

Doc. 3111

Evid

Folder 5

(57)

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3111

極秘

一〇ノ(三) 十月二日米總督全的ニ容認セル場合常
國ノ國際地位就中對支地位ハ事變前ニ比シ如何
ニ變化スルヤ

米國側ニ於テ所謂十月二日案(六月二十一日案
ヲ基礎トス)中日本領兵求ヲドノ程度迄容認セ
ントスルモノナルヤ今日迄ノ交渉ニ於テ明瞭ヲ
缺ク話少カラサルモ假ニ所謂四原則並ニ(一)支那
及佛領印度支那ニ於ケル陸兵及撤兵問題(二)支那
ニ於ケル國際通商上ノ無差別待遇(三)三國條約ノ
解釋及履行問題カ米側主張通りニ妥結セララル
モノト假定スル時ハ

一帝國政府ノ支那事變完遂ハ大東亞共榮圈建設ノ大業
ニ關シ第三國關係ハ餘地ヲ與ワルコトナリ
我ガ自主外交ニ幾分制約ヲ受クルカ如キ觀ヲ
量シ之ニ伴ヒ國內ニ於テモ相當ハ反動的事變
ハ發生ス能ハスルヲ要スヘキモ之ヲ全盤的ニ
制シハ我對支地位ハ事變前ニ比シ幾分強化セ
ラルル望シアリ他方滿洲支那ハ佛印ヲ中心
トスル帝國ハ平和的進取ヲ齎スコトニ依リ共
榮圈ハ漸進的建設ヲ爲シ得サルニアラサルハ

カ又帝國、國、防、方、ヲ、保、持、ス、ル、モ、ト、ニ、依、リ、他、人、列、
 強、カ、執、手、ハ、爲、メ、衰、弊、セ、ル、無、帝、國、ハ、發、言、權、ハ、有、
 大、ヲ、期、シ、得、ヘ、ク、以、テ、他、日、ハ、飛、躍、ニ、備、ヘ、得、ヘ、シ、
 從、テ、實、質、的、ニ、ハ、我、方、ニ、必、ス、シ、モ、大、ナ、ル、不、利、ヲ、
 奈、タ、ス、モ、ト、ハ、認、メ、難、キ、モ、更、ニ、内、外、ノ、諸、狀、勢、
 ヲ、リ、深、ク、檢、討、ヲ、加、フ、ル、ニ、於、テ、ハ、諸、種、不、利、ノ、點、
 少、カ、ラ、サル、ニ、由、リ、米、條、ハ、此、意、ニ、テ、ハ、受、諾、シ、難、
 シ、

一 支那及滿洲關係事項

(イ) 現下ノ事態ニ於テ日米交渉ノ妥結ハ支那事態
 解決唯一ノ方策ニシテ右以外解決ノ見込無
 シ

(ロ) 米側四原則ニハ武力ニ依ル現狀打破ヲ認メサ
 サル趣旨ノモノアリト雖モ我方提案ノ日支
 和平條件中「滿洲國ノ承認」ニ付米側ハ何
 等異議ヲ唱ヘ居ラサルヲ以テ之カ實現ヲ見
 ハ滿洲國ノ地位一層確立セラルヘシ

(ハ) 支那ニ於ケル經濟活動ニ付國際通商上ノ平
 等原則ヲ認メタル場合ニ於テモ事態前ニ比
 シ格別ノ不利益ナキノミナラス寧ロ今日ノ
 既成ノ事實ヲ維持スルコトニ依リ幾多ノ

先的地歩ヲ保持シ得ヘシ尤モ將來右原則ヲ
 楯ニ英米等ヨリ種々苦情ヲ提起シ來ルカ如キ
 コトアルヲ覺悟セサルヘカラス

(ニ) 駐兵條項ニ付日米間ニ約諾ヲ爲ササル場合
 ニ於テモ撤兵ニ付テハ米側ニ於テ一兩年間
 ノ猶豫ハ之ヲ認ムヘシト想察セララルノミ
 ナラス日文和平交渉ノ際兩國間直接交渉ニ
 依リ駐兵ヲ認メシムルコト必シモ不可能事
 ナラサルヘシ

(ホ) 日支間和平成立支那側ノ誠心直ニ併消ス
 ルヤ疑問アルモ多年ノ戰亂ニ疲弊セル一般
 民衆ハ平和ヲ歡迎シ日支間融和ヲ齎シ其ノ
 結果經濟合作ニ付テモ協力的態度ニ出ツヘ
 キコト豫想セラル

