

Witness Short

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and that the American Government had, and believed, reports

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that --

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"* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American

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Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to

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the President or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any

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effect on the general situation."

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If this information is connected up with the knowledge

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gained of the definite Japanese intention to expand southward,

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it is clear that the War and Navy Departments must have known

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that war was a certainty, and that they, with this exclusive

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intelligence, wanted to make the estimate and decision as to

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American military defensive action. This explains their care

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in ordering me not to disclose intent, alarm the population,

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or do anything which Japan could use as propaganda that the

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United States had provoked war.

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Nov. 20 Ultimatum. I had not been told, but Washington

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knew, that the Secretary of State regarded the November 20,

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1941 Japanese proposal as an ultimatum⁶⁹ and that from then

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on it was merely a question of trying to stall off the final

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break as long as possible and, quoting Secretary Hull, "in

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the hope that somewhere even then something might develop sud-

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denly and out of the sky."⁷⁰

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Deadlines. I did not know, but the War Department knew

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69 - Testimony of Mr. Hull, Joint Committee Daily Record,
Nov. 23, 1945, vol. 7, pages 1136, 1181.

70 - Testimony of Mr. Hull, Joint Committee Daily Record,
Nov. 23, 1945, vol. 7, page 1195.

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2 that the Japanese had set a deadline after which their armed
3 forces would move. On November 26 a translation of intercept
4 No. 188, on page 174 of Exhibit No. 1, disclosed that --

5 ** * * our forces shall be able to move within the
6 day"

7 in the event that the U.S.-Japanese negotiations were not
8 successfully terminated by 25 November 1941. The first Navy
9 translation which told of the November 25 deadline was made
10 as early as 5 November 1941.⁷¹

11 On 17 November, an intercept was deciphered which included
12 this sentence:

13 "I set the deadline for the solution of these
14 negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change."⁷²

15 On 22 November, a translation of a 19 November intercept
16 showed that Kurusu and Nomura still regarded the 25 November
17 deadline as "an absolutely unalterable one."⁷³ This message
18 also contained considerable discussion about evacuation of
19 government officials and their wives. The 25 November dead-
20 line was then extended to 29 November, by an intercept of 22
21 November, translated the same day. But the Tokyo Government

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23 71 - See #736, Committee Exhibit No. 1, page 100

24 72 - Intercept 16 Nov 1941, pages 137-138, Comm. Ex. No. 1.

25 73 - Intercept #1140, 19 Nov., page 159, Comm. Ex. No. 1.

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2 became more emphatic, saying:

3 "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely
4 cannot be changed. After that things are automatically
5 going to happen." ⁷⁴

6 On the 28th of November it was learned in Washington that
7 in two or three days a report would be sent from Tokyo in
8 answer to the "humiliating" American proposal after which --

9 " * * * the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." ⁷⁵

10 This same intercept, moreover, showed a design to hide the
11 fact that negotiations were broken off.

12 Code Destruction. Another thing I did not know is the
13 fact that the Japanese were under orders to destroy their
14 codes and code machines. The War Department knew of this code
15 destruction as early as 1 December 1941 and knew specifically
16 of the orders to destroy the codes in the United States on 3
17 December 1941. ⁷⁶ I should certainly have been told of this
18 intelligence. The following testimony of General Miles makes
19 it plain why the Japanese messages ordering the destruction
20 of their codes did not reach the Commanding General in Hawaii:

21 _____
22 74 - Intercept #812, 22 Nov., page 165, Comm. Ex. No. 1.

23 75 - Intercept #844, 28 Nov., page 195, Comm. Ex. No. 1.

24 76 - Intercepts #2436, 2444, 2443, 867, pages 208, 209, 215,
25 Comm. Ex. No. 1.

Witness Short

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"Mr. Gesell: The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

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"General Miles: No, sir.

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"Mr. Gesell: What is the explanation of that?

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"General Miles: The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

"Mr. Gesell: It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

"General Miles: That is true, sir.

