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THE ROLE OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES IN UNITED STATES DEFENSE STRATEGY

The need for GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

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The strategic nuclear forces are only the first part of the United States defense Triad. As President Ford has pointed out, they require no more than about 20 per cent of the total budget, even when a number of indirect costs are allocated to them. The general purpose forces, consisting of our theater nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities (which, for all practical purposes, include our mobility forces and support to other nations), are by far the most expensive part of our defense establishment. For FY 1976, the National Guard and Reserve forces alone will cost the Federal Government $5.6 billion in total obligational authority.

Even during a generation of great U.S. strategic nuclear superiority, the theater nuclear and non-nuclear forces had important roles to play. Now, in the era of Vladivostok and strategic equivalence, their importance has increased still more. It is essential, therefore, that the basis for these two parts of the defense Triad be discussec in some detail.

Theater Nuclear Forces

I hardly need remind the Congress that it was the American scientific community which in its wisdom led the effort to develop and deploy our theater nuclear forces. But however much the original initiative lay with us, the Soviet Union has shown the liveliest possible interest in the concept of theater nuclear warfare. As a consequence, it is now the Soviets who set the pace here, as they do in so many other respects.

Soviet peripheral attack and theater nuclear forces are numerous, diversified, and of high quality. Their medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) capabilities represent a powerful potential threat to our allies in Europe and Asia as well as to U.S. forces stationed in these theaters. In addition, Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—while primarily seen as antiship weapons—could be used for strategic missions, including attacks on European and Asian targets as well as on U.S. coastal cities and installations. Other long-range forces include a major portion of the Soviet medium bombers which, while assigned to the long-range aviation (LRA) of the U.S.S.R., and having a marginal intercontinental attack capability, are oriented primarily toward targets in Europe and Asia.

Shorter-range Soviet capabilities include nuclear-capable tactical aircraft

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and a series of mobile surface-to-surface missiles, many of which have an off-road capability. These forces can be rapidly deployed from one front or theater to another and, as we know, can be transferred to other countries as well. Pact commanders appear to plan on the rapid application of firepower, with priority given to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear delivery units. Pact armored forces are postured to exploit these attacks by rapidly seizing territory in the West.

This is not a situation that we can ignore or wish away, particularly where our NATO Allies are concerned. Accordingly, we continue to deploy our own theater nuclear forces in both Europe and Asia. In the case of Europe, we have three basic reasons for our deployments. First, the maintenance of theater nuclear capabilities in NATO is essential to deterrence as long as the Warsaw Pact deploys theater nuclear forces of its own. They help to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the Pact and, along with our strategic nuclear and conventional forces, provide a general deterrent across the entire spectrum of possible aggression. Second, should deterrence fail, our theater nuclear capabilities provide a source of limited and controlled options other than the early use of U.S. and allied strategic forces. Third, in keeping with NATO's flexible response strategy, we do not rule out the use of nuclear weapons by the United States and its allies if that should prove necessary to contain and repel a major conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact.

While the NATO Alliance has made progress in developing an armory of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes, much work on this leg of the NATO Triad remains to be done. This includes—as stipulated by Public Law 93-356 (the Nunn Amendment)—striving further to reduce the vulnerability of the tactical systems already deployed, improving our doctrines for the tactical use of nuclear weapons, and improving our ability to minimize collateral damage and escalation if the Alliance decides to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. As we continue to come to grips with these problems NATO should also consider whether, in the future, there are serious possibilities of replacing the existing stockpiles with nuclear weapons and delivery systems more appropriate to the European environment.

It would be premature at this time to summarize ongoing work to grapple with these problems within the Alliance or to provide a specific report along the lines required by Public Law 93-365. Nonetheless, we can already see in outline five major conditions that our theater nuclear forces must meet if their effectiveness as a deterrent is to be materially increased.

First, we must reduce their vulnerability to sabotage, seizure, and conventional assault. Measures are already underway to ensure this condition in cooperation with our allies.

Second, the vulnerability of these forces to surprise nuclear attack should be reduced, and the more exposed dual-capable systems should have the capability to disperse quickly so as to match a surprise dispersal by the Warsaw Pact. And even after dispersal, all forces should also increase the survivability, controllability, and effectiveness of the force.

Third, we need to improve our centralized command and control and campaign assessment capabilities to the point where reliable and comprehensive information about both non-nuclear and nuclear attacks, and the status of defending forces, can be more rapidly and reliably communicated to those political leaders who hold the responsibility for nuclear decisions and the release of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, target acquisition systems that can survive at least the first phase of any nuclear use still remain essential if we are to be able to implement a range of selective and controlled options, and at the same time limit the collateral damage from their implementation.

Fifth, we should continue to develop selective, carefully controlled options that will permit us:

- To enhance our ability to deal with major penetrations of an allied sector and achieve a quick, decisive reversal of the tactical situations; and
- To engage, if necessary, in a

The U.S.S.R. ground forces are estimated at about 1.7 million men marshalled into 166 divisions of varying sizes and degrees of readiness.

interdiction campaign against enemy lines of communication.

Both basic options are designed so as to minimize the incentives for the enemy to reply at all or to respond with uncontrolled attacks. As I indicated earlier, changes in the size and composition of our deployed nuclear stockpiles and systems will improve our ability to accomplish these ends.

It should be evident that these are demanding conditions, and that they will be difficult to satisfy. For that reason, and for many others as well, we cannot regard our theater nuclear forces as a substitute for powerful conventional capabilities. They have a unique role to play in the spectrum of deterrence, and we should continue to maintain and improve them. But we cannot lean on them as a crutch in place of a strong non-nuclear leg to the deterrent Triad.

Non-nuclear Forces

Last year, this report emphasized the importance of modernizing our concepts about nuclear deterrence. This year, it is equally essential to think in fresh terms about the role of our non-nuclear forces. The deterrence of non-nuclear war is probably the most challenging and complex problem that faces the defense planner. In part this is simply because credible conventional deterrence across a broad range of contingencies is difficult to achieve with high confidence in a turbulent world. But in addition, the challenge is so great because of the magnitude of the non-nuclear capabilities fielded by potential rivals in the international arena.

Opposing Capabilities

The most imposing of these capabilities is at the command of the U.S.S.R. We currently estimate Soviet ground forces at about 1.7 million men (paramilitary organizations aside) marshalled into 166 divisions of varying sizes and degrees of readiness. These forces could deploy over 40,000 tanks and would have the support of more than 7,000 tactical aircraft (excluding the medium bombers of long-range aviation and naval aviation). Soviet naval forces consist of about 220 major surface combatants (including one new aircraft carrier already launched and two helicopter anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) carriers) and approximately 265 general purpose submarines (of which about 80 are nuclear). These naval forces are distributed among four separate fleets.

The Soviets maintain 31 divisions in Eastern Europe, along with about 1,500 tactical aircraft. Of this imposing total, 27 divisions and 1,200 tactical aircraft are deployed against the sensitive Center Region of NATO. The total Warsaw Pact capability in East Germany, Poland, and Czechosolvakia consists of 58 divisions, about 16,000 tanks, and nearly 2,900 tactical aircraft. A powerful assault force, nearly half of it Soviet in origin, stands poised near the heart of Western Europe.

The U.S.S.R. also maintains a force of more than 40 divisions and 900 tactical aircraft deployed in Soviet Asia. This force probably exceeds what is required to defend against a Chinese attack. Therefore, some of this capability, along with the Pacific Fleet of the U.S.S.R., could be used against U.S. forces or allies if the need should arise. The Soviets, in short, have the forces to wage a two-front war—in Europe against NATO, and in Asia against either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the United States and its allies.

The Chinese, with an Army of around 3.5 million men and 210 divisions, deploy more than 90 of their divisions in regions opposite these Soviet forces.

Non-nuclear Deterrence

It is the continued view of the United States and its allies that all parties would gain from a mutual and balanced reduction of forces, particularly in Central Europe. But as is the case with Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the strategic nuclear forces, even if we were to achieve reductions and a state of parity in conventional capabilities, we would still face the problem of how unilaterally to plan our forces and assure a condition of deterrence. Here as elsewhere, detente and arms control do not absolve us from dealing with force-planning issues in a

systematic way. To proceed otherwise—and especially to cut away more or less casually at our general purpose forces—would be not merely to sink us to the status of a second-rate power, as it were, by default; it would be to undermine deterrence and collective security, and bring the fundamental interests of the United States (and perhaps its survival as well) into the gravest possible danger.

Unfortunately, the legend still lingers, especially in Europe, that because potential opponents have such imposing non-nuclear capabilities, the conventional deterrence of major conflict is infeasible, and that we present our budgets for these very costly forces based on the product of some inner bureaucratic interest and momentum. But while both aspects of the legend are false, it is certainly the case that the requirements of non-nuclear deterrence are, if anything, even more complex and stringent than they are for strategic nuclear deterrence. Perhaps that is why they attract so little outside analysis.

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Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why an understanding of non-nuclear deterrence and its requirements is crucially important. After 30 years of the nuclear era, most nations have developed a deep and understandable reluctance to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the inhibitions against the use of traditional force are not nearly so great. However unpredictable the course and outcome of conventional conflicts, we probably understand them better than the risks and consequences of a nuclear campaign. If military force finally seems in order, familiar force is what is most likely to be used.