(ヘ) 支那政府カ南京政府要人ヲ包含スヘキニモ
 鑑ミ政治經濟其ノ他諸問題特ニ資源ノ開發
 租界ノ開放、海關制度ノ運用等ニ付相當程
 度ノ提携ヲ期待シ得ヘシ

ニ佛印、泰、蘭印等ニ關スル事項

(イ) 佛印ニ付テハ現行日本佛印通商諸取極ニ差キ
既ニ優越的地歩ヲ固メ居ルヲ以テ假令撤兵
ヲ實行スル後ニ於テモ我方ノ施策宜敷ヲ
得ルニ於テハ兩國ノ提携ヲ増進スルヲ得ヘ
シ

(ロ) 泰ニ付テハ列國ノ侵略ヲ恐ルルコトナキニ
至リ自然日泰關係モ從前ニ比シ漸次改善増
進セラレ我方必要物資タル米ノ買付等ヲ容
易ナラシムヘシ

(ハ) 蘭印其他南方諸國ニ通商平等ノ原則カ行
ハルル結果石油、錫、一ボークサイ
ド一等帝國必要國防資源ノ獲得カ容易トナ
ルヘシ

ニ其他ノ事項

(イ) 日米關係ノ改善ニ依ル利益ハ必ラスシモ專
從前ニ比シ大ナリト謂フヲ得サルモ政治的
不安ノ除カルルト共ニ新通商條約モ締結セ
ラルルニ至ルヘシ物資ノ購入ハ歐洲戰爭ト
ノ關係モアリ相當條約ヲ受クヘキモ兎ニ角
石油其他相當量ノ國防資源獲得可能トナリ

中南米地方ニ於ケル無差別待遇ト相換ツテ
 東亞新秩序ノ建設ニハ少カラサル好影響ヲ
 與フヘシ又將來世界平和克復ノ爲日米カ重
 長ナル役割ヲ演スル基礎ヲ築キ得ルコトト
 ナル利益アリ

((ロ)) 對蘇關係ニ於テ我方ノ地歩鞏固トナルニ從
 ヒ漸次平和的交渉ニ依ル要求貫徹ノ可能能
 増大スヘシ

尙米案ノ承諾ノ場合ハ

- (イ) 東亞ノ問題ニ關シ列國容喙ヲ招來スル惧ア
 ルコト
- (ロ) 日本國體ノ滯騰ヲ見ルヘキコト
- (ハ) 九國條約ノ再確認トナルヘキコト
- (ニ) 日獨伊關係ニ好マシカラサル影響ヲ與フル惧
 アルコト等ハ不利ノ點トシテ認ムルヲ要ス

Doc. 3111

證 明 書
「ワシントン」文書局 第 三 一 一 一 號
國 際 檢 察 部 第 三 一 一 一 號

與據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、杯髯／HAYASHI KAORU／ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、
即チ、日本外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的
關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲
ニ添附セラレタル、八頁ヨリ成ル、千九百 年
／昭和 年 附、下記題名、即チ十月二
日米覺書全的ニ容認セル場合帝國ノ國際地位就中對
支地位ハ爭變前ニ比シ如何ニ變化スルヤノ又誓ノ保
管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ
ルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類
及ビ綴ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又ハ引
用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ
特記スベシ)

外務省

千九百四十七年／昭和二十二年／十一月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名 杯髯／K. HAYASHI／署名捺印／

右ノ者ノ公的資格 文書課長

證 人 浦部勝馬／K. DRABE／署名

Art.

Cart.

Doc. 3111

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ヘンリー・シモジマ/HENRY SHIMOTIMAハ余ガ聯
合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、
竝ニ上記證既ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官
吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十七年/昭和二十二年/十二月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 備 へんりー・シモジマ /署名ノ

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際検査部書記官

證人 ジェー・エフ・マンロウ /署名ノ

J. F. MUNRO /署名ノ

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Exh. No.

Very secret

(3) of 70. What change would there be in Japan's international position, especially in her position as regards China as compared with the pre-Incident time, in the case the U.S. memorandum of Oct. 2, were fully accepted?

