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THESIS

PARTY POLITICS AND GREEK SECURITY POLICY
FROM 1974 TO 1984:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

by

John L. Haines

December 1984

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The fundamental issues include: relations with the Eastern Bloc, Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, relations with NATO, and U.S. military installations in Greece. These issues are analyzed for three periods: the 1974-1981 New Democracy Governments, the 1974-1981 opposition policies of PASOK, and the 1974-present PASOK government. Although some expected a radical departure in policies with the 1981 change to a socialist government, practical policies have shown very little change. The basic requirements of a developing and maturing country influenced by the conditions of its regional environment and general world conditions seem to lend consistency and rationality to Greek security policy and should be considered in forming Western policy for the region.

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Party Politics and Greek Security Policy
From 1974 To 1984:
Change and Continuity

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the effects of political change on Greek security policy during the period 1974 to 1984. This period encompasses significant change in Greece's foreign relations including those with the United States. The central question is: Are the elements of Greek security policy based on long-term basic interests which find consistent expression, or are they a function of domestic political factors, more ideologically motivated and therefore variable according to the governing political party? The fundamental issues include: relations with the Eastern Bloc, Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, relations with NATO, and U.S. military installations in Greece. These issues are analyzed for three periods: the 1974-1981 New Democracy Governments, the 1974-1981 opposition policies of PASOK, and the 1974-present PASOK government. Although some expected a radical departure in policies with the 1981 change to a socialist government, practical policies have shown very little change. The basic requirements of a developing and maturing country influenced by the conditions of its regional environment and general world conditions seem to lend consistency and rationality to Greek security policy and should be considered in forming Western policy for the region.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PERSPECTIVE

In recent years considerable concern has been expressed about the future viability of the Atlantic Alliance as a cooperative security venture. Numerous authors have pointed to the many divergences which have been straining the alliance for years and which seem to be worsening. Changes within the global strategic environment as well as within various regions and individual states seem to increase the difficulty of gaining commonality of purpose and consensus in action among the Western allies. These changes have been interpreted both pessimistically and optimistically, but most observers seem to agree that a careful reconsideration of the basics of the alliance seems in order. Central to this consideration has been the observation that certain elements within the alliance leadership seem to take a conservative approach to the security arrangement, seeing its success over the past 34 years as evidence of its viability and an argument against change. One tendency, then, may be to partially overlook the changes which have taken place on many levels within the Western sphere and resort to past generalities to form policy for the alliance. Other optimists will say that it is the very strength of the alliance which has allowed it to survive the numerous "crises" and shifts which have occurred since its founding, and that it is the fundamental assumptions which have carried the alliance through these rough times. However, there are pessimists who see growing and multiplying political, economic and military problems as an indication of future collapse if new arrangements and outlooks are not adopted. Pierre Hassner has put it quite succinctly:

In sum, the traditional problems of NATO are all still present, but they are exacerbated by much more serious external situations, both military and economic, and by more difficult domestic situations, particularly in countries ... in which, for a long time, domestic divisions did not affect foreign policy. The economic and the military crises coincide with the so-called governability crises of Western societies, and the postwar national and alliance consensus is now being increasingly challenged. [Ref. 1: p. 378]

It is therefore a combination of factors in increasing complexity which adds new dimensions to alliance problems. Generational shifts in Europe and the United States which have brought significant new domestic and international political and security perceptions. This has added new elements to be taken into consideration during policy formation for the Alliance and for the United States. The perceived strength of the monolithic Soviet challenge has diminished in many countries. Increasing East-West connections have had significant effects, especially in some Western European countries, on Western perceptions of the East-West relationship. Political, cultural and economic connections developed during the detente era have sometimes tended to obfuscate the formerly clear-cut security policy goals. With the addition of what some call a strategic East-West stalemate and the worsening economic realities of the past several years, it has become increasingly difficult to identify common security interests among the allies. Instead, policy formation within most European countries has become a balancing act between national interests, regional interests and larger community interests. In a 1982 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which dealt with the growing problems in the Atlantic Alliance, it was stated that:

The challenge for American policy makers who want to ensure the future of the alliance is to adopt policies which respond to today's security problems and which have sufficient credibility to attract the support of future generations of Europeans. [Ref. 2: p. 27]

Hassner pointed out that the starting point for any reevaluation of alliance policy should be a thorough understanding of the "overriding issue of domestic priorities versus NATO priorities." He continued to explain that this can only be obtained through a detailed case-by-case analysis which can differentiate among the various forces affecting the alliance relationship. It is this type of analysis which forms evidence of new realities which may have been covered up by old generalizations. [Ref. 1: p. 389]

This thesis examines one of these cases, that of Greece. This analysis may serve as a basis for further comparisons and contrasts to form a set of realistic assumptions upon which policy formation or readjustment could be based. Considerations brought out by this study could be applied in other similar situations in other regions or states.

B. PURPOSES

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between Greek security policy and Greek politics as it has developed since the critical events of 1974. There is no doubt that security in this region has taken on increased importance during this period. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of Iran to the anti-U.S. Islamic fundamentalists, the increasing strategic importance of the Middle East and the greater presence of the Soviets in the Eastern Mediterranean region demonstrated by the growing strength and activity of the Soviet Mediterranean naval squadron, security analysts have shown increasing concern over the viability of security arrangements in the NATO "southern flank." Added to this concern are the various regional problems which complicate intra-alliance relationships. Finally, specific developments within Greece, starting from the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the withdrawal of the

Greek forces from the integrated military structure of NATO, and the recent change of government with a heretofore unknown shift to the left in Greek politics have all served to place former Western and United States security interests and arrangements in question. An example of this concern was voiced by F. S. Larrabee, shortly after the Greek national elections of 1981:

[The] election ... raises troubling doubts about Greece's future, particularly its ties to the West. Is Greece headed toward neutralism? What impact will Papandreou's election have on Greece's ties to NATO? Will his victory give new impetus to the wave of pacifism and neutralism sweeping Western Europe? What impact will Papandreou's election have on relations with the United States and the future of U.S. bases in Greece? [Ref. 3: p. 158]

These questions can only be adequately answered by a detailed examination of political events and policy evidence during the period in question.

C. THE QUESTION AND STRUCTURE

The general question explored in this thesis is: Are the elements of Greek security policy based on long-term basic interests which find consistent expression, or are they a function of domestic political factors, more ideologically motivated, and therefore variable according to the governing political party? The question, further distilled, asks whether the specific Greek situation determines Greek policy regardless of the ideological orientation of the party in power or whether the ideology of the party in power determines Greek policy. The answer to this question has important implications for policy makers and for the future of Greek relations with the West.

To answer this question and to further clarify the realities of the Greek-West relationship (specifically with the

NATO and the U.S.) this study will be structured around three segments of post-1974 political developments which have had an important influence on Greek policy-making:

1. Policies under the prime ministership of Konstantinos Karamanlis and the leadership of the New Democracy party from 1974 to 1980, continued under Prime Minister George Rallis from 1980 to 1981.
2. The evolution of policies during the development of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) opposition party from 1974 to 1981, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou.
3. The policies which have been developed by the PASOK government following the 1981 election under the leadership of the present Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou.

For each of these segments, particular attention will be placed on the nature of the political developments and their relationship to specific Greek security interests. The focus is on three important Greek security concerns: the Cyprus problem; the issues involving primarily Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean Sea region and their implications for NATO military command and control arrangements in the area; and issues concerning the U.S./NATO military facilities in Greece. These three issue areas along with other basic Greek security concerns are examined as they impinge on Greek-NATO integration and the quality and nature of Greek-U.S. security relations. Finally, by analyzing and comparing the findings from these three periods, certain constants are considered which form the basis for Greek-Western security relationships.

D. RATIONALE

In limiting the time period for study, the year 1974 was chosen for the beginning, because, as acknowledged by most authors writing about recent developments in Greece, it marks a critical juncture in almost every aspect of Greek development. The catalytic events of 1974--the abortive summer coup engineered by the Greek military junta in association with the Greek Cypriot militia against the Makarios regime in Cyprus and the ensuing Turkish invasion and occupation of a portion of the island--has led to significant change in most phases of Greek public life. A period of readjustment and reexamination of both the internal issues of Greece and the role of Greece in the West has followed. The resulting changes in Greece's political system and its foreign and security policies have been cause for both worry and relief in the West. Extending the period to the present covers the apparently dramatic political changes evident in the rise of the left in Greece and the eventual socialist victory of PASOK in the 1981 national elections.

The three issues chosen for particular attention--Cyprus, the Aegean and U.S. bases--are important in that they represent points of convergence between specific Greek national security interests, overlapping and often conflicting security interests of the regional actors and the more strategic security interests of the United States and NATO. Each of these issues involves NATO in a specific way. They all affect the force structuring and defense planning for the area, they affect the use of facilities during NATO exercises and contingencies, they directly affect command and control planning and structuring in the area, and they affect the internal cohesion of the alliance and the strength of its southern flank, since they represent divisive issues between two NATO partners. These issues

also have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the region. The military support facilities located in Greece have been put under reexamination and their former basis as well as their very existence has been questioned. Regional security, especially with relation to the adjoining Middle East, has become an important interest in U.S. security planning; and although it has been demonstrated adequately in the past that the U.S. cannot expect a great deal of support from the countries of the region for any U.S. operations outside of the NATO area, the continuation of a Western orientation in the region is a significant contribution to the American interest of increased stability in the region. Also, because the U.S. is the major military equipment supplier to the region, the continuation of Greek-Turkish friction has increasingly complicated U.S. attempts to strengthen both countries militarily. Finally, the unsolved regional problems, in damaging relations among the regional allies, seriously constrains U.S. regional security considerations and arrangements.

E. SCOPE AND CAVEATS

For purely practical reasons and for reasons of clarity, the scope of this study is limited to the examination of the issues from the Greek perspective; that is, the perspective presented through reported views and statements of the political figures representing the two parties which are to be compared. Although the author has tried to refer mainly to sources as close to the original as possible in describing policies and developments during each of the three major segments, it is freely acknowledged that constraints of space and resource availability may have caused certain simplifications of the extremely complex issues involved.

A further assumption of this study was that the two major political parties studied represented, at various times, the general consensus of the views of their constituencies and therefore could be considered representative of some major trends in post-1974 Greek politics. This assumption, however, does not disregard the existence of other political parties or even divergent views among voters who supported the two parties under consideration here. Evidence of this fact is that the number of actual party members is considerably smaller than the number of votes cast for a particular party.

Finally, in limiting this study to the various Greek points of view, the fact that some of the issues surveyed are disputed, requires one to acknowledge that there are opposing viewpoints held by other regional actors. The purpose of this study is to probe in detail the outstanding Greek security issues and their relation to political developments in Greece as well as their role in forming particular Greek perceptions of security interests. It is not intended to make a judgement as to the ultimate validity of specific Greek perceptions. It is the intention of the author to present a limited case study which can be used for further comparison and consideration when establishing parameters for general policy formation. It is believed that certain similarities can be found among the policies of other NATO countries which could perhaps be generalized to form a realistic view of the security situation within the West. Through this more realistic viewpoint, it is suggested that the challenge of strengthening the security of all the Western allies might be approached more effectively. The Congressional study quoted above indicated that the basis of much of the intra-alliance friction is found in the differing attitudes held by various allies with respect to major security issues. This friction is compounded by

sometimes faulty perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic as to the intent of the other. Thus it is of ultimate importance that some basis of understanding be established to supplant growing misapprehension about and misrepresentation of interests and intentions. This study serves as an example of an alternate approach to policy formation which grounds itself in the assumption that multiple interests must be balanced to form a policy which will have optimum benefit for all concerned. Thus, a detailed understanding of these multiple interests is necessary at the outset, one which should be based as much as possible on reality and divorced from ideological overgeneralization.

II. BACKGROUND

Since the object of this thesis is to survey particular Greek security concerns within the context of a changing domestic political environment, some background is necessary to place these concerns into perspective and show how they relate to one another, to the internal interests of Greece, to regional interests generated from outside the Greek state, and to the political development of the country. This background section is designed to briefly cover some of the general and historical considerations which contribute to Greek security policy. General Greek security considerations are discussed first. Following this, a short background of the main security issues which are of primary concern for this thesis is presented. The linkage between the primary Greek interests and the broader regional western security interests (particularly of the United States and NATO) is briefly explored.

A. GREEK SECURITY: SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The broad term "security" has been subject to many uses and misuses in the justification of a diverse range of national policies. For purposes of this study, however, a limited and clear definition is necessary--one which will apply specifically to the post-World War II Greek security environment. Within this context, the term is used to apply only to those issues and considerations, policies, or attitudes which concern the preservation of the Greek state from perceived threat. Although this threat is generally considered to be external, an internal dimension is also recognized for purposes of this thesis. The latter is included

since, especially for smaller countries, the internal strength of the country and its institutions very often influence the nature as well as the intensity of the external threat. Thus security, simply defined for purposes here, is the protection, by whatever means available, of Greek national interests from perceived internal and external threat. Of course, the treatment of this subject in its broadest sense would reach far beyond the limits of this thesis. Certain key issues have therefore been chosen to be surveyed, within a limited time frame and from specific political points of view, to present examples of general security policy formation trends and influences.

1. Defence and Sovereignty

In considering the general nature of Greek security, an initial distinction must be made between two general alternatives in pursuit of national interests; between an offensive or a defensive policy. (Normally this distinction is superfluous when discussing "security" policy, however, in certain cases and especially when the policy exists in an atmosphere of regional accusations and counter-accusations, this distinction can become elemental.) It is the position of this thesis that particularly in this post-World War II period, Greek security policy has been limited to a strictly defensive context. Certain events have conspired to make this so, although historically this was not always the case.

In the early 1900's Greek policy was based on two major concerns: the protection of the Macedonian sections of the country from encroachment and the irredentist policy of reclaiming, primarily Greek-inhabited territories in the Anatolian region from Ottoman Turkish control. The latter was referred to as the "Megali Idea" (great idea), and was the source of several attempts, when conditions were considered favorable, to secure areas within the

degenerating Ottoman Empire for Greece. With the end of World War I, the issue of control in the area was brought to the fore, mainly within the context of great power maneuvering for influence and protection of interests. It was in this unsettled environment that Greece chose to pursue its irredentist goals in Thrace and Asia Minor. This initially attracted the interest of the British and the United States in seeing friendly Greek influence in the Smyrna region as an effective counterbalance to growing Italian influence in the area. However, with the numerous changes taking place in the region and with the signing of several treaties which began to more clearly delineate interests and control in the area, support for the Greek cause waned and the Greek campaign, pursued in earnest in 1921, fell quite disastrously before Turkish nationalist forces in the fall of 1922. The ensuing 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which officially ended the hostilities, can be seen as the turning point in Greek security policy. At the most general level, and in light of the new realities within the region, it signified the effective end of Greek irredentist aspirations. The effects of this treaty have important implications for the development of security concepts and issues today.

Among the provisions of the treaty, the most far-reaching was the massive compulsory ethnic population transfer which was prescribed. Approximately 1.5 million ethnic Greeks were evacuated to Greece from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. Correspondingly, about .5 million Muslims from Epirus, Macedonia and Crete went the opposite direction. The result of this transfer along with other treaty arrangements effectively consolidated the modern Greek state both territorially and demographically.¹ The outcome of this

¹In the area of Greek Macedonia and Thrace, the consolidation was aided by the voluntary exodus of the Slavs from the region from 1920 to 1922, undertaken under the provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) concerning the recip-

transfer was a changed Greek security policy outlook from that of pursuing redemption of territories for the Greek homeland to the protection of a consolidated Greek state. The treaty had provided a new definition of Greek sovereignty and protection of the newly defined status quo became the primary security issue. Regional realities had been redefined and the new realities became Greek security policy bases.

This is not to say the the Lausanne Treaty had resolved the persistently disputed issues of Balkan security once and for all. More realistically, it represented some of the issues which are still relevant for regional security. First, although an attempt was made through the treaty to settle the issue of Greek claims in the region, the fact that the irredentist policy had had such a priority in Greek policy for so many years could not be easily forgotten by other regional actors; historical sources for security perceptions are not easily changed by diplomatic arrangements. Additionally, certain provisions of the treaty became manifestations of future problems in the region. Some of the specific issues should be pointed out:

1. The Greek minorities of Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos as well as the Greek-Thracian Turkish minority, were exempted from the exchange. The treatment of these remaining minorities became a persistent point of contention between Greece and Turkey.
2. The island of Cyprus was officially ceded to Britain. This was to become the subject of Greek concern over the rights of the Greek majority on the island. It led to the gradually expanding Greek

local emigration of national minorities. Also, many of the Greek emigres from Turkey settled in this region, which further served to consolidate the Greek position in the area.

desire for union of the island with Greece (enosis), the increasing involvement of Turkey in the issue (to whom the British turned to attempt to partially counterbalance Greek claims), and the explosive events of the 1950's which created serious international tension and the eventual establishment of the independent state of Cyprus in 1960. This hurried solution later proved ineffective in completely resolving the conflicting desires of those involved.

3. The Dodecanese were ceded to Italy, with the exception of Rhodes. In later maneuvering over the control of the islands especially within the context of World War II, conflicting interests were again to become influential in creating Greek-Turkish friction.

The events of the early 1920's were to have some further general outcomes which are important to this discussion. First, the disastrous consequences of the military losses, coupled with the strain and expense of the settlement of one and one half million refugees in a country with a total population of only about five million, severely weakened the country in many respects, especially economically. However, the influx of the large number of unattached people onto the urban areas greatly increased the work force, which was to contribute to social and demographic changes contributing to later economic and industrial growth. This represented the beginning of the 20th Century trend toward modernization accompanied by continuing urban growth and depletion of the agricultural work force--a significant departure from the previous agrarian economy. This general change in social and economic character brought about new social demands and had significant political impact. The period brought about an era of instability--political, economic and social--which was to set a new

character for Greek public life. All these influences contributed to the beginning of a transformation typical to the largely agrarian and heavily dependent smaller states of the time. This transformation was the beginning of a quest for independence and maturity for the Greek state, which was to bring with it several decades of political polarity and tension.

The events of the inter-war period, accompanied by the devastating experience of the occupation during World War II and the ensuing destruction of the Greek Civil War (1944-1949), all served to ensure that Greece, for the near future, was not to have the power to pursue an expansionist or irredentist policy. The highest priority remained the preservation of the status quo and the attempt to codify this through treaty arrangements and agreements which would attract the support of at least one of the great powers. Lacking sufficient resources to accomplish this militarily, it was necessary for Greece to turn to diplomatic means for support. The result was that Greece had very little control over its policy formation, and became increasingly dependent on its supporting powers, especially Britain before World War II and after 1947 the United States. A polarization resulted within the country which still persists to a lesser extent today--the polarization between those supporting dependence on external powers and those desiring severance of these relationships and a more independent course for Greece. The need for external support was to frustrate the modernization process, which was often subordinated to outside interests.

Thus two important general aspects of the nature of Greek security were well established. Greek security was to be purely defensive and was to a large extent shown to be dependent on external factors and external support.

2. Threat Perception

Traditionally, the Greeks have had to deal with two major external threats to their security interests. The first came from the North, from Balkan Slavic expansionism later translated to Soviet expansionism through the Warsaw Pact. The second threat is seen as coming from the East, from perceived Turkish expansionism. Both of these threats are grounded in long histories of give and take between Greece and the countries of these two regions. Both involve the basic security interest of preservation of the territorial integrity of the Greek sovereign state. Both have also involved, since the turn of the century, periods of both cooperation and confrontation. The at times limited capabilities of Greece to deal with these threats, especially simultaneously, with military power has led to continuing efforts toward diplomatic solutions. The periodic Balkan cooperation initiatives are representative of this as are the Venizelos-Ataturk accords of 1930 with Turkey. Although the two threats are mutually exclusive, they have tended to have an indirect effect on one another. Thus, when the Eastern Threat looms large, Greece has seen fit to increase contact with the Balkan countries. Conversely, when the threat from the North seems more serious (as it did at the end of the second World War), Greek-Turkish confrontation seems to diminish. Neither of these external threats has had a consistent weight in forming Greek security perceptions. Instead, they seem to vary in intensity largely due to factors beyond the control of the Greeks.

The evolution of external threat perception has been seen quite vividly since the end of World War II. It was the threat from the North which was connected to the Greek communist uprising and the Civil War, and it was the further fear of Soviet expansionism which brought Greece and Turkey

into NATO on the same day in 1952. However, with growing prosperity and the security provided by the western association, perceptions of a threat from the North began to subside. The continued resistance to Soviet domination by Yugoslavia contributed to increasingly better Greek-Yugoslav relations. With limitations of Soviet influence in the other Balkan countries of Albania and Rumania the northern threat was further reduced. Finally, with the East-West thaw and detente, the Greek perception of the northern threat followed a pattern similar to many of the European states and continued to diminish. Increasing diplomatic, economic and cultural contacts with the northern neighbors under the umbrella of Western alliance protection have helped neutralize some of the outstanding issues between the countries and have caused the perceived threat from the north to largely subside, although relations with eastern bloc countries and with the Soviet Union remain cautious.

Conversely, no longer united by an overriding Soviet threat and both pursuing their own form of "Ostpolitik" with the Soviet Union to enhance their positions, the relations between Greece and Turkey have become more conflictual, the threat from the East looming larger in Greek security considerations. The Greek interpretation of Turkish action in Cyprus and the Aegean, of Turkish demographic trends, and of Turkish relations with the United States, NATO and even the Soviet Union led to increased worry about the protection of Greek interests. The Greeks have generally taken an increasingly pessimistic view of Turkish intentions, a pessimism which has been increased by a growing lack of confidence in the protective capabilities of its Western allies. Within this environment the threat from the East has received increasing priority recently.

Finally, another fundamental threat should be added to the two external threats mentioned above (which is not

normally included by most authors as such). It is the internal threat--the threat of internal political upheaval, destabilization or collapse. This threat is manifested in the history of Greek instability, external penetration, internal polarization and schism, frequent military intervention and civil war. Indeed, some recent authors, taking a quite different view from that surrounding the Truman Doctrine interpretation of the Greek Civil War, have seen that destructive struggle as an internal matter. According to this interpretation, it was an expression of the radicalization of politics resulting from years of foreign influence in Greek affairs which supported the clientelistic right wing political establishment and effectively eliminated the political center. The results of internal instability, no matter what the cause, inevitably lead to security weakness and vulnerability and the detrimental difficulty in pursuing Greek interests. The 1967-74 junta government has become a vivid symbol of the threat from internal instability and has become an important consideration in recent policy formation. Political weakness has led to external penetration and the subordination of Greek interests to those of external forces. Through a strong stable, government Greek interests can be protected and pursued and the "damaging influence" of external intervention can be prevented. This is another security consideration which has firm support in the Greek historical experience.

3. Security Arrangements

Achieving adequate security in light of Greece's unique circumstances has historically been a fundamental problem for Greece. Regardless of the nature of Greek security policy, due to circumstances, resources and other limiting factors, Greece has neither been able to provide

for its own security completely independently nor has it been able to secure its interests completely militarily. Therefore, a consistent characteristic of Greek security has been its reliance on political arrangements to secure external support. It has been necessary for Greece to rely on a "great power" benefactor for this support. Consequently, Greece security policy and foreign policy has been constrained by the necessity of securing this support. This dependence is complicated by three factors:

1. At times the "great powers" have simply intervened to pursue their own interests irrespective of Greek desires.
2. At times, support from an external power has been solicited by a particular faction in Greece to further its own political power.
3. At times the supporting power has had to balance Greek interests with conflicting interests of other allies.

Support has generally come from the "West" (Great Britain, France and most recently the United States). This too is not so much a matter of choice for Greece but a function of the nature of the global power structure and its influence on the area. The support has generally led to external involvement in influencing the course of Greek politics. It has been noted that the primary purpose for the arming of Greece and the initial force posturing after the accession of Greece to NATO was to deal with the internal threat, to ensure proper, Western-oriented internal political arrangements. Greek domestic support for external intervention has generally been identified with the political right, the royalists and the military.

A particular difficulty for Greece has arisen in the attempt to rationalize its dependency with national interests. Dependency has had some adverse effects. It has been

seen as reinforcing the political patronage system, as spreading to economic dependency and exploitation, polarization of society, and general loss of control over Greek affairs. The enthusiasm with which the foreign powers have taken on their responsibilities has not only reinforced Greek dependency and raised Greek expectations, but has put these powers in a position to receive some blame for the ills which may befall Greece. The positive effects of this external support are critical, however. It has provided for the basic survival of the Greek state (although some would argue that Turkish domination was exchanged for domination from other powers).

The reality of partial Greek dependency on foreign powers for its security has created a fundamental dilemma: it has been in the interest of Greece to seek external support for security, but the support has not necessarily been rendered in deference to Greek interests. While the support has contributed to the basic survival of Greece particularly during times when due to many factors Greece was weakened and therefore vulnerable, it has been seen by a broad section of public opinion as an inhibiting influence on general Greek progress, modernization and independence. Wrestling with this dilemma has become a permanent feature of Greek security policy formation--the problem has been to strike a balance between Greek desires and internal and external realities.

Geopolitical reality has to a large extent determined the character of Greek security arrangements. The orientation and security of Greece have been seen as peripheral or supporting interests within the larger complex of regional strategic interests of the great powers. Greece has therefore often been seen as providing either an element of counterbalance or continuity for the powers controlling the region. This has further been mainly associated with

the control of influence in the Mediterranean, the Balkans or the Middle East, often all simultaneously. The decisive element of influence for Greece has been the role of Mediterranean naval power, predominated for many years by the British and later taken over by the United States. For these powers the maintenance of a favorable alignment of Greece, among other things, might strategically be seen as a counterbalancing of land-power extension into the region and prevention of the establishment of regional power bases by an opposing force which could threaten regional influence and the strategic situation. For Greece, the predominance of a single-power or alliance in the region has in some ways limited the options for Greek security arrangements and given them a single-source nature. This in turn could lead to greater dependence and vulnerability for the Greek state.

