the JCP and heed its advice. While he was talking, four fishermen accosted him. One of them said:

"You speak everywhere. How can you understand our problems? You have never worked on the sea. You know nothing about the issues at stake today."

Other fishermen seized another of the Communists and shook him. As soon as he had been released, the Communists fled. No further incidents occurred and the group dispersed peacefully. (B-2)(CONFIDENTIAL)(a)

(3) JCP Strategy for Saitama Gubernatorial Election: Governor Nishimura Jitsuzo of Saitama Prefecture resigned 27 Mar 49, as a result of his indictment on the charge of accepting bribes. Upon acceptance of his resignation by the Prefectural Assembly, a special election date was set for 17 May 49. Saitama Communists met recently to discuss the Party's election strategy. Among those present were Prefectural Chairman, Kimura Toyotaro, Watanabe Yoshimichi and Takada Tomiyuki, newly-elected Communist Diet members.

These Party leaders feeling that a known Communist would stand little chance of election in Saitama, decided to join forces with the Left-Wing Socialists and back the candidacy of Leftist Morooka Eiichi, a Communist fellowtraveler. The Communists, however, insisted on one condition being fulfilled: If the Socialist Morooka is elected, he must agree to appoint a known Communist vice governor, thereby assuring the Party of influence in the appointment of other non-elected prefectural officials.

A few days later, the leaders of the Left-Wing Socialists in Saitama, including the candidate Morooka, met the Communist officials in Omiya City. The Socialists accepted the terms of the agreement, decided to join the JCP for this one campaign and formulated plans for a joint election effort. (B-2)(CONFIDENTIAL)(b)

(4) JCP Oral Directive: The JCP Politburo recently issued a verbal directive to its Hokkaido Greater Regional Committee and its Tohoku (Northern Honshu) and Kanto (Tokyo plain) Regional Committees. The gist of the directive follows:

1. The Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kanto Regional Committees will submit maps of their regions showing the location of major power plants, of buildings with a seating capacity of more than 50 people, and the shortest vehicular routes to these sites.
2. These three regions will increase their efforts to raise the number of secret Party members within the police force.
3. The three regions are to consider all professors, teachers and other school officials as secret members.

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2. These three regions will increase their efforts to raise the number of secret Party members within the police force.
3. The three regions are to consider all professors, teachers and other school officials as secret members.
4. All three regions are to promote labor union struggles with the month of Aug 49 as the climactic point.
5. The three are ordered to convene meetings of house-wives to hear their complaints and to use the complaints as material for agitation, propaganda and corruption exposure campaigns.
6. The Hokkaido Greater regional committee will locate 20 houses where secret "mobile" members can be safely billeted.
7. The Politburo will secretly dispatch organizers to the three regions affected by this directive in order to facilitate the points outlined above. (C-6)(SECRET)(c)

(5) JCP "Scalping" Theater Tickets: The JCP in Tochigi Prefecture, to replenish its treasury following an election deficit, is buying theater tickets in bulk and reselling them at a profit. On one film, "A Tale of Siberia," which was showing at two theaters in Utsunomiya City, the JCP netted ¥5 per ticket. Whenever a Communist scalper sold a ticket, he gave the buyer a leaflet explaining the film. The Utsunomiya JCP District Committee ordered 10,000 copies of the leaflet. (B-2) (CONFIDENTIAL)(d)

(a) S/I D4-1470 (5b)
(b) S/I D4-1558 (10)
(c) S/I D4-1479 (5b)
(d) S/I D4-1451 (5b)

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FOURTH DISTRICT

TYPE OF CASE	PENDING A	PENDING B	CLOSED A	CLOSED B
Sabotage	8	0	0	8
Espionage	1	1	0	0
Treason	0	0	0	0
Sedition	0	0	0	0
Subversive Activity	207	228	8	39
Disaffection	0	0	0	0
Security Inspections	0	0	0	0
Security Surveys	0	0	0	0
Background Investigations	35	29	18	16
Miscellaneous	25	19	8	8
Totals:	276	277	34	71

A--March B--April

REPRESENTATIVE CASES

The following briefs represent a cross-section of the current Counter Intelligence case load in the Fourth CIC District:

DISSATISFIED KOREANS ACT: The Nakakama City Branch of the Yamanashi League of Koreans Residing in Japan was torn by dissent recently when approximately one third of the members banded together to voice their dissatisfaction with the management of Choren. They stated that Choren had become a tool of the Communist Party, and had lost sight of the original reason for its foundation. They proposed that the local Nakakama Branch of Choren should be reorganized and should abstain completely from any political activity in the future.

SOVIET CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE RECEIVED: The All Japan Metal Workers Union received a letter from the Soviet Metallurgical Union, congratulating its members on the work done by their organization, and proposing a regular exchange of ideas and information between the two groups. The method of transmission of this message is unknown.

DEMOCRATIC-LIBERAL PARTY UNDER FIRE: In Chiba Prefecture, the Democratic-Liberal Party became the target for the JCP's wrath, in connection with the Communist Party sponsored anti-tax campaign. Posters were displayed in Inage Village purporting to show that the Democratic-Liberal

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KOREANS RECEIVE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING: Action Corps member of the Korean Democratic Youth League's Tochigi Prefectural Branch recently underwent a strenuous seven day training course, designed to prepare them for the impending revolution. The school, which was conducted with the utmost secrecy, offered mainly ideological courses, designed to temper the minds of the attendants to the proper pitch. Some 18 Korean youths attended.

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FIFTH CIC DISTRICT

1. Subversive Activity

a. Radical
(1) Communists Double-Cross Voters
(2) Secret JCP Document Intercepted
(3) Demobilization Official Threatened

a. Radical

(1) Communists Double-Cross Voters: The Japan Communist Party is conducting an intensive campaign against government tax programs in Akita Prefecture as well as elsewhere in Japan. However, while the JCP has achieved success in some parts of the country, their efforts have been disappointing in Akita. This, presumably, is due to an incident that occurred in January, prior to the general election, and has just come to light.

Before the January election, JCP members of the Kumosawa Village cell had sold a detailed account form to the people of the village. This form was to be used by the villagers to obtain a reduction in the amount of their tax. The blank forms were sold for ¥10. Purchasers were told that they would receive their instructions in the proper method to use to fill out the forms after the election was over.

Following the election, those villagers who had purchased the forms approached the house of Nishimura Kosaku, the leading Communist of the village, for the promised aid in filling out the forms. Nishimura, however, was not at home, and a stranger was living in the house. The stranger told them that he would not help them to fill out the forms to obtain the tax reduction, because they had not voted for the Communist candidates who were running for office. He added, however, that if they would join the Communist Party, he would then instruct them in the proper procedure to follow in completing the forms. (C-6)

Formation of New Union Thwarts JCP: In Akita Prefecture as a whole results obtained by the Communists closely parallel those in Kumosawa Village. In a total of eight tax offices scattered throughout the Prefecture, Aoki Tamotsu, Akita Tax Office Chief, states that there are no Communist Party members employed. He attributes this to the fact that Akita Prefecture workers withdrew en masse from the National Finance Office Workers Union (Zenzei) and formed the [illegible]

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The reason for the mass withdrawal was the JCP domination that was creeping into the Zenzai. Aoki further said that since the only persons who would have withdrawn from the national union were those who disliked the Communist Party line, he was certain that it would take a long time for the JCP to infiltrate the new union, if it was able to do so at all.

Aoki stated he believes that the JCP is relying more on propaganda designed for the farmers and working classes in Akita Prefecture than pressure tactics directed at large and medium sized businessmen. He said he knew of no instance of direct threats or pressure being used by the JCP in its anti-tax struggle. (F-3) (SECRET) (a)

(2) Secret JCP Document Intercepted: A secret JCP document issued by the Special Defense Planning Committee (Tokubetsu Boei Taisaku Iinkai), outlining a JCP headquarters meeting was intercepted and translated by the personnel of Yamagata CIC Area.

(a) A/R D5-214 (5b)

S E C R E T

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Reports were rendered on various phases of investigations being carried out at the direction of JCP headquarters. Extracts from this documents are set out below.

"Eighty per cent of the planned investigation on anti-Communist organizations, and other domestic organs of various types have been conducted to date. However, investigations conducted on CIC and MG have been inadequate."

The headquarters budget was expanded to provide for an enlargement of the 'intelligence agencies', used to conduct these investigations.

The Special Action Squad (Tokubetsu Kodo Han) reported that it had been successful in sending groups of Japanese ex-military officers into North Korea. It further reported that while complete liaison had not been effected with the Chinese Communists, opportunities for such a union were better than they had been in the past.

JCP Intelligence and Security Plans: The Japan Communist Party representative stated that it was considered that the JCP had won a victory in the elections, and further, that the plan to establish a second headquarters in Hokkaido had been completed.

At this same headquarters meeting, measures were adopted to promote anti-American agitation.

As in every other recent Communist meeting recently, great stress was laid on the necessity for more adequate security measures. The Supreme Council voted to punish severely those responsible persons who lost Party documents, or allowed them to be stolen. (C-3)(SECRET)(a)

(3) Demobilization Official Threatened: Shindo Takio, chief of the Repatriate Assistance Section (Sewa Ka) of the Iwate Prefecture Welfare Bureau (Iwate-ken Kosei Ka) and formerly a colonel in the Japanese Army, recently reported that he had received a letter purportedly from the JCP, threatening to report him to General MacArthur if he did not cease what were claimed to be illicit actions. He was threatened as a person subject to the purge and also for having misappropriated the funds assigned to his section for official use.

The letter was purportedly written by a man named Murata, but

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The letter was purportedly written by a man named Murata, but neither Shindo nor his subordinates know of anyone in the government offices by that name. Sindo believes that the letter is part of a JCP sponsored smear campaign being conducted against all the prefectural officials, by the local office workers' union. While the letter itself definitely states that "this is not a prank of the Communists; this is the voice of all prefectural citizens," many of the statements made have a typically Communistic ring. (B-1)(SECRET)(b)

2. Social and Civil Conditions

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a. Political
   (1) JCP to Conduct Training Program
   (2) Yamagata Governor Visited by JCP Committee

b. Labor
   (1) JCP Document on International Labor Conferences
   (2) Soviet and Japanese Labor Unions Correspond

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a. Political

(1) JCP to Conduct Training Program: The Murayama District

(a) A/R D5-143 (5b) (b) A/R D5-226 (5b)

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Committee, JCP, recently issued the following instructions to cells under its jurisdiction:

New Party members are to be trained by the cells through a series of classes. The first term will cover the reading of newspaper articles using the Akahata as a text; the second term will cover instructions on Party regulations, discipline, and general principles; and the third term will cover Soviet history, culture, strategy, tactics and the fundamental political principles of the Communist Party. Each term will last three to five days and the terms will be held at intervals of about two months. Between terms the students will be assigned to practical Party activities. The Yamagata Prefectural and Murayama District Committees will furnish instructors for the classes and will assist the cells in sponsoring practical activities. Although the classes are to train new Party members, Communist Party sympathizers will be invited to attend. (C-3)(SECRET)(a)

(2) Yamagata Governor Visited by JCP Committee: Five representatives of the JCP Yamagata Prefectural Committee, called on Murayama Michio, Yamagata Prefectural Governor, recently. They demanded that he answer their questions, then presented him with a written program which they demanded the prefectural government follow. Two of the questions asked, with the replies, are given below:

One of the delegates asked Murayama about the number of surplus personnel in the prefectural government and if any were to be discharged in the economic readjustment program. Murayama assured the delegates that no prefectural government worker would be discharged.

A second question concerned the over-quota rice delivery allegedly ordered by the Occupation Forces. Murayama denied that any over quota rice delivery had been ordered and stated that no intimidation or force was used to collect extra rice from the farmers. He further stated that he had requested the Yamagata Military Government Team not to make tours to encourage the over quota delivery of rice because the farmers probably misunderstand the purpose of these tours and feel that they must deliver more than the quota of rice.

JCP Program for Prefectural Improvements: The written program which the delegates demanded that the prefectural government carry out as closely as possible is quoted below:

a. "The Yamagata Prefectural Government is expected to do its utmost to prevent the closing of the Tokyo Shibaura Company's Nagai plant. If the plant closes, a major industry will disappear from the

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a. "The Yamagata Prefectural Government is expected to do its utmost to prevent the closing of the Tokyo Shibaura Company's Nagai plant. If the plant closes, a major industry will disappear from the prefecture and the workers who lose their jobs will suffer many hardships.

b. "The prefectural government must promote the resources and protect the Tagawa and the Mogami soft coal mines which are being neglected by the monopolistic capitalists.

c. "The prefectural government must sponsor a program to revive the casting industry in Yamagata City and the textile industry in Yonezawa City, both of which are in a critical condition.

d. "The prefectural government must furnish rice for those farmers who were compelled to furnish their own food to fulfill the rice quotas.

e. "The prefectural government must furnish aid to destitute people, protection must be given to their children from enforced absence from school, and freedom from the child slave trade must be insured.

f. "The prefectural government must not discharge any employees and none shall be forced to quit because of unreasonable transfers.

g. "The prefectural government must make urgent efforts to complete the land reformation program." (C-3)(SECRET)(b)

(a) S/I D5-1250 (5b) (b) S/I D5-1254 (5b)

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b. Labor

(1) JCP Document on International Labor Conferences: Fifth CIC District recently intercepted a JCP document which discusses international labor gatherings to take place during 1949 and JCP plans for these conferences. The following article is based on extracts from the document.

During 1949 the following international labor meetings are scheduled: The Soviet Union's Labor Union Conference at Moscow to have begun 19 Apr; the Second World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Convention at Milan, Italy, beginning 29 Jun 49; the regular International Labor Organization Convention at Geneva, Switzerland, beginning 29 Jun 49; the Asia Labor Union Liaison Conference; and the Pan-Pacific Labor Group.

It is impossible for the JCP to be indifferent to these international labor gatherings, especially as it has received invitations to them.

Selection of Representatives to Conferences: The Asia Labor Union Liaison Conference, scheduled to be called in July, perhaps at Tientsin as a regional meeting of the WFTU, is a powerful group of laborers leading the struggle for racial independence in the various colonized countries. The Far East Cominform, unless it utilizes this Asiatic labor conference, cannot expect truly powerful and vigorous activities. The JCP representatives for this conference have not yet been decided upon.

Three representatives have been chosen to attend the International Labor Organization Conference. Suga Michi, vice-chairman of the National Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu), was selected to attend the Soviet Union's Labor Union Conference. Seventeen representatives and the same number of alternates are being elected for the WFTU meeting.

Participants in the conference should be JCP members and the selected representatives must make the trips regardless of hardships. The laborers of the world are looking forward to our participation, so we must exert our efforts to make the trips possible. (B-2)(SECRET)(a)

(2) Soviet and Japanese Labor Unions Correspond: Recently the Soviet Metallurgy Workers Labor Union sent the following message through the All Japan Liaison Council of Labor Unions (Zenroren) to the Metal Workers Union in Tokyo:

"Our Dear Comrades,

"Through the data published in the organ papers of Japanese Labor Unions, we know that the Japanese Metal Industrial Workers Union are making a great effort for the establishment of the Japanese labor front. Only a powerful single-union movement in Japan can cope with the united strife of the reactionary forces within and without the country.

"We would be happy to know more about the living and strifes of the Japanese metal workers and propose that a system of regular exchange of

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"We would be happy to know more about the living and strifes of the Japanese metal workers and propose that a system of regular exchange of information shall be firmly established. This would solidify our mutual friendship. Please let us know your opinions of this proposal.

"Representative of the Metallurgy
Labor Union Central Committee —
Michael F. Stratov"

Upon receipt of this message, the Metal Workers Union discussed it at a central committee meeting and sent a reply.