There are not a few points which are not clear yet in the negotiations up to now about how far the United States will accept Japan's requests in the so-called Oct. 2 draft (based on the June 27th draft). If however, the so-called four principles, as well as (1) the problem of the stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indo-China, (2) non-discriminatory treatment regarding international trade in China and (3) the problem of the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact - were to be settled in accordance with the U.S. insistence, "The great task of the Imperial Government to bring the China Incident to a conclusion and to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would afford some scope for third Power participation and it appears that our independent diplomacy would be restricted to some extent, and we should have to be prepared as a result for the occurrence of a reactionary situation of considerable importance in our country; on the whole, however, there is hope that our position as regards China would be strengthened to some extent as compared with pre-Incident times, while on the other hand it would not be impossible to gradually establish the Co-prosperity Sphere by carrying out the peaceful progress of the Empire chiefly in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China; and by preserving our national defense at a time when the other Powers were exhausted with the War we could expect the Empire's voice to gain weight and we would consequently be able to prepare for future activity.

Such being the case, it cannot necessarily be admitted that we should sustain any substantial disadvantage, but the U.S. draft cannot be accepted as it is because there are not a few disadvantages when it is investigated in the light of various conditions both in the country and abroad.

1. Matters Relating to China and Manchuria.

(a) Under the present situation the negotiations between Japan and the United States are the only means of settling the China Incident there being no possibility that it will be settled by any other means.

(b) Though the U.S.'s four principles contain something to the effect that the existing situation should not be broken by means of armed force, the United States is making no objection to "the recognition of Manchukuo" which is one of the conditions of the peace treaty between Japan and China proposed by us, and if it should be realized the position of Manchukuo would be established all the more firmly.

(c) In case the principle of equality in international trade is recognized with regard to economic activities in China, there would not only be no particular disadvantage as compared with pre-Incident times; on the contrary, by adhering to the present established facts, a considerable preferential position might be retained. It must, however, be anticipated that Great Britain, the United States, and others might make various complaints in the future on the strength of the said principle.

(d) Even in case an agreement should not be reached between Japan and the United States on the stationing of troops, not only it is supposed that the United States would admit one or two years' extension of time but also it would not be quite impossible to have the stationing of troops admitted through direct negotiation between Japan and China in their peace negotiations.

(e) Though it is doubtful whether the hostile feelings of the Chinese would die out immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and China, it is expected that the people, impoverished by a war of many years, would welcome peace, that Japan and China would be reconciled, and that as a result, they would take a cooperative attitude in economic joint efforts.

(f) In view of the fact that the Chinese Government will include some high officials of the Nanking Government, a considerable degree of cooperation can be expected in political, economic, and other problems, especially in developing natural resources, withdrawing concessions, managing the system of maritime customs, and other matters."

2. Matters Relating to French Indo-China, Thailand the Netherlands Indies, and others.

(a) As regards French Indo-China, we have already strengthened our predominant position by means of the existing various agreements between Japan and French Indo-China; Therefore, cooperation between the two countries could be furthered even after the withdrawal of troops had been carried out provided that our measures were proper.

(b) As regards Thailand, the fear of being invaded by the big Powers will be removed, accordingly the relations between Japan and Thailand will gradually be improved and furthered, and the purchase of the rice which is (one of) our necessities and other matters will be facilitated.

(c) As one result of the practice of the principle of equality in trade in the Netherlands Indies and other areas in the South, the acquisition of resources necessary for the defence of the Empire such as kerosene, gum, tin, bauxite, and so forth would be made easier.

3. Other Matters.

(a) It cannot be said that the advantages which would result from the improvement of Japanese-American relations would necessarily be greater than they were before the Incident, but on the removal of political uneasiness a new commercial treaty would eventually be concluded. In view of the effect of the European War, the purchase of goods and materials would suffer considerable limitations. Be that as it may, the acquisition of national defence resources in considerable quantities would become possible and along with the non-discriminatory treatment in Central and South America, this would to a great extent

exert a favorable influence toward the establishment of a new order in East Asia, and besides, would stand Japan and America in good stead by furnishing them with a basis on which they would be able to hold an important position in restoring peace of the world in future.