Finally, internal political affairs have been affected by this external ingredient of Greek security policy. The large interest in foreign affairs issues has become an assumption of Greek politics for generations. Additionally, political parties have in the past been identified with the nature of their external relations and support from certain foreign elements. Many political battles have been fought over the issue of foreign affairs--that is, support and alignment--causing at times deep political splits within the country. Most notably, the "Great Schism" was to a large extent a result of a division of opinion as to which side of the European power split the country would align with during the period around the First World War. The Greek civil war of the 1940's can also be seen to a large extent revolving around this question. And finally, the alignment policies during the 1967-1974 junta have had serious political and foreign policy implications for the present external relations of Greece. Thus, to a large extent, Greek politics and external relations have

been closely interconnected, generally centering on basic security issues. This has had not only a significant effect on internal Greek development but has been an important determinant of foreign relations with Greece, important for purposes here. It is also indicative of a situation present in most developing countries which intersect strategic interests of great powers, for which Greece, in addition to having some unique problems, may serve as a generalized example.

B. SECURITY ISSUES

Within the framework of these general security considerations, specific issues have been chosen as focal points: Cyprus; the Aegean disputes, particularly as they relate to NATO military control in the area; and the United States/NATO facilities in Greece. These issues represent the intersection of a number of the general characteristics of Greek security. They all have to do with the protection of some aspect of Greek sovereignty from a perceived threat. They all intersect with the security of other nations who pursue their own interests in the region, and they all have had a significant domestic political importance in Greece. Specifically, during the time period under consideration, from 1974 to 1984, they have involved both Greek interests of alignment and support, independence and modernization as well as security. Additionally, they affect the Western alliance (and particularly the United States) interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the security of the Southern Flank of NATO and the protection of the regional status quo from alteration, especially by the Warsaw Pact. These connections and their background will be discussed in this section.

Greek security also cannot be discussed without consideration of the "northern threat." This is also of some importance here as it represents the fundamental rationale for the Greek association with NATO, and has been one of the primary regional concerns of the United States. Therefore, this issue has also been briefly discussed in this thesis as it interrelates with Greek/Western security concerns in general.

1. Balkan Security Issues

Owing to the destruction of the Second World War and ensuing instability, the nature of Balkan security was drastically altered.² The Balkans became a region split by the cold war division established on the northern border of Greece and further divided by the efforts of communist factions maneuvering for power under increased pressure from the Soviet Union. It was a combination of the post-war Stalinist assertiveness and the vacuum of power in Greece threatened by the British retreat from regional influence which brought on the active intervention in the chaotic post-war Greek situation by the United States, and it was the perceived threat of Soviet regional expansion which brought Greece and Turkey into NATO. This polarization of the Balkan region was to provide only temporary stability to the area and a brief hiatus in the normal character of Balkan relations. However, it created new requirements and constraints in these relations. F. S. Larrabee summed up the direction of Balkan politics and security as follows:

²See F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security, (Adelphi Papers No. 135), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977, and Veremis, Thanos, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, (Adelphi Papers No. 175), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 6-9, for good discussions on Greek-Balkan issues.

The polarization of the Balkans produced a certain stability in the area, however artificial. For a while many of the region's traditional tensions were subordinated to the strictures of 'tight bipolarity' and bloc politics. With the onset of detente, however, many of the old patterns of Balkan politics have begun to reassert themselves, and the region has once again become the object of international attention. [Ref 2: p.2]

Several factors have contributed to the increase of interest in the region. Major powers have been motivated primarily by the strategic proximity of the Balkans to the Middle East and the usefulness of the area for supply and support in any future Middle East contingencies. Furthermore, recent complication of Balkan-Soviet relations brought on by the Chinese Communist interest in the area, the death of Tito and the question of the future of Yugoslavia, and the further assertiveness of other states, particularly Rumania and Albania, have brought in question the nature of future Soviet intentions in the region. Finally, the growing reassertion of Balkan nationalism, never fully suppressed by bloc politics and the relaxation of tension between the superpowers has fostered a revival of regional associations and conflicts. These factors combined with recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland have increased Western concerns. In addition, the loss of Iran as an ally has made the United States more aware of the importance of especially Greece and Turkey to its security interests in the area. Thus, the issue of collective security in the region still has significant meaning to the West.

For Greece, on the other hand, a number of concerns have become important. First, historically, the Balkan countries have periodically sought cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally to secure common interests from external intervention. This has been reflected in the attempts at Balkan union over the years, at times sponsored by outside powers and at times generated internally.

Secondly, disputes between Greece and her neighbors have complicated attempts at cooperation. For example, the question of Macedonia (control or independence) has been a perpetual issue between Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Greece's interest since the Second World War has generally been the preservation of the status quo.³ Relations with Albania are another example of local complications to Balkan relations, revolving around the disputed area of Northern Epirus and the status of the Greek minority (estimated anywhere from 40 to 80,000). [Ref. 1: pp. 43-44] Within the context of Western alignment of Greece and the Soviet influence interest in other Balkan countries, open conflict or excessive demands have been avoided. Instead, relations between Greece and its northern neighbors have been progressing step by step on the bilateral level and the outstanding problems have been taken up within this framework.

Thirdly, although the facts of the various issues which separate the Northern Greek security concerns from the Eastern ones seem to be quite distinct, the realities of Greek security indicate intricate links between Balkan issues and other security concerns. Thus, the relaxed atmosphere in the North makes possible a greater concentration on the Eastern issues. It also affects the strength of the ties between Greece and the Atlantic Alliance, since the Soviet threat for Greece is articulated through the Balkan region. Any improvement in Greek-Balkan relations reduces the perceived necessity for a strong NATO tie. The relaxation of tensions in this region also has led to

³This issue has at times been a liability for the Communist Party in Greece and a reason for its lack of popularity, since it has in the past taken the position that an independent Macedonia should be created. This was in the interest of Moscow but would have meant loss of territory for Greece--a powerful political issue touching on Greek "sovereignty."

greater desire for independence in both Turkey and Greece and has created an atmosphere in which the overriding necessity for cooperation has been reduced and the importance of individual issues has expanded. Conversely, the search for support and security in the face of other, perceived more pressing issues, has led to increased attempts at Greek-Balkan cooperation. This has been especially true since shortly after the end of World War II, where both sides have sought the support of the other in various contexts in order to pursue other interests.

Finally, Greek-Balkan relations cannot be separated from the changing international situation and are limited by the realities of Greece's position within it. Thus the interests of collective security still temper relations between Greece and the Balkan states. They have limited the possibilities for cooperation from both sides, neither superpower being willing to allow the Balkan region to pursue its own collective course independently. However, within a limited latitude, the bipolar arrangement has allowed the countries to exert a certain amount of independence from their superpower mentors which is reinforced through bilateral support. Thus the independence of Yugoslavia has been partially linked to the presence of strong Western influence in Greece. This has become representative of Western resolve to counter stronger Soviet presence in the area. This is also true for Rumania, to a lesser degree. Similarly, the recent Greek reassessment of its NATO and U.S. relations would be to a large degree unthinkable without a corresponding improvement in Greek-Balkan relations reducing the northern threat.

Ultimately, however, increased Greek diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the area have been contingent on external forces. It has been in the interest of the superpowers to allow them to progress. However, it has been also

their prerogative to limit them when necessary as seen in the early post-war period where Western interests prevented extensive contact between Greece and the Balkans while fear of any Balkan cooperative arrangements have caused the Soviets, mainly through their Bulgarian contacts, to limit these efforts. In this same vein, it is interesting to note that Greco-Yugoslav relations have been greatly affected by Soviet policies. Where the Soviets have been more demanding, Yugoslav relations with Greece have improved. And when Greek-Western relations have degenerated, Greek contacts and diplomatic efforts with the Balkan countries have increased.

In summary, although Greek Northern security issues may be separated from others in content, they cannot be totally divorced from general considerations of Greek security, since they impact not only the Greek security relationship with the West but are important co-determinants of Greek Eastern and even domestic security policy.

2. Cyprus

a. General Background

The overriding interest of Greece in Cyprus is rooted in the ethnic, cultural and religious ties between the Greek-Cypriot majority (estimated to be about 80% of the approximately 640,000 population) and the Greek mainland.⁴ However, in the late 19th Century, British strategic Mediterranean interests overrode those of Greece, and Cyprus was occupied by the British (1878) and later became a British colony (1925). Even though Greek irredentist policies of the early 1900's would have logically advocated

⁴Kourvetaris [Ref. 7] in a 1978 article surveys six other essays dealing with the interpretation of the Cyprus conflict and gives an excellent 7-page bibliography on the subject.

annexation of Cyprus to Greece, British interests and the degree of Greek dependence on Britain kept this from happening. The situation had changed by 1950 and the cause of enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) gained ever increasing support within the Greek-Cypriot community and in Greece. A plebiscite in the Greek-Cypriot community in that year returned 96% of the votes in favor of enosis with Greece [Ref. 3: p.10] In support of its side and to counterbalance Greek influence in the increasingly violent anti-colonial struggle being waged in Cyprus, Britain enlisted the support of Turkey, which up until this time had not taken a very active interest in the Cyprus situation. It was during this period that Turkey assumed responsibility for the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriots and the Cyprus issue became increasingly one of Greek-Turkish confrontation.

Pressed by severely deteriorating problems in regional and U.S./British relations growing out of the enosis policy, Greece was forced to amend its goals and seek a quick solution. In 1959 Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes drafted an agreement (known later as the London-Zurich Agreements) which was presented to and approved by leaders of the two Cypriot communities and Britain. The arrangements allowed for sovereign British military bases within an newly created independent republic of Cyprus (formally declared on August 16, 1960) which was to be run under a delicately apportioned mixture of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot control. A treaty of guarantee was included among the agreements. Britain, Greece, and Turkey undertook to recognize and maintain the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. Each of these countries was empowered to act either singly or collectively to maintain the independent integral status of Cyprus. Enosis and partition of the island were officially proscribed. [Ref. 4: p.13]

The government had built-in elements which were soon to bring it to a stalemate when trying to produce legislation to run the country. Growing assertiveness and sensitivity of the Turkish minority and its mainland sponsors as well as the feeling within portions of the Greek community that Turkish influence in the control of the government was disproportionate to the size of the Turkish-Cypriot minority increased intercommunal friction.

The following were to become important ingredients of the issue from the onset and persistent sources of later Cyprus problems:

1. A truly independent state was not really established; the new republic was still formally under the watchful influence of the three external guarantor powers. Theoretically, therefore, external Turkish and Greek interests in Cyprus were legitimized by the 1959 agreements.
2. The agreement was essentially imposed from without and was based not solely on internal Cypriot interest. This increased mutual suspicions as to the intentions of the two most involved external powers--Greece and Turkey--which spread to large segments of the two communities on the island and were reinforced by the continuing presence of both Turkish and Greek political and military influence in Cyprus.
3. Lingering among the Greek and Greek-Cypriot communities was the belief that the partitionist aims of the Turks had not really been suppressed. The growing militancy of Turkey over Cyprus issues, which probably stemmed largely from Turkish domestic political considerations, combined with Turkish actions against the Greek communities in Turkey, especially in Istanbul [Ref. 3: p.10], and

reinforced this perception of Turkish anti-Hellenist tendencies.

4. The Turks and the Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand, still suspected that the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots had not totally given up their desires for enosis. The Turkish community therefore tended to interpret attempts by President Makarios (the acknowledged political and spiritual leader of the Greek community who had during the 1950's expressed enosis desires) to amend the unworkable governmental arrangements as a desire to limit the influence of the Turkish community. Further Greek actions during the 1960's only confirmed their suspicions.

These characteristics of the newly formed Cyprus state, which had apparently failed to provide for a workable form of intercommunal cooperation and had failed to rid the Republic of the confounding influence of external forces, led rapidly to governmental deadlock and increasing crisis during the 1960's. In 1963 Makarios proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution which would have broken the deadlock but also diminished Turkish governmental influence. This was rejected by the Turks and fighting between the two communities broke out. The situation was finally settled in 1964. The threat of Turkish invasion and Greco-Turkish conflict was averted through strong U.S. diplomatic pressure on the Turkish government and the insertion of a United Nations peacekeeping force.⁵

However, the issue was not settled permanently and further violence erupted in 1967. In this year, General Grivas, leader of the pro-enosis, anti-communist guerilla

⁵On the progressive role played by the UN force in Cyprus see Ref.6 which also contains good bibliographical material on opposing viewpoints surrounding the Cyprus issue.

forces of the EOKA movement during the anti-British efforts of 1955 to 1959, had maneuvered himself into the position of Commander of the Greek-Cypriot militia forces. Between 1964 and 1967, Grivas had managed to secretly mass a force of perhaps as many as 10,000 Greek officers and NCO's on the island to support his pro- enosis movement. [Ref. 5: p.48] New attacks on Turkish-Cypriot villages renewed the crisis and the threat of Turkish invasion. Again, forceful American and NATO diplomacy deterred Turkish intervention and led to the removal of the excessive Greek forces from the island. [Ref 3: p.11] Intercommunal negotiations were initiated in 1968 but were undermined by continuing internal frictions, the destabilizing influence of Grivas (who secretly returned to the island in 1971) and his newly founded EOKA-B, and continuing external involvement, particularly by the 1967-74 Greek junta government.

It was the legacy of fifteen years of Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus based on mutual suspicions, misperceived intentions, historical antagonisms, and failures of intercommunal cooperation spawned in a large degree by outside pressure which finally led to the disastrous events of 1974. ⁶ Misreading U.S. interests in the area and hoping to rescue his faltering government, junta strong-man Ioannides supported a Greek-Cypriot coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974. In Ankara, this was perceived as a step toward a Greek solution to the Cyprus issue which would effectively lead to enosis. Five days later, after attempts to enlist the support of Britain to intervene, acting ostensibly as guarantor of the Cypriot Republic and

⁶For a provocative treatment of U.S. involvement in Greece and the Cyprus affair from 1967-74 see Stern, L., "Bitter Lessons: How we Failed in Cyprus," Foreign Policy, v. 19, pp. 34-78, Summer 1975; and his later book on the same subject, The Wrong Horse, Times Books, 1977. For a study of the Greek role in the 1974 Cyprus events, see Bell, J.B., "Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis," Orbis, v. 18, pp. 791-808, December 1980.

as protector of Turkish-Cypriot minority interests, and seeing a military opportunity to force a solution more amenable to Turkish interests, Turkish forces landed on the island. Unsupported and unable to mount a credible military response, the Greek military government collapsed, and after mounting a relatively tenacious resistance, the Greek-Cypriot forces were subdued. Having the upper hand, Turkey increased its demands for its Turkish-Cypriot community. After peace talks collapsed, there arrived a second wave of Turkish forces (14 August) on the island which proceeded to consolidate and strengthen its military position on the island. The result is the situation which still exists today--Turkish occupation of approximately 36% of the island maintained by approximately 20,000 Turkish troops (reduced from the original 40,000 strong invasion force).

The events of 1974 have had tragic results for Cyprus. Cyprus remains a divided state with little intercourse between the communities.⁷ The economy of the island was devastated, and has only partially recovered in the Greek zone while the Turkish zone, although having most of the valuable commercial assets of the island, has not really recovered and continues to rely on large amounts of Turkish aid for its survival. The plight of the approximately 180,000 Greek-Cypriot and about 30,000 Turkish-Cypriot refugees who lost everything during their flight from their respective zones has not yet been solved. Continuing attempts at bilateral negotiation under United Nations aegis have not produced meaningful headway. The repeated calls for a solution by the UN have been ineffective. And the continuing problem has initiated a serious period of

⁷The "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" was proclaimed on 13 February 1975 but has never been recognized except by Turkey. The Republic of Cyprus continues to exist on the Greek 2/3 of the island and is still the officially recognized government and member of the UN.

Greek-Turkish tension which has spread to other regional issues.

b. Greece and the Cyprus Issue

Some commentators have seen the Greek "enosis" policies which have contributed to the past problems and present situation in Cyprus as the last vestige of Greek irredentism. As Veremis has pointed out, the struggle which arose out of a "mixture of traditional irredentism with contemporary anti-colonialism," has, through the course of events, "gradually developed into a confrontation between Greek and Turk." [Ref.3: p.10-11] This has moved it into the realm of one of the primary Greek security concerns--the threat from the East. The realities of the present regional context stripped the concept of enosis of any practical meaning for Greek policy or politics today. Instead, Cyprus has taken on a more generalized security importance for the region and for Greece.

Larrabee has titled the Cyprus issue catalytic. He states that:

....in terms of security in the Eastern Mediterranean, the [Cyprus] situation produced three important results: it led to sharp deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey; it intensified differences between both countries and the United States and gave them a strong emotional edge; and it contributed to a polarization of domestic politics and an increase in domestic instability. [Ref. 2: p.17]

For Greece, having apparently not seriously considered a military option since 1974 and having repeatedly called for support of a UN solution and the restoration of the independent and unified republic, Cyprus has taken on a more symbolic security significance.

Primarily, the Cyprus situation represents a Greek perception of Turkish military and expansionist

designs in the region. It could be perceived by some as an example of Turkish disregard for the norms of international behavior in thwarting both the provisions of the London-Zurich agreements and the repeated UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Although Greece does not claim any sovereign territorial interests in Cyprus, the invasion and occupation of the island can be seen as a threat to established international order and Greece's legal position as well as an infringement of the ethnic and cultural sovereignty and rights of the greater Hellenic state. This view might easily be translated into apprehension over the future of Greek insular territories off the Anatolian coast, which came under Greek control as a result of international agreements but are equally vulnerable due to their proximity to Turkey.

On a second level, the Cyprus conflict necessitates, for the Greeks, a reappraisal of former security arrangements. The inability of Greece's security partners, in particular NATO and the United States, to forestall the use by another ally of military power for other than NATO purposes and against Greek interests, could, in some minds, call into question the real ability or desire of Greece's allies to protect Greek interests.⁸ NATO in general is implicated by some observers for several reasons. Primary is the fact that Turkey is a NATO ally and used "NATO equipment" for the Cyprus operation. Secondly, NATO failed to put sufficient pressure on Turkey or take sufficient sanctions to curb Turkish actions and resolve the situation--actions which NATO has considered in the case of aggressive moves by the Soviets. Further, NATO is often seen as an

⁸This position tends to overlook the successful efforts of the U.S. during the 60's in preventing similar actions, to the detriment of U.S. relations in the area. It also does not recognize the "no-win" nature of the situation for the U.S. during periods of Greek-Turkish friction.

extension of the United States in the region, which, to some, had failed to exercise its power and influence in deference to Turkish wishes.

U.S.-Greek security arrangements have come into question also. The inability of the American government to prevent Turkish invasion as it had in 1964 and 1967 was interpreted by some as a conscious U.S. policy shift toward Turkey and against Greece. The perception was that the U.S. could have done more, as it had in decisively responding to other Middle East crises, to prevent the Cyprus situation. These views, of course, fail to take into consideration the many pressures and serious concerns and limitations facing the United States during that particular time.

Finally, the Cyprus situation and Greek policy has extremely serious domestic political implication. Out of the events of 1974 and having established the Cyprus issue as a symbolic rallying point used for political consolidation, continuing political propaganda has virtually locked Greek security policy to the Cyprus issue. Any movement on this issue would not only be politically very dangerous for the survival of the party effecting such a change but would risk disruption of Greek political stability. Furthermore, it could, in the Greek view, send a signal to Ankara which could touch off more serious threats to Greek sovereign interests.

It must be pointed out that there are alternate interpretations of the meaning of the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the events leading up to it. These often opposing viewpoints are no less real to their holders nor are they any less grounded in reality as it is selectively seen. Indeed, it is precisely these varying interpretations of facts, circumstances and intentions that have contributed to the difficulty in finding a solution. As time passes without a solution to the Cyprus question, the longevity of the

varying positions alone makes them more pervasive within each country. Also, since both Athens and Ankara have made considerable domestic political investment in their side of the issue, neither side is politically able to freely change their policy without serious internal political consequences.

c. NATO, the U.S. and the Cyprus Issue

The immediate and obvious effect of the recent Cyprus crises culminating in the Turkish operations of 1974 has been the complication of NATO security arrangements in the area. Cyprus, as the most visible representation of Greek-Turkish disputes, has had serious consequences for NATO regional security interests. While open conflict between the two allies (a very real possibility over the Cyprus situation in the 1960's) and its devastating effects for the region has for the present been avoided, complete cooperation with and solidarity of NATO regional security arrangements cannot be anticipated without a full and equitable solution. It is therefore in NATO's interest to aid in seeking a resolution.

While NATO, by its very nature, is not equipped to deal with such issues as Cyprus, the problem has directly affected alliance strength, at least during peacetime. The 1974 crisis resulted in a rift in Greek-NATO military ties which has yet to be fully repaired. It also has weakened Turkish military capabilities through the U.S. Congress's Turkish arms embargo which is only slowly being remedied. The dispute has caused both countries to turn their attention from the common NATO threat and to direct a portion of their security and defense efforts toward one another. Perceptions within both countries have severely eroded public support for NATO. This has led them to look elsewhere for support, primarily in new contacts with the

Eastern bloc. Also, the conflict and its consequences have placed the future of NATO/U.S. facilities in both countries in question. The final result has been a general weakening of NATO strength and credibility in the area, according to many observers.

As the major alliance representative in the region and having strategic interests of its own, the U.S. position has been most severely affected by the Cyprus situation. U.S. interests have supported the continuing viability and strength of a unified (if non-aligned) Cyprus. The continuing partition of the island works against this interest not only by placing it in the difficult, often untenable position of being the primary defensive ally to both major adversaries, but by the resultant increasing strength of the far left, more pro-Moscow political elements in Cyprus. While as yet no permanent damage has been done and Cyprus remains favorably disposed to the West, the continuing shift in Cypriot politics could lead to a disadvantageous position for the West in the future.

The most serious legacy of the last two decades of Cyprus conflict has been the continued deterioration of U.S.-Greek-Turkish relations. From the U.S. interventions in 1964 and 1967 and the arms embargo of 1975-78, U.S.-Turkish relations have been damaged. The events have been perceived by many Turks as a U.S. "tilt" toward Greece and lack of support for Turkish interests. This has possibly contributed to Turkish militancy in the situation. On the other hand, while the U.S. was able to restrain Turkey in Cyprus during the crises of the 1960's, the inability of Washington to do so in 1974 combined with the continued Presidential and State Department efforts against the Turkish arms embargo, the lifting of the embargo without a Cyprus settlement, and the massive predominantly military aid proposed for Turkey, have been perceived in

Greece as a U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey. This has been looked on by some in Greece as de facto acceptance of the situation in Cyprus and approval of Turkish claims. U.S. military aid to Turkey without the addition of appropriate concessions from the Turks is seen by some Greeks as a U.S. contribution to the primary security threat perceived by many. The persistence of the Cyprus problem can therefore be looked on as a possible source of deterioration of the U.S. strategic position in the region, a position becoming more critical with the increasing tension in the adjoining Middle East.

C. AEGEAN ISSUES

1. General

While the Cyprus issue has been important as a representative of Greek-Turkish friction and was an important catalyst in the worsening relations between the two countries, Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean have become potentially more serious. Although the control of the Aegean Sea region, its islands and its adjoining land masses has been disputed since ancient times, new elements beginning in 1973 have refueled the old controversies and have added some new ones. These include the issues of the control of "continental shelf" regions, territorial waters, Airspace control, the regional balance of military power and the command and control of NATO forces in the area.

Andrew Wilson [Ref. 8] has produced a very detailed and comprehensive study of the Greek-Turkish issues revolving around the Aegean which includes background information and an appraisal of the Greek and Turkish views on the various issues. This work need not be repeated here. Instead, a general survey of the points to be covered in the following chapters is in order along with a general appraisal of the issues from the standpoint of general Greek security considerations.

The primary security issue for Greece in the region has become the protection of the status quo of the territorial arrangements which, since World War II, have progressively defined what Greece has come to regard as sovereign Greek territory. Particularly vulnerable are the numerous Greek islands near the coast of Turkey whose formal possession has been ceded to Greece through the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, which not only set the northern and Thracian Greek borders but also (as recognized by Turkey as co-signator) gave Greece possession of the islands of Limnos, Lesbos, Chios Samos and Icaria. In return, Greece gave up claims to territory in Anatolia. The final arrangement was further strengthened by the massive transfer of minority populations to create a relative ethnic homogeneity. The Dodecanese islands, under Italian control since 1912 were ceded to Greece by the 1947 Treaty of Paris, in recognition for Greece's sacrifices for the allied cause in the Second World War. (Turkey had remained neutral and did not have a place in the settlements of former Italian possessions.) [Ref.8: pp. 2-3] Concern for the security of the eastern insular frontier is intensified in the Greek view by several facts:

1. The Greeks realize that the islands were not always under Greek control. In fact for nearly the first 100 years of the existence of the modern Greek state (until the 1910's and 20's) they came under Ottoman Turkish control. Thus, should any of the later agreements be questioned, Turkey could possibly assert historical claims in the region.
2. Quantitatively, at least, Greece is at a demographic and military disadvantage in the region. A burgeoning Turkish population as well as the Turkish military flexibility created by East-West detente has increased the perceived vulnerability of the

islands to a theoretical scenario of Turkish expansion to the West.

The overriding concern for Greek security is therefore the deterrence of any future actions by Turkey to alter the status quo. Any change in the territorial arrangements of the Aegean would throw into question the whole Greek eastern frontier. Thus while Greece itself cannot legitimately attempt to alter these agreements by asserting any further claims (which would also negate treaty arrangements), it cannot afford to be at all flexible as to what it considers sovereign territory. Since about 30% of the Greek population lives on the islands or border regions of the Aegean (as opposed to 12.5% of the Turkish population on the Turkish coast) [Ref. 8: p.3], control of the region is tantamount to control of the economic, military and communication links which unite Greek territory. Any degradation of this control can be seen by Greece as a threat to Greek territorial integrity. Thus, from a security standpoint the entire region is extremely sensitive to the Greeks.

