

signatories to the Washington Treaty an invitation to meet in Geneva to agree upon the extension to auxiliary craft of the principles of that Treaty. The British Empire and Japan accepted this invitation. The President's initiative in calling the Conference was in conformity with the repeatedly expressed desire of our Congress, as specifically set forth in an Act of February 11th, 1925, that armaments should be effectively reduced and limited in the interests of the peace of the world and for the relief of all nations from the burdens of inordinate and unnecessary expenditure. The President's invitation left no room for doubt as to the purpose he had in mind, and the proposals to be made by the American delegation could have been forecast with considerable accuracy. It was known from the President's message that we would propose limitation of auxiliary craft by categories that we were in favour of limiting them according to the principles of the Washington Treaty. It was not difficult to forecast even the tonnage levels which we would suggest, as it was obvious that no fresh complications in the world situation had called for a material increase over the figures suggested by us at Washington in 1922, namely, 450,000 tons for both classes of auxiliary surface vessels.

In strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the President's invitation, the American delegation on the opening day of the Conference laid on the table clear, simple and

comprehensive proposals for a genuine limitation of naval armaments. We were confident that proposals of this general character would be acceptable to the Powers represented here. It was not unreasonable to feel that, even if the specific figures suggested by us as a basis of discussion were not acceptable, a reasonable limitation might be achieved on the basis of the present state of the strongest navies in the different categories; that is to say, the British Empire in cruisers and the United States in destroyers and submarines, with the result that, by agreeing upon such figures, we should be relieved of the dangers of competitive building. The Japanese delegation subsequently indicated its willingness to negotiate on the basis of the minimum tonnage figures suggested by the American delegation. It should be recalled that the minimum figures of the American proposals involved a considerable reduction in the destroyer and submarine tonnage now possessed by the United States.

From the first, however, we encountered a serious difficulty in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably larger number of cruisers than it now possesses. Instead of the 48 cruisers now in service, the British Empire delegation has set forth in the report of the Technical Committee a need for 15 8-inch gun cruisers and 55 cruisers of a smaller type, a total of 70. The claim for these figures was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American

delegation has never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitation on the basis of mutual concessions. If the sole purpose of our negotiation be that of setting forth the view of each Power as to its requirements without regard to the navies of others, it is difficult to see how we can arrive at a treaty for the real limitation of navies. Further, we have not yet been able to understand why, in a time of profound peace and at the moment that we are seeking to reduce the burdens of naval expenditure, the British Government considers a considerable programme of naval expansion as an absolute and even a vital necessity.

In an effort to meet the views of the British Empire delegation, we have indicated our willingness to make very substantial modifications in our original proposals respecting cruisers. We have agreed to discuss a tonnage in the cruiser class far in excess of what we had hoped might be fixed as a limitation for the future. This was done in an effort to help meet the British claim for numbers of vessels. Further, we have agreed to discuss the number of 10,000-ton cruisers and to accept a secondary class of cruisers, provided that the secondary type of cruisers should not be of a maximum individual displacement which will preclude the mounting of 8-inch guns, a calibre of gun which was agreed upon by the signatories of the Washington Treaty.

Unfortunately, these efforts to meet the British position, together with other American proposals to which I shall refer later, were not considered sufficient. Any further concessions on our part would have involved a complete surrender of the right to build ships responsive to our needs, and we were obliged to take the ground that, if agreement were to be reached, there must be some measure of reciprocity in concession. We frankly recognize that the naval needs of various Powers differ, and we have never contested the argument which had been put forward that the naval requirements of the British Empire could best be met by numbers of vessels. One of the virtues of the system of limitation of naval strength by total tonnage in classes is that each country is left free to use its tonnage allotment according to its special needs. We have felt, however, that the making of a treaty to which we could honestly subscribe as representing a limitation of armaments was dependent upon meeting these requirements within total tonnages which constituted a limitation and not an expansion. With a large number of naval bases scattered along its lines of communication, we can quite well understand the desire of the British Empire for a certain number of cruisers of the smaller type. At the same time, we feel that it should be recognized that our own geographical position and our lack of bases resulting in part from the restrictions of the Washington Treaty require a larger type of cruiser affording a longer cruising radius. We felt further that the repeated

expression of our willingness to reduce the total cruiser tonnage to the lowest limits acceptable to the British delegation was sufficient evidence that we have no thought of engaging in a programme of construction which can be any cause for apprehension:

The British delegation, in its proposals, sought to secure agreement to limit very strictly the number of the larger type of cruisers with 8-inch guns and to limit all other construction to small sized cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, a type of ship of relatively small use to us because of its lack of cruising and operating radius and protection. The immediate and obvious result of acquiescing in these British proposals would have been that the British Empire would have been able to build exactly what it desired and that we, on the other hand, would be restrained from building what we consider we might need and yet the tonnage levels insisted on by the British Empire would result in a substantial increase even over present strength.

It may be well here to touch upon the view which has been expressed that we have rendered agreement difficult by our alleged insistence upon freedom to build a large number of 10,000-ton cruisers armed with 8-inch guns. These the British delegation terms offensive vessels as distinguished from the 6,000-ton cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, which they call defensive cruiser. No such distinction was recognized at the time of the Washington Treaty. The 10,000-ton cruiser with 8-inch gun

armament was fixed by the Washington Treaty, and this decision was supported by the British delegates at that Conference and adopted as non-controversy. Furthermore, the United States did not commence the construction of cruisers of this size. Five cruisers of this type have now been practically completed by the British Empire and six more are in process of construction, while four vessels of 9,750 tons are now in commission. The United States has two 10,000-ton cruisers which are about 15 per cent completed and six for which the contract has been recently set. We have none that will be afloat for approximately two years. In the Act authorizing the construction of these cruisers, it was provided that, in the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armament, the President was empowered in his discretion to suspend in whole or in part any construction authorized by the Act.

The British Empire delegation had drawn a sharp distinction between the offensive and aggressive character of 8-inch-gun cruisers and the essentially defensive character of the 6-inch-gun cruisers which they feel would adequately serve for our purposes. The American delegation cannot but feel that every warship possesses essential offensive characteristics and that no ship is built for the sole purpose of defending itself against attack. We cannot follow the reasoning which attributes to 6-inch-gun cruisers a purely defensive role. We are told that they will police trade routes and protect British commerce on the sea.

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But, in order to afford effective defense to British commerce upon the seas, these cruisers must in time of war effectively deny the sea to others. When we come down to essentials, the claim on the part of any nation for the right to maintain in time of peace a cruiser strength sufficient to afford complete security to its commerce in case of war renders impossible any effective naval limitation by international agreement.

When we are asked to limit strictly the number of cruisers on which 8-inch guns may be mounted and eventually to abandon that gun altogether in favour of the 6-inch gun, we are compelled to consider the effect of such a limitation upon our situation in view of the fact that the British Government had at its disposal approximately 888,000 tons of fast merchant ships, capable of being readily converted into cruisers and armed with many 6-inch guns, as contemplated by the Washington Treaty. We, on the other hand, have only 188,000 tons of such ships. As was so ably brought out by Lord Jellicoe, converted merchant ships played a great part in the late war.

There is another matter which has given us cause for reflection. At the time of the adoption of the Washington Treaty, as I have mentioned before, the delegates of the British Empire looked upon a total tonnage for surface auxiliary craft of 450,000 tons as an acceptable and reasonable figure. But now we are faced with a programme calling for 647,000 tons of auxiliary surface craft, a tonnage far in excess of that contemplated at the time of

the Washington Conference. What has brought about this change on the part of the British Government? What new factor in world affairs has appeared upon the horizon which has caused them apprehension? One of the mightiest fleets on the high seas, that of Germany, has disappeared. So far as we know, no other great maritime nation has embarked on any programme which could conceivably be considered a menace to the British Empire. Other than the Powers here represented, there are in the entire world but five navies possessing modern cruisers of effective combat value; the strongest of these has approximately 72,000 tons, and the total effective cruiser tonnage of all five combined is now less than 200,000.

The British contention has been that their proposals make for economy, while ours call for a large outlay. We cannot admit the justice of such a claim. We have proposed a low limitation on total tonnage, which means a very large saving. Economy can only be realized by reduction of total tonnage. The fact is that within the total tonnage limitation, the larger the unit size of vessels the greater is the economy, both in initial construction and in operation and maintenance. Both high total tonnage and small units are necessarily expensive. I should like once more to stress that the American proposals would obviously permit of drastic economies, and that a proposition largely to increase the tonnage of auxiliary craft beyond that which any country now possesses would impose, we believe, an unnecessary burden.

The latest proposals of the British Empire delegation do not indicate any substantial reductions in the tonnage demands or modifications in the position taken by the British representatives on the Technical Committee during the early days of the Conference. The proposals of the British Empire delegation which have recently been submitted to us contained the points of difficulty which we have encountered from the outset, and, in addition, a new difficulty is that a combined tonnage limitation for all auxiliary craft, including submarines, is suggested. This total, fixed at 590,000 tons, is to be augmented by an additional 25 percent of so-called over-age ships. But the age-limit for replacement within the tonnage limitation of 590,000 tons has been so reduced that we have, in effect, a proposal for a total tonnage limitation of effective auxiliary vessels of over 737,000 tons. If we deduct from that figure the highest submarine and destroyer tonnage heretofore suggested by the British Empire delegation, namely, 90,000 tons of submarines and approximately 221,000 tons of destroyers, there would remain a tonnage limitation for cruisers of at least 426,000 tons. This is over 75,000 tons in excess of the British cruiser strength upon completion of vessels now under construction. This figure could be materially increased under the combined tonnage system proposed by the British through the utilization of a part of the destroyer and submarine tonnage for cruiser construction.

It is obvious that, in a treaty fixing total tonnage

limitations, any such figures would not be a present limitation and that even without a treaty it is unlikely that any of the Powers would reach any such maximum tonnages before 1931, when in any event we are to meet again to consider the question of naval armaments. Thus for the immediate future the only real effect of the British proposals is to restrict types of cruisers, not building programmes, and to obligate the United States, in case it should desire to build within the total tonnage limitations proposed, to construct many 6000-ton 6-inch-gun cruisers a type which we have clearly indicated, is not adapted to our needs.