"We received with great pleasure the message that the Soviet Metallurgy Industry Workers Union, which is fighting at the head of the peace-loving laborers of the world, sent to us. We 450,000 laborers who organized the Metal Council in Oct 48 are driving back our enemy's attacks of dismissals, lock-outs, delays of payments and intensification of labor. We agree that a regular means of communication between our unions should be set up and desire that comrades from the Soviet Union visit us." (C-6)(CONFIDENTIAL)(b)

(a) S/I D5-1292 (5b) (b) S/I D5-1255 (5b)

SECRET

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FIFTH DISTRICT

TYPE OF CASE	PENDING A	PENDING B	CLOSED A	CLOSED B
Sabotage	8	1	0	7
Espionage	12	6	0	6
Treason	0	0	0	0
Sedition	0	0	0	0
Subversive Activity	326	340	9	28
Disaffection	0	0	0	0
Security Inspections	0	0	0	0
Security Surveys	0	0	0	0
Background Investigations	28	30	20	12
Miscellaneous	33	50	1	11
Totals:	407	417	30	64

A--March B--April

REPRESENTATIVE CASES

The following briefs represent a cross-section of the current Counter Intelligence case load in the Fifth CIC District:

POLICE TELEPHONE NETWORK INSECURE: Fujiwara Sanshiro, head of the Akita City Municipal Police, states that the police telephone networks are particularly susceptible either to tapping or complete blocking, because of the system whereby the police switchboards are connected into the civilian telephone exchanges. Switching one wire would enable an interested person to monitor all police calls, and in the event of an actual emergency, it would be the work of only a minute to block all incoming and outgoing telephone calls.

SEAMEN TO RECEIVE JCP ATTENTION: Tokuda Kyuichi, Secretary of the JCP, blames inattention as the cause for little gain in new members in Miyagi Prefecture. He alleges that much more time and attention should be paid to organizing the seamen as a source for many new Party members.

COMMUNISTS STRIKE OUT: In Shiriuchi Village, Aomori Prefecture, the JCP is operating partly on funds obtained from an oil extraction company. The Japanese government furnishes soy beans to the company, which presses them and extracts the oil. A certain percentage of the oil must be returned to the government as reimbursement for the beans, and the rest can be kept by the plant operator. Funds obtained from the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 77509

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SON PROMISES FATHER'S HELP TO JCP: A student named Suzuki promised the Wednesday Society of the Miyagi Communist Party that his father, a former member of the Special Higher Police, could obtain any information they wanted from the police. Investigation disclosed that a man named Suzuki had a student son, had been in the higher police, did work for the police, but knew nothing of his son's wild promises.

JCP POLITICAL STRATEGY ALTERED: An intercepted directive of the JCP congratulated all Party members for what the JCP considered a great success in the January elections. However, the same directive stated that the people as a whole are losing interest in the Party, in spite of the election results, and that the current strategy and policy as directed by the JCP against the Socialist Party must be changed, or certain failure would result.

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SIXTH CIC DISTRICT

1. Subversive Activity

a. Radical
   (1) Inflammatory Korean Independence Day Speech
   (2) Summer Offensive Planned by JCP
b. Foreign
   (1) Koreans Financed by Illicit Liquor

a. Radical

(1) Inflammatory Korean Independence Day Speech: Communist Terai Katzuo, at a celebration of the Korean Independence Day Anniversary in Otaru City, Hokkaido, sponsored by the Otaru Branch of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (Choren) made the following speech:

"During the war Koreans were drafted and sent overseas as labor battalions and because they were Koreans, they were discriminated against. The Koreans shed blood for Japan, yet now they are oppressed instead of rewarded for their service. Since the defeat of Japan the Japanese and the Koreans are still making a poor living, just as they did before the war, even though freedom has been given us. The Koreans are being oppressed by the police. You, who hope to remain in Japan indefinitely, must join with the Japanese people who advocate justice while reconstructing Japan. Korean strength is small, but if the little elements will unite, an army can be organized to protect our livelihood while we fight poor management. Let us unite and fight for our livelihood." (C-3)(SECRET)(a)

(2) Summer Offensive Planned by JCP: The Hokkaido Greater Regional Committee of the JCP recently completed a police conference in Sapporo City, Hokkaido, to plan their tactics for the remainder of 1949. The Party, according to a CIC source, plans to use the anticipated dismissal of government workers as a basis for agitation. Starting with a so-called "April Revolution," the agitation is expected to carry through until August or September, at which time a general nation-wide strike is slated. (C-3)

At a lower planning level, JCP schemes for the future center around the "April Revolution." At Sunagawa Village, Hokkaido, the Kami Sunagawa cell of the JCP met to discuss their plans. Principal speaker at this meeting was JCP member Takahashi Matsuji, Chief of the Kami Sunagawa Cell's Labor Union Counter-Measure Section. Takahashi said: "The

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instead of rewarded for their service. Since the defeat of Japan the Japanese and the Koreans are still making a poor living, just as they did before the war, even though freedom has been given us. The Koreans are being oppressed by the police. You, who hope to remain in Japan indefinitely, must join with the Japanese people who advocate justice while reconstructing Japan. Korean strength is small, but if the little elements will unite, an army can be organized to protect our livelihood while we fight poor management. Let us unite and fight for our livelihood." (C-3)(SECRET)(a)

(2) Summer Offensive Planned by JCP: The Hokkaido Greater Regional Committee of the JCP recently completed a police conference in Sapporo City, Hokkaido, to plan their tactics for the remainder of 1949. The Party, according to a CIC source, plans to use the anticipated dismissal of government workers as a basis for agitation. Starting with a so-called "April Revolution," the agitation is expected to carry through until August or September, at which time a general nation-wide strike is slated. (C-3)

At a lower planning level, JCP schemes for the future center around the "April Revolution." At Sunagawa Village, Hokkaido, the Kami Sunagawa cell of the JCP met to discuss their plans. Principal speaker at this meeting was JCP member Takahashi Matsuji, Chief of the Kami Sunagawa Cell's Labor Union Counter-Measure Section. Takahashi said: "The 'April Revolution' will have its beginning at the Mitsui Sunagawa Coal Mine. Instructions from JCP Headquarters point out that the revolution could not be successful until the number of Communists members reached a million.

"According to the result of the last general election, we (the JCP) have approximately three million sympathizers. Therefore, we are able to make this year a 'year of revolution.' We must fire the first rocket in the forthcoming struggle from this coal mine. The Yoshida Cabinet can be overthrown easily. An anticipated personnel change within the management of this coal mine will be made in the near future, and at that time, the company will be weakened and we will be able to succeed more easily. Concrete measures to be taken will be sent out in a secret document after further consultation with Party headquarters in Tokyo." (C-3)(SECRET)(b)

b. Foreign

(1) Koreans Financed by Illicit Liquor: Because of financial difficulties, the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (Choren) has been

(a) A/R D6-832 (5b) (b) A/R D6-860 (5b)

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forced into the business of legally obtaining, and illegally disposing of, certificates for the purchase of tax-free beer and liquor. Formerly, Choren housekeeping expenses, amounting to approximately ¥50,000 a month, were borne by the local chapter president of the league. Han Sho-un, former Choren Hokkaido Regional Headquarters president, reports that this system, due to a marked shortage of reputable, well-to-do Koreans, cannot be used. Consequently, the league has been forced to choose its president by democratic methods, and as result, no reputable, well-to-do Koreans have been voted into office, and the league has been forced to resort to other methods of raising the necessary ¥50,000 a month.

To raise this money, the Choren is selling liquor certificates. It is possible to obtain certificates for tax-free beer and sake from the General Affairs Bureau of the Sapporo Finance Bureau, ostensibly for entertainment. However, the league and its affiliates, after obtaining the certificates, do not purchase the beer and sake to which they are entitled, but sell the certificates to various restaurants and drinking establishments. These certificates afford a saving of approximately ¥450 per sho (1 sho = .48 gallon) of sake, and approximately ¥90 per bottle of beer. In the last six months the league and its affiliated organizations, have obtained these certificates for approximately 2,780 sho of sake and 8,050 large bottles of beer. As a result, the Choren has been able to meet its expenses by selling certificates, but is still looking for a reputable, well-to-do Korean to become "permanent" president of the Hokkaido Branch. (B-2)(SECRET)(a)

2. Social and Civil Conditions

a. Organizations
   (1) Korean Rightists Wreck Choren Headquarters
b. Political
   (1) JCP Infiltration of Hokkaido Schools
   (2) Reported Plans for Communist Revolution

a. Organizations

(1) Korean Rightists Wreck Choren Headquarters: Two Korean Rightists, smarting under injustices received from the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (Choren) members and resentful of last intimidations by Choren members recently, sought revenge in Sapporo. Bolstering their courage with liquor they approached the Choren's Hokkaido headquarters in Sapporo, demanding admission. The office was closed, and someone on the second floor told them to return the next day. The two, Yi Jin-kon and Kim Bun-kichi, thereupon broke down the door, entered the office, and overturned desks, furniture and stoves, ripped out the telephone and

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Mindan officials severely reprimanded them for their conduct and turned them over to the Japanese police the next day. The two said that in addition to the intimidations and injustices they had received, they had been threatened by Korean Leftists with reprisals "after the Soviets take over," for their continued contempt of the Communist ideology. (B-2)(SECRET)(b)

b. Political

(1) JCP Infiltration of Hokkaido Schools: The JCP Central Committee issued a verbal directive to its organizers in Aug 48 the gist of which was that all organizations in which the Party had influence were to assist student and youth organizations in the development of school strife.

(a) A/R D6-859 (5c) (b) S/I D6-1164 (10)

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In Nov 48 the Hokkaido JCP Greater Regional Committee began an "Education Rehabilitation Struggle." Directives ordered school cells, youth organizations, "democratic" parent-teacher associations, school committees, students and JCP subordinate committees to push the struggle and tie it in with other Party efforts against taxation, wages, etc.. By Jan 49 the JCP, the Young Communist League and the Communist-front Democratic Scientists Association (Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyokai) all maintained direct liaison with committees planning struggles in Hokkaido's schools.

A society for those who "love literature" was organized in the Tsukisappu area as a means of enticing local "intelligentsia" to support the Party, and it was further aimed at teachers in the Tsukisappu Primary School and the Shinsei Middle School. Later in the same month (Feb 49) the JCP Greater Regional Committee announced that it was preparing to proclaim a "mass entrance into the Party of educators." (C-2)

JCP Makes Inroad in Teacher Ranks: Hayashi Shunzo, a teacher at the Embetsu Boys Middle School, is the new Embetsu cell JCP leader. He has published a Party pamphlet called "North District Flag," which he has tried to sell at his school. (C-3)

Two professors at Hokkaido University are known Communists. Four are secret members and two more are probable members. The highest percentage of communization of both students and faculty is found in the Hakodate Normal School. Only 15 of approximately 800 students have resisted conversion to Communist ideology. At least half of the students are now Party members, the remainder, less the staunch 15, are either members or fellow travelers. Of approximately 60 faculty members, only four are completely free of the Party influence. The majority of the 1949 graduating class, slated to teach in primary schools, are members of the Party or sympathizers. Fourteen faculty members belong to the Hakodate JCP cell. (C-2)(SECRET)(a)

(2) Reported Plans for Communist Revolution: The Communist fractions in the Communication Workers Union (Zentei) locals in the Hakodate area recently received orders to prepare for "paralyzing" tactics to be used by Telegraph and Telephone fractions in preparation for a new offensive. On 15 Mar 49 the Hokkaido JCP Greater Regional Committee transmitted a verbal order on strategy to JCP member Konno Yaeko a leader of the JCP fraction in the Government Railway Workers

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The Fourth Day Society (Yokka Kai)(Ref: CIS Periodical Summary No. 34, 15 Nov 48, page CIC-39) of the Hokkaido JCP District Conference has been discussing a general strike throughout Japan between Jul and Oct 49. They say it will be greater in scope than the 1 Feb 47 strike was planned to be, and will be coordinated with a world wide strike. Japanese Communists are to be prepared to sacrifice their lives, if necessary, in order to carry out this effort successfully.

The Hakodate Area Metal Workers Union (Kinzoku Rodo Kumiai) plans to form an organization composed of workers from small enterprises in Southern Hokkaido who are willing to fight. The nucleus will be the Uroko and Tomioka Iron Works Unions and JCP cells. (C-3)(SECRET)(b)

(a) S/I D6-1205 (5b)

(b) S/I D6-1202 (5b)

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SIXTH DISTRICT

TYPE OF CASE	PENDING A	PENDING B	CLOSED A	CLOSED B
Sabotage	1	0	0	1
Espionage	22	22	0	0
Treason	0	0	0	0
Sedition	0	0	0	0
Subversive Activity	103	100	10	26
Disaffection	0	0	0	0
Security Inspections	0	0	0	0
Security Surveys	0	0	0	0
Background Investigations	3	3	0	1
Miscellaneous	15	15	10	2
Totals:	144	140	20	30

A--March B--April

REPRESENTATIVE CASES

The following briefs represent a cross-section of the current Counter Intelligence case load in the Sixth CIC District:

ANTI-COMMUNIST ARRESTED: Nakagawa Osamu, ardent Rightist and anti-Communist leader, was arrested in Hokkaido for illegally entering the JCP headquarters of the Hokkaido Greater Regional Committee with the intention of stealing secret JCP documents. Nakagawa and Sano Kazuo are leaders of the Far East Anti-Communist League.

POLICE CHIEF IN JCP INNER CIRCLE: Yawase Stotji, Chief of the Yoichi Village Police, is a leading member of the police faction of the JCP Hokkaido Greater Regional Committee. Through his efforts, and using his wife as a liaison agent, the JCP is aware of all activities of the Yoichi Police.

POLICE STATION RELAYS COMMUNIST DOCUMENT: A Civil Censorship Detachment intercept disclosed that the Otaru Police Station was relaying to the Sapporo Police Station a Communist document which stated: "The police and all anti-Communists should be shot to death immediately after the revolution breaks out."

CHINESE AID IN SUPPORT OF JCP: A CIC source reports that the newly

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CHINESE AID IN SUPPORT OF JCP: A CIC source reports that the newly formed Chinese-Japanese Friendship Society is contributing large sums to the JCP. One recent donation was reported to have been ¥500,000.

CONSOLIDATE AND COMMUNIZE: The main objectives of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan and the Democratic Youth League are to consolidate and communize. They hope to consolidate through the efforts of the Democracy Protection League and completely to communize themselves through their contacts with the USSR and North Korea.

BRIBERY IN TAX OFFICES GOES UNPUNISHED: In Hokkaido, a source states that some members of the tax office have been apprehended accepting bribes, but have only been transferred rather than dismissed. In Wakkanai, Hokkaido, members of the tax office have been criticized for wearing clothes which would seem to be out of the price range of their income as minor taxation officials.

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DISTRICT CASE LOAD TABLE

	PENDING		CLOSED	
	A	B	A	B
First CIC District.....	546	508	28	124
Second CIC District.....	412	423	72	90
Third CIC District.....	531	525	85	160
Fourth CIC District.....	276	277	34	71
Fifth CIC District.....	407	417	30	64
Sixth CIC District.....	144	140	20	30
Tokyo-Kanagawa CIC District.....	413	643	90	107
Totals:	2729	2924	359	646



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

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LEADS PASSED TO AGENCIES OTHER THAN CIS



SPOT REPORTS FOWARDED TO CIS



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

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

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ACTION TAKEN ON LEADS PASSED TO AGENCIES OTHER THAN CIS

The preceding chart depicts the number of informative leads which passed from CIC units to other investigative branches of the Occupation Forces. Investigation of these leads is not within the jurisdiction of CIC.

As an example of one CIC lead, and action taken thereon, the following is listed:

During a recent celebration sponsored by the Yokkaichi Harbor Fire Department, Akatsuka Masafumi, one of the celebrants, became overstimulated as a result of overindulgence, and decided to sleep it off in a truck which was parked nearby. Akatsuka was allegedly awakened by two American soldiers who allegedly gave him a sound beating. According to witnesses, the American soldiers had come to town in a truck bearing Air Force markings. As a result of that information, the case was turned over to the Provost Marshal of Nagoya Air Force Base for investigation.

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OTHER LEADS AND ACTION TAKEN

File:	Description:	To:	Action Taken:
S/I HIR-5-360 (11)	Hidden Gold	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I HIR-5-364 (11)	Blackmarket (Japanese)	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I D2-HIR-590 (10)	Blackmarket (Japanese)	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I D2-HIR-594 (5b)	Anti-Occupation Speech	Hiroshima MGT	Pending

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Over to the Provost Marshal of Nagoya Air Force Base for investigation.