2. Continental Shelf

The Greek discovery of possible oil deposits in the Thassos region in 1973 raised the question of control of the "continental shelf" in the Aegean Sea. On 1 November 1973, Turkey responded to Greek exploration activities in the region by issuing mineral exploration rights of its own in areas claimed by the Greeks. Turkey also published an official map delimiting the Turkish continental shelf west of the eastern Greek islands, reflecting basically a median line division in the Aegean for continental shelf purposes. In addition, Turkey has sent exploration ships into the disputed areas, the most notable and controversial have been the voyages of the Candalaria in 1974 and the Sismik I (the Hora) in 1976. The details of developments from 1973 to

1979 are covered well by Wilson [Ref. 8: pp.4ff.]. These actions and Turkish claims have been perceived as extremely provocative by the Greeks and have led them to appeal to both the International Court of Justice and the UN for restraint of the Turks.⁹

The Greeks base their continental shelf claims on the Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958, entered into force 10 June 1964 and supported by further conventions of 1968 and similar cases concerning the North Sea region). Article 1a gives islands the same rights to continental shelf areas as other land masses, barring other arrangements [Ref. 8: p.4]. Turkey, on the other hand, not having signed the convention, claims that a median-line arrangement is more equitable and cites the "special circumstances" paragraph of the 1958 convention for support.

While Greece has been adamant that the legal provisions uphold its claims and that any arrangements concerning Turkish rights be based on a strict legal interpretation of the Geneva Convention, security perceptions have played a large role in the Greek outlook. Some of these are:

1. Greece cannot allow areas of Turkish control to surround its island territories. This would represent a break in the continuity of the Eastern islands with the Greek mainland and would bring into question other issues of control in the area. In the Greek view, this would infringe on the territorial integrity of Greece and could eventually lead Turkey to question Greek control of the islands themselves.

⁹For a complete coverage of these issues and their outcomes see References 9, 10 and 11.

2. Any bilateral arrangements would constitute capitulation of "legal sovereign rights" to the areas surrounding the Greek islands. Thus, only a judgment by an international body (e.g. the ICJ) has the power to alter the status of the continental shelf in the Aegean.
3. Until such time as further legal definitions are established, Greece cannot allow adverse precedents to be established by unilateral concessions on what it sees as its legitimate claims.

Thus, the continental shelf issue has taken important security implications in addition to economic ones. In 1981 Thassos wells were brought into production and their yield has been much smaller than originally anticipated. Thus the economic aspects of the dispute have taken on a lesser importance. However, security and sovereignty issues will continue to play an important role in any search for a modus vivendi concerning the continental shelf.

3. Territorial Waters

In 1958 the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea provided a new legal definition as the basis for establishing territorial waters--extending the previous convention of 6 miles to a new optional and acceptable 12 mile limit. Should Greece at some time decide to extend the limits around all its Aegean territories, its control of seaspace in the Aegean would increase to 63.9%, leaving only 26.1% of the sea as international waters [Ref. 8: p.37]. This would effectively block the entire western Anatolian coast from free transit and would effectively set up a theoretical barrier to North-South sea transportation in the Aegean. Although Greece has reserved the right to exercise this option, the consequences of such a move would be extremely serious. Turkey has openly stated that this would

be cause for war. However, Greece has used the possible extension of territorial waters as a coercive point, especially during more heated periods of the continental shelf dispute, airspace disputes and the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

4. Aegean Airspace

The control of Aegean airspace has become an issue since 1974 in a manner similar to that of the continental shelf. The precipitating event was the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. Alleging security considerations Turkey published Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714 which required aircraft travelling from West to East with international destinations to report to Turkey at the mid point of the Aegean while still in the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR). This, in the eyes of the Greeks during a period of severe Greek-Turkish tension was seen as an attempt to alter the status of the FIR and the control of the region in general. The FIR was originally established in 1958 under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to facilitate the movement of civil air traffic in the region outside of national airspace. The eastern border of the area for which Greece was assigned responsibility was set on a median line between the eastern Greek islands and the coast of Turkey. It has taken on a special meaning for Greece, however, in that it effectively encompasses all of Greek territory under a single point of Greek control, and it came to be largely coterminous with pre-1974 NATO military air control responsibility delineation. The Greeks have viewed control of the Aegean airspace from the standpoint of territorial contiguity and, unfortunately for ICAO, the FIR happens to correspond to these views. Thus, NOTAM 714 could be seen as an attempt by Turkey to create a break in communication between the Greek mainland and the territorial airspace of the islands (set unilaterally by Athens as 10

miles surrounding its islands in 1931). Greece, citing possible confusion arising from conflicting control procedures, published NOTAM 1157 (September 1974) which declared the Aegean airspace unsafe for civil air traffic. Until 1980, when both NOTAMS were cancelled, international air traffic ceased in the Aegean region.

Although the initial issues have since died down, the principles of the dispute have remained important for general Greek security perceptions. In the light of perceived Turkish expansionist desires, any redrawing of the airspace control responsibilities is seen as an attempt to isolate the eastern islands and change the status of control in the region. As Wilson has pointed out, "Although military security considerations may have been a factor in the airspace dispute...the dispute appears rather to be about national status which has come to be identified with the FIR's." [Ref. 8: p.12] In a similar manner, the corollary issues of the Greek 10-mile airspace limit and the extension of the control zone around the island of Limnos have been matters of Greek-Turkish friction. All these issues have brought a continuous series of charges and countercharges over alleged violations, provocations and harassment by the two countries.

5. Aegean Balance of Power

In the light of Greek perceptions of the "Eastern Threat," the important Greek security interest in defense of the regional status quo and in the increasing distrust in the ability of former security arrangements to provide for all of Greece's security needs, Greece has seen the need to increase its own defense capabilities. As the threat perception has recently evolved from the 1950's and in light of a perceived increase in Turkish aggressiveness in the region, Greece has undertaken to build up its military

strength to a point where it believes it can deter a hypothetical "next move" by Turkey similar to the 1974 Turkish Cyprus operations.

This policy of Aegean deterrence has taken two paths. The first consideration has been to strengthen the immediate defense of the eastern border regions. This has included the strengthening of the military defenses of some of the Greek islands off the coast of Turkey. While Turkey has viewed this as provocative and in contravention of existing treaties, Greece has countered by pointing out the offensive nature of the so-called Turkish "Aegean Army" and has cited overriding defensive security considerations in its actions. [See Ref. 8: pp.16-17 for details.]

The second, more long-term action has been to keep a watchful eye on military aid and arms going to Turkey (primarily from the United States but also from other countries such as Germany), and to try to keep that coming to Greece at a commensurate, albeit lower, level. The goal is to balance the Greek defensive capability with the perceived military potential of Turkey. This has involved the United States arms transfer and military aid levels primarily. Greece, in attempting to maintain the balance, has linked the issue to numerous other issues which affect U.S. interests in the area. In essence, as both countries admit, a small and costly arms race has developed on the two sides of the Aegean.

6. NATO Command and Control

The issue of control of NATO military forces in the Aegean region has come to incorporate and essentially represent the other disputes between the two regional allies. In the attempt to reintegrate Greece into the military arm of NATO, Greek-Turkish disputed issues have been at the heart of some of the difficulties encountered. It is this issue

(a particular problem since the 1974 Greek withdrawal and the beginning of efforts to find a plan of reintegration since 1975) in which interests of Greece, Turkey and the Alliance coincide and sometimes conflict. The events of 1974 have complicated the issue and have led to serious difficulties in the establishment of smooth continuity of control. These difficulties, even with the reentry of Greece to "full" NATO participation in 1980, have yet to be fully overcome. They can be seen as a direct result of the unresolved basic Greek-Turkish regional disputes.

Prior to 1974, NATO regional air forces were under the local control of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (6 ATAF) located in Izmir, Turkey. Within this arrangement Greek and Turkish officers coordinated air operations in the area under allied supervision. Essentially, Greek officers had responsibility for most of the Aegean Sea region from a line running approximately along the eastern border of the Athens FIR (about half way between the eastern Greek islands and the Turkish coast) and extending to the west. A coordination zone was established either side of the line in which military air operations information would be mutually reported. After the 1974 withdrawal of Greek forces from NATO, this arrangement was no longer valid and while Greek forces were placed under autonomous Greek control, NATO forces were, in 1977, placed under the control of Turkish Generals with American advisors. This gave Turkey tacit control of allied air security operations in areas surrounding Greek territory.

Pre-1974 control of allied Aegean naval forces suffered similarly, previously being coordinated under the command of a Greek admiral. After 1974, various plans have been tried, including the "task force" concept, in which the allied commander possessing the majority of naval forces in the region at the time of a contingency would be assigned

control of all area allied naval forces regardless of nationality.

The Greek position on the issue of the reestablishment of allied military control arrangements in the area has paralleled and been linked to their other positions in the area. Greece, for security reasons which extend beyond the NATO threat perception, has not seen it possible to submit to any arrangements which would expand even the hint of Turkish control or responsibility for military defense of the areas in, on, or around any of its territories. Turkish military control in the Aegean would be seen as an alteration of the status of Greek sovereignty in the area and even the sharing of intelligence could be, in some Greek perceptions, misused against Greek interests. The extension of any Turkish control over the defensive arrangements for the eastern Greek islands and their surrounding areas would bring into question Greek control of the islands themselves.

D. U.S./NATO MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE

Since the end of World War II, the United States has established or helped develop a large number of defense-related facilities in the Mediterranean. As of 1979, 199 of these were actively maintained by the United States, 24 of which are located in Greece. [Ref. 12: p.47] In times of war, these facilities are designed to support the NATO military effort. In times of peace they are almost all operated by the United States, solely or in conjunction with the host country, to serve both allied and U.S. defense interests and support.

The authority for the establishment of the U.S. installations came originally from Article 3 of the NATO Charter, which authorized NATO members to make bilateral arrangements to enhance the defenses of the alliance. A little over a

year after Greece acceded to NATO (15 February 1952) an agreement was concluded which provided the general basis for the establishment of U.S./NATO facilities in the country.¹⁰ Implementing this agreement, numerous technical agreements have been concluded which regulate the U.S. military activities at the bases and deal with such items as force deployments, exercises, status of forces, intelligence activities, and operations plans. Nearly all of these agreements are classified.

Under the auspices of these agreements, the major installations created were:

1. The Souda Bay (Crete) facility, providing a large airfield and extensive port facilities primarily important for the storage of fuel and ammunition for the U.S. and NATO naval forces in the area and as a staging base for Allied air missions. Sufficient anchorage is available to accommodate the entire U.S. 6th Fleet. In addition the NATO missile firing range nearby (NAMFI) is important for the training and exercise of NATO forces.
2. Iraklion Air Station (Crete) is primarily important for reconnaissance and electronic surveillance facilities which monitor Soviet military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Hellenikon Air Base (at Athenai airport in Athens) is primarily an administrative center and logistics support base.
4. Nea Makri communications center (near Marathon) is a major link in the U.S. Defense Communication System.

¹⁰The official title is "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military Facilities" which entered into force on 12 October 1953. [Ref. 13: pp. 85-86 contains a copy.]

Several other important communication sites serve the 6th Fleet and NATO Mediterranean communications networks.

5. Five NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) early warning sites are located at dispersed points in northern Greece to monitor Warsaw Pact military activity.

All these facilities are still operational. While at the outset mainly operated solely by the United States, they are now generally Greek-administered facilities with U.S. units operating as tenants.

In 1976 an agreement was initialled which was to amend the 1953 agreement and bring it more in line with the changed strategic environment and Greek interests [see Ref. 13: p.87]. This was also tied to a military aid package and was to provide closer Greek control of the U.S. operations in Greece. The agreement paralleled an earlier U.S.-Turkish agreement of the same year. These agreements were never implemented, however, and according to most observers the original agreements remain in effect. Since the original agreement was very vague, the actual operational status of the U.S. facilities has been modified over the years through amendment of technical agreements. At this writing a new agreement has been initialled but has not yet been placed in force.

Nuclear weapons in Greece and their associated support facilities come under separate agreements. As the agreement points out, they are tied to allied defense considerations:

Considering that [The U.S. and Greece] are both participating together in an international arrangement pursuant to which they are making substantial and material contributions to their mutual defense and security...[and] considering that their mutual security and defense require that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of nuclear warfare.... [Ref. 14: p.37]

This treaty went into force on 11 August 1959, and provides for the existence of NATO defense related nuclear weapons in Greece. It also provided for the transfer of non-nuclear parts, training, security and cooperation concerning U.S.-produced weapons systems in Greece. It is the exact duplicate of an agreement signed with Turkey less than a month prior. Since the existence of nuclear weapons in Greece has recently become a prominent political issue, it is important to note here that this issue, by virtue of these separate agreements, is not necessarily formally connected with any of the other military facilities agreements mentioned above.

In general, the issue of the U.S. facilities in Greece is basically separate from the Greek-Turkish issues and is only indirectly related to NATO. Primarily it involves direct security relations between Greece and the United States. As the environment within which these arrangements operate has changed from the days of the Korean war to the days of the Harmel report, the NATO/U.S. facilities issue in Greece has also evolved. It has become symptomatic of larger changes which have taken place due to a variety of changes in the Greek security environment, the realm of bilateral relations and relations with NATO. The evolution has also been sensitive to changes in the larger global security environment. Established originally as an integrated part of the perception of the Soviet threat and the needs of mutual or collective defense, the Greek view of the bases has evolved as the Greek security perceptions have changed. Characteristically, while the U.S. strategic interests in the region have remained relatively consistent (the bases being established to support these interests among others), Greek interests have tended to diverge from those conceived in the early post-war period.

In the Greek perception, the bases have taken on not only a security significance but have become associated also with the legacy of certain historical political liabilities. Some see the bases as no longer representing the true security picture in Greece, as a vulnerability in the face of a perceived Turkish threat, a political liability in the area of divergent U.S.-Greek policies toward the Middle East, and a representation of former dependency relationships which are presently being reevaluated. If the relationship and purposes of the bases cannot be changed to better serve perceived Greek needs, then they remain merely visible representations of the infringement of foreign powers on Greek internal sovereignty and former arrangements which have, to some, become discredited in the last couple of decades. Thus, they become symbols of foreign interference in the evolution of a more independently secure and maturing Greece. As the perception of the Soviet threat has diminished, so the meaning of the bases in defense of the new Greek concerns which have taken its place has changed.

It is interesting to note that the development of the bases issue in Greece closely parallels that in Turkey. Three reasons might be brought out for this. The obvious one is that they were established for the same reasons. The second is that more recently they have become in both countries to be viewed more as instruments of U.S. policy and serving only U.S. interests and have been tied to other country interests such as U.S. military aid. Thirdly, the bases issue has come to represent a general trend in similar arrangements especially noticeable in the Mediterranean area. There is a general drive toward more independence, modernization and reassessment of security needs which has generally meant the erosion of former dependent relationships of the earlier, post-World War II cold-war monochromatic era.

III. NEW DEMOCRACY AND GREEK SECURITY POLICY 1974 TO 1981

A. INTRODUCTION

Some of the basic connections between issues of internal politics, external politics and security in Greece have already been indicated. It remains to be seen how these connections actually work out in forming the bases and character of Greek security policy in the specific programs of the two major parties (PASOK and New Democracy) as they developed since 1974. This chapter explores the issues from the point of view of one of the two major political forces which developed during the 1974-1981 period--New Democracy (ND).

This chapter deals with the evolution of the New Democracy program under the guidance of Konstantinos Karamanlis (during his tenure as Prime Minister from November 1974 to May 1980) and the follow-on government of George Rallis (1980-1981). The basic security policies of the New Democracy government will be viewed through the prism of the three basic security concerns as elaborated in the background section of this work (Chapter 2). Initially, internal security and the threat from the "North" will be handled briefly. Then the focus will be turned to the "Eastern Threat" (Greek-Turkish) issues--Cyprus, and the Aegean Sea disputes. Finally the NATO connection and U.S. military bases in Greece will be discussed as they apply to New Democracy policies.

ND and PASOK were, of course, not the only active political forces in Greece during this time. Indeed, while ND seemed to dominate the political picture (albeit with diminishing majorities) until 1981 it was not until the elections

of November, 1977, that PASOK actually became the legitimate opposition party. The results of the 1974 national election gave the party of George Mavros, the Center Union New Forces (EK-ND), considerable strength. As it turned out, however, EK-ND policies were only minimally distinguishable from those of ND in the realm of foreign and security policy (although some minor divergences occurred in some internal issues). This and the EK-ND's ultimate defeat under the new title of EDIK (Union of the Democratic Left) in the elections of 1977, make it of secondary importance for this study's purposes. A number of smaller parties have competed in elections but with little success. (In November, 1974, a total of 8 identified parties participated, and in 1977 the number had risen to 14. These included factions of the newly legalized communist parties) [Ref. 1: Appendix B]. Additionally, the smaller parties have tended to have a reduced influence in the Greek Vouli (Parliament) due to the system of "reinforced proportional representation." Under this system, the parties polling over 17% are augmented with representatives according to a complicated proportional formula. This system tends to enlarge the power of the larger parties in parliament while it tends to give smaller parties less representation than their actual polling percentages would suggest.¹¹ As can be seen, however, this system has the effect of stabilizing the fragmenting effects of a strictly proportional representation system.

It is from the historical perspective that the continuity of the ND party and the rapid rise of the "novel" PASOK party are of interest. Concern from this research

¹¹An example from the November 17 elections of 1974 shows that while PASOK received 13% of the vote, a respectable showing, it only received 12 out of 300 total seats in the Vouli while ND received 54.4% of the vote and 220 seats. While PASOK received only 7% fewer votes than the number two contender, EK-ND, it received 48 fewer seats) [Ref. 1: p.202].

perspective and the perspective of most policy makers interested in Greece and Western interests in the Southeast NATO region, has dictated the comparison of these two parties as representatives of Greek political trends.

B. NEW DEMOCRACY AND GREEK SECURITY, 1974-1981

1. Emergence of New Democracy and its Policies

a. The Interim Government of Karamanlis.

At 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of July 22, 1974, the political and military leaders of Greece assembled in the former Greek parliament building. Most of the personalities represented the perpetuation of the Greek military regime which had controlled Greece since the 1967 Greek military coup. Although some of the original faces were missing, these people had been influential in carrying out the 7-year regime's suppression of Greek democracy, which on this day had simply collapsed. Faced with the effects of one of the most humiliating political disasters ever perpetrated in Greece, the abortive coup against President Makarios of Cyprus; faced with the invasion of the island by Turkey, the island they had dreams of annexing to the Hellenic motherland; faced with a military completely incapacitated by seven years of politicization and purges; faced with a collapsing economy and increasingly open and less controllable popular dissent; faced with outrage from a large number of their Greek brothers in Cyprus and almost universal world condemnation, this group had to finally face reality. Their adventure was over. The President, Phaidon Gizikis, had taken it upon himself to relinquish control of the government back to the civilians, and after some deliberation and bargaining (especially by a close colleague of Karamanlis, Mr. Evangelos Averoff), the call went to Paris,

where Konstantinos Karamanlis was in self-imposed exile. Stepping out onto Greek soil on July 23 for the first time in 11 years, it appeared that Karamanlis had done some soul-searching and had also kept at least one finger on the public pulse of Greece. In his first words, he declared himself "at the disposal of the nation to restore normality and achieve national reconciliation." [Ref.1] In this simple statement, Karamanlis' perceptions of Greek internal needs were clear. No fiery rhetoric about attacking Turks and avenging Hellenism, or the like, was heard; instead he saw his mission and major challenge as the metamorphosis of Greek political culture toward democratic stability. To quell the centrifugal internal forces which had caused him to resign the premiership over an argument with the former king and caused him deep disillusionment with Greek politics on more than one occasion, the forces which brought the unmanageability of the feuding parties in the mid-1960's and finally led to the 1967 military coup, Karamanlis was now resolved to apply a steady hand of political discipline, moderation, and maturity. Given the multitude of problems besetting the nation at that point, this was no easy task. For a number of reasons, political levelheadedness and firm resolve were the only qualities which could bring the pieces back together. The contemporaneous Portuguese example was a lesson well taken and the Greek army's tanks were still on the outskirts of Athens. As one official put it, "any relapse of the anomaly [junta] would lead the nation to disaster." [Ref. 3]

This basic threat to Greek security, the threat of internal collapse, became the focus of Karamanlis' efforts in the early days after his return. The unprecedented manner in which the junta had collapsed provided a unique environment to advance the aims of Karamanlis' interim "Government of National Unity," established on July

24. The junta had not been overthrown by an opposing force, but had ignominiously crumbled under the weight of its own ineptitude. This meant that no one faction could claim primacy over another for having "saved" the nation. Indeed, demands from within the army and government itself had created pressure for a return to civilian government [Ref. 4: p.338].

The personal credentials of Karamanlis also served him well in this respect. At the time, he was a well-known and apparently broadly well-liked figure. Premier of Greece from 1955 to 1963, he presided over an unprecedented period of stable conservative government which brought a degree of prosperity to Greece.¹² His resignation in 1963 as a result of disagreement with the King marked him as a person of independent integrity, against foreign intervention, which to many, the King had represented. He had openly criticized the government of the coup on several occasions and had always been irritated by the typical radicalism and confrontations of Greek politics. In his own rather forceful style, Karamanlis pointed this out prior to the 1974 elections by lecturing to the opposition that, an irresponsible political "mentality has led to the downfall of democracy before.... Democracy is not only threatened by tanks. It is threatened even more by the demagoguery which leads to the tanks." [Ref. 5] To support him in his efforts, Karamanlis filled his cabinet with like-minded ministers with impeccable anti-junta and centrist conservative credentials, among them prominent political figures from former governments.

¹²Loulis points out that "between 1922 and 1936 Greece had experienced 22 major cabinet changes and 17 changes in effective executive; between 1946 and 1951 9...changes had occurred and between 1955 and 1962 only 3...." [Ref 1: p.55]

While the Cyprus problem was externally the most pressing, and other Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean Sea issues were menacing, Karamanlis realized that he could not attack these issues without a stabilized and unified political base at home. The junta brought discredit among European allies and isolation and humiliation in the world political arena, and only a stable democratic government could garner the support needed from other nations in Greece's time of trouble. He therefore took immediate steps to secure political stability at home. Some of these included:

1. Freeing all political prisoners and reinstating the citizenship of dissidents exiled by the junta.
2. Reinstating freedom of the press (while urging moderation).
3. Legalizing the Communist parties (outlawed since 1947) and allowing them to publish their newspapers.
4. Depriving the ESA (the Greek military police) of most of its powers.
5. Replacing nearly all junta-installed local district prelates with their former civilian counterparts.

Karamanlis made it clear, however, that it was not open season for radicalism. While the Cyprus crisis was a major external security concern to be dealt with, it did provide the interim government opportunities to check some problems associated with the return to democracy. One example of this is that Karamanlis was able to maintain order under martial law while advocating democracy. This was justified outwardly by the exigencies of the Cyprus crisis and the fear of possible direct confrontation with Turkey. Privately, however, there was no doubt that he intended to maintain strict public order and move quickly to quell any violence with "merciless severity."

A second example was the general military mobilization called in order to face any possible Turkish threat. Among other effects, the mobilization moved much of the Third Army Corps from the Athens area toward the Thracian border. This not only removed the "tanks," a symbol of the fallen junta regime, from the Athens area, but preoccupied an otherwise possibly volatile segment of the Army officer corps, whose insecurity arising, from the removal of most of their top commanders in mid-August, was a potential source of military reaction. The "national crisis" of Cyprus made it easier to retain firm control over the populace and the army, and to facilitate a smoother transition to democratic government [Ref. 6: p.38].

It was also for purposes of national political unity that Karamanlis decided to pull Greek forces out of the integrated NATO command. (This will be discussed in greater detail later.) Faced with an untenable situation in Cyprus (a Greek military response would most certainly be a disaster, and capitulation would be political suicide), Karamanlis chose to channel Greek feelings of humiliation and frustration toward a scapegoat and restore Greek pride. Capitalizing on the growing anti-Americanism, which could be easily translated to "anti-NATOism," he formally notified the alliance that Greek forces would no longer participate in the integrated military command of NATO. In one decisive move he undercut the more vocal left opposition who had been whipping up public opinion against the U.S. for its support of the former junta, its failure to act to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its perceived pro-Turkish tilt. This action also allayed and transferred any feelings of guilt to an external bogeyman and consolidated a broad spectrum of public opinion behind an apparently assertive, nationalistic unifying governmental force.

Four steps remained for Karamanlis in his program for political stability. First, he had to form a legitimate democratic government. In October free elections were called for, held on November 17. Second, the perennial problem which had deeply polarized Greek society and had been the source of instability at least since the "great schism" of the early 20th century--the question of the Greek Monarchy--had to be finally and resolutely solved. A national referendum was to be scheduled not later than 45 days after the national elections. It was held on December 8, returning 69.2% of the votes for a republic and only 30.8% for the monarchy [Ref. 1: p.63]. This was seen as an unmistakable signpost for the future direction of Greek political development. Third, a new constitution had to be drafted to replace the 1952 constitution (in effect since the fall of the junta). Karamanlis envisioned this document as strengthening the authority of the government while ensuring a strong democracy. This was effected in 1975. Finally, to strengthen Greek democratic ties to Europe and help insure the perpetuation of Western democracy in Greece, Karamanlis immediately reactivated Greek association with the European Economic Community, seeking full membership, not only as a potential economic benefit, but a political maneuver to achieve greater voice in European affairs and to supplant "superpower" (U.S.) domination with a viable Western alternative of support.

Thus through various decisive maneuvers, Karamanlis and his deputies of the interim government of national unity laid the foundation for a potentially more stable and secure democratic government in Greece. Combined with the remarkable degree of political restraint and maturity demonstrated by the Greek populace during the transition, and Karamanlis' carefully measured delicacy in removing the threat of reaction within the military, which

could "bring back the tanks," the new Greek state had apparently passed a milestone on the road to political maturity.

b. Formation of New Democracy (ND): General Policies.