Once the decision to commit conventional force is made, surprise, shock, speed, and the rapid acquisition of territory tend to be even more seductive to the non-nuclear attacker than to the operational planner of a nuclear assault. In fact, in the nuclear era, there may be a special premium on surprise and rapid advance; they permit the achievement of valuable objectives before the agonizing nuclear decision can be made.

The ability to resist and repulse such conventional attacks (and we have seen many of them during the last 35 years) calls for a much more diversified inventory of capabilities than we currently understand to be the case with respect to the strategic retaliatory forces.

Annually American forces are deployed to various locations in Europe to take part in joint U.S.-NATO exercises. Here United States ground forces participate in Exercise Reforger.

One such capability, however distasteful, is that of toxic chemicals. The Soviet Union has the world's largest capability to conduct chemical warfare, both offensively and defensively. You will note, by contrast, that our own modest budget for chemical munitions stresses protection against and deterrence of chemical warfare.

Finally, it must be repeatedly stressed that the deterrence of nuclear war depends not only on the adequacy of our strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities. It also rests heavily in the first instance on our ability to deter the outbreak of conventional conflict among the great powers. All of us recognize the theoretical utility of large-scale bolt-out-of-the blue surprise nuclear attack scenarios for force planning purposes. Nonetheless, most of us would agree that the more likely first use of nuclear weapons would arise out of a setback at the conventional level of conflict. To keep the nuclear threshold high, we must therefore maintain strong conventional forces and work unceasingly to deter the outbreak of any major conflict.

Strategic Concept

This would be a tall order even if our policymakers were operating in a more traditional world of conventional military force only, and multiple centers of great power. Now, however, we must deal with three different tiers of force and only two real superpowers. Even so, we must still try to find our way to safety in an environment that is governed more by traditional considerations than by the simple equations of nuclear attack and retaliation—especially when the answer to these equations is usually stalemate.

Despite the relative good fortune and self-sufficiency of the United States, we still must care about such matters as access to the Persian Gulf, passage through the Straits of Malacca, and other important waterways. Despite our strategic and theater nuclear capabilities, non-nuclear forces remain the prime coin of the military realm. Hence, deterrence depends very basically on these forces, on allies, and on our ability to hold certain strategic areas. Shifts in the balance of economic power still matter; certain areas of the world continue to affect our well-being and, ultimately, our integrity and independence. Despite all the nuclear calculations and theology, we cannot forget geopolitics as the world becomes truly interdependent. Unless we are prepared to join in defending portions of the world lying outside North America, we shall soon find ourselves with nothing else but North America to defend.

Granted the importance of these considerations, the United States should not attempt to solve all the world's problems—not that it has ever tried. We could not hope to create and sustain the military establishment necessary to stand guard throughout this turbulent world, nor could we command the resources to defend on all fronts simultaneously. In any event, our allies have an equal interest in collective security and international stability; they should bear a fair share of the burden of keeping the peace and deterring major conflict.

But even with allies, there is a need for us to decide what, at a minimum, we should be prepared to defend and how we should design and deploy our forces for that purpose. In short, we require a strategic concept and the

capabilities to go with it. If we should have learned one lesson from the 1930s, it is that collective security is a hollow term if there is no conception of where and how to apply it, and if there are no forces of any consequence to back it up.

The utility of the strategic concept for collective security (or deterrence as we now seem to call it) is fourfold:

- By defining certain primary contingencies (such as an attack on Western Europe) as of critical concern to the United States, it narrows down the force planning problem to manageable proportions even though it does not preclude the development of a wide range of contingency plans.
- It sets a specific force requirement for the defense establishment to satisfy; in the process, it precludes fortification of the moon.
- It establishes priorities by defining the primary missions of the Armed Forces and the individual Services.
- But it does not preclude the use of the forces thus generated for other purposes as directed by the President and approved by the Congress. In fact, even as we design and implement the concept, we must recognize the need for enough flexibility to deal with other than the standard planning contingencies.

The strategic concept itself cannot, of course, tell us what are the main contingencies on which we should focus, but certain considerations help to make the choices fairly evident. It is noteworthy, for example, that Soviet ground forces are divided almost evenly east and west of the Urals. Although they are deployed in such a way that they could operate in a number of different directions, two points about them are reasonably evident: despite the increasing mobility of their forces, the Soviets would have grave difficulty in opening up a series of offensives more or less simultaneously; and their main concerns (whether offensive or defensive) are obviously in Central Europe and Northeast Asia.

What this suggests for the United States in general is that we should not plan forces, even with allies, to attempt to deal simultaneously with a large number of contingencies. Instead, we should continue to maintain a small number of strongpoints in areas of the most critical interest to us, acquire the bases necessary to support these points, and develop forces flexible enough to reinforce our forward positions and to deal with unforeseen contingencies.

Western Europe is the most obvious place for a strongpoint and a conspicuous display of collective security. Not only do we have long historical, cultural, and economic ties with the nations of Europe, we would not want to see them united and dominated by an alien power. Yet, as has been the case for many years, a very large force of Warsaw Pact divisions and aircraft continues to stand on the borders of our European allies.

That force alone is sufficient reason for the collective defense established by NATO, to which the U.S. Army and United States Air Forces, Europe, and the Sixth Fleet make such signal contributions. Surely it is far better that we should establish a forward defense in this sensitive area and deter hostile action there rather than risk the failure of deterrence because of insufficient force and then undergo the agonizing and costly effort to recover lost and devastated territory.

In addition, power in the Center has beneficial effects on the flanks of NATO. As long as the Pact countries know that the forces in the Center are strong and mobile, they will exercise greater caution on the more vulnerable northern and southern flanks. Indeed, they should recognize that NATO, while a defensive alliance dedicated to collective security, does not completely foreswear offensive action in one theater should there be aggression in another.

Whether there should be a comparable presence in the Western Pacific is a more complex issue. While we continue to maintain tactical air forces in

Thailand, their strength is on the decline. The military situation in South Vietnam remains a cause for grave concern, but there is little outside threat to the Philippines and Taiwan at the present time, which leaves open the question of the role that Northeast Asia should play in our force planning.

Because it is an area where the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan converge, Northeast Asia will continue to be an area of concern from the standpoint of collective security. The importance of Japan, and the special nature of our mutual defense relationship, make it important to maintain forces sufficient to give visible evidence of the seriousness of our commitment to the stability of the region and to provide a credible ability to respond quickly and effectively to unforeseen events.

I believe that there are a number of reasons for using a major contingency in Asia as a basis for testing the adequacy of our conventional force planning:

- U.S. interests in the area remain strong, and we continue to have mutual security treaties with Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea.
- We cannot preclude political changes that would make the direct threat to the Republic of Korea much more serious than we now consider it to be.
- We continue to be concerned about developments in Southeast Asia, and we are closely allied with Australia and New Zealand.
- The Korean peninsula is relatively easy to defend at a minimum cost in U.S. deployments and reinforcements.
- U.S. ground, naval, and tactical air power can project power over a wide area from strongpoints in Okinawa and the Philippines.
- Generally speaking, quite apart from any specific contingency, U.S. military power still has a stabilizing role to play in the Pacific area.

It should be clear that our interest in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal continues undiminished, and the Middle East must remain a matter of military as well as economic and diplomatic concern. It would also be unwise from a strategic standpoint to ignore the proximity of Alaska, our 50th state, to the mainland of Asia. All in all, then, there appears to be a limited number of key areas where we

> *"There has been concern for some time that our forward defenses in Central Europe were not being held in sufficient strength. In fact, any U.S. withdrawls would shift the ratio in favor of the Pact to an unacceptably dangerous degree, quite apart from their psychological impact and their implications for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions."*

would want to deploy forces and a relatively small number of contingencies for which we should size our forces.

In designing our conventional military establishment, we could, of course, ignore the geography and the possible contingencies and devise some other approach to force planning. I await with interest suggestions on that score. Alternatively, we could decide to program forces sufficient, in conjunction with our allies, to:

- Deal simultaneously with a major contingency in Europe, a major contingency in Asia, and one or more lesser contingencies elsewhere;
- Deal simultaneously with one major contingency (wherever it might occur) and one minor contingency, with the capability to "swing" with some speed from one major theater to the other.

The first concept governed conventional force planning in the 1960s, at least in principle. The second concept was adopted in 1970 and has been in effect since then. With the end of our involvement in Vietnam, the emphasis of our planning has shifted toward Europe; however, we still retain a presence in South Korea with backup forces primarily in Okinawa. Most of our forces already are or soon will be oriented toward a war in Europe, but we maintain some less heavily armored and mechanized units for a lesser contingency and as the basis for a rapid swing toward Asia, or some other theater.

The success of this concept as the basis for defending our interests obviously depends to a large extent on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. would not strike more or less simultaneously in Europe and Asia, whether separately or in renewed cooperation. Since the United States obviously cannot carry the burden of implementing the concept alone, its success also depends on continued cooperation from our allies in Europe and Asia. Most important of all, the concept as a basis for planning will continue to have validity only as long as there is agreement within the United States itself that these minimum strongpoints and the military balances that we attempt to maintain in their immediate areas remain in the best interests of collective security, deterrence, and peace.



