


**Mexico's Struggle
Towards
Democracy**

**The
Mexican Revolutions
of
1857 and 1910**

By
MARGARET SHIPMAN



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
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INTRODUCTION

SIXTY-FIVE YEARS ago Civil War, of which the basic cause was the institution known as chattel slavery, began in the United States. At the same time, a still more bitter internal conflict was waged in Mexico. Benito Juarez led the small property-owners and oppressed masses against the great feudal land-owners, chief of which was the Catholic church, established in Mexico by the Spanish conquerors.

Civil war in Mexico lasted ten years, during half of which French invaders assisted the feudalists. Throughout this conflict the United States supported the cause of Juarez. President Buchanan and General Grant urged military intervention in his behalf. Abraham Lincoln assisted him by official recognition and shipments of arms and finally demanded withdrawal of the French troops.

The Church lost its great estates, but during the period of reaction, 1876 to 1910, it regained some of them. The balance of power, however, fell into the hands of foreign investors; those of the United States, in 1910, owned nearly half the wealth of Mexico.

Today the Mexican government is again in controversy with the Catholic church. The press and the politicians of the United States profess horror at the religious intolerance of the Mexican govern-

ment. The United States Government maintains a threatening attitude regarding protection of American interests which may at any time break into open hostilities. What has caused this change of front on the part of the United States toward Mexico? The following accounts of the Mexican Revolutions of 1857 and 1910 discuss the economic factors involved, and their relations to the United States.

MEXICAN REVOLUTION of 1857

The Ayutla Revolution

I. BASIC CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION.

THE basic cause of the Mexican Revolution of 1857 was the struggle between an oppressive and decadent feudal aristocracy and a rising middle class. Economic antagonisms were rendered more bitter by racial division between the classes.

The Mexican ruling class was exclusively of Spanish descent. The followers of Cortez had imposed upon the people of Mexico a drastic system of exploitation. The masses became peons of the land and slaves of the mines. From intercourse between conquerors and natives, there arose the half-castes or mestizos, most of whom remained in the status of the natives. Some became wage workers, artisans, traders, professionals, and small property owners, but were excluded from governmental and higher economic positions.¹

It was mainly this mestizo class, lead by some of the lower clergy, that started the revolution for independence in 1810, arousing the apathetic peons to fight for their land. They were finally put down by the upper clergy and the creole property owners. Thereafter, the efforts of this reactionary ruling class to suppress the rising ambition of the middle class and the land hunger of the peons was the un-

¹ Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*, Vol. I, pp. 35-118. Priestley, *Mexican Nation*, pp. 116-126.

derlying cause of Mexico's internal struggles which culminated in the revolution of 1857.¹

2. IMMEDIATE CAUSES.

The immediate causes of the revolution may be summed up as the aftermath of the defeat suffered in the war against the United States (1846-48). This defeat was followed by economic distress, political agitation and disorder on the one hand, and by dictatorship and oppression on the other.

The poorly equipped Mexican volunteers and non-combatants suffered much in trying to repel the invaders from the United States. The terms of peace, by which Mexico surrendered more than one-half of her territory, were humiliating. For the three years following the war, the expenditures of the government were more than twice its receipts. Taxes and levies upon industry became exorbitant. The masses and the middle class suffered while the upper classes, clergy and military, flaunted their luxury. Crimes and banditry increased. Yucatan and the states on the northern border were in revolt. To quell the rising disorder, the army was enlarged. A law, passed in 1848, which limited government troops to 10,000, was evaded by increasing state militias and bringing them under central control.

Santa Anna, upon his re-election in 1853, took control of all state properties and revenues and dissolved state legislatures. In 1847, Congress had passed a law authorizing sale or mortgage of certain church property to meet war expenses.² It was now proposed that the unused property of the church be pledged to secure a loan. The opposition of the

¹ Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, Vol. IV, 117-119.

² Rives, *United States and Mexico*, pp. 316-320 and 393-94.

church was so bitter that neither of these measures was carried out. Freedom of the press had been virtually abolished. The secret police became oppressive. A conspiracy law was passed, according to which anyone suspected of opinions adverse to the government or the church was tried before military court and punished by imprisonment or death. Santa Anna proclaimed himself dictator but he was, in reality, the tool of his conservative cabinet, the chief of whom was Lucas Alaman, mouthpiece of the church and an outspoken monarchist.¹

3. GROUPS TAKING PART IN THE REVOLUTION.

The creole ruling class, represented by the conservative party, and standing for a strongly centralized government, opposed the middle class, represented by the liberal party, and standing for autonomy of the states. The working class, though divided in its allegiance, fought mainly with the liberals. As the struggle progressed, imperialistic France, England and Spain, and the Pope of Rome assisted the conservatives while the influence of the United States and the liberal elements of Europe aided the revolutionists.

The conservatives, forming less than one-fifth of the population, were composed of the ecclesiastical, military and civil aristocracies, and were dominated by the Catholic church. The church is estimated to have owned in 1856 from one-half to one-third of the most valuable land, and one-third of Mexico's real and personal property.² It owned the schools,

¹Baneroff, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 565-637. Gutierrez de Lara, *Mexican People*, pp. 149-177.

² *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1911, Mexico.

most of the fine buildings, and collections of art and literature. Catholicism was the legally established religion, embraced by all classes, and the church managed to control most of the lay and military feudal groups. The clergy were exceedingly corrupt, both in private and public life, and church officials had repeatedly plotted with rulers in Europe for establishment of monarchy in Mexico.¹

The middle class, chiefly mestizo, was small but vigorous. The mining industry, since the expulsion of the Spaniards, had fallen into the hands of small owners. These mine operators, the rancheros (farmers), other provincial property owners and traders were opposed to the strongly centralized government with its exorbitant levies upon industry. Lawyers, merchants and shop-keepers were also influential. Through study of law and military prestige, some liberals entered politics and public office. This middle class was responsible for the constitutions of 1824 and the beginnings of church reform in 1833, at which dates they briefly controlled the central government. When suppressed, they carried on secretly through the Masonic order, which was an important political organization, the York rite being liberal and the Scottish rite conservative.²

The laboring class was composed of peons and free wage-workers. The relative size of these two classes is difficult to estimate as Mexican statistics are usually based on racial and property-owning rather than occupational classification. It is certain, however, that the peon class was the larger.

The peons were partly mestizo, but chiefly Indians. They were, as a rule, serfs attached to the land.

¹ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 345-46.

² Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 467-69.

This bondage was not strictly legal, but was rendered practically so by a law which required persons without property to render service in payment of debt. Debts could be transferred and inherited by the children. A large share of the peons lived in little villages on the estates, surrounded by their communal lands (ejidos). These, the Spanish overlords had established, conforming to the native custom. Each village had a cachique, native chief, who now acted as a sort of overseer for the owner of the estate, and frequently exploited those under him for himself as well as for his master.

The peons had no political rights and no opportunity for education. They clung with great persistence to the languages, customs, and traditions of the various tribes to which they belonged. As in the days before the Spanish conquest, they manufactured by hand or with the aid of primitive tools most of the scanty clothing, ornaments, and implements which they possessed.¹

The free working-class, mostly mestizo, was an economic as well as racial mixture, shading at the bottom into peonage from which some of the more enterprising individuals escaped temporarily or permanently; and at the top into the middle class. The main part of the wage workers, however, were farm hands during the busy season, domestic servants in the cities, and miners. The last mentioned were the most highly paid and independent, but were not numerous, as the mines at this time were in the hands of small native owners who were not able to work them extensively. It was from this non-descript wage-earning class and the small property-owning class that most of the revolutionary army was drawn.²

¹ Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 609-13.

² Garcia Cubas, *Republic of Mexico*, pp. 18-20.

4. PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION.

There were five distinct stages of the Revolution of 1857—(A) initial uprising, 1854; (B) period of parliamentary strategy, 1855-57; (C) second military stage, the war of revolution, 1858-61; (D) European intervention, the counter revolution, 1861-67; (E) Constitutional rule, 1867-1876.

The revolution opened with sporadic revolts, but it was soon unified by a typical Mexican proclamation: the Plan de Ayutla, drawn up by a group of liberals under General Alvarez. It proclaimed that Santa Anna should be discharged, that certain definite steps should be taken for election of president, organization of political machinery in each state and election of Congress, that oppressive laws in regard to individual taxation, the army, and the interurban tariff should be annulled. The response was enthusiastic and wide-spread. Repressive measures failed to quell revolts, Santa Anna fled and the conservatives resorted to strategy.¹

General Vega, a conservative, called a convention and declared for the Plan de Ayutla. The army now numbered 90,000. Its influence vied with that of the church and had been greatly increased under Santa Anna, who, as a means of consolidating the power of his dictatorship, had filled most of the minor political offices from the military class. General Vega's subterfuge was successful in quieting the people but not in gaining control of the revolution. In 1855, General Alvarez was elected president and Benito Juarez was made minister of justice. Taxes were lightened and organization of state militias authorized. Most important of all, the *fueros*, established in Mexico ever since the days of the

¹ Gutierrez de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 174-85.

Spanish conquest, were abolished. The fueros were ecclesiastical and military courts in which all clerical and military law breakers, and also many offenders against church and state, were tried. Half the crimes in Mexico were committed by men thus exempt from the civil courts.¹ The abolition of the fueros caused such a storm of protest from the conservatives, that Alvarez was forced out of office and Comonfort, a prominent liberal, but a compromiser, took his place.

Juarez, however, remained in the administration, and the revolutionary program was continued. In 1856 a law was passed providing for the sale of the great church estates on reasonable terms. The proceeds went to the church, the object of the law being, not confiscation, but distribution of the land to small farmers. During that year, \$20,000,000 worth of land passed into private hands; but people of small means dared not face the wrath of the church, so that the sales, largely to foreign capitalists, served to establish a new landed aristocracy.

