i. Mission, Concept and Means of Affecting. Before embarking on counter-insurgency operations, all concerned must know what they are trying to accomplish and how to do it. This has been related to the particular situation of the area and locality in which they are working. To employ the necessary initiative and adapt to the rapidly changing situations of counter-insurgency, the mission and all its aspects must be clear in the mind of each man.

A-1

Annex (A)

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2. Training of the Joint Action Platoons (PF Platoon and Marine Rifle Squad).

a. Training of the village platoons is directed towards the training of the complete intergrated unit. Marines go through the training with the Popular Forces, with the objective of building a single unit. Classes are conducted in Vietnamese and English and include a demonstration which is followed up by practical application. An extensive demonstration has been found to be the most effective means of teaching and should amount to approximately one third of every class. The training of the Popular Forces has been one of the most promising aspects of the program. They enjoy formal classes and work hard for praise for a job well done. Improvement in discipline and military manner is becoming quite evident; they will not go outside without their covers, they carry rifles like Marines; every day another Popular Force soldier turns up with a "Marine Haircut". The patrolling and ambush technique of the unit as a whole is excellent and their marksmanship is improving.

b. Scouting and Patrolling. The Popular Forces use some variations of techniques which Marines have not been exposed to. As a result, there is a two-way exchange of information.

c. Marksmanship. Classes are conducted in marksmanship and maintenance of weapons (M-14, Carbine, TLMBA Submachine Gun and the Bar). Each platoon fires on the range every three weeks with an armorer from 3d Battalion (Rein) 4th Marines (-) (Rein), present to perform minor maintenance on the weapons.

d. Ambushes and Counter-action. After initial classes, work in this area has been mostly practical application with a critique held every few days. The Popular Forces are capable of some very sophisticated forms of ambush and counter-action plans. Counter-action drills are held at least once a week.

e. Handling of POW's. Initially the Popular Forces had no concept of prisoner handling. After several classes and actual handling of prisoners with Marines, the Popular Forces can now handle prisoners properly.

f. Intelligence Needs and Collection. As members of the village, the Popular Forces have access to any information in the village. The Village and Hamlet Chiefs should be aware of the essential element of information, as they are also an important source of information.

g. Population Control. The Joint Action Company, Hamlet Chiefs, Village Chiefs and District Chiefs must know who is living in the area and whether or not he belongs there. All sweeps, population checks and police actions are made by Vietnamese Forces, Police, Popular Forces or Regional Forces. Marines are used as blocking or screening forces with other Vietnamese units, but do not enter houses since the "Gestapo" concept must not be attributed to the Marines if the program is to be successful. The routes of travel, land and water, are controlled and curfew and identification measures are being strengthened. Population control is handled in a discreet and tactful manner so as not to cause undue irritation of the people. Sweeps and population checks should have a reason based on intelligence reports.

h. Communications. Vietnamese and Marines must be able to communicate. Therefore, besides the language program, arm and hand signal communications have been established, based on the Marine Corps system.

A-2

Annex (A)

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CIVIC ACTION

1. The Civic Action as performed by the Joint Action Company is toward the overall organization effort. As always the most important and receptive program is the medical aid. The Battalion Medical Team visits each village once each week. This team is composed of the Battalion Medical Officer, three U. S. Navy Corpsman and the Popular Forces Corpsman of the village visited (usually two). Prior to employment of the Joint Action Company, this team treated from 200-300 patients at each visit. Since the Joint Action Company now holds daily sick call, the number has been reduced to approximately 75-100 per visit. This allows the Medical Officer to spend more time with the more serious cases and better utilize his time.

2. Another reason that the medical cases have been reduced has no doubt been the distribution of soap. Soap is a luxury in Vietnam and to use it needlessly is considered wasteful. Giving the soap to adults, rather than the children, has proven more beneficial. After each distribution, classes are held on the proper use of soap and its hygiene value. These classes are normally held for the village officials and the Popular Forces Platoon and the word is carried down to the people. Another method was tried in the village of Thuy Tan and proved quite successful. The squad operating in this village offered to demonstrate the proper method of washing infants and small children and invited the mothers of the village to participate. As the mothers brought up their children, one Marine undressed the child, one Marine washed, one rinsed, one dried and another redressed the child. This project was not only considered successful in the improvement of hygiene but did much to enhance the United States Marines' image in this village. Over all, it is believed that proper hygiene and improved sanitation measures can reduce 70-80% of the sickness in this area.

3. Although the roads and bridges are a military necessity within the area, the repairs of such must also be considered civic action. Marines and Popular Forces, whenever time is available, make repairs to roads and bridges within their area. On many occasions, civilians have joined in, after watching the work for a while. Many other contacts with civilians should be considered as civic acts because they do enhance the overall civil affairs program. Simple everyday contacts, whether it is helping a man push a heavy cart, helping a woman with a heavy load, or picking up a child who has fallen, are all important in this program. Many Vietnamese have invited the Marines to eat with them or offered them food for their use. These acts of friendship are proof of a "working" program.

4. It is felt that since the Joint action Company is actually with the people everyday and most nights they are our most important civic action project. It is also felt that this program does much for the civil affairs effort which in turn is a major support in accomplishing our military mission.