It seems reasonable to believe that the commitment to Europe continues to command widespread U.S. support, even though we continue to have periodic disagreements with our NATO allies over budgets, forces, and base utilization under certain conditions. The allies have cooperated in our efforts to comply with the Jackson-Nunn Amendment without the withdrawal of any U.S. forces from

Europe. Now, given the serious impact of oil prices on the European economies, balance-of-payments issues no longer should be allowed to exacerbate relationships within the Alliance. Instead, we must focus on the more basic strategic questions that the Nunn Amendment has raised. Here, again, the Allies are assisting in the various reviews and assessments required by the amendmant, particularly with respect to the need for standardization and further improvements in combat-to-support ratios in both ground and air forces.

It is also worth noting that most of our European Allies are attempting to maintain and increase their real defense expenditures despite the heavy inflationary and balance-of-payments pressures from which they are suffering. Moreover, they recognize increasingly, despite the magnitude of Warsaw Pact capabliities, that their non-nuclear efforts are worthwhile. As a consequence, the chances are improving that NATO will develop a solid defensive posture in Central Europe. In the circumstances, quite apart from the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, this would be the wrong time and place to reduce the U.S. defense contribution. On the contrary, as will be explained later, the combat power of that contribution should be increased.

Our position in Northeast Asia may not command as much attention as our deployment in Europe, but the security of Japan and the peace of Northeast Asia are critical to international stability. We should also keep in mind the fact that President Ford has recently reaffirmed our commitment to the Republic of Korea and to the continued maintenance of U.S. forces there. Our critics should realize that if we withdrew these forces, we might reduce the risk of involvement in some unwanted conflict, but at the price of losing leverage in the area. There is no risk-proof policy.

There is another problem as well. Our intelligence does not pretend to understand the convolutions of Kim Il Sung's mind, but there is no evidence for believing that he is friendly to the Republic of Korea or to the United States. A withdrawal of our forces might tempt him into adventures even more imprudent than those in which he indulges as of now. Our presence, however modest, operates as a restraint on North Korean adventurism. It also means that other powers in the area must think twice before instigating major trouble on the Korean peninsula or redeploying forces to theaters where they might prove more threatening to us.

For all these reasons, there are solid grounds for believing that the basic strategic concept is sound. As was stressed last year, the concept enables us to put bounds on our force requirements and plan prudently to deal with the contingencies that would have the most adverse affect on U.S. interests. It also helps to underline those strategic areas where it makes the greatest sense to concentrate our strength. But the concept does not oblige us to think about these areas and contingencies to the exclusion of all others or to tie the forces generated for the strategic concept to these theaters. While Europe and Asia remain important for force-planning purposes, it is essential to maintain powerful reserves centrally located in the Continental United States, along with increased strategic mobility. Our defense establishment, as an instrument of deterrence, must be able to respond rapidly and effectively to any emergency as directed by the President and approved by the Congress.

The strategic concept helps to establish the framework within which more detailed planning of the conventional forces can go forward. But it leaves a number of issues unresolved. One of the most important is the length of the war that we should be prepared to fight with our non-nuclear capabilities. Views range from the position that we should have only enough conventional capability to meet the initial enemy assault, to the argument that we should have the capability to fight indefinitely on a non-nuclear basis.

Most of the United States' European allies are attempting to maintain and increase their real defense expenditures despite the heavy inflationary and balance-of-payment pressures from which they are suffering.

The view of this Department is that, within the framework of the strategic concept, we have two fundamental needs: the capacity for a successful strong initial forward defense based primarily on our active forces; and a long-war hedge that depends primarily on our Guard and Reserve forces and our production base. As has been stressed on a number of occasions, our first concern must be to dissuade a potential enemy from believing that, by means of a short, intense, fast-moving assault, he can either destroy our deployed defenses or gain a favorable territorial position from which to negotiate advantageous peace terms. Failure to deal with this contingency makes long-war preparations hopeless and pointless.

However, once we have ensured our capability for a stout initial defense, we must hedge against the possibility that a conventional conflict could continue well beyond this first, intensive stage. Such an approach has met, and continues to meet, with something less than universal understanding. Some students of strategy argue that we should pour all our resources (including most support forces) into making certain that we can last as long as our opponent in the first phase of the conflict. Others assert that, given the high probability that a war among the great powers would rapidly escalate to nuclear exchange, any commitment of resources to an extended non-nuclear campaign would be wasted.

Despite these arguments, it is worth remembering that previous calculations about the duration of a war and the nature of high policy decisions have usually been in error. According to most of the conventional wisdom available at the time, World War I should have ended after about six weeks; yet it went on for four more years. Britain supposedly should have come to terms with Germany after the fall of France in 1940; certainly Hitler thought she should. To her credit, she did not.

As for an early use of nuclear weapons, that too is uncertain. Here as elsewhere, our responsibility is to present choices for the highest policymaker, not to trap him into decision by default. That is to say, depending on costs, we should have the option to continue a non-nuclear campaign for an indefinite period of time. To prepare otherwise could indeed lower the nuclear threshold. Alternatively, it might leave a vulnerability in our deterrent posture that a determined and well-supplied opponent might seek to exploit. How much we should invest in our long-war hedge is an issue that deserves the most serious consideration. That we should hedge to some degree against a long conventional war hardly seems to be a matter for dispute.

As was noted previously, the main test of our deterrent—whether nuclear or conventional—is the credibility and effectiveness of our military response in the event that deterrence should fail. If our forces, and those of our allies, can give a satisfactory account of themselves in combat, it seems reasonable to assume that an opponent would be loath to challenge them. It should be clear, moreover, that deterrence is not an either/or proposition. Instead, we have to gauge our requirements in terms of probabilities and confidence-levels when we make choices about the size and composition of our forces.

On this score, we ought to be no less prudent in the design of our non-nuclear forces than we are in the determination of our nuclear capabilities. Surely, if we wish to preserve our essential interests and maintain the nuclear threshold at a high level, we should keep sufficient active and ready conventional forces, along with selected, high-priority reserves, to have a high probability of repelling



The Soviets value their navy's role in providing an overseas presence but they are still concentrating on longer-range missiles for their ballastic missile submarines.

an initial attack in such crucial theaters as Central Europe and Northeast Asia. It is worth adding, in this context, that while history provides many inspiring examples of units that have repulsed attackers 10 or more times their size, no one would argue that (on the average) those are acceptable odds or that a deterrent based upon such a large asymmetry of forces would inspire high confidence.

There is always room for debate about the precise force structure needed to exercise deterrence over a wide range of possible contingencies, especially when the structure is intended to complement those of allies. But there should be no real disagreement about the main requirements of a non-nuclear deterrent under modern conditions. Each of these main requirements will be discussed briefly before our specific programs for the general purpose forces are described.

Ground Forces

Despite the advances of modern technology, no one doubts the need for ground forces in most conventional conflicts. There is no other full countermeasure to enemy ground forces. They are the key element in holding territory against attack, and (of course) they can also seize enemy territory or threaten to do so. Because of this versatility, they provide the most effective leverage that we have available in bringing an enemy to terms. For all these reasons, the ground forces are an indispensable ingredient of any non-nuclear deterrent.

In 1964 we set our Army strength at 16⅓ active and 8 Reserve divisions. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the change in strategic concept, budgetary pressures, and the concerns about the feasibility of the all-volunteer force, we reduced the Army objective to 13 active and 8 Reserve divisions. (The Marines, as you know, maintain 3 active divisions and air wings by law.) Now we believe that we should return to the 16 active and 8 Reserve division objective provided that the Army is able to improve its "teeth-to-tail" ratio and find more combat spaces within its existing manpower total.

Some observers have asked why, if 13 active divisions was a good enough number several years ago, we now need to revise the number upward. Others have suggested that, if there are support spaces to be saved, we should return the money to the Treasury rather than provide the Army with this allegedly perverse and unnecessary incentive to become more efficient. But these criticisms miss the point that we had already gone too far in reducing our active-duty ground forces.

When the previous administration changed the strategic concept and set an objective of 13 active Army divisions, it did so on the assumption that our high-priority National Guard and Reserve divisions would achieve sufficiently high standards of combat readiness so that we could deploy them almost as rapidly as our active Army divisions. We have now concluded, however, that such heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve divisions for initial defense missions would be imprudent. It is worth remembering, in this connection, that it took a minimum of 11 months to ready these divisions for combat in World War II and Korea.

Our plans for initial defense should depend primarily on the active forces for two main reasons. First, we might have very few days or weeks in which to ready and deploy forces before the outbreak of fighting. Second, as matters now stand, we must depend primarily on active-duty ground force units to meet such demanding schedules.

This is not to say that Guard and Reserve units would not have important roles to play in conventional conflicts of the future. Mobilization and deployment schedules might prove less demanding than I have indicated, in which case we might be willing to call up the main Reserve units. In addition, they can continue to serve as the long-war hedge described earlier.