I cannot but feel that the British Government has an unnecessary apprehension as to the use which might be made by the United States of reasonable freedom of action in the cruiser class within strict tonnage limitations. It is to be remembered that if the total tonnage for cruisers should be fixed as low as 300,000 for the United States and the British Empire, a certain part of this will be consumed in the construction of the maximum-size cruisers of a number to be agreed upon. A further considerable part is already taken up as far as the United States is concerned by the existence of ten 6-inch-gun ships of the Omaha class aggregating approximately 70,000 tons. The only practical question arising therefore is whether, in addition to building an agreed number of maximum-size cruisers, none of which have yet been completed by the United States, our future construction of secondary cruisers with 8-inch guns within this

narrow limit could be on such a scale as to give concern to the British Empire.

In an effort to meet any possible concern of the British Government on this score, an apprehension which, I hasten to add, we consider unwarranted by anything in our past or present policy, we had already suggested the possibility of inserting in the Treaty a political clause providing in effect that if the building programme of any one of the signatory Powers within the tonnage limitation agreed upon for cruisers should give concern to any other contracting Power, a meeting of the signatories could be called at any time after 1931 and, if a satisfactory agreement was not reached, the Treaty might be shortly terminated. It is difficult to see why this would not adequately meet any possible apprehension, as it would not be possible for a Power to make any substantial progress on a building programme within the short time prior to the termination of the Treaty. Furthermore, I may add that we are so confident that nothing in our own policy could give ground for such concern that we felt no hesitation in suggesting such a clause.

The American delegation was greatly impressed by a statement recently made by the British Foreign Secretary to the effect that war between the British Empire and the United States was already outlawed in the hearts of both nations. We give our thorough endorsement to this view, and the sincerity of this endorsement has been proved by the fact that our Government has not indicated mis-

givings or concern because the British Empire has build up a cruiser force entirely disproportionate to our own. We find it difficult, however, to reconcile the British conviction that war is already outlawed between us with their present unwillingness to recognize our right to build a limited number of the type of ships we would desire or with their willingness to risk the success of this Conference because they fear the problematical possession by us during the life of this Treaty of small number of 8-inch-gun cruisers, and this in spite of the fact that any apprehension which might be occasioned by such problematical construction is amply covered by the political clause which offers a release from the obligation of the Treaty.

Before concluding, I should like to take occasion in the name of the American delegation to express once more our appreciation to the Japanese delegation for the proposals they have brought forward and supported as regards low tonnage limitation. We feel that the firm desire of their country to effect limitation of armament at or below existing tonnage levels will have a profound influence.

We regret exceedingly that we have as yet not been able to harmonize the conflicting views on naval limitation. We believe that on broad principles, looking ahead to its influence on disarmament among the nations of the world and the interest of peace, an agreement between the principal naval Powers is of surpassing importance. We believe that we can all afford to make

a very strict limitation which will largely decrease our armaments, in the near future and consequently decrease the burden of taxation and the fear of war. We cannot believe that, if the three great naval Powers are all willing to make this limitation and reduction, there is any resultant danger to their respective Governments, their trade routes or their possessions. We believe we should deal with this subject on a broader and higher ground than our need of meeting all conceivable eventualities.

From generation to generation during the last 100 years, it has become more evident that these three nations intend to and will live in a state of peace, and we should approach this subject of naval limitation on the basis that war between them is unthinkable. The interruption of our work should not be interpreted as indicating a permanent inability to agree upon effective methods of naval limitation, and it is our hope that a thorough study of the whole problem of naval armaments may lead to the finding of some method of reconciling the views of our respective Governments and that a satisfactory agreement may be shortly concluded for a greater limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

In conclusion, I should like to express on behalf of the American delegation our warm personal esteem for our associates of the British Empire delegation and of the Japanese delegation. It has been a privilege to work with them on this problem, and we trust that, even though we have not succeeded in reaching agreement at this time, our work may mark a step forward toward

eventual agreement acceptable to us all. We are, all of us, united in the sincere desire to promote good understanding and friendship between our three countries, and I am confident that the inability to agree will not discourage us in our efforts to achieve substantial limitation in naval armaments.

Before proceeding to present the joint Declaration, I am desired to state on behalf of the three delegations that we have been very glad to welcome to French and Italian representatives at our this occasion to express, on behalf of the American delegation - I feel I may say on behalf of the other delegations - our warm thanks to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the generous measure of assistance he has accorded us: and to express our thanks as well to the very helpful secretarial staff under the able direction of Mr. Howard Huston, who has contributed so materially to our comfort and to the prompt and efficient handling of the large volume of secretarial work entailed by the Conference. I am confident that my colleagues will desire that our Secretary-General be requested to convey an expression of our appreciation to Sir Eric Drumond.

I will now read the joint Declaration:

In pursuance of the suggestion of the President of the United States, the Plenipotentiary Delegates of the President of the United States, of His Britannic Majesty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, met at Geneva on June 20th to consider the limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

Meetings have been held from that date until August 4th, during which period the delegates and their advisers have considered in detail various methods of effecting this object. On many important, questions, provisional agreements have been reached, certain of which are embodied in the annexed Report of the Technical Committee of the Conference. These points of agreement relate particularly to the limitation of destroyers and submarines, and it was only when the Conference took up the question of the limitation of the cruiser class that difficulties were encountered. These difficulties proved to be of character to render it desirable to adjourn the present negotiations until the respective Governments have had an opportunity to give further consideration to the problem and to the various methods which have been suggested for its solution.

The American delegation presented the view that, within total tonnage limitations, which they initially suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessel which they might consider best suited to their respective national needs, with freedom subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit.

The British delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground

that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired, first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton 8-inch cruisers, and secondly the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons, carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstance and its special needs.

The Japanese delegates presented the view that low total-tonnage levels should be fixed which would effect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the 8-inch-gun cruisers, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further 8-inch-gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorized in existing programmes.

Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made, the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible

total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restrictions as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty.

Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.

Further, the delegates agree to recommend to their respective Governments the desirability of arranging between the Signatories of the Washington Treaty that the Conference to be called pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the Treaty should be held earlier than August 1931, the date contemplated under the terms of that instrument, in order that any decisions reached by such a Conference may come into force before the capital ship construction programme commences, namely, in November of that year.

In making these recommendations and in submitting the statement of the points of agreement, as well as of the points on which agreement has not yet been achieved, the delegates desire to place on record a statement of their conviction that the obstacles that have been encountered should not be accepted as terminating the effort to bring about a further limitation of naval armament. On the contrary, they trust that the measure of agreement which has been reached, as well as the work which has been done in clarifying their respective positions, will make it possible, after consultation between the Governments, to find a basis for reconciling

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divergent views and lead to the early conclusion of an agreement for the limitation of auxiliary naval vessels which will permit of substantial economy and, while safeguarding national security, promote the feeling of mutual confidence and good understanding.

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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 16 pages and entitled "The Joint Resolution and Mr. Gibson's Address made at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, Aug. 4, 1927" (Annex 3) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Report of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, 1927 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/s/ Enomoto, Juji
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /s/ Okuyama, Hachiro
(seal)

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1-24

Naval Disarmament Secretariat

Confidential. Telegram No. 63.

Transmission date:

1400 hours 27 March 1930

From: Vice-Minister for Navy

To : Senior Delegate Sakonji

Telegram (Code, highly confidential,
Personal)

Request you relay message to
Minister.

At 1700 hours 15 March, received from Hamaguchi, supervisor of affairs. plenipotentiary telegram No. 208 asking for instructions.

Situation very Sudden and unexpected. Circumstances leading to situation not clear to us. Not even data upon which to base judgement in drafting instructions available. Extremely perplexed; hence the various telegrams sent to you.

We know that at the conference held-between senior delegates of the three powers on 17 February, negotiations ended in a rupture, though not of a serious nature; after which private talks were held between Matsudaira and Read with the understanding that those talks should not bind the home governments in no way.

However, the Navy is uninformed even on the progress of the negotiation, much less on the substance. Moreover, the figures

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according to plenipotentiary telegram No. 206 we had understood to be the U.S. Proposal, but reports received later make us think it is the U.S. British, Japanese compromise plan. However, according to data available here we cannot judge it to be so. (In the period from 17 February to 22 March, 16 out of 77 plenipotentiary telegrams were not relayed to the Navy, and 17 telegrams were handed to the Vice Minister through the Prime Minister.) However, after that, information was received from you; and on 22 March separate telegram (A-part one) in response to your request for instructions was sent from Hori, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, to Chief of America and Europe Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

But no answer has been received as yet, (26th), nor even any expression of opinion thereon. On the other hand, our policy for dealing with the current situation and the future as well, was decided after repeated deliberations from various angles. It was submitted to the Ministry's supreme council including Admiral Okada and Vice Admiral Nomura this morning (26th), and approval thereof obtained. And vis-a-vis also the aforementioned draft instructions already sent to the Foreign Office, it was considered advisable to take steps necessary to show that the said draft represented the agreed opinion of the Ministry rather than the personal opinion of the Chief of the Naval Affairs

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Bureau, and also to explain its authenticity and nature. This afternoon, therefore, Hamaguchi, Supervisor of affairs, was visited, and the separate messages A (part One), B (part Two) were delivered in documental form, and explanations given.

Upon the request and advice of Mr. Hamaguchi, Foreign Minister Shidehara was visited once again, and the same procedure was followed with him as with the Supervisor of Affairs.

(However, separate message B (part Two) was only restricted to Explanations.) The Supervisor of Affairs and the Foreign Minister both understood the Navy's viewpoint, and I was able to express my ideas freely as usual. Both Supervisor and Minister also freely expressed opinions.

Separate message A (Part One) (Same instructions)
B (Part Two) (Policies for the future)

End.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval Disarmament Secretariat Confidential Telegram No, 63" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of July, 1937

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

4

MEMORANDUM OF STATEMENT

Opinion expressed by the Vice Minister of Navy from a technical standpoint, at the Cabinet Session held on 1 April 1930 to draft response to the request for instructions; the said opinion having been approved in advance by the Temporary Supervisor of the Affairs of the Navy Minister.