"Mr. Gesell: And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes as we have seen, was it not?

"General Miles: That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

"Mr. Gesell: Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities

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at Pearl Harbor?

"General Miles: Any instruction to the Navy?

"Mr. Gesell: To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them?

"General Miles: No, sir, that was not considered necessary."⁷⁷

Ships in Harbor Report. While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington knew of this Japanese espionage.⁷⁸ This message, analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.⁷⁹

77 - Daily Record, Vol. 13, pages 2220-2222

78 - Army Intercept No. 23260, 24 Sept. 1941, page 12, Comm.

Ex. No. 2

79 - Daily Record, vol. 12, page 2101.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Winds Code. I was not informed, but the War Department knew, of the so-called "Winds" code or of the fact that the so-called implementing message had been received, definitely confirming the fact that diplomatic relations would be severed between Japan and the United States.⁸⁰

Hull's "Ultimatum" to Japan. I was not informed of Secretary Hull's note of November 26th, proposing a ten-point plan which the Japanese considered an ultimatum.⁸¹

War Considered Inevitable. I did not know that sometime in the fall of 1941 the Chief of Staff had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.⁸²

Jap Reply - 13 Parts. Critical information (the first 13 parts of the long Japanese memorandum) finally terminating relations with the United States was received in the War Department by 9:00 P.M. on December 6. The so-called "pilot" message from Tokyo to Washington December 6, 1941, No. 901,⁸³ had been received in the War Department sometime during the

80 - Intercepts #2353, 2354, 19 Nov., Comm. Ex. No. 1, pages 154, 155; Test. of Capt. Safford, USN, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Tr., Vol. C, pages 126-135, 152-157, 173.

81 - Hull's Note, 26 Nov. 1941, Joint Comm. Ex. No. 1, Intercept No. 1189, pages 181-182.

82 - See Army Pearl Harbor Board, vol. A, page 40.

83 - Exhibit 1, page 238.

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2 afternoon of December 6. This message stated definitely that
3 the long Japanese memorandum would be sent as message No. 902
4 and would be presented to the Americans as soon as instruc-
5 tions were sent.

6 Part 14, Jap Reply. The 14th part of the long memorandum
7 and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador
8 to deliver the long memorandum at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th were
9 in the hands of the War Department between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M.
10 December 7th.⁸⁴ This message indicated a definite break of
11 relations at 1:00 P.M., and pointed directly to an attack on
12 Hawaii at dawn. Had this vital information been communicated
13 to Hawaii by the fastest possible means, we would have had
14 more than four hours to make preparations to meet the attack
15 which was more than enough for completing Army preparations.
16 The Navy might have had time to get all ships out of the har-
17 bor.

18 Delay of Dec. 7 Message. Not until seven hours after the
19 attack was I informed that the Japanese Ambassador had been
20 directed to deliver the 14-part memorandum to the Secretary
21 of State at 1:00 P.M., December 7th. This message was re-
22 ceived in the War Department from a naval courier between
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24 84 - Exhibit 1, No. 902, page 245, and No. 907, page 248;

25 Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. A, pages 13-17.

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 2 8:30 A.M. and 9:00 A.M., December 7th (3:00 A.M. to 3:30
 3 A.M. Honolulu time). This message definitely pointed to an
 4 attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 P.M., Washington time. If this
 5 message had been delivered to me by the most rapid possible
 6 means of communication I would have had four hours, more than
 7 enough time, to fully alert the Army forces against an air
 8 raid.

Delayed Translation Dec. 6 "Pearl Harbor" Message.