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AND ACTION TAKEN

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S/I HIR-5-364 (11)	Blackmarket (Japanese)	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I D2-HIR-590 (10)	Blackmarket (Japanese)	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I D2-HIR-594 (5b)	Anti-Occupation Speech	Hiroshima MGT	Pending
S/I D2-56 (5b)	Violation of Tax Law	Kochi MGT	Pending
S/R, same subject, dtd 25 Apr 49	Assault on Japanese National by American Soldiers.	Nagoya AFB PM	Pending
S/I D3-2761 (10)	Illegal possession of firearms.	Mie MGT	Pending

S E C R E T

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441st CIC DETACHMENT
STATION LIST

UNIT	LOCATION	POPULATION	STRENGTH
Tokyo-Kanagawa CIC District	Tokyo		161
Tokyo-to Area	Tokyo	5,417,871	(Incl. above)
Kanagawa Area	Yokohama	2,317,551	60
First CIC District	Kokura		26
Kagoshima Area	Kagoshima	1,766,514	9
Miyazaki Area	Miyazaki	1,052,483	8
Kumamoto Area	Kumamoto	1,786,058	11
Oita Area	Beppu	1,245,689	7
Nagasakai Area	Nagasaki	1,565,558	13
Saga Area	Saga	931,336	7
Fukuoka Area	Fukuoka	3,312,577	20
Second CIC District	Kure		33
Yamaguchi Area	Yamaguchi	1,505,532	10
Hiroshima Area	Kure	2,045,923	13
Shimane Area	Matsue	903,576	6
Tottori Area	Tottori	592,863	5
Okayama Area	Okayama	1,644,908	10
Ehime Area	Matsuyama	1,481,106	3
Kochi Area	Kochi	866,385	7
Tokushima Area	Tokushima	869,290	8
Kagawa Area	Takamatsu	934,123	8
Third CIC District	Osaka		53
Hyogo Area	Kobe	3,156,888	21
Kyoto Area	Kyoto	1,784,753	26
Osaka Area	Osaka	3,515,225	25
Wakayama Area	Wakayama	979,982	4
Nara Area	Nara	778,677	7
Mie Area	Yokkaichi	1,451,100	11
Shiga Area	Otsu	872,775	7
Fukui Area	Fukui	454,192	5
Ishikawa Area	Kanazawa	941,772	11
Toyama Area	Toyama	998,349	5
Gifu Area	Gifu	1,524,812	6
Aichi Area	Nagoya	3,226,116	13
Fourth CIC District	Camp Drake		41
Shizuoka Area	Shiquoka	2,407,102	13
Chiba Area	Chiba	2,140,511	10
Yamanashi Area	Katsuyama	815,485	11

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Chiba Area	Chiba	2,140,511	10
Yamanashi Area	Katsuyama	815,485	11
Saitama Area	Urawa	2,132,221	11
Gumma Area	Maebashi	1,608,894	11
Ibaraki Area	Isohama	2,044,578	9
Tochigi Area	Utsunomiya	1,557,860	13
Nagano Area	Nagano	2,071,589	11
Fifth CIC District	Sendai		36
Niigata Area	Niigata	2,435,451	13
Fukushima Area	Fukushima	2,026,482	11
Miyagi Area	Sendai	1,596,307	11
Yamagata Area	Yamagata	1,346,492	13
Akita Area	Akita	1,283,710	12
Iwate Area	Morioka	1,294,203	12
Aomori Area	Aomori	1,218,325	14
Sixth CIC District	Sapporo	4,021,050	78
Sapporo Area	Sapporo	(Total	12
Hakodate Area	Hakodate	for	13
Asahigawa Area	Asahigawa	District)	4
Wakkanai Area	Wakkanai		4
Kushiro Area	Kushiro		7

S E C R E T

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441ST CIC DETACHMENT
LOCATIONS—JAPAN

3rd CIC DISTRICT (OSAKA)
TOYAMA CIC AREA
ISHIKAWA CIC AREA (KANAZAWA)
NANAO SUB DET
GIFU CIC AREA
AICHI CIC AREA (NAGOYA)
FUKUI CIC AREA
SHIGA CIC AREA (OTSU)
MIE CIC AREA (YOKKAICHI)
NARA CIC AREA
WAKAYAMA CIC AREA
OSAKA CIC AREA
KYOTO CIC AREA
MAIZURU SUB DET
HYOGO CIC AREA

2nd CIC DISTRICT (KURE)
TOTTORI CIC AREA
OKAYAMA CIC AREA
SHIMANE CIC AREA (MATSUE)
HIROSHIMA CIC AREA
YAMAGUCHI CIC AREA
KAGAWA CIC AREA (TAKAMATSU)
TOKUSHIMA CIC AREA
EHIME CIC AREA (MATSUYAMA)
KOCHI CIC AREA

1st CIC DISTRICT (KOKURA)
FUKUOKA CIC AREA
TSUSHIMA SUB DET
SAGA CIC AREA
OITA CIC AREA (BEPPU)
KUMAMOTO CIC AREA
NAGASAKI CIC AREA
SASEBO SUB DET
MIYAZAKI CIC AREA
KAGOSHIMA CIC AREA

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441ST CIC DETACHMENT
LOCATIONS—JAPAN



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ISHIKAWA CIC AREA (KANAZAWA)
NANAO SUB DET
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AICHI CIC AREA (NAGOYA)
FUKUI CIC AREA
SHIGA CIC AREA (OTSU)
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EHIME CIC AREA (MATSUYAMA)
KOCHI CIC AREA

1st CIC DISTRICT (KOKURA)
FUKUOKA CIC AREA
TSUSHIMA SUB DET
SAGA CIC AREA
OITA CIC AREA (BEPPU)
KUMAMOTO CIC AREA
NAGASAKI CIC AREA
SASEBO SUB DET
MIYAZAKI CIC AREA
KAGOSHIMA CIC AREA



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

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION
GENERAL STAFF
441ST CIC DISTRICTS

- 6TH, 3RD, TOKYO-KANAGAWA DISTRICTS
- 4TH, 1ST DISTRICTS
- 5TH, 2ND DISTRICTS
- AREA DETACHMENT
- AREA SUB DETACHMENT

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441ST CIC DETACHMENT
LOCATIONS—JAPAN

3rd CIC DISTRICT (OSAKA)
- TOYAMA CIC AREA
- ISHIKAWA CIC AREA (KANAZAWA)
  - NANAO SUB DET
- GIFU CIC AREA
- AICHI CIC AREA (NAGOYA)
- FUKUI CIC AREA
- SHIGA CIC AREA (OTSU)
- MIE CIC AREA (YOKKAICHI)
- NARA CIC AREA
- WAKAYAMA CIC AREA
- OSAKA CIC AREA
- KYOTO CIC AREA
  - MAIZURU SUB DET
- HYOGO CIC AREA

2nd CIC DISTRICT (KURE)
- TOTTORI CIC AREA
- OKAYAMA CIC AREA
- SHIMANE CIC AREA (MATSUE)
- HIROSHIMA CIC AREA
- YAMAGUCHI CIC AREA
- KAGAWA CIC AREA (TAKAMATSU)
- TOKUSHIMA CIC AREA
- EHIME CIC AREA (MATSUYAMA)
- KOCHI CIC AREA

1st CIC DISTRICT (KOKURA)
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  - SASEBO SUB DET
- MIYAZAKI CIC AREA
- KAGOSHIMA CIC AREA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

441ST CIC DETACHMENT
LOCATIONS—JAPAN



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SHIGA CIC AREA (OTSU)
MIE CIC AREA (YOKKAICHI)
NARA CIC AREA
WAKAYAMA CIC AREA
OSAKA CIC AREA
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

971st CIC DETACHMENT: KOREA

1. Subversive Activity

a. Radical
   (1) SKLP Reorganizes and Strengthens Cells
b. Foreign
   (1) Chinese Group Aids SKLP

a. Radical

(1) SKLP Reorganizes and Strengthens Cells: The South Korea Labor Party (SKLP) has restrained its activities recently because of the purge in the Korean Army and the National Police and because the United Nations Commission is in South Korea. However several assassinations have been attempted, some of which have been successful. The SKLP will not take strong, positive action until the UN Commission withdraws from Korea or there is some decided change in the international situation. In the meantime, the party will concentrate on building up its existing cells and forming new cells in Rightist organizations and other strategic places, especially within the Korean Army.

The cells previously in operation within the Army were rendered almost useless by the purge of Communists from the Army following the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 39, 15 Apr 49, page SPA-13) However the Army in South Cholla Province still has many members of the Rebel 14th Regiment, several of whom are now military policemen. The SKLP is turning to these men for assistance in their program.

In addition to organizing new cells in the Korean Army, the SKLP is attempting to weaken the Army from within, agitate the soldiers, conduct espionage against the Army, and obtain weapons and ammunition. The rebel troops in the South Cholla Province are dependent almost entirely on the SKLP cells in the Korean Army for their supplies of arms and ammunition.

The SKLP is having great difficulty organizing cells in the police force because of the cruel treatment of policemen during the insurrection. The SKLP now plans to treat policemen better thus hoping to gain their cooperation. The SKLP also hopes to obtain weapons and ammunition from the police. (B-2) (CONFIDENTIAL) (a)

b. Foreign

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b. Foreign

(1) Chinese Group Aids SKLP: The Chinese Associate Group, formed in Inchon, has recently moved its headquarters to Seoul, and is organizing branches in the main South Korean Ports. The chief purpose of the organizations is to furnish liaison between the Chinese Communists and the South Korea Labor Party. It also transports espionage agents between Korea and Communist China. The ultimate aim of the Chinese Associate Group is to overthrow the South Korean Government by aiding the underground organizations in any possible manner. (C-3) (CONFIDENTIAL) (b)

2. Social and Civil Conditions

a. Organizations
   (1) Great Korea Social Party, Pusan Branch
b. Political
   (1) Expected Changes in the Rhee Cabinet
   (2) Petition Requests US Remain in SK

(a) MIR No. 11, CIC Korea, Par I 13, 14e
(b) MIR No. 11, CIC Korea, Par I 8

S E C R E T

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

a. Organizations

(1) Great Korea Social Party, Pusan Branch: Cho So-ang, president of the Great Korea Socialist Party, (Ref: CIS Periodical Summary No. 36, CIC-51, Par 3a (1)) recently presided over the inaugural ceremonies of the Pusan branch. The meeting which was attended by about 1,000 people, was opened by the presentation of the Korean flag, followed by the singing of the national anthem and a silent prayer for those who had been "laid waste on the field of Korean independence." A progress report, including the relationship between the Great Korea Socialist Party and the international situation, was given by a national staff member. Cho So-ang suggested that a report of the meeting be forwarded to President Rhee, the National Assembly, and the United Nations Commission on Korea. The aims of the party include the following:

a. Government subsidized political and economic education of the people.
b. Redistribution of lands, increased authority for local government and educational programs for adults.
c. Protection of personal rights, unemployment insurance, and women's suffrage.
d. Increase the power and membership of the Great Korea Social Party to include all the people of Korea.

(B-1) (CONFIDENTIAL) (a)

b. Political

(1) Expected Changes in the Rhee Cabinet: Another reshuffle in the Rhee Cabinet is expected to take place soon, partially because of Lee Bum-suk's reaction to his removal from the post of Minister of National Defense. Lee has expressed his desire to resign the premiership, but Rhee has requested him to remain indefinitely. A second reason for the expected shake-up is that Kim Hyo-suk's tenure as Minister of Home Affairs is expected to be brief as he lacks the qualifications and is also in very poor health.

Lee's removal as Minister of National Defense is viewed by many political observers as an attempt by Rhee to weaken Lee politically. Lee is extremely popular with the Korean Army and the National Police and would, if he desired, have had a fair chance to carry out a coup d'etat. President Rhee's fear of Lee's power was aggravated by Lee's refusal to unite his National Youth Corps with the Rhee sponsored Great Korea Youth Organization. (B-2)

If and when the reshuffle takes place, President Rhee is expected to nominate Baik Sung-wook as prime minister. Should the National Assembly refuse to confirm Baik, Cho Byung-ok, if successful on his mission

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009

c. Protection of personal rights, unemployment insurance, and women's suffrage.
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If and when the reshuffle takes place, President Rhee is expected to nominate Baik Sung-wook as prime minister. Should the National Assembly refuse to confirm Baik, Cho Pyung-ok, if successful on his mission to the United States, will be the alternate choice. Louise Yim, Minister of Commerce, will probably be replaced by Ho Chung, now Minister of Transportation. Lee Yun-yung, Minister of Social Affairs, will be given the post vacated by Ho Chung and will be replaced by Kim Do-yun, now Minister of Finance. The Finance Ministry will be taken over by Kim Woo-kyung, a representative of the Korean Government to the 1948 United Nations General Assembly Meeting in Paris. (B-3) (CONFIDENTIAL) (b)

(2) Petition Requests US Remain in SK: Since 63 members of the National Assembly submitted a petition to the United Nations Commission on Korea requesting the withdrawal of foreign troops, the National Assembly has been in a state of turmoil. Yoon Chi-yung, backed by the Democratic National Party and the Tai Baik Club of the National Assembly, has been attempting to submit a counter-petition to the UN requesting that American troops be retained in Korea. Yoon has not been able, at this writing, to obtain sufficient signatures to equal the first petition. (B-1) (CONFIDENTIAL) (c)

(a) MIR No. 11, CIC Korea, Par I 10
(b) MIR No. 11, CIC Korea, Par I 4
(c) MIR No. 11, CIC Korea, Par I 3

SECRET

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III PUBLIC SAFETY

HIGHLIGHTS

15 May 49

LAW AND ORDER: Japanese casualties in traffic accidents involving Occupation Forces personnel or vehicles fell to 190 in Feb 49, the fourth consecutive month of decrease. Offenses against the Occupation Forces by Japanese in Feb 49 numbered 1,188, an increase of 163 over the previous month, yet the second lowest total on record. Offenses by Occupation personnel against the Japanese totaled 193 in Feb 49, only one more than in Jan. Illegal entries of Koreans during Apr 49 were 662; of whom 65% (435 persons) were arrested.

MARITIME: The Maritime Safety Board investigated 2,622 vessels and seized 260. Reorganization of MSB planned to improve efficiency and personnel. 93 vessels rescued in Mar 49. MSB Training School enrolls 85 MSB personnel in 682-hour course, the third such class since school established.

POLICE: Tokyo police arrest 5,516 hoodlums and gangsters for typical gangster offenses between Jun 47 and Mar 49; convictions few. Over 1,400 of the 1,596 municipal police chiefs of Japan met in Tokyo in Apr to pass four significant resolutions. Communists caused two parade disorders in Osaka in one week; Osaka City Police Chief Suzuki acted impartially; but was censured by both conservative and radical groups. Criminal Code Offenses rose 20% in Feb 49 as non-Criminal-Code offenses jumped 41%. Japanese police strength tabulated on 1 Apr 49. Municipal police forces found fewer than number of communities of 5,000 or more population; reasons listed. May Day crowds relatively small and orderly.

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PRISON: Prison population rises for first time in six months mainly because of rise in prisoners awaiting trial. Prison training courses of national scope instituted. New prisoner classification system put into effect.

FIRE: Number of fires dropped in Feb 49, but estimated yen fire losses were highest on record because of three conflagrations. Photos of film company fire illustrate fire protection lessons for Japanese. District conferences of fire chiefs discuss mutual problems, fire prevention work and fire fighting techniques.

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2. ¥20 Million Fire in Film Company Laboratory	PSD-19
3. District Conferences of Fire Chiefs	PSD-20
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R E S T R I C T E D

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LAW AND ORDER

1. Japanese Traffic Casualties

Casualties Lessen For Four Consecutive Months

Japanese casualties in traffic accidents involving Occupation Forces vehicles have fallen for four consecutive months. Of the 190 reported casualties, 24 were deaths, 55 were serious injuries and 111 minor injuries in Feb 49.

Prediction is one of the functions of statistics, and prediction is usually a matter of probabilities. The following even chances for months have been determined from data for 1947 and 1948.

TABLE A — RANGE OF CHANCES ON CASUALTIES

Type	Range Of Middle Half
Fatalities	25.5 - 32.5
Serious Injury	60 - 80
Minor Injury	102 - 145
Total Casualties	185 - 249

For example, there is an even chance that fatalities for any month of 1949 will fall between 25.5 and 32.5. If they fall outside that range they may be above or below it. Both Jan 49 and Feb 49, with 21 and 24 deaths, respectively, were below the range.

The chances are even that serious injuries will fall between 60 and 80 for any month. January with 65 was within, February with 55 was below the range.

Chances are even that minor injuries will fall between 102 and 145. Both January and February with 125 and 111, respectively, were within the range.

Chances are even that total casualties will fall between 185 and 249. Both January and February with 211 and 190 casualties fell within this range.