Considering the draft of the reply to be given to the request for instructions from a technical standpoint, we find that while acceptance of the purport of the American proposal will enable us to realize almost completely our demand for 70% in the aggregate tonnage of auxiliary vessels, which is one of the three items we are insisting upon, it will still leave us far short of our desires as regards the other two items. That is to say that should the existing ratio of 5:3 in cruisers mounting 20 centimeter guns as between the United States and Japan become binding upon the relations between the two countries, not only would our defense plans for the future be seriously affected, but today when such striking developments are being made in shipbuilding, ordnance and other fields of technology that it is impossible to foresee what the future will bring, Japan, possessing nothing better than the obsolete FURUTAKA class built under the 1921 program, would be forced to stand idly for the next six years and watch our ratio go down while America goes ahead building numerous 10,000 cruisers mounting 20 centimeter guns.

Until 1935, to be sure, the 12 ships we have already completed will be slightly more than 70% of the 15 ships that America will have by that time.

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In the interim, however, she will commence construction of three more ships are bound to be completed at some future date. So even if we were to make a reservation of some kind regarding our shipbuilding subsequent to 1935, there is the possibility, in view of validity of treaties being long-lasting, that should our reservation be not recognized at the next conference, there is every apprehension of our being unable to maintain the 70% ratio for certain even if the period of validity of the treaty should be clearly stipulated. Even if we were to tolerate such a situation for the period of the treaty as a temporary phenomenon, we cannot bear to thrust this grave responsibility upon the naval authorities in the years to come.

We feel the more apprehensive when we think of the moral blow that will be felt by our navy, which is now in high spirits in the confidence that it can cope with America by supplementing its inferior ratio in capital-ships with its present superiority in 20 centimeter gun cruisers, when it realizes that the relative positions will be reversed in consequence of the treaty.

Coming next to the question of submarines, should a reduction in our present strength in that category by so much as one-third be forced upon us, it would constitute a serious blow to our plan of national defense based on submarines. If we were to accept the proposal for our retention of 52,700 tons with the replacement age fixed at 13 years, the result would be, in effect, tantamount to a recognition of the complete abolition of submarines. For until 1936 we would not be able to build a single new

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submarine for replacement; and in the interim our shipbuilding capacity would deteriorate most seriously. We are even apprehensive that this may be but the first step toward a complete abolition of submarines at the next conference.

I therefore hope that due consideration may be given to the points I have already set forth during your deliberations on the draft instructions.

One word I wish to add here is that should the draft instruction be approved here: in its present form, I would ask you to take the following into consideration.

The only way in which we can ease the numerous difficulties that will be encountered in the execution of our national defense plans as a result of the conclusion of a treaty on armament limitation will be through strengthening of substance and improvement of technique. With regard to the former, it is essential to take suitable measures for the maintenance and improvement of our strength in existing ships, strengthening of air power and encouragement of organs for air research and experiment, development of defense installations, strengthening of special surface ~~craft~~, maintenance of shipbuilding and industrial power, and prevention of unemployment. With regard to improvement of technique, it will be necessary to take into consideration such measures as the improvement of various training activities and improvement of living conditions in the service. To that end I would ask your special consideration of such items as the various ordinary expenditures, training expenditures, and expenses for repair and improvement of ships, all of which have hitherto been slighted in favor of expenditure for shipbuilding.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Memorandum of Statement" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau)

certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKAYAMA, Hachiro
(seal)

4

APPENDIX I of First Report of the First Committee.

31 January 1930.

- Official Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930. Printed & published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, P.P. 317 - 319.

FRENCH TRANSACTIONAL PROPOSAL.

The limitation of Naval material deals with floating material. It consists of the following:-

1. Measures for limitation.
2. Measures for Public Information.
3. Regulations for replacement.

1. Measures for limitation.

A.--The limitation of Floating material relates to the total (global) tonnage, that is to say, to the total of the individual displacement of all vessels susceptible of being used as fighting units, with the exception of those vessels which are specified as not being subject to limitation.

The maximum total tonnage (global) which no High Contracting Power shall exceed during the period of application of the Convention is fixed at tons.

Table I shows for each H.C.P. the total (global) tonnage which, taking into consideration the limit laid down in the preceding paragraph, and the present state of security, this

H.C.P. undertakes not to exceed during the period of application of the Convention.

B.--The individual standard displacement for vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed. . . . tons.

C.--The calibre of the guns of vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed. . . . mms.

2. Measures of Public Information.

The limitations specified in paragraph 1 are supplemented by the following measures of public information:-

A.--Table II shows, by tonnage per class, the way in which each H.C.P. intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I. For each class, this tonnage corresponds to the figure which should not be exceeded, during the period of application of the Convention, by the total of the individual displacements of all the vessels at any one moment on active service, and which by their characteristics belong to the class in question. The classes mentioned above are specified as follows:-

Class A.--Vessels the individual standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons, or with guns of more than 8-inch (203 mms.) calibre.

Class B.--Light surface vessels with guns exceeding 6-inch
(155 mms.) calibre.

Class C.--Light surface vessels with guns not exceeding 6-inch
(155 mms.) calibre.

Class D.--Submarines.

Class E.--Aircraft Carriers.

Class F.--Special vessels (minelayers, training ship, aircraft
transports, etc.).

B.--Within the limits of the total (global) tonnage shown in
Table 1, and in the absence of more strict conditions resulting
from special conventions to which it is or may become a party,
each of the H.C.P.s may alter this distribution, subject to the
two following conditions:-

(1) The tonnages by class shown in Table II shall in no
case be the object of an increase or subtraction of an amount
exceeding the figures given in the annexed Table;

(2) The amount of tonnage of one class which is to be trans-
ferred to another class shall be notified to the other H.C.P.s at
least one year before the laying down of the ship or ships for the
construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned.

C.--Each of the H.C.P.s shall notify within the month
following the laying down of any vessel that is being built for
its own account, the type and displacement of this vessel. This
information shall be supplemented at the time that the vessel is
launched by publication of the main characteristics of the armament

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of the vessel.

D.--Even should they not have been declared to be on active service, vessels still under construction shall be regarded as being on such service after the lapse of a period, dating from their laying down, of years in the case of Class A, of years in the case of Class B, etc.

TABLE I.--LIMITATION OF

H. C. P.

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

TABLE II.--DISTRIBUTION

H. C. P.

(Vessels, the individual
standard displacement of
which exceeds 10,000 tons
or armed with guns exceed-
ing 8 in. (203 mm.)
calibre.)

Light Surface Vessels
with Guns Exceeding
6 in. (155 mm.).

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

Total (global) Tonnage

OF TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

Light Surface Vessels with Guns not exceed- ing 6 in. (155 mm.)	Submarine	Aircraft Carriers.	Special Vessels (Mine-Layers, Train- ing-Vessels, Seaplane Carriers, etc.)
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right half (6)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "French Transactional Proposal" (Annex 6) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/s/ Enomoto Juji
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /s/ Okuyama Hachiro
(seal)

7

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE, HELD AT ST. JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON, S.W.1,
ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 30TH, 1930, AT 10 A.M.

- Documents of the London Naval Conference,
1930 Printed and published by His Majesty's
Stationery Office, P.P. 151-154.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman; the reference to a Committee for study and report of the important subject of methods of naval limitation may tend to create an erroneous impression as to the scope of the task that we are asking this Committee to undertake. It is gratifying, however, to be able to say that the scope of this enquiry has been very materially reduced by previous discussions, and that the task of the Committee is reduced to a purely practical problem bearing on the work of this Conference. Perhaps the most expeditious way of making this clear is briefly to restate the various steps in the previous discussions by which we have narrowed the question at issue.

The general problem of methods of naval limitation was first taken up by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1926; sub-committee A of that body sat for some months and carried on exhaustive--and sometimes exhausting--discussions, with a view to finding a single and ideal method by which naval limitation could be achieved. It soon became apparent, however, that the various Powers entertained divergent views as to what constituted this ideal method. Roughly, there were two schools of thought: that of limitation by categories and that of limitation by total tonnage. Limitation by categories fixes the tonnage which each country may use for each type of vessel, and

thereby fixes the total tonnage. Limitation by the global method fixes the total tonnage for each navy and allows each country to apportion that tonnage among the various types of ships as it sees fit.

The discussions in the first session of the Preparatory Commission revealed the divergence of views of the various Powers as to the merits of limitation by categories as opposed to the system of total tonnage limitation. I think it is important to stress the fact that these discussions were not immediately concerned with the reaching of an agreement, but were carried on merely with a view to determining the merits of these methods, and there was, therefore, no reason for attempting to conciliate the divergent needs of the various naval Powers at that time. (Indeed, the general work of the Preparatory Commission, as indicated by its name, has been to draw up a plan of work rather than any exact limitation.)

When, however, the Preparatory Commission met at its Second Session in 1927, this divergence of views had crystallised into a complete deadlock between the two opposing schools of thought, and it became important to devise some means of bridging the gap. In an endeavour to accomplish this the French Delegate, M. Paul-Boncour, brought forward a compromise proposal. This proposal was based upon the author's understanding of the inability of any Power, supporting one of these schools of thought, to accept for its own navy the system advocated by the other school, and has had a most important bearing upon the subsequent course of events. In a modified form it is one of the most important elements in our discussions to-day. The proposal was placed before the Preparatory Commission on

April 11, 1927. In its essence, it provided for the allocation of a total tonnage for the navy of each of the Naval Powers. This tonnage was then to be sub-divided into four categories--capital ships, aircraft-carriers, surface vessels of 10,000 tons and submarines. The provision was added that each of the High Contracting Parties, while keeping within the limits of the total tonnage, could alter the employment of that tonnage as apportioned among the various categories, subject to one year's notice before laying down the portion of tonnage transferred from one category to another. In the course of subsequent discussions, the four categories were increased to five by the division of auxiliary surface vessels into two categories, from 10,000 to 1,850, and from 1,850 to 600 tons. Moreover, a limited right of transfer between the last three categories was recognized in principle, any tonnage added to one of the categories being deducted from one or both of the other categories, with the result that the total tonnage should never be exceeded. Although there was no definite agreement at this stage as to the percentage of transfer, it was generally understood that the deviation would be small.