(b) Following the consolidation of our position in Soviet relations the ability to accomplish our requests through peaceful negotiation would gradually be increased. Further, the following should be recognized as disadvantages in case the American plan should be accepted;

- a) There would be danger of inviting interference by the big Powers concerning East Asia questions.
- b) Public opinion in Japan would become agitated.
- c) The Nine Power Treaty would be reconfirmed.
- d) There would be fear of its exercising an unfavorable influence on the relations between Japan, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

WDC No. _____
IPS No. 3111

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Keoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated _____, 19 , and described as follows: "WHAT WOULD BE THE CHANGE IN JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN HER POSITION TOWARDS CHINA, AS COMPARED WITH THE PRE-INCIDENT TIME, IN CASE THE U.S. MEMORANDUM, DATED 2 OCTOBER, IS FULLY ACCEPTED."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
5th day of December 1947.

s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ K. Urabe

SEAL

Chief, Archives Section.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
5th day of December, 1947.

s/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: s/ J. F. Munroe

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Dec. No. 3111

Date: 22 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Loose Mimeographed Sheets entitled, "WHAT WOULD BE THE CHANGE IN JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN HER POSITION TOWARDS CHINA, AS COMPARED WITH THE PRE-INCIDENT TIME, IN CASE THE U.S. MEMORANDUM, DATED 2 OCTOBER, IS FULLY ACCEPTED?" Foreign Office Memorandum.

Date: Undated Original () Copy (X) Language: Japanese but probably Oct. 1941

Has it been translated? Yes (X) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL:

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

TOYODA, Teijiro; TOGO, Shigeru (Foreign Ministers during this period.)

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Relations with the U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

This document is a memorandum of the Japanese Foreign Office, evidently written shortly after the U.S. Memorandum of 2 October 1941. The major part of the document is a discussion of the pro's and con's, from the standpoint of JAPAN's international prestige and achievements of the CHINA INCIDENT and the CO-Prosperity Sphere, of accepting the U.S. "October 2 Plan." /A.N. U.S. Plan required that Japan (1) withdraw her troops from CHINA and FRENCH-INDO CHINA (2) establish international trade in CHINA on a non-discriminatory basis (3) re-interpret the Tripartite Pact./

Dec. No. 3111
Page 1.

In general, the memorandum favours JAPAN'S pursuing a peaceful policy and favors her acceptance in the main of American proposals as a means of re-inforcing her status in CHINA and MANCHURIA.

The memorandum sets forth the arguments for and against acceptance of the American proposal, as it would affect (1) "Matters Relating to CHINA and MANCHURIA" (2) "Matters Relating to French INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and the DUTCH EAST INDIES" and (3) Other Matters /A.N. relating to the international political situation, improved Japanese U.S. relations, non-discriminatory treatment of Japan in Central and South America, and accomplishment of Japan's aims in SOVIET-Japanese relations./

The following excerpts, taken from the Foreign Ministry Memorandum, give the advantages and disadvantages of Japan's acceptance.

I Matters Relating to China and Manchuria

F. "In view of the possibility that the Chinese Government will include the high officials of the Nanking Government, we can expect a considerable collaboration in politics, economics, and various other matters, especially in developing natural resources, withdrawal of concessions, management of the system of maritime customs, etc."

II Matters Relating to French Indo-China, Thailand, and Dutch East Indies

A. "Regarding French Indo-China, the collaboration between the two countries (Japan) will be improved even after the withdrawal of the troops, if the policy of Japan is proper for Japan is ready to strengthen her prominent position based on the regulations already set up between the two countries."

C. Regarding the Dutch East Indies and other territories in the South, the acquisition of petroleum, gum, tin, bauxite, etc. will become easier as the principle of equality in trade will be put into practice.

Dec. no. 3111 - Page 3 - Summary cont'd

III Other Matters

- A. "The advantages which will result from the improvement of Japanese-American relations could not be as remarkable as before the Incident, but the political uneasiness will be removed and a new commercial treaty will be concluded.

"The purchase of goods will be restricted to a considerable extent in connection with the European War, but the acquisition of petroleum and other resources for the national defense will become possible to such an extent as to have a good influence over the establishment of a New Order in East Asia together along with non-discriminative treatment in Central and South America."

Additional information attached to memorandum;
Disadvantages in case the U.S. Plan is Accepted.

- A. "There is the danger of inviting interference by other nations concerning East Asia questions."
B. "The public opinion of Japan will become agitated."
C. "The Nine Power Treaty will be confirmed."
D. "An unfavorable influence will be given to the Japan-German-Italian relations."

Analyst: E.T. Garden

Dec. No. 3111
Page 3.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3111

Date 22 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Loose mimeographed sheets entitled "What Would Be The Change in Japan's International Position, Especially in Her Position Towards CHINA, as Compared with the Pre-Incident Time, in case the U.S. Memorandum, dated 2 October, is fully accepted?" Foreign Office memorandum.