In the same year, a constitutional Congress was called and the famous constitution of 1857 was framed. The church, meanwhile, was excommunicating all who bought her lands, and a ferocious papal bull was sent from Rome, denouncing the government and ordering disobedience to its decrees.²

With the promulgation of the new constitution, the conservatives abandoned parliamentary procedure, and three years of very bitter civil war ensued. Comonfort deserted the revolutionists, and Juarez took his place. Benito Juarez, called the Lincoln

¹ Burke, *Life of Juarez*, p. 64.

² Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 324-28. Noll, *From Empire to Republic*, pp. 182-87.

of Mexico, was a full-blooded Zapotec Indian, who had risen from poverty to positions as judge, state governor and public administrator. Under his leadership, the radical and racial character of the revolution deepened.¹

Despite the utmost efforts of the clerical party to create the issue of a "holy war," the soldiers of both sides continued throughout the whole struggle to fight with religious zeal in the name of the holy Catholic church. In 1859, the Reform Laws of Juarez confiscated the remainder of the church property, real and personal, and completed the separation of church and state. The sale of church lands brought funds to the liberals and "greatly contributed towards ending civil war."²

President James Buchanan, in 1859, recognized the government of Juarez and recommended to Congress military intervention in Mexico, with or without the co-operation of the revolutionists, for the purpose of redressing United States citizens for damage to property rights, and protection of immediate and future commercial interests.³ The problem of transit across the Isthmus between the two oceans had been under consideration for many years, and its importance to the United States had been greatly increased by the acquisition of Mexican territory and the discovery of gold in California in 1848. Since 1850 negotiations had been going on with England concerning joint control of a proposed canal across Nicaragua. Under Buchanan a treaty was negotiated with Juarez for a loan of four million dollars from the United States in return for the privilege of perpetual unlimited tran-

¹ Burke, *Op. Cit.*, Chapters 3 and 4.

² Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. V, p. 768.

³ President Buchanan's Annual Messages to Congress, 1858-59, Appendices Congressional Globe.

sit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and states of northern Mexico. The United States Congress failed to ratify the treaty or to undertake intervention. The United States navy, however, prevented shipments of arms from Cuba to the conservatives, while munitions were permitted to go across the border to the revolutionists.¹

The forces of the revolutionists steadily increased and in 1861 were definitely victorious. Juarez re-established his government in Mexico City, obtained a re-election, continued to execute confiscation of church property, and to wrestle with the problems of reconstruction.²

The reactionaries now intrigued with the European powers for intervention and monarchy. A few months after the revolutionists entered Mexico City, England, France and Spain signed a pact for joint military intervention in Mexico.³ Their excuse was protection of their financial interests as Juarez had temporarily suspended payment of interest on the national debt. Their real object was to gain a stronger foothold in the commercial fields of the new world where they saw that the United States was rising to a position of control. Juarez negotiated tactfully in adjustment of the financial situation and England and Spain soon withdrew their small quotas of troops. France continued to press unreasonable financial demands and, in 1864, began military operations which continued until 1867. Maximilian was imported and welcomed exultantly by conservatives. The church encouraged the Indians in their superstitious belief that in him they saw the return of their mythical hero-

¹ Latane, *The United States and Latin America*, pp. 140-65.

² Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 334-39.

³ United States Congress, 37:2, House Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 134.

god. Maximilian, however, soon won the disapproval of the church by refusing to comply with its demand for restoration of lands, and by favoring, to quite an extent, liberal policies.¹

The French invaders captured one city after another. Juarez and his cabinet were obliged to change their headquarters frequently, and in being thus chased about over the country, came much in contact with the people. Large estates encountered in their travels were divided up and distributed to the peons. Revolutionary education by word and deed was spread broadcast.

The United States was busy with her own civil war, and at first took no decided stand against French intervention. The government, however, recognized Juarez as the head of the Mexican government, all through the struggle. He in turn abstained from recognition of the southern confederacy. "The chances for Maximilian's success in Mexico had been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis of the probable success of the southern confederacy."² The confederate government sought alliance with Maximilian and after its defeat several influential southerners identified themselves with his government. In the north there was considerable pressure, in which General Grant played a leading part, for military intervention on the side of the revolutionists and the government allowed munitions and volunteers to go to them. Finally, Seward formally demanded the withdrawal of French troops, but already Napoleon III had announced intention of withdrawal to the French chamber. His action was due in part to the unexpected difficulty and cost of the Mexican cam-

¹ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 342-44.

² Latane, *Op. Cit.*, p. 217.

paign, to the military success of Germany, and to pressure from liberal elements in France.¹

Among the first measures of the Juarez administration was the reduction of the army to 16,000, which threw two-thirds of the revolutionary soldiers upon their own resources. This aroused much animosity and was one cause of the disorder which continued during the five years that Juarez remained in office. Ambitious officers headed revolts which restless and impoverished soldiers were ready to join. The defeated conservative elements added to the spirit of discontent.²

The administration was notable for mildness towards opponents, vigorous administrative reforms, and adherence to constitutional methods. Confiscation of estates of hostile families of the old aristocracy was soon commuted to fines. Few political adversaries were executed, and general amnesty was declared in 1870. Law breakers were allowed regular trials in civil courts. "Every department of state was rendered less costly and more efficient."³ Financial difficulties were great. Most of the national income was derived from duties which were now all mortgaged to foreign creditors. The administration was held responsible for acts of the defeated reactionaries. The European governments refused for sometime to recognize Juarez and put in exaggerated claims of which Juarez recognized about \$79,000,000 as the national debt.⁴

Juarez died in office, 1872, and was succeeded by Lerdo de Tejada, as justice of the Supreme Court,

¹ Latane, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 217-37. Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 357-58.

² Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 352.

³ Burke, *Op. Cit.*, p. 350.

⁴ Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 368. Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 363-68.

soon confirmed in office by election. The following years were comparatively peaceful and prosperous. A notable event of the administration was the completion of the first railroad in Mexico, connecting Vera Cruz and Mexico City. The railroad question was much discussed in political circles. Lerdo favored the ideas of Juarez, who had declared for government ownership, construction and operation of railroads and telegraphs, and also shared his fear of too intimate connection with the United States. "Between the weak and the strong there must be a desert," is credited to Lerdo. He was accused by his opponents of favoring English construction companies and of paying them too high subsidies. On the other hand, Diaz favored United States investors.¹

Porfirio Diaz had been the most important general in the war against French intervention. He considered the constitutional methods of Juarez and Tejada inadequate and in all of the elections after the war was the opposition candidate, representing the disgruntled military and property-owning classes. After each defeat, his adherents arose in armed insurrection. After the second election of Juarez (1869) Diaz issued a revolutionary proclamation and the revolts were quite wide-spread. Under Lerdo he accepted terms of general amnesty and was restored to his rank in the army. He used his position for organization and probably for negotiations with foreign capitalists, who were increasingly active in Mexico. Early in 1876, he spent some weeks in Brownsville, Texas, in conference with United States business men. While he was still there, a revolutionary proclamation was

¹ Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 399-404. Creelman, *Diaz, Master of Mexico*, pp. 328-35.

issued by one of his military adherents. The main points of the "Plan de Tuxtepec" were denunciation of Lerdo, demand for his retirement, allegiance to the constitution, and demand for constitutional amendments, establishing effective suffrage, and non-re-election of president and state governors. Lerdo was able to hold revolts in check for several months, but finally his forces were defeated by those of Diaz. Iglesias, Justice of the Supreme Court, claimed the presidency by legal succession, negotiated with Diaz, and finally advanced to fight him with superior forces. These, however, rapidly deserted to the more popular leader. In November, Diaz entered the capital and his reign of thirty years began.¹

5. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION.

The chief results of the revolution were (A) declined in the power of the church and the old feudal aristocracy; (B) rise of the new capitalistic aristocracy; (C) crystallization and promulgation of the revolutionary ideas embodied in the constitution of 1857.

The economic power of the church was wrecked by the revolution, and loss of economic power very largely destroyed its political and social control. With it fell the old feudalism of which it was the bulwark. No ecclesiastical courts and very few monastic orders were ever re-established. Under Diaz, the church was allowed to evade constitutional prohibitions, and thus regained some land and power, but it never again became the dominant element in Mexican life.²

¹ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 371-73. Gutierrez de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 275-90.

² Beals, *Mexico*, pp. 41-44.

The military element was now very strong and in conjunction with it there developed that of capitalistic owners of large estates, which had been started by sale of church lands in 1856. These estates, however, were still worked by the labor of peons whose status was practically the same as before the revolution. More and more, the ownership of lands, mines, factories, and means of transportation came under the control of foreign investors.¹

The constitution of 1857 was in the main modeled after that of 1824 which had been the standard liberal document of Mexico up to 1857. They both divided authority between the federal government and the states and provided machinery quite similar to that of the United States. The outstanding difference between the constitution of the United States and the Mexican constitution of 1824 was the latter's provision that the Roman Catholic religion should be forever established to the exclusion of all others.²

The constitution of 1857, with the Reform Laws of 1859, which were incorporated as amendments in 1874, made the following important changes and additions:—church and state to be independent (Amendment 1); marriage made a civil contract (Amendment 2); private law and special courts for civil offenses forbidden (Art. 13); religious institutions forbidden to acquire real estate (Amendment 3); slavery and imprisonment for debt prohibited (Art. 2 and 18); everyone declared free to engage in any honorable calling suited to him and to avail himself of its products (Art. 4); no one to be compelled to render personal service without just compensation, contracts to the contrary and

¹ Gonzales Roa, *Mexican People*, p. 8.

² Ward, *Mexico*, Book III, Sec. I.

monastic orders forbidden (Amendment 5); monopolies, civil or ecclesiastical forbidden (Art. 8); all adult citizens to have right of suffrage (Art. 35); instruction to be free (Art. 3); bill of rights, liberal regulations in regard to aliens, and steps looking towards the abolition of capital punishment provided.¹ This constitution remained theoretically in force until 1917, though many of its provisions were never put into practice.