The proposal put forward by M. Paul-Boncour was conceived in the desire to facilitate agreement among the Naval Powers. This conciliatory spirit found ready response, and was the first step toward recognition by each school of thought that agreement must be found through consideration of the special needs of different types of navies.

This session of the Preparatory Commission was followed by the Three-Power Naval Conference in Geneva, but as the three Powers party to that Conference were all in favour of limitation by categories, the compromise

proposal found no application and was only brought to the fore again after the adjournment of the Three-Power Conference.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the British and French Governments during the early part of 1928, agreement was reached as to the terms of a proposal which divided warships, for the purposes of limitation, into four classes--capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than six inch up to eight inch calibre, and oceangoing submarines of over 600 tons. With regard to the last two classes, it was agreed that the Disarmament Conference, eventually to be called, would fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers which no Power would be allowed to exceed during the period covered by the treaty; and within this maximum limit each Power should indicate at the final Conference for each of these categories, what tonnage it proposed to reach, and would undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the treaty.

This compromise proposal was submitted to the American, Italian, and Japanese Governments. In setting forth the reasons for its inability to accept this plan, the American Government expressed its determination not to close the door on any possibility of obtaining a mutually satisfactory basis of limitation, and declared its willingness to take into consideration the special needs of other naval Powers for the particular classes of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defence, and suggested that this might be accomplished by permitting any of the Powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes, within the total tonnage, this percentage to be agreed upon, and any increase in one class to be deducted from the

tonnage used in another class or classes; in other words, the American Government suggested a re-examination of the proposal by M. Paul-Boncour.

Shortly after the opening of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission in April, 1929, the American Government, in expressing its willingness to undertake negotiations for a formula to determine equivalent naval strength, taking into account other factors besides tonnage, further stated that, for the immediate purpose of discussion, it was prepared to take as a basis the French compromise proposal of 1927, which constituted a middle ground between the thesis of global tonnage limitation and limitation by categories. At the same time, the American Government indicated that it did this, because it considered the technical aspects of naval reduction to be secondary to the spirit in which the problem is approached.

This statement of the development of the past discussions, in regard to the methods of limitation, has been made with a view to showing that such has already been accomplished, and that, when we refer to a committee the study of the methods of limitation, we are, as a practical matter, asking them to consider the various methods already devised and discussed, with a view to determining how the gap between them can be bridged, as a matter of practical application for the purposes of the treaty we are now seeking to conclude.

The American Government has consistently held the view that the method of limitation by categories is better calculated than any other method, thus far devised, to reduce international competition in the building of armaments and the feeling of mistrust, suspicion and insecurity

inevitably attendant upon such competition. If the system of global tonnage limitation were applied to all navies, no nation would know exactly what its neighbour was contemplating, now would it know exactly what steps it would have to take to meet the situation; all would be faced with an unknown factor, calculated to introduce an element of tenseness into the situation instead of one of complete certainty and security. It is the fear of the unknown that engenders distrust. As an example of what this means, let us assume that the three largest existing navies-- British, Japanese and American--were to adopt the system of global tonnage for those categories not now covered by the Washington Treaty. We would each have available several hundred thousand tons which might be applied in such a way as definitely to create suspicion and possibly endanger international security through the use of an undue proportion of that tonnage, for construction in some special type of ship, which would upset all the calculations of the other navies and provide all the elements of the competition which would exist in the absence of any agreement.

In brief, our conviction is that a strict system of limitation by categories affords a clear understanding as to the intentions of each naval power and affords a maximum of reassurance to all the parties to an agreement, so that they can regard each other's programmes without misgiving or alarm.

While we feel that the system of limitation by categories affords a maximum of benefits, still we recognise that smaller navies have inevitably a tendency towards specialisation, and we are not disposed to press our

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methods for the purpose of preventing such specialization. Further, specialisation can be taken care of under the category method. Nevertheless, we are not disposed to impose our theories upon other people who do not agree with them, and it is this which has led us to accept the compromise proposal for discussion.

DEF.DOC.#1904 Annex 8

RESOLUTION PERTAINING TO CRITERIA FOR THE
LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS (Adopted
at 14th Meeting of the General Commission,
20th April, 1932).

AGENDA OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION

Article 1, II a) b).

RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

Conf.D./C.G./24.
April 19th, 1932.

In view of the proposals submitted by various delegations concerning the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The General Commission declares that, in determining those criteria, the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations shall be applied, and that, in consequence, armaments must be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

It will be necessary, further, to take account of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State.

The General Commission decides that the application of these criteria and the methods by which the reduction and limitation of armaments must be effected, shall be immediately examined from a practical standpoint.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution Pertaining to criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments (adopted at 14th meeting of the General Commission, 20th April, 1932)" is an official document handed to me when I attended Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present. Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affix hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 9

Resolution adopted by the General Commission
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd, 1932.

- Official Conference

Document Number, Conf.

D.C.G. 26 (1)

Without prejudice to other proposals which fall to be discussed under
later heads of the Agenda, the Conference declares its approval of the
principle of qualitative disarmament-- i.e., the selection of certain
classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should
be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalised by means of
a general Convention.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 9

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932. (Annex 9)" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: ~~(S)~~ YAMAKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

2

Resolution adopted by the General Commission
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd, 1932.

- Official Conference

Document Number, Conf.

D.C.G. 28 (2)

In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution (Conf. D./C.G./26(1)), the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians civilians.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd, 1932. (Annex 10)" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 11

Draft Convention Submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference, March 16th, 1933.

Article 36.

-Conference Document No. Conf.
D. 157.

With a view to effecting the reductions necessary to facilitate the attainment of the object referred to in Article 35, the number of aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties who at present possess such aeroplanes shall, by the end of the period of the present Convention, not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the table annexed to this chapter; as regards the other High Contracting Parties, the status quo existing on January 1st, 1933, shall be maintained during the said period.

Each of the High Contracting Parties mentioned in the table annexed to this chapter may keep a number of aeroplanes in immediate reserve, not exceeding in each case 25 per cent of aeroplanes in commission in the land, sea and air forces of such Party.

Table - AEROPLANES

(Note - Figures will have to be inserted subsequently for the other Parties which at present Possess military or naval aeroplanes).

Belgium.....	150	Norway.....	75
United Kingdom.....	500	Poland.....	200
China.....	100	Portugal.....	25
Czechoslovakia.....	200	Roumania.....	150
Denmark.....	50	Siam.....	75
Estonia.....	50	Spain.....	200
Finland.....	25	Sweden.....	75
France.....	500	Switzerland.....	75
Greece.....	75	Turkey.....	100
Italy.....	500	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic..	500
Japan.....	500	United States of America.....	500
Latvia.....	50	Yugoslavia.....	200
Lithuania.....	50		
Netherlands.....	150		

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 11

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, the 2nd Demobilization Office hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Draft Convention Submitted Delegation at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference, March 16th 1933", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30 day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA Hachiro (seal)

December 9th, 1932.

PROPOSAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE
REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

- Conference Document No. Conf. D. 150.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the delegations to the Conference the following proposals of the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government, anxious for the realisation of the project of disarmament, whereby the peace of the world is to be consolidated, have been doing their utmost, in co-operation with other Powers concerned, to contribute to the success of the present Disarmament Conference. Paying sincere respect to the initiative taken by the participating Powers, particularly by President Hoover and the British Government, in putting proposals before the Conference, the Japanese Government have given careful consideration to those proposals. Having found, however, that these proposals contain certain points with which the Japanese Government cannot associate themselves, they wish to submit their point of view in so far as the problem of naval disarmament is concerned.

It is the earnest desire of the Japanese Government that, for the purpose of qualitative and quantitative reduction of naval armaments, the following should be observed by the present Conference as its guiding principle: that the Conference, always relying on the basis of the three important resolutions adopted by the General Commission in the early stages of the Conference-viz., those embodying the principle of reduction of

armaments, the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments and the principle of qualitative disarmament-should seek to reduce those forces which are aggressive in character and strong in offensive power, and to find a fair and rational solution of the problem in such a way as to meet existing conditions, giving due consideration to the geographical situation and special circumstances of the Various countries, so that the sense of security may not be impaired.

For the success of the Conference, the most careful attention should be given to the procedure to be followed in its future discussions. It is believed to be practically impossible for a World Conference such as the present one to seek to conclude a comprehensive agreement at a single stroke by having all the participating Powers take part in the discussion of every problem regard-less of whether it is of minor importance or of concern to only some of those Powers. Such a method would rather jeopardise the chance of ultimate success. In the future discussion of naval questions, therefore, and with a view to realising the guiding principles set forth above, to facilitating the progress of the Conference, and to assuring the attainment of its object, the Japanese Government propose, as a practical and effective procedure, that:

- (1) The general outline of agreements to be concluded shall form the subject-matter of prior negotiations between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, as was contemplated by the resolution of the General Commission on July 23rd;
- (2) The agreements shall be of two kinds-general and special. Discussions on matters of a general character will be followed by discussions on matters of a sectional and detailed nature;
- (3) A distinction shall be made between powerful naval vessels, which possess a high degree of relativity as between Powers, and less powerful vessels, which, having a close relation to geographical situation and special circumstances, are primarily necessary for defence and patrol services; in other words, such vessels as capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers on the one hand, and such vessels as B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines on the other, shall be dealt with separately.

In the general agreement, qualitative limitation of all categories of naval vessels and quantitative limitation between the five leading naval Powers of capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers are to be effected so that the offensive power of these vessels will be greatly reduced; and the maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the afore-mentioned five Powers, for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively shall be fixed.

In the special agreements, quantitative reduction to be applied mainly to B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines shall be effected within each group of Powers most closely related, taking into account their geographical situation and special circumstances.