Date: undated but probably (Oct-~~1941~~ 1941) Original () Copy (X) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes (X) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Doc. Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Japanese Foreign Ministry

TOYODA, Teijiro; TOGO, Shigeru (Foreign Ministers during this period)

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Relations with the U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This document is a memorandum of the Japanese Foreign Office, evidently written shortly after the U.S. memorandum of 2 October 1941. ~~The~~ The major part of the document is a discussion of the pro's and con's, from ~~the~~ ^{the} standpoint of JAPAN'S international prestige and achievements of the CHINA INCIDENT and the Co-Prosperity Sphere, of accepting the U.S.

Analyst:

Doc. No. 3111

E. T. Garden
WJW

(see next page)

"October 2 Plan" / ^{A.N.} U.S. Plan required that Japan

- (1) withdraw her troops from CHINA and FRENCH-INDO CHINA
- (2) establish international trade in CHINA on a non-discriminatory basis
- (3) re-interpret the Tripartite Pact /

In general, the memorandum favors JAPAN'S pursuing a peaceful policy and ^{favor} her acceptance in the main of American proposals as a means ^{of} re-enforcing ~~maintaining~~ her status in CHINA and MANCHURIA.

The memorandum sets forth the arguments ~~for~~ ⁱⁿ it and against acceptance of the American proposal, ~~under~~ ^{would affect} ~~the general heading~~ (1) "Matters Relating to CHINA and MANCHURIA", (2) "Matters Relating to French INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and the DUTCH EAST INDIES", and (3) "Other Matters ^{A.N.} relating to the international political situation, improved Japanese U.S. relations, non-discriminatory treatment of Japan in Central & South America, and ~~accomplishment~~ ^{achievement} of Japan's aims in Soviet-Japanese relations."

The following excerpts taken from the ^{Foreign Ministry} memorandum, ~~show~~ ^{give} the ~~advantages~~ ^{advantages} and disadvantages

of JAPAN'S acceptance.

(Typist - see attached notes & continued analysis
by typing material in brackets.)

20.) (Screening Clippings)ASAHI 5, Oct. 1940

Talks of Premier KONOE

-- "The stationing of troops to F.I.C. is from necessities by our operation in China.

8. Oct. 1940

MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister's speech

Re. tripartite treaty.

-- "relating to the F.I.C. route, -- the negotiations between French Ambassador and I were agreed upon 30 Aug.

23. - Oct. 1940 Latest report re Economic Situation of F.I.C. (from HANOI).

" MATSUMIYA, Ambassador Extraordinary, met with F.I.C. delegates on 22 Oct. has begun to make negotiations relating to the economic agreements. -- "

Some descriptions about Mining, agriculture and commerce of F.I.C. --

26, Dec. 1940Reminiscence of The Year 1940.

-- "our Sea-Eagles began to start a fresh activity by new bases made utilisable by the stationing to F.I.C. --

(Europe) -- "France walking a thorny Ways" --

-- Marshal Petin as the Leader of the government -- is walking to organize a totalitarian state -- "

Foreign Ministry - I.P.S. No. 3111

Title - Loose mimeographed sheets (translation in full)

What would be the change of the Japan's international position especially ⁱⁿ her position towards China as compared with the pre-Incident time, in case the US memorandum, dated 2 Oct., is fully accepted?

There are many points which have not been clarified so far in the negotiation.

How far would the U.S. accept the requests of Japan ~~shown in~~ the so called

Oct 2 Plan? However, suppose the

following actions -

(1) the stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and the French-Indo China (2) Non-discriminatory treatment of international trade in China (3) the interpretation and execution of the

Tripartite treaty are concluded
in accordance with the U.S. insistence.
* Japan's great enterprises of achieving
the China Incident and ~~the~~ establishing
of the Greater East Asia ^{CO-Prosperity} Sphere
shall ~~will~~ come to admit ^{of} the participation
of ~~the~~ third countries and ~~will give~~ the
impression, ^{will be given} that Japan's independent
diplomacy is somewhat restricted.

Accordingly, some ^{reactionary} ~~reactional~~ situation
will be brought about in the interior.