The graph below shows the casualties by months from Jan 47 through Feb 49.



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

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2. Offenses Involving Occupation Forces

a. Offenses Against Occupation Forces
b. Offenses By Occupation Personnel

a. Offenses Against Occupation Forces: Reported offenses committed against the Occupation Forces by Japanese in Feb 49 were 1,188, an increase of 163 over January. This total is the second lowest monthly total on record.

Offenses against the person rose from one to 32 between January and February. In view of the 40 such offenses in Dec 48, the single one in January seems abnormally low.

Offenses against property numbered 900 in Feb 49, slightly over 75 percent of the total, a normal percentage.

Miscellaneous offenses nearly doubled, rising from 135 in January to 256 in February.

Table A shows the distribution of offenses by jurisdiction as reported by the National Rural Police.

TABLE A — OFFENSES AGAINST THE OCCUPATION FORCES BY JAPANESE DURING FEB 49

	Person	Property	Others	Total
7th Div	-	34	-	34
1st Cav Div	16	535	184	735
25th Div	5	208	16	229
24th Div	10	115	26	151
BCOF	1	8	30	39
TOTALS	32	900	256	1,188

b. Offenses By Occupation Forces Personnel: Reports prepared by the Provost Marshal's Office show a total of 193 offenses committed by Occupation Forces personnel against Japanese in Feb 49, an increase of one over January.

Of these offenses, 103 were against the person, 58 against property and 32 were miscellaneous offenses.

A similar report from the National Rural Police gives a total of 467 offenses. The data are given in Table B.

TABLE B — OFFENSES BY OCCUPATION PERSONNEL, FEB 49

Area Covered	Provost Marshal Office	National Rural Police

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TABLE B OFFENSES BY OCCUPATION PERSONNEL, FEB 49

Area Covered By	Provost Marshal Office				National Rural Police			
	Person	Property	Other	Total	Person	Property	Other	Total
7th Div	10	18	-	28	11	-	-	11
1st Cav Div	7	9	4	20	6	1	-	7
Tokyo PM	19	4	1	24	137	148	3	288
Yokohama PM	14	8	15	37	47	17	2	66
Other IX Corps	13	2	1	16	Included under 1st Cav			
25th Div	11	6	7	24	42	15	-	57
24th Div	5	1	-	6	16	13	-	29
Other I Corps	24	10	4	38	Included under 25th Div			
BCOF	No report received				6	3	-	9
TOTALS	103	58	32	193	265	197	5	467

The reasons for differences in the reports from the Provost Marshal and the National Rural Police have been discussed too frequently to warrant a repetition; however, a comparison of the variations may prove worthwhile merely to point out the possibility of invalid inferences.

According to the Provost Marshal, offenses against the person accounted for 50 percent of the total for both 1947 and 1948. Offenses against property accounted for 18 percent and others took up the balance of 32 percent.

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PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION FIELD AC

POLICE BRANCH

NRP REGION V: 2 PERSONS, 21 MAR-4 APR; NRP REGION VI: 5-18 APR; NRP REGION IV: 5-15 APR. SUPERVISED OBSERVED & COORDINATED OPERATIONS OF VARIOUS NATIONAL RURAL POLICE TROOPS, PREFECTURAL & MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSIONS & MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICE LAW.

AICHI, OSAKA & HYOGO PREFECTURES: 1 PERSON, 7-14 APR. SUPERVISED, OBSERVED & COORDINATED OPERATIONS OF VARIOUS NATIONAL RURAL POLICE & MUNICIPAL POLICE SCHOOLS IN CITIES OF NAGOYA, OSAKA & KOBE.

FIRE BRANCH

SAPPORO & SENDAI: 1 PERSON, 20-30 APR. TOKYO: 2 PERSON, 18-19 APR. OSAKA: 1 PERSON, 4-9 APR. HIROSHIMA & FUKUOKA: 1 PERSON, 7-14 APR. ATTENDED DISTRICT FIRE SAFETY CONFERENCES HELD IN ABOVE CITIES UNDER AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL FIRE DEFENSE BOARD.

PLATE I

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC
30 APR 49

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Y DIVISION FIELD ACTIVITIES, APR 49

FIRE BRANCH



SAPPORO & SENDAI:
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ATTENDED DISTRICT FIRE SAFETY CONFERENCES HELD IN ABOVE CITIES UNDER AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL FIRE DEFENSE BOARD.

PRISON BRANCH



NIIGATA PREFECTURE:
2 PERSONS, 18-22 APR.
INSPECTED NIIGATA MAIN PRISON.

TOCHIGI PREFECTURE:
2 PERSONS, 26-30 APR.
INSPECTED UTSUNOMIYA MAIN PRISON & TOCHIGI WOMEN'S PRISON.

NAGOYA & OSAKA CORRECTION & REHABILITATION DISTRICT HQ. & OKAYAMA PREFECTURE:
2 PERSONS, 12-21 APR.
SUPERVISED, OBSERVED & COORDINATED INITIAL OPERATIONS OF DISTRICT HQ. & INSPECTED OKAYAMA MAIN PRISON.

ILLEGAL ENTRY OF KOREANS INTO JAPAN

A. NATIONAL STATISTICS, JAN 47-APR 49



B. PREFECTURAL COMPARISON, JAN 47-APR 47



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

B. PREFECTURAL COMPARISON, JAN 47 - APR 47



SOURCE:
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE
MARITIME SAFETY BOARD

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC
2 APR 49

PLATE II

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009

Japanese reports give offenses against the person as 60 percent, and against property as 37 percent, the three-percent remainder being miscellaneous. While there may not be a distinct demarcation between property and miscellaneous offenses, there is a clearer one between person and property. The classification of 50 to 60 percent as offenses against the person might be fairly indicative of the Occupation attitude toward the Japanese when it is known that offenses against the person in the United States are seldom more than 20 percent of the total; such an inference would not be valid, however, because of the great differences in applicable laws and regulations, in police methods and procedures, in distribution of personnel and population and many other differences between the United States and Japan.

3. Illegal Entry of Koreans Into Japan

Jan-Apr 49 Shows Increase Over Same Period of 1947 and 1948

An estimated total of 662 Koreans illegally entered Japan during Apr 49 and 65 percent (435 persons) of this total were arrested, according to reports received from the National Rural Police and the Maritime Safety Board. The estimated total entry and the number arrested for the period Jan 47-Apr 49 are shown in Part A, Plate II, opposite this page.

The estimated total and the percent of arrests for Apr 49 represents a drop from those reported for Mar 49; however, a comparison of estimated totals and percent of arrests reported for the first four months of 1947, 1948 and 1949 shows an increase in the 1949 figures. This is shown below.

TABLE A

First Four Months of	Estimated No. of Entrants	Percent Arrested
1947	1283	65
1948	1981	74
1949	2520	73

Part B of Plate II shows the total number of estimated entrants reported for the prefectures of Nagasaki, Fukuoka and Yamaguchi as compared with the total number estimated for all other prefectures which reported entry during the period Jan 47-Apr 49.

Nagasaki reported entry during each of the 28 months in this period and Fukuoka and Yamaguchi each reported entry during 27 months, neither having had any known entry during Jan 47.

A total of 22 other prefectures reported entry during at least one month of this 28-month period. These included Saga Prefecture with re-

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period Jan 47-Apr 49 are shown in Part A, Plate II, opposite this page.

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A total of 22 other prefectures reported entry during at least one month of this 28-month period. These included Saga Prefecture with reported entry during 23 of the months, Shimane during 21, Hyogo during 16, Kagoshima during 12, Kumamoto during 10 and 17 other prefectures with known entry during at least one, but fewer than 10, of the 28 months.

4. PSD Field Surveys, Apr 49

Yokohama Maritime Safety District Headquarters Surveyed

PSD personnel spent a total of 130 man-days on field surveys outside of the Tokyo-Yokohama area during Apr 49, this total including 74 man-days for Police Branch, 34 for Prison Branch and 22 for Fire Branch. These surveys are illustrated on Plate I, opposite p. PSD-4. In addition to the above surveys, the Maritime Branch conducted a four-day survey of the land and water operations of the Yokohama District Headquarters of the Maritime Safety Board and all PSD branches maintained continuous liaison with, and constant supervision over, all Japanese public safety agencies in the Tokyo-Yokohama area.

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MARITIME

1. Maritime Safety Board Reorganization Plan

a. Background
b. Structural Reorganization
c. Personnel Changes
d. Qualified Personnel Assisting Japanese

a. Background: Correction of the structure and personnel needs of the Maritime Safety Board, Transportation Ministry, along the lines indicated by the organizational chart in Plate III, opposite this page, was in the planning stage at the end of April. These proposed changes, founded upon the experience gained in the first year of operation of the Maritime Safety Board, are aimed at elimination of the divisional and sectional overlapping which presently exists as the result of original planning by Japanese officials who had had no previous experience with this type of organization and who attempted to reconcile and combine the United States Coast Guard system with the Japanese governmental system. Public Safety Division recommendations were not incorporated in the original organization plan. It is hoped that a more effective and close-knit organization will result from the proposed changes, with qualified personnel placed where they are needed.

b. Structural Reorganization: The plans call for elimination of the duplication which resulted when the newly established Maritime Safety Board assumed control on 1 May 48 over several already-established, related agencies having some duplicate functions. In the original MSB organization, which is still in force and which will remain in force until proposed revisions of the Maritime Safety Authorities Law and Sea Casualties Inquiry Law have been passed by the Japanese Diet, the sections of the Secretariate have no direct administrative or supervisory jurisdiction below the MSB National Headquarters level, so that, while the district and local MSB headquarters have duplicate structures, there is no standardization of administration on all three levels.

This will be corrected by placing the sections of the Secretariate directly under the new position of the Assistant Director General giving these sections the directive, supervisory and administrative authority commensurate with their status as staff sections.

The Maritime Safety Board Training School, presently under the MSB Maritime Safety Bureau, will be redesignated as the Maritime Safety Academy and will be placed directly under the Director General for operational control, with the Assistant Director General holding administrative control.

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The Maritime Safety Board Training School, presently under the MSB Maritime Safety Bureau, will be redesignated as the Maritime Safety Academy and will be placed directly under the Director General for operational control, with the Assistant Director General holding administrative control.

The Marine Courts of Inquiry, now under the Transportation Minister will, in the proposed reorganization, be placed under the Director General of the Maritime Safety Board. The Marine Courts have no punitive power except to revoke the licenses of ships' officers who are involved in casualties, when such action is considered necessary, and it is felt therefore, that the Marine Courts properly belong under the jurisdiction of the MSB, which was established as the single agency having responsibility for maritime safety affairs.

Under the present MSB organization the MSB Maritime Safety Bureau is charged with responsibility for both land and sea functions, each of which functions is in itself highly specialized. To provide for more efficient and streamlined operations the MSB Maritime Safety Bureau's functions have been broken down and placed in two separate divisions of the proposed organization, the Merchant Marine Safety and the Patrol and Rescue Divisions. The former will be responsible for regular safety inspections of merchant vessels and for the certification of merchant marine personnel; the latter will be responsible for the preservation of

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SOURCE: MARITIME SAFETY BOARD PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
PLATE III 29 APR 49

MARITIME SAFETY BOARD HEADQUARTERS

——— CHAIN OF COMMAND
---- ADMINISTRATIVE LINE

DIRECTOR GENERAL

MARITIME SAFETY ACADEMY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL

SUPPLY & PROCUREMENT SECTION

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

PERSONNEL SECTION

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

LIGHTHOUSE DIVISION

HYDROGRAPHIC DIVISION

SECTIONS

OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION
RADIO BEACON ADMINISTRATION

SECTIONS

ADMINISTRATION
SURVEYING
OCEANOGRAPHIC
ASTRONOMICAL
CHART & PUBLICATION
PRINTING

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

BOARD HEADQUARTERS REORGANIZATION PLAN

※ TEMPORARY FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR GENERAL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL

MARINE COURTS OF INQUIRY

RELATIONS ECTION

PLANS & POLICY SECTION

COMMISSIONERS' ROOM

UNICATIONS ECTION

FINANCE SECTION

OFFICE OF ENGINEERING

RAPHIC DIVISION

ECTIONS

ISTRATION
YING
OGRAPHIC
NOMICAL
& PUBLICATION
NG

MERCHANT MARINE SAFETY DIVISION

SECTIONS

MERCHANT MARINE TECHNICAL
MERCHANT VESSEL INSPECTION
MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL

PATROL & RESCUE DIVISION

SECTIONS

EX-NAVAL SHIPS CUSTODY ※
MINESWEEPING ※
DISTRESS & RESCUE
LAW ENFORCEMENT
FLOATING UNIT

MARITIME INVESTIGATIONS & ARRESTS

A. DISTRICT STATISTICS, MAR 49

MARITIME SAFETY BOARD DISTRICT	NO. OF VESSELS INVESTI-GATED	NO. OF ARRESTS		BREAKDOWN OF ARRESTS BY OFFENSE									
				Maritime Safety Laws		Illegal Entry & Exit		Smuggling Laws		Fishing Limit Laws		Economic Control Laws	
		V	P	V	P	V	P	V	P	V	P	V	P
Otaru	164	13	15	5	5	0	0	0	0	3	5	5	5
Shiogama	28	2	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0
Niigata	21	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4
Yokohama	78	29	32	22	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	10
Nagoya	137	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	3
Kobe	326	52	82	19	19	1	11	4	12	17	25	11	15
Maizuru	76	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hiroshima	630	112	171	31	34	0	0	0	0	32	97	49	40
Moji	1162	43	243	7	8	6	131	1	2	23	89	6	13
TOTALS	2622	260	560	88	92	7	142	5	14	77	222	83	90

V represents vessels; P represents persons

B. NATIONAL STATISTICS, MAY 48-MAR 49



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

BREAKDOWN OF 11-MONTH TOTAL ARRESTS BY OFFENSE

OFFENSES INVOLVING	NUMBER OF ARRESTS VESSELS	PERSONS
Maritime Safety	293	354
Illegal Entry&Exit	97	2004
Smuggling	85	475
Fishing Limits	357	1183
Econ. Controls	443	771
TOTALS	1275	4787

SOURCE:
MARITIME SAFETY BOARD

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC
2 MAY 49

PLATE IV

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

life and property at sea and for law enforcement at sea.

Present functioning of the MSB Lighthouse and Hydrographic Bureaus is generally satisfactory and their present organization will be retained, though they will be redesignated as divisions in line with the proposed reorganization plan.

The present organization and the proposed reorganization may be compared by reference to Plate III, opposite p. PSD-6, and to CIS Periodical Summary No. 28, par. 1, p. PSD-10 and Plate IV, opposite p. PSD-9. It should be noted that the two plates mentioned above refer to the national headquarters of the MSB; in the reorganization plan, a similar organization will be followed at each of the lower levels of the MSB.

c. Personnel Changes: The first year of MSB operations has indicated that a large number of the personnel assigned to MSB duty are not fully qualified for their positions. Many came over from the Transportation Ministry when the MSB was formed and many, in line with general Japanese Government policy, were transferred from other agencies with no regard for the technical requirements of most MSB jobs. While correction of personnel deficiencies cannot be accomplished as simply as can the structural reorganization, present plans provide for the placing of qualified mariners in all key positions requiring such experience, establishing minimum standards of qualifications for all section chief positions and formulating a promotion policy based on qualifications rather than on previous governmental position. Also the present system of various MSB positions being held concurrently by General Maritime Bureau officials of the Transportation Ministry will be eliminated as soon as suitably qualified personnel can be secured.

d. Qualified Personnel Assisting Japanese: One of the greatest problems underlying the entire first year of MSB operations was the shortage of adequately qualified personnel for key positions in the Maritime Branch of the Public Safety Division. During the greater part of the first year of operations, PSD Maritime Branch consisted of one U.S. Army officer and one Japanese consultant, and frequent attempts to secure additional qualified personnel were unsuccessful. In recent months several additional qualified members have been secured and it is felt that they will be able to maintain closer supervision and coordination over the Maritime Safety Board's operations and to implement fully the reorganization plan.

2. Maritime Investigations and Arrests

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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2. Maritime Investigations and Arrests

2,622 Vessels Investigated in March

During Mar 49 the Maritime Safety Board investigated a total of 2,622 vessels on suspicion, seizing 260 of those vessels and arresting 560 persons for various illegal acts. The breakdown of these investigations, seizures and arrests by MSB District and the breakdown of seizures and arrests by offense is shown in Part A, Plate IV, opposite this page.