9
 10 A more prompt decoding and translation of one of the December
 11 6th intercepts would have pointed out clearly to the War and
 12 Navy Departments that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was
 13 planned. After discussing the lack of balloon barrage de-
 14 fense, the consul at Honolulu reported as follows to Tokyo:

15 ** * * However, even though they have actually made
 16 preparations, because they must control the air over the
 17 water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity
 18 of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits
 19 to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that
 20 in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
 21 to take advantage for a surprise attack against these
 22 places." ⁸⁵

23 I would like to set up my conclusions. There will be a
 24 certain amount of repetition, but I think it is desirable.

25 Obeied Instructions. On December 7, 1941 I was obeying

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2 my instructions from Washington as I understood them, and as
3 the War Department had every reason to know that I understood
4 them, and was acting in accordance with the information which
5 was available to me at that time. Little information was
6 available to me. The little that was given to me in the War
7 Department message of November 27th did not give an accurate
8 picture of the prospects of war. The War Department knew
9 definitely by 9:00 P.M., December 6th, that the hour had
10 struck and that war was at hand. By 9:00 A.M., December 7th,
11 the War Department knew the hour of attack. None of this in-
12 formation was given to me.

13 War Department Responsibility. If for any possible
14 reason the War Department felt that it could not give me the
15 information, then it was the responsibility of the War Depart-
16 ment to direct me to go on an all-out alert particularly since
17 it well knew that we were on an anti-sabotage alert. The
18 Hawaiian Department was not provided with agencies for obtain-
19 ing Japanese information outside of Hawaii, and was dependent
20 on the War Department for such information.

21 War Department Estimate. When the War Department was
22 informed that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against
23 sabotage, it not only did not indicate that the command should
24 be alerted against a hostile surface, subsurface, ground or
25 air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protec-

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2 tion against sabotage and subversive measures. This action on
3 the part of the War Department definitely indicated to me
4 that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War De-
5 partment had nine more days in which to express its disapprov-
6 al. The action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17's
7 from Hamilton Field, California, on the night of December 6th,
8 to Honolulu confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was
9 not probable.

10 Reasonable Reliance on Report. Confirmation of my view
11 that the War Department's silence and failure to reply to my
12 report of November 27th constituted reasonable grounds for my
13 belief that my action was exactly what the War Department de-
14 sired is contained in General Marshall's testimony before this
15 Joint Committee on December 11, 1945:

16 "Senator Ferguson: Well, would this be true from an
17 Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered
18 to take 'such measures as he deems necessary and to re-
19 port measures taken to you', is he correct in assuming
20 that if his report is not the kind of action that you had
21 in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically
22 of this difference?

23 "General Marshall: I would assume so."⁸⁶

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25 ⁸⁶ - Daily Record, vol. 21, page 3443.

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Distant Reconnaissance Plan. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier places upon the Commandant of the 14th Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. During the period November 27th to December 6th the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the locations of the Japanese carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval ships and planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the Army. It is noted that the Navy Department, both on October 16 and on November 27, directed Admiral Kimmel to make preparatory defensive deployments, and that Admiral Kimmel had several task forces at sea and was conducting considerable reconnaissance.⁸⁷ He did not have

87 -- Exhibit 37, pages 20B and 31B.

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2 sufficient equipment to conduct complete reconnaissance. Gen-
3 eral Marshall has testified here that even during the war the
4 Hawaiian Islands had never had sufficient equipment for com-
5 plete perimeter reconnaissance.

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Army-Navy Cooperation. During this period I held fre-
7 quent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United
8 States Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
9 and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared
10 the probability of an air attack by the Japanese. In fact,
11 the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that
12 there was no probability of such an attack. With a large
13 part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with
14 their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy
15 would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to
16 approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from
17 task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the
18 presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the prob-
19 ability of an air attack.

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Expectations from War Department. I felt that I had a
right to expect the War Department to inform me by the most
rapid means possible if a real crisis arose in Japanese rela-
tions. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the mes-
sage would remain in the hands of General Miles and Colonel
Bratton without action from 9:00 A.M. till 11:25 A.M., and

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2 that when action was finally taken the desire for secrecy would
3 be considered more important than the element of time. Had
4 the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burn-
5 ing of their code machines been given me by telephone as an
6 urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding
7 and decoding, delivery, etc., or if I had been directed by
8 telephone to go on an all-out alert for a dawn trans-Pacific
9 raid, without being told the reason, I would have had approxi-
10 mately four hours in which to make detailed preparations to
11 meet an immediate attack.