However, generally speaking, our
position against China will have
some possibility ^{of being} to be strengthened
as compared with ^{our position} that of ~~the~~ pre-
war time, and by bringing about
the peaceful advancement towards
Manchuria, China and ~~the~~ French-
Indo China, the gradual establishment

Co-Prosperty
If the Coprosperity sphere will be realized and by maintaining the national defence power, Japan could enlarge her right of speaking when the other Powers become impoverished as the result of war, and she ~~can~~ ^{could} be prepared for the rapid progress of ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the future} tomorrow.

So, the acceptance of the U.S. plan ~~is~~ not necessarily disadvantageous ~~in substance~~ as far as Japan is concerned. Still, by making ~~the~~ ^{into} further investigation ~~over~~ ^{into} the matter and considering the ~~situations~~ ^{in the} of interior ^{in the} and exterior ^{outside JAPAN}, we can find many points which are disadvantageous.

So, it is hard to accept the U.S. plan as it is.

I Matters Relating to China and
Manchuria

- A. The conclusion of the America-Japan Negotiation is the only key to the solution of the China Incident under the present situation and there can be no other way.
- B. In the Four principles of the U.S. proposal, there is something which does not admit ^{of} to breaking the situation by force. However, she / the U.S. has no objection to the "Recognition of Manchukuo" which is one of the conditions of the Sino-Japanese peace conclusion suggested by Japan.

and if the "Recognition of Manchukuo" is realized, the position of the nation will ^{be} established on a firmer basis.

C. If the principle of equality ⁱⁿ of the international trade regarding the economic activities in China is recognized, it will not cause the particular disadvantages as compared with the pre-incident time.

On the contrary, by maintaining the established facts, Japan can keep ~~various~~ advantages of various ^{recognize} kinds; nevertheless, we must know that various complaints will be made in the future by Britain or the U.S. on the strength of the said principle.

D.

Even in case an understanding is not reached ~~by~~ ^{on the} US and Japan regarding the stationing of troops, it can be supposed that the US would admit the ~~substance~~ ^{extension} of time for one or two years. Moreover it is not absolutely impossible to have them admit the stationing of troops in the negotiation of the Sino Japanese peace conclusion through the direct talks between Japan and China.

E. It is doubtful whether the hostile feeling of Chinese side ^{on the} ~~is~~ ^{will be} removed after the peace is concluded between Japan and China, but the people who have been impoverished by the long war will welcome the

return of the peace and reconciliation
will be brought about, and as the result, ~~of it~~
^a the friendly attitude will be expected
in the economic cooperation.

F. In view of the possibility that the
Chinese Government will include
the high officials of the Nanking
Government, we can expect ^a considerable
collaboration in politics, economics,
and various other matters, especially
in developing natural ^{resources}, ~~withdrawing~~ ^{withdrawal}
of concessions, management of the system
of maritime customs, etc."

II.
2. Matters Relating to French Indo-China,
Thailand, and Dutch East Indies

A. "Regarding the French Indo-China, the collaboration between ^{Japan} ~~the two~~ and French Indo-China ^{able to be promoted} ~~countries (Japan)~~ will be ~~improved~~ even after the withdrawal of the troops, if the policy of Japan is proper. ^{for} ~~for~~ Japan ^{had already} ~~has already~~ to strengthen her ^{predominant} ~~prominent~~ position based on the ^{existing agreements} ~~regulations already set up~~ between the two countries."

B. Regarding Thailand, the fear of being invaded by the Powers has been removed and accordingly the relations between the two nations will be improved and become more friendly than before and the purchase of ^{rice} ~~rice~~ ^{and} the most necessary goods will become easier.

c. Regarding the Dutch East Indies and other territories in South, the acquisition of petroleum, gum, tin, bauxite, etc will become easier as the principle of equality in trade will be put into practice.

III Other matters

A. "The advantages which will ^{result} ~~be resulted~~ from the improvement of ~~the~~ Japanese-American ~~relations~~ could not be as remarkable as before the Incident, but the political uneasiness will be removed and a new commercial treaty will be concluded.

"The purchase of goods will be restricted to a considerable extent

in connection with the European War,
but the acquisition of ^{petroleum} ~~oil~~ and other
^{resources} resources for the national defence will
become possible to such ^{an} extent as to
^{have} give a good influence over the
establishment of ^a new order in the
East Asia together ^{along} with ~~the~~ non-
discriminative treatment in the
Central and South America. "Along

~~the advantage to build the foundation~~

Also, there will be ~~the~~ advantage in
~~to~~ build ^{ing} the foundation for the U.S. and
Japan to take the leading roles in
recovering the peace of the world in the
future.