The Japanese Government think that the method outlined above should prove to be the most practical way to obtain a fair and equitable agreement.

A. GENERAL AGREEMENT.

It is the purpose of this agreement to provide for qualitative limitation of naval vessels of all countries, together with a quantitative limitation between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, of vessels having a great offensive power and to fix the maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the said five Powers, for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively.

1. Reduction in the unit size of the various naval vessels and the calibre of the guns shall be agreed upon.

2. The reduction and limitation of the tonnages of capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers of the above-mentioned five Powers shall be agreed upon.

3. The maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the five naval Powers for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively shall be agreed upon in the general agreement. The actual tonnages of these vessels to be retained by the five Powers shall, however, be fixed as low as possible within the above-mentioned maximum, by means of special agreements, between the

Powers in the respective groups to which the said five Powers belong, taking the tonnages actually possessed by each Power as a basis and also bearing in mind the geographical situation and special circumstances of each country concerned.

4. As for the tonnages of the Powers other than the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, it shall be agreed in the general agreement that they shall be limited and reduced by means of the special agreements, upon the basis of the actual tonnages of the Powers and with due regard to their geographical situation and special circumstances.

B. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS.

For the purpose of these agreements, the world shall be divided broadly into the Pacific, Atlantic, European and South-American groups, and the limitation and reduction of the tonnage to be actually retained by a country shall be agreed upon between that country and other countries of the same groups on the basis of the provisions embodied in the general agreement. (As for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, the special agreements apply to the tonnages of B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines). A country which is closely related to more than one group shall participate in the negotiation of the agreement of each of those groups.

Throughout the discussions of the Conference in the first six months, the most important point unanimously agreed upon was the principle of qualitative limitation, which was adopted with the basic idea in mind of strengthening defensive power by weakening offensive power.

Having this end in view, the Japanese Government urge, first of all, the total abolition of aircraft-carriers, which were admitted by a great majority of the members of the technical Commissions to be most offensive, most efficacious against national defense, and most threatening to civilian populations. The Japanese Government also urge the reduction in the unit size of all categories of naval vessels, especially that of capital ships and A-class cruisers.

In view of the fact that the basic idea referred to above of strengthening defensive power by weakening offensive power necessarily demands a large sacrifice on the part of larger navies in

comparison with that of smaller navies, the former should be prepared to take the lead in larger reductions than the latter. To apply the same percentage of reduction to both large and small navies alike would naturally impair the sense of national security of countries with lesser navies, and this sense of security will diminish as the measure of reduction is increased. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that, in effecting the reduction in the tonnages of vessels possessing a high degree of relativity as between Powers, such as capital ships and A-class cruisers, the above consideration of national security should be taken into account in order that lesser naval Power may not be disturbed in this regard. B-class cruisers and destroyers, having no great offensive power, are less important in the consideration of relativity. The tonnages required by each Power should therefore be determined primarily by the needs of that Power in view of its geographical situation and with due regard to the function of these types of vessels in coastal defense and protection of lines of communication in war-time, and for patrol and similar services in time of peace. Submarines, as was recognized by a large majority of the members of the Naval Commission, are of defensive and not offensive character. The degree of their relativity as between Powers is extremely slight, and they constitute an arm indispensable for the defense of a lesser naval Power. The required tonnage should be determined, therefore, solely by the geographical situation and defensive needs of each country.

In short, the greatest importance should be attached to considerations of the geographical situation and social circumstances of each country in determining the tonnages of B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The Japanese Government therefore propose that the actual tonnages of these vessels to be retained by the various Powers be determined by means of special agreement, and that the uniform maximum tonnages acceptable to all the Powers, for these three types of vessels, be stipulated in the general agreement.

In pursuance of the above considerations, the Japanese Government wish to put forward the following concrete proposal for the general agreement:

1. The maximum unit size and gun-calibre of vessels to be constructed in the future shall be reduced and limited as follows:

Type	Tonnage	Gun-calibre
Capital ship	25,000	14 inches (355 mm.)
A-class cruiser	8,000	8 inches (203 mm.)
B-class cruiser	6,000	6,1 inches (155 mm.)
Destroyer (including flotilla leader	1,500	5,1 inches (130 mm.)
Submarine	1,800	5,1 inches (130 mm.)

Aircraft-carriers shall be abolished, prohibiting at the same time the construction of aircraft landing platforms of decks on naval vessels.

2. The strength of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan in capital ships, and A-class cruisers shall be reduced to the following figures:

Capital Ships.

	Tonnage	Number of units
United States	275,000	11
British Empire	275,000	11
Japan	200,000	8

For France and Italy, the maximum tonnage shall be fixed at 150,000 (number of units, not fixed); and within that limit the actual tonnage to be allowed each Power shall be agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

A-class Cruisers.

	Tonnage	Number of units
United States	96,000	12
British Empire	96,000	12
Japan	80,000	10

For France and Italy, the maximum tonnage shall be fixed at 56,000 (number of units, 7); and within that limit the actual

tonnage to be allowed each Power shall be agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

3. The maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines shall be fixed as follows:

Type	Tonnage
B-class cruiser	150,000
Destroyer	150,000
Submarine	75,000

The proposal of the Japanese Government, based as it is upon the principles of disarmament, which have received the approval of the public opinion of the entire world, offers, in their opinion a fair, reasonable and practical solution of the problems of naval disarmament. In putting forward this proposal, the Japanese Government wish to make it clear that they are animated by the sincere desire to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Conference. It is submitted, not only with the hope that the other naval Powers will encounter no difficulty in accepting it, but with the firm conviction that it will effect an enormous reduction in expenditures on armament that now weigh heavily upon the peoples of the world, and that it will lead the way toward the consolidation of a lasting world peace.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Proposal of the Japanese Government for the Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armament" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 26th day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Admiral Nagano's explanation made at the 1st Meeting
of the heads of delegations (London Naval Conference,
1935), on 16th December 1935.

- Stenographic Notes
(L.N.C.(35) (H.D.)
1st Meeting, P. 7.

Admiral Nagano (Translation): I have stated that the strongest
must make the greatest sacrifices. As I said on a former occasion, the
state of my mind in making the Japanese proposal is very similar to
that of the British Delegate at the Geneva Conference, who, at the
meeting of the Bureau in November 1932, made a proposal for the reduc-
tion of air forces. He explained the British proposal to the following
effect: the British Air Force at present stands fifth in strength; that
is to say, there are four Powers stronger in the air than Great Britain;
he would like those four other Powers to come to the British level, and
then all would effect a reduction of one-third.

The difference between that proposal and ours is that in the
British proposal the level to which the four Powers were to come down was
the level of the British Air Force at that time. We have not stated a
definite level to which we propose all the navies should come down.
Regarding the position of armament as a whole, it is true there are in
addition to the navy, land and air forces, but here we are discussing
only navies and, so far as navies are concerned, we believe that equality

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (1)

of armaments, that is to say, of naval armaments, will best produce a state in which defence is easy and attack difficult. Our thesis is to set the limit as low as possible, and that low limit we propose should be fixed by this Conference.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Admiral Nagano's explanation made at the 1st Meeting of the heads of delegations (London Naval Conference, 1935), on 16th December 1935 (Annex 13 (1))" is an official document handed to me when I attended ^{the} London Naval Conference: 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Jui (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (2)

Excerpt from the general statement by Sir John
Simon (United Kingdom) at the twenty-ninth
meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments
(League of Nations), held on November 17th, 1932.

- Conf. D/Bureau/P.V/29, PP. 14 and 15.

We are bound to face the immediate question that presents itself while the full examination of these wider conceptions is proceeding. Take the case of the United Kingdom Government. In spite of world-wide responsibilities, the Air Force of the United Kingdom has been reduced until it stands only fifth in size to-day, but His Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, prepared, if other countries will reduce their air forces, to go still further, and they suggest as a practical and immediate measure of disarmament (1) the immediate reduction of the air forces of the leading Powers to the level of those of the United Kingdom; (2) a cut of 33 1/3% all round in the air forces of the world thus reduced, the United Kingdom included; (3) and limitation of the unladen weight of military aircraft to the lowest figure upon which general agreement can be obtained. The United Kingdom Government propose that the figures thus arrived at should be subject to a further reduction at a subsequent stage so as to apply to air disarmament the principle of limitation by stages.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (2)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from the General-Statement by Sir John Simon (United Kingdom) at the twenty-ninth meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (League of Nations), held on November 17th, 1932" (Annex 13 (2))" is an official document handed to me when I attended the Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitation of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

2

Instructions Sent To Imperial Government Delegates
At The Preliminary Negotiations Of The Naval Disarmament
Conference Of 1935.

1. The reason for our Government giving consent to the opening of preliminary negotiations for the Naval disarmament conference which was proposed by Britain in May this year was because the present Naval Disarmament Conference is an important affair and as difficulties were foreseen. Therefore, it is to avoid unnecessary agitation of public opinions, of nations concerned, as well as to exchange opinions fully between nations represented and thereby clarifying the standpoints and assertions of all participant nations and accomplishing our objectives to enable the smooth attainment of the conference aims and also security of our national defense.

2. In view of the present preliminary negotiations inevitably facing a difficult situation the Imperial Government places great expectations to your efforts. In negotiations, follow the basic policy as indicated herein, as well as the import of this instruction and as for naval technical affair consult the senior naval-expert delegate.

As negotiations are expected to be delicate, anything which require fast and appropriate measures are entrusted to your decision within the scope of authority specified in this

instruction.

3. As to the problem of formalities, exchange of opinions with the main participant nations have already been made but endeavour to accomplish our assertions on items still unsolved at the preliminary negotiations scheduled to open around October this year.

4. The British Government has repeatedly made proposals on debating on the problem of the so-called substantial problem of naval disarmament but it was not necessarily the same with the U.S.

As there seems to be considerable difference between what has been explained to our Embassy at Washington from competent U. S. authorities and what the U. S. delegates spoke to our delegates at London and therefore it is requested that you make it clear at the very beginning of preliminary negotiations if the U. S. is prepared to make sufficient arguments on the problem of substantial disarmament. Even in case the U. S. is not prepared to discuss on the substantial disarmament problem the Imperial Government has no objections in negotiating with Britain but attention must be paid to see that Britain does not lead in negotiations and make our standpoint disadvantageous.