12 Follow-up of Orders. When any department of the Army has
13 issued an order on any matter of importance, it has performed
14 only one-half of its function. The follow-up to see that the
15 order has been carried out as desired is at least as important
16 as issuing the order. The War Department had nine days in
17 which to check up on the alert status in Hawaii and to make
18 sure that the measures taken by me were what was desired,
19 which it did not do. The check-up would have required no
20 more than a reading of my report of measures taken.

21 Supervision by Chief of Staff. Repeatedly, from the
22 time I took command in Hawaii in February 1941, the Chief of
23 Staff had written me at length advising me on policies and
24 details of operation. However, after October 28, 1941, with
25 the War Department receiving information almost daily which

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2 indicated that war was imminent, he communicated to me none
3 of those personal messages containing the inside information.

4 Erroneous Estimate of Situation. My decision to put the
5 Hawaiian Department on an alert to prevent sabotage was based
6 upon a belief that sabotage was our gravest danger and that
7 air attack was not imminent. I realize that my decision was
8 wrong.⁸⁸ I had every reason to believe, however, that my
9 estimate of the situation coincided with that of the War De-
10 partment General Staff, which had the signal advantage of
11 superior sources of intelligence as to enemy intentions.

12 Insight Value of Information Withheld. I know it is
13 hindsight, but if I had been furnished the information which
14 the War Department had, I do not believe that I would have
15 made a mistaken estimate of the situation. To make my mean-
16 ing clear, I want to add that I do not believe that my estim-
17 ate of the situation was due to any carelessness on my part
18 or on the part of the senior Army and Navy officers with whom
19 I consulted. Nor do I believe that my error was a substantial
20 factor in causing the damage which our Pacific Fleet suf-
21 fered during the attack.

22 Intelligence Complacency. I have been more than astounded

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24 88 -- Compare Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, Testimony
25 of Gen. Short, vol. 38, page 4440.

Witness Short

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2 to learn the complacency of the War Department General Staff
3 with relation to so-called "magic" intelligence. The War
4 Department could have devised a method to paraphrase the in-
5 formation obtained and send it by courier to me, without, if
6 they chose, disclosing to me that it resulted from an abil-
7 ity to decipher Japanese messages. I want to quote for the
8 committee the following pertinent paragraph from the Opera-
9 tions Manual then current:

10 "From adequate and timely military intelligence the
11 commander is able to draw logical conclusions concerning
12 enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an
13 essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in
14 the conduct of operations." 89

15 General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson have pointed out
16 that the security of our cryptanalytic ability was risked for
17 the slight, temporary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto's
18 plane. Surely, then, supplying the data to me and to Admiral
19 Kimmel would not have been inconceivably risky.

20 Opinion of Judge Advocate General. I want to quote for
21 the committee one paragraph from the opinion of the Judge Ad-
22 vocate General of the Army concerning this intercept intelli-
23 gence:

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25 89 - Par. 194, FM 100-5, dated May 22, 1941, p.40.

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2 "But since we know in retrospect that Short was not,
3 apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and
4 since the War Plans Division had received substantial in-
5 formation from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board
6 argues that had this additional information been trans-
7 mitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that
8 war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of
9 a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is diffi-
10 cult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending
11 Short this additional information or, in the alternative,
12 checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to
13 the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion
14 General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to
15 realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to
16 Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial
17 effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in
18 failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese
19 intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from
20 Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl
21 Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions
22 for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November
23 to Honolulu to make 'the ships in harbor report' irregular
24 and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking
25 for reports even when there were no ship movements, (Top

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2 Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imagin-
3 ative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Fail-
4 ure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows
5 a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing
6 against eventualities which we have a right to expect in
7 an officer at the head of the War Plans Division. If
8 this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the ad-
9 visability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret
10 information to Short."⁹⁰

11 Adequate Sabotage Defense. I had been furnished adequate
12 means to prevent sabotage. I used those means with complete
13 success, as the testimony has shown. No one can say to what
14 extent sabotage would have occurred if the Army had not taken
15 such measures to prevent it.