Part B, Plate IV, shows the number of vessels investigated on suspicion, the number of those vessels seized, the number of persons arrested for various illegal acts and the breakdown of the 11-month total of seizures and arrests by offense. It should be noted that considerable variation in the operating procedures of the various MSB Districts has been observed. Some districts on their own initiative or on instructions of local Occupation commanders have established maritime check points, making a large number of investigations and relatively few arrests. Other districts, conducting investigations on more reliable information, have shown a larger percentage of seizures and arrests per total investigations.

R E S T R I C T E D

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

3. Japanese Maritime Casualties

73 Percent of Distress Responses Result in Rescue in Mar 49

A total of 93 vessels in distress were rescued by the Maritime Safety Board and various private lifesaving agencies during Mar 49, according to reports received from the Maritime Safety Board. These 93 rescues represented only 15 percent of the total of 601 vessels reported in distress, but were 73 percent of the total rescues attempted by the MSB and the various private agencies.

Plate V, opposite this page, shows the breakdown of the Mar 49 casualty and rescue figures by MSB district together with the national total of casualties, attempted rescues and successful rescues for the months May 48 through Mar 49.

An unknown number of vessels either cancelled their distress reports, made port or resolved their difficulties without aid, or were rescued by unreported vessels or agencies.

4. Maritime Safety Board Training School

Third Training Cycle to Educate 85 MSB Personnel

A group of 85 students, including officials and seamen from National MSB Headquarters, from the nine MSB districts and from the patrol fleet, were enrolled in the third training cycle of the MSB Training School which began on 16 Apr and will continue until 5 Aug 49. The two previous cycles which have been conducted since the 1 May 48 activation of the Maritime Safety Board graduated a total of 156 students, including 87 in the first cycle, which ran from 7 Jul 48 to 5 Nov 48, and 69 in the second cycle, which ran from 17 Nov 48 to 19 Mar 49.

The curriculum for the third cycle, revised in accordance with experience gained by the faculty during the previous two cycles, will include a total of 682 hours of training. The breakdown of this training by subject and by number of hours is shown below.

TABLE A — MSB TRAINING SCHOOL CURRICULUM

	Classroom Hours
Background	
Including organization and mission of MSB and lectures by various SCAP officials	116
Maritime Affairs	
Including interpretation of all pertinent maritime safety laws, general seamanship subjects, maritime law enforcement	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 77500

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TABLE A — MSB TRAINING SCHOOL CURRICULUM

	Classroom Hours
Background Including organization and mission of MSB and lectures by various SCAP officials	116
Maritime Affairs Including interpretation of all pertinent maritime safety laws, general seamanship subjects, maritime law enforcement procedures, hydrographic subjects, lifesaving and ship salvage operations	282
Jurisprudence Including interpretations of international law and the criminal laws of Japan	124
Civil Police Procedures Including policing techniques and preparation of necessary reports relative to indictment	42
Technical Training Including inspections, arrest technique, signal and life-saving training and physical exercise	88
Miscellaneous Including special study groups (research)	30
TOTAL	682

RESTRICTED

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 715009

JAPANESE MARITIME CASUALTIES*

A. DISTRICT STATISTICS, MAR 49



B. NATIONAL STATISTICS, MAY 48 - MAR 49



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

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

BREAKDOWN OF 11-MONTH TOTAL REPORTED CASUALTIES

EXTENT OF DAMAGE	NO. OF VESSELS	PERCENT OF TOTAL
SLIGHT	3,026	73
SEVERE	700	19
TOTAL LOSS	389	8
TOTAL	4,115	100

※ INCLUDE FIGURES FOR MARITIME SAFETY BOARD AND VARIOUS PRIVATE LIFESAVING ASSOCIATIONS

SOURCE:
MARITIME SAFETY BOARD

PLATE V

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
5 MAY 49

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

HOODLUM AND GANGSTER ARRESTS, TOKYO
15 JUN 47 - 31 MAR 49

A. ARRESTS BY PLACE AND PERIOD

POLICE STATIONS	15 Jun 47 – 30 Jun 48	1948 1 Jul -24 Jul	25 Jul -24 Aug	25 Aug -24 Sep	25 Sep -24 Oct	25 Oct -24 Nov	25 Nov -24 Dec	25 Dec -25 Jan	1949 26 Jan -28 Feb	1 Mar -31 Mar	TOTAL 1 Jul 48 - 31 Mar 49	TOTAL 15 Jun 47 - 31 Mar 49
Kojimachi	2	12	3	5	1	2	0	2	0	2	27	29
Marunouchi	45	5	0	27	2	4	0	0	0	0	38	83
Kanda	25	11	1	6	1	0	4	0	0	0	23	48
Nihonbashi	6	0	11	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	28
Tsukiji	22	0	1	13	0	7	0	0	18	0	39	61
Kyobashi	25	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	4	30	55
Tsukishima	5	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	10
Atago	50	13	3	8	0	0	10	0	0	0	34	84
Mita	12	8	1	0	6	5	1	2	3	2	28	40
Takanawa	6	7	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	12	23	29
Azabu	15	0	0	0	9	0	25	27	0	2	63	78
Akasaka	13	0	1	0	4	2	6	1	3	1	18	31
Yotsuya	43	1	3	12	7	0	9	19	8	13	72	115
Kagurazaka	18	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	4	11	29
Waseda	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Tomisaka	16	12	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	22	38
Otsuka	12	1	3	7	1	0	5	2	0	3	22	34
Motofuji	5	0	0	0	7	0	3	0	0	4	14	19
Komagome	10	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	22	32
Ueno	111	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	131
Yanaka	15	0	5	0	1	0	5	0	0	2	13	28
Sakamoto	23	0	39	5	1	4	0	0	0	11	60	83
Asakusa	158	28	39	0	0	62	0	0	0	102	231	389
Honjo	40	0	34	22	0	5	12	0	0	27	100	140
Fukagawa	32	6	13	0	7	7	0	0	5	7	45	77
Shinagawa	13	8	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	16	29
Oi	22	0	3	0	0	0	3	4	2	0	12	34
Osaki	15	2	4	2	1	3	2	4	9	11	38	53
Ebara	51	17	13	12	0	6	0	0	0	0	48	99
Omori	13	0	0	0	3	7	0	0	0	0	10	23
Kamata	49	15	9	9	0	0	10	0	0	1	44	93
Higashi-Chofu	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	25	31	46
Setagaya	11	21	0	6	10	0	11	0	3	8	59	70
Seijo	4	0	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	16
Tamagawa	17	0	0	14	0	13	0	0	9	15	51	68
Meguro	19	4	0	7	2	7	0	0	13	4	37	56
Himonya	20	0	36	3	10	0	2	0	8	2	61	81
Shibuya	74	18	45	25	17	6	18	15	10	16	170	244
Harajuku	28	4	4	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	13	41
Yoyogi	24	0	7	2	1	0	0	7	0	2	19	43
Yodobashi	133	0	129	0	63	0	0	0	0	2	194	327
Totsuka	41	0	8	11	0	0	0	0	20	8	47	88
Nakano	96	16	13	27	0	13	0	0	10	48	127	223
Nogata	20	1	2	2	1	0	0	3	2	3	14	34
Suginami	6	0	0	0	0	36	2	7	0	4	49	55
Ogikubo	15	0	0	2	4	0	4	0	0	0	10	25
Daizawa	24	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	3	9	33
Ikebukuro	36	13	3	15	4	2	2	8	6	0	53	89
Mejiro	20	0	0	5	0	0	16	0	4	5	30	50
Takinogawa	14	3	2	19	0	4	0	1	0	0	29	43
Itabashi	34	5	15	9	4	5	3	0	5	19	65	99
Nerima	38	11	14	18	8	0	0	0	0	0	51	89
Shimura	13	7	0	8	1	0	0	4	3	6	29	42
Oji	33	5	10	3	9	4	12	0	0	10	53	86
Akabane	61	23	16	8	7	13	7	0	17	9	100	161
Ogu	8	3	7	8	2	0	0	0	0	1	21	29
Minami-Senju	26	3	5	0	2	9	0	3	0	4	26	52
Senju	17	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	17	9	36	53
Arakawa	12	0	8	0	19	0	33	0	0	3	63	75
Nishi-Arai	67	0	7	2	0	1	3	25	5	0	43	110
Mukojima	51	29	14	40	18	28	15	0	25	24	193	244
Kameari	14	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	15	29
Horden	28	14	0	3	0	0	0	0	37	0	54	82
Joto	43	16	3	10	14	0	7	0	0	15	65	108
Komatsugawa	21	0	7	12	10	0	10	0	3	32	74	85
Koiwa	18	3	4	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	13	31
Suijo	0	0	0	1	0	10	0	1	0	0	12	12
Kuramae*	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
Manseibashi*	-	-	-	-	-	0	1	33	1	4	39	39
Hisamatsu*	-	-	-	-	-	0	4	0	0	9	13	13
Kitazawa**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	5	5	5
Takido**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0
Ikegami**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1	1
Juvenile Sec, MPD	48	13	12	0	11	8	0	0	0	1	45	93
2d Crim Invest Sec, MPD	63	28	0	11	12	21	11	0	0	0	83	146

B. MONTHLY ARRESTS
15 JUN 47 – 31 MAR 49



C. ARRESTS BY OFFENSE, 15 JUN 47 - 31 MAR 49



TOTAL: 5,516 PERSONS ARRESTED

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Kanda	49	15	9	9	0	0	10	0	0	1	44	93
Higashi-Chofu	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	25	31	46
Setagaya	11	21	0	6	10	0	11	0	3	8	59	70
Seijo	4	0	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	16
Tamagawa	17	0	0	14	0	13	0	0	9	15	51	68
Meguro	19	4	0	7	2	7	0	0	13	4	37	56
Hinonya	20	0	36	3	10	0	2	0	8	2	61	81
Shibuya	74	18	45	25	17	6	18	15	10	16	170	244
Harajuku	28	4	4	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	13	41
Yoyogi	24	0	7	2	1	0	0	7	0	2	19	43
Yodobashi	133	0	129	0	63	0	0	0	0	2	194	327
Totsuka	41	0	8	11	0	0	0	0	20	8	47	88
Makano	96	16	13	27	0	13	0	0	10	48	127	223
Nogata	20	1	2	2	1	0	0	3	2	3	14	34
Sugimami	6	0	0	0	0	36	2	7	0	4	49	55
Ogikubo	15	0	0	2	4	0	4	0	0	0	10	25
Jugamo	24	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	3	9	33
Ikebukuro	36	13	3	15	4	2	2	8	6	0	53	89
Mejiro	20	0	0	5	0	0	16	0	4	5	30	50
Takinogawa	14	3	2	19	0	4	0	1	0	0	29	43
Itabashi	34	5	15	9	4	5	3	0	5	19	65	99
Nerima	38	11	14	18	8	0	0	0	0	0	51	89
Shimura	13	7	0	8	1	0	0	4	3	6	29	42
Oji	33	5	10	3	9	4	12	0	0	10	53	86
Akabane	61	23	16	8	7	13	7	0	17	9	100	161
Ogu	8	3	7	8	2	0	0	0	0	1	21	29
Minami-Senju	26	3	5	0	2	9	0	3	0	4	26	52
Senju	17	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	17	9	36	53
Arakawa	12	0	8	0	19	0	33	0	0	3	63	75
Nishi-Arai	67	0	7	8	0	1	3	25	5	0	43	110
Mukojima	51	29	14	40	18	28	15	0	25	24	193	244
Kameari	14	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	15	29
Honden	28	14	0	3	0	0	0	0	37	0	54	82
Joto	43	16	3	10	14	0	7	0	0	15	65	108
Komatsugawa	21	0	7	12	10	0	10	0	3	32	74	85
Koiwa	18	3	4	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	13	31
Suijo	0	0	0	1	0	10	0	1	0	0	12	12
Kuramae*	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
Manseibashi*	-	-	-	-	-	0	1	33	1	4	39	39
Hisamatsu*	-	-	-	-	-	0	4	0	0	9	13	13
Kitazawa**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	5	5	5
Takaido**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0
Ikegami**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1	1
Juvenile Sec, MPD	48	13	12	0	11	8	0	0	0	1	45	93
2d Crim Invest Sec, MPD	63	28	0	11	12	21	11	0	0	0	83	146
TOTAL (TOKYO CITY)	2088	435	579	415	315	295	272	170	277	510	3268	5356
Hachioji***	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fuchu***	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Machida***	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tachikawa***	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Musashino***	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanashi***	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ome***	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Itsukaichi***	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GRAND TOTAL (MPD)	2248	435	579	415	315	295	272	170	277	510	3268	5516

* - New police stations, established 15 Nov 48.
** - New police stations, established 15 Feb 49.
***- Police districts which were removed from jurisdiction of Metropolitan Police Department on effectuation of the Police Law on 7 Mar 48.

C. ARRESTS BY OFFENSE, 15 JUN 47 - 31 MAR 49



TOTAL: 5,516 PERSONS ARRESTED

D. ARRESTS BY OFFENSE, 1 JUL 48 - 31 MAR 49



TOTAL: 3,268 PERSONS ARRESTED

E. KNOWN GANGSTERS ARRESTED JUL 48-MAR 49



SOURCE:
TOKYO METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

PLATE VI

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
25 APR 49

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

POLICE

1. Hoodlum and Gangster Arrests in Tokyo

Police Continue 21-Month Campaign

From 15 Jun 47 to 31 Mar 49 the Tokyo Metropolitan Police arrested 5,516 persons, not all of them known gang members, for typical gangster offenses, such offenses comprising intimidation with demand, intimidation, violence or injury, eating at restaurant or entering theaters or other amusement places without paying, possession of weapons and miscellaneous other offenses. The number of arrests for each of these offenses is shown in Parts C and D of Plate VI, opposite this page. The number of such arrests recorded at each Tokyo police station is shown in Part A of Plate VI.

Of the 5,516 arrests, 2,248 were made between 15 Jun 47 and 30 Jun 48 and the balance, 3,268, were made between 1 Jul 48 and 31 Mar 49. A new method of reporting, begun in Jul 48 by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, shows gang affiliations and police and judicial disposition of the persons arrested. Of the 3,268 persons arrested for these typical gangster offenses during the period 1 Jul 48 - 31 Mar 49, a total of 1,953 (60%) were released by the police or procurators without being accused, while 677 (21%) had been indicted and 636 (19%) were still in detention on 31 Mar 49 awaiting either indictment or release. Of the 677 indicted, 119 had been tried and convicted or fined, and 548 were still awaiting trial. None had been acquitted.

In a separate report on gangster affiliations of the persons arrested, a total of 3,264 arrests were recorded during the period 1 Jul 48 - 31 Mar 49. (The discrepancy of four arrests is not accounted for.) Of these 3,264 persons arrested, only 518 (16%) were known by the police to be members of organized gangs. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 33, par. 10, p. PSD-7.) Part E of Plate VI shows the ratio of Oyabun-Kobun gangster arrests to total arrests.

2. Meeting of Chiefs of Police

Over 1,400 Chiefs Enact Significant Resolutions

Municipal police chiefs from all over Japan met in Tokyo for the first time on 11 Apr 49, representing over 1,400 of the 1,596 autonomous municipal police forces in the nation. They came as members of the All-Japan Municipal Police Chiefs' Association to discuss mutual law enforcement problems and enact resolutions in the interest of better enforcement.

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During the meeting the Chief Police Administrator of the Public Safety Division addressed the assembled chiefs. He advised them to disregard the widespread and current rumor that the municipal police forces will be arbitrarily absorbed by the National Rural Police (i.e., that the police will again be centralized as before effectuation of the Police Law on 7 Mar 48). This rumor has in many municipalities resulted in the slowing down or cessation of activities for police improvement. The Chief Police Administrator assured the police chiefs that the rumor is unfounded and that no municipality will ever be forced to abolish or give up its autonomous police force. He also advised them to try to fill the police training school quotas allotted to them by the National Rural Police, but assured them that it is not mandatory that they fill the quotas.

Before returning to their respective municipalities, the police chiefs passed four significant resolutions:

(1) Pledging to maintain the peace of the nation in cooperation with the National Rural Police.

(2) Requesting that municipal police chiefs be given the

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opportunity to render opinions on future revisions of police law before any revisions are submitted to legislative bodies for enactment.