The promulgation of the constitution, the wars of invasion, and the sense of proprietorship in the land and institutions all tended to increase national consciousness. Distrust of foreigners and fear of invasion were inevitable results.²

The most important immediate result of the revolution was the breaking up of the church estates, of those confiscated from lay owners, and of the communal lands. There seems to be very little definite information as to the amount of land distributed to the peons.³ Ownership was in a state of flux. New estates were being formed and many who obtained small holdings soon sold or lost title to them. In 1876, Cubas wrote: "Within the republic there are more than 5,700 haciendas and 13,800 farms (ranchos) and not a few other locations of vast extent." (Republic of Mexico, p. 24.) He estimates the average value of the haciendas to be \$45,000 and of the ranchos, \$5,000, and makes no mention of smaller holdings. From this it would appear that at the end of the constitutional period, most of the small holdings had been absorbed by larger owners. Under Diaz the land was still further concentrated.⁴

¹ Rodriguez, *American Constitution*, Vol. I, pp. 39-96.

² Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 364.

³ "In the brief space of the Juarez regime (before intervention) at least one million peons became independent farmers on their own land." Gutierrez de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, p. 232.

⁴ Cabrera, *Mexican Situation*, p. 250. Gutierrez de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 277-78.

During the years of constitutional rule, there was a decided advance in the political and social status of the middle and working classes. The constitutional party, representing the middle class, increased from a minority before the war, to a strong majority, which controlled the government for ten years, and materially improved administration, finances and economic conditions.

Among the wage workers, beginnings of working-class organization were made, but they were probably social and educational rather than industrial. Says Cubas in 1876, speaking of the mestizos, "Desire of improvement in their social condition and education has developed itself amongst them in most remarkable manner. The idea of forming associations (which in Mexico do not have as their object the interruption of public order, but fraternity and mutual benevolence) has been already carried into effect by some societies of the working classes, as evidenced in their late strikes. Not only in the larger cities but in some of the second and third order, well-regulated organizations are being formed, at which the citizens congregate, in places chosen for the purpose, at times to attend lectures and to promote discussion upon some interesting subjects."¹

Even the Indian peons, whose economic condition was least improved, were to some extent aroused from the state of dejection and apathy, which centuries of extreme poverty and suppression had imposed upon them. The success of the Indian leaders, the loosening of the church bonds, the temporary possession of the land and encouragement in education, all hastened the process which had been going on since 1810.

¹ Garcia Cubas, Republic of Mexico, p. 19.

Prior to the revolution there had been practically no public schools. Between 1867 and 1876, schools were established in all villages and hamlets, and attendance was made compulsory. In 1874 there were over 8,000 primary schools of which 5,800 were supported by public money. There were 105 higher schools and colleges, with an attendance of 14,809 students. The attendance of the primary schools of 360,000.¹ With the advent of Diaz, primary schools, especially in rural communities, disappeared.

6. REASONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

The revolution was successful in greatly reducing the power of the church and in substituting for decadent mediaeval feudalism, a new capitalisticly controlled economic system, but it failed to establish a permanent constitutional government and to develop a large class of small property owners. The basic reason for this measure of success was that the corrupt feudalism of Mexico had exhausted itself and could no longer stand against the new economic system which was dominant in the world. Immediate factors, working for success, were the victory of the capitalistic element in the United States civil war, contemporaneous events in Europe, the sincerity and wisdom of Mexican leaders and the hardihood of the masses.

The basic reasons for failure to establish permanent constitutional government and a thriving middle class were (1st) the backwardness of the Mexicans in government, industry and education, and (2nd) the power of international capitalism.

¹ Garcia Cubas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24.

The Mexican masses had no tradition of democracy. For three centuries they had been slaves to a foreign power. Since national independence, they had been torn by war. Their only political knowledge was loyalty to military leaders. "To assume that one-tenth of the qualified voters participated in the late popular elections, is a liberal estimate."¹ Even the small middle class trusted more in force than in parliamentary rule. The people were just emerging from illiteracy, and industrially were of the middle ages.² They had been literally starved by an exploitation that did not afford them enough food to maintain physical strength. When the chance for betterment came, they were mentally and physically unable to break away from serfdom.

Capitalism in Europe and the United States had reached the imperialistic stage. The great industrial expansion that followed the civil war in the United States was under headway. Mexico, one of the richest undeveloped fields in the world, was easily accessible to its powerful neighbor. The proximity of the United States and her eagerness to exploit new fields, which had helped the constitutionalists to win the war, now contributed to their overthrow.

Under these circumstances it is hardly conceivable that constitutional government could hold out. Before it would have time to establish itself and develop, the surplus wealth of the more highly industrialized nations would overflow and sweep it away. It is possible, however, that with wiser procedure, more might have been accomplished for the Mexican people.

During the period of their administration, the constitutionalist leaders were active in political re-

¹ Bancroft, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 482.

² Farnham, *Mexico*, pp. 28-29.

form, but followed the laissez-faire policy in economics. The bad results of this course are evident in (1st) distribution of the land, and (2nd) disposal of the disbanded army.

The decree of 1856 failed in its object of establishing small farms and served instead to ground a new land-owning aristocracy. This might have been prevented by limiting the size of holdings or putting into execution a law, passed in that year, which says: "the right of property consists in the occupation or possession of the land, and these legal requisites cannot be conferred unless the land be worked and made productive."¹

The decree of 1856 also destroyed communal property owned by villages and towns. "The aborigines (Indians) were swiftly transferred from a system of communal to individual ownership for which they lacked preparation—no means whatever was taken to finance the laborers and small agriculturalists nor were laws enacted to render impossible the prompt sale of their lands."² No attempt was made to utilize the communal customs of the Indians by developing collective agriculture and irrigation so much needed in Mexico. Neither did the government take steps to introduce modern farm implements and method.

There was no plan for disposal of the disbanded army. Diaz took advantage of this and, after seizing the government, organized the dissatisfied military element into a constabulary for maintaining his dictatorship.

¹ Gutierrez de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, p. 199.

² Gonzales Roa, *Op. Cit.*, p. 245.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910-20

I. THE FOUR REVOLUTIONARY CENTERS.

The Mexican revolution of 1910 has been called "the battle of three ages: serfdom, capitalism and industrial freedom."¹ Within the boundaries of Mexico exist landed estates among the largest in the world, a developing class of Mexican business men and lesser land owners, and thousands of exploited industrial workers employed chiefly in mines and factories and on transport systems owned by foreign investors.

In order to follow the course of the revolution intelligently, one must know the local conditions in the four principal revolutionary centers, situated, respectively, on the south-central plateau, in Yucatan, and in the northern and eastern sections of Mexico.

The state of Morelos may be considered typical of south-central Mexico. Owing to rich soil and fair amount of rainfall, this has always been a productive and thickly populated region and here, during the Spanish rule, peonage early attained a high development. Here the Indians still cling tenaciously to their old communal customs and have little understanding of individual ownership of land.² When, under Diaz, their communal lands (ejidos) were seized for division, few attempted to establish individual holdings. The land soon accumulated in the hands of a very few owners, mostly

¹ Beals, Mexico, p. 89.

² McBride, Land Systems of Mexico, p. 30 and 176.

Spanish capitalists, who worked tens of thousands of the dispossessed Indians as peons on sugar plantations under a system of extreme exploitation.

Yucatan is separated from the rest of Mexico by distance and tropical forests. The natives are the Mayas, by nature pacific but strongly tribal and proud of their ancient culture. Yucatan has been called Mexico's Ireland and for a century the Mayas have been plotting to break away and join the Central America federation.¹ During the time of Diaz, the planters of Yucatan developed the henequen industry, involving an elaborate system of railroads, irrigation, and considerable capital. Gradually foreign speculators, who came to buy the henequen, acquired a strangle hold upon the industry. They controlled the local banks, loaned money to the planters at extortionate rates, and by 1908 held mortgages on nearly all the plantations, and were thus enabled to buy henequen at very low rates and hold it for high prices in American markets. Thousands of Mayan and imported peons who raised the crop were compelled to work for only a few cents a day, many of them branded and in chains.²

In these two centers developed strong agrarian movements, under able Indian leaders, of whom Zapata in Morelos and Carrillo in Yucatan became the most noted, but so universal was the land question that similar movements appeared in almost every Mexican state.

A large share of northern Mexico is semi-arid with a sparse population. Here peonage was never highly developed and was supplemented with free labor having a large intermixture of white blood and ideas of individual ownership.³ Here, under Diaz,

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 7-8.

² *Latin American Year Book*, 1919, pp. 422-35. Turner, Kenneth, *Barberous Mexico*.

³ McBride, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 30-34.

American investors acquired rich mining concessions and huge grants of land for cattle ranches, fake colonizing schemes, and other speculative purposes. With the building of railroads, there developed also smaller land holdings, and business enterprises.¹ Sonora, most western of the northern tier of states, is more rugged, with mountains rich in copper, rivers, and fertile valleys. This is the ancestral home of the Yaqui Indians. Fierce, courageous, industrious, they were never subdued to peonage, but up to 1880 practiced their communal system of agriculture. Diaz granted their best river lands to foreign speculators and in retaliation for the Yaquis' determined and continued resistance, thousands of them were sold as slaves at \$65 per head to the planters of Yucatan. By 1910 the tribe had been reduced to a small fraction of its former size.² From this northern section of Mexico came the leaders of the revolution who represented middle-class interests.

In the state of Vera Cruz, extending in a narrow strip along the Gulf of Mexico, are located most of the great oil fields, the two largest ports, Vera Cruz and Tampico, and also in this state and those adjoining it on the west are situated most of the largest factories in Mexico.³ This section became the chief center of organized labor.

2. BASIC CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.

The basic causes of the revolution were (1st) rapid growth of capitalism, controlled by foreign investors, which caused increasing concentration of land, monopolistic business development and rising price of food; (2nd) a rising Mexican middle class:

¹ Carson, Mexico, pp. 404-24.

² Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 44-48. Whitaker, Herman, The Planter.

³ Schnitzler, The Republic of Mexico, Chapt. 6.