On September 26, 1974, acting Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis formed the New Democracy Party, after decreeing the resumption of political activity. Emphasis was placed at the outset on the "newness" of the party, intending to imply that the party was not simply a reincarnation of Karamanlis' broad right conservative National Radical Union (ERE) of the 1950's. New Democracy was to be a party shifted to the center (left of the conservative spectrum), and indeed it was perceived as such both in its later policies and in the fact that many far-rightists chose to oppose the party in the 1974 and 1977 elections. Although the party had no clear or specific platform, Karamanlis listed the pressing problems which had to be dealt with: (1) to reorganize the administration of the country, which was in chaos after the fall of the junta, (2) to bolster the economy, (3) to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem, (4) to contain Turkish aggressiveness, and (5) to restore discipline to the army [Ref. 5]. It is noteworthy that three out of the five major problems deal essentially with internal problems, while only two have to do with external threats. This is perhaps a key to understanding Karamanlis' view of Greek security. No matter how serious Greece's external problems were made to seem, his program reflected the fact that internal stability was a critical support for dealing with the external threat and overcoming the previous turbulence in Greek political life. Hinging on this was the drive for independence from direct foreign influences, which could not be realized unless some sort of internal stability and security were achieved. The

argument was that Greek political culture had allowed foreign penetration through its divisive and paternalistic character. In summing up the New Democracy program, C. Sulzberger outlines the apparent goals of its leader after the 1974 election by listing seven points, only one of which deals with the external problem of Cyprus. The rest undertake to calm political passions and modernize political and social life, draft a constitution with a strong executive and strong central democratic government, reorganize administrative and educational systems, take drastic, perhaps unpopular economic measures to relieve economic problems, and hold a referendum to begin a new political life featuring a more progressive attitude [Ref. 7].

From a new position of national strength, Karamanlis' foreign policy was to be grounded in the ideas of (1) national independence, (2) security, and (3) dignity. This was also to be supported by a strong army. Karamanlis' credentials in the first element were established through his assertive withdrawal of Greece from NATO and his questioning of U.S. military bases on Greek soil; in the second by his uncompromising attitude on issues such as the sovereignty of the Aegean islands; and the third by his desire to become a participating and "equal" member of international organizations such as the European Community (EC) and his support of the U.N. and the International Court in resolution of disputes. However, a military buildup was necessary to insure the credibility of Greek foreign policy and allow a more independent security policy to succeed. He therefore showed restraint in purging the army to allay its fears of political retribution and essentially absolved the general mass of the officer corps from any wrongdoing.

With these goals, New Democracy recorded a considerable victory in the November 1974 national elections. It received a comfortable majority of the seats,

210 out of 300, which would allow it to proceed with its programs virtually unrestricted. The elections coming quickly after the junta's fall, the myriad of problems which Karamanlis had tackled with some apparent initial success, along with the confident and charismatic assertiveness of his leadership--all served to muffle the opposition. The major opponents often found themselves agreeing with many of the New Democracy programs. The more radical leftist parties, being split and weak, barely registered. The only really new arrival on the Greek political scene, PASOK, had little time to organize and consolidate any formidable support. The vote for Karamanlis, while it represented a vote for the charismatic leader who had steadied the country during a hypercritical transitional period, was also generally a vote for prudence and moderation in the face of multiple perceived threats, including the possible return of the Greek military dictatorship and Turkish aggression. It was also a well-distributed vote indicating widespread support. Grasping this mandate and the even more decisive mandate for a republican government in the December 8 referendum, Karamanlis proceeded to build up the country's internal strength through aggressive economic policies, sweeping "de-juntification" of the civil service and education, labor reforms, nationalizations of certain industries and constitutional reform. All these measures were designed to once and for all secure Greece as a stable democracy, able to assert itself confidently and with some degree of independence on the international scene.

The four main objectives of the New Democracy party after 1974 were to be: "to tackle the 'national' crisis [Cyprus], to re-establish and solidify democratic rule, to give the country a strong government, and to make a powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics." [Ref. 1: p.59] It is also significant that Karamanlis had abandoned

the passionate anti-communism of his former years. This worked to his favor in three ways: it represented a modern attitude of detente, and allowed him to pursue a more vigorous and independent foreign policy; it showed the government not afraid to "embrace all Greeks" including the Greek Communists within its modern democratic structure; and it avoided the shopworn appellation to the cold-war "communist threat" which the junta had so frequently misused. New Democracy, during its first three years, "concentrated its attention on four fronts; strengthening democracy, achieving socio-economic progress, changing the basic structures of the educational system and tackling foreign policy issues." [Ref. 1: p.54] In assessing the accomplishments in the first three of these areas, Marios Evriviades sums up the rather impressive results for the first three years of the New Democracy:

...[the] government's domestic record was positive. Under his [Karamanlis'] leadership, the army was depoliticized and the foundations for parliamentary rule were re-established with the passage of the new Greek constitution. The life of the average Greek had also improved considerably. The rate of inflation had been reduced from 80% to about 14%, average wages were doubled through a bold incomes policy; and there was full employment and booming consumer demand. There was, finally, an atmosphere of unprecedented personal freedom. [Ref. 8: p.164]

With internal security steadily improving in this manner, Greece could attend more confidently to its foreign policy concerns, the fourth front listed above.

In foreign policy, Karamanlis sought mainly to free Greece from over-dependence on a single power, especially the United States. Rather, diversity became the key and a multilateral policy was the way in which to avoid possible foreign penetration and interference which had become a permanent negative mythology in Greece. This mythology allowed Greeks to transfer some of Greece's own

problems to the shoulders of the "great powers." It also reinforced the beliefs (probably partly substantiable) that the problems of Greece were in a large part due to its over-dependence on a patron power which handicapped its relations with others, did not support Greece in time of need, and generally seemed to frustrate Greek national interests.¹³

Karamanlis, while still remaining firmly oriented to the West, was determined to lead his adolescent Greek state to political "equality" with other states. He turned toward Europe with the vision of participating in the formation of some new assertive European arrangement free from superpower domination. Karamanlis stated, in conjunction with his efforts to achieve Greek acceptance as a full member of EC, that he wanted to belong to a "united, Atlantic Europe, sovereign and independent, which would cooperate with the United States on an equal footing." [Ref. 9] Karamanlis' foreign policy meant exploring and developing other ties as well, notably with Greece's Mideastern neighbors, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Finally, the crucial element in Karamanlis' foreign policy was, of course, to deal with the threat from the East, specific aspects of which will be dealt with individually later.

Apparent general satisfaction with the New Democracy programs returned Karamanlis to power in the national elections of 1977, albeit with a reduced majority in the parliament. That his support had begun to erode indicated growing trends of discontent from the far right and the left.¹⁴ In 1977, the New Democracy party received only 41.85% of the votes, which reduced its seats to 173 (a

¹³It is also noted on this point by many authors that the Greek politicians had often "invited" this external support to further their own designs.

¹⁴For a thorough analysis of the political issues surrounding and precipitated by the 1977 elections, see Ref. 1 appropriate sections, Ref. 10 and Ref. 8.

loss of 42 seats). PASOK came out as the largest opposition party with 25.33% and 92 seats (a gain of 77). The Democratic Center Union (EDIK--formerly the Center Union--New Forces) was the real fatality of the election. It received only approximately 12% of the vote and 15 seats. (The communist parties made slight gains.) The consequent breakup of the political center was touted by some as a return to polarization in Greek politics. However, a positive aspect may be seen in that the other major parties would be expected to make a grab for the center vote which possibly would prevent ND and PASOK from drifting further to the right or left respectively.

Karamanlis called the 1977 elections one year before they were constitutionally due because, as Karamanlis stated, "I want a renewed popular mandate so the government can have increased prestige and negotiating power." [Ref. 11] The prestige and power was "needed" for a stepped up program for dealing with external concerns, notably Aegean and Cyprus issues, NATO, and the EEC. These issues were to increasingly occupy the center stage in the Greek foreign policy debate and became the focus of Karamanlis' ND government after 1977. They culminated with Karamanlis' opening to detente with his 1979 visit to Moscow, the 1980 reentry into the military structure of NATO and the accession on January 1, 1981 of Greece to full membership in the EC [Ref. 12].

The political security of the republic apparently was on firm ground, despite considerable criticism from the opposition. Evidence for this is the uncharacteristic political stability shown in the orderly conduct of the elections since 1974. A crucial test was seen when it came time for Karamanlis to relinquish his Prime Ministership. This shift occurred in 1980, amid dire predictions of political destabilization. However, the

transition went smoothly. Karamanlis, unopposed, was elected President on the third vote in parliament, and George Rallis took control of ND and was asked to form the government, albeit on a close vote within the party. Averoff, the main contender, lost by a very small margin. That Averoff threw his support behind Rallis indicates another aspect of increasing stability in Greece. Time, if nothing else, was bound to take its toll on the support of ND. Forces bound to erode ND support were pointed out by Mario Modiano:

....the loss of the charismatic leadership that Mr. Karamanlis had given the party...has perceptibly weakened [ND's] psychological appeal. The government party must also pay for the sins of omission and commission, for all the grudges that have piled up, for all the anti-western feelings its opponents have whipped up. Especially it will suffer from the pocketbook impact of inflation...Finally there is the traditional or presumed Greek yearning for... change with a capital 'C'....[Ref. 13]

An additional factor of impending weakness for ND was its apparent inability to modernize its party structure and extend its base down to the electorate. The charismatic leadership of Karamanlis could not carry it indefinitely in the face of the modern, well-organized PASOK political machine. As the left became stronger, issues became more hotly debated.

The EC accession debate is representative. In a 1981 article, George Coats reported in the Economist that there was a feeling that Greece was at a turning point in its modernization:

EC entry is seen both as a symbol and a symptom of this feeling but for others it represents exactly the opposite--an attempt by the entrenched...forces to prolong their domination. For the government... the accession represents a step not only toward modernization but is a guarantee of stability and an acceptance of Greece as an equal member of the community of civilized European nations rather than as a backward and volatile Balkan state. [Ref. 14: p.6]

On this basis, entry into the EC became an obsession in ND politics. Coats also points out that the debate on EC entry took on a "metaphysical" character in Greece, the opposition not focusing entirely on the economic balance sheet, but on issues of sovereignty and Greek independence as well. To them it would be seen as a serious compromise and backsliding. [Ref. 14]

While important internal security accomplishments were registered by the Karamanlis--Rallis ND regime, one must consider the other two thirds of the Greek security triangle--the Northern threats and the Eastern threats.

2. Karamanlis and the Northern Threat

For Greece, there is no escaping the threat from the North. In earlier years it was the prime consideration. The fear of communist aggression from the north led Greece into NATO, and Greek defense was defined in terms of securing Greece from northern aggression and internal communist infiltration. The events of 1974, however, marked a turning point in Greece's northern relations and threat perceptions, the seriousness of which is often overlooked. It is perhaps only in the context of detente between the superpowers that Greek-Turkish disputes could have reached today's proportions. And it was the fall of the junta and the foreign policy of Karamanlis which allowed detente to come belatedly to Greece. (Initial contacts were, however, made by the junta with Greece's Balkan neighbors, in an effort to seek foreign contacts after receiving effective diplomatic ostracism from Western European countries.) Greece could not ignore the Balkan portion of its heritage, a heritage of conflict vacillating from time to time toward cooperation. Numerous outstanding security issues within the Balkan neighborhood, including the Macedonian question involving Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece, the Northern Epirus and

minorities issues with Albania, Eastern Yugoslavia and Western Bulgarian commercial access, and the traditional Bulgarian desires in Thrace (which they have from time to time realized)--all are examples of issues which could possibly be ameliorated through diplomatic efforts. The resolution or defusing of some of these issues would have important benefits for Greek security.

The Balkan efforts cannot be seen outside the context of the Western alignment of Greece. That the whole issue of security in the Balkan countries is related in part to Greece's NATO orientation was recalled by George Mavros, Foreign Minister in the interim 1974 government. He reflected that "the first complaints we got after we pulled out of NATO were from Rumania and Red China" [Ref. 15] Tito is also known to have been concerned lest Greece quit its relationship with the West [Ref. 16]. Anti-Western developments in Greece definitely have repercussions on the future relations of countries such as Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania with the Soviet Union. A Greece not firmly aligned to the West would definitely decrease the bargaining power of Balkan Communist countries trying to maintain their semi-independent status. For Greece, too, an active Balkan policy without the ultimate security guarantee of the U.S. and NATO would certainly cause a reassessment of Balkan policy in Moscow, to the detriment of Greek national independence.

Two of Karamanlis' three tenets of Greek external relations, national independence and national security, were well served by what has been dubbed Greece's "Nordpolitik." Karamanlis' Balkan efforts also "bore the stamp of the Greek Prime Minister's own diplomatic style. It is essentially personalized, high level, and aims at improvement of the political climate in the region" [Ref. 17]. It is with these considerations in mind that one can view Karamanlis'

bilateral and multilateral Balkan efforts. Beginning in 1975 Karamanlis traveled to all the Balkan countries (except Turkey) to establish relationships [Ref. 17: p.161]. These visits have since been reciprocated. The culmination of bilateralism with the "North" was the Karamanlis-Brezhnev meeting in Moscow in 1979. Throughout this period, reciprocal visits have fostered bilateral initiatives with all Greece's Balkan neighbors and with the Soviet Union. Multilateralism was a decidedly more elusive goal for Karamanlis. However, with his typical aggressive statesmanship, he managed to convene two Balkan conferences; the first in Athens in 1978, the second in Ankara in 1979. The growing uncertainties as to Soviet intentions as a result of several incidents, most notably the then extremely important question of Yugoslavia after Tito, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and the Polish crisis, seemed to cool Balkan multilateral efforts [Ref. 18]. However, persistent efforts throughout the 1974-1981 period resulted in the achievement of many bilateral contacts and took many of Greece's northern security issues off the critical list.

The effects of this policy on Greek security are most notable. Through Karamanlis' own "bridgebuilding" policy, many economic, cultural, and political links were created with Balkan neighbors. They have even resulted in some limited defense-related agreements with Yugoslavia [Ref. 19]. The objective was stated by the Greek Prime Minister: "My vision is of a Balkan peninsula that will be an area of permanent peace. The network of friendly Balkan relations will create a system of Balkan cooperation " [Ref. 17: p.162]. The logical security benefit of this policy is the reduction, by political and diplomatic means, of Northern threat.

The existence of a credible security threat from some external source has been "the midwife of intra-Balkan cooperation." For Yugoslavia, for example, the increase of Soviet aggressiveness toward that country has historically led to a corresponding warmth in Yugoslav approaches to Greece. For Greece, the increased threat from the Turks has made a diminished northern threat imperative: ¹⁵

...the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations probably remains a big factor influencing the state of Balkan affairs....The Greek Prime Minister told Tito...'Turkey is threatening the peace enjoyed by the Balkans for the past 30 years.' One can argue that in this instance of regional cooperation, the external 'threat' remains a key incentive, at least as far as Greece is concerned. [Ref. 16: p.162]

In summary then, the following security objectives can be seen in Karamanlis' northern policy:

1. To reduce the threat from the North.
2. To resolve bilateral disputes or issues peacefully through continuously expanding diplomatic and economic ties.
3. To allow Greece to concentrate defense efforts toward the "Eastern threat."
4. To reduce independence on NATO for security.
5. To achieve at least the non-involvement of other Balkan states in the event of a Greece-Turkish conflict.

Collateral political benefits have accrued from Karamanlis' Balkan initiatives. The quest for a "new relationship" with NATO following Greece's partial exit in 1974 would be unthinkable without a relaxation of tensions to the North. They have also come to symbolize Greece's emergence, diplomatically, as a modern nation with an independent

¹⁵The converse is also true: with a diminished Northern threat, the Turkish threat has become important.

status equal to other European powers. They have characterized, especially to the Greek public, Greece's increasing independence from the U.S. and NATO domination. The favorable impression on public opinion created by his Balkan policy, gave Karamanlis widespread political support from a broad spectrum of political shades in Greece.

Balkan ties within the context of the ultimate Western security guarantee and the East-West strategic stalemate gave ND the flexibility to pursue a modern diversified foreign policy, while enhancing security and allowing Greece to divert its attention to the Turkish Threat.

3. Karamanlis and the Cyprus Issue

Karamanlis had a reputation as a firm believer in Greece's Western orientation. The dramatic rise of the far left vote was in part the result of the disunity of the central parties, in part the result of growing disenchantment with the attitude of Greece's NATO allies over the Cyprus issue, which made neutralism...more attractive to the Greek electorate. [Ref. 20: pp.172-3]

The real historic tragedy of the 1974 Cyprus debacle and its particular connection to the new Karamanlis government becomes glaringly clear in the above statement, for it was written not about the Karamanlis government of the seventies, but about Premier Karamanlis and his ERE government of 1955-1963. It was Karamanlis who in February 1959 negotiated a quick settlement of the then serious Cyprus crisis and settled, he hoped, the question of British imperialism, the enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) movement growing in both Greece and Cyprus, and pushed by the exiled Makarios, and growing Turkish militancy about the Turkish-Cypriot minority (spurred on by the British). It was his attempt to settle the dispute within the NATO security system which brought him criticism within Greece for "betraying the cause of Hellenism in the interests of

NATO and the Americans" [Ref. 20: p.175]. It was his Cyprus settlement plan, negotiated in Zurich and London in 1959 (the oft-quoted London-Zurich agreement), which set up Britain, Turkey, and Greece as guarantors of the security of a new Cypriot Republic, to be governed by what was to prove in the 1960's an unworkable compromise system which caused serious Cyprus crises in 1963 and 1967, and gave pretext to the July 15, 1974 Turkish invasion. Finally, it was same Karamanlis--leaving Greece for Paris in 1963 after three turbulent final years, frustrated by attempts to unite the Greek political center, "resentful of the prerogatives of the Monarchy... (and) disillusioned with the Greek political system in general, believing that the 1952 constitution favored parliament at the expense of government" [Ref. 20: p.179]--who returned eleven years later in the midst of a second installment of the same problems in Greece, only this time they were probably even more serious. It is in light of this historical bit of irony that some of Karamanlis' Cyprus policies become clear.

When Karamanlis returned to Athens and accepted the interim Prime Ministership, he was faced with the Turkish fait accompli in Cyprus. In a sense, the Greek and Turkish options had been played, and while the Turks still had reserves, the Greek options had been played out. Lacking even the hint of support from Britain, the other guarantor, the Greek military position was untenable. Without any form of air cover, an invasion force could not possibly succeed in the face of Turkish regional air superiority. A feeble attempt at military reinforcement had been launched on July 21, with 14 antiquated Nor-Atlas aircraft, but the mission was doomed from the start [Ref. 21]. Although some contemporaries feared that Greece might launch a punitive strike against Turkey along the Thracian border:

what deterred the Greeks from crossing the Evros river in the North into Turkey now is the disparity of the 40,000 fighting Greeks facing 90,000 Turkish soldiers across this frontier in Thrace. The Turks have amassed as many troops, tanks and armored cars in Thrace as Greece possesses in total. [Ref. 22]

Thus, faced with the equipment inadequacies of the Greek military, compounded by the adverse effects of the junta regime, Karamanlis was fast running out of options. However, and perhaps more important, to capitulate or accept any sort of bargain with the Turks would have created a political disaster in Greece which would wreck completely his chances to pull Greece out of its internal problems intact. The best he could do was to remain firm, not accept any sort of division of Cyprus, and attempt to sway, in time, opinion through diplomatic means. Greece accepted the cease fire called for by the UN Security Council on July 20 and agreed to enter negotiations with the Turks and the British. On July 30 the three parties signed a declaration to end Turkish advances and establish a buffer zone along the Turkish lines. The Geneva talks which produced this solution were hardly a triumph of Greek diplomacy:

but the newspapers and politicians are determined to maintain unity and support the government... Besides, after the disastrous adventure in Cyprus, most Greeks are in a grimly realistic mood... a typical editorial praised the agreement. Under especially difficult circumstances, ... Greece managed to get the maximum, perhaps, of what was possible. The talks... will exclude the options of partitioning the island or of unifying it with Greece or Turkey. [Ref. 23]

Initially, Karamanlis, anxious to avoid the problems of the past, sought support from Greece's allies to pressure Turkey into withdrawal of all troops and to support inter-communal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He pledged to support whatever agreements they might come up with. He remained adamantly against the Turkish proposals

for a "bi-communal federation" which would essentially split Cyprus into separate Turkish and Greek "mini-nations." But, in the light of the second wave of invasions by Turkey on August 14, the inability of NATC or the U.S. to persuade the Turks to exercise restraint, and the apparent lack of good faith demonstrated by the Turks, Greece shifted its policies. Greece now intended to press for international involvement through the U.N. and resort to more dramatic tactics of their own. The Greek positions and aims were set out clearly by George Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister:

[Mavros] said the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the United Nations General Assembly would be a test case. 'If the United Nations cannot save Cyprus...we cannot see what reason it has to exist.' ...The problem of Cyprus could be settled by the island's two communities negotiating freely, not under the threat of 40,000 troops, 300 tanks, or the unbearable pressure of the tragedy of 200,000 refugees. ...The Greek government is against enosis. We are for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island.' ...Greece was in favor of full demilitarization of the Cypriot republic--'not one Turkish, not one Greek soldier should remain.' [Ref. 24]

On August 14, to demonstrate its outrage at the apparent inability of NATO to forestall the second, completely unwarranted (in Greek and in most other international opinion) Turkish attack on Cyprus, Karamanlis announced withdrawal of Greek troops from the military structure of NATO. The preceding points out some of the basics of the Karamanlis ND policy on Cyprus, which remained fairly consistent throughout the period of 1974-1981.

Karamanlis has consistently maintained that "the Greek side would not give in to the faits accomplis which the Turks were trying to create in Cyprus" [Ref. 25]. He further stated that it was time the U.N. showed its worth by showing that it could render justice in the Cyprus situation. He asserted that Greece will continue to refuse to recognize any form of autonomous Turkish state in Cyprus (a

reference to the proclamation of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975). Karamanlis justified Greek interests in two ways:

- Greece "reserves its rights under existing international treaties" [Ref. 25], referring particularly to the London-Zurich agreements and Greece's position as Cyprus' guarantor.
- Greece "reserves its rights to defend the inviolable rights of Hellenism" [Ref. 26].

However, in light of the Turkish military power on Cyprus which had "created facts" in a somewhat forceful style, any use of overt force in Cyprus would be counterproductive for Greece. Greece laid blame on Turkey for perpetuating the problems of Cyprus. "It is Turkey, not Greece, that seeks to alter the legal status...in Cyprus" [Ref. 27]. Greece therefore has sought an internationalized solution to the problem, taking its complaints to, and mainly seeking support from, the U.N. within the framework of intercommunal talks. Consistently for the New Democracy, Turkish action in Cyprus:

was considered morally reprehensible and logically inadmissible. Hence, Greece supported efforts toward settlement through talks between the two Cypriot communities held under the U.N. auspices. Responsibility for reaching an acceptable agreement, of course, ultimately rested with the government of Cyprus. Greece, in other words, did not wish to dictate terms to the government of an independent country. [Ref. 28: p.177]

This by no means indicated that Greece would accept a solution which would be prejudicial to the Greek-Cypriot majority, accomplished under the threat of Turkish arms. The ND government had done three things to prevent this from happening:

1. It had thrown full support toward compromise solutions proposed by Greek-Cypriot negotiators which

would acknowledge the existence of the two communities, place them under some sort of strong central federal arrangement, and would seek a territorial arrangement with the Turkish community more proportional to the demographic split in Cyprus.

2. It had sought support wherever it could, especially from the superpowers, to use their influence with Turkey as a counter balance to Turkish military power. (The support of the USSR obtained through the U.N. Security Council and the Greek NATO withdrawal can be seen in this light.)
3. Finally, it had been willing to meet with Turkish leaders, when conditions were right, to attempt to improve a supportive atmosphere for the intercommunal talks.

The most forceful action that Karamanlis was able to take was to link the settlement of the Cyprus issue to other issues. To attempt to force NATO and the U.S. to put pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Cyprus, Greek reintegration into NATO and the use of U.S. bases in Greece were made contingent on a just Cyprus settlement. To further pique the conscience of the U.S., Greece linked the perpetuation of the U.S. military presence in Greece to Cyprus policies, citing U.S. policies which seem to support the Turks and accept the fait accompli. This linkage, however, was not totally successful in the long run, although it has generated some support in the U.S. Congress for the Greek side of the Cyprus question, notably the Turkish arms embargo. When the embargo was lifted, the U.S. President was required to certify progress toward a Cyprus solution.

In 1980, pressed with other concerns--European integration, Aegean issues, and other security concerns--Greece finally returned to NATO. New Democracy came under heavy fire for reneging on its 5-year policy of making a return to

NATO contingent on the settlement of the Cyprus problem. ND justified this by pointing out that the reintegration made Greece militarily stronger, which would lend force to its support of the Greek-Cypriot cause, and that over the years the NATO withdrawal had simply achieved all it could or was even meant to achieve. This brought an uproar of protest from the Greek opposition and even the Cypriot community saw it as a tacit capitulation to Turkish power and resignation to the new status quo in Cyprus.

Despite this, New Democracy has never accepted the idea of either a partition in any form, the establishment of two essentially autonomous Cyprus communities under an extremely weak central federation, or the solution of the problem without the aegis of the U.N. or within the NATO community on the bi-communal level. These would all be politically suicidal for the party in Greece, would accomplish nothing for the Greek Cypriots, and would tacitly reward what were perceived as aggressive and expansionist power tactics by Turkey.

This last point hints at the real significance of the Cyprus problem. Having renounced formally all desire for enosis and exhibiting willingness to accept some equitable compromise in the relationship between the two Cyprus communities, and having even acknowledged the Turkish-Cypriot needs for a just settlement to protect their community, one can draw the conclusion that for ND it is not "Cyprus" which is the central threat. The central meaning of the Cyprus affair for the New Democracy was its implications for other security concerns. Cyprus first caused the Greeks to question the viability of the NATO alliance in protecting Greek security interests. Secondly, it confirmed Greek fears of Turkish expansionist intent in the region. These were linked to the more vital Greek security interests in the Aegean region, which had heated up in 1973 and were

continuing to play a more central role for Greece. The Greek view of Turkish militancy and intransigence led them to interpret every move of the Turks in the Aegean as a threat to their sovereignty and an attempt to eventually create a Cyprus-style fait accompli and alter the Aegean status quo. It therefore caused the ND government to maintain an absolute hard line on all Aegean issues, no matter what justification the Turkish government used for its positions. The Greek government's reasoning went roughly as follows:

The unyielding Turkish line on Cyprus deepens Greek suspicions that Turkish claims to be a continental shelf in the Aegean Sea and an extension of its airspace over the sea [have to do] with regaining Greek islands lying off Turkey's Aegean coast. If Greece agreed [to any concessions in the Aegean] Turkey's next argument would be that the Greek islands on the Turkish shelf...should revert to Turkish control. [Ref. 29]

Thus the Cyprus events had a precipitative effect of hardening Greek policy toward Turkey. They also led to a stepped up defense effort, which absorbed about 25% of the Greek government's budget throughout the period. By citing Turkey's disregard, in the Cyprus situation, for international law and Turkey's "illegal and immoral" use of power, New Democracy dictated the fortification of its eastern islands and the Thracian border area. Karamanlis intended to deter the possible further expansion of Turkish claims in the Aegean region.