(3) Requesting the National Government to re-appraise the matter of local autonomy in financial matters because many smaller municipalities are in financial difficulty; (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 39, par. 1c, p. PSD-14, in reference to financial condition of municipalities.)

(4) Pledging to continue the improvement of autonomous police facilities and personnel morale, meanwhile disregarding the false rumor that autonomous police departments are to be arbitrarily centralized under the National Rural Police.

The All-Japan Municipal Police Chiefs' Association comprises six regional and 46 prefectural associations, each of which includes all municipal chiefs of that region or prefecture. The members of each association elect their association officers. The associations are, however, unofficial groups and no association has arbitrary control over any of its members in law enforcement or other police matters; the groups are organized solely to augment law enforcement through mutual discussion, understanding and cooperation.

President of the Association is Tokyo Municipal Police Chief Tanaka Eiichi, while Osaka City Police Chief Suzuki Eiji is Vice-President.

3. Communists Cause 27 Mar and 2 Apr Disorders in Osaka

a. Distortion of Police Actions
b. PSD Investigation Findings
c. Investigation Conclusions
d. The Meaning of the Incident

a. Distortion of Police Actions: The question of police handling of blatant Communist agitation was recently raised in the Communist stronghold of Osaka, where firm action prevented or minimized public disorder. The Communists hurled their standard charges of "police suppression" and a PSD investigator went to the scene to determine what, if any, validity these charges had. The results of the investigation comprise a typical picture of effective Communist propaganda designed to weaken, and if possible, destroy effective police operations. The Communists have cleverly played upon the pre-war reputation of Japanese police brutality to discredit the reforms and reorganization of the police under the Occupation. Should this propaganda campaign succeed, the outlook for law and order in Japan would be bleak indeed.

b. PSD Investigation Findings: Investigation of the 27 Mar and 2

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b. PSD Investigation Findings: Investigation of the 27 Mar and 2 Apr parade disorders in Osaka was begun on 8 Apr by a PSD Police Administrator who had been scheduled before 2 Apr for a police survey in Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe.

Persons interviewed by the PSD Police Administrator included Japanese officials and other Japanese, representing all viewpoints, and various Occupation Forces officers.

The investigation developed the following information and conclusions:

(1) Communist Demonstration on 27 March: A meeting and parade on 27 Mar involved approximately 35,000 persons, some 20,000 of whom violated the provisions of their parade permit and, led by 200 agitators, attempted to march on the Osaka Prefectural Office. Having anticipated this move, Police Chief Suzuki concentrated 2,000 policemen who met and stopped this group (in a zone "off limits" to the paraders; i.e., an area not included in the approved line of march in the parade permit), first separating and arresting the more violent and conspicuous agitators. The paraders then attacked the police with clubs, stones and the staffs to which their parade slogans and banners were attached. The police defended themselves with police batons and, after suffering some casualties and causing more among the paraders, successfully dispersed the group.

The 18 arrested agitators proved to be primarily young Communist

R E S T R I C T E D

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members of the Osaka Metal Industry Workers Union, a branch of the All Japan Metal Industry Workers Union (Kinzoku), which is one of the most strongly Communist-dominated unions in Japan. It should be noted that the police intervened only after the paraders had violated specific laws.

(2) Non-Communist Sponsorship of 2 Apr Parade: The meeting of 10,000 and parade of 6,600 persons on 2 Apr were sponsored by the Osaka Chapter of the Japan Federation of Labor (Sodomei) and participated in mainly by conservative unions; the meeting was closed with an exhortation by Nakabashi Kisaburo, the general leader of the union, in which he requested the group to participate in the parade in an orderly manner, to obey the parade rules, to prevent infiltration of agitators into the parade and to expel anyone from the parade who should violate the parade rules.

Nakabashi made this statement as the result of a written warning from the Osaka Police against any violation of the parade permit specifications, traffic laws or other laws.

(3) Forewarning: Warning that Communists would infiltrate the ranks of the 2 Apr parade and would create disorder at a predetermined place along the line of march caused Police Chief Suzuki to station police reserves near that point. He also requested and received aid from the Osaka Municipal Fire Department, which placed fire engines at his disposal near the threatened point.

(4) First Illegal Action: The first illegal move, zigzagging of the parade column at a run across a major traffic artery, was made by members of the delegation from the Fuso Metal Company, a Sumitomo affiliate. When the police suppressed this illegal action and arrested the instigator, some 20 persons in the preceding Sumitomo Electric Company contingent sat down in the street as a protest against the arrest; they resumed their march when police reserves appeared. Immediately afterward the leading elements of the parade reached the dispersal point specified in the parade permit, but refused in violation of local ordinance to disperse, thus holding up the entire parade. The police, by infiltrating into the parade ranks and separating them, forced this group to disperse.

(5) Further Law Violations: A few minutes after the above incidents, about 50 persons representing the Sakai Manufacturing Company of the Osaka Metal Union began another zigzag march, resisting when the police tried to hold them to one side of the street and incurring several

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the ranks of the 2 Apr parade and would create disorder at a predetermined place along the line of march caused Police Chief Suzuki to station police reserves near that point. He also requested and received aid from the Osaka Municipal Fire Department, which placed fire engines at his disposal near the threatened point.

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(5) Further Law Violations: A few minutes after the above incidents, about 50 persons representing the Sakai Manufacturing Company of the Osaka Metal Union began another zigzag march, resisting when the police tried to hold them to one side of the street and incurring several casualties in the process. In spite of appeals for order by staff members of the Japan Federation of Labor, approximately 150 persons from the delegations of the Kubota Iron Industry Company, Mikunishima Industrial Company and Toyo Machine Company resorted to sitdown tactics in violation of the parade permit, blocking the street and delaying the following elements of the parade, both results being violations of law. They resisted strongly when ordered to resume the march and the police finally employed fire engines, spraying water at very low pressure from self-contained tanks, in order to disperse them without a hand-to-hand engagement. Nine members of this sitdown group were arrested.

Five minutes after these sitdown demonstrators were forced to move on, 50 more persons, again from metal industries company delegations, resorted to the same gesture, sitting down in virtually the same spot as the previous group. These demonstrators refused to move even when sprayed with water and attempted to capture the fire engine; the police arrested nine persons, however, and the remainder resumed the march. The rest of the parade was relatively orderly and the groups dispersed without significant disorder.

The actual disorders involved only a small portion of the estimated

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6,600 paraders.

c. Investigation Conclusions: Photographs and motion pictures of the 2 Apr parade and disorders, together with statements of witnesses and other evidence, indicate the following conclusions:

(1) Communists Behind Disorders: The actual law violations (zigzagging, refusing to move on or to disperse, sitting in street) were instigated and initiated mainly by members of groups representing the various metal industries; these groups had been infiltrated by left-wing agitators from the Osaka Metal Industry Workers Union, which was instrumental in causing and leading the 27 Mar disorder and which is a branch, as stated in subparagraph b(1) above, of the Communist-dominated All Japan Metal Industry Workers Union. These agitators, following a predetermined plan, caused a series of illegal actions, most of them occurring at approximately the same spot in the line of march of the parade. The police, forewarned of the violations, were ready at the chosen spot in sufficient strength to suppress the law violations as they occurred.

The point at issue is not, however, whether the parade was or was not Communist-sponsored or infiltrated, but whether or not the police may employ requisite force to suppress or prevent violations of law, regardless of the identity or affiliations of the law violator.

(2) Minimum Force Used: Trained to control disorders in such emergencies through attendance at emergency control courses prepared and sponsored by the Public Safety Division, the Osaka City Police employed only the minimum force necessary to suppress the law violations. They used no firearms.

Although Chief Suzuki warned the parade sponsor beforehand that he would use his full force if necessary to preserve order, the force had only 7,658 men available for duty on its roster on 2 Apr and Suzuki employed approximately half of them. A considerable portion of this half was held in reserve, however, and did not appear at the scene of the disorders.

Occupation Forces officers were present and witnessed the 2 Apr parade and disorders. They observed the law violations and the fact that the police used a minimum of force.

The police baton was correctly used, as the motion pictures show, to gain the maximum effect with the least possible lasting injury to the law violators; it was employed only in self-defense or when no other action would suppress the law violators. Fire engines were used to spray water at very low pressure on the sitdown violators in order to reduce personal

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The police arrested only the foremost law violators and agitators, who numbered only 19; four of them were released shortly, while the remaining 15 were legally placed in detention during investigation. All 15 were released at noon on 3 Apr after police and procurator had decided that they could legally be released from detention pending possible prosecution.

(3) Attempt to Oust Chief: Since the parade various individuals and groups representing both conservative and radical political parties, labor groups and other influential organizations have pressed for immediate dismissal of Suzuki.

Preliminary action to dismiss Suzuki was initiated by a member of the Osaka Municipal Public Safety Commission who was apparently acting at the order of outside interests. This action was not successful, however, and Chief Suzuki was neither "fired" nor given any hint of such action.

Suzuki did not notify "Occupation authorities in Tokyo" (i.e., the Public Safety Division). He did come to Tokyo in his capacity as Vice President of the All Japan Municipal Police Chiefs Association to preside at the 11 Apr meeting of that association (See par. 2, p. PSD-9.)

R E S T R I C T E D

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and while in Tokyo conferred with members of the Public Safety Division to discuss police and law enforcement matters; however, his visit had no connection with the rumored threat of his dismissal.

Previously, though, a conference called by the Commanding Officer of the Kinki Military Government Region in Osaka on 7 Apr was attended by the Mayor of Osaka, the Chairman of the Osaka Municipal Public Safety Commission, the Governor of Osaka Prefecture, the Police Committee of the Osaka Municipal Assembly and members of the Assembly from the various political parties represented therein. The group discussed the demonstration from all viewpoints and at the conclusion of the meeting all Japanese officials present announced their wholehearted support of Chief Suzuki and the action taken by him on 2 Apr.

d. The Meaning of the Incident:

(1) The Local Scene: Locally the parade disorders of both 27 Mar and 2 Apr were part of an extended Left-Wing campaign to cast discredit upon Chief Suzuki and secure his dismissal. This determination springs partly from the fact that Suzuki has repeatedly and forcefully dealt with those Communist and Communist-dominated leaders and followers detected in actual violation of law.

On the other hand, because Suzuki has employed equal and impartial force against law violators from other groups, including anti-Communist unions, many non-Communist organizations and persons would like to see him removed from office.

This feeling against Suzuki plays into the hands of the Communist elements, who are thus able to place their professional agitators in the ranks of non-Communist organizations, incite disorders and law violations which the police must suppress and let the resulting publicity against Suzuki further the Communist aim of removing him.

(2) The Big Picture: Little imagination is needed to fit the 27 Mar and 2 Apr parade incidents into the world-wide picture of Communist tactics. Communism has continuously and forcefully resorted to every possible means of weakening state security in non-Communist nations. As primary or secondary implements of national security, the police of all such nations have been prime targets of the Communists. As the sole implement of national security in Japan, the police receive the full force of JCP machinations.

4. Crime Statistics, Feb 49

a. Criminal Code Offenses Rise 20 Percent

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4. Crime Statistics, Feb 49

a. Criminal Code Offenses Rise 20 Percent
b. Economic Offenses Jump 41 Percent

a. Criminal Code Offenses Rise 20 Percent: Criminal Code offenses reported in Feb 49 rose to 120,000 from 100,000 in the previous months. This jump is in line with the annual pattern of reported crime and is only slightly larger than corresponding rises for the last two years.

Arrests in February numbered 40,342, an increase of 13,000 from January. The ratio of persons arrested to offenses reported climbed from the abnormal low of 26.7 percent for January to 33.6 percent in February which is very close to the annual percentage for the last two years.

Cases in which arrests were made (i.e., cases cleared) jumped from 35,200 in Jan 49 to 57,800 in February. The ratio of cases cleared to offenses reported was 48.2 percent in February against 35.0 percent for January. The increase brought the ratio nearly to the annual figures for 1947 and 1948.

Part A of Plate IX, opposite p. PSD-14, gives February crime data by prefecture. Part B shows graphically the February prefectural crime (offense) rates and the national rate of 147 offenses reported per 100,000

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population. Part C shows the number of offenses reported and the number cleared annually since 1924 and by month from Jan 47. Part D shows selected offenses reported monthly.

Arrests by nationality for Criminal Code offenses in Feb 49 were as follows: 38,503 Japanese, 1,798 Koreans, 29 Formosans, four Chinese and eight others. Korean arrests were 4.7 percent of the Japanese, a percentage slightly below the average for 1948 and sharply below the 5.5 percent of last month. These percentages indicate, however, a Korean arrest rate much higher than that of the Japanese per unit population.

b. Non-Criminal-Code Offenses Rise 41 Percent: Reported non-Criminal-Code offenses, increased from 80,000 in Jan 49 to 113,000 in Feb 49. This is as sharp a rise as any in the post-war years and may presage a further increase in reported economic offenses. The police record of 101.1 percent of these cases cleared in 1947 (Some occurred in previous year but were not reported then.) and 99.9 percent in 1948 may have inspired public confidence with a resulting increase in reporting.

A National Rural Police report indicates that about 95 percent of the non-Criminal-Code offenses are economic offenses, most of them involving foodstuffs. Only a small part of the economic offenses are reported, of course, but it is possible that the increase in numbers reported may represent an increase in reporting, rather than an increase in offenses.

The arrest percentage (ratio of persons arrested to offenses reported) for non-Criminal-Code offenses in Feb 49 was 93.2, which is lower than usual, but the number of cases cleared was 112,000, or 99.2 percent of the offenses reported and quite normal for these offenses.

Plate X, following Plate IX, shows the offense rates by prefectures for February as well as the national rate of 141 offenses reported per 100,000 population.

5. Japanese Police Strength

a. Police Strength on 1 Apr 49
b. Number of Municipal Police Forces

a. Police Strength on 1 Apr 49: Tabulated in Plate XI, following Plate IX, opposite this page, is Japanese police strength, both authorized and actual, on 1 Apr 49. These figures include both National Rural Police and municipal police with the latter broken down within each prefecture to show the population group of the communities they represent.

On 1 Apr the National Rural Police roster (actual) strength was 99.4 percent of the authorized strength of 30,000. The total municipal

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volving foodstuffs. Only a small part of the economic offenses are reported, of course, but it is possible that the increase in numbers reported may represent an increase in reporting, rather than an increase in offenses.

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On 1 Apr the National Rural Police roster (actual) strength was 99.4 percent of the authorized strength of 30,000. The total municipal police roster strength of 92,473 was 97.3 percent of the authorized strength of 95,000.

Of the total municipal police roster strength of 92,473 on 1 Apr, some 18,822 (20.4%) were distributed in communities of 5,000-30,000 population, 13,646 (14.8%) in cities of 30,000-100,000 population, 7,964 (8.6%) in cities of 100,000-200,000 population, 7,024 (7.6%) in cities of 200,000-500,000 population and 45,017 (48.6%) in the six great cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Yokohama and Kobe.