(3rd) a dictatorship which encouraged foreign exploitation, fostered the decadent church and remnants of creole aristocracy, denied the middle class political expression and economic opportunity, and wrested from the masses the hope of freedom which the revolution of 1857 had brought them.

Diaz, during his rule of over thirty years, welcomed foreign investors and put at their disposal the rich and varied resources of Mexico. In 1883, seven years after he came into power, a law was enacted according to which those who surveyed and mapped public lands, should receive as recompense one-third of all land surveyed and an option to buy the remainder at a very low rate. Thus the public lands, which might have been developed into small holdings, fell into the hands of a few foreign speculators. In 1894, a still more sweeping law was enacted by the provisions of which unlimited quantities of land on which titles were uncertain could be acquired.¹ This and the breaking up of the ejidos (under laws enacted but not widely enforced in the time of Juarez) enabled foreign investors to seize large tracts of the best land, evicting families whose ancestors had tilled it for generations. In many cases the legal formality of dividing the lands among the villagers was omitted and unquestionable titles ignored. The courts were so corrupt that appeal to them was useless.² In case of serious resistance, armed forces were rushed in and the people ruthlessly massacred. According to official Mexican records, during the Diaz regime, grants of land totaled 180,000,000 acres, one-third the area of Mexico.³

¹ McBride, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 73-74.

² Phipps, *Agrarian Phase of the Mexican Revolution of 1910*, pp. 1-3.

³ Gonzales Roa, *The Mexican People and Their Detractors*, p. 5.

Authorities agree that the concentration of land was much greater in 1910 than a century before. According to most authentic estimates, the number of large estates (each containing 25,000 acres or more) decreased from 25,000 in 1810, when all the land was held by one-fifth of the people,¹ to 11,000 in 1910, when about 98% of the families were landless. In only three of the thirty Mexican states and districts did the percentage of landless families fall below 95% while in five it was 99%.² Some of the estates contained several million acres.

Only a small part of the tillable land of these great estates was cultivated, serving the double purpose of keeping up the price of agricultural products and of reducing the number of laborers needed. The methods of cultivation were antiquated and unscientific so that the fertility of the soil during the century 1810 to 1910 was reduced by at least one-third.³ The price of food was also increased by railway rates and by import duties of from 100 to 250% on corn, wheat, and flour.⁴ The condition of the peons was thus worse than at any previous period. Though not uniform, the wages through a large section of the most productive part of Mexico were from 5 to 25 centavos per day, with a standard ration of one quart of corn and one quart of pulque.⁵ Wages were usually paid in some sort of script to be traded out at the hacienda store. The most thorough study made of the living conditions of the Mexican working class, by A. J. Pani, estimates that the usual diet of the working man could produce little more than one-half the number of

¹ Phipps, *Some Aspects of the Mexican Agrarian Situation*, p. 38.

² McBride, *Op. Cit.*, p. 154.

³ Negri, *Survey Graphic*, May, 1924, p. 151.

⁴ Trowbridge, *Mexico To-day and To-morrow*, pp. 119-29.

⁵ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 115.

calories needed for a normal person to perform his labor.¹

In 1876, there were 416 miles of railroad in operation in Mexico; in 1910, there were 16,000 miles for which the Mexican government had paid \$75,000,000 in subsidies.² These railroads for the most part traversed the sparsely settled northern portion of Mexico and were built to connect American enterprises with the United States. The more productive and thickly settled portions of south-central Mexico had relatively little railroad mileage.³

In 1884, a code of mining laws was adopted by the federal government which took the regulation of mines out of the hands of the states and, departing from the old Spanish-Mexican idea that ownership of surface and subsoil is distinct, provided that a person who secured title to the land should also have a right to coal, petroleum, and certain other minerals beneath the surface. The ownership of mines soon fell almost entirely into foreign hands,⁴ and mineral production was greatly increased. Factory development was not so extensive and consisted largely of textile mills, smelting, and power plants. Industrial development was fostered by concessions to foreigners under special legislation, often granting monopoly privileges, exemption from taxes and from duties on imported machinery, etc. Banks were established with exclusive rights of currency issued, to the amount of two or three times their currency reserve, exemption from federal and municipal taxes, and the right to foreclose on mortgage securities by private action of bank officials without judicial procedure. These banks

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 117-23.

² Drum, *Business Conditions of Mexico, 1810 to 1910*.

³ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 112-13.

⁴ *Mexican Year Book, 1920-21*, p. 274. Gonzales Roa, *Op. Cit.*, p. 47.

were controlled by small groups of capitalists who lent large sums of money to their friends and rendered small land holders helpless.¹

The labor needed in railroad construction, mining and factories was recruited from the dispossessed and surplus supply of peons. Sometimes they were collected and driven en masse by mounted men to the seat of enterprise, but more and more they came voluntarily, for they were leaving the estates and wandering about the country in search of work. The wages for industrial laborers, though very low, were higher than for agricultural workers, but they were forced to live and work under conditions of extreme poverty and filth. Workers in the large cities were particularly wretched, as there rents were relatively high and food as costly as in the United States. The death rate in Mexico City from 1895 to 1912 ranged from 42 to 50 per thousand, two or three times as high as in the cities of the United States and Europe, and comparable only to a few of those in the orient.²

The political machinery of government, though nominally based upon the constitution of 1857, was in reality a dictatorship by Diaz and a bureaucracy headed by the científicos. Through thoroughly subsidized courts and an efficient system of secret police, freedom of press and public utterance was rendered non-existent and even private criticism of the government, dangerous. Political agitation was prevented by imprisonment or death of leaders. Law and order was maintained by 3,000 rurales, one of the best drilled and most highly paid constabularies in the world, and a federal army of 25,000 or 30,000 men in reserve. Mexico City was said to be the "safest city" in the world. Public instruction was

¹ Gonzales Roa, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 44-53.

² Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

practically confined to the well-to-do and was used to safeguard the established order. The teaching of the constitution was forbidden in the schools. Towards the end of the regime, student clubs were organized to support Diaz.¹

3. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.

The immediate causes of the revolution were (1st) increasing fear of United States imperialism; (2nd) the rush for oil lands; (3rd) the financial depression of 1907; (4th) Mexican crop failures and decrease in importation of cereals; (5th) bloody suppression of strikes; (6th) political agitation.

The imperialistic outburst of the United States, shown in the Spanish American and Philippine wars, the Rooseveltian Panama policy, and the control of Cuba as provided by the Platt amendment, impressed the Mexican moneyed classes and increased their aversion to United States investors. There was much discussion in the Latin-American press concerning the probable intention of the United States to "Cubanize" all Latin America.

The modern oil industry in Mexico began about 1900. In 1901 a law was promulgated which authorized permits good for one year, giving exclusive right to explore for oil specified lands at five cents per hectare (2.5 acres); ten-year patents for exploitation of oil lands; privilege of importing machinery, needed in the business, free of duty; exemption of all capital invested from federal taxation for ten years; right to buy national lands, needed for installation of plans, at low fixed rates, and other special privileges.² In the following years

¹ Priestley, Herbert I., *The Mexican Nation*, pp. 380-87. Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 43-45.

² *Mexican Year Book*, 1911, pp. 255-58.

occurred a great scramble for oil lands, in which Mexican small investors felt themselves discriminated against by law and government policy. Scores of small companies were formed and two large ones, i. e., in 1907, the Mexican Petroleum Company (Doheny) under the laws of Delaware with a capital stock of \$60,000,000, controlling 550 thousand acres of land; and, in 1908, under the laws of Mexico, the Mexican Eagle Oil Company (Lord Cowdrey and several Mexican directors) with a capital of \$50,000,000, controlling 800 thousand acres.¹ Thus the stage was set for the struggle between American and English oil interests.

The business depression of 1907 in the United States caused financial pressure upon Mexico which led to the reorganization of the Mexican national debt, establishment of currency upon a gold basis, and negotiation for a loan. It was currently understood that these transactions brought large profits to financiers and feeling became so high that the loan was given up. Government control of the railroads was effected in 1909 by purchase of stock, controlling over half the mileage. This was supposedly done in opposition to the railroad merger at the time being put through by E. H. Harriman, whose exclusive control Diaz feared.² All these measures were costly, added taxation and pressure upon business interests and the masses.³

In 1907 and 1908 severe frosts and droughts caused failure of crops in Mexico. In average years the value of Mexico's corn crop exceeded that of any other one product, vegetable or mineral, but

¹ Mexican Year Book, 1914. pp. 86-87.

² These remarkable financial operations were achieved by Limantour, minister of finance for many years. See E. J. Bell's *Political Shame of Mexico*, pp. 9-13.

³ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 383. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, New Volume, 1922, Mexico.

in years of drought, it was insufficient for the needs of the masses whose chief articles of food are corn and beans, and importation was necessary. In the year 1907--08 the importation of cereals was valued at less than one million dollars, as compared with an average of two million for each of the two preceding years, while in the following year it dropped to only one-tenth of a million.¹ In October, 1909, removal of the tariff on importation of grains was decreed and Diaz was authorized by the legislature to spend a million pesos for corn and beans to relieve the masses. In the year 1909-10, the value of imported cereals was five million dollars.

In 1906, several thousand miners at the great American-owned copper works in the state of Sonora, struck for \$2.50 per day and an 8-hour shift. Troops were sent in and hundreds of miners killed, causing excitement on both sides of the border. In 1907, a large number of employees of the French-owned Orizaba cotton mills in the state of Vera Cruz, went on strike for a wage of 75 cents per day for day men, 40 cents for women and 30 cents for children, with a reduction of working hours from 16 to 14 per day. To break this strike, the workers were forbidden to use company wells, their only source of water. When this had stirred up some little violence, troops were brought in and many workers slaughtered. Several freight cars of bodies were rushed to Vera Cruz to be thrown into the ocean.² In his opening message to Congress, 1907, Diaz deplored property losses due to this disorder and promised to increase armed forces to preserve law and order.³

¹ Mexican Year Book, 1911, p. 262.

² Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 132, G. de Lara, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 320-28.

³ Mexican Year Book, 1908, p. 160.

During the decade 1900-1910, agrarian reformers, among whom were Soto y Gama, Villareal, the Magon brothers, and others afterward prominent in the revolution, agitated in Morelos with pamphlets, speeches and proclamations, and even attempted revolt in 1906.¹ They were forced to flee the country and joined a group of Mexican propagandists who organized as the revolutionary committee of the Mexican liberal party with headquarters at St. Louis, Mo. They seized the opportunity of the Mexican strikes to circulate propaganda in the United States and by underground methods in Mexico. The secret service of the Roosevelt administration caused a number of these agitators to be arrested in St. Louis, San Antonio, El Paso, and California, and, finally, three of them were sentenced to imprisonment for breach of neutrality laws. Magon died in prison. The American socialist and labor movements were aroused and declared their sympathy with the Mexican revolutionary movement. There was also agitation in Yucatan, where a Cuban labor organizer was deported and Felipe Carrillo was imprisoned for reading the constitution to the Indians.

In 1908, middle class political agitation began in Mexico after publication of the Creelman interview,² in which Diaz stated that his country was now ready for democracy, that he would allow political opposition, and retire in favor of any opponent legally elected. This statement caused much surprise in the United States and in Mexico. A few months later, Madero came out with a moderately expressed criticism of the Diaz regime in a book, "The Presidential Succession", which, by 1910, had been published in three editions. Sev-

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 94-95.

² Published in *Pearson's Magazine*, March, 1908.

eral political parties were organized, two of which nominated Madero for president. The administration attempted to allay popular dissatisfaction by establishing a bank for promotion of irrigation and other agricultural improvements, but loans were given to only a few rich favorites and made matters worse.

4. GROUPS IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION.

The elements that were against the revolution were the bureaucracy, supported by most of the foreign interests, the creole aristocracy and the church. Those for the revolution were a considerable section of the middle class, a large portion of the laboring class, and probably certain of the foreign interests.

The científicos, who headed the bureaucracy, were a small group, perhaps a score, of astute business manipulators, who obtained huge graft from all large enterprises, public and private. Contracts, monopolies, concessions, adjustment of the public debt, all brought them wealth, and their example was emulated by most public office holders and employees to the extent of their opportunity. Owing to the small amount of middle class business in Mexico, educated workers and professionals depend very largely upon the government for employment. Diaz, who is described by business men as "honest" and was proud of the fact that he left several millions in the public treasury, grew old in office and it is generally supposed that the científicos carried things with a high hand towards the last.¹

General Reyes, long an important adherent of Diaz, conceived a desire to supplant him and for

¹ Bell, Edward I., *Political Shame of Mexico*, Chap. 1.

some time prior to 1910 conducted a covert campaign through Masonic lodges and Reyes clubs. His following was particularly strong in several states in north-central Mexico where he had held political office. Shortly before the presidential election, Diaz adroitly sent Reyes to Europe on a mission and Madero inherited his following.¹

The remnants of the corrupt old creole aristocracy, mostly rich non-resident hacendados, who lived riotously in the capital or in foreign cities, took little active part in the government, but approved of it since it protected their interests.²

The church which had been allowed to evade the constitution and reform laws, and had thus regained huge tracts of land, became increasingly arrogant and oppressive. The masses still bowed before it in superstitious reverence, but many of the educated middle class deeply resented its encroachments. During the revolution the church organized politically as the Catholic party, stored arms in its places of worship and used all its influence, religious and economic, to support the old regime.³

The greatest economic power in Mexico, the foreign investors, were divided and shifting in their stand at various stages of the revolution, always, of course, with the idea of advancing their immediate interests. Accurate estimates of the various foreign investments in Mexico are impossible.⁴ One most often quoted for this period places the total wealth of Mexico at approximately 2,434 million dollars, of which United Statese investors owned 1,058 million, Mexicans, 793 million, English 321 million, French, 143 million, and all other foreign-

¹ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 394-95.

² Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 151-61.

³ Dillon, *Mexico On the Verge*, p. 190. Cabrera, *The Religious Question in Mexico*.

⁴ Marsh, *Investments in Mexico*, p. 3.

ers, 119 million dollars. The English possessed large investments in metal mining. The French dominated the textile industry. The Americans exceeded the English in mining, owned about 650 million dollars in railroad stocks and bonds, and 100 million dollars in national bonds, banks, and land.¹ The action of the Mexican government in opposing Harriman's railroad merger, and in granting Lord Cowdrey very favorable oil concessions may have disgruntled some American investors. There is some testimony that Madero in his struggle for power received financial backing from certain American bankers and from Standard Oil interests.² Be that it may, at the outset, most of the investors were satisfied with the Diaz regime. Later, the competition for the oil fields, which rapidly grew in value, caused a schism among American investors and a struggle between American and English oil investors.

The chief official leaders of the revolution were members of the upper middle class, land owners, industrialists, men who had filled important political and military positions. They represented the Mexican property owners who felt that Diaz had discriminated against them in favor of foreign investors. The sub-leaders, those actually in contact with the masses, and who came into more and more prominence as the struggle advanced, were men of the working class, educated reformers, and small dispossessed property owners, often illiterate but spirited men, who sought freedom in the hills, as "bandits."⁴

¹ Daily Consular and Trade Reports, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 168, 1912, p. 316.

² Rippey, *The United States and Mexico*, p. 328.

³ U. S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, "Revolutions in Mexico," 1913, pp. 104-05.

⁴ Haberman, *Survey Graphic*, May, 1924, p. 147. Reed, *Insurgent Mexico*, Part 2, Chapt. 1.

The middle class, under Diaz, had attained education and a moderate degree of economic prosperity, but was small numerically and stifled politically. Many of its members were lawyers and other professionals who served the ruling class. Another section of the lower middle class were the *rancheros*, owners of relatively small land holdings, usually tilled by and supporting a single family. Many of these ranchos were formed by the breaking up of the *ejidos* and by acquisition of public lands under the homestead law of 1863. Some of these holdings were absorbed by the large land owners during the latter part of the Diaz regime, but on the whole, their number was considerably increased between 1876 and 1910. The *rancheros*, being in fairly comfortable circumstances, were a conservative rather than a revolutionary force.¹

According to the census of 1910, three million people still tilled the soil as serfs and with their dependents formed at least ten million inhabitants, two-thirds of the total population of Mexico.² It was this class who fought the battles of the revolution.

Workers in mines and factories were less than 60,000.³ Railroad workers numbered 30,000 or 40,000. The few unions organized prior to 1910 had no power, importance, or inter-relations.⁴ The industrial workers participated in the Madero uprising passionately, but without definite constructive aim.

¹ McBride, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 83-100.

² Phipps, *Agrarian Phases of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920*, p. 3.

³ Gonzales Roa, *Op. Cit.*, p. 54.

⁴ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.

5. PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION

The stages of the revolution were (1st) Madero's accession to power and rapid decline, 1911-1913; (2nd) Huerta's military coup d'etat, supported by the Pearson syndicate and most of the other foreign interests and his elimination by the action of the United States government, 1913-1914; (3rd) period of struggle between revolutionary factions, 1915-1916; (4th) triumph and decline of Carranza, 1917-1920; (5th) De la Huerta-Obregon-Calles administration, 1920—.

Shortly before the election of 1910, Diaz imprisoned Madero, but allowed him to escape after the election which Diaz carried as usual by strict control of the election machinery. Madero's activity now became frankly revolutionary. He found useful as nuclei of his organization the Reyes clubs already mentioned. His revolutionary proclamation was issued in October, 1910, its declarations for non-re-election of executives and free suffrage being almost identical with those of the Diaz proclamation more than thirty years before. There were also included abolition of the "jefes politico" (local bosses), a corrupt system by which the federal government controlled local affairs,¹ and a vague clause promising restitution of lands to those who had been wrongfully dispossessed.² For the moment Madero received the support of all dissatisfied factions from the conservative supporters of Reyes to the radical agrarian reformers. Guerilla bands formed all over the country. Gonzales, governor of the state of Chihuahua in the north, with his state troops came over to support of Madero. Diaz combatted uprisings in a dozen states and his small army of

¹ Inman, *Intervention in Mexico*, pp. 54-57.

² Text of Proclamation, U. S. Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 348-354.

25,000 was wholly inadequate for the task.¹ In his message to Congress, April 1911, he promised division of rural estates, reform of the courts, etc.,² but was soon after requested by the científicos to resign. Madero came into power, June, 1911, with very little bloodshed, not because he had formulated a program to meet the situation, but because he dared take the leadership in breaking a dictatorship that had become intolerable to both the middle class and the masses.

Under Madero's leadership no reforms were made. His official appointees included some of the old científicos, but his cabinet consisted principally of members of the Madero family, wealthy land owners, also interested in smelting and banking, who blocked all attempts at land reform. President Madero suggested legislation, authorizing the establishment of a fund to purchase land for distribution. A few concessions were revoked, but others were granted.³

In a few months nearly all the groups that had supported Madero were against him. The counter revolutionists were led by General Reyes in the name of Felix Diaz, backed by the Pearson Syndicate. The opposition of the masses was led by the Zapata brothers, whose proposal to reconstitute the ejido system, formulated in 1910, had been ignored. Zapatism spread rapidly. By the end of Madero's regime it dominated not only Morelos, but five or six of the neighboring states and the federal district⁴ and Zapata with his following of ragged and hungry peons had almost reached Mexico City.

In the north, the Yaqui Indians, enraged at Madero's failure to return their land and by his

¹ Trowbridge, pp. 133-35.

² Mexican Year Book, 1911, p. 6.

³ Phipps, Op. Cit., pp. 4-6.