In other words, if we are to act responsibly toward the National Guard and Reserve, we should stop pretending that we can use all of them as full substitutes for

active-duty ground forces. Obviously they can be useful in special circumstances such as the callup during the Berlin crisis of 1961. Eventually they did play an important role in World War II and Korea, and they might have done so in Vietnam had there been the political will to call them to active duty. But in circumstances where there are only short periods of warning and the most decisive battles of the war occur during the first days and weeks of conflict, then the active-duty ground forces must bear the brunt of the initial defense. Nonetheless, we will still rely on two brigades and a number of separate maneuver battalions from our Reserve components to round-out the 16 division active Army force that we are planning.

There still remains the question of why we need 16 rather than 13 active-duty Army divisions. Part of the answer obviously lies in a greater substitution of active-duty components for reserve units in our initial defense force. But of even greater importance is our belief that in the aftermath of Vietnam and the changeover to the all-volunteer force, we basically went too far in reducing our active-duty ground forces.

For most contingencies, the ground force requirement depends on several factors. The first is the ratio of force to space. Whether we are talking about Central Europe or Korea, if a front is to be held along its length with a reasonable degree of confidence, there must be a minimum density of manpower along that front, with no significant gaps between units. Second, there should be a reserve—both locally and at higher levels, that can be allocated to halt penetrations or develop counterattacks. Third, certain ratios—whether we are talking about manpower, manpower in maneuver battalions, firepower scores, or weapons effects indicators—should not be allowed to favor an attacker by too great a margin. For example, if an attacker could achieve a favorable overall ratio of perhaps 1.5:1 in several of these respects, he could embark on such large local concentrations that the defender would find it difficult to prevent one or more breakthroughs.

With these factors in mind, and a detailed knowledge of the capabilities of both allies and potential enemies, it becomes possible to calculate the needed input of ground forces by the United States to provide an adequate initial defense in any given theater, and the deterrence that goes with it.

Our current strategic concept, the maintenance of two major strongpoints in conjunction with our allies, and the need to provide a highly combat-ready force for initial defense pretty well dictate our ground force requirement. To satisfy this minimum initial defense requirement (the United States ultimately deployed 90 large divisions in World War II), not only would we want 16 active-duty Army divisions; we would also have to depend heavily on the three active-duty Marine divisions to help fill the need.

Within a total active Army strength of 785,000 men and women, we obviously cannot expect to acquire the full 16 division force or anything like it as part of the standing Army. Even if we are able to bring our overhead for training support and command down to 25 per cent of the total, that will still leave us with fewer than 590,000 people for the ground forces. At this level, we must continue to draw on the reserve for selected combat units as well as for critical supporting elements of the division slices.

Given all these circumstances, I believe that the Congress not only should endorse the goal of 16 active-duty Army divisions, but should also join in:

- Continuing to offer the Army the incentive to convert spaces from support to combat by allowing them to retain the benefits of real efficiencies in the form of increased combat power;
- Maintaining active-duty Army strength at the minimum level of 785,000 despite the high cost of manpower and the understandable temptation to reduce military personnel as an allegedly quick way to save money;
- Considering whether, in fact, we should not increase active Army manpower so as to reduce still further our



Tactical air forces complement rather than compete with ground forces. They cannot prevent an enemy from infiltrating on the ground, but speed and range permit airpower to concentrate rapidly and to attack outside the range and surveillance of ground forces.

dependence on the Guard and Reserve for our initial defense forces.

If the Congress will provide this kind of support, the Department is confident that General Fred C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff,—following the example so powerfully set by General Abrams—will ensure the evolution of a lean and capable Army of which we can all be proud. We are also confident that our overall non-nuclear deterrent—and thus all deterrence—will be substantially strengthened.

Tactical Air Forces

The need for tactical air forces is well accepted, but the precise role of these forces in non-nuclear deterrence is not always understood. We have, of course, had spectacular demonstrations of the effectiveness of tactical airpower: during World War II in the Normandy campaign, and during the 1967 six-day war in the Middle East. But our tactical air forces have also come under some criticism on grounds of both performance and cost. It is not uncommon to hear the argument that tactical aircraft have very low probabilities of kill against important targets and that they are much less cost-effective than artillery.

These criticisms miss several important points about the attractiveness of tactical airpower to the United States. Tactical air forces are complementary to, rather than competitive with, ground forces. They cannot prevent an enemy from infiltrating on the ground, but because of their range and speed, they have the ability to concentrate very rapidly and to attack important targets outside the range and suveillance of our ground forces. And with the advent of precision guided munitions (PGMs) the cost of destroying relevant targets is in the process of going down. In any event, measuring the effectiveness of tactical airpower by its ability to kill specific arrays of targets overlooks the "virtual attrition" that it imposes on an enemy by forcing him into air defenses, dispersal, night movement, and the general "heads down" mentality that goes with the presence or threat of enemy airpower in the vicinity.

We also have to face the stark fact that because of rising manpower costs and the difficulty of going beyond quite minimal levels of active ground forces, tactical airpower quickly becomes a potentially efficient way of acquiring additional firepower without relying on manpower-intensive means. In many instances, to the extent that allied and other friendly nations are able to provide adequate ground forces, the most effective way for the United States to assist them is by the timely provision of tactical air support. Several wings of modern attack aircraft can deliver as much high explosive tonnage in one day as an entire division, and they can do so at about a seventh of the manpower cost. What is more, fewer of those men are at risk.

Despite these advantages, there is no doubt about the heavy dollar cost of tactical airpower. Air Force tactical airpower alone runs to about $12 billion a year. If we add to it the cost of Marine Corps wings and carrier-based tactical air, the total comes to around $24 billion a year—much more than we pay for our strategic nuclear forces. Accordingly, we should be as precise as we can in determining the size and composition of these forces. Since the carrier-based airpower performs multiple land and unique sea-based missions, I shall discuss them later in connection with our naval forces. Here the focus will be on our land-based tactical air forces.

There are two issues to resolve: the nature of the overall requirement, and the mix of aircraft within the required total.

One factor in determining the overall number is the size of the total tactical air force of the other superpower and our ability to match it. The difficulty with this approach is threefold. First, the Soviet tactical air force is somewhat different from our own in function and capability. Second, we should credit ourselves and the Soviets with the tactical air forces of our respective allies in the theater when arriving at any such balance. Third, we should allow for the fact that the

United States tends to substitute tactical air forces for ground forces more heavily than does the U.S.S.R. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, NATO as a whole should not allow the tactical air forces of the Warsaw Pact to achieve any substantial numerical superiority. At present, depending on how certain Soviet interceptor aircraft are counted, approximate parity exists between the two sides. On the most pessimistic assumptions, the Pact might enjoy a 50 per cent superiority in total aircraft, but NATO would hold a substantial qualitative advantage.

A second factor to consider is the capability to counter the ground threat that our tactical air forces will assist in stopping. The size of that threat has increased in quantity and quality, especially in terms of armor, requiring an increasing ground attack role for tactical air forces. Warsaw Pact armor is expected to be used in massive, concentrated thrusts against the NATO line early in any European conflict, presenting a demand for flexible, numerically sufficient tactical air forces.

A third factor in sizing our land-based tactical air is to relate it to the number of divisions that we field. For example, the Marine Corps is organized as a combined air/ground force built around division and wing teams. These teams are particularly suited for offensive employment. Marine tactical air forces are sized to provide a full spectrum of air support, especially because of the immediate need for responsive firepower in the amphibious assault phase.

Because of the central control exercised over its forces, the Air Force believes that it can perform its diverse missions in a somewhat different way. Its operational planning tends to be based in part on its ability, if necessary, to provide a certain number of fighter-attack sorties per division per day rather than integrating their wings into a combined air/ground force. The number of Army divisions to be supported, as we have seen, will grow over the next few years.

The second and third factors translate to providing a required daily level of ordnance on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), a level that should increase with the increase in threat and in the number of units supported. The achievement of an optimum level is realized by varying the proportion of TACAIR sorties allocated to anti-armor attacks, close air support, defense suppression, air superiority, etc., depending on how the enemy attack develops.

Also adding to the quantitative requirement in a NATO conflict is the possibility that we may become engaged in a conflict elsewhere first, attriting the force remaining for NATO. There are not yet additional demands on our tactical air forces that do not impinge on force size, such as sea surveillance and augmentation of Continental United States (CONUS) air defense forces.

At present, we have the equivalent of about 22 active Air Force fighter-attack wings. Although it would be preferable to have a more systematic way of computing tactical air wings, the factors outlined here are based on experience which for the most part, has proved satisfactory.

The three main missions performed by the tactical air forces have been air superiority, interdiction, and close air support. Historically, the Air Force has put the main weight of its effort into the first two missions and has given less attention to the function of close air support. This, in turn, has led the Army to push the development and deployment of attack helicopters.

As the cost of procuring and operating tactical aircraft has risen, the Air Force has tended to select multipurpose aircraft optimized more toward pursuing the air superiority battle and the interdiction campaign than toward close air support and shallow interdiction. The result has been the long-range, heavy fighters of recent vintage. Now, however, several conditions dictate, not a reversal of this trend, but a shift in emphasis.

As we have seen from the last war in the Middle East, sheltered aircraft are extremely difficult to destroy. And where concentrated air defenses are present, they can exact a heavy toll of attacking aircraft. There is also the problem in Eastern Europe that the network of railroads and roads is sufficiently dense so that a deep interdiction campaign, even with precision guided munitions (PGMs), would take considerable time to work its impact on the fighting front, and probably could not prevent a considerable leakage of tonnage to the forward edge of the battle (FEBA). In a war of surprise and rapid movement, these effects might well occur too late to break the momentum of an enemy assault.