16 Inadequate Means for Air Defense. I had not been furnished
17 adequate means to defend against a surprise air raid. The
18 War Department was aware of the inadequacy of our aircraft and
19 anti-aircraft defense establishment. The following table will
20 show at a glance how inadequate our air defense was at the
21 time:⁹¹

22
23 90 - Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, 25 Nov. 1944,

24 Committee Exhibit 63, page 45.
25

Witness Short:

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2 I would like to offer at this time a table showing the
3 type of equipment that was actually available on December 7th,
4 the number that we required to complete our plans and the
5 amount of equipment that was actually on hand in December 1942.

6 The Vice Chairman: General, is that information you are
7 seeking to offer now different from the table that is in your
8 statement?

9 General Short: It is in that it has the additional equip-
10 ment that was present at Hawaii in December 1942.

11 The Vice Chairman: And that table, is that different
12 from the one appearing in your statement?

13 General Short: Just the third which it adds.

14 The Vice Chairman: It adds another column?

15 General Short: It adds another column.

16 Mr. Murphy: May I ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, if
17 this statement given here is a correct statement about there
18 being no bombers in Hawaii on December 7th?

19 General Short: No, no torpedo bombers.

20 Mr. Murphy: No torpedo bombers?

21 General Short: We had no torpedo bombers.

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23 91 - The required number of planes is based on the "Study of
24 the Air Situation in Hawaii", dated 20 Aug. 1941, Comm.
25 Ex. 13, Daily Record, pages 1013 to 1050; the anti-air-
craft requirements are stated in my letter to the Chief
of Staff dated March 15, 1941, Exhibit 53, pages 15;
also Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. 1, pages 21, 23.

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Mr. Murphy: It shows no bombers at all. My impression is there were 37.

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General Short: The B-17's were bombers.

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Mr. Murphy: Are those the only ones then?

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General Short: Those were the only bombers. We had B-18's that were seven years old, that were distinctly out-of-date, with a maximum speed of 150 miles per hour and I did not include those because the air people did not feel that those were proper equipment to fight with.

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Mr. Murphy: We will go into that later with you as to what I had in mind.

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Senator Lucas: General, you said "December 1942".

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General Short: I am making a comparison of what they had provided at the end of another year.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, do you have copies of this new table that you want to refer to now?

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General Short: I have only one.

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The Vice Chairman: Or can you give us this third column?

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General Short: I will give you the third column.

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The Vice Chairman: If you can give us the third column slowly so that we can insert it on here, that might serve the purpose.

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General Short: All right, sir. I would like to call attention to the fact also --

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The Vice Chairman: How is this third column to be headed?

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General Short: "On Hand December 1942."

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I would like also to call attention to the fact that in December 1942 the Japanese had several months before been decisively defeated at Midway and that the danger of an attack was far less than it had been on December 7, 1941.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, now, it would be helpful, I think, if you would give us the third column just exactly as it appears here. For instance, "B-17D Planes."

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General Short: I will give each one in turn if that will be satisfactory.

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The Vice Chairman: All right.

General Short: B-17 planes: Available on December 7th - 6; required 180; in December 1942 there was only one B-17 plane but there were 40 B-24 planes, which was a very comparable plane.

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The Vice Chairman: One B-17 and --

General Short: 40 B-24's which would accomplish the same purpose.

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Interceptors and Fighters: There were 105 available on December 7th; required according to our plans 185; and in December 1942 they had 200.

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Torpedo Bombers: There were none available on December 7th, 36 were required according to our plans and there were

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still none on hand in December 1942.