B. Regarding the Soviet-Japanese
relations, the possibility will be
increased ^{of} ~~to~~ accomplishing our requests
through peaceful negotiations as the

position of Japan becomes firmer.

In case the U.S. Plan is Accepted:

- A. "There is ^{the danger of} a fear to inviting interference by other nations concerning ~~the~~ East Asia questions."
- B. "The public opinion of Japan will become agitated."
- C. "The nine Power Treaty will be confirmed."
- D. "An unfavourable influence will be given to the Japan-German-Italian relations."

Analyst: E.T. Garden

DOC. NO. 3111

I P S Doc. No. 3111

~~Very~~
Top Secret

Translated by T. Kawai

(3) of 70. What ~~would be the change~~ ^{would} ~~be~~ ^{there be} in

Japan's international position, especially in her

position ^{as regards} ~~towards~~ China as compared with the

pre-Incident time, in case the U. S. memo-

-randum, ^{of} ~~dated~~ Oct. 2 ~~nd~~, ^{were} ~~is~~ fully accepted?

There are not a few points which are not

clear yet in the negotiations up to now about

how far the United States will accept Japan's

requests in the so-called Oct. 2 draft (based

on the June 27th draft). If, however,

the so-called four principles, as well as (1)

the problem of the stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indo-China, (2)

~~the~~ non-discriminatory treatment ^{regarding} of international trade in China and (3) ^{the problem of} the interpretation

and execution of the Tripartite Pact —

~~were to be~~ ^{were to be} ~~concluded~~ ^{settled} exactly in accordance

with the U. S. insistence,

"the great ^{task} ~~enterprises~~ of the Imperial Government

to ^{bring} ~~achieve~~ the China Incident, ^{to a conclusion} and to establish

the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

would afford some scope for third Powers^W

participation in them and ^{it appears that} our independent
 diplomacy would ~~seem~~ to be restricted ^{to} some
^{extent} ~~measure~~, and we should have to be prepared ^{as a result,} for
 the occurrence of a reactionary situation of considerable
 importance in our country; on the whole, how-
^{ever,} ^{there is hope} ^{as regards} our position towards China ~~would promise~~
^{would} to be strengthened to some extent as compared
 with the pre-Incident times, while on the
 other hand it would not be impossible to
 gradually establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere
 by ^{carrying out} ~~making~~ our ^{of the Empire} peaceful advances ^{chiefly} into Manchuria,
 the peaceful progress of the Empire ^{chiefly} in Manchuria,

China and French Indo-China; and we could
~~expect Japan's voice to be greater~~ by preserving
 our national defense ^{at a time} when the other Powers
~~we could expect~~ ^{the Empire's} ~~voice to gain weight~~
 were exhausted with the War and we ^{would} could
 consequently ^{be able to} prepare for future activities.

Such being the case, it cannot necessarily
 be admitted that we should ^{sustain} have any great
 substantial disadvantages, but the U. S.
 draft cannot be accepted as it is because
~~we have~~
 there are ^{not} a few disadvantages when
 it is investigated ^{in the light of} from various ^{conditions} situations

5

^{was}
in the country and abroad.

7. Matters Relating to China and Manchuria.

(a) Under the present situation the negotiations between Japan and the United States

^{are}
~~is~~ the only means of settling the China

Incident, there being no possibility that

it will be settled by any other means.

(b) Though the U. S.'s four principles con-

tain something to the effect that the existing

situation should not be broken by means

of armed force, the United States is making

6

no objection to "the recognition of Manchoukuo" which is one of the conditions of the peace treaty between Japan and China proposed by us, and if it ^{should be} realized the position of Manchoukuo ^{would be} established ^{all the more} ~~on~~ a firmer basis.

(c) In case the principle of equality in international trade is recognized with regard to economic activities in China, there ^{would} ~~will~~ ~~(we shall have)~~ not only be, no particular disadvantages as compared with ~~the~~ pre-Incident times; on the contrary, by ^{adhering to} ~~maintaining~~ the present estab-

7

a considerable preferential position
lished facts, ~~many~~ ^{superior} greater advantages might

be retained. It must, however, be antici-

ipated that Great Britain, the United States,
and others ^{might} ~~etc.~~ ^{in future} make various complaints on the
strength of the said principle.