⁴ Phipps, Op. Cit., p. 7.

grant of a new concession of their territory to a foreign company, took to the war path with the avowed intention of exterminating all foreigners. In the adjoining state of Chihuahua, Orozco, an agrarian leader who had supported Madero, came under the influence of the rich Terrazas family who owned a six-million-acre hacienda, and became the leader of the reactionary forces in the north. Madero was obliged to maintain a large army to fight guerilla bands in many parts of the country. Early in 1913, Madero's commander-in-chief, Victoriano Huerta, entered into an agreement with Felix Diaz and during "the tragic ten days" a sham battle was fought in the capital in which the military suffered but little, but several hundred non-combatants were killed in the streets. The United States ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, during this time was in frequent consultation with Huerta and Felix Diaz and, as he had been for some time previously, very antagonistic to Madero, using his influence to discredit him at Washington.¹

6. HUERTA THE COUNTER REVOLUTION

After Huerta's dictatorship was declared, Ambassador Wilson and diplomats representing European countries urged his recognition by their respective governments and such recognition was immediately extended by England, France and Spain. The Taft administration, however, hesitated. Carranza, leading political power in Coahuila, backed by the state legislature, refused to recognize Huerta and was soon supported by Generals Obregon, Hill and Alvarado of Sonora and by Villa with a strong following of the laboring classes in Chihuahua. The

¹ Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1912-1913, Mexico.

general in command at Vera Cruz and the Zapatistas independently rejected Huerta. Military operations converged towards the east coast to gain control of the ports, with customs houses and war supplies.

Within a few months after his inauguration, President Woodrow Wilson publicly announced that Huerta would not be recognized, nor would any government established by intrigue and assassination, and thereafter conducted a determined campaign for his elimination. John Lind, as the president's personal representative, was sent to Huerta with proposals for an immediate armistice on the part of the warring factions, an "early and free" election in which Huerta should not be a presidential candidate and by the results of which all parties should abide, followed by a promise that upon prompt compliance with these suggestions, the United States Government would favor a bankers' loan to the Mexican Government. This proposal being rejected, President Wilson adopted more conventional methods—control of shipment of arms, and diplomatic negotiations as a result of which England's support of Huerta was withdrawn and a second European loan was denied him.¹ This period of diplomatic strategy, which President Wilson described as "watchful waiting," and during which the demand instituted by the interests for direct military intervention became insistent, ended when United States troops were ordered to occupy Vera Cruz. This was done under pretext of maintaining the dignity of the United States following the Tampico flag incident, but was in reality to cut Huerta off from his chief source of supplies. The immediate action of the United States troops was

¹ Nearing and Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 96-99.

to prevent delivery of arms to Huerta from a German steamer,¹ and thereafter to control the port and collect the customs. For four months after Huerta had left Mexico, the occupation of the port continued under protest from Carranza who voiced the resentment of the Mexican people at this invasion of their territory.² American oil interests were advanced in Mexico by the elimination of Huerta who was admittedly supported by the British oil interests. That President Wilson and the American oil interests acted in accord is shown by the testimony of Mr. Doheny before the Senate investigating committee that "with the knowledge and consent and after consulting with John Lind" the oil interests assisted the Carranzistas with sympathy and money.³

In a few weeks after the flight of Huerta, Carranza entered Mexico City, in the same month that the world war began. The capitalists of the United States turned their attention to making fortunes in war industries and finance. Mexico, for the time being, except as a source of oil, became to them a matter of secondary importance.

7. STRUGGLE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONARY FACTIONS.

With the elimination of Huerta, the various revolutionary leaders who had been more or less united in opposing him now turned against each other, and for two years a period of internal conflict continued. Villa, who had been led to hope by emissaries from President Wilson and the approval of some of the interests, that he would be supported for the presidency, broke with Carranza. The

¹ Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 423.

² Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 262-63.

³ U. S. Senate, 66:2, Sen. Doc., Vol. IX, pp. 276-79.

Zapatistas, whose agrarian program Carranza refused to consider, came up from the south. Villa and the Zapatistas took turns in occupying Mexico City while Carranza retreated to Vera Cruz. He was supported by Obregon with a following of the Yarquis and other revolutionary elements of Sonora, by Alvarado of Yucatan, and by organized labor.

This period of chaos was of great value to the Mexican revolution. With the central government non-existent and the attention of the great powers somewhat diverted by the world war, the various agrarian elements and the leaders of organized labor were able to do some constructive work.

The Zapatistas established a provisional government in Morelos with a secretary of agriculture who appointed in each of the districts controlled an agrarian commission to make surveys and recommended steps for the reconstruction of the ejidos. This proving a difficult task, in 1915-1916, provisional distribution of land was made and an agricultural co-operative system centered about an agricultural loan bank was established. Under this regime, "the state of Morelos achieved comparative prosperity."¹ The main points of the plan, modelled on the Raiffeison co-operative system, were as follows:—local credit associations were formed of the farmers in each village which jointly determined methods of applying loans; these local associations united to form larger credit associations which had charge of larger districts and the prevention of general crop failures by means of concentrating resources upon certain localities; the directive head of the system was the rural loan bank of the state of Morelos; the local associations guaranteed loans from the bank for the purpose of buying seed, tools,

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 97.

and work animals, and carrying the farmer until his crops could be grown and harvested; the larger associations guaranteed negotiable certificates, issued by the bank on the produce in warehouses, pending its sale; the bank also took charge of marketing sugar cane, the growers delivering their cane at the proper stations and receiving immediate fixed payment, supplemented by dividends after the goods was marketed.¹

During Madero's administration, Governor Vales of Yucatan instituted a commission for the regulation of the henequen market, the object of which was to create a fund with which to buy enough of the henequen to break the power of the speculators. This plan failed to gain the confidence of the planters, and during the reaction under Huerta was used as an excuse for exorbitant taxation.² Carranza sent General Alvarado to Yucatan as military governor. He modified the plan of the henequen commission by issuing to each planter who signed a contract, a bond representing his pro rata share in the capital of the commission fund. In a few months all the planters signed up and the speculators disappeared. Later the commission was strengthened by legal provisions which made it obligatory for planters to sell to it for a fixed price with profits after re-sale to be divided pro rata or added to the fund. The commission was also empowered to supervise plantations, limit or increase production, control transportation and create a mutual insurance scheme.³ During the World War, Yucatan gained a monopoly of henequen and became very prosperous. While all the rest of Mexico was flooded with paper money, issued by the

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 110-11.

² *Latin American Year Book*, 1919, pp. 336-39.

³ *Latin American Year Book*, 1919, pp. 442-47.

various warring factions, Yucatan did business on a gold basis and General Alvarado is said to have sent 20 million pesos to Carranza from the treasury of the commission¹ and was one of the most powerful factors in his success. In the mean time, under leadership of Felipe Carrillo, native Mayan reformer and labor leader, the workers of Yucatan were organized in the Liga de Resistencia del Partido Socialista, a socialistic labor organization of 100,000 members, male and female. The planters were forced to return plots of land to the peons, co-operative stores were founded, schools were opened on every hacienda, and prohibition and other social reforms instituted. Laborers received as high as 7 or 8 pesos per day and annoyed the planters by taking days off to till their own plots of land and otherwise enjoy their newly acquired privileges.²

8. THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR.

Under Madero, for the first time labor was allowed to organize, and did so rapidly in the chief industrial centers. Organizers came from southern Europe and Latin America, bringing with them syndicalist ideas. The strongest union formed was the Casa del Obrero Mundial (House of the Workers of the World) in Tampico, with a revolutionary program of direct action. Organizations of the same type sprang up in many places. In Vera Cruz, the Camara del Trabajo was organized by a deported Spaniard who had spent years in organizing South American workers. In Yucatan, Carrillo and others organized the railroad workers. When Madero fell, the workers' organizations had

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 55.

² Trowbridge, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 230-31. Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 62.

grown so strong that Huerta's reign of terror could not overthrow them. During Carranza's fight for supremacy, in order to win the support of labor from Villa, Carranza's secretary signed a written pact with the leader of the Casa del Obrero Mundial, promising to put into effect at the earliest opportunity an enlightened labor code. Then the various labor leaders organized the workers into the **Batallones Rojos (red batallions) industrial units** whose union officials became their military leaders. These rendered Carranza valuable service.¹

It was at this period that Mexican and United States labor first entered into friendly relations. A message signed by Morones and other prominent Mexican labor leaders appealed to the A. F. of L. to use its influence on the United States Government for withdrawal from Mexico of the Pershing punitive expedition. This was sent ostensibly to capture Villa after his Columbus raid, but was also used to strengthen the demands of American investors, represented by the American and Mexican Joint Commission.² Carranza captured some of the United States soldiers and refused to comply with a preemptory demand from President Wilson for their release. Jingoism rose to a high pitch. Senator Fall's intervention speech covered 17 pages of the Congressional Record. Senator Gallinger presented a letter from ex-Senator Blair, declaring that "our southern boundary is Panama."³ After a conference in Washington between Mexican labor representatives and the executive committee of the A. F. of L., Gompers sent a message to Carranza, urging him in the name of humanity and to pre-

¹ Lord, *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. II, 1920-1921; p. 392. Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 133-35.

² Public Statement Franklin P. Lane, issued late in November, 1916.

³ Congressional Record, Vol. 53, pp. 6627-28.

vent bloodshed to release the soldiers. They were immediately released and tension relieved. Gompers then presented the Mexican visitors with a letter heartily endorsing their project for forming a Pan-American Federation of Labor.¹

9. CARRANZA'S REGIME.

Carranza was a land owner, described as the country gentleman type, who in a long respectable political career had never shown any particular interest in the masses. He was wholly out of sympathy with the demands of militant labor which he had pledged himself to support. In 1916, following a strike in the Federal District which paralyzed industry and traffic, he issued a decree making it a criminal offense, punishable by death, for a workman to take part in a strike, and followed up with military suppression of all radical labor organizations. He countenanced the organization of the C. R. O. M.,² of more conservative type, but by military action rendered all effective mass action impossible.³ When the Queretaro Constitutional Convention met in 1916, the constitution proposed by Carranza contained no labor code and was more conservative than the existing constitution of 1857. Radical representation was, however, in the majority and forced through amendments which made the constitution of 1917 more liberal in its provisions for the masses than any other constitution in the world. Carranza made no attempt to execute these provisions, either in connection with labor or agrarian reform, but, on the contrary, abandoned

¹ Proceedings 36th Annual Convention A. F. of L., pp. 54-64.

² Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (Mexican Federation of Labor).

³ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 335-36.

efforts to enforce his own decree of 1915 for distribution of land. He sent troops to destroy the Zapatistas organization and to drive the people back into the hills where their inability to raise crops caused a famine. During his years of bitter campaign against them, more than half of the population of their district perished and Zapata was finally killed.¹

Meanwhile, in Yucatan, absentee landlords found their profits decreasing. The high price of henequen annoyed the United States Government, which needed it for war purposes. The Yucatan Henequen Commission was bitterly opposed by the United States Food Commission as well as by the McCormick Company. Denouncement of the Yucatan Commission as a monopoly was unsuccessfully sought in the United States Supreme Court. Much pressure was brought to bear upon Carranza and towards the end of his administration he attempted to break the power of the Yucatan Commission by getting control of the state railroads. Later, when Obregon was endorsed by the Liga de Resistencia for a presidential candidate, Carranza sent a military governor to control the elections. This his troops prepared to do by pillaging co-operative stores, driving farmers from their land, flogging naked Indians in the streets and demolishing villages with machine guns.²

In many other states Carranza pursued a similar policy of driving peons from the land and imposing military governors. Other factors contributing to his downfall were the opposition of the oil interests, financial and industrial exhaustion of a

¹ Ross, *Social Revolution in Mexico*, pp. 63-67.

² Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 64.

large share of the country, and corruption and brutality of the army.

Carranza attempted to carry out those provisions of the new constitution which vests control of oil lands in the nation and to gain for his depleted finances some of the wealth that the immense production of oil was bringing to foreign investors. His decrees, requiring registration of holdings and establishing taxes on oil output and lands, were claimed by the oil companies to indicate intention to confiscate. They protested all decrees as unconstitutional, refused to pay taxes and were backed by their respective governments.¹ Meanwhile the companies were paying Pelaez, leader of an outlaw group, \$200,000 per month to protect their oil fields.²

After entering the world war, the United States declared an embargo on both food stuffs and gold going into Mexican territory, which added to the economic distress following the years of warfare. Carranza as well as opposing factions financed their campaigns on paper money with the result, that speculators made fortunes while the people starved.³ By using military force as the chief basis of his power, crushing instead of promoting social reconstruction, Carranza allowed the feudalistic army to get entirely out of hand. The whole country was ravaged.⁴

Obregon, Calles and De la Huerta, who occupied leading positions in the cabinet of Carranza, became disgusted with the conduct of his administration, resigned and retired to Sonora, where De la Huerta was elected governor, and Calles organ-

¹ Congressional Record, Vol. X, pp. 3155-61.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, pp. 279-89.

³ Trowbridge, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 174-86.

⁴ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 50.

ized the workers. Obregon accepted the position as mayor of his native pueblo and later announced his candidacy in the coming elections. Sonora, during the war had become, next to Yucatan, the most prosperous state in Mexico, since it has closer economic connection with the United States than with the rest of Mexico. There General Calles had made some progress in settling his troops in agrarian colonies and in carrying out constitutional land reform. Carranza now attempted to gain control of the state by sending in additional federal troops. This action was strongly opposed by De la Huerta and led to the final break between state and federal authorities.

At this time, Morones, president of the C. R. O. M., organized the workers politically in the Partido Laborista, nineteen out of the twenty-seven states being represented, in support of Obregon. Obregon was also endorsed by a convention of labor unions in Tampico which included the railway workers who are not affiliated with the C. R. O. M. The railway workers' union was one of the strongest in Mexico and rendered Obregon valuable service in sabotaging trains used by Carranza in military operations. Obregon was placed under arrest by Carranza, but escaping from Mexico City, organized the forces in the district west of the capital where the Partido Socialista de Michoacan gave him strong support. Obregon came into power in the spring of 1920 by the time-honored method of revolutionary proclamation and armed revolt, but he came, supported by practically all the revolutionary elements of Mexico, more solidly organized and with a more definite program of reform than ever before.¹

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 65-74.

10. OBREGON'S ADMINISTRATION.

The new administration had three principal problems for immediate solution, the agrarian, the military, and relations with the United States. Each agrarian leader was at once granted land on which to settle his followers; given arms with which to defend their property, seed, tools and machinery with which to till it, and aid in establishing schools. During the six months in which De la Huerta was ad interim president, he signed grants for the return of 100,000 acres of land.¹ He encouraged and strengthened the Zapatista co-operative system, but Obregon later decided to replace the agricultural bank by a national bank which has since been established. In Yucatan, Felipe Carrillo became governor and with the assistance of his Liga de Resistencia made Yucatan one of the foremost states in distribution of land and social advancement. He introduced cultivation of a variety of crops, believing that thus rather than by the exclusive culture of henequen, his people would become economically independent.² His policy aroused the bitter animosity of the reactionary planters and led to his murder during the De la Huerta rebellion.

The army, after the assured triumph of the administration had brought all the various groups under the control of General Calles, numbered about 180,000, of which a large proportion were officers, costing the government a million pesos a day in direct upkeep.³ Obregon proposed to demobilize this army to 50,000 and to that end employed many soldiers in road building and other public works, and settled others in agrarian colo-

¹ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 98.

² Carrillo, *Survey Graphic*, May, 1924, p. 139.

³ Beals, *Op. Cit.*, p. 75.

nies. By October, 1923, the army had been demobilized to 75,000.¹ The process was then interrupted by the De la Huerta rebellion.

During the Obregon revolt, the attitude of the American press indicated that commercial interests believed that he would prove more amenable than Carranza to foreign influence. Obregon's revolutionary proclamation contained declarations in favor of investment of foreign capital, restitution of seized properties and encouragement of business on a basis of equal favor to all.² Hearings of the Fall United States Senate Committee for investigation of Mexican affairs, instigated by American investors, was in progress when Obregon's accession to power came. The committee immediately submitted recommendations that the new government should be recognized only on condition of its pledge that articles in the constitution of 1917 in regard to confiscation of lands, control of petroleum, religious organizations and foreigners should not apply to citizens of the United States. The official conditions of recognition presented by the Harding administration to Obregon were that, previous to recognition, a treaty should be signed repudiating retroactive clauses of the constitution and guaranteeing recognition of United States property rights.³ Obregon refused to enter into such treaty on the ground that it would create special privilege for United States investors and violate his oath to support the constitution. The deadlock continued for two years despite the recognition of Mexico by 24 countries and the growing demands of United States business men for resumption of diplomatic

¹ Haberman, *Survey Graphic*, May, 1924, p. 196.

² Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 441-46.

³ Association for International Conciliation, Publication No. 187, 1923.

relations. Finally, a bankers' international committee headed by Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co., who was also a member of the Association for Protection of American Rights, arranged a detailed plan for the payment of the Mexican national debts,¹ after which Secretary of State Hughes announced that an informal commission would hold conferences for adjustment of differences. This commission, consisting of two Mexican and two United States representatives, came to no formal agreement excepting the claims conventions. The final statement of the Mexican commissioners, however, signified the intention of the Mexican executive to carry out the principle established by the decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court in regard to oil claims acquired prior to 1917, namely: that such claims should be validated in case owners had performed, before the promulgation of the new constitution, some positive act towards extracting the oil. The United States commissioners stated that their government reserved all rights of its citizens in respect to the subsoil, as acquired under the laws existing before the promulgation of the 1917 constitution. The Mexican commissioners recognized the right of the United States Government to do this but reserved the rights of the Mexican Government, under its laws, as to all lands in connection with which no positive act as specified had been performed.²

Meanwhile, oil companies operating in Mexico were refusing to pay their taxes. In 1922, the British companies decided to pay up and conform to the law and the United States companies were obliged

¹ Association for International Conciliation, *Op. Cit.*

² Proceedings of the United States and Mexican Commission, Formal Meeting, August 2, 1923.

to follow suit to hold their places in the market. At last, in August, 1923, more than three years after Obregon had come into power, the United States Government accorded him formal recognition.

II. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION.

The results of the revolution may be summarized as (1st) the constitution of 1917; (2nd) economic, political and social changes actually made; (3rd) psychological changes.

As the constitution of 1857 expressed the ideals of the revolutionists who broke the power of church-controlled feudalism, so the constitution of 1917 expresses the ideals of the Mexican revolutionists of today. In general, it follows the plan of the constitution of 1857, but adds long clauses in regard to control of natural resources and protection of labor. It materially strengthens safeguards against church domination and alien interference, increases the power of the executive, abolishes the "jefes politicos," and makes minor changes in governmental machinery, civil rights, monopolies and instruction.¹

Ownership of land, water and minerals is vested in the nation. Measures are to be taken to break up the great estates, develop small land holdings, and reconstitute the ejido system. Payment for expropriated lands is to be in government bonds and equal to assessed taxable value, plus 10%. Buyers of land are to reimburse the government in twenty annual payments. Concessions of mineral resources are conditioned upon regular development

¹ Supplement *Annals American Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science*, May, 1917. Mexican constitutions of 1857 and 1917 translated and compared.

and are granted only to Mexican citizens or foreigners agreeing to act as citizens in regard to such grants. No foreigner is to acquire direct ownership of lands situated within 100 kilometers of the border or 50 kilometers of the ocean. All contracts and concessions made by former governments since 1876 which have resulted in monopoly may be annulled by the executive. (Art. 27) Legislation is to be enacted providing the 8-hour day, minimum wage, profit sharing, three months' wages in case of unjust dismissal of worker and a long list of other protective labor measures. Social insurance and co-operative housing are to be encouraged. (Art. 123.)