5. In the present Naval disarmament preliminary negotiation, the Government, based on the basic policy as defined

under No. 6. herein, shall prepare a disposition to form a new agreement which will secure an impartial and adequate naval strength and establish a stable national defense. Thereby reducing the people's burdes in the future and promoting peaceful intercourse between all nations. And after the expiration of already existing naval armament limitation agreements, it must be borne in mind that the Imperial Government will not tolerate the conclusion of any agreement which will continue to force upon us disadvantageous conditions and make our national defense insecure.

6. The following basic policy of the Imperial Government in connection with naval disarmament is viewed with greatest importance and therefore, our basic principles shall be here indicated. It is requested that every effort be exerted to get the recognition by the nations concerned, especially the U. S. and Britain. The basic policy of the Imperial Government is as follows.

The Imperial Government seeks to establish a principle of non-intimedation and non-aggression without impairing the sense of security in national defense for all nations because every nation is entitled to the right of possessing armaments required for the safety of the state. Among major naval powers it is a fundamental problem to agree upon a criterion for common maximum limitation of arms for each nation to

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possess, as a measure for reducing arms. In reaching an agreement on this point, in order to demonstrate the true spirit of disarmament minimize the above limitation and drastically curtail offensive arms while adjusting defensive arms. Thereby basing upon the principle of "difficult to aggress and secure in defending". To attain this objective, highly-armed nations will be compelled to make greater sacrifices than the others.

7. In reference to the grounds for the above basic policy, if necessary, you are to begin negotiations on definite problems bearing in mind the following factors.

- a. You may assert the complete abolition of capital ships if the condition of the conference permits.
- b. Assert the complete abolition of aircraft carriers.
- c. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are to be maintained, place restriction on total tonnage of such ships including A and B class cruisers, destroyers and submarines as well. In this case, emphasis should be put on the reduction of capital ships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. Designate tonnage allotment for each type of ship to each nation and the allotment to the U.S. and Japan shall be equal. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are abolished this will be applicable.
- d. The Imperial Government at an early possible

date shall demand attaining the standard of the newly agreed military strength, but if necessary, in conformity to the above contents of agreed naval strength we shall consider concluding an agreement in which we will gradually have to attain a standard in a limited time.

8. Depending on the progress of preliminary negotiations, it may confront a situation where negotiations may be closed abruptly or adjourned or even not opened. But the manner in which the present negotiation proceeds will greatly influence the international situation to follow and therefore in such a case utmost care must be taken not to incur any undesirable conditions to our overall plans for the conference.

9. The question of equality in naval strength between France and Italy has been unsettled to this day. In connection with our present assertion, the standpoint of our Government against these two nations shall be extremely delicate. Therefore put the center of negotiation on the two nations of Britain and the U. S. first and thoroughly explain on the point that our assertion is the result of earnest desire cherished by our people. Endeavor to have the U. S. and British understand this point. Again, as for the two countries of France and Italy, according to situation, explain to them that the main objective of our assertion is Britain and the U. S.

As for the relations between France and Italy, make it known to them that we have no objections whatsoever on any adequate compromise reached direct between the nations concerned.

10. The Washington Treaty on naval armament limitation in view of the assertion to be made at the present naval disarmament preliminary negotiation is to be abolished as of 1936 according to our Government policy. Even if we announce its abolition, it does not mean that we do not favor a new naval disarmament agreement but seek to contribute to the establishment of a world peace by forming on impartial and fair new agreement between the nations concerned. Therefore, in the present preliminary negotiations, first indicate our basic policy and impress upon the delegates of the respective participant nations that in view of the above policy the Washington Treaty inevitably must be abolished. Moreover, as our present assertion is based on the earnest hopes of our people the Government has already decided upon its abolition notification, but on the other hand our Government desires to carry out the preliminary negotiations in a friendly and effective manner to the extent it is possible. Therefore, the Government is withholding the notification so it is desirable that efforts be made to guide the negotiations so that this opportunity is taken to take formal steps in

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abolishing it with the mutual understanding of all nations concerned and following which all nations will cooperate in the formation of a new treaty. Thereby it will contribute to the alleviation of public opinion. This point should be explained to the respective delegates.

Of the above nations concerned, the U. S. will show considerable opposition. It appears that some part of the British side are opposed to the continuation of the Washington Disarmament Treaty. On the other hand, two years after the notification of its abolition, all signatories will witness its abolition, so it is wiser to put emphasis on future negotiations and develop it amidst a friendly atmosphere. Persuade the participant powers to consent upon abolishing this agreement by the end of 1936.

However, if case our proposal is not accepted or if the decision hung on a balance, the Imperial Government will announce its abolition by the end of the year according to its independent decision.

11. Any item besides what has been referred to in this instruction, or any matter considered irrelevant to the import of this instruction, it is requested that you cable us.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the Demobilization Section of the Demobilization, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Instructions sent to Imperial Government Delegates at the Preliminary Negotiations of the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

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Strictly Confidential

NOTES ON THE MINIMUM BRITISH NAVAL
STRENGTH NECESSARY FOR SECURITY.

1. At the final meeting of the three Delegations on the 19th December, the Prime Minister urged the representatives of Japan and U.S.A. to realize that Great Britain was basing herself on essentials and asked them, therefore, not to assume that it was only a matter of pressure or time for the United Kingdom to change. The figures that have been communicated to the Japanese and the U.S.A. representatives are, in fact, not maxima up to which the United Kingdom desires to be able to build, but minima below which the British Empire cannot feel a sense of security.

2. As stated in the Japanese fundamental claim "To possess the measure of armaments necessary for national safety is a right to which all nations are equally entitled and "due regard must be given to that right in order that the sense of national security of the various powers might not be impaired." The unique situation of the British Empire lies in the fact that it is not a single unit geographically concentrated in one area of the world but consists of a number of Dominions and Colonies scattered over the whole world. Consequently, the strength of the British Navy must be calculated so as to produce a sense of national security in all the

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Dominions and Colonies, each of which has a right to its own safety.

3. In estimating the naval needs of the British Empire, it is accordingly necessary to take into account responsibilities in European waters and in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. This implies the possession of a fleet of sufficient strength to be able to dispose simultaneously in more than one area forces adequate to meet all reasonable defensive needs.

Capital Ships.

4. When the matter of capital ship strength was considered at Washington in 1922 and again in London in 1930, it was decided that 15 capital ships represented the minimum which would give to the British Empire the requisite defensive strength. Since then Germany has not only built 4 battle-cruisers of a special type but will undoubtedly insist on naval expansion qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Italy is already building 2 capital ships of 35,000 tons each; France will wish to lay down ships of the same size and is understood, in addition, to wish to increase her capital ship strength beyond the limits imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty. If these tendencies continue and if there is no international agreement on naval limitation after 1936, the probabilities are that, far from any decrease in British capital ship strength being possible a further increase in numbers would be rendered necessary.

5. With less than 15 capital ships it would not be possible to provide reasonable security both in European waters and elsewhere. The tonnage figure in this category communicated to the Japanese representatives, however, is dependant also on the qualitative limit to be arrived at for new capital ships. The British Government have, as is well known, proposed a limit of 25,000 tons with 12" guns, a reduction of 28% on the existing limit. Could this limit be generally agreed upon, the tonnage in the capital ship category could ultimately be correspondingly reduced.

Aircraft Carriers.

6. The under-age tonnage of aircraft carriers that was communicated to the Japanese representatives was calculated on 5 units of the proposed maximum size of 22,000 tons each. This is the least number of units that could be accepted for the normal operations of the British Fleet. The Japanese representatives have proposed, however, that the future qualitative limit should be reduced to 20,000 tons. If there is a reasonable prospect of agreement in other categories, the British Government would be willing to consider this reduction with a corresponding reduction of the tonnage in the category.

7. Further, if it should prove possible to bring about the abolition of bombing, still greater reductions might be made in the aircraft carrier category.

Cruisers.

8. The British Government have already announced their hope of the ultimate abolition of the 8" gun cruiser. All such vessels, however, are comparatively modern, and it is highly improbable that foreign powers would agree to scrap them before the end of 1942. France and Italy each have 7 of these vessels in service already, and Japan has 12, while America has 18 built and building. It is not possible, therefore, for the British Empire to reduce below the 15 ships already built.

9. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire agreed to the low total cruiser figure of 339,000 tons, which was calculated on a basis of 50 cruisers. Even if it were possible to make a further agreement on such a basis (and reasons why it is not are given below) the tonnage figure would have to be considerably larger than 339,000 tons. The British Empire cannot replace existing small wartime cruisers by ships that would be outclassed from the start by those of other navies. From this it follows that there must be an automatic increase, even without any increase in the number of ships, from a tonnage of 339,000 to about 410,000 tons. This figure is based on the general acceptance of a future qualitative limitation of 7,000 tons, and would be made up as follows:-

15 - 8" Gun Cruisers.....	146,800 tons
10 Large 6" Gun Cruisers.....	95,000 "
8 Leanders	57,000 "
4 Arethusas	20,800 "
13 Nes ships at 7,000 tons	91,000 "
	<hr/>
	410,600 "

10. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire accepted a cruiser tonnage figure based upon the tonnage of 50 cruisers for the following reasons:

- (a) Under the international conditions existing at that time, the prospect for the next six years was more unclouded than it can be said to be today.
- (b) It was accepted subject to the Powers other than the three signatories to Part IIII of the London Naval Treaty agreeing to corresponding reductions. This has not occurred; on the contrary the naval forces in Europe have greatly increased.
- (c) In 1930 we were on the eve of a General Disarmament Conference from which much was hoped.
- (d) In the process of a steady reconstruction of the fleet after the war a halt had been called in cruiser building for some years, in the hope of inducing a corresponding halt in foreign building. Thus, the curve indicating the number of British under-age cruisers was at its lowest during the period of the treaty.