Also, a total of 116,076 NRP and municipal policemen, or 95.0 percent of the actual strength, were available for duty on 1 Apr, while 5,057 (4.1%) were attending National Rural Police Regional Training Schools or the Police College and 1,158 (0,9%) were not available for duty by reason of serious illness or injury, suspension or other causes.

b. Number of Municipal Police Forces: Although the Police Law of 1947 provided that each urban community of 5,000 or more population should have its own autonomous police force, and although there were 3,741 cities (shi), towns (machi, or cho) and villages (mura) of 5,000 or more population distributed as shown in Part D, Plate IX, according to the

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JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS

(CRIMINAL CODE OFFENSES)

A. PREFECTURAL CRIME STATISTICS

FEBRUARY 1949

PLACE		INCIDENCE		OFFENSE RATES		
MG Regions & Regl Hq	Prefectures	Offenses Reported	Persons Arrested	Jurisdictional Area Of: MG	HQ	MG & HQ
Region I Sapporo	Hokkaido	5,439	2,659	55	184	135
	Miyagi	1,328	483	30	139	83
	Fukushima	1,767	685	63	172	87
Region II Sendai	Iwate	786	365	38	111	61
	Aomori	677	373	19	100	56
	Yamagata	877	332	29	120	65
	Akita	864	570	31	124	67
	Tokyo	16,978	4,663	50	330	313
	Kanagawa	8,007	2,467	44	389	320
	Niigata	1,883	632	31	144	77
	Saitama	2,843	912	83	190	133
Region III Tokyo	Gunma	2,204	705	101	180	137
	Chiba	2,220	887	56	152	104
	Ibaragi	1,449	829	37	144	71
	Tochigi	2,032	753	81	193	130
	Shizuoka	2,484	933	43	151	103
	Yamanashi	804	323	55	179	99
	Nagano	1,690	741	46	151	81
	Osaka	10,686	2,738	84	330	304
	Kyoto	4,616	1,164	59	332	259
	Hyogo	6,821	1,850	67	303	216
	Nara	628	215	40	143	81
	Shiga	572	290	38	105	66
Region IV Osaka	Wakayama	1,284	544	49	230	131
	Aichi	6,684	2,189	89	254	207
	Mie	1,757	410	39	239	121
	Gifu	1,817	576	65	191	119
	Fukui	677	336	38	179	92
	Ishikawa	867	284	24	168	92
	Toyama	692	391	24	117	69
	Hiroshima	2,750	1,072	48	209	134
	Tottori	625	260	53	260	105
	Shimane	432	252	23	107	48
Region V Hiroshima	Okayama	2,232	1,091	63	238	135
	Yamaguchi	2,946	850	78	274	196
	Kagawa	1,116	362	58	203	119
	Ehime	1,717	635	37	223	116
	Tokushima	513	225	37	90	59
	Kochi	1,217	240	60	267	140
	Fukuoka	6,828	1,889	88	275	206
	Saga	852	389	59	141	91
	Nagasaki	1,759	647	55	152	112
	Kumamoto	2,015	921	42	224	113
	Oita	755	327	27	108	61
	Miyazaki	944	314	52	124	90
	Kagoshima	1,801	569	40	166	102
ALL JAPAN		119,935	40,342	51	232	149

B. PREFECTURAL CRIME RATES*

FEBRUARY 1949

NATIONAL RATE, FEB 49: 149



* REPORTED OFFENSES PER 100,000 POPULATION

C. OFFENSES REPORTED AND CLEARED*

1924-1948



D. OFFENSES REPORTED, BY CRIME

JUL 47-FEB 49



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	Gifu	1,817	576	65	191	119
	Fukui	677	336	38	179	92
	Ishikawa	867	284	24	168	92
	Toyama	692	391	24	117	69
	Hiroshima	2,750	1,072	48	209	134
	Tottori	625	260	53	260	105
	Shimane	432	252	23	107	48
Region V Hiroshima	Okayama	2,232	1,091	63	238	135
	Yamaguchi	2,946	850	78	274	196
	Kagawa	1,116	362	58	203	119
	Ehime	1,717	635	37	223	116
	Tokushima	513	225	37	90	59
	Kochi	1,217	240	60	267	140
	Fukuoka	6,828	1,889	88	275	206
	Saga	852	389	59	141	91
	Nagasaki	1,759	647	55	152	112
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



* CLEARED: OFFENSES IN WHICH ARRESTS WERE MADE

D. OFFENSES REPORTED, BY CRIME

JUL 47-FEB 49



RED CURVES - OFFENSES AGAINST PERSON

SOURCE:
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

PLATE IX

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
21 APR 49

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

PREFECTURAL RATES*

(NON-CRIMINAL-CODE OFFENSES**)

FEBRUARY 1949



NATIONAL RATE, FEB 49:
141

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



NATIONAL RATE, FEB 49:
141



LEGEND

	1-40
	41-80
	81-120
	OVER 120

* OFFENSES REPORTED PER 100,000 POPULATION
** OFFENSES AGAINST LAWS OTHER THAN THE CRIMINAL CODE

SOURCE:
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

PLATE X

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC
25 APR 49

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

JAPANESE POLICE STRENGTH

A. AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1 APR 49

PREFECTURE and NRP REGION	NATIONAL RURAL POLICE	MUNICIPAL POLICE: Cities with population of: 5,000-30,000	30,000-100,000	100,000-200,000	200,000-500,000	Over 500,000	Total M P	GRAND TOTAL NRP & MP
NRP Hq (Tokyo)	211	-	-	-	-	-	-	211
NRP Regional Hq	604	-	-	-	-	-	-	604
Reg I (Sapporo)	(96)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(96)
Reg II (Sendai)	(87)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(87)
Reg III (Tokyo)	(121)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(121)
Reg IV (Osaka)	(118)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(118)
Reg V (Hiroshima)	(92)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(92)
Reg VI (Fukuoka)	(90)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(90)
Totals	815							815
Region I Hokkaido	1,199	1,130	506	585	542	-	3,365	4,564
Miyagi	598	430	128	-	428	-	1,386	1,984
Fukushima	880	561	366	-	-	-	927	1,787
Iwate	573	220	145	153	-	-	518	1,091
Region II Aomori	582	136	324	-	-	-	660	1,162
Yamagata	580	198	215	142	-	-	695	1,275
Akita	505	140	66	212	-	-	678	1,183
Tokyo	1,688	573	382	-	24,588	25,543	26,231	
Kanagawa	990	318	680	-	1,149	3,532	5,459	6,049
Niigata	992	685	290	-	367	-	1,342	2,334
Saitama	833	689	290	347	-	-	1,326	2,159
Gunma	625	611	321	-	-	-	932	1,557
Region III Chiba	743	685	538	166	-	-	1,391	2,134
Ibaragi	894	599	222	-	-	-	781	1,675
Tochigi	614	513	247	130	-	-	890	1,504
Shizuoka	741	650	597	203	363	-	1,813	2,554
Yamanashi	417	219	-	143	-	-	362	779
Nagano	962	444	480	-	-	-	924	1,886
Osaka	530	541	859	593	-	8,600	10,593	12,123
Kyoto	526	158	287	-	-	3,557	4,002	4,528
Hyogo	1,166	713	403	171	761	2,511	4,559	5,725
Nara	396	242	153	-	-	-	395	791
Shiga	401	215	250	-	-	-	465	866
Region IV Wakayama	433	216	165	337	-	3,996	5,393	6,323
Aichi	930	979	588	230	-	-	808	1,453
Mie	645	181	459	168	-	-	896	1,530
Gifu	624	393	305	296	-	-	434	821
Fukui	387	184	250	-	-	518	788	1,195
Ishikawa	497	122	148	-	474	-	744	1,241
Toyama	453	280	-	474	387	578	1,719	2,445
Hiroshima	718	575	258	387	-	-	270	625
Tottori	355	66	204	-	-	-	378	846
Shimane	468	257	221	-	-	-	1,012	1,736
Okayama	666	422	268	402	-	-	1,379	2,033
Region V Yamaguchi	654	187	696	496	-	-	528	929
Kagawa	411	251	115	152	-	-	893	1,452
Ehime	599	271	328	254	-	-	471	884
Tokushima	413	297	56	158	-	-	559	972
Kochi	439	283	-	273	-	-	1,283	4,331
Fukuoka	3,048	725	653	1,065	912	-	590	968
Saga	431	255	195	-	-	-	1,510	2,130
Nagasaki	600	457	278	392	413	-	1,077	1,773
Region VI Kumamoto	698	366	196	-	515	-	672	1,171
Oita	499	231	441	-	-	-	795	1,237
Miyazaki	462	402	293	-	-	-	1,635	1,727
Kagoshima	632	280	146	284	-	-	1,635	2,267
Totals	29,185	19,228	13,947	8,195	7,246	46,384	95,000	124,185
GRAND TOTALS	30,000	19,228	13,947	8,195	7,246	46,384	95,000	125,000

B. ACTUAL STRENGTH, 1 APR 49

PREFECTURE and NRP REGION	NATIONAL RURAL POLICE	MUNICIPAL POLICE: Cities with population of: 5,000-30,000	30,000-100,000	100,000-200,000	200,000-500,000	Over 500,000	Total M P	GRAND TOTAL NRP & MP
NRP Hq (Tokyo)	209	-	-	-	-	-	-	209
NRP Regional Hq	586	-	-	-	-	-	-	586
Reg I (Sapporo)	(93)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(93)
Reg II (Sendai)	(85)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(85)
Reg III (Tokyo)	(118)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(118)
Reg IV (Osaka)	(111)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(111)
Reg V (Hiroshima)	(90)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(90)
Reg VI (Fukuoka)	(89)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(89)
Totals	795							795
Region I Hokkaido	1,167	1,130	505	575	88	-	1,773	2,940
Miyagi	596	430	134	-	700	-	1,264	1,860
Fukushima	850	552	355	-	-	-	907	1,757
Iwate	561	214	139	151	-	-	504	1,065
Region II Aomori	522	324	314	-	-	-	638	1,160
Yamagata	577	324	215	128	-	-	667	1,244
Akita	503	323	96	230	-	-	667	1,170
Tokyo	1,707	860	360	-	-	24,322	25,542	27,249
Kanagawa	575	314	454	-	1,116	3,318	5,202	5,777
Niigata	971	648	281	-	354	-	1,284	2,255
Saitama	820	667	373	319	-	-	1,359	2,079
Gunma	624	396	504	-	-	-	900	1,524
Region III Chiba	751	640	533	166	-	-	1,379	2,130
Ibaragi	898	551	321	-	-	-	772	1,670
Tochigi	613	513	247	130	-	-	890	1,503
Shizuoka	729	621	574	191	335	-	1,721	2,450
Yamanashi	416	212	-	143	-	-	355	771
Nagano	962	437	466	-	-	-	903	1,865
Osaka	633	533	851	354	-	7,908	9,646	10,279
Kyoto	525	151	286	-	-	3,360	3,797	4,322
Hyogo	1,165	708	402	174	764	2,440	4,488	5,653
Nara	401	235	149	-	-	-	384	785
Shiga	397	210	248	-	-	-	458	855
Region IV Wakayama	451	218	160	315	-	-	693	1,144
Aichi	931	954	578	230	-	3,469	5,231	6,162
Mie	637	180	448	165	-	-	793	1,430
Gifu	600	387	201	287	-	-	875	1,475
Fukui	387	176	231	-	-	-	407	794
Ishikawa	406	121	147	-	494	-	762	1,168
Toyama	388	206	-	452	-	-	708	1,096
Hiroshima	721	575	284	387	374	-	1,721	2,442
Tottori	354	64	200	-	-	-	264	618
Shimane	467	155	208	-	-	-	363	830
Okayama	666	388	226	392	-	-	1,006	1,672
Region V Yamaguchi	653	186	685	479	-	-	1,350	2,003
Kagawa	403	243	114	152	-	-	508	911
Ehime	398	268	323	249	-	-	840	1,438
Tokushima	411	250	53	156	-	-	459	870
Kochi	439	279	-	273	-	-	552	991
Fukuoka	923	780	651	1,042	883	-	3,356	4,279
Saga	431	347	291	-	-	-	638	969
Nagasaki	600	434	261	383	412	-	1,470	2,070
Region VI Kumamoto	689	347	193	-	511	-	1,051	1,740
Oita	499	228	438	-	-	-	666	1,165
Miyazaki	439	396	386	-	-	-	782	1,221
Kagoshima	803	650	496	243	-	-	1,389	2,192
Totals	29,023	18,822	13,646	7,964	7,024	45,017	92,473	121,496
GRAND TOTALS	29,618	18,822	13,646	7,964	7,024	45,017	92,473	122,291

C. NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES, 1 APR 49

PREFECTURE	NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES: Shi, machi and mura with population of:	
		Total

D. NUMBER OF SHI, MACHI AND MURA OF OVER 5,000 POPULATION, 1 AUG 48

PREFECTURE	SHI, MACHI AND MURA WITH POPULATION OF:					TOTAL
	5,000-30,000	30,000-100,000	100,000-200,000	200,000-500,000	Over 500,000	

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	Miyagi	1,164							
	Akita	396							
	Shiga	401							
Region IV	Nakagawa	433							
	Aichi	930							
	Mie	645							
	Gifu	616							
	Fukui	387							
	Ishikawa	407							
	Toyama	453							
	Hiroshima	718							
	Tottori	355							
	Shimane	468							
Region V	Okayama	666							
	Yamaguchi	654							
	Kagawa	411							
	Ehime	599							
	Tokushima	413							
	Kochi	438							
	Fukuoka	838							
	Saga	431							
	Nagasaki	600							
Region VI	Kumamoto	698							
	Oita	499							
	Miyazaki	462							
	Kagoshima	635							
Totals		29,189	19,228	13,947	8,195	7,266	46,384	95,000	124,189
GRAND TOTALS		30,000	19,228	13,947	8,195	7,266	46,384	95,000	125,000

	Nara	401							
	Shiga	397							
Region IV	Nakagawa	481							
	Aichi	931							
	Mie	637							
	Gifu	600							
	Fukui	387							
	Ishikawa	406							
	Toyama	466							
	Hiroshima	722							
	Tottori	354							
	Shimane	467							
	Okayama	666							
Region V	Yamaguchi	653							
	Kagawa	403							
	Ehime	598							
	Tokushima	411							
	Kochi	438							
	Fukuoka	923							
	Saga	431							
	Nagasaki	600							
	Kumamoto	689							
	Oita	499							
	Miyazaki	439							
	Kagoshima	653							
Totals		29,029	18,822	13,646	7,964	7,024	45,017	92,473	122,291
GRAND TOTALS		29,458	18,822	13,646	7,964	7,024	45,017	92,473	122,291

C. NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES, 1 APR 49

PREFECTURE	NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES: Shi, machi and mura with population of: 5,000-30,000	30,000-100,000	100,000-200,000	200,000-500,000	Over 500,000	Total
Hokkaido	65	8	3	2	-	88
Aomori	31	3	-	-	-	34
Iwate	20	3	1	-	-	24
Miyagi	37	2	-	1	-	40
Akita	34	1	1	-	-	36
Yamagata	26	3	1	-	-	30
Fukushima	46	4	-	-	-	50
Ibaragi	39	3	-	-	-	42
Tochigi	36	4	1	-	-	41
Gunma	35	5	-	-	-	40
Saitama	43	3	2	-	-	48
Chiba	35	6	1	-	-	42
Tokyo	19	3	-	-	1	23
Kanagawa	20	5	-	2	1	28
Niigata	49	5	-	1	-	55
Yamanashi	20	-	1	-	-	21
Nagano	31	6	-	-	-	37
Shizuoka	30	3	1	1	-	35
Toyama	19	-	2	-	-	21
Ishikawa	12	2	-	1	-	15
Fukui	15	3	-	-	-	18
Gifu	38	3	1	-	1	43
Aichi	55	8	1	-	1	65
Mie	19	6	1	-	-	25
Shiga	20	3	-	-	-	23
Kyoto	14	2	-	-	1	17
Osaka	42	12	2	-	1	57
Hyogo	48	5	1	2	1	57
Nara	17	2	-	-	-	19
Wakayama	19	3	1	-	-	23
Tottori	3	2	-	-	-	5
Shimane	14	3	-	-	-	17
Okayama	33	4	1	-	-	38
Hiroshima	49	3	1	1	-	54
Yamaguchi	14	8	2	-	-	24
Tokushima	26	1	1	-	-	28
Kagawa	23	2	1	-	-	26
Ehime	23	5	1	-	-	29
Kochi	19	-	1	-	-	20
Fukuoka	42	6	4	1	-	53
Saga	21	2	-	-	-	23
Nagasaki	33	3	1	1	-	38
Kumamoto	32	3	-	1	-	36
Oita	14	5	-	-	-	19
Miyazaki	20	3	-	-	-	23
Kagoshima	27	2	1	-	-	30
Totals	1,307	174	35	14	6	1,536

D. NUMBER OF SHI, MACHI AND MURA OF OVER 5,000 POPULATION, 1 AUG 48

PREFECTURE	SHI, MACHI AND MURA WITH POPULATION OF: 5,000-30,000	30,000-100,000	100,000-200,000	200,000-500,000	Over 500,000	TOTAL
Hokkaido	200	16	3	2	-	221
Aomori	88	3	-	-	-	91
Iwate	79	2	1	-	-	82
Miyagi	106	3	-	1	-	110
Akita	68	3	1	-	-	72
Yamagata	86	3	1	-	-	90
Fukushima	111	3	-	-	-	114
Ibaragi	123	5	-	-	-	128
Tochigi	133	2	1	-	-	136
Gunma	109	5	-	-	-	114
Saitama	100	7	2	-	-	109
Chiba	126	6	1	-	-	133
Tokyo	46	5	-	-	1	52
Kanagawa	37	6	-	2	1	46
Niigata	153	6	-	1	-	160
Yamanashi	39	-	1	-	-	40
Nagano	106	6	-	-	-	112
Shizuoka	127	5	1	1	-	134
Toyama	27	-	2	-	-	29
Ishikawa	33	2	-	1	-	36
Fukui	22	3	-	-	-	25
Gifu	65	3	1	-	-	69
Aichi	137	12	1	-	1	151
Mie	34	6	1	-	-	41
Shiga	37	3	-	-	-	40
Kyoto	21	2	-	-	1	24
Osaka	64	13	2	-	1	80
Hyogo	110	4	1	2	1	118
Nara	38	2	-	-	-	40
Wakayama	33	3	1	-	-	37
Tottori	11	2	-	-	-	13
Shimane	20	3	-	-	-	23
Okayama	33	4	1	-	-	38
Hiroshima	73	3	1	1	-	80
Yamaguchi	48	8	2	-	-	58
Tokushima	71	3	1	-	-	75
Kagawa	49	2	1	-	-	52
Ehime	72	5	1	-	-	78
Kochi	45	-	1	-	-	46
Fukuoka	108	13	4	1	-	126
Saga	79	2	-	-	-	81
Nagasaki	92	3	1	1	-	97
Kumamoto	82	4	-	1	-	87
Oita	66	5	-	-	-	69
Miyazaki	67	4	-	-	-	71
Kagoshima	120	7	1	-	-	128
Total	3,474	212	35	14	6	3,741 Grand Total

SOURCE:
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
5 MAY 49

PLATE XI

JAPANESE PRISON STATISTICS

A. PRISON POPULATION COMPONENTS



B. ADMISSIONS, SENTENCED PRISONERS



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

B. ADMISSIONS, SENTENCED PRISONERS



C. RELEASES, PAROLE AND EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE



SOURCE:
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

PREPARED BY: PSD, G-2, FEC.
21 APR 49

PLATE XII

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Resident Population Census of 1 Aug 48, the actual number of autonomous municipal police forces on 1 Apr 49 was only 1,596, distributed as shown in Part C of Plate XI.