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The Vice Chairman: None?

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General Short: None, yes, sir.

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3-inch Anti-aircraft Guns: There were 82 available on December 7th, 98 required by the plan. In December 1942 there were only 40 3-inch anti-aircraft guns but there were 44 90-millimeter guns, which was a much more powerful gun, able to accomplish much more.

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37 millimeter Anti-aircraft Guns: On December 7th there were 20 available. There were required under our plans 135. In December 1942 there were actually 276.

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50 calibre machine Guns: Available December 7th 109; required according to our plan 345; actually available in December 1942 793.

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I wish to point out that the fifty caliber machine gun was the most effective weapon against planes coming in very low over the water, and that the number that they had in December 1942 was more than seven times the number that we had on December 7th.

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I am presenting this table because there has been a statement before the committee that we had all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese attack.

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The seriousness of this shortage of equipment is best borne out by recalling that our equipment was inadequate to

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2 protect the Pacific Fleet, even had we been on an all-out
3 alert such as that which the Chief of Staff had ordered on
4 June, 1940. I want to quote General Herron's testimony on
5 this point:

6 "General Frank. * * * Let us assume that in 1940,
7 when the Army was in that alert, that there was a real
8 menace and that an attack had come similar to the one
9 that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and
10 the Navy not. What do you think would have happened?

11 "General Herron: Well, approximately what happened
12 on December 7th. The five bombers would have come in.
13 The Army could not have stopped them with its three-inch
14 guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring
15 more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they
16 would bring 150, surely." 92

17 Army Failure - Heroism of Troops. Due to the fact that
18 the War Department did not make available to Hawaii the in-
19 formation in its possession, the Army forces in Hawaii were
20 unable to prevent the terrific destruction caused by the Japan-
21 ese attack. However, the fine action of the Hawaiian troops
22 when struck by the surprise attack should not be overlooked.
23 Every officer and man did his full duty with promptness, pre-

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25 92 - Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr., vol. 3, page 234.

1 Witness Short

2 cision and efficiency. All organizations moved quickly to
3 their battle positions and took up their prescribed duties.
4 Acts of heroism, were the rule, not the exception.

5 General Staff Reorganization. I trust that the reor-
6 ganization of the War Department General Staff will lead in
7 the future to prompt evaluation and use of all items of in-
8 telligence concerning possible aggressive movements by foreign
9 military Powers.

10 Unjust War Department Treatment. I do not feel that I
11 have been treated fairly or with justice by the War Depart-
12 ment. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for
13 the disaster. My relatively small part in the transaction
14 was not explained to the American people until this Joint Con-
15 gressional Committee forced the revelation of the facts. I
16 fully appreciate the desire of the War Department to preserve
17 the secrecy of the source of the so-called "magic", but I am
18 sure that could have been done without any attempt to deceive
19 the public by a false pretense that my judgment had been the
20 sole factor causing the failure of the Army to fulfill its
21 mission of defending the Navy at Pearl Harbor. I am sure that
22 an honest confession by the War Department General Staff of
23 their failure to anticipate the surprise raid would have been
24 understood by the public, in the long run, and even at the
25 time. Instead, they "passed the buck" to me, and I have kept

Witness Short

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my silence until the opportunity of this public forum was presented to me.

War Department's Four-year Silence. The War Department had four years to admit that a follow-up should have been made on the November 27 message and on my report of the same date, but no such admission of responsibility was made public until General Gerow and General Marshall testified before this committee.

First Opportunity to Present Story. I want to thank all the members of this committee for the thorough manner in which you have tried to bring out the facts and particularly for the opportunity to present my story to you and through you to the American public.

The Chairman: The committee will excuse you at this time, General, until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

General Short: Thank you, sir.

The Chairman: The committee desires to have an executive session and the spectators will depart as rapidly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 P.M., January 22, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 A.M., Wednesday, January 23, 1946.)

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