Actual accomplishment in the working out of the ideals expressed in the constitution include a beginning in the distribution of the great estates, limited government control of the exploitation of mineral resources; phenomenal growth in the organization of the working classes; broadened opportunity for middle class development; restoration of constitutional government; a decided check upon the returning power of the church; considerable increase in educational facilities.

On the other hand, results that hamper constructive development, are a large increase in the size of the army and a revival of its feudal characteristics, an increase in the national debt and foreign bankers' hold upon the resources of the country, a falling off in agricultural production due to unsettled conditions and uncertainty of titles.

Constitutional provisions for distribution of the land have been moderately interpreted in various federal and state laws administered by agrarian commissions. Actual distribution has been carried out quite fully in the chief agrarian revolutionary cen-

ters while in some of the more remote districts almost nothing has been done. Distribution has been hampered on the one hand by the estate owners who particularly object to payment in government bonds and on the other by the poverty and ignorance of many of the peons. Soto y Gama, who is now leader of the national agrarian party, is quoted as recently saying "only the ejido can confront the proprietor with an economic fortress against the battering ram erected to destroy it,"¹ The hope is thus to gradually educate the peons in better methods of agriculture, to supply them with machinery and means of irrigation, and by rendering them more independent, raise the price of farm labor, force the owners to use more efficient methods and increase production. In September, 1924, Obregon reported that during his administration he had returned to the villages in absolute or provisional possession between two and three million acres. In August, 1925, it was announced that one-third of the proposed return of land to the villages had been accomplished. Since 1915, 12 million acres had been given.² Several hundred co-operative societies have also been granted land. Various laws, the latest the homestead law promulgated in 1926, provide for individual acquisition of land, by residence and cultivation, and for renting of land with payment of a small per cent of the crop. In general, however, most of the rural population remain landless as before the revolution.³

The two chief means that have been used to control exploitation of mineral resources are tax or rental on oil lands and tax on oil exports. This

¹ Walling, *Current History*, April, 1925, p. 40.

² Saenz and Priestley, *Some Mexican Problems*, p. 123.

³ Tannenbaum, *The Standard*, February, 1927, p. 161-6.

has brought to the Mexican Government a small fraction of the wealth extracted.¹ In December, 1925, two laws were enacted for putting into effect the principles of the constitution regarding national control of land and oil claims. These aroused storms of protest from United States investors and were the subject of prolonged diplomatic correspondence. The real point of disagreement, as shown in this correspondence, lies in the conception of property rights. Secretary Kellogg maintains that "the very essence of a vested interest is that it is inviolable and cannot be impaired or taken away by the state save for a public purpose upon rendering just compensation."² The Mexican position is that social progress may necessitate change in ownership laws. "Whenever a law is enacted which brings a change in the ownership system the main problem consists in laying down temporary measures which make it possible to pass from one system to another."³ Owners, if damaged, should receive recompense but progress must go on. Accordingly, the 1925 petroleum law⁴ requires that oil land titles acquired prior to 1917 should be exchanged for 50 year concessions, if necessary to be extended to provide ample time for extraction of the oil. Likewise, the alien land law⁵ provides that foreigners holding land in the prohibited zones or under other conditions forbidden by the constitution, may

¹ Official estimates show that since 1901 Mexican produced petroleum has netted more than 100% profits to investors, who still hold property greatly increased in value. On the other hand, the total amount received for oil taxes by the Mexican government would scarcely pay its expenditures for one year. Saenz and Priestley, *Op. Cit.*, ps. 10 and 27.

² Correspondence between the United States and Mexican Governments, Note of Secretary Kellogg, July 31, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, Note of Minister Saenz, October 7, 1926.

⁴ Foreign Policy Association, Pamphlet, No. 38, Series of 1925-6, p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

retain such lands during their lifetime but may not transmit it to their heirs. In the case of corporations, the land must be disposed of within a certain number of years.

The chief labor organization is the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (C. R. O. M.), claiming 1,000,000 members. Other unions total two or three hundred thousand members.¹ The C. R. O. M. includes 200,000 members of the Yucatan Liga de Resistencia, 100,000 mine and factory workers and a large number of agricultural workers. It is a federation, somewhat on the plan of the A. F. of L. but more loosely organized and broader and more socialistic in spirit. The Catholic workers are organized by priests with a pledge to respect the fundamentals of society, i. e., religion, family, country, and property, and are, of course, intended to undermine the true labor organizations.

Although, in general, the labor code of the constitution has not been put into action, several states have passed laws embodying its chief provisions and in some localities progress has been made in enforcement.

The annual budget for education has been increased to 50 million pesos, more than five times that of any previous administration. The number of schools is over 12,000, with 25,000 teachers and more than a million pupils. A great effort is being made to reach rural communities, if only for a few weeks in the year, with extension courses giving instruction in agriculture as well as in reading, writing, and the arts in which Mexicans are gifted.*

¹ International Labor Directory, 1925, Mexico.

² Vasconcelos, Survey Graphic, May, 1924, pp. 167-71. Saenz and Priestley, Op. Cit., pp. 62-74.

The results of the revolution in material conditions is small in comparison with the psychological effects, manifested among the masses in a tremendous awakening of independence, courage, self-respect, and ambition for economic betterment and education; among the middle classes, a quickening in nationalism and racial pride, both Indian and Spanish, and resentment against foreign exploiters and the church.

12. FACTORS MAKING FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE REVOLUTION.

Factors making for success are the inability of the old system to provide for wants of the masses and the middle class; schisms among foreign investors due to their conflicting interests; solidarity of Mexican agricultural and industrial labor and their understanding of other labor movements; national dislike of foreign investors which has a tendency to unite middle class and mass interests; growing solidarity among Latin American countries in their opposition to United States aggression. The pre-occupation of the great powers in the world war was a temporary condition, making for success.

Factors making for failure are agreement of world imperialists to give the United States a free hand in Mexico; proximity of the United States; her immense surplus wealth, overbearing nationalism and lack of sympathy for Latin races; religious prejudice, which is used by interventionists to stir up feeling against the Mexican Government's anti-church regulations; Mexico's backwardness in political, economic and educational development and the strangle hold of foreign bankers upon her re-

sources. Under the agreement of the bankers' international committee for payment of the external debt, Mexico pledged all her oil and railroad revenues and agreed to return the railways to private owners, i. e., foreign bond holders. Her budget for education and internal constructive work has been cut down to meet external obligations.

The agreement to give the United States a free hand in Mexico was reached before the world war began, as shown by acquiescence of England and France in Wilson's policy towards Huerta, and was assured by the dominant position which the world war gave the United States. How Mexico is hampered in carrying out her program of reconstruction has been well shown during the last two years, beginning with the sudden warning of Secretary Kellogg issued through the press soon after the reported negotiation for sale of the Doheny Mexican oil properties to a Standard Oil company.¹ Secretary Kellogg stated that in case of another revolutionary movement of which he heard rumors, "it should be made clear that the United States Government will continue to support the Government in Mexico only so long as it protects American lives and American interests."² Diplomatic protests against the 1925 land and petroleum laws began before they were enacted but the correspondence was not made public until the spring of 1926. Subversive propaganda was spread broadcast by Catholic organizations and the oil interests. Tremendous pressure was exerted at Washington. "Guy Stevens, counsel for the Association of Oil Producers of Mexico, said before the Foreign Policy's Association of Providence (February 23, 1927) that he

¹ New York Times, March 11, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, June 13, 1925.

would carry the issue, if permitted, to the point of war rather than yield."¹ Matters reached a crisis with refusal of certain of the oil corporations to comply with the registration requirements of the petroleum law. A careful analysis² of the claims that failed to register shows that a very large proportion of them are those acquired by E. H. Doheny, of questionable legality, the transfer of which to Standard Oil seems to have been delayed. Publication of these facts early in 1927 strengthened public protest against the belligerent Mexican policy of the Coolidge administration. Open hostilities were averted but the issue remains unsettled. In April the United States Government refused to renew the smuggling treaty with Mexico, under which each government agreed to notify the other of all shipment of liquor, arms and certain other forbidden articles. Abrogation of this treaty makes it easy to supply arms to Mexican rebels. Revolts against the Mexican Government are encouraged, business and constructive work hampered and suffering of the people increased.

¹ Greene, *The Present Crisis in our Relations with Mexico*, p. 55. The Knights of Columbus claim to be raising a million dollar Mexican fund to combat bolshevism and to have printed for free distribution millions of copies of "Red Mexico", "Mexico, Bolshevism, the Menace", and others. These pamphlets grossly misrepresent Mexico's social and political aims.

² Beals, *Whose Property Is Kellogg Protecting?*, New Republic, February 23, 1927, p. 8.

SUMMARY

In the revolution of 1857-1867, the Mexican middle class and masses overthrew the Spanish-Creole feudal land-owners, chief of which was the Catholic church. In this struggle European commercial interests added the conservatives, while those of the United States aided the revolutionists.

During the period of reaction, 1876-1910, foreign investors became the dominant economic power in Mexico. A large proportion of the land fell into their hands, was concentrated in vast estates, and held out of cultivation for speculative purposes. Two-thirds of the population of Mexico remained practically serfs upon these estates.

In 1910, the Mexican middle-class and the masses, driven by increasing misery, again rose in revolution. Again the clashing interests of foreign investors, now centering about the development of the oil fields, ranged them upon opposing sides.

The Mexican people won. They are alive with ambition for education, for better living conditions, for expression of their own racial and national character. The present Mexican Government has shown ability and courage. It seeks to regain some of the land for the use of the people who toil upon it and a little of the vast wealth which is being extracted from mines and oil fields.

The power of United States investors has been greatly increased by the world war. They are unwilling to abide by the laws of the country from which they draw their wealth. They endeavor by

intrigue to overthrow the Mexican Government and substitute one which will be their willing tool. They demand and receive the support of the United States Government. They welcome the agitation of the corrupt Mexican Catholic church, which has always oppressed the masses, and use the plea of religious tolerance to stir up popular feeling in the United States. Will the people of the United States allow themselves to be used to crush the rising people of Mexico?

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