This is not to say that we should abandon the air superiority or deep interdiction missions. Nor is there a case for jettisoning the heavy, long-range fighter exemplified by the F-14 and F-15. As PGMs become more versatile, and as countermeasures to modern air defenses continue to improve, these two missions may again prove sufficiently worthwhile on a large scale to warrant a substantially increased investment. For the foreseeable future, however, our policy, within the force objective, should be to procure and maintain a sufficient number of sophisticated deep penetrators to preserve the threat of a long-range air superiority/interdiction campaign and thereby, at a minimum, force potential enemies to spread their defenses.

Following that policy will obviously facilitate the task of shallow interdiction and close air support, where we should increase our investment. That in turn will require more emphasis on the air combat fighter for air defense and local air superiority in the vicinity of the FEBA, and on the A-10 for shallow interdiction and close air support. Movement in these directions should also help to satisfy the Army. And it should bring our tactical airpower more effectively to bear during the early phases of a conflict when the main effort, particularly in Europe, must go to halting fast, armor-heavy assaults on the ground.

It is a pleasure to report, in this connection, that under the imaginative leadership of General David Jones (Chief of Staff, USAF) and General John Vogt (Commander in Chief, USAFE) we are now taking meaningful strides toward the prompt battlefield application of tactical airpower in the Center Region of NATO. The 4th and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAFs) are being brought into much closer coordination. General Vogt is establishing a centralized headquarters for the two ATAFs so that the flexibility and economy of force inherent in our tactical airpower can be effectively exploited. And due consideration is being given to the most effective use of our air assets during the initial phases of a campaign. It would not be surprising if note of these developments were being taken at the Soviet military headquarters in Potsdam, and that the credibility of the NATO deterrent has risen substantially as a consequence.

Naval Forces

In the discussion of our strategic concept, mention was made that for force planning purposes we focus on possible conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia. It hardly needs to be added that we must also be concerned with getting to and from those two great theaters, and other areas of the globe as well. The seas have been and remain—despite the continuing revolution in air transportation—the great highway upon which, in peace and war, vast quantities of goods must travel.

Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has performed four missions as its contribution to collective security and deterrence. First, it has sought sufficient command of the seas to ensure our sea lines of communication (SLOC). Second, it has provided a special means of projecting power ashore though its attack carriers and amphibious forces. Third, with its various ships, it has provided a presence—a visible reminder of U.S. interest and power in distant seas. Fourth, and most recently, it has contributed very substantially to nuclear deterrence through its sea-launched ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

This last mission has already been discussed elsewhere. Here,

A Soviet IL-28 Beagle light jet bomber flies a mission in Europe.



it should only be added that the SSBNs should continue to be regarded as the Navy's main contribution to nuclear deterrence. While other naval vessels may be able to carry nuclear weapons (and do), their main missions and their main justification should be non-nuclear. Aside from the SSBNs, there is no current basis for building new ships on the premise that their primary mission would be to add to nuclear deterrence. Again excluding the SSBNs, we must justify naval forces on the basis of their contribution to non-nuclear deterrence.

To determine the nature and size of that contribution, we must look first and foremost to the Soviet navy. It is a force, to borrow from Churchill, that is to some degree a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. It is divided into four separate fleets, three of which have relevance to our Atlantic and Mediterranean interests, the fourth of which bears on our concerns in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean area. In peacetime there is, of course, the possibility of interchange among these fleets. It also seems reasonably clear that the Soviets value their Navy's role in providing an overseas presence. As is well known, they frequent the Norwegian Sea, various parts of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, and even the Caribbean. However, it is not at all clear that they plan to increase their deployments above the levels of the past few years.

Whether the Soviets have still more ambitious objectives for their naval forces is not at all clear. They continue their flirtation with the Cuban facility at Cienfuegos, but at the same time they are concentrating on longer-range missiles for their ballistic missile submarines. They have launched one Essex-sized carrier and are constructing a second, presumably to supplement the reach of their land-based naval airpower. They have built-up a substantial fleet of ocean-going major surface combatants (about 220 in all) with a heavy concentration of first-strike firepower, but without much sustained combat capability or support from underway replenishment groups. Perhaps as a partial substitute for this shortcoming, they have sought base rights of various kinds in the Mediterranean, along the Horn of Africa, and in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.

Whatever lies behind all of this activity—and the trends that it portends—the Soviets now possess or are acquiring the capability to:

- Challenge our attack carrier task forces in such areas as the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Sea of Japan;
- Undertake a major assault on U.S. and allied sea lines of communication and the surface combatants protecting them;
- Provide a limited degree of long-range protection for their merchant shipping in contrast to the situation that prevailed during the Cuban missile crisis (when they were not in a good position to challenge the U.S. quarantine); and,
- Maintain at least a modest presence in such distant waters as the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean.

The United States, as a traditional maritime power, naturally favors freedom of the seas not only for itself but for all other nations as well. At the same time, because of our extended interests overseas, we intend to maintain the capabilities essential for the protection of these interests. U.S. naval forces, especially in light of the Soviet developments I have just outlined, remain a vital component of those capabilities. Without them, the rest of the deterrent will not work and collective security will return to the realm of farce.

Our carrier task forces have three main functions to perform in strengthening the deterrent. First, they provide us with mobile platforms under our own sovereignty that permit us to project tactical airpower ashore where land bases are not available to us or where the number of land

Carrier-based airpower performs multiple land and unique sea-based missions.

bases is insufficient for our purposes. Second, they provide support for amphibious operations. Third, they continue to be the dominant ship in any contest among surface combatants. No foreign power can assume that the denial of land bases will nullify our tactical airpower. No belligerent can ignore the prospect of flanking operations from amphibious forces protected by carrier-based air. No hostile surface fleet can expect to operate unchallenged by the long reach and the firepower of the attack carriers.

From all of this, it should be clear that the issue surrounding this force for a decade or more has never seriously been whether or not we should have carrier task forces. The argument has centered, instead, on the number of carriers that we should maintain and on the first part of the issue that must be of the greatest concern from the standpoint of force planning. What we decide on that score will largely govern what we do in the future about modernization.

It would be misleading to pretend that there is any generally acceptable formula for determining our inventory of attack carriers. However, quite apart from the need for peacetime deployments (which I shall discuss later), we have had two historical instances where, despite the availability of land bases, we found it desirable to place at least five carriers on line in combat for the projection of tactical airpower ashore. In the case of Korea, when the enemy had driven us back to the Pusan perimeter, the carriers proved of particular value. In Vietnam they helped to split the air defenses and control our losses.

If we are to preserve positions of strength and contribute to collective security in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and keep a basic power equilibrium in those three great theaters, I see no choice but to maintain roughly 13 carrier task forces over the current planning period. Such a capability should enable us to:

- Provide adequate coverage against marauding surface combatants in the Atlantic and Pacific and other waters;
- Place a substantial number of carriers on line in both the European and Western Pacific theaters during an emergency (even though they might have to operate in high-threat environments);
- Keep a number of carriers on station in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific, should we continue to desire to do so; and,
- Dispatch a carrier task force into other seas and oceans from time to time as diplomatic interests dictate. A periodic presence in the Indian Ocean and occasional visits to the Persian Gulf may be a case in point.

This last policy, and the expansion of our facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, have become a source of some misunderstanding. There are, however, two arguments for the policy that deserve consideration. Not only the United States, but Western Europe and Japan as well, have a rather considerable interest in the area of the Persian Gulf and access to it. Not the least of our interest is that the area be kept out of unfriendly hands. While the problem is not yet of alarming proportions, a Soviet force is in fact in the Indian Ocean and has been there since 1968. With the reopening of the Suez Canal, maintenance of a larger Soviet force will become feasible. Under the circumstances, it seems only prudent to observe the situation in the Indian Ocean and to demonstrate from time to time that the United States can make its presence felt there should our interests, and those of our allies, be jeopardized. Diego Garcia will allow us to support such operations efficiently without additional mobile logistics capability.

In sum, 13 carrier task forces (with 12 active air wings) should give us the dual capability of maintaining strong off-shore tactical air forces and countering any surface challenge to our sea lines of communication. The fact that the Soviets are building aircraft carriers of their own can be taken as testimony that the carrier, despite frequent announcements of its imminent demise, remains the capital ship of the modern navy.

Despite the gradual growth of the Soviet surface fleets, the greatest potential danger to our sea lines of communication arises from the large Soviet attack submarine force. The principal threats come from the forces in Murmansk and Vladivostok. Depending on the circumstances, one of these forces could support the other; the Soviets could also draw on their Baltic and Black Sea fleets for reinforcements. But however they might choose to allocate and deploy these forces, the possibility of interfering with our sea lines of communication (SLOC) would be substantial.