The reasons for this apparent discrepancy are twofold:

(1) There is no unincorporated land in Japan; all land area falls within the boundaries of some city, town or village (mura). The mura, which is the lowest political entity, usually consists of a considerable area of cultivated land, or other land where houses are dispersed, and at least one small hamlet with houses close together. In order to qualify for an autonomous police force, the mura must include such a community center and that center must have at least 60 percent of its lots occupied by houses or buildings and, in addition, must possess some of the following: (a) Intersecting streets in addition to the central road, (b) parks, (c) a theatre, (d) a post office, (e) a library, (f) a railway station, (g) any other public structure and (h) business houses. In short, the community center must present a somewhat urban appearance.

(2) The second reason why the number of municipal police forces falls short of the number of shi, machi and mura of 5,000 or more population is that communities with no distance or open spaces between their urban centers have in several instances combined their police forces in the interest of economy and police efficiency.

6. May Day Proves Orderly

Crowds Smaller Than In Previous Years

May Day 1949 in Japan brought with it the labor meetings which have been seen in the past three years, but, while there were the usual speeches, parades and singing, the crowds appeared much smaller than in 1946, 1947 or 1948 and were much more orderly and quiet than in the past. The tenor of the sponsorship of the gatherings was distinctly Communist, and members of the Soviet Mission to Japan were in evidence at the Tokyo meeting, however, they appeared to be taking little or no verbal part in the proceedings.

Although PSD representatives observed the May Day gathering and subsequent five-branched parade in Tokyo, not a single instance of disorder was seen or reported. The police throughout Japan were alerted for possible violence but did not show their strength; in Tokyo the only sign of added police duty was the few additional traffic policemen placed along the parade lines to guide the marchers along the prescribed routes and to guide traffic around the parades. Hardly any spectators

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forces in the interest of economy and police efficiency.

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Although PSD representatives observed the May Day gathering and subsequent five-branched parade in Tokyo, not a single instance of disorder was seen or reported. The police throughout Japan were alerted for possible violence but did not show their strength; in Tokyo the only sign of added police duty was the few additional traffic policemen placed along the parade lines to guide the marchers along the prescribed routes and to guide traffic around the parades. Hardly any spectators lined the parade routes in Tokyo on the chill, overcast day. A PSD Police Administrator who observed the gathering and parade in Osaka reported no disorder there.

No reports of May Day disorder or violence involving the police have been received from other areas or cities of Japan.

R E S T R I C T E D

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PRISON

1. Prison Statistics, Mar'49

Downward Population Trend Halted
a. Increase in New Admissions
b. Slight Increase in Discharges
c. Paroles Sharply Higher
d. Convicted Population Drops
e. Persons Awaiting Trial Increase
f. Rates of Admission and Release
g. Deaths and Escapes
h. Total Prison Population

a. Increase in New Admissions: Some 3,912 newly sentenced prisoners were admitted to prisons in Mar 49, an increase of 600 over February admissions and nearly 300 over January. But the total of 10,865 admissions this year is nearly one-third below the 15,200 for the first quarter of 1948.

b. Slight Increase in Discharges: Discharges by expiration of sentence numbered 807 in March, an increase of 76 over February. Total discharges for the first quarter of 1949 were 2,356, a little higher than the 2,202 reported for the same period of last year.

c. Paroles Sharply Higher: In part reflecting American tendencies in prison work, paroles from Japanese prisons have consistently increased. Paroles for March totaled 3,839, and for the quarter, 9,050, an increase of 40 percent over the 6,561 of the first quarter of 1948.

d. Convicted Population Drops: At the end of March adult convicted prisoners in Japanese prisons totaled 72,993 and juveniles, 2,830. The total convicted prison population of 75,823 was 886 less than that of February.

e. Persons Awaiting Trial Increase: Persons awaiting trial in prisons increased in March to 13,457, up 1,610 from February. The number in this category will probably increase for the next few months.

f. Rates of Admission and Release: Rates of admission and release were incorporated as a new feature in CIS Periodical Summary No. 39. Table A gives them for March.

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[illegible] numbered 807 in March, an increase of 78 over February. Total discharges for the first quarter of 1949 were 2,356, a little higher than the 2,202 reported for the same period of last year.

c. Paroles Sharply Higher: In part reflecting American tendencies in prison work, paroles from Japanese prisons have consistently increased. Paroles for March totaled 3,839, and for the quarter, 9,050, an increase of 40 percent over the 6,561 of the first quarter of 1948.

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f. Rates of Admission and Release: Rates of admission and release were incorporated as a new feature in CIS Periodical Summary No. 39. Table A gives them for March.

TABLE A RATES OF ADMISSION AND RELEASE, MAR 49

	March			Monthly Average, Jan-Mar 49		
	Persons	Population Rates*	Prison Rates**	Persons	Population Rates*	Prison Rates**
ADMITTED						
By Sentence	3,912	4.81	5.08	3,622	4.46	4.70
RELEASED						
Expiration***	807	0.99	1.04	785	0.97	1.02
Parole	3,829	4.73	4.99	3,017	3.72	3.92

* - Population Rate: The number of persons admitted and released per 100,000 national population, based on ESS estimate of 81,192,000, 1 Jan 49.

** - Prison Rate: The number of persons admitted and released per 100 convicted prisoners based on convicted population of 77,003 on 1 Jan 49.

*** - Expiration (completion) of sentence.

R E S T R I C T E D

g. Deaths and Escapes: With only 49 deaths, the March death rate of 0.543 per thousand inmates per month is one of the lowest for the Occupation period. Escapes also dropped in number in March with only 17 escape cases involving 18 prisoners, five of whom were recaptured. These escapes include not only those within the walls but also those on outside work and those in transit. This is the lowest number of escapes in one month for more than three years.

h. Total Prison Population: The increase in admission of newly sentenced convicts was more than balanced by the increase in discharges through expiration of sentence and parole. This increase in discharges accounts for the drop in the total convicted population between February and March. The increase of over 1,600 in persons awaiting trial, however, resulted in a net increase of 803 in the total prison population. This rise marked the end of a six-month period of decreasing prison population.

The prison population is now 166 percent of the total rated prison capacity. The population has been much more than 166 percent at times during the Occupation, but Japanese prison officials have been working to increase prison capacity. The increase in capacity within the last year has been enough to house 4,700 prisoners, a 9.2 percent rise. Capacity is determined on the basis of 0.75 tsubo (26.7 sq.ft.) of cell floor area per prisoner as a standard.

2. National Training School Courses

a. In-Service Training for Parole Clerks
b. Refresher Course for Social Workers

a. In-Service Training for Parole Clerks: A combination orientation and in-service training course marked the inauguration of training for prison parole clerks at the National Correctional Officials' Training School of the Attorney-General's Office. The 10-day course enrolled 75 persons and was designed both for training the personnel in this new work and as an experimental preview of future similar ones.

The course followed the basic theory that the work of parole clerks is a bridge between prison officials and administrators on the one hand and the psychologists, psychiatrists and parole personnel on the other. The findings of classification experts must be recorded both clearly and simply for the guidance of parole and prison officials.

The techniques of recording and collating reports were also studied in the course. The 10-day course ended on 23 Apr 49.

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floor area per prisoner as a standard.

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a. In-Service Training for Parole Clerks
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The course followed the basic theory that the work of parole clerks is a bridge between prison officials and administrators on the one hand and the psychologists, psychiatrists and parole personnel on the other. The findings of classification experts must be recorded both clearly and simply for the guidance of parole and prison officials.

The techniques of recording and collating reports were also studied in the course. The 10-day course ended on 23 Apr 49.

b. Refresher Course for Social Workers: A five-day refresher course for social workers was presented at the National Correctional Officials' Training School during the week beginning 25 Apr. Fifty persons were enrolled in this continuation of the first course, which was given last August.

Three universities co-operated in preparing the first course, which enrolled 125 persons. In the original course an introductory study of social work terminology was followed by a series of lectures defining various fields of penal social work.

In the refresher course these fields were further differentiated and the basic principles of work relating to each field were set forth and illustrated.

3. Prison Classification System

a. Retraction of Old Rule and Substitution of New
b. Objectives and Methods
c. Types and Times and System of Classification

a. Retraction of the Old Rule and Substitution of New: Effective 1 Jan 49, the Attorney General retracted the "Compendium of Prison Inmates

R E S T R I C T E D

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Investigation Rule" issued by the Penal Administration Bureau of the Justice Ministry in 1944. This action was taken to make way for a new order which had been developed in cooperation with Prison Branch, PSD through continuous mutual effort since Feb 47.

Replacing the retracted order is "A Compendium of Prisoners Classification Rule, CARGAB No. 1778," issued in Jan 49. This new order directs that a scientific classification of prisoners shall be made at stated periods.

b. Objectives and Methods: The object of the new order is to set up a scientific classification system that will help establish the most appropriate policy of treatment and training of each individual prisoner, which policy will in turn better prepare him for successful rehabilitation and thus serve the social welfare of Japan.

Classification will be planned so that its results may be used not only in the rehabilitative treatment of the inmates but also as a factor in the parole decision and post-release protection. This aim implies, as stated in the order, that a report shall be prepared for each individual prisoner. All available knowledge of medical science, psychology, psychiatry and modern penology will be brought to bear on each case, although professionally qualified advisers in these fields are as yet relatively few in Japan.

Certain major considerations will determine the type of classification. The first of these is public safety, or classification for security to the public, based on the characteristics of the offender's acts, his delinquency record and his criminal record.

Another consideration is education, or classification on the basis of the offender's previous training and investigation of environmental factors in his life.

A third consideration is protection for the family of the prisoner, watching their conditions of living and their social relationships.

A fourth consideration is work, or classification according to training and vocational experience of the prisoners.

The last of these considerations is health, or classification in regard to physical and mental conditions; necessary medical treatment shall be determined, and the extent and kind of prison labor decided after consideration of physical and mental habits and the psychiatric evaluation of the inmate.

These and other factors will be studied by the staff conference which is empowered to make disposition and final classification. Naturally all available records will be used in the classification.

c. Types and Times and System of Classification: Admission classifications shall as a rule be made within 15 days of the prisoner's ad-

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relatively few in Japan.

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These and other factors will be studied by the staff conference which is empowered to make disposition and final classification. Naturally all available records will be used in the classification.

c. Types and Times and System of Classification: Admission classifications shall as a rule be made within 15 days of the prisoner's admission to the institution. Reclassification shall normally be made every two months after the admission classification in the case of a prisoner whose term is less than eight months, and every six months for any other prisoner.

The order provides for a Classification Center in each Correction and Rehabilitation District and a Classification Committee in each prison. The center is to be composed of the Supervisor of the Correction and Rehabilitation District, the Classification Specialists and the personnel of the administrative units. The Classification Committee in a prison will be composed of the warden, deputy warden, Classification Section Chief and the Chief Field Workers.

RESTRICTED

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FIRE

1. Fire Statistics, Feb 49

February Fire Losses Skyrocket
a. Number of Fires
b. Monetary Losses
c. Casualties
d. Area Losses
e. Graphics

a. Number of Fires: Fires reported for Feb 49 numbered 1,693, down 176 from the January figure. The decrease in February is not according to pattern, as usually the number in February is somewhat higher than the January total.

b. Monetary Losses: Monetary losses in February were the highest in Japanese history, as far as can be determined. The enormous total of ¥5.836 billion was due to three huge fires. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 39, par. 2, p. PSD-23.) The fire in Noshiro, Akita Prefecture, caused a loss of over ¥3 billion. The other two, at Akashi, Hyogo Prefecture, and Kodachi in Yamanashi Prefecture, each caused damage to nearly ¥400 million.

c. Casualties: The 46 deaths represent a decrease of nine from January. Injuries totaled 1,105, a figure clearly due to the three huge fires mentioned above. This total is a record monthly high for injuries caused by fires during the period of the Occupation.

d. Area Losses: Land area burned over in Feb 49 totaled 2,970 acres (3,636,216 tsubo) or exactly half of the land area loss for the previous month.

Building fires in February came to 1,485, a proportional decrease from the 1,614 of January. Structural area losses in February amounted to 7.5 million square feet, an average of 5,028 square feet per building fire and an average due mainly to the three big fires mentioned above.

e. Graphics: February prefectural fire data appear in Part A, Plate XIII, opposite p. PSD-20. Part B shows the monetary loss rates by prefecture. The national rate of nearly ¥75,000 per 1,000 inhabitants in February was a tremendous increase from the ¥17,852 of Jan 49; however, this increase was also caused mainly by the three big fires in February

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and Kodachi in Yamanashi Prefecture, each caused [illegible] million.

c. Casualties: The 46 deaths represent a decrease of nine from January. Injuries totaled 1,105, a figure clearly due to the three huge fires mentioned above. This total is a record monthly high for injuries caused by fires during the period of the Occupation.

d. Area Losses: Land area burned over in Feb 49 totaled 2,970 acres (3,636,216 tsubo) or exactly half of the land area loss for the previous month.

Building fires in February came to 1,485, a proportional decrease from the 1,614 of January. Structural area losses in February amounted to 7.5 million square feet, an average of 5,028 square feet per building fire and an average due mainly to the three big fires mentioned above.

e. Graphics: February prefectural fire data appear in Part A, Plate XIII, opposite p. PSD-20. Part B shows the monetary loss rates by prefecture. The national rate of nearly ¥75,000 per 1,000 inhabitants in February was a tremendous increase from the ¥17,852 of Jan 49; however, this increase was also caused mainly by the three big fires in February and does not indicate a trend.

Akita Prefecture led with a rate of ¥2,440,000 per 1,000 population; Yamanashi was second with ¥508,000, followed by Nagasaki with ¥271,000, Tochigi with ¥138,000 and Hyogo with ¥104,000.

2. ¥20 Million Fire in Film Company Laboratory

a. Place and Fire
b. The Lessons

a. Place and Fire: The Konishi-Roku Film Company occupies a large group of buildings in Hino for the manufacture of nitrated film. Hino is a town of 17,500 population lying between Tachikawa and Hachioji in Tokyo Prefecture.

In the evening of 10 Apr 49 a chemical engineer was working on the second floor of a two-story laboratory building. Leaving a bunsen burner turned on, he went across the corridor to a dark room about 2030 hours and, upon returning to the laboratory a few minutes later, found the room full of smoke. He ran down to the guard post located about 200 meters

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