B-1

Annex (B)

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco 96601

3/MJO/jdw
 3000
 4 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: G-3(REDCOPS))
 Subj: Command REDCOPS
 Ref: (a) FMFPAGD P003000.5

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following REDCOPS is submitted:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Label</u>	<u>Date</u>
Hq Co.	ORPERS	C-1
	ORCOP	C-2/Unk
	ORSUP	C-1
	ORTRO	C-1
1st Battalion, 1st Marines	ORPERS	C-1
	ORCOP	C-1
	ORSUP	C-2/Unk
	ORTRO	C-1
1st Battalion, 3d Marines	ORPERS	C-1
	ORCOP	C-1
	ORSUP	C-2/Unk
	ORTRO	C-1
3d Battalion, 4th Marines	ORPERS	C-2/Unk
	ORSUP	C-2/Unk
	ORCOP	C-2/Unk
	ORTRO	C-1

T. H. FISHER

Encl = 14

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 FPO San Francisco, Calif 96601

3: HJC:hlw
 0000
 28 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Attn: G-3 (REDOPS))
 Subj: Command REDOPS
 Ref: (a) DivO 03000.5
 (b) FMFPAC 003000.5

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), the following REDOPS is submitted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TRANS</u>	<u>LABEL</u>	<u>DATA</u>
2d Bn, 1st Mar	C	CRPERS	C2/C1 unknown
	C	CRBQP	C2/C1 unknown
	C	CRSUP	C1
	C	CRTRG	C1

T.H. FISHER

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl #15

CO	/
XO	/
11013	

HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 FPO San Francisco, Calif 96601

3/JAM/hlw
29 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Boat report

Ref: (a) Telecon Maj HIAZ, 3d MarDiv, G-3 Sec., of 272155H Dec.65

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following Boat Report is submitted:

a. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

(1) Has one fourteen foot aluminum boat and one fourteen foot wooden boat and one nineteen horse power outboard motor.

(2) To date the battalion has not employed their boats.

(3) The Battalion has no problem with the boats.

(4) The Battalion feels it has a sufficient number of boats.

(5) It is considered that patrols might have a use for a small portable two man boat for stream crossing.

b. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.

(1) This Battalion has two eight man rubber boats (LCR).

(2) As yet, the battalion has not had an opportunity to employ the boats on land.

(3) The number of boats presently on hand is considered adequate.

(4) No problems have been experienced in employment of the boats.

(5) The Battalion intends to use the boats for river crossings and small unit river patrols.

c. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

(1) This Battalion has three boats; one fibre glass boat with a 40 horse powered outboard motor and two fourteen foot wooden boats. The outboard motor is presently being repaired.

Comd-16

(2) It is considered that if the Battalion had more boats that they could be effectively utilized especially at the NAM O Bridge area.

(3) Sand bars in the river would cause some problems in the employment of small boats.

(4) The Battalion could effectively utilize eight boats.

(5) Boats would be employed as follows:

(a) Two at NAM O Bridge

(b) Four in the LE MY area along the SONG CA DE.

(c) Two small portable boats on inland waterways.

H.J. CONLIN
By direction

20
XO/MLB

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, Calif 96601

3/HJC/hlw
29 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn: Aide-de-Camp)

Subj: Senator SYMINGTON's Visit 3d Marine Division 29 Dec;

1. The below is a list of units/staffs and principle personnel visited.

UNIT/STAFF

III MAR Staff Briefing
3d Medical Battalion
Company C, 3d Medical Battalion
Le My Village

3d Marines Command Post

Company C, 1st Battalion,
3d Marines, Command Post

Company B, 1st Battalion,
1st Marines, Command Post

PRINCIPLE PERSONNEL

Col G.C. AXTELL, Chief of Staff
Cmdr A.C. WILSON, Commanding Officer
LtCmdr R.H. ESQUJEDA, Commanding Officer
LtCol R.R. DICKEY III, Commanding Officer
1st Battalion, 3d Marines

Capt J.C. WILSON, Commanding Officer
Co A, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
Lt J.E. WILKERSON, MCUSN
Battalion Surgeon, 1st Battalion,
3d Marines

Col T.H. FISHER, Commanding Officer
LtCol V.D. BELL, Executive Officer

Capt R.L. BROMWELL, Commanding Officer,
Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

LtCol H.A. HATCH, Commanding Officer
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
Capt R.R. RAISELIS, Commanding Officer,
Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

H.J. CONLIN
By direction

Encl 17

3/HJO/jdw
3480
2 Dec 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 3d Battalion (Main), 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
ltr 3/JPS/rsa over 3480 dtd 28 Nov 1965

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
To: Captain R. A. RUSSELL, OIC 3d Marine Division Sniper Team

Subj: Sniper Team Summary Form; submission of

1. Forwarded.

E. H. MACKEL
By direction

Encl 2118

HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion (Rein), 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
 3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

3/JPS/rea
 3480
 28 Nov 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Captain R. A. MUSSELL, OIC 3d Marine Division Sniper Team
 Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines (Attn: S-3)

Subj: Sniper Team Summary Form; submission of

Encl: (1) Summary Form of Cpl GARY EDWARDS
 (2) Summary Form of Cpl BARNEY H. GASTON
 (3) Summary Form of Pfc JOHN ERICKSON
 (4) Summary Form of Pfc THOMAS M. HICKS

1. During the period of 23-25 November 1965, the Battalion Sniper Team, with the S-2 Scouts, proceeded by vehicle to the NAM HOA District Headquarters (YD 763128), where, in coordination with the District Chief, they entered the TAOR from the western side to conduct reconnaissance and sniper activities. In the afternoon of 23 November 1965, while employed on Hill 109 (YD 767136), seven VC were sighted approximately 1000 meters from this position. The Sniper Team, moving within 600 meters of the VC, killed two and wounded one.

2. Enclosure (1), (2), (3), and (4) contain the statements of the members of the Sniper Team involved in this section.

W. C. RUTHAZER
 By ~~Signature~~ Direction

3/JMK/hlw
1300
29 Dec 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st Bn., 3d Mar AA form dtd 23 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Subj: Request for personnel

1. Forwarded.

H.J. CONLIN
By direction

Encl 4 19