One issue that arises in this context is whether, considering the emphasis currently being given to short conventional wars, it makes sense to continue a major investment in anti-submarine warfare forces, even though the magnitude of the threat from the attack and cruise-missile submarines continues to be great. What is certainly the case is that in times of rapid mobilization, deployment, and attack by an enemy, the first phase of an assault might already have occurred before our protected sealift could begin to deliver equipment and supplies to the front. There remain a number of reasons, however, why we should continue to strengthen our ASW forces and programs:

- The fast mobilization and deployment scenarios are not the only cases that we should consider. Slower buildups are equally plausible; where they occur, protected sea-lift continues to make sense.
- If we and our allies do what is necessary to ensure our initial defenses, protected sealift can make a significant contribution to the early stages of our resistance; it will also add significantly to our long-war hedge.
- In any event, we should not put all our mobility eggs into the basket of airlift, which has vulnerabilities of its own.
- It would be unthinkable, finally, to allow any competitor in the international arena to believe that we could not protect our shipping, whatever the circumstances; to leave our SLOC unprotected would create a vulnerability that would obviously degrade our deterrent. Our deployed forces should not be left dangling from the slender thread of our airlift and its capability for long range resupply.

While the continued need for ASW forces seems evident, there is continuing debate about the preferred size and composition of these forces. The Congress has complicated the debate by its passage of Title VIII of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975 which requires that we now procure only nuclear-powered ships for our major naval strike forces.

As was indicated last year, our preferred ASW strategy is to establish a series of barriers (speaking somewhat figuratively) which enemy submarines must penetrate in order to attack our merchant shipping and main fleet units. The first of these barriers, because of geography, can be most effectively created by a combination of passive defenses, attack submarines, and patrol aircraft. The second barrier depends primarily on long-range patrol aircraft and attack submarines assisted by surveillance systems, but carrier-based aircraft can also help to strengthen it. The third, close-in barrier—whether supporting merchant shipping or the main units of the surface fleet—involves principally our escort forces and the helicopters that accompany them.

Thirteen carrier tasks forces should give the United States the dual capability of maintaining strong off-shore tactical air forces and countering any surface challenge to the U.S. sea lines of communications (SLOC).

With our current and programmed force of attack submarines, ASW aircraft, and surface combatants, I believe that, in conjunction with our allies, we would have the platforms necessary both to man the barriers I have described and to provide protection for any major shipping convoys that we may desire to form. Our problem, in other words, is not the number of platforms that we have in the fleet and on order. Rather, it is the modernization of these platforms and their sensors and weapon systems, together with essential surveillance systems, that we need. Simply adding to the total number of platforms beyond the required number, or making them all nuclear-powered, will not significantly increase the effectiveness of the barriers; increasing the kill probability of each available platform will obviously do so.

Our shipbuilding program has already suffered severely from the impact of inflation. As a consequence, our plan for modernizing the fleet is badly behind schedule, and we will require substantial increases in budget authority if we are to complete the program already authorized by the Congress. If, in addition, there is to be more nuclear propulsion than had previously been programmed still more budget authority will be required for our shipbuilding program.

If nuclear power is to become the main source of propulsion for the Navy in the future, we must also consider the versatility of nuclear attack submarines both on the ASW mission and against enemy surface ships. Indeed, despite their high cost, we may well want to regard them as competitive with surface escorts and combatants of other types. Visibility and presence remain of capital importance in the design of a navy. But, the SSBNs aside, non-nuclear threats and our combat effectiveness against them must remain the first priority of the U.S. Navy.

In addition to our carriers and ASW forces, we maintain the amphibious capability for the assault portions of slightly over one Marine division-wing team, and are continuing to build toward a 1⅓ division lift objective. This capability, in turn, will make demands on our escort forces and underway replenishment groups as well as on our carriers.

The amphibious forces are not cheap. Moreover, we are modernizing them not only so as to replace vessels of World War II vintage, but also so that all ships will have a 20-knot capability. These programs, their costs, and the delays that have attended their completion have raised questions about the need for an amphibious assault force which has not seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for over 20 years, and which would have grave difficulty in accomplishing its mission of over-the-beach and flanking operations in a high-threat environment.

Despite these doubts, I believe that the modernized amphibious forces will be well worth their cost. The entire globe is not defended by sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and high-performance fighters. Nor is it the case that the United States has lost all interest in beachheads and flanking operations. Moreover, there is certain salutary value in having reinforced Marine battalions aboard their assault ships in various sensitive parts of the world. But to maintain such forces on-station in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Western Pacific effectively requires that we have two equivalent forces in reserve for each one on station. Our amphibious lift objective is only just sufficient for these deployments. We would be ill-advised to reduce it.

Forward Deployments

It is generally accepted that forces in forward visible deployments make an important contribution to non-nuclear deterrence. One has only to recall our withdrawals from South Korea in 1949—and the events that followed—to recognize the inhibiting value of a military

presence. But there continue to be issues about the necessary location and size of these deployments for purposes of deterrence. Since they are important issues, and central to the future role of the United States in the world, it is worth addressing them separately from the questions of strategy and basic force structure.

If we are to take our strategic concept seriously (not only for force planning purposes, but also for the realistic implementation of collective security and deterrence), we should maintain military deployments in Europe and Asia. To ensure these deployments, we should be in a position to control the approaches to the Atlantic and the Western Pacific. In addition, for quite obvious reasons, we should be able to make our presence felt in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

This does not mean, in our naval deployments, that we must keep certain fixed levels of force permanently on station in these strategic areas. Rather, we should give consideration both to altering the mix of our on-station forces from time to time, and to reducing fixed on-station commitments. A more impressive policy than one of fixed forces would be to surge large numbers of U.S.-based naval capabilities into wider areas for relatively brief intervals on an unscheduled basis.

With deployments of this general character, we are in a position to:

- Contribute immediately to collective security and the deterrence of attack in critical strategic areas;
- Lay the groundwork for reinforcements and provide a strong initial defense in the event of an attack;
- Prevent major losses of territory and the terrible human and material costs of taking the counteroffensive;
- Keep the nuclear threshold high;
- Project power into other areas so as to deter or respond to unforseen contingencies; and
- Stabilize relationships in these areas because of our presence as one of only two superpowers, and because of the great potential that lies in back of our presence.

All of these functions are important in a world of competition and conflict. But political justifications for military deployments, however relevant, rarely provide the basis for specific numbers and types of forces in a theater. A corporal's guard may be as effective as a division if our main purpose is merely to demonstrate a U.S. interest and presence in the area. In order to justify the current deployments, we can and should provide the military and deterrent basis for their presence.

It is generally accepted that we should maintain strong naval forces in the Atlantic, Western Pacific, and Mediterranean, even though we may wish to vary their strength along the lines I have indicated. They act as deterrents to Soviet surface and submarine forces and they are in a position to provide early protection to our sea lines of communication. They also give us some capability for early power projection in key areas with our attack carrier and amphibious forces.

Much more at issue is our base in Diego Garcia and the periodic sailing of U.S. naval forces into the Indian Ocean. The view that we should guard against overextending ourselves and assuming new and potentially dangerous commitments is understandable. But the strength of the opposition to such a modest base and such a modest presence is puzzling. Surely no one needs reminding that the area of the Persian Gulf, with its large oil preserves, has become a matter of the keenest possible interest to a number of powers, including the U.S.S.R. Surely we have not yet forgotten that in December, 1940, during one of those several tete-a-tetes between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, M. Molotov claimed for his country the area of the Persian Gulf as one of the spoils of World War II. And surely, we should not simply ignore the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and Soviet efforts to obtain base rights of various kinds both in the Gulf itself and along the Horn of Africa.

Considering the stakes that are involved—not only for the United States itself, but also for its partners—it makes elemental sense to have some capability to operate our forces efficiently in the area. The modest base at Diego Garcia and the occasional detachment of task forces from the 7th Fleet hardly seem out of proportion to the situation and our interests there.

Our forward deployments in Europe and Korea are determined by such tested planning considerations as the ratio of men to space, the ratio of our own forces to opposing forces, and the ratio of allied to opposing firepower. Although we would expect, at least initially, to be on the defensive in both these theaters (should deterrence fail), we do not believe that any of the basic planning factors should be allowed to favor opposing forces excessively. It is particularly important that, whatever the overall manpower and firepower ratios, allied forward defenses be manned in sufficient strength and depth so that an opponent would not be tempted into exploiting gaps in our lines in order to obtain a quick and cheap territorial advantage.

There has been concern for some time that our forward defenses in Central Europe were not being held in sufficient strength. Despite the efforts on the part of our allies there to sustain their strength and despite the major contributions made by 7th Army and United States Air Force Europe (USAFE), which are the political and military backbone of NATO, the balance of military power in the Center Region still tilts toward the Warsaw Pact. In fact, any U.S. withdrawals would shift the ratio in favor of the Pact to an unacceptably dangerous degree, quite apart from their psychological impact and their implications for MBFR.

Public Law 93-365 (the Nunn Amendment) now offers us the opportunity and incentive to strengthen U.S. combat forces in the Center Region provided that we keep our total force levels constant and trade in support spaces for additional combat power. With the cooperation of the Army and the Air Force, we are making distinct progress precisely in that direction. Accordingly, we should be able, in calendar year 1975, to add two combat brigades, and other ground combat elements, and to strengthen U.S. Air Forces in the Center Region. These additions not only should improve our combat manpower and firepower ratios relative to the Pact; they should also give us better division frontages and increase our confidence in being able to withstand an initial assault from deployed Pact forces.