4. Aegean Issues

Ultimately more important to the Greeks than the Cyprus issue are the disputes with Turkey in the Aegean. Greek islands located off the coast of Turkey were perceived as threatened by Turkish expansionism. During the period 1974-1981, the Greek government saw what it called a

persistent pattern of provocation and aggression in the Aegean region. The effect of the Cyprus invasion on this perception has already been alluded to. Reinforcing the fears of the Greeks were the recent predictions of Turkish population growth. "They fear that Turkey, with a forecast population of 100 million by 1995 will be expansionist. Since an eastward expansion is definitely out, Turkey covets the land to its west, they say" [Ref. 30]. In addition, statements by Turkish politicians on the theme "struck by Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in an interview in July [1975]--that the islands of the Aegean always belonged to whoever possessed Anatolia" [Ref. 29] reinforce Greek apprehensions. Referring to the Turkish oil exploration ship provocations of 1976, a Turkish minister flatly stated that "the first thing is to establish our sovereignty rights in the Aegean in a way to leave no room for doubt...sovereignty rights are safeguarded by carrying out seismic surveys"[Ref. 31]. In the face of this, what Greece saw as the continual provocation and insincerity of Turkey, Karamanlis had found it necessary to take a hard line. The issue here was not a matter of a Greek ethnic majority within an independent state but a matter of Greek sovereign territory.

The general position of the New Democracy government therefore was clear:

[it is to] seek earnestly a peaceful settlement. The recommended sequence was as follows: (1) negotiate bilaterally with Turkey on the various Aegean questions, (2) avoid situations that might give rise to aggressive unilateral acts in the interim period, and (3) submit points that cannot be agreed upon bilaterally to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice. [Ref. 28: p.177]

Karamanlis had always stated a willingness to negotiate the issues, but only on certain pre-agreed and legal bases. However, his Defense Minister, Averoff, stated, "In our own

sea, the Aegean, our attitude will be aggressive, if necessary, and victory will be certain" [Ref. 32]. The ND government rejected suggestions that the Aegean issues be settled at the ministerial level (as Turkey proposed), since any agreement might lead to de facto change in the status quo which would then be viewed in Greece as a territorial concession. Therefore, elevation of the issues was important to gain acceptance and reduce risk within the Greek political realm. While reiterating his desire to negotiate (from a position of strength), Karamanlis asserted:

I can assure you that when the critical hour does come... both our vital interests and the honor of the nation will be protected... while we negotiate with Turkey we must reinforce our defense to the utmost so that it can act as a deterrent to certain circles in Ankara who want to mislead the Turkish people toward a dangerous adventure. [Ref. 33].

It will be most effective here to simply state the New Democracy policy on the important Aegean issues. The reader must keep in mind, however, that the issues are much more complicated than as presented here. (See Ref. 34 for a more complete treatment of the issues.)

a. The Continental Shelf

ND based Greek rights on the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1958, which gives islands their own continental shelf. This gives Greece effective control of the seabed surrounding most of the Anatolian coast. The Turkish desire for an Aegean Sea median line solution is not acceptable to Greece. Any arrangement which would result in enclavement of Greek islands within a zone of Turkish economic interest would be seen as a threat to the islands' future security. ND was not opposed to negotiating an arrangement whereby the wealth of the Aegean might be shared in some equitable manner, but it rejected as absurd Turkish

claims to settlement by virtue of population proportions in the area. Karamanlis attempted to get arbitration on the issue by the International Court of Justice, but these efforts were relatively unsuccessful. He also signed various documents with the Turkish government to establish peaceful bases for negotiations, most notably the Berne protocol of November 11, 1976. He also simultaneously took the issue to the U.N. Security Council to restrain Turkey from provocative acts in the region, which the Security Council supported (U.N. Security Council resolution, August 25, 1976). Politically having the status quo and the weight of legal argument in her favor, Greece would not have accepted any agreement other than that handed down by an internationally respected body (ICJ). Athens sought diplomatic level contacts with Ankara to define the situation and find some common ground for agreement. However, Karamanlis insisted that the legal documents from the Geneva convention of 1958 and successive U.N. Law of the Sea conventions be the basis. This has been supported by U.N. Resolution 395 which calls on the parties to settle their differences within the framework of international law. ND was and remains opposed to any bilateral or ministerial agreements or formulae.

b. Territorial Waters

Quite simply, New Democracy did not choose to extend its island territorial waters to the internationally acceptable 12 mile limit. However, it consistently emphasized that it would not relinquish the right to do so should Greek interests dictate the move. Occasionally, the Greek government used this as a veiled threat to try to effect an agreement with Turkey.

c. Aegean Airspace

In the wake of the Cyprus crisis, turkey, ostensibly for security reasons, issued NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) 714 which required aircraft travelling east to report to Turkey over mid-Aegean. This was contrary to ICAO procedures of 1952 which established the boundary of the Greek-controlled Flight Information Region (FIR), for technical purposes, at a median line between the eastern Greek islands and the Anatolian coast. This arrangement, originally intended as a convenience for the facilitation of international air traffic, has been subject to various interpretation by Greece. ND came to view the FIR as essentially defining Greek sovereign airspace. They cited several reasons for not conceding on this point. First, they saw the attempt by Turkey to control the eastern half of the airspace as a further effort to isolate the Greek islands. Greek flights originating from the mainland would have to "receive permission" from the Turks to commute to their sovereign territories. Second, such an arrangement, according to the Greek positions, would enclose the airspace of the islands and threaten their sovereignty. Thirdly, such arrangements would make it difficult for Greece to insure the security of their islands from the air. Consequently, the ND government took several actions:

1. It issued opposing NOTAM 1157 which declared Aegean airspace unsafe and suspended air services in the region, blocking it to international traffic.
2. It extended the airspace limit of the Greek islands from 6 to 10 miles.
3. It expanded the Limnos Island airspace to include 3000 square miles for military and civilian traffic.
4. It stated that any final agreement must be taken within the ICAO aegis at the international conference level.

5. It has demanded prior Turkish notification of military/NATO exercises reserving the right to limit operations in the area for "air safety" purposes, and played down Turkish complaints of harassment.

With advancement of radar coverage in the area, the median line requirement became less necessary and progress was made. However, the government continually cited violations by Turkish and U.S. planes over what Greece considered her sovereign airspace.

- d. Militarization of the Greek Islands

Efforts in this respect were psychological as well as military:

There are reports that many Greeks have fled from the Eastern Islands. The Athens government believes that unless it takes an unflinching stand against Turkey, depopulation may continue, making it easier for the Turks to move in. [Ref. 30]

In order to protect the security of the Greek inhabitants, Greece undertook to reinforce the islands militarily. The government cited several reasons:

1. In the area of Limnos and Samothrace, the islands are critical to Greek defense arrangements and were considered militarized by the Montreux Treaty of 1936.
2. The rest of the Greek islands along the coast have the right to self defense which supercedes the Treaty of Lausanne, which supposedly demilitarized some of them, and the Treaty of Paris, which applies to the Dodecanese.
3. The formation of the Turkish Fourth Army, located on the coast opposite the Greek islands, is sufficiently provocative to warrant Greek defensive preparations. Its commander stated, "The army of the

Aegean has a striking capability. Its deterrent potential is very important to us. It now [19 August, 1976] disposes a force of 123,000 men" [Ref. 34: p.40]. New Democracy stated that because Turkey continues to act in contravention of international law, treaties and resolutions, the Greek government was relieved of any qualms about militarizing the islands.

e. Aegean "Balance of Power"

The New Democracy government continuously undertook to improve its military position vis a vis Turkey. The withdrawal from NATO was couched in these terms--to gain the military flexibility to meet the Turkish military threat. Later, the maintenance of this balance turned into an Aegean arms race--or rather an "aid race." The government was extremely sensitive about the amount of military aid it receives from the U.S. relative to that received by Turkey. New Democracy continually linked this ratio to Greek-U.S. negotiations on U.S. military facilities in Greece. Notably, the 1976 Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA framework) was negotiated in light of the Turkish DCA of the same year. As part of the price of operating its bases, the U.S. agreed to grant Turkey \$1 billion in aid over four years and Greece was to receive \$700 million. Although these agreements never went into effect, this 7:10 ratio became a standard reference point in the New Democracy's balancing program. In 1980, Foreign Minister Mitsotakis of the Rallis government stated that "Greece is absolutely opposed to any grant that might upset this delicate equilibrium...the balance providing military assistance to Greece and Turkey at a seven to ten ratio--we insist on that" [Ref. 35]. Karamanlis has regretted this expensive balancing process, however. In the context of a 1976 non-aggression pact effort with Turkey, he said:

I would make two proposals to Turkey--that the two countries put an end to the arms race which is detrimental to the welfare of its people and to conclude a non-aggression pact and seek a peaceful solution to their disputes. [Ref. 36]

Of the external threats to the security of Greece, New Democracy definitely gave priority to issues on the Aegean. These issues bear directly on Greece's NATO relationship for not only have they contributed to continued frustration among NATO allies, but they have confounded attempts to reintegrate Greece into the NATO military structure. This will be the topic of the next section.

5. New Democracy and NATO "Ins and Outs"

a. The NATO Exit

That NATO interests in the "Southern Flank" have been affected by the events of 1974 is obvious. Quarrels between two NATO members, by definition, reduce the capabilities of the military alliance in that area. From the Greek point of view, the events of 1974 crowned a seven-year buildup of anti-NATO feelings. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was a crowning blow. Faced with the infeasibility of pressing a military solution and their political inability to make concessions in Cyprus, the only option was to attempt to placate public opinion and relieve public humiliation by a bold and assertive move. When Turkey, in apparent disregard for U.N. ceasefire orders, pressed the second invasion of Cyprus on August 14, 1974, Karamanlis went to the public and announced that Greece was removing itself from the integrated structure of NATO.

At the time, the government tried to emphasize that it was not a political or diplomatic maneuver. They justified their actions on two grounds, principles and military necessity. George Mavros, the Foreign Minister at the time, explained:

An alliance which is in no position to impose on its members respect for those principles for which the alliance itself was founded in the first place, and remains unmoved when one member attacks another, has lost both its credibility and its usefulness. [Ref. 37]

A Karamanlis radio address referred to the scandalous act of the Turks as being perpetrated with the tolerance of those who could have prevented it [Ref. 38: p.106]. He also indicated that, because of the compilation of Turkish aggressive moves, it was necessary to assume complete control of the military so as to meet the Turkish threat. Recalling the situation in 1974, Rallis remembered in 1980 that Greece at the time was faced with 3 options with respect to the the Cyprus situation; (1) to limit itself to simple verbal protest, (2) to declare war, or (3) to effect "withdrawal of our military forces from the alliance and their placement under Greek control, under Greek command, and...[to make a] statement that this was a move of severe protest for what was happening..." [Ref. 39]. Since that time various analysts have pointed out that aside from the public protest and military reasoning, the intent was two-fold: (1) to place pressure on the U.S. particularly (through the connected issue of U.S. bases and as leader of NATO) and to bring the issue before the NATO community in a dramatic way to gain support for the Greek side of the Cyprus problem, and (2) to allay leftist and centrist public opinion by capitalizing on the anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism, which had built up over the junta years to broad proportions, and thereby strengthen broad-based political support for the Karamanlis program. An indication of the effect that the first had, was mentioned by Rallis in his justification of the 1980 integration move. He pointed to the United States' Turkish arms embargo of 1975 (U.S. Congressional arguments for which were similar to Greek arguments). [Ref. 39]

The second intent was almost predetermined for Karamanlis if he was to survive politically. The genesis of the anti-American and anti-Atlanticist mythology in Greece is not to be analyzed here. Suffice to say that the legends of the "power that wasn't used" and the Kissinger "Mid-East miracle worker" made the failure in restraining the Turks look, to some, like conscious U.S. policy in Greece. Thus, when Karamanlis said he was withdrawing from NATO and rejected a meeting with U.S. President Ford, he was met with accolades of approbation from all sides--from the monarchists to the communists. The wide-spread feeling was that Greece would now no longer be "sacrificed" to Washington and Atlantic interests. "Most Greeks seemed to welcome the decision to withdraw armed forces from the Atlantic Alliance as an assertion of Greek pride following weeks of humiliation" [Ref 40]. But even though the NATO move seemed to be a tactical political masterstroke, the longer-range risks were also evident:

....the most serious damage done to NATO may be neither the tension between two of its members, nor yet the decision of the Greek government...., but the hostility aroused in the Greek public. All reports from Athens agree that Mr. Karamanlis' action was the minimum he could get away with politically in the circumstances, and that resentment against NATO and the United States runs very deep in Greece at present. Most observers are very doubtful whether any future government will find it politically possible to reverse the direction. [Ref. 41]

But Karamanlis calculated that the risk was acceptable in view of his political priorities. Faced with a choice "between a disastrous war or open capitulation, or to follow the lead of popular reaction" [Ref. 42], Karamanlis was bound to choose the latter. Foreign Secretary Mavros pointed out that "The Cyprus problem is a delaying factor to the process of restoring democracy...we have to give priority to solving that problem." [Ref. 43] With the swell

of multi-partisan public support created by the NATO withdrawal, Karamanlis could reinstate democracy with less trouble than would normally have been thought possible in the centrifugal Greek political culture. Given the inability of Greece to effect a solution in Cyprus, the NATO withdrawal could have been a tactical political coup. However, the persistence of the feelings created were to eventually cause difficulties for New Democracy in subsequent years. The emotionally created juncture was to eventually be turned by the opposition against Karamanlis himself and was to contribute partially to his party's loss in 1981.

b. The Effects of the NATO Move

Although the cliché of a "crumbling southern flank" of NATO became a perennial concern for some analysts, the effect of Greece's limited exit was probably to be felt more severely within Greece than within the Atlantic Alliance. Most NATO observers saw it for what it was--a political maneuver. And since Greece never completely severed ties, but remained fully within the political NATO structure, few actually believed that in the context of an East-West crisis, Greece would wish to remain "independent," especially militarily. Additionally, it was pointed out that the mission of the Greek NATO forces had been to defend Greece anyway. Some effects did exist, however, such as the reassignment of Greek forces toward the East, especially those in Thrace, the halt to Greek military force reporting to NATO, the potential restriction of information to NATO from the Greek NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) sensors, restriction in exercises in the area, restricted use of the NATO Missile Firing Range (NAMFI) on Crete, and the possible effects of the loss of U.S. military bases and intelligence sites, the status of which was linked to the whole NATO/Cyprus question.

The adverse effects were to be more serious to the Greeks, as it would later appear. First, for Greece to maintain and modernize its defenses to meet their perceived Eastern threat, New Democracy had to commit itself to an expensive program. Defense expenditures rose 43.2% from 1974 to 1975, another 23.6% in 1976, remained the same in 1977, and in 1978 were up again by 26%. This coupled with an upward creeping inflation rate made it clear that in the long run Greece's defense effort could not adequately support its needs. [Ref. 44: p.26] It also eventually became apparent that the Turks could use Greece's withdrawal to veto Greece's reentry (using as bargaining power their support of later Greek reentry bids) and to possibly further their interests in the Aegean.

Karamanlis' 1974 interim government, while taking a hard line in public, showed flexibility almost immediately. Shortly after the withdrawal announcement, Greece's NATO connections were shown as open for discussion pending a resolution of the Cyprus crisis. As a government source at the time stated:

The decision to withdraw from the military side of the North Atlantic Alliance is definite... but if our allies contribute to a just solution of the Cyprus problem, we do not exclude the re-examination by Greece of her position vis-a-vis the alliance. [Ref. 45]

Thus the position was that Greece's association with the U.S. and NATO was linked to progress toward solution of the Cyprus problem, a position which became a plank of New Democracy's security program. But this too was to have an increasingly adverse political effect on ND. It deterred the party in its later efforts to reintegrate with NATO and to effect a Cyprus solution. Any reintegration efforts without a settlement would be seen, by a number of

Greek voters, as a capitulation and acceptance of the Turkish fait accompli in Cyprus. An even more serious foreign policy complication appeared in reference to the strong, almost obsessive, desire of ND to achieve full membership in the EC. Other NATO/EC members could use Greece's desires for the EC accession to pressure Greece to return to NATO as an indication of good faith. The party was therefore sandwiched between two very public policies, EC entry and NATO withdrawal over Cyprus. This was to become a tremendous political liability, for, in the hands of the opposition, EC accession could be linked with NATO reintegration efforts, and the two could then be criticized as ND's acquiescence to U.S. and central European pressure. This argument, that ND had once again sold out Greek interests to the U.S.-Northern European "imperialists," would surface with a vengeance in 1980-81.

c. 1975-1981--Attempts at Reintegration

The foreign policy credo adopted by ND and Karamanlis (that "we belong to the West" and that Greece is by virtue of history and culture a "Western European" country) confirmed Western beliefs that the Greek break with NATO was never meant to be complete and permanent. ND's efforts toward EC entry supported this. In fact, in the same interview where Foreign Minister Mavros laid out the official reason for the Greek withdrawal in September 1974, he went further to say that "the Greek boundaries are the boundaries of the Western World," [Ref. 37] meaning of course, the eastern Greek boundaries. This could be interpreted that there was never any intention to pursue a complete break with the West. In concert with these views of Karamanlis' government:

Athens announced as early as August, 1975 its interests in a normalization of military relations to the alliance. Karamanlis justified this change of mind in that a formalization of the Greek association with NATO would serve the Greek National interest as well as strengthen the Athens position in the Cyprus question. The recommendations presented by the Athens government in September/October, 1975 in Brussels contained the proposal of a Greek special relationship to NATO. [Ref. 38: p.106]

The Greek proposals of 1975 contained the following points:

1. Greek forces would remain under national command during peacetime.
2. After prior approval, NATO could use Greek territory for its purposes.
3. Also with prior permission, NATO forces could use the upper Greek regions for exercises.
4. NATO would be able, as before, to use depots already in Greece and the early warning (NADGE) equipment.
5. NATO was to establish a 7th ATAF (Allied Tactical Air Force) in Thessaloniki or Larisa for the Greek air forces parallel to the 6th ATAF in Izmir manned by Turkish air forces. [Ref. 44: p.26]

Immediate opposition arose in Turkey, the U.S. and among other NATO allies against this plan. The argument was that such special relationships could lead eventually to the dissolution of the alliance. This initial opposition soon became a main instrument of Turkish foreign policy toward Athens and initiated a long struggle against a Turkish veto of the ND reintegration efforts.

However, the real difficulties for New Democracy arising out of the NATO question were characterized by two major opposing forces. First, political complications arose from three sources:

- The political center, to which the ND program belonged, saw the necessity of NATO reintegration arising out of Greece's organic relationship to Western Europe.

- The far right perceived a threat from the move and was more radicalized (polarized), achieved increasingly more support and eventually turned away from ND to follow its own course just as before the 1977 elections.
- The left of center forces were gaining strength, to a great degree, through this open anti-Western rhetoric (also evident in the dramatic PASOK gains in 1977).

It appeared that the ND dilemma of a split policy toward NATO was to help in a gradual erosion of support from both sides, apparently irreversible. [Ref. 44: pp.25-26]

Second, while the political situation recommended that ND proceed with the permanent severance of NATO ties, the increasingly serious security situation seemed to demand a reconciliation even more strongly. This latter "demand" came primarily from two sources:

1. the increasing and apparently destructive burden of defense costs (which, however, achieved relatively unanimous political support) to the detriment of domestic programs,
2. the growing seriousness of the Turkish threat into Aegean security and territorial interests which culminated in a near-war situation in 1976.

Adding to the seriousness of the latter was the fear that NATO would give allied control of the Aegean airspace to the Turks.

It was eventually the Aegean security concerns which became the controlling factors in the ND Greek-NATO reintegration issue. However, the domestic political side of the question became an increasing liability to the survival of the ND party itself. Under continuous pressure of PASOK and leftist hyperbole, the public opinion could not be turned from the anti-NATO/U.S. feelings created by the events of 1974 and prior. It was finally in 1980 and 1981

that both sides realized their desires and were reconciled--ND got NATO reintegration in October 1980 and PASOK got the government in 1981.

The efforts of ND and NATO to settle the NATO Aegean Forces command and control problem was central to Greek integration and became increasingly representative of the numerous outstanding Greek-Turkish conflict issues in the Aegean, mainly turning on the question of Greek territorial and airspace security.

From the 1975 Greek reintegration proposals, negotiations proceeded hesitatingly under continual Turkish veto, through a special NATO working group (created in 1975). The work came to a head in 1978-79 with three specific proposals detailed by then SACEUR Gen. Haig.

(1) First Haig Plan (Haig-Davos Plan).

It envisioned a general return to the status quo ante 1974. Military control of the Aegean airspace was to be with Greece, under a new NATO command at Larisa. (Vetoed by Ankara).

(2) Second Haig Plan.

Third party NATO commanders (neither Greek nor Turkish) would coordinate control of the Aegean airspace. Control was to be apportioned equally between the Larisa and Izmir commands. (Greeks objected that the plan would bring defense of Greek islands under Turkish control.)

(3) Third Haig Plan.

This plan attempted to divide equitably the Aegean airspace between international airspace and Greek territorial airspace over Greek Aegean islands. This could have been an effective compromise, but had enormous practical complications. Greek officers in Larisa were to oversee defense over the islands, and third party officers, the defense of international airspace. Greeks protested this plan also by pointing out that "under this formula, a

Warsaw Pact bomber on its way from Bulgaria to Crete would fly in and out of Greek airspace eleven times, which presented an unacceptable coordination problem." [Ref. 38: p.109] The failure of the Greeks and the Turks to establish a modus vivendi in the Aegean over the multitude of contentious issues frustrated any attempts at solution of the NATO Aegean command and control issue.

The Haig plans had been formulated in the atmosphere of perceived confidence in Athen's bargaining posture:

Emphasizing that there is growing exasperation over the protracted deliberations in NATO about the special status requested by Greece...[Greek ministers hinted that] Greece may withdraw from NATO's military structure altogether if Turkey continues to block negotiations...Mr. George Rallis, the Greek Foreign Minister, told Mr. Cyrus Vance...that the delay was making Greeks wonder whether the West wanted Greece to stay in the alliance. [Ref. 46]

This attitude was also a response to the assignment of Turkish command at 6th ATAF in Izmir.

However, the situation in 1980 was drastically altered when Gen. Bernard Rogers replaced Gen. Haig as SACEUR. New developments on the regional and international scene, as well as growing impatience to complete slated programs before the next elections were due, caused ND to press harder for reintegration. Consultations between high level Greek defense officials and Karamanlis took place. One observer noted:

It is evident that the world crisis emanating from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Tito's sudden illness have been posing problems for the Greek defense, adding urgency to the need for an end to the present ambiguity in the country's military links with NATO...President Tito too is known to be eager to see Greece once again firmly anchored in NATO both as a deterrent to a Soviet adventure in the Balkans,...and a Western lifeline for Yugoslavia...Another concern for the Greek government...is the American Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement signed earlier this month [January 1980]. [Ref. 46]

And in May, the new ND Prime Minister (Karamanlis had stepped down to become President), George Rallis, the same one who threatened to withdraw Greece from NATO completely, was saying that "the military reintegration of Greece in the Atlantic Alliance would best safeguard the interests of the country, and also the alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean." [Ref. 48] It was in this context that the new set of Rogers proposals were formed. The "First Rogers Plan" was essentially a repeat of the last Haig plan. This proposal would have set up an air defense buffer zone over the Greek islands and Turkish territory in which a "cross-tell" military flight information exchange system would effect defense coordination. Also the naval forces in the Aegean were to be organized under a "task force concept" assigned to the commander with the largest force in the area at the time. This proposal was unacceptable to the Greeks because it would change the pre-1974 arrangement whereby the Greek Admiral had control of naval forces in the Aegean. The ND government could not accept this apparent capitulation and insisted that Aegean command and control be settled after integration. (The Turks had always maintained that a settlement must be reached before Greece was allowed in. This, of course, was seen by the Greeks as a Turkish plot to "divide up" the Aegean.) [Ref. 49]

Realizing that there was apparently little hope in settling the airspace control problem, Rogers changed his tactics--he would press for Greek reintegration first and settlement of the airspace question by Greek-Turkish-AFSOUTH negotiation. What prompted the Turkish government to become more conciliatory was a matter of speculation and political controversy in Greece. The retraction of Turkey's NOTAM 714 and the resumption of normal air traffic on the basis of the pre-1974 FIR arrangements definitely made the agreement more palatable to the

Greek public. Under the final Rogers plan the NATO airspace control question was to be left to future discussion and arrangements between the Larisa and Izmir commanders in coordination with NATO's Air Force Commander, South Europe. This insured that Greek Aegean interests could not be compromised by some future permanent agreement. The previously mentioned "cross-tell" arrangement was implemented. To resolve the naval command problem, interim arrangements were made pending final decision on the "task force" concept (see above). The interim arrangement provided that:

The commander-in-chief and the naval commander, South Europe, will decide in consultation with the area commanders the delegation of the operational command of available naval forces. The meaning of this...is that the NATO naval commander in the Aegean, who is a Greek admiral, stays on but he will no longer have exclusive jurisdiction in the area. The headquarters...will simply consult with him when assigning an operation to a subordinate commander....[Ref.50]

The nebulousness of these airspace and naval command arrangements was meant to make it easier to advance Greek integration. Greece was not being tied to any formal agreements, and both countries were without any stigma of possible "sell-out." The Greek Prime Minister was also quick to point out that the introduction of the agreement specifically stated that it was to be without prejudice to the bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey and that it constituted no precedent for eventual solutions to these problems. Rallis could therefore argue that there was no basis for a feared Turkish "next-step," and no control was formally given to Turkey over any territory or airspace Greece considered sovereign.

New Democracy therefore met with final success in its integration efforts. The plan was approved by NATO on October 20, 1980. However, due to a fairly large public reaction against the plan, Prime Minister Rallis

called for a vote of confidence in Parliament. His government was retained on October 24, by a vote of 183 to 20. (94 PASOK and communist deputies walked out before the vote) [Ref. 51]. As mentioned before, the worsening international situation could have been instrumental in propelling the ND government rapidly toward reintegration. However, it appears that the New Democracy party had consistently desired and probably expected reintegration from the very start of the episode. Noteworthy is the fact that especially after 1978, Greece was relatively active in support of and participation in Eastern Mediterranean NATO exercises, notably the annual "Dawn Patrol" and "Display Determination" scenarios [Ref. 52]. (Greece participated in its first post-1974 exercises in 1977.) Also, the NAMFI training facility had remained active during the period, operated and upgraded by the Hellenic Army and used by forces of the U.S., FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece for all sorts of missile training and tests [Ref. 53]

It could be assumed, then, that the delay in making de jure what was already almost de facto integration might have been the persistence of adverse public opinion. ND may have thought at the outset (1974) that Greek public opinion would eventually forgive and forget. It appears, however, that the opposite was true. A poll released in 1980 surveying Greek opinion about NATO, conducted in November by the Greek magazine Tachydromos, sampled 600 Athenians. 51% of those polled said that Greece's return to NATO was bad, 43% were more impressed by the opposition over the NATO debate in the Greek parliament, and 51% preferred nonalignment and indigenous defense efforts for Greece as a NATO alternative [Ref. 54]. While this may show that the Greeks had a distorted view of their defense capabilities, it also shows that they were not convinced of a credible threat requiring NATO protection and

had not bought into the ND pro-West line. A study reported in the fall of 1981 presented similar conclusions and showed a persistent anti-U.S./anti-NATO trend since the days of the 1967-74 junta [Ref. 55]. It could be said, then, that New Democracy, aware of the trends in public opinion and the gaining strength of PASOK, locked desperately to conclude its reintegration into NATO before a possible PASOK victory in 1981 could reverse this and lead Greece to a "dangerous course" of non-alignment [Ref. 55].

d. The Great Debate

Confronted with a considerable amount of hostility at home over the announcement of the agreement which brought Greece back into full NATO participation (the now infamous "Rogers agreement"), Prime Minister George Rallis called for a vote of confidence for his government in the parliament. He also agreed to 3 days of parliamentary debate in which he could present and defend the government's NATO policy. Assured of a ND majority, he hoped to allay some of the criticism by formally answering the opposition's objections. Rallis' arguments and the ND NATO policy as presented before Parliament on October 22, 1981 can be summarized as follows:

1. The original 1974 NATO withdrawal was based on the realities of the time, when there was no other option. It was done for the defense purposes against Turkey and as a symbolic protest over the invasion of Cyprus.
2. It had had important beneficial international effects, stimulating the Turkish arms embargo and U.N. anti-Turkish resolutions.

3. It had important psychological effects for the morale of the Greek and Cypriot people.
4. Return to NATO had been desired in 1977, since prolonging the rift would be "dangerous" to Greek security.
5. Turkish veto power and Greek steadfast resolve not to compromise sovereignty had prolonged the process.
6. The accepted plan did not in the least infringe upon any Greek sovereignty. It represented no concessions or bargains.
7. All pending issues of Greek interests which existed prior to 1974 and were created thereafter were left open. Only temporary solutions were reached, over which Greece had complete control.
8. Turkey lifted its veto because of the "extremely dark international horizon."
9. It reduced Greek island airspace to 6 miles from the 10 mile limit for NATO military purposes only, in accordance with NATO procedures established in 1960.
10. It strengthened Greece militarily, and a strong Greece would be better able to press a solution to the Cyprus problem and protect the Greek-Cypriot majority interests.
11. Greece's total withdrawal from the alliance would weaken her security and channel increased NATO military aid to Turkey, thus tipping the Aegean balance of power against Greece. Additionally, Turkish aircraft and ships would take over control of the Aegean.

12. Greece has to remain in NATO to protect its national interests. This was the only arrangement that could provide full security to the Greek people, given the prevailing circumstances. However, the option of change was left open should conditions warrant a reevaluation. [Ref. 56]

The Pasok NATO positions will be covered in the succeeding chapter. However, while New Democracy had apparently achieved a major security goal in the 1980 NATO reintegration and a foreign policy goal in tying Greece to the West (Greece also became a full member in the EC on January 1, 1981), the goal of consolidating political support for the party seemed to be slipping through its fingers. Rallis stated that the final decision on the NATO issue would be made at the polls in 1981. The exact extent to which the NATO issue affected the outcome can never be certain. Indeed, the decision was made--to the delight of PASOK and to the disappointment of New Democracy.

6. New Democracy and the U.S. Military Installations in Greece

The future of American military bases in Greece (which were provided for initially under the 1953 Military Facilities Agreement which has been supplemented by numerous "technical agreements") underwent reconsideration after the events of 1974. The September withdrawal of Greece from military integration with NATO naturally brought the bases in question, since, although the actual operation of the bases had been codified by bilateral agreements, the existence of the bases under bilateral arrangements was based on the broader authority of Article 3 of the basic North Atlantic Treaty. Under existing agreements, certain U.S.

operations were authorized in peacetime, but the bases were to revert to NATO control during NATO-related contingencies. Thus, the status of the bases became involved within the whole Greek-Turkish-NATO-U.S. nexus of issues and disputes.

In line with the "independence" plank of Karamanlis' foreign policy, a thorough review of the U.S. military installations was to be undertaken. The reasons behind this are quite clear. First, Karamanlis was well aware of the general anti-Americanism which had been growing in Greece. The presence of the bases in Greece was to some visible representation of dependence on and domination by foreign powers. Since they came under almost total control of the U.S. commanders and the personnel were protected extensively by extra-territoriality agreements, they were seen as "greatpower" enclaves on Greek soil. Even the former Papadopolos dictatorship had to succumb to public pressure in 1973 by severely limiting U.S. use of the bases for support in the Arab-Israeli War.

With common perception of U.S. acquiescence to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the belief that the U.S. could have prevented it if it had wanted to (as it did in the 1960's), the bases had important implications and liabilities. Second, their value in enhancing the security of Greece was questioned. With Greece severing military ties with NATO, and the U.S. not performing up to Greek expectations in the Cyprus affair, their value in Greek security needed to be redefined.

That this redefinition included bargaining power with the U.S., is clear. If Athens could put pressure on the U.S. to alter Turkish policy by bargaining over the bases, they would definitely serve a security interest. Thus, despite the calls from the more vocal opposition to immediately close down the bases, Karamanlis decided to take a more measured approach. The official ND party policy (1975) was formulated as follows:

The future of the American military installations in Greece will depend on the outcome of the 'technical negotiations' which opened in force in Athens [10 February 1975]...Karamanlis told Parliament in December that all foreign military installations 'not relevant to Greek interests would go.' He promised a full revision of agreements on American bases in Greece. The Greek Defense Ministry has been giving priority gradings to the bases for their relevance to Greek, NATO, and U.S. interests. Those having the highest ratings in the first two categories will be maintained, although they will be stripped of the many privileges and exemptions they enjoy at present. [Ref. 57]

It was also pointed out that the legacy of the bases was that Greek interests, indeed its democracy and freedom, had been sacrificed to the interests of the U.S. to support Israel during the junta period. On this basis, along with the adverse public opinion created, the status of the bases warranted review. According to U.S. administration officials, a note from the Athens government at the time asserted that "all foreign installations in Greece were there as part of NATO and that therefore their future had to be discussed, now that Greece was reaffirming her sovereignty" [Ref. 58], i.e. her independence from previous patterns of foreign involvement.

The first action taken by ND concerned the U.S. homeport of 6 destroyers at Elefsis. This arrangement had been completed not long before by the former junta government and was particularly visible and sensitive. In April 1975 it was announced that other installations would be closed, including the U.S. Air Base at Hellenikon. The second plank in the ND bases policy was made clear in conjunction with this action. In the April 29 joint U.S.-Greek statement, it was agreed that in addition to "the elimination, reduction, and consolidation of other U.S. facilities,...the installations where United States facilities remain will be placed under Greek commanders." [Ref. 59] Those facilities remaining were to respect full Greek territorial sovereignty and Greek laws.

Another plank in the ND bases policy was made clear in early 1975 also. It was reported that:

Greek officials indicate that they are using the current talks to put pressure on Washington to aid the Greek cause in Cyprus. In addition, Athens is seeking foreign aid to ease its balance of payments deficits and refurbish its armed forces. In public, Greek Officials deny that American aid would influence the [bases] talks. In private, they say that the two issues are definitely linked. [Ref. 60]

Thus the principle of linking the bases to a general Greek-Turkish balance of power was established from the beginning. Indeed, the fact that no new bases agreement was ever put into effect under the ND government, could have indicated their status as a permanent Greek bargaining chip with the U.S. The 1975 ND actions dictated that the home-porting agreement would become the sacrifice to public opinion and the legacy of the junta. The other bases were to be held hostage to the Greek-Turkish Aegean "balance of power."

The culmination of this approach came in the Spring of 1976. On March 26, the United States and Turkey signed a comprehensive Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Article XIX of that agreement committed the United States to "furnish defense support consisting of grants, credits and loan guarantees of \$1,000,000,000 during the first four years." [Ref. 61: p.92] (Grants were to amount to \$200,000,000.) In reaction to this the Greek government broke off negotiations on the status of U.S. bases and indicated that it would make a major policy review. The general concern was voiced that "this large-scale military support for Turkey may upset the balance of power in the Aegean at a particularly delicate phase of Greek-Turkish antagonism." [Ref. 62] Greek officials also were interested in establishing a new set of rules governing any

further negotiation in light of the new bases relationship agreed to in the U.S.-Turkish DCA. It was also made known that Greece would be interested in a commitment by the U.S. (as the major military supplier and foreign military force in the Aegean) to guarantee the status quo in the region. On April 12, this proposal was agreed to by the U.S. As a prelude to resumption of U.S.-Greek facilities talks, the U.S. said it would give public reassurances that it would be determined to prevent and, if necessary, oppose aggression in the Aegean and Cyprus. Having the guarantees it wanted, New Democracy could now be politically safer in presenting any sort of U.S. agreement to the public.

The document which was to form the pillar of ND bases policy was initiated on April 15, 1976. (It was officially titled the Department of State Press Release on Principles to Guide Future United States-Greek Defense Cooperation.) Karamanlis assessed the package deal by pointing out that "the agreement vindicated Greece because not only does it avert the dangers, it strengthens the Greek position [in the Aegean]." [Ref. 63] His Foreign Minister, Mr. Bitsios, went on to add that "the balance of power in the Aegean, which we had feared might be upset by the United States-Turkish agreement, is no longer threatened." [Ref. 64] Major points of the agreement are as follows:

(a) Installations:

---each one under Greek command.

---only activities authorized by Greece are allowed.

---up to 50% of the worker personnel on the base will be Greek and the U.S. will provide for training.

---intelligence information collected by bases will be shared.

---the agreement will last for four years but may be terminated earlier and must be renewed.

---specific operations at major installations will be provided for by separate annexes.

(b) Assistance:

---four-year military assistance commitment established.

---amount will total \$700 million, a portion of which will be in grants.[Ref. 61: p. 87]

Unfortunately for the ND party, the agreement met with only limited public approval. Although it appeared to accede to Greek wishes and addressed the issues, the opposition continued on the anti-West line and criticized the agreement, saying that it jeopardized the independence of Greek foreign policy. Consequently, to placate public opinion, Karamanlis was forced to make some changes in the status of the bases.

A decision whether to sign the agreement was put off for other political reasons. Karamanlis was reluctant to give the Ford-Kissinger duo ("Kissinger the Killer," on Athens' demonstrators' placards) a pre-election victory [Ref. 64]. Actually, the Prime Minister also would not have been upset if neither the Turkish nor the Greek agreements were ever signed, and he stated so openly in connection with his proposals to end the Aegean arms race and conclude a Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact. Although the two agreements (Turkish and Greek) never took effect, their provisions remained guidelines for Greek bases and aid policy--specifically the linkage of the bases to aid and the maintenance of the Greek-Turkish 7:10 ratio.

The second success of the linkage policy of Karamanlis, although not specifically related to the bases, was the further codification of U.S. responsibility in

maintaining the Aegean military balance. This was in the form of the 1978 amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. One of the provisions was that U.S. aid would be provided for NATO purposes and that "the present (1978) balance of the military strength among countries of the region, including between Greece and Turkey, would be maintained." [Ref. 65]

The new ND government of George Rallis perpetuated the policy of the former government, insisting on the bases' linkage to larger issues in which the U.S. was involved. For example, his government threatened dire consequences and closure of American bases if the U.S. did not pressure Turkey to lift its veto of Greek NATO reintegration. Sensing trouble brewing for the upcoming elections, his ministers insisted that the NATO issue would be liquidated one way or another before the 1981 elections. [Ref. 65 & 66] The uproar created also spilled over into the ND party itself, creating visible tensions between the more politically centrist Rallis and the respected Defense Minister Averoff, who leaned further to the right.

Finally, the inability to settle on a completely acceptable bases package in the face of increasing NATO and U.S. aid to Turkey and in light of the public uproar of the left, forced Rallis to conclude that no final agreement would be politically possible before the 1981 elections. He foresaw that a concluded agreement with the U.S. could be a pre-election liability, so he decided to suspend negotiations with the U.S. until after the elections.

C. SUMMARY

This chapter reviews the New Democracy program with reference to the three major Greek security concerns; internal security, security from the Northern threat (Balkan

Issues), and security from the Eastern threat (Greek-Turkish Cyprus and Aegean disputes). It can be seen that all these security considerations coalesced to form the background, indeed, the shaping force, of the Greek-U.S.-NATO relations. The discussion is deliberately limited to the right-of-center Karamanlis and Rallis majority governments. It is important to note that at no time during the 7-year New Democracy regime was there a need for coalition government. This brought in a particularly stable political situation where essentially two major political poles developed--right-of-center and left-of-center. With the strengthening of PASOK and the dissolution of EDIK in 1977, both parties were in contention for the center votes while a small increase in the radical right and radical left developed. What is important, though, is that, disregarding the usual hyperbole (characteristic of parliamentary and opposition politics and a way of life in Greece), transitions and internal changes occurred remarkably smoothly. Unfortunately, the New Democracy party itself was apparently unable to modernize to fit its new vision of Greece. It remained under the autocratic control of Konstantinos Karamanlis, and, because of a fear of losing influence and the lack of any deep, well-organized party structure, tended to hold on perhaps too much to the old paternalistic image. Thus with the tarnish of a seven-year tenure, the Karamanlis aura began to fade, and with it the fortunes of his party.

On security issues, the party tried to maintain its attachments to the West, seeking support for its national interests through a foreign policy aimed mainly at negotiation and diplomatic influence. Karamanlis tried to supplant some of the historically traditional great-power patronage with reliance on international regimes such as the UN, ICJ, EC, and NATO for security. At no time did he ever endorse the false notion that Greece could realistically pursue its

security goals with total independence from association with allies. When the Greek-NATO association prior to reintegration was compared to France's NATO relation, Rallis, then Prime Minister, only scoffed that the comparison did not obtain, since Greece had neither the military capabilities of France nor the resources. Therefore, ND gave priority to the stabilization of the Greek domestic base, for only with a strong government, society, and economy could Greece project a credible unified image abroad. Divisiveness and domestic weakness had caused great-power intervention and domination in the past, and had led to the abhorred seven-year junta. Furthermore, Greece's past military adventures had led to defeat, foreign intervention and domestic strife. It was therefore in the interest of building up domestic strength to pursue an aggressive peace policy to settle differences with neighboring countries. To rid Greece of the plagues of the past would be to make Greece independent, secure, and an "equal" actor in European and regional affairs--to whatever extent possible.

The next chapter offers for comparison and contrast the developing policies of PASOK and its leader, Andreas Papandreu, relative to the same set of issues presented here.

IV. PASOK OPPOSITION POLITICS AND SECURITY ISSUES, 1974-1981

As we have noted in the previous chapter, the New Democracy security framework was based on the necessity of government management. New Democracy did not exist in a political vacuum, since, as has been discussed, it governed with a diminishing consensus. The evolution of the political opposition to the ND government is examined in this chapter in order to form a basis for comparison of Greek security policy under a "divergent" political trend.

The developing PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) party is used for this comparison. Like New Democracy, it was a new actor on the Greek political stage in 1974. Despite its relatively modest beginnings, most observers predicted an enduring importance for PASOK in Greek post-junta politics. These predictions were realized by the PASOK national election victory in 1981.

This chapter begins with a survey of the rise of PASOK from 1974 to 1981, including an overview of the formation of its general character and policies. The PASOK security policies will then be discussed as they evolved through this period. Specifically, the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean and the U.S./NATO bases and the Greek-NATO connection will be detailed from the point of view of the PASOK opposition party.

A. THE FORMATION AND RISE OF PASOK

1. The Party of September 3, 1974

Andreas Papandreou arrived in Greece in mid-August 1974, after an exile forced by the colonels' regime in 1967. The enthusiastic crowds that greeted him on his return from

Canada attested to the fact that he was already an established political figure in Greece, and one who, in the Greek tradition of single personality-based parties, would have some impact. Andreas was the son of George Papandreou, pre-junta leader of the Center Union Party. The father's party governed in the early 1960's and was close to winning another election in the Spring of 1967, only to be preempted by the April 21st coup. Andreas, an American-educated economist, had taken part in his father's government, forming somewhat unorthodox economic policies for the Center Union. He also became known for his leftist tendencies and was allegedly linked to a small left-wing covert army group, ASPIDA. His increasing notoriety in Athens politics--he was perceived by some as a protest leader and a Marxist, anti-American revolutionary--contributed to the growing apprehension among the conservative elements of the government which ostensibly precipitated the 1967 coup. (Andreas Papandreou himself has characterized the coup as being directed by the U.S. to keep him and his leftist movement from achieving power.) During the junta period, Papandreou had organized the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) which operated in Greece mainly through contacts within the student-academic sphere. Within his anti-reactionary rhetoric he portrayed the slain students of the "Athens Polytechnic Massacre" of November 16, 1973, as martyrs for the "genuinely socialist, anti-imperialist" cause, who were described as sacrifices on the altar of U.S. imperialism and domination of Greek politics controlled through the hated military regime and the CIA, which some alleged was in control of Greek politics. [Ref. 1] The slogans of the student movement--"out with the Americans," "democracy now," "Greece out of NATO," became slogans of the "movement" established to contest the elections of 1974 after the fall of the junta and to carry on Papandreou's vision of the

socialist transformation of Greek society. Thus Papandreou brought with him the credentials of a leader; who had been oppressed by the junta with its allegedly close U.S. and NATO connections, and who was a fighter for Greek independence and nationalism. He apparently possessed the first prerequisite for the traditional single-personality Greek political party pattern.

On September 3, 1974, Papandreou announced the formation of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). In the previous month Papandreou had attempted to quiet fears of new radical political activism and upheaval by saying "We have seen the cost of a confrontation and we know we have to be more patient, but not less determined. We have all matured, not only me, but the Greek people at large." [Ref. 2] This more cautious, measured attitude was an important factor for PASOK, for it allowed the party to gradually gain strength while maintaining its legitimacy, promoting a stable atmosphere for change and eventually allowing for orderly transfer of power--something unique in Greek politics. In his ideology and policies, however, Papandreou was to remain assertive. His movement, despite the possibility of antagonizing the conservatives and risking a return of the military, was not going to be politically coerced into acquiescence. He emphasized, "We [the left] shall not be overwhelmed by any complex of fear, we shall not suppress the broad guiding objectives of our political life, which are national independence, full popular sovereignty, and social justice." [Ref. 2] PASOK was not to return to the centrist politics of his father's pre-junta party, but was to be a continuation of the "national liberation" movement--anti-royalist, anti-U.S./imperialist and anti-rightist--begun in the 1960's and hardened through the junta resistance and the "blood of November." As such it was to be a truly unique appearance on the Greek political scene--

the first non-communist leftist party formed in Greece since it achieved independence.¹⁶

The so-called "principles of 3 September" have become the persistent leitmotif of the PASOK political program. They are based on a set of three sequentially organized goals: "national independence, peoples' sovereignty and democracy, and social liberation." Papandreou based the future survival of a true Greek state on the ultimate strategic goal of socialist transformation. To create the atmosphere for this proposed transformation to occur, the state would first have to be purged of all non-democratic, oppressive elements (i.e. the Monarchy), all foreign (i.e. the U.S.) political penetration and domestic patronage, and all intervention of foreign-controlled, exploitative, multi-national capital. Of crucial interest for this survey, however, is the issue of "national independence," for in it lay the basis for the development of PASOK internal and external security policies and general foreign policy views. The idea of "popular sovereignty," formed basis for the PASOK political policies which would establish a Greek state capable of safeguarding the Greek national interest and the interests of its populace.

2. The Program for National Independence

To understand the post-civil War [1944-1949] history of Greece, one must bear in mind that the political life of the country was closely supervised, when not directed, by the United States. The Washington formula for Greece...included the direct penetration of the Greek state machinery, ...unconditional support for an affiliated dependent political party, the party of the Right, ...the development of a bourgeois opposition party to

¹⁶This, in itself, is perhaps a tribute to the post-1974 Greek "political maturity" which many have noted. The facts that a leftist party was legitimately taking shape with apparently little reaction, and that it added a new ideological dimension to Greek politics seem to indicate that a maturation process was indeed underway. The implication is that a more politically "mature" state tends to tolerate a greater spectrum of dissent and political activity.

engage in creative criticism, [and] finally, the obliteration of any party of the left.

From information that is now [1973] available, it is clear that the decision for a military coup in Greece was taken in Washington in mid-1965. But the actual execution was delayed until 1967....

.... United States faces an impasse in Greece. The anti-American feeling runs so high that bourgeois democracy is not an eligible option for them. The Greeks have come to identify their bondage, their economic exploitation, with U.S. policy and, of course, with NATO. No political party could survive in free elections that did not commit itself to national independence, to a complete rupture with NATO, to ousting the American military from the shores of Greece.

....It has become clear in Greece by now that democracy is meaningless in the context of foreign domination, of covert foreign occupation; that popular sovereignty cannot be established without national independence. For this reason the primary objective is national liberation--the ousting of the United States and NATO from Greece. [Ref. 1: pp. 16-21]

In these statements, Andreas Papandreou, in 1973, characterized what he saw as the essentials of his party's struggle for Greece. The threat of external control of the internal workings of the Greek state was clearly characterized by these statements and their gist was written into the new PASOK movement's guiding principles. Parallel to the demonology created around the U.S./NATO complex--the supporter of the Monarchy, perpetrator of the 1967 coup, supporter of the junta, controllers of the Greek military, architects of the 1974 Cyprus coup, and supporters of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus--Papandreou portrayed himself and PASOK as the incarnate representative of the myth of the Greek resistance fighters of the 1940's, the "generation of the polytechnic," and the aspiration of the people for freedom and democracy.

The desire to rid Greece of what he saw as the negative foreign influences was immediately put into concrete policies in 1974. Within the 12-point declaration of party principles of September 3rd, PASOK declared that "All international treaties and agreements which led Greece

to economic, political and military dependence on the monopolistic blocks [sic] of the West, and particularly American imperialism are to be abrogated." [Ref. 3] If some could see room for interpretation in this statement, their optimism would have been shattered by further campaign pronouncements such as those criticizing the only partial Greek withdrawal from NATO. Papandreou asserted that "Links with the political sides of NATC must be severed and we must oust all American bases which converted our country into a nuclear target without affording us any protection." [Ref. 3] This policy was put in even starker terms in November, when Papandreou indicated that if his party won the upcoming elections, Greece would walk out of NATO, disband all American bases and adopt a non-aligned foreign policy. He went even further in saying that his government would "incorporate in the constitution the ban on Greek participation in any economic political or military blocks [sic] which undermine national independence and popular sovereignty" [Ref. 4], referring obviously to NATO and the EC.

The primary element of threat, the most basic challenge to the very integrity of the Greek state, spreading its influence both internally and externally to subordinate Greek interests to those of the capitalist-imperialist-colonialist West, was defined thusly by PASOK. It was the elimination of this threat that became the prerequisite for all other socialist progress and the freedom of the Greek populace. As a central theme of PASOK, this anti-American, anti-Atlanticist and anti-North European theme may serve several practical political purposes (in addition to the ideological ones) both for the electorate in general and for the party:

1. It disassociated Greeks and the left from responsibility for the problems of the past, especially since World War II. External forces were made the

perceptual scapegoats for a multitude of Greek problems including the Cyprus problems, the 1967 coup, the regime of the colonels, the economic problems, the Turkish militancy, political problems of governance, the oppression of the right, the politicization of the army and secret service, the paternalistic and clientelist political structure, and more--all of which "oppressed and disenfranchised" the "well-meaning but powerless Greek" citizens.

2. It provided a facile political argument (lacking the necessity for proof) that anything suspect or not in accordance with PASOK policies was most likely being manipulated by the U.S. in its "well-known desire" to reassert its former controls over the Greek situation. Those opposing PASOK, even Karamanlis himself, could be linked with "well-known" U.S. behind the scenes manipulation. An instant reaction was sure to follow among a large section of the populace whenever these hackneyed phrases were uttered. This was done with increasing frequency by PASOK and reinforced their supposed believability.
3. It relieved Papandreu and his leftist activism of the 1960's from responsibility for inciting rightist reaction. (Some had linked him to outbreak of the events of 1967.)
4. It provided Papandreu a very visible and (in the age of detente) fashionable rallying point, sufficiently removed from the Greek "bread-and-butter" issues but closely tied to vague feelings of Greek pride and nationalism, so as to be a "safe" issue for garnering popular support.

The extent to which the last of the above was used by Papandreu is quite apparent, and an opportunity was

rarely allowed to pass during the 1974-1981 period where he did not bring the issue of freedom from foreign intervention to the fore in some context. Through persistent, pounding rhetoric PASOK made the United States (as "overlord" of NATO, multinational capital, and Turkish militarism) a perceived threat to Greek security. Typical of this line was his statement at a 1980 New Year's Party celebration where he described the outlook for the coming year in the following menacing terms:

We are faced with dangerous developments not only on a world-wide scale but also in our own immediate area. We are particularly faced with the U.S. threat against our very freedoms, the very democratic institutions and the very course laid down by the peoples' movement in Greece which, despite contrary U.S. desires, leads to the victory of the people and of PASOK. [Ref. 5]

Indeed, as the 1970's progressed, it became apparent that the idea of national independence with its corollary of reaction to perceived American dominance had been installed as a persistent feature in Greek political life for the indefinite future, its roots going back not only to the events of the previous two decades, but reaching far into the history of the Greek republic. Papandreou established the U.S. as a symbol of the chronically foreign-penetrated Greek state. In this light, his statement after returning to Greece in 1974 seems politically realistic, perhaps even calculating. Referring to the United States, his analysis was that "They have lost the Greek people. It will take a generation to heal those wounds." [Ref. 2] It most certainly will take the duration of the period of Papandreou leadership, if not much longer.

3. Political Development of PASOK, 1974-1981

a. Ideology

To political observers of this period, PASOK was enigmatic. Lacking precedents in Greece and concrete ideological links with any of the more common varieties of socialism, it was, and has been, difficult to make predictions as to where its politics would lead. Papandreu initially labeled the party socialist based on Marxist principles but always pointedly rejected even a remote connection to Marxism-Leninism. He also rejected the Eastern European bureaucratic state socialist model. Opposed to this he asserted a sweeping populist approach to government and advocated decentralization. Indeed, the Marxist model does not apply well to the economic and structural views of Papandreu. [Ref. 6: p.111] Referring to various connections Papandreu cultivated, especially among the Arab socialist states, PASOK was criticized from time to time for advocating a one-party socialist state. However, the PASOK leader has always emphasized the strictly democratic nature of his movement, placing it within the framework of a multi-party system based on the present (1975) constitution. He has not proposed any sweeping constitutional changes. The most often mentioned structural change has been a change in the parliamentary elections system--and that only to a strictly proportional system. Of course, this change would have resulted in some restructuring of alignments, probably giving slightly greater weight to the combined left representation. Attempts at finding parallels for PASOK have been undertaken, comparing PASOK to the Swedish, Austrian, and Yugoslavian systems, to the French socialist party, and to some of his Arab Mediterranean counterparts. However, each of these comparisons is only successful within very limited contexts. The terms

populism, extreme nationalism, paternalism, and trade-unionism in addition to socialism all apply to the PASOK program; each, however, only to a limited extent.

As Featherstone has stated, and this is probably the best summary, "PASOK's ideological roots are eclectic and ambiguous." [Ref. 7: p.182] Perhaps this was the essence of the party, especially if one added the term "flexible" to the list. For it is this ambiguity and flexibility which gave the party the capability of responding to an increasingly broad spectrum of left-of-center public opinion, and it is the eclecticism which has made it appear as an indigenous movement and has given it its populist and nationalist appeal.¹⁷ The ideological flexibility of the party is evident in that the term 'Marxist' essentially disappeared from the party rhetoric quite early in its development, and even the term "socialist" has been used less and less [Ref. 6: p.116]. The best description available of PASOK socialism is that it is the triptych of these strategic political goals: "national independence, popular sovereignty and social liberation"--in whatever concrete tactical form they may take and whatever perceptual images they may create among electoral groups. It is structurally as well as ideologically significant to say simply that PASOK came to represent increasingly larger numbers of voters who occupy positions from the left side of the political center up to (but not including) the far left, whatever their specific desires may have been.

It is important, here, to mention what PASOK is not, politically. First, PASOK is decidedly not a radical-militant political movement, typical of some far left movements. It showed itself, rather, a more evolutionary (but

¹⁷Three very good theoretical treatments of the PASOK political phenomenon in Greece are contained in Featherstone, pp.181-185, Elefantis, in Penniman Chapter 5; and Mouzelis, "On the Greek Election."

assertive) movement, content to allow its support to build through the "natural expression" of the wishes of the masses (those people were seen by some as disenfranchised by the domination of foreign interests and by the political patronage system which, Papandreou would say, is the characteristic of the rightist-monarchist-militarist Greek governments of the past decades). It appears by giving these formerly "enclaved" (that is, held in a group outside and without access to the political process) groups access to Greek politics through the PASOK party structure, a "change" would occur which would finally vindicate the PASOK position with its democratic support. Papandreou and PASOK:

....never failed to pledge that the road to change would be peaceful, parliamentary, and democratic, clearly with the aim of minimizing adverse reaction from the conservative middle strata.... Above all, [PASOK] wanted to be seen as a party striving for the integrity of the country.... Papandreou carried this to the point of undisguised paternalism; always he was anxious to convince, to reassure. [Ref. 6: p.116]

This was politically realistic. It was near the center, where the broad popular electoral base lay. Furthermore, any return to radicalism could have risked return of military rule.

This points toward the second thing that PASOK was not --a socialist party which cared to embrace the far left. From the outset, PASOK rejected the idea of forming any close association with the long-established communist left in Greece. Although the various communist and far left parties of Greece continually sought to form a grand leftist coalition with PASOK, lending support on some occasions to PASOK candidates, especially in local elections, Papandreou has continually refused to acknowledge these parties within the PASOK sphere. While many of the policies of the communist parties seemed well-matched with those of PASOK, this

seemed to be viewed by Papandreu as merely coincidental. This again had to do with Greek political realities. Any gains PASOK may have realized in additional political power by associating with the left (e.g., in the Parliament) would most likely have been negated by the loss of center votes to New Democracy (the center not being a powerful independent force since 1974 and experiencing its final breakup in 1977) and increased internal party management problems. PASOK ideology was already spread thin, from the more radical Marxist PASOK youth, to the centrist parliamentary group. The broad base which Papandreu sought lay toward the center.

Two other considerations are important here. First, there was the lingering legacy of the Greek communist civil war which mitigated against support for the communist left among certain constituencies. Second, and more importantly, the communist parties represented internationalist tendencies and associations with "great powers" which Papandreu and his nationalism could not abide. Papandreu, during this period, essentially rejected any form of internationalism for PASOK no matter what its flavor, be it the Marxist-Leninism of the KKE, the Eurocommunism of the KKE-I, the Socialist International, European Social democracy, or anything else. In 1980, although Papandreu had started a dialogue with European Socialists, he asserted that each party is free to choose its "own road" to socialism. For PASOK to exercise complete autonomy over its policies for Greece and not enter into any leftist coalitions was fundamental to PASOK ideology.

b. Structural Development

A detailed discussion of the structure of PASOK is not within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, several structural aspects are important in assessing the

nature and strength of the party--thus its potential for future power.

First, in addition to its novel leftist ideological basis, PASOK was also a unique structural entity. It was the first Greek party, aside from the communists, to organize a thorough vertical structure which reached from the central committee all the way down to the "grass roots" level. The party structure is ostensibly set up (on lines very similar to typical communist organizational structure) to provide a vehicle for the mass electorate, the so-called "non-privileged Greeks," to express their political will, which PASOK would then translate into political action. Extensive cadres were formed to bring in "farmers, workers, wage earners, professional people, scientists, intellectuals, artists, as well as the youth and women, all of whom are exploited by the foreign and domestic economic oligarchy." [Ref. 7: p.183] These strata were to form the electoral base of PASOK. As they would break out from their "oppression" they could form an ever broadening base for the movement. Indeed, this expansion became one of the main Papandreou directives to his party cadres--to actively recruit membership participation among the voters. As he put it:

PASOK...has become the main and decisive representative of the people's movement in our country. ...it opens up an avenue which leads toward a new Greece after entire decades of lost opportunities for our people. It is not sufficient...that we are determined and militant. ...our organization must quickly open its gates and embrace our people, the farmers, the workers, the artisan the wage earners and the youth of our country... The movement has deep roots among the people and it is we who will be responsible if we are unable to embrace our people and safely lead them toward...victory." [Ref. 8]

The second purpose of the organization is to destroy the influence of the "traditional" Greek political

patronage system, often referred to as "rousfetti." This system relied on a small cadre of regional party bosses who dispensed favors in return for support of the party. The PASOK organizational scheme theoretically did away with this and opened up the avenues of power to the mass electorate through its participatory structure.

While this populist structural orientation remained an ultimate goal of the movement, there is no doubt that during the 1974-1981 period, a major portion of PASOK support was actually based on its charismatic leader. Andreas, during this formative period, left little doubt as to the centrality of the party and to the primacy of Papandreou within that structure. Angelo Elefantis judged that "Appearances notwithstanding..., the party base does not participate in any direct constitutive way in the formation of PASOK's political line, which is determined almost solely by Papandreou...." [Ref. 6: p.107] In the initial phases of the consolidation of party power and the reconciliation of divergent political "mentalities" within the party, the "connecting link is the President of the Movement [Papandreou] and the September 3rd declaration" [Ref.6: p.108] And indeed, it has been the imposing figure of Papandreou which has been able to balance the divergent trends (one towards Marxism and one toward the center) on the basis of his party centrality.

Notwithstanding the populist theory behind PASOK's organization, the fact was that during the formative period the structure was instrumental in carrying the views of Papandreou and the central party organs to the voters, not vice versa. That the central party organization was in control of policy formation and that at least for an indefinite initial period, the rank and file was expected to follow, was pointed out in a 1979 editorial discussing PASOK's alleged internal problems. "...the problem PASOK is

facing...could be easily solved if everyone understands that decisions must be implemented and that the leadership is determined to supervise this implementation at close range. All those who do not conform to the decisions will have to face the consequences" [Ref. 9] Papandreu himself expressed this several months later in quite concrete terms: "We must warn everyone that either they join our ranks with self-sacrifice and with militant spirit or else they should get off the bandwagon now so that they may not have problems later." [Ref.8]

That Papandreu intended to retain his position as the undisputed head of the party and would, at least for the time being, brook no encroachments on his authority, can be demonstrated by several examples of internal party issues from the period.

- In June 1975, 42 PASOK officers published a declaration which criticized Papandreu for considering himself "the only source of power within the party." This action was in response to a dismissal of 11 members of the PASOK Central Committee. 37 of the 42 critics were dismissed, 15 of whom were members of the Central Committee.
- In the September 1977 report of the PASOK Executive Secretariat, Papandreu was acknowledged as the "crucial parameter" of PASOK's existence. [Ref.6: p.108]
- The removal or resignation of a high PASOK official, Mr. Simitis, in 1979 was related to his "ideological problems," which he developed when he criticized Papandreu. [Ref.9]
- The alleged proposal by the editor of Exormisi (a PASOK oriented newspaper) that a party congress should be convened "for the purpose of electing new leadership" was criticized. A party spokesman responded that "the time was not ripe" for such a move. [Ref. 11]

- A general party congress was never convened; only central committee meetings and "conferences" took place. Presumably the congress would have the authority to change party leadership, including its president, if it desired.¹⁸

One former associate of Papandreou stated that Athens was littered with former friends of Andreas who had opposed him.

Papandreou has not denied internal problems, but he had to neutralize and control them. Especially after the 1977 elections, Papandreou undoubtedly was concerned with holding the party together while pursuing the drifting centrist vote. This could best be accomplished by a certain amount of policy flexibility which only a single-personality party could offer. Papandreou contented that during this critical period of PASOK's rise toward power, the party must unify behind his leadership. This, in his mind, was important for the short term but did not in any way affect long range goals. In an interview with Exormisi, Papandreou explained:

At this stage, it is a fact that PASOK is very closely linked with the name of Andreas Papandreou. Indeed, this is how it is. However, our entire course is such that even this will be surpassed at some other stage and PASOK will become a movement that will be less identified with a specific personality. This happens in my case because I am the man who created the movement. However, if one were to talk about the country's distant future, our effort and hope is that the movement should rely on our people's own forces...in the country's long development, which of course cannot be counted in 4-year terms or even decades. [Ref. 12]

Thus, for the time being and for decades to come, PASOK was expected to remain a single-personality party in consonance with Greek political tradition. Authority was to flow from the top down for an indefinite

¹⁸A general party congress was finally held in May 1984 and Papandreou was overwhelmingly reelected as chairman.

period of time, and the structure was to temporarily subordinate itself to the support of the leader's policies, giving him the flexibility needed to take advantage of the short-range Greek political reality to eventually achieve PASOK's goals. At least temporarily, "the organization...[was] assigned a secondary role, and the whole mission of its rank-and-file entities [was] to cultivate the leader's myth and strengthen the members' bonds with him." [Ref. 6: p.109]

c. International Political Orientation

The centrality of foreign policy to the PASOK political line is illustrated in the description of a 1981 campaign poster: a claw hammer (representing PASOK) was poised over a Greek flag nailed against a wall with three nails, representing NATO, the EEC and the U.S. respectively. The caption underneath read, "With PASOK in power Greece will belong to the Greeks and will have a foreign policy independent, proud and respected." [Ref. 14] However, Greece was not totally, self-sufficiently secure, and therefore needed some support from outside sources. It is of course this question which may have worried analysts the most about Greece--would PASOK turn Greece away from the West completely? And where--and to whom--would Greece turn?

The early views of PASOK indicate that a turn to either of the two superpower blocs was ideologically out of the question, although the party's views concerning the Soviet Union were considerably more vague than those concerning the U.S. Papandreou was quite adamant about the "anti-imperialist" course for Greece. The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were seen as extensions and mechanisms of this super-power imperialism. He therefore took a more "third-worldist" point of view, advocating an independent, non-aligned course for Greece. Through the 1970's, in

addition to regular contacts with Eastern European governments and Greece's Balkan neighbors, especially Yugoslavia, he sought support from two important directions. First he maintained liaison with a selected group of the European socialist parties (especially those of the Southern European and Mediterranean area), such as the French and Belgian Socialist Parties, the People's Socialist Party of Spain, the Italian Socialist Party and the Labor Party of Malta. [Ref. 6: p.113] Papandreu specifically excluded the possibility of PASOK association with European Social Democracy and the Western European Eurocommunist movements as being collaborationists to the super-power capitalist-imperialist nexus, which was bent on exploiting "peripheral" states such as Greece [Ref. 6: pp.112-113]. For Europe, he saw the grand goal as being the eventual elimination of the two opposing blocs and a unification, not solely under Western European auspices, of all European states (Eastern and Western). This would eventually allow Europeans to pursue a course free from the diverse influences of super-power sponsored East-West confrontation.

A second important direction in Papandreu's international politics was toward an establishment of a new Mediterranean axis of cooperation. To this end, he sought close relations not only with the Socialist parties of the Mediterranean littoral, but with all regional "progressive" forces. He actively supported and participated (even organized) conferences of the "Socialist Progressive" parties of the Mediterranean, examples of which took place on Malta, in July 1977, and Athens in 1979. In his speech at the former conference, he:

... stressed that these parties [Mediterranean Socialist and Progressive] must struggle for the overthrow of imperialist dependency, for a radical change in the international economic order, and for the formation of a Mediterranean community which ought to play an important part in the development of the North-South

contradiction. For this reason, these parties must coordinate their activities and promote Mediterranean cooperation.

As he put it:

In North Africa and the Middle East, Algeria, Libya, Iraq and, of course, the Palestinian movement make up the progressive anti-imperialist front. For in our era--the dominant form of class struggle is the struggle between the capitalist metropolis and the periphery, i.e. the struggle for national liberation. [Ref. 6: pp. 113-114]

This concept naturally excluded such countries as Israel and especially Turkey. They were seen as instruments of the extension of super-power influence which trampled the national interests of developing countries. A concept, which became common in Papandreu's rhetoric from the late 1970's on was that Greece was simultaneously European, Mediterranean and Balkan. PASOK intended to diversify its international quest for political support toward all four cardinal compass directions.

The question remains as to the PASOK view of existing European cooperation efforts, especially in light of the ND-led Greek government's decisive EC-integration policy. In the initial stages, Papandreu was vehemently opposed to Greece's integration within the EC. In 1974, the general idea was that if PASOK were to come to power, ties with EC would be severed immediately and applications withdrawn. As this issue evolved, the party line began to include a referendum on the issue. PASOK reasoned that broad anti-Western Greek sentiment would demand severance of Greece-EC ties, which were instruments of external control of Greek national interests.

As the decade progressed, however, Papandreu was to begin softening on this issue. "By 1977, PASOK's policy had developed to one of putting Greek membership to a

referendum and of forming a special relationship with the community." [Ref. 7: p.183] There was, at that time, perhaps a touch of reality creeping into the PASOK program, for it was pointed out that the Greek farmers (an important source of PASOK support) saw the Community as a panacea for their economic problems and would look forward to the massive influx of development funds, were Greece to become a full member [Ref. 15].

By 1980, when the efforts of the Karamanlis government for Greece-EC integration had succeeded, a decided change in PASOK's European relations position was increasingly evident. In February, in an address to foreign journalists, Papandreou appeared to be realigning his European policy. During this speech, it was reported:

He underlined a divergence of positions between Europe, particularly France, and the United States... He appeared closer to the positions of the Socialist International [which he had formerly rejected] as adopted in Vienna, [and] he admitted his party does not want to break off relations with the EEC but that it intends to propose an agreement on special relations... He accused the United States of wanting cold war and, ... he stressed it is fortunate that the Europeans, and particularly France, are separating their positions from those of the United States...." [Ref. 16]

The decisive move came in August when PASOK arranged a meeting (August 20-21) of European socialist leaders.¹⁹ The meeting was to have an open agenda, although (according to PASOK) it was convened to "coordinate action on peace, detente, and, disarmament." [Ref. 17] In viewing the meeting, Papandreou in a September speech before the party youth conference attempted to put the meeting into perspective with PASOK policy:

¹⁹Attending were Benito Craxi of Italy, Felipe Gonzales of Spain, Mario Soares of Portugal, and Charles Hernu, representing the French Socialist Party.

For PASOK, the Kekira meeting [with Eurosocialist leaders] was one of the most important milestones in its 6-year history. This is because the five socialist parties of Southern Europe laid the foundations for long-term cooperation and coordination of their activities in the struggle against the right, [and] in the promotion of the interests of the people of Southern Europe... at the same time despite its youth, PASOK has established itself in the European area as a dynamic people's party which is at the threshold of authority. It appears that... the great change in Europe will come from the South, that the great change will begin in Greece. ...

PASOK, which has already conducted important activities in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area, is today a bridge between the progressive national liberation movements of the Mediterranean and para-Mediterranean areas and progressive socialist forces of Southern Europe. In this way it is decisively contributing to the strengthening of the south in the North-South dialogue both in Europe and, more generally, in the Mediterranean area. [Ref. 18: p.S9]

PASOK, then, in these expansive terms, was looking for a more amiable relationship with Europe and Eurosocialism. This was perhaps because Greece inevitably would have full accession to the EC on January 1, 1981, and PASOK support was growing, leading it closer to attaining power. To portray PASOK as a leading force in the mainstream of the Southern European socialist movement would give the party (previously associated with the more peripheral Mediterranean movements) a new image of international legitimacy. One would probably not doubt that this political move was in part aimed at balancing the desires of the more centrist PASOK elements for a less radical foreign policy with more leftist elements of the party. The latter could be appeased in that PASOK was at the vanguard of an "independent" Southern European movement aimed at confrontation with the rightist Northern European-U.S. bloc.

This evolution toward Europe spilled over into the PASOK policy on the EC. Papandreou sought to undercut criticism of his apparent turn-around on the Europe-EC issue later in the September 8 speech cited above:

Rapprochement with the Socialist parties of Southern Europe simply confirms PASOK's position that Greece is a Balkan, a European and a Mediterranean country. PASOK has diligently cultivated its relations in all three areas and it has played a decisive role in establishing permanent cooperation both among progressive movements of the Mediterranean and among Socialist parties of Southern Europe. As of 1 January 1981 it will play an active role in the socialist group of the Europarliament.

It has always been PASOK's position that the accession of our country to the EEC is a mistake [economically]... In place of accession we have proposed a special agreement of the type recently granted to...Yugoslavia. It has always been PASOK's position that the people must be called upon to judge--within the framework of a genuine plebiscite-- between accession and a special agreement...

It has always been PASOK's position that--once we have acceded to the EEC--we must participate in all organizations of the community; that we should wage a battle to protect Greek interests....[Ref. 18: pp.9-10]

This was to become the basis for the PASOK's EC policy. However, Papandreou in 1981 emphasized that PASOK did not intend to join the Socialist International despite increasing contacts with the Eurosocialists. He characterized his position as an act of solidarity which conveyed the message that "PASOK is not alone in the European area," but rather an integral part of a legitimate European movement--"France is first, Greece second and Spain third" in the socialist transformation of Europe. He also further qualified his stance on the EC referendum, pointing out that "We [PASOK] believe that...Greece and the Greek people have the right to judge through a plebiscite. Whether this will take place or not and whether it will be soon or late I cannot say at this moment...."[Ref. 19]

Thus, within the context of Greece's assured admission to the EC, the obvious short-term lack of any meaningful Mediterranean cooperation, the continued divisive Middle-East situation, and the active detente policy of the Karamanlis government, realistic political considerations dictated that the PASOK policy evolve (from a rejection of

Eurosocialism in any form and the immediate pull out from the EC) toward a policy of qualified conciliation and cooperation with European forces. It is noteworthy that this evolution was highly correlated to the growth in PASOK electoral support--increasing voter support at the ballot box was matched by increasing PASOK flexibility on European relations. Some important reasons for this could have been:

1. A quest for greater respectability as the PASOK's chances at victory increased.
2. A desire to retain contacts with the West, from where most of Greece's (economic and military) support came, in the light of limited tactical alternatives.
3. A desire for more statesmanlike and centrist image to lure more of the political center votes away from New Democracy.
4. The ability for PASOK to couch its policy in the framework of the independent approach to socialism and the Southern European commonality of interests--separate from the Atlanticist-U.S. connection of the Central European bloc. This could appease the more leftist voters.

While PASOK, by 1981, was advocating a foreign policy program which it characterized as truly "multi-dimensional; and which placed an "independent" Greece at the center of a nascent Euro-Mediterranean anti-imperialism coalition movement, it was obvious that the traditional European ties would not be severed as early PASOK policies had led some to fear. Greece's position and security, according to Papandreou, was to be based on "multiple external props," each designed to support Greek interests.

Shortly before the 1981 elections, Papandreou put his external politics in perspective:

Concerning the story that PASOK will turn Greece away from the West, I believe that the matter is placed wrongly. We want to have excellent relations with the West. However, we do not consider that the West is the entire world. ...one target is to turn toward all cardinal points: East, West, North, and South. [Ref. 20]

It is this flexibility that had become important in Greek politics, for both government and opposition. The Karamanlis-Brezhnev 1979 summit resulting in Greek-Soviet agreements and the Papandreu turn to Europe might be seen as two expressions of a single Greek political trend away from the single great-power patronage arrangements of the past to a new political realism and diversification. In foreign policy, this could form the basis of the "independence" (limited as it may be by international reality) which both parties were seeking for Greece. It also may have been the expression of a new centrist trend in Greek politics which could form a more stable political basis for internal Greek security.

B. PASOK AND SECURITY ISSUES (1974-1981)

PASOK policies relative to Greek security issues can also be seen as evolutionary. As PASOK policy moved from the declaration of September 3, 1974 to the comprehensive government program declaration of July 1981, the realities of becoming the growing voice of the opposition under the New Democracy regime influenced PASOK policy. This policy, until the 1981 program was published, was basically a compilation of the various pronouncements of Andreas Papandreu. In addition the policies were typical of parliamentary opposition politics-- they were often reactive to government actions, often hypercritical, and lacked the concreteness and specificity as to policies to be implemented within existing realities.

It is therefore most valuable simply to survey PASOK policies on the issues of defense, the northern threat, the series of Greek-Turkish issues (Cyprus and Aegean) and the issue of United States military bases. These will then be related to one of the central issues which developed during 1974-1981, the question of Greek relations with the Atlantic Alliance and, specifically, NATO.

1. Greek Defense and the Military

PASOK, despite its many calls for disarmament, denuclearization and "zones of peace," continually supported an aggressive defense effort to build up the country's armed forces. The party never contested a ND defense budget. This occurred even though defense, in real terms, represented an increasingly larger financial strain given a declining Greek economy and rising inflation. Papandreou continually maintained that a strong Greek military defense was necessary to deter the Turkish military threat. To this end, he also saw the maintenance of the Aegean military balance as critical. In a 1980 parliamentary foreign policy debate, Papandreou recalled PASOK's support of the 1974 NATO withdrawal for purposes of bringing the nation's defense forces under Greek control. He added that:

It is a fact that it must be admitted...that during the past 6 years [1974-1980] the armed forces were truly armed in such a way that they are in a position to deal with any imposition against the nation. This was done with the concurrent opinion of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement. [Ref. 21]

Indeed, Papandreou usually did not criticize the "Aegean Arms Race" as the government had, and, instead, in line with his other somewhat militant views vis-a-vis Turkey, he criticized any sort of negotiations (e.g. NATO reintegration or Aegean disputes) which might weaken the Greek military position.

Criticizing the NATO reintegration efforts of 1980 as detrimental to Greek defense development and deployment, Papandreou again reiterated the need for a specifically Greek-controlled defense program. Seeing procurement of NATO military equipment as ineffective against the "real" Turkish threat, Papandreou asserted, "We must state it clearly, aircraft, missile boats, helicopters--this is the type of equipment we will require to defend the land of our fathers.... We must be in the position to mount an effective defense because it is the only way that the danger of a Turkish invasion can be averted." [Ref. 22] In short, in order to meet what was portrayed as an imminent Turkish threat, PASOK program for defense was:

to arm the people comprehensively, build an arsenal that is diversified in source and in scope, develop a sizable defense industry and secure nuclear weapons for use as the ultimate deterrent of external aggressive behavior²⁰ [Ref. 23: p.37]

To this end, priorities were given in the PASOK economic proposals for the development of strategic industries, including defense (armaments), energy and mining.

On the subject of the military forces themselves, Papandreou and PASOK, evolving from their 1974 calls for drastic action against the junta elements of the military, have taken a supportive line. Papandreou's caution not to attack the military may be at least partially linked to the desire to avoid a return of the events of 1967. Consequently, he developed a line which usually linked the military with the preservation of the Greek democratic state from Turkish aggressors--attempting to continue to capitalize on the 1974 Cyprus invasion. The call for purging

²⁰The last policy was maintained early in PASOK's career and has been modified with the development of Papandreou's later peace and nuclear disarmament policies.

the army rightist junta elements was dropped from the rhetoric soon after the elections of 1974 and the 1975 trials of junta leaders.

One departure from PASOK's laissez-faire attitude toward military reorganization or similar measures came in 1979, when in a United States interview he proposed what he called a "people's militia"--keeping all eligible men in the reserve security forces from age 20 to 50. This policy was attacked from several sides as aimed at creating a private PASOK party militia for enforcement of some future one-party PASOK Greek state. PASOK said of the criticism that "nobody questions that the role of the armed forces is useful in the defense of our country, but it is truly difficult for us to understand why the Minister of Defense opposes universal popular participation in this defense when our country's integrity is being threatened." [Ref. 24] Nevertheless, this line was also eventually dropped from the party rhetoric.

PASOK military policy became even more conciliatory in the early 1980's, especially within the context of Papandreou's hyperbole against NATO reintegration. Referring to the armed forces in a Rhodes Campaign speech, (Aug. 1981) Papandreou emphasized what had become the "proper" posture of the military. "Democracy in Greece is indestructible," he said, "It is guarded by the people and country's armed forces, which are dedicated to their supreme duty--the protection of our national independence and of our fatherland's territorial integrity." [Ref. 25: pp.55-6] In this same speech he accused the government of fueling rightist alarmism over PASOK policies, serving the "circles of anomaly" (a codeword used by Papandreou for the 7-year junta government). Further, to reassure the military and more conservative elements within the party, he stressed that:

With regard to the measures PASOK will take to implement its national defense and foreign policy, repercussions on the nation's armed forces' fighting ability will be taken into consideration. In no case and with no step will PASOK allow the downgrading of the readiness of the country's armed forces to defend us from foreign designs." [Ref. 25: p.55]

These conciliatory statements were apparently important. Papandreou continually tied the PASOK program to the support of a strong army standing for the same policies as PASOK. If the predicted 1981 passage of government to the socialists did occur, it would probably be the most critical change in Greek history, resulting in the first non-rightist government of Greece. Papandreou knew that if ever there was the possibility of a reassertion of a military rightist reaction, it would be in the context of an impending PASOK victory.

2. PASOK and the Northern Threat

In light of PASOK's multi-dimensional program for foreign policy, Papandreou could hardly criticize the Karamanlis government's efforts to improve ties with the Balkan states. Papandreou himself undertook to improve ties with various Balkan and Eastern European states, especially with Yugoslavia. He viewed these countries as being in a position similar to that of Greece (victims of the superpower polarization of Europe), and therefore saw the Balkan community in particular as moving toward a more independent and mutually supportive regime, free of superpower influence. Concerning possible threats from the area, Papandreou iterated a common southern European theme: "My view is that no dangerous development should be expected in the Balkans in the immediate future." [Ref. 26] Instead, he foresaw an attempt to move the Balkans toward more internal cooperation, taking them out of the cold war blocs and interacting with other similar regional groups (e.g. in the

Mediterranean, and the Middle East) for mutual support and cooperation in order to secure independence and freedom from superpower hegemony.

For Tito and Yugoslavia, Papandreou held a special regard. The particular brand of Yugoslav non-alignment was inspirational to Papandreou and was exemplary of the sort of position toward Europe and its international environment he would envision for Greece. "Tito's presence in Yugoslavia, and in the Balkans," he said, "...as within the non-aligned movement, is, without a doubt, a stability factor. The foundations for the unity of the people have been firmly set in Yugoslavia. Its national defense, based on the mobilization of all its citizens, has effectively armed the country against intervention from the outside." [Ref. 26]

The supposed Turkish military threat was, to Papandreou, the major threat to Balkan security. He predicted that should Turkey implement this threat, the Balkan balance of forces would be overthrown and a serious regional crisis would develop.

Papandreou therefore sought much the same strategic goals for the Balkans as he did for the Mediterranean region--the elimination of foreign bases and forces and the establishment of a regional regime. He foresaw Greece as being a central force in the liaison between these peripheral regions. The ultimate goal would be the dissolution of East-West bloc influence within the region--the eventual expulsion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact--and the independence of the Balkan countries.

This, of course, would be the most desirable security position for Greece. With a firm and growing political and economic linkage between the countries based on similar national and regional interests, the "Northern" threat would further diminish and regional disputes could be solved on a bilateral basis. He foresaw no serious clash or

outside intervention in the region, even in the increased "cold war atmosphere" of 1980--unless the cold war became a "hot one."

Toward the U.S.S.R., Papandreou was not as enthusiastic. Although he did not preclude relations with almost any country, his attitude toward the Soviets was a little more reserved. The fact that the Soviets had not intervened in the 1974 Cyprus situation (as they had to some extent in the 1960's) and coerced Turkey to withdraw must have been noted. That the U.S.S.R. and Turkey had ongoing economic and political relations, quite extensive compared to the nascent Greek efforts, could also not be overlooked. As a result Papandreou viewed the Soviet Union, being the second half of the cold war European arrangement, with reserve. An example of this is seen when he was asked to comment on the possibility of Soviet "bases" being established in Greece following the Greek-Soviet ship repair agreements concluded in the late 1970's. He stated he was against foreign bases of any type in Greece and the Mediterranean. He apparently did not appreciate the growing presence of the 5th Soviet Eskadere in the Eastern Mediterranean any more than he did the U.S. 6th Fleet--both seen as instruments of superpower infringement on the sovereignty of the regional states.

3. PASOK and the Cyprus Issue

The 1974 invasion of Cyprus and its subsequent partition provided a consistent and constant point of departure for PASOK policy. Papandreou's initial views were less directed toward some concrete solution of the problem and more toward expanding upon the implications of the affair for internal and domestic policy.

Papandreou was probably the figure most vocal in keeping the "meaning" of the Cyprus invasion alive before a large segment of sympathetic Greek opinion. The PASOK interpretation was that:

1. The U.S. had a role in the 1974 anti-Makarios coup and was therefore largely responsible for the disaster.
2. NATO and the U.S. could have prevented the Turkish invasion, but instead, by not preventing it, tacitly condoned Turkish actions and did not pursue a fair settlement.
3. The affair made the whole nexus of U.S./NATO-Greek relations null, since it was through U.S. and NATO arms and support that Turkey was able to desecrate an independent state and oppress Hellenism.
4. The Turkish actions were concrete proof of Turkish belligerent and aggressive intentions against Greece.
5. The whole fiasco was a direct contradiction of Greek interests by NATO and the U.S. superpower in order to secure a military base and exercise control over the island for NATO purposes.

PASOK Cyprus policy, then, was fairly consistent over the period. PASOK first demanded that the U.N. assembly resolution No. 3312 (November 1, 1974) be implemented immediately and all foreign troops be withdrawn from the island. Second, independence and unity of the island must be restored on a basis equitable to the Greek majority. Papandreou has stated emphatically that Greece, as guarantor of Cyprus security, must take a strong stand to achieve the reunification and independence of the country.

As to the framework for working out a solution, Papandreou consistently called for the "internationalization" of the problem--i.e. the convening of an international conference including "third" (non-NATO) parties to arbitrate the problem. The intercommunal talks under U.N. guidance were criticized as being efforts by the U.S. and NATO countries to effect a solution to the problem which would

ultimately end up in de facto division of the island. Papandreou, in a 1979 parliamentary debate, stated "The tug-of-war between Cyprus' internationalization and nationalization continues." (Papandreou preferred the former, the latter being the NATO and U.S. sponsored line.) He proceeded in typical form; "Immediately after the U.N. resolution of November 9, 1978²¹ that was so favorable to Cyprus, the Americans publicized a new plan.... Its goal...was to derail once again the Cyprus issue from its international framework, to decrease the significance of the U.N. resolution and create a framework of international talks which would satisfy Atlantic interests." [Ref. 27: p. 515]

Papandreou has adamantly rejected, therefore, the intercommunal approach to solution which was supported by the Karamanlis government. He has seen it as an attempt at "NATOization" of the problem, leading to eventual partition of the island, the legitimization of Turkish aggression, and the thwarting of Greek national interests. Under the pressure of the more than 20,000 Turkish troops on the island, negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities could not possibly lead to a just settlement (according to Papandreou). Furthermore, any acceptance of an agreement made under such conditions by the Greek government would mean Greek capitulation and defeat. Consequently, Papandreou and PASOK maintained a hard and vocal line on Cyprus and its meaning for Greece's relations with NATO and the U.S. The leader explained the PASOK position as follows:

²¹Passed by the general assembly, this called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and insisted that the Security Council enforce this.

The gravest mistake is that we, both the Cypriots and the Greeks of Greece have allowed the creation of the impression that the Cyprus issue is a matter between two communities, the Greek and the Turkish communities. ...when I said that I do not believe in the intercommunal talks, I meant exactly that. This is an international issue, it is an issue for the United Nations. Apart from the fact that it is an issue for the guarantor power, it is also an issue for Greece. [Ref. 28: p.S10]

Implied here is that in addition to the plight of the Cypriot people, there is a basic Greek interest which must be protected in Cyprus.

Papandreou, contended that the real issue is that of the "British-American bases" and the Turkish-NATO troops on the island. At the core is the liberation of the Cypriot people from the "yoke" of external intervention. There are no real problems between the two communities on the island, only problems of attempted external manipulation which had divided and destroyed the island.

Papandreou adamantly warned both the leaders in Athens and in Nicosia that:

.... neither the Cypriot government nor the Greek government has the right to legalize faits accomplis in order to end the Cyprus problem in accordance with NATO interests.

We are ready to support the Cypriot people's struggle, we are ready to support the work of the Cypriot government... However in no way will the Greek people recognize the faits accomplis of Attila I and Attila II [Turkish 1974 Cyprus operation code names]. We must not forget that our own territorial integrity and national independence are solidly linked with the fate and course of the Cyprus problem. [Ref. 29]

Referring to the ongoing negotiations and proposals of various types of federations for Cyprus, Papandreou said that concessions which would even hint that there was a legitimate separate Turkish community on Cyprus, if accepted by the Greek government, "would constitute treason."

It is open to question what PASOK actually had in mind for the concrete implementation of its vocal Cyprus position. One weapon it continually advocated was the complete severance of ties with NATO and the removal of U.S. bases from Greece. It is therefore understandable that the 1980 reintegration into NATO was condemned by PASOK as a complete sell-out of the Greek Cypriots and the future of Cypriot independence under pressure from NATO-member Turkey.

However, one must also speculate that Papandreou's plan of internationalization was an attempt to place Greece--essentially excluded from the discussions, while the Turks spoke through their tightly controlled Cypriot government--in a position of influence in the situation. Be that as it may, it was clear that Papandreou felt some sort of close Greek attachment to Cyprus affairs and felt that the situation demanded more assertive action from the Greeks to protect not only Greek-Cypriot interests but Greek interests as well.

4. Aegean Issues and PASOK Policy

It is in the Aegean Sea region that PASOK sees the gravest danger to Greece from the Turkish threat. It appears that Papandreou and his followers are convinced of the reality of their perception that Turkey has militant and aggressive intentions, supported by the NATO/US military aid program, to expand its influence around, above and eventually on Greek sovereign territory. Toward this eastern "threat" PASOK has taken a particularly militant and intransigent attitude. In a parliamentary debate which mainly turned on the Aegean issues, Papandreou characterized these perceptions as follows:

....the nation confronts a mortal threat. Cyprus for years now has been under the bestial Attila occupation. In the Aegean since 1973, Turkey has questioned the entire regime which has been established by

international treaties and agreements. With numerous official statements Turkey demands the disarming of the Eastern Aegean islands; the partition of airspace; the partition of the undersea area; the non-implementation by us of the right to extend our territorial waters to 12 miles.... With numerous high-handed and illegal acts it has violated Greek airspace, the Aegean continental shelf and our territorial waters. [Ref. 30: p.S14]

PASOK continually criticized the efforts of the Karamanlis government at negotiation and arbitration. As Papandreu saw it, negotiation with Ankara over Aegean issues and even appeals to bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an arbitration constituted a tacit admission that perhaps there was some validity in Turkish claims--an idea which PASOK totally rejected. Additionally, behind the scenes Papandreu saw both direct and indirect support of the Turks by the U.S. and NATO in their efforts to create a Turkish "fortress" in the Eastern Mediterranean--especially in the context of the loss of Iran. PASOK therefore took an uncompromising line on the various sub-issues involved. An unfortunate aspect of opposition politics in the Aegean situation was that not only were the Karamanlis efforts at peaceful resolution of the situation hampered by the apparently belligerent attitude of PASOK and the public support it generated, but the same was occurring within Turkey. The "hard-line" pressure from the opposition within both countries was almost identical. (Particularly vocal in Turkey was the Ecevit opposition to the more conciliatory Demirel government.)

a. The Continental Shelf

It was this issue which sparked Athens-Ankara controversy--and on this issue the PASOK policy was quite confrontational. The party wholly subscribed to the interpretation that according to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the Greek islands off the Anatolian coast have their own

continental shelf, within which the Greeks have broad legal rights which should not be negotiated. Turkish probes into these areas were deliberately provocative, according to PASOK, and should have been met with unflinching strength--militarily if necessary.

In the context of the crisis situation created by the exploration voyage of the Sismik I into Greek-claimed waters, Papandreou called for its sinking. This famous "sink the Hora" speech (Hora being the former name of the Sismik I) was to return to haunt him in the 1981 election campaign, where it was used to insinuate the dangerousness of Papandreou's positions. He attempted to dodge this charge by saying that the government at the time had agreed to the speech in order to indirectly put pressure on the Turks. Be that as it may, this was a good example of Papandreou's inflexibility on the issue.

Regarding the government's attempt to resolve the question through negotiations and appeals to international bodies (U.N. and ICJ) Papandreou was also outspoken. In principle he condemned the approach by the government in its somewhat inconclusive appeal to the Hague (ICJ) and its simultaneous appeal to the U.N. Security Council (1976). "We [PASOK] stated, right from the start, that we opposed the appeal to the Hague. This is because, in this way, we recognized the question of the Aegean as a matter for adjudication." [Ref. 30: p.518] Thus the "fiasco of the Hague" represented admission that there was some question about Greek rights--the resolution of which could only result in a change of the Aegean states quo and Greek concessions to Turkey. In this same view, the August 1976 decision of the U.N. Security Council directing the two parties to negotiate a settlement bilaterally could also lead to compromise of the Greek position.

Finally, Papandreou denounced the November 1976 "Berne Protocol" which the government had signed with Turkey as giving Turkey an unrestricted framework to formulate demands against Greek interests, without any firm limits dictated by the Greek interpretation of the Geneva Convention. "He characterized the Berne Protocol of November 11, 1976, as a legal void.... 'It means that there is no obligation regarding principles. There is no specific legal framework; that important rules of international law can be ignored altogether--including certainly, the Geneva Convention which has the famous first three clauses which define the continental shelf of islands.'" [Ref. 30: p.S19]

However, the PASOK position was not totally confrontational. Papandreou admitted that "no one can deny that on the technical issue of the delineation of the continental shelf, there must be a dialogue. This is provided for under the Geneva convention." [Ref. 30: p.S20] PASOK believed that these talks should be based on the following strict preconditions:

1. Advance acceptance by Turkey of the rules of law, including the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea resolutions and the 1958 Geneva Convention, as the only basis for any negotiations.
2. Public renunciation by Turkey in advance of the "provocative" measures it has taken in the region specifically those of the 1973 Turkish Aegean map, 1974 ceding of prospecting rights and the 1976 Sismik I cruises.
3. Statement of policy by the Greek government that if Turkey persists in its "unilateral" delineation of the Aegean, that Greek publish its own scheme and effectively solve the issue by extending Greek territorial waters.

Thus, in general, the PASOK policy has been to oppose any Turkish claims in the region, by force if necessary, and to criticize any negotiations which might appear to concede that Turkey has any rights within the legal framework of international law.

b. Aegean Airspace

With regard to the problem of the control of the Aegean airspace, PASOK has taken an equally uncompromising attitude. Papandreou clearly stated the party's views on this subject:

Under a decision of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Athens FIR [Flight Information Region], as it is called, was and has been defined to cover Aegean airspace up to our Eastern frontiers.... with the announcement of NOTAM 714, the Turks attacked this status and extended boundaries of their own FIR to approximately the middle of the Aegean. It is clear that any extension of Turkish airspace west of our frontiers includes Greek national territory. It mutilates our fatherland's airspace and adds it to Turkey. [Ref.30: p.S16]

With this rhetoric, Papandreou has slightly distorted the actual legal and procedural meaning of the Athens FIR to make it appear that it is somehow completely Greek territorial airspace. "The Athens FIR coincides with our eastern frontiers," he asserted in 1980, "This FIR cannot be violated. Any violation of the FIR means an act of war in exactly the same way that NOTAM 714 of 1974 was." [Ref. 31 p.S13] ²² This statement, issued during the NATO reintegration parliamentary debate, showed Papandreou's particular

²²In reality, the airspace over the Aegean is mainly international airspace. It was agreed by ICAO, of which Greece is a member, that the Athens FIR control the civil air traffic for pragmatic procedural reasons. Territorial airspace with defined vertical and horizontal limits surround the Greek coastline and the Greek islands. This has been set at a limit of 10NM and constitutes "Greek Territorial Airspace." All other airspace is supposedly free to air navigation subject to ICAO rules and procedures. (See Chapter 2.)

sensitivity about the airspace issue. One of his main bases for criticism of the NATO move was that by agreeing to reentry without the question of the command and control of the Aegean airspace resolved, the government had essentially acknowledged that Turkey had equal rights in the area. Furthermore, the reduction, for NATO purposes, of Greek island national airspace from ten to six nautical miles was portrayed as a sellout under NATO pressure and Turkish demands. He called this arrangement "a form of joint sovereignty over the Aegean," and, using Rallis' own words, he equated any reduction in, or ceding of airspace to the control of the Turks as bordering on treason [Ref. 31]. PASOK, on this basis, opposed any changes or readjustments in the Aegean airspace from the pre-1974 status quo and criticized the NATO reintegration arrangements concerning the airspace as invasions by NATO and Turkey into sovereign Greek territorial airspace.

c. Territorial Waters

The position of PASOK regarding the limits of Greek territorial waters was consistent. In 1974, in response to the Turkish Cyprus invasion and the 1974-1975 "provocative" acts of Turkey regarding the continental shelf, Papandreou called unequivocally for the immediate extension of the Greek territorial waters from six miles to twelve. Papandreou reiterated these demands during the 1976 Aegean crisis. He maintained this line, even though he could not but be aware that the Turkish government has continually stated that this move would be viewed as a declaration of war. (To disregard these consequences by deliberate provocation is only the prerogative of the opposition party.) In 1979, Papandreou clearly stated his views:

....The continental shelf issue would have been greatly simplified if Greece had used its inalienable right to expand its territorial waters to 12 miles. Eleven or twelve Mediterranean countries have done so. Turkey has also done so on the Black Sea and on its south coast. ...The argument that this would turn the Aegean into a closed sea can easily be dealt with through a guarantee... in regard to free international corridors. PASOK is irrevocably in favor of extending our territorial waters to 12 miles. [Ref. 30: p.S21]

d. Militarization of the Islands

PASOK supported the fortification of the Greek islands on much the same basis as the government, and in this respect there was little divergence between government and PASOK policy. PASOK reserves for Greece the ultimate right of self-defense regardless of international treaties which ostensibly called for the demilitarization of the eastern Greek islands. Strong defense of the islands was necessary, according to PASOK, to ward off the Turkish "menace," represented by the creation of the Turkish Aegean Army. "It is our duty to warn the government," Papandreu stated, "that demilitarization of the islands, which are under the immediate threat of Turkish armed forces, would be a nationally unacceptable act." [Ref. 32]

e. Aegean Balance of Power

In response to aid efforts by the U.S. and NATO to help Turkey modernize its military, PASOK continually called for "equality of treatment" for Greece. Papandreu characterized any U.S.-Turkish agreements as further evidence of the U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey, U.S. and Atlantic designs in the area, and support of Turkish aggressive tendencies against Greek interests. He described Turkish policy as "the spearhead of the United States and NATO, which plays a role of the subimperialist power in the area. ...[therefore] economic aid being granted to Turkey is

of no interest to us but...we are particularly interested in military aid because it threatens the balance of power in the Aegean." [Ref. 33] Consequently, he viewed aid to Turkey not in NATO defense terms, but in terms of possible Turkish use of this military equipment against Greek interests.

With respect to using the military bases in Greece as a vehicle for securing aid from the U.S., and in light of the signing of the Turkish-U.S.A. defense agreement in 1930, Papandreu clearly stated his position:

The new U.S.-Turkish 'defense' agreement converts Turkey into a permanent U.S. stronghold for the purpose of policing the Eastern Mediterranean...with the additional military aid furnished by West Germany,...the balance of power in the Aegean is completely destroyed. ...the danger to our country is fatal. ...It is consequently imperative that we develop our own war industry--in cooperation with countries with advanced technology...in two, three or even more directions-- and it must not be in exchange for providing military 'facilities' in our country. [Ref. 34]

5. PASOK and U.S. Military Bases in Greece

The PASOK call for the elimination of U.S. bases in Greece is almost legendary. From 1974 on, PASOK has fairly consistently responded to any developments in Greek-Turkish issues with a call for the immediate elimination of the bases from Greek soil. (This points out the apparent, but publicly denied acceptance by PASOK of the bases' value as leverage with the United States.) PASOK has used the following reasoning to justify its policy:

- The bases did not serve any Greek interest, as evidenced by their ineffectiveness in supporting any Greek response against what he portrayed as Turkish "aggression."
- They were only important for NATO and U.S. interests, particularly for interventions in Middle Eastern and other non-NATO countries friendly to Greece.

- Considering the apparent NATO non-support of Greek security interests, the bases invited attack by the Soviet Union in the event of an East-West conflict while they were ineffective in guaranteeing Greek security against the supposed Turkish threat in times of East-West peace and Turkish "aggressiveness."
- They were residual enclaves of U.S. interference in sovereign Greek affairs and could be used in U.S. attempts to reassert its former control in Greece.
- Since they were established on the basis of the NATO treaty, and since NATO had become, in PASOK eyes, ineffectual for Greece, the bases automatically became superfluous.

Consequently, Papandreou during the later 1970's called for removal of the bases in numerous specific contexts. On a more general level, too, elimination of bases was an integral part of the PASOK philosophy. Papandreou emphasized this fact in a 1979 statement: "Pasok is in favor of a non-aligned independent policy. This means refusal of foreign bases no matter to which country they belong. If we were the government we could have immediately abrogated and ended the status of foreign bases." [Ref. 35] In 1980, he put it even more emphatically (as a reaction to the Turkish-U.S. DCA), by demanding that the government:

....must inform the United States that it does not intend to sign any agreement on the bases--and it must set a deadline, after which it will cease providing 'facilities' to the armed forces of the United States and NATO. At the same time, the government must warn the United States that it prohibits the use of these 'facilities' for any form of intervention in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Southeast Asia [sic]. [Ref. 34]

Two additional aspects of the PASOK policy on the U.S./NATO bases should be mentioned. The first is the

tangential issue of the storage sites in Greece for nuclear weapons. From the beginning, PASOK claimed that the existence of the U.S./NATO nuclear weapons on Greek soil would be defensively irrelevant in any East-West conflict scenario, but would serve to invite nuclear attack on Greece.²³ In addition, Papandreou's plans for regional independence in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, freeing them from foreign bases and nuclear weapons, were jeopardized by the existence of these weapons in Greece. The nuclear issue became a point on which Papandreou could gain political prestige at the expense of the government which was continually led into embarrassing situations over the issue. This embarrassment came to a peak in 1981 with the following incidents:

1. The "Drama incident," in which the inappropriate actions of a U.S. Army contingent exposed a nuclear storage site near the town of Drama, the existence of which the government had tended to play down.
2. The release of the "Mills-Chrisospathis note" of 1977 which seemed to question the honorable intentions of the ND government in negotiating the 1976 Greek-U.S. Defense Cooperation Understanding by showing that the Greek government had privately agreed to U.S. control of nuclear storage facilities despite its nationalistic statements on ties with NATO and the U.S.²⁴ This series of events culminated in the publishing within Elevtherotipia, a PASOK-oriented newspaper, particulars about four U.S. nuclear storage sites in Greece, including

²³On January 20, 1981, Papandreou pointed out that "The USSR has warned Greece that for as long as there are nuclear installations in our country, it would be a nuclear target in the event of a conflict between the superpowers." (FBIS VII, 21 January, 1981, p.51)

²⁴Papandreou failed to point out that "the continued nuclear warhead stockpiling in Greece" was one of the public points of the 1975 Greek proposals for a NATO-Greek special relationship. [Ref. 37]

their location, the nature of weapons stored, and the nature of the American command. On the latter, the article pointed out that "the four American commanders only take orders from the U.S. Pentagon, and disregard the Greek military authorities, as happened in Drama recently." [Ref. 38]

Thus, PASOK was able to make political mileage out of the nuclear issue, playing on the fears of the public to the discredit of the government.

The second nuance in PASOK bases policy began to appear as the 1981 national elections drew near. No longer did the rhetoric include an unconditional removal of the U.S. bases. Rather, the bases issue was placed in the vague realm of independence of all regional countries, Balkan and Mediterranean, from foreign influence and association with the "superpower politico-military blocs." [Ref. 25: p.53] Couching a shift in policy in the terms of realistic tactical deviation, Papandreu said, on the issue of the U.S. bases, "We shall give a time limit for their removal. In France's case this took one year, in Malta's three years. How long this will be here, we shall determine after PASOK comes to power." [Ref. 40] It was also reported that during the interim, Papandreu would also "want guaranteed American arms sales to Greece while the bases remained. ...'the decisive issue for us is the full satisfaction of the country's defensive requirements....'" [Ref. 41] This constituted a considerable shift from the previous rhetoric. This shift coincided with the shift of PASOK, as the vocal