It is unfortunately the case that since the London Naval Treaty was concluded in 1930, a serious deterioration in the international and political outlook has occurred. Further, there are not present today any of the other conditions that rendered possible

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the acceptance in 1930 of a cruiser tonnage based on 50 ships.

11. The British 6" gun cruiser under-age tonnage is governed by the intention of the British Government to arrive, by a programme of steady building of about 3 ships a year, at an ultimate total of (including 15 8" gun cruisers) 70 ships, of which 10 would be over-age. Due to the necessity for building large 6" gun cruisers, brought about by the building of such ships by the U.S.A. and Japan, the 243,800 tons of under-age tonnage at the end of 1942 (the figure given to the U.S.A. and Japanese representatives) would represent only 3 ships, making at that time with the 8" gun cruisers a total of 47 under-age cruisers in all. A balance of over-age ships must, therefore, be retained to provide security.

Destroyers.

12. The 150,000 tons of under-age destroyer tonnage is the same as that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and could only be reduced if submarines were abolished or drastically reduced in numbers. (If submarines were abolished, 100,000 tons of destroyers would be sufficient). As, however, an increase of submarine tonnage appears likely in certain European navies as well as in the Japanese Navy, it will be necessary to retain additional over-age destroyer tonnage.

Submarines.

13. The British Government desires to abolish all submarines. If this cannot be achieved, however, they neither desire nor intend to increase their tonnage beyond that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and would consider the additional destroyer tonnage required by an increase in the submarine tonnage of others as a provision in lieu of an increase in their own submarine tonnage.

January 15th, 1935.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief
of the Archives Section of 23d Demobilization Office,
hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written
in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled
"Notes on the Minimum British Naval Strength Necessary
for Security" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an
official document in the custody of Japanese Government
(2nd Demobilization Office).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 30 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro
(seal)

DDF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.15

EXCERPT FROM MR. GIBSON'S ADDRESS MADE
AT THE 3RD PLENARY SESSION OF THE THREE
POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA, AUGUST 4TH,
1927.

- Official Conference Record
P 42.

From the first, however, we encountered a serious difficulty in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably large number of cruisers than it now possesses. Instead of the 48 cruisers now in service, the British Empire delegation has set forth in the report of the Technical Committee a need for 15 8-inch gun cruisers and 55 cruisers of a smaller type, a total of 70. The claim for these figures was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American delegation has never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitations on the basis of mutual concessions. If the sole purpose of our negotiation be that of setting forth the view of each Power as to its requirements without regard to the navies of others, it is difficult to see how we can arrive at a treaty for the real limitation of navies.

(Annex No. 15).

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from Mr. Gibson's Address made at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Three Power Conference at Geneva, Aug. 4, 1927" (Annex 15) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Report of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, 1927 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ Fnomoto Joji
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /S/ Okuyama Hachiro
(seal)

REPORT BY VICE ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO, REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE PRELIMINARY NAVAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATION HELD AT
LONDON IN 1935, TO THE EMPEROR ON FEBRUARY 19, 1935.

I, Isoroku, Your Majesty's most obedient subject, do hereby solemnly report before the Throne on the progress made since October, 1934, for the preliminary conversation of the naval disarmament conference of 1935.

Ordered by the Japanese Government I left Japan last September and arrived at London late in October to participate in the preliminary negotiation of the 1935 London Naval Disarmament Conference representing the Imperial Government together with Tsuneo MATSUDAIRA, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in London. And recently I was ordered back to Japan to report to the Government on the negotiation.

The preliminary meeting resumed on October 23, 1934 and was solely confined to the negotiations among the three powers, Great Britain, the United States and Japan. It was carried out chiefly in the form of bilateral, instead of trilateral, negotiations on the naval disarmament problem.

At the inception of the resumed meeting the basic principle of the Japanese Government as stated below was presented to the British and the American delegations. Together with this

presentation the Japanese representatives made clear sincere hope embraced on the part of Japan that the coming agreement of disarmament was to be reached in order to facilitate a secure maintenance of the world peace. And in the light of the new principle, we explained the necessity of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty on Naval Armament Limitation, which had been concluded on the basis of the principle of discriminating ratio. The following is the basic principle proposed by the Japanese Government to the British and American Delegations:

"Each nation equally enjoys the right to equip with armament up to the extent necessary for her to maintain her own national security. With this idea in view, any disarmament agreement must be reached under the principle of 'Non-Aggression and Non-Menace' in order to prevent any one nation from hurting the sense of security of any other nation. To realize the above the best way for us to follow is to adopt a concrete plan such as this: . . . as a formula to be applied to the three greatest naval powers in their disarmament we set a common upper limit to the armaments to be allowed to these powers first of all, and, once this basic principle set, each power is to be allowed to build up and maintain an armament required for its own national security within the limit thus prescribed. And, as a prerequisite for reaching such an agreement, the foregoing limit should be set as low as possible, and offensive

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weapons be reduced to the lowest possible strength with defensive armaments equipped appropriately, with a view to see each nation hardly able to launch offensive while at the same time kept secured in its defense".

Against this proposal of ours the British delegation strongly contended: that in view of the difference of vulnerability among the national securities of various powers, it was only natural for each power to possess a different size of armament from those of other; that if a upper common limit equally binding all participant nations should be rigidly set in spite of the above, states which could be satisfied with a size of armament smaller than the limit could enjoy flexibility in the maintenance of their armament, while a nation whose defense would demand an armament up to the limit would be deprived of such flexibility; and that especially for British, which is situated near the European powers, a room for flexibility had to be always reserved to enable her to cope with the shipbuilding development of the European powers.

Strong opposition also came from the U.S. representatives to the effect that: i) the Washington Naval Armament Limitation Treaty was a fruit of great sacrifice by all of the parties after an exhaustive study of all related affairs in addition to a more analysis of naval armament, it had worked most effectively these ten odd years preventing shipbuilding race

and producing equality of national security among nations, and together with the London Naval Treaty later concluded, it had succeeded in bringing about a framework of peace and security for the world; ii) in the face of the above fact the Japanese proposal just presented was considered to be a result of an idea deviated from the principle of the equality of security which constituted the fundamental thought of the existing treaties for naval armament limitation, and therefore the proposal not only called for a renewed analysis of all related problem including political factors from the very fundamentals, but also it was a truly unfortunate one because such a proposal would seem destined to ruin the peace machinery built up at great sacrifices; iii) moreover, the equality of the size of the armed strength between the United States and Japan would mean in effect a superiority on the part of Japan over the United States because of the advantageous geographic position enjoyed by Japan; iv) the adoption of the Japanese proposal would stimulate a shipbuilding race among nations which would naturally strive to build up to the common upper limit. Thus opposing the Japanese plan the American delegation firmly insisted that the disarmament agreement to be reached henceforth was to be based on the revision of the London Treaty on the one hand and the continuation of the Washington Treaty on the other

In reply to the above mentioned arguments by Britain and

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America we contended that no discrimination was to be allowed to exist among the naval armaments of the various powers concerned in view of the mobility of sea power; that the fruition of the principle of 'non-menace and non-aggression' as proposed by Japan would forestall the consideration of the vulnerability regarding the national defense; that if ever the question of national vulnerability should arise, Japan would prove more vulnerable than the United States; that the Washington Treaty, which was already more than ten years old, now became unapplicable to the situation of today due to the change of international relations, the development of naval vessels and weapons, and the like; and that to attach a discriminating ratio to the armament to be possessed by each nation might create a sense of inequality among its people and this in turn would influence unfavorably the friendly relations between the nations concerned. But both America and Britain persisted in their assertions firmly and did not agree to our contentions.

Moreover, as regards the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, both Britain and the United States did not accept our proposal, although we made clear the standpoint of our country to discontinue the treaty adherence after 1936 when it would expire, and although we advised that all parties to it should concur in notifying the abrogation so that the

abrogation would be realized in a friendly atmosphere.

In the face of these circumstances a proposal was presented by the British authorities as a step to break the deadlock. The gist of the proposal had suggestions as follows: i) each party would enjoy equal footing on the fact of the treaty stipulation; ii) all parties should confer with each other on their shipbuilding programs to be effective for the several years after 1936 and should make a unilateral announcement of each own program in the form of a voluntary statement. This suggestion, though taking into consideration our proposal, seemed to intend in reality to maintain the existing ratio almost intact, and therefore it was not one acceptable to us offhand. Sometime later on, the British representatives made another suggestion that they would not insist to bind the foregoing unilateral voluntary announcement on a contractual basis; and they furthermore repeatedly presented their desire for reaching some sort of an agreement in having the powers to show with each other their shipbuilding program of the several years to come. Proposing this way they went so far as to show us the shipbuilding plan of their own. According to this plan the size of the armament to be possessed by the British navy was roughly of one million and twenty hundred thousand tons or so, though it might differ a little depending on conditions. Here we could not see almost no difference between this figure and that of the existing treaty strength. Besides, the figures for light

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cruisers and others were bigger than the ones so far admitted, Moreover it was insisted that the plan was for the absolute minimum requirement barely reducible. Such a proposal, far from the line of our contention aiming at a great reduction, could not be accepted by our own side.

The British delegation further suggested that it would be advisable to reach an agreement on a qualitative limitation at least, such as concerning the displacement of individual ships, the size of guns, etc., as a means to curb shipbuilding race in case a quantitative limitation would not be feasible. But this British plan would affect us very unfavorably in view of our plan to equip ourselves with such an armament as to give us a guarantee of national security at a smallest possible armament expenditure. Accordingly we rejected the proposal, too.

As for the United States, the British proposal seemed to have failed to attract any great attention from the delegation. The American representatives showing a firm attitude for the support of the existing treaties with their present ratio, insisted on the twenty per cent reduction from existing armament in a whole sale manner.

Such being the case any further progress seemed to be out of hope for the negotiation. Moreover, the American delegation made clear that it intended to return home temporarily from the necessity to confer with the government and reconsider all the

related problems at the fundamentals to prepare for the eventualities of the Japanese abrogation of the Washington Treaty. Therefore the representatives of the Three Powers came to an agreement that the meeting was to be adjourned for the time being that each power was to give a renewed consideration to its contentions, and that the British Government was to take an appropriate step as soon as possible when an atmosphere would become ripe for the reopening of the negotiation. The adjournment was made on December 20.