(d) Even in case an agreement ^{should} ~~is~~ not
be reached between Japan and the United States

on the stationing of troops, not only it

is supposed that the United States ^{would} admit

one or two years' extension of time, but also

it ^{would} ~~will~~ not be quite impossible to have the

stationing of troops ~~be~~ admitted through direct negotiations between Japan and China in their peace negotiations.

(e) Though it is doubtful whether the hostile feelings of the Chinese ^{would} ~~will~~ die out immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty between Japan and China, it is expected that the people, impoverished by ^{as} ~~the~~ war of many years, ^{would} ~~will~~ welcome peace, that Japan and China ^{would} ~~will~~ be reconciled, and that, as a result, they ^{would} ~~will~~

|the Chinese|

take a cooperative attitude in economic joint efforts.

(f) In view of the fact that the Chinese Government will include some high officials of the Nanking Government, a considerable degree of cooperation can be expected in political, economic, and other problems, especially in developing natural resources, withdrawing concessions, managing the system of maritime customs, and other matters etc.

2. Matters Relating to French Indo-China,
Thailand, the Netherlands Indies, and others

a) As regards French Indo-China, we have already strengthened our predominant position ^{by means of} ~~in accordance with~~ the existing various agreements between Japan and French Indo-China; therefore, ~~the~~ co-operation between the two countries ^{could} ~~will be able to~~ be ^{furthered} ~~promoted~~ even after ~~the carrying out of~~ the withdrawal of troops, ^(had been carried out) provided that our measures ^{were} ~~be~~ proper.

b) As regards Thailand, the fear of being invaded by the ^{big} Powers will be removed, accordingly the relations between Japan and Thailand will gradually be improved and ^{furthered} ~~promoted~~, and the purchase of ^{the} rice which is one of our necessities and of other ^{matters} will be facilitated.

c) As the ^{one} result of the practice of the principle of equality in trade in the Netherlands Indies and other areas in the South, the

acquisition of resources necessary for the defense of the Empire such as kerosene, gum, tin, bauxite, and so forth ^{would} be made easier.

III. Other Matters.

a) It ^{can} ~~could~~ not be said that the advantages which ^{would} result from the improvement of Japanese-American relations ^{would} necessarily be greater than they were before the Incident, but on the removal of political uneasiness a new commercial treaty ^{would eventually} ~~will come to~~ be concluded. In view of the ^{effect-} ~~connection~~ with the European War, the purchase of goods and materials ^{would} suffer considerable limitations. Be that as it may, the acquisition of national defense resources in considerable quantities ^{would} ~~will~~ become possible and, along ^{with} ~~dependently on~~ the non-discriminatory treatment in Central and South America,

^{would} to a great extent exert
 This ~~will exert~~ ^{in a great measure} a
 favorable influence toward the establish-
 ment of a new order in ~~the Far East~~ ^{Asia} and
 besides, ~~will~~ ^{would} stand Japan and America
 in good stead by furnishing them with
 a basis on which they ~~will~~ ^{would} be able to
 hold an important position in restoring
 peace of the world in future.

b) Following the consolidation of our
 position in ~~the~~ ^{Soviet} relations with the Soviets,
 the ~~possibility~~ ^{ability} ~~will~~ ^{would} be gradually increased of
 to accomplishing our requests through
 peaceful negotiations. ~~will~~ ^{would} gradually be increased

Further, the following should be ~~admitted~~ ^{recognized}
 as disadvantages in case ^{the} American plan
^{should be} ~~is~~ accepted:

a) There ~~will~~ ^{would} be ~~the~~ danger of inviting
 interference by the ^{big} powers concerning

(4)

East Asia questions.

b) The Public opinion of Japan ^{would} ~~will~~ become agitated.

~~V.V.~~ c) The Nine Power Treaty ^{would} ~~will~~ be caused to be ^{re} confirmed.

d) There ^{would} ~~will~~ be a fear of ^{its} exercising an unfavorable influence ^{on} ~~toward~~ the relations between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 3111

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TOWARDS CHINA, AS COMPARED WITH THE PRE-INCIDENT TIME, IN CASE THE U.S. MEMORANDUM, DATED 2 OCTOBER, IS FULLY ACCEPTED.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

5th day of December 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe

Chief, Archives, Section.
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Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify

that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Ihigo on this

5th day of Dec., 1947

Witness: J. F. Munson

Henry Shimojima
NAME
Investigator IPS
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Translated by
HATATE, Kinei

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號
國際 機 察 部 第三、一、一 號

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第二号
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