Greater strength in these respects also increases our chances of bringing in reinforcements—both ground and air—at a rate that will permit us to repulse the much larger Pact assaults that were discussed with you last year. Of the utmost importance in this regard is that we continue four major programs with our allies: continued sheltering of our tactical aircraft; standardization of weapons; reception facilities for the large reinforcements that we are determined to provide in the event of a crisis; and provision of a central reserve for Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).

At the same time that we move to strengthen the U.S. contribution to NATO, in an effort to counterbalance Soviet increases and fortify deterrence, we continue to hope for progress in the negotiations toward Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe in the interest of detente. These are compatible and complementary goals, and the Department of Defense will work toward both. The agreement in principle at Vladivostok, setting a common ceiling on the central strategic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union, could well serve as a precedent for our deliberations in Vienna. And, just as we believe it would serve the interests of both sides to lower the agreed ceilings on the central strategic systems, so we are convinced that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would benefit from having a common ceiling at reduced levels on their conventional forces in Central Europe.

U.S. deployments in Thailand do not fall into the same category as those in Europe and Northeast Asia. The forces there, while

An artist's concept of the new Soviet aircraft carrier under construction. It is expected to be more than 900 feet long and will have 45,000 ton displacement.



substantially reduced from their peak levels, remain as a hedge against an overt North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam of the character that we witnessed in the spring of 1972. Whether such a flagrant attack is likely to occur again in the near future remains a matter of some uncertainty. However, the North Vietnamese have certainly deployed the manpower and the means to launch one.

Accordingly, while we can reduce our deployments in Thailand still further, it seems prudent to continue our presence there as a deterrent to reckless action by Hanoi and as a contribution to a more stable and lasting settlement in Southeast Asia.

Our main strongpoint in Northeast Asia remains in South Korea, with backup forces in nearby Okinawa. The 2nd Division in South Korea, along with the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces on line, assures a solid front and a sufficiently favorable ratio of manpower and firepower to provide reasonable assurance that we could repulse any sudden attack from North Korea alone. Our deployments also provide the necessary foundation on which to build a much larger force in an emergency.

Perhaps of even greater importance, should a crisis erupt in Europe, we would have several major objectives in Asia: first, to deter adventures by other Asian nations; second, to prevent forces currently deployed in Asia from being transferred west of the Urals; and third, to discourage the opening of another front in Northeast Asia, whether on land or at sea. Our deployments in Korea and Okinawa, together with the "swing" forces in Hawaii, California, and Washington, provide us with the basic means to achieve these objectives. Indeed, these deployments are an outstanding example of the classical military principle of economy of force. We would be making a mistake to disrupt it.

Nonetheless, our overseas deployments have become an annual source of controversy in connection with the defense budget, and there are recurring pressures for withdrawals on grounds that we are overcommitted, are discouraging our allies from carrying their fair share of the collective burden, are incurring excessive balance-of-payments deficits, are risking becoming involved in unwanted wars, and in any event have been playing the leadership role too long. In addition, of course, troops cut from overseas deployments or overseas bases that are closed create few political problems at home.

These are understandable and popular arguments, but they miss the point of what we are trying to do. We are attempting to create a genuine system of collective security, balance, and deterrence—not the hollow shell of such a system. As this report emphasizes, we have explicit strategic reasons for our deployments: they accord with our interests and commitments, and they complement the forces of our allies. Moreover, our overseas deployments are now 100,000 fewer than they were in 1964. Not only have we managed to make cuts (however painfully) without any loss of combat power or strategic position; we have also done our utmost to comply with the Jackson-Nunn Amendment. Our military balance of payments costs are being largely offset by our allies, and we would save little in real costs by returning deployed forces to the CONUS, unless we then demobilized them. To do so would be a serious strategic error.

As matters now stand, our baseline overseas posture is at the minimum that our commitments, our strategy, and our position as one of the two superpowers requires. To reduce it to any measureable degree in the absence of agreed reciprocal action by the other side either calls for greater faith in the goodwill of other nations than we have experienced in the past, or requires a much more restrictive



The Soviet navy is divided into four separate fleets, three of which have relevance to the U.S. Atlantic and Mediterranean interests, the fourth of which bears on U.S. concerns in the Pacific and Indian Ocean area.

definition of the U.S. role in the world than the one to which we now adhere.

We are now entering the 30th year of relative peace among the great powers, and the record, however modest, owes much to the generosity and steadfastness of the United States. The course has been long and the role burdensome, but the prize has been great. I doubt that we should want to surrender it now out of fatigue, pique, or a mistaken sense of priorities.

If our relations with former adversaries continue to improve, perhaps we can begin to plan our forces and their deployments on some basis other than opposing capabilities. But that time has not yet arrived. Our posture, in prudence, should continue to be based on the objective realities of what competitive postures contain. If and when those realities change, our posture should change as well. Meanwhile, we should entertain a certain skepticism toward those in whom persuasion and belief have ripened into faith, and faith has become a passionate intuition. As a statesman of some repute is alleged to have said: "It's a good thing to make mistakes so long as you're found out quickly." Our passion may have become focused on troop withdrawals; the mistake of it might not become apparent for several years to come.

Strategic Mobility

At the present time, our operational strategic mobility forces consists of our heavy airlift (70 C-5 and 234 C-141 aircraft) and a controlled sealift force of only 34 ships (troop ships, cargo ships, and tankers). Their essential contribution to collective security and deterrence hardly needs elaboration.

These forces not only symbolize our ability to move forces and supplies rapidly over great distances, they are essential to the flexibility of response that should characterize modern non-nuclear strategy. If we are to minimize our deployments in strategic areas, maintain a powerful central reserve in the CONUS that can "swing" in a number of different directions, and persuade potential competitors that we can put our ground and tactical air forces "on line" at rates that match their own mobilization and deployment, both the deterrent itself and its credibility will have been strengthened.

The alternatives to strategic mobility (if we are to achieve the same objective of initial forward defense) are either to lock large forces into particular theaters—with all the costs, rigidities, and frictions they cause—or to engage in very large-scale pre-positioning of equipment and supplies in those theaters. This latter course is also costly (because units in the CONUS must have another set of equipment to train with), lacking in flexibility, and risky in that it creates high-value targets and requires protection.

Accordingly, as I indicated last year, while it makes sense to deploy some forces forward and preposition a limited amount of materiel and supplies in critical theaters, we can best meet our planning objectives by maintaining a substantial strategic lift which has the space and structural strength to move even the heaviest and most bulky equipment. This means primary dependence on large, wide-bodied jets which are able to receive, carry, and unload large and heavy materiel.

Unless we are willing to make the necessary investment in strategic lift, we run the risk of several unpalatable consequences. Either we will have to deploy more forces forward, with resulting decreases in strategic flexibility and increases in both budgetary and balance-of-payments costs, or we will have to accept the risk that an opponent, by a rapid buildup, would overwhelm U.S. and allied deployed forces before our reinforcement could arrive. At the same time, we will have to acknowledge that some of our more distant and informal but nonetheless likely obligations will become increasingly difficult to fulfill. In these circumstances, it would make more sense to reduce our commitments and strategies that depend on a rapid

response—whether of forces or of materiel—and cut back on our central reserve in the CONUS, with non-trivial budgetary savings, than to maintain the facade of non-nuclear deterrence and keep in our inventories both forces and materiel that we are incapable of delivering anywhere in meaningful amounts.

There remains a temptation to restrict or abandon our strategic mobility forces on the premise that, by so doing, we will be kept from meddling and becoming involved in distant places of little or no concern to the United States. As Neville Chamberlain said in 1938: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we shoud be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here [in England] because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing!" That is one possibility.

There are, however, several difficulties with that premise. The Congress, by various acts, has asserted itself to the point where meddling (if that is the right word for it) is presumably less likely than in the past. The premise assumes, moreover, that decisions of war or peace are made on the basis of force availability rather than on the interests of this Republic. There is no evidence to support that case.

We should also keep in mind that tides of opinion change in the United States, and that whereas some of us may have deplored U.S. actions of a decade ago in one distant place, the very same groups may now deplore with equal vehemence our inability to act with power and speed in some other distant place. Faced with these uncertainties, it would be a mistake to deprive ourselves capriciously of adequate strategic mobility.

We should be as precise as possible, however, about how much strategic mobility we need. This is not an easy task considering the varied demands that are made on our mobility forces, particularly our airlift. Not only has it been called upon for the movement of troops and their equipment, as in the case of our Reforger exercises to Germany when we test our capability to reinforce the U.S. Army, Europe; it has also met the test of a 22,000-ton lift of equipment and supplies to Israel, the movement of UN forces to Cyprus, and the delivery of food and medicine to Bangladesh.

Despite all the uncertainties, if we have the capability to move (on the average) about 10,000 tons a day in wide-bodied aircraft over a distance of about 4,000 nautical miles (without any dependence on intermediate bases), we should be able to meet most of the demands on our strategic airlift. In other words, if we are able to lift a division with all its equipment each week from the CONUS to bases in Europe, we should have in hand the capability to deal with most of the other contingencies that could arise.

This was the objective set last year when I proposed increasing crews and spare parts for the C-5 and C-141 fleet, stretching the C-141s, and modifying 110 wide-bodied jets in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). While the program we are proposing this year is somewhat different, the basic approach and philosophy remain the same.

More lift would clearly give us greater confidence in our ability to match a rapid mobilization and deployment by the Warsaw Pact. Less would put our defensive posture in Europe at greater risk. The objective being proposed here is the minimum commensurate with a sober view of Pact capabilities and reasonable expectations about what our allies can contribute to collective security and deterrence in Central Europe.

We have no present plan to expand our sealift capability. Our sealift forces are not expected to add much to our initial defense in Europe unless both sides mobilize more slowly than we have assumed for planning purposes. If our planning assumptions are

wrong, there is more than enough sealift capacity in merchant fleets controlled by the U.S. and our allies to meet war needs. We are less certain about the adequacy of our sealift for contingencies other than major war in Europe. Our experience in resupplying Israel during the October War, for example, indicates that airlift is indispensable for the rapid transport of a limited tonnage of critical items, but sealift must be used to haul the bulk of large, heavy equipment.

Availability of shipping for contingencies less than general war is uncertain. Mobilization for general war implies the authority to direct the activities of merchant shipping; lesser contingencies, and, indeed, a period of indecision leading up to general mobilization, would be characterized by lack of such authority. The Navy has under continuing review the question of how much sealift capacity we may need to command for various contingencies.

Readiness

The main requirements to implement our strategic concept for collective security and non-nuclear deterrence should now be clear. However, it should be stressed that it is not sufficient simply to have our initial defense forces and long-war hedges in being. We must also maintain a high level of readiness in our active forces. Otherwise we will have the facade, rather than the reality, of deterrence.

By readiness, I mean forces that are well trained, have modern unit equipment in good operating order, and hold war reserve stocks on which they can draw for the early stages of any conflict. For example, in order to attain this goal, the Air Force portion of the FY 1976 budget request includes the largest funding of aircraft spare parts in recent years. This increased request is to permit the procurement of War Reserve Materiel to enhance the surge and sustaining capabilities of our strategic airlift and our tactical fighters.

Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to state with confidence that we have a high degree of readiness in our non-nuclear forces today.

There are several reasons for this state of affairs. First, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 not only demonstrated that stocks of equipment and supplies can be consumed at very high rates (much higher than anticipated), it also resulted in a major drawdown of U.S. war reserve stocks as we replaced Israeli losses and helped to rebuild her inventories. Second, our efforts to conserve fuel have meant reductions in Army training exercises, Navy steaming hours, and flying hours for both the Navy and the Air Force. Third, inflation and increased pay, combined with the continuing need to modernize our forces, have resulted in fewer funds for operations and maintenance than is prudent.

There is a tendency, understandably, to hold down on O&M funding when budgets are tight. The conventional wisdom is that, in an emergency, these funds can be quickly acquired and the necessary state of readiness rapidly achieved. Meanwhile, scarce resources should be concentrated on the long lead time items, which means funding Research and Development (R&D) and modernization at the expense of readiness.

This philosophy may have had merit in those bygone days when the United States did not have such large responsibilities for collective security and had time to mobilize. Now, as events have recently demonstrated, it is an anachronism. We must keep up our training not only because our forces may be sent into action with very little warning, but also because we rely increasingly on the sophistication of our equipment to compensate for superiority in enemy numbers. It is essential to keep our war reserves high, not only for our own needs, but also for the resupply of our friends. We must keep our equipment overhauled and combat-ready because, owing to unit costs, we have less of it to bring to bear in an emergency. In short, unless we are prepared to fund these components of readiness, collective security and deterrence will be seriously undermined.

The United States strategic mobility forces include 70 C-5 Galaxys, right, 234 C-141 Starlifters and a controlled sealift force of 34 ships (troop ships, cargo ships and tankers.)

Production Base

The Arab-Israeli war was so short, and consumption rates of equipment and supplies so high, that for all practical purposes it was fought out of inventories. But, as we have subsequently discovered with some pain, inventories must be replenished from a production base. And that base should have the skills, diversity, and responsiveness to supply these needs in a timely fashion; otherwise, the readiness that we require simply cannot be adequately maintained.

It is not clear, however, that these attributes characterize our production base at the present time. It is worth recalling, in this connection, what the U.S. arsenal of democracy proved capable of doing in World War II. On the average, we managed an annual production of more than 50,000 aircraft, 20,000 tanks, 500,000 trucks, 1.5 million rifles, and 80,000 artillery pieces. As late as 1963, we could still launch 13 Polaris and 4 attack submarines in one year. Now, while the Soviets produce 2,000 tanks a year, we are struggling to build to an annual rate of some 800. New military aircraft are coming off the lines at a rate of about 600 a year, and helicopter production over the last decade has fallen by a factor of ten.

One cause of this rather modest recent performance is the dramatic decline in real defense procurement dollars. What looks like a great deal of money for the purchase of military goods and services has been badly eroded by inflation. For example, jet fuel that used to cost 11 cents a gallon is now over 35 cents a gallon. Map paper that was $24 a ream only a year ago, is now up to $52 a ream. Manila rope, at $28 a coil last year, now is $40 a coil. And in many areas lead times on deliveries have more than doubled.

But other factors have also had an adverse impact on our ability to acquire needed goods and services. Our new maritime subsidy programs have caused a crowding of our shipyard capacity, driven up prices, and lessened the attractiveness of naval contracts to shipyards. Environmental programs and higher standards of health for industrial workers (which I support) have eliminated reserve capacity, increased prices, and slowed reaction times in the production of such diverse products as forgings, castings, and propellants. In some instances, because current defense demands are low (and we do not have the resources to maintain standby capacity), we find ourselves reduced to a single supplier of vital military goods—with considerable uncertainty as to whether we can generate enough orders to keep that one line in production.

None of us should begrudge the very real increases in pay that have gone to our military personnel as well as our civil servants. But we should recognize that we have provided these increases largely at the expense of other outlays. One result has been that our

production base for the general purpose forces has now shrunk to an alarming degree. It may well prove less than adequate to our needs, especially if it is again put under the kind of pressure that resulted from the drawdown of stocks in the Arab-Israeli war. Remedial action clearly is in order.

Support To Other Nations

Effective collective security and non-nuclear deterrence must obviously depend to a crucial degree on the contribution of our allies. In some cases, especially where guerrilla and subversive threats arise, we expect them to solve these problems without the involvement of U.S. forces. However, where our interests are involved, we may be willing to provide military and economic assistance.

There are other cases where friends and allies are in strategic positions and eager to participate in collective security efforts, but lack the economic base and the resources to provide adequate forces for their role. In these circumstances, it is preferable to provide support for the necessary forces through security assistance rather than to incur the even heavier burden of adding forces of our own.

Our assistance may take the form of grants or foreign military sales. We prefer to provide it solely in order to help defeat externally inspired subversion and maintain the kind of military balance that will deter external attacks. In supplying our assistance, we seek to ensure that regional stability is maintained. We have no interest in fueling local arms races.

But we must also recognize the fact that today, as never before, foreign countries have alternatives to the acquisition of defense equipment from the United States—particularly if some form of purchase is involved. Nonetheless, we shall continue to review most carefully potential sales of military equipment, even to close allies, and to refuse them where regional security or other U.S. interests would be adversely affected.

Despite the issue that arose over military assistance to Turkey—a nation of considerable strategic importance to us—it is generally appreciated that security assistance, properly managed, strengthens collective security and reduces the military burden on the United States. There is, however, a marked exception to this general appreciation, and it applies to the Republic of Vietnam. There, in Churchill's words, we seem to be decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, and all powerful for impotence. Our forces are now out of that tortured country, and the cost to the United States of the continuing conflict is currently about 3 per cent of what it was at the peak of the war. The South Vietnamese did not say to us: "Give us the tools and we will do the job." Instead, we simply informed them that we would provide them with the tools—and the munitions—and would expect them to do the job as best they could.

Since that time, three things have happened: The South Vietnamese have pretty well held their own despite our departure; our assistance to Saigon has declined; and outside aid to Hanoi has increased. A small state, beholden to us, still struggles to maintain its independence, but we have neither the temerity to sever its lifeline nor the resolution to pay the relatively small but necessary price to assure its continued existence. We have chosen, instead, to put an ally—facing an increasingly intensive attack—on the military equivalent of starvation rations.

This is not an edifying spectacle. As a contrast, consider what occurred when conflict resumed in the Middle East in October, 1973. Members of Congress—not all of whom sympathized with the equipment and munitions requirements of the South Vietnamese—persistently urged the Department of Defense to do whatever was necessary to ensure the survival of Israel. A supplemental request of $2.2 billion for military assistance to Israel was sent to the Hill, and the Congress quickly approved it.

It is worth noting that the hostilities in the Middle East lasted for three weeks. In a sense, the bill to the United States for the war worked out to $700 million a week. Yet we now begrudge the South Vietnamese $700 million a year for munitions and refuse to appropriate the resources necessary for the replacement of their losses in equipment. Some may say that the decision does not relate very strongly to collective security and deterrence as such, but I cannot say that it enhances our credibility or demonstrates our resolve. Yet credibility and resolve, along with ready military power, are precisely what we must demonstrate if we are to have collective security, deterrence, and a meaningful peace.

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