It is to be added in this connection that both France and Italy did not participate in the present preliminary negotiation and that they were placed in a position to be informed by the British Government from time to time of the progress of the Three Power negotiation.

Throughout the preliminary negotiation the representatives of all of the parties exchanged their opinion frankly and freely in a friendly atmosphere and made an earnest endeavour to find out some sort of basis on which an agreement could be reached. There could be seen no shadow of prejudice in which any two parties, conspiring between themselves, oppressed or alienated the other. As for the British side especially, perhaps partly due to its position as the party who called the meeting, its good officers were exerted in an enthusiastic manner throughout the negotiation for the smooth progress with the eager desire

for the conclusion of disarmament agreement. Moreover both British and American delegations listened to our contention most attentively to enable us to explain the principles of the Japanese Government at the fundamentals, while at the same time we could have the opportunity to know almost fully the British and American contentions. But due to the difference of their stands, the three delegations have so far failed in reaching an agreement.

It is really regretful that the Japanese representative has not succeeded to have our proposal accepted by the British and the United States sides. And it is believed that a further toilsome exertion on our part is needed to attain our aim.

I feel highly honored in having been granted Your Majesty's audience throughout to my humble report.

February 19, 1935.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Report by Vice Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau)

certified at Tokyo,

on this 10 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

Def. Doc. No. 1904 Annex 17

Studies through Questions and Answers Concerning the
Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Is there any way of modifying the Washington Treaty?

Ques : In the Treaty the following three different cases are
provided.

(1) During the period this Treaty is in effect, if in case either of the contracting powers considers the requisite for its own national security concerning defense by naval strength gravely affected by changes in surrounding circumstances, the respective signatories shall reconsider the provisions of this Treaty in compliance with the request of the nation concerned and through mutual agreement a conference shall be convened for the purpose of its modification.

(Article 21, Clause 1.)

On this case, reconsideration of the Treaty provisions in general will be made and therefore discussions should also be made on such important clauses as capacity of military strength in possession.

Of course the above clause refers to the discussion of alterations to be made which is based on the provisions of this Treaty and needless to say it could not possibly alter the objective of this Treaty. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether it is possible or not to lodge a radical protest against such

matters as admitting difference in military strength possessed by the respective powers, which constitutes the basis of this Treaty. In either case at the conference convened in accordance to the foregoing clause and item, all nations will feel a strong inconvenience for them to take unrestricted actions from a free standpoint.

(2) With the object of discussing what changes will be necessary in the Treaty to meet the developments both technically and scientifically, a conference attended by all contracting powers shall be held 8 years after this Treaty takes effect. (Article 21, Clause 2.)

In this case, the object of the conference is to only meet technical and scientific developments, and not the kind of conference to discuss such important problems as the reciprocal relation of military strength in possession.

Further, the above conference was fixed to be held 8 years after this Treaty took effect (that is, in 1931) but as a result of the London Conference of 1930, it became unnecessary. Therefore at the 6th General Meeting held on 22 April 1930 the conference scheduled for 1931 was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer its disposal to the conference to be held in 1935.

(3) The case when either of the signatory powers involves in a war which is considered as affecting the defense of national security by naval strength.

The case when the remaining contracting powers may make a temporary modification in this Treaty.

The case when an amendment conference is held attended by all contracting powers subsequent to the cessation of hostile activities.

(Article 22.)

Ques: The reason for not taking steps to revise the Washington Treaty.

Ans : (1) Measures which can be considered in the steps to revise the Washington Treaty are restricted to provisions set forth in Article 21 Clause I and Clause 2.

Of the above clauses the measure provided in item two deals with the joint agreement on revisions to meet the developments in both technical and scientific fields. The scope of its revision is very limited and cannot ration.

(N.B.) This conference should have been held in 1931 but due to the London Conference it was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer it to the 1935 conference.

But circumstances are not too clear on how things stand.

Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether or not to discuss items for which purpose the conference was opened on the occasion of the 1935 conference.

In either case, the purpose of the conference is extremely limited. It is interpreted to be intolerable to make discussion on a radical revision of this Treaty.

(N.B.) In January 1922 at the plenipotentiary delegate's conference to draft the Washington Naval Treaty, the British delegate Mr. Palfore proposed to declare the inability of demanding alterations in ratio at a conference opened according to Article 21 Clause 2.

2. He spoke as follows.

"The gathering of eight years later shall be limited to only technical and scientific matters and should not discuss serious issues such as the question of ratio, brought about as a result of political changes. For instance, the limitation of 35,000 ton may require a slight alteration according to scientific changes but the ratio of strength should not be changed."

Furthermore, at the same conference, the French delegate stated that it was unnecessary to limit the items for discussion at the next conference but the U.S. delegate Mr. Hughes replied, "as long as item one of this Treaty provides that discussions may be made on general subjects according to political developments, is it not sufficient as it is?" and to Mr. Palfore stated

that, "This Treaty cannot be revised unless unanimously agreed upon. Of a single nation opposes it would not only be unable to discuss the problem of ratio but also impossible to fix the date of discussion. In the future, when the conference is held again and the ratio problem is discussed, it would be necessary to exchange diplomatic papers before hand. Whether to discuss or not can be decided then and therefore would not require discussing deeply into the matter." Thereby, dissuading Mr. Palfors' assuertion.

In view of the above circumstances and the provision of item one in the Treaty which provides that a conference will be held which may even demand the revision of ratio, it is considered reasonable to interpret that items for discussion at the conference held in conformity with the clause and item of this Treaty will be extremely limited.

(2) The measure provided in Clause One is to be adopted to meet political or any other serious changes in case it possesses a certain condition. Therefore, there is no restriction on items for discussion as the measure provided in Clause Two and free to discuss the provisions of the Washington Treaty in general. But ultimately its object would be the revision of the Washington Treaty and the basis of deliberations would be no other than the Washington Treaty itself. Consequently it would be difficult for the respective powers to take an unrestrained action from a free standpoint.

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Especially in the case of our assertion, not adhering to circumstances of the past and seeking to establish a disarmament agreement on an entirely new basis, it is apparent that it will incur extreme inconvenience. Therefore, it is considered an unadaptable step to call for a revision conference according to the above measure.

(3) In short, the provisions set forth in the Washington Treaty on revision, are in both cases unadaptable in concluding a disarmament agreement desired by our Empire and we deem it necessary to choose a different measure.

Ques: Reasons why the Washington Treaty has to be abolished.

Ans: (1) A long period of time has elapsed since the Washington was concluded and it has become difficult to adapt itself to drastic changes in international situation and radical changes in technical and scientific achievements.

(2) The object of the Washington Treaty has already been achieved. Its term of validity will expire as of 1936 and it appears there are no reasons for further continuation.

(3) The Washington Treaty was based on recognition of possessing graded strength among the respective powers, and there is a radical divergence compared to our present disarmament policy. As it is impossible to reach a reconciliation it is considered advisable to abolish the Washington Treaty and form an agreement on a new foundation.

(4) The Washington Treaty fixed the ratio of military strength to be possessed of capital ships as of 12 December 1921. There is a regret that it did not take into deep consideration the question of national security. Therefore, the prolonged continuation of this Treaty will not be the way to establishment of national security for all nations and to maintain peace.

It is especially so in the case of our Empire which could not even full accomplish the assertions on the possession of minimum limit for national defense at the time.

(5) The replacement construction of capital ships which can be recognized as the most important factor of the Washington Treaty provision was postponed six years as a result of the London Treaty. The above period of postponement expired as of 1936 and all contracting powers have access to immediately commence building replacements from 1937.

However, the London Treaty only postponed the shipbuilding for 6 years and did not fix any arrangements thereafter so unless a new agreement is formed it will lead to the construction of capital ships simultaneously by all the signatory powers at once. Because they could not build them for 6 years. Their capacity will reach a colossal figure and would actually be the same as if no treaty existed.

Further, any limitation in quality would practically bear no significance in view of existing circumstances because they are as extremely restricted. Ultimately, from both angles, in quality or quantity, it may be said that the provisions of the Washington Treaty are ineffective.

The grounds for demanding the continuation of the Washington Treaty, may be acceptable perhaps from a political viewpoint but from the standpoint of actual armament limitation it may be said that it is of practically no value.

Ques: Are there no other nation besides our Empire which sent a notification of renunciation?

Ans : (1) The French Government had been advocating dissatisfaction against the Washington Treaty ever since it was concluded. Thence after, she has been cherishing almost the same feeling but it is unknown whether or not she holds any intention of announcing its abolition right away.

(2) The British Government desired the permanency of this Treaty when it was concluded and even showed reluctance in inserting clauses and items (such as stipulations on revising the Treaty) which tend to lessen the effect of the Treaty. It is believed she adheres to principles of roughly the same significance hence after, but it is worth noting that recently there are some who advocate the abolition of the Treaty.

(3) The U.S. Government takes pride in being the originator in drawing up the Washington Treaty and desires the permanency of this Treaty. The U.S. especially seeks to fix definitely and unchangeable the naval power ratio decided by the Treaty. Therefore, even if a criticism was made on the provisions of defense armament limitation it could not alter the above powerful influence.

It is surveyed that the U.S. Government would oppose to the abolition of this Treaty.

(4) It is believed that the Italian Government will follow the attitude of the U.S. Government. However, the principle of balanced strength for France and Italy as fixed in the Washington Treaty complies with the desires of Italy and considering her peculiar position she will desire the continuation of this Treaty.

(5) To sum it up, under present circumstances it is difficult to conclude that any other nation except our Empire would willingly take the procedures to renounce the Treaty.

Ques: What are the formalities for sending a notification?

Ans : It is provided in Article 23 of the Washington Treaty. That is, to send a notification in documental form to the U.S. Government. The notification takes effect as of the day above document is received by the U.S. Government.

The notification does not require any adding of reasons.

Ques: The reason why it is necessary to send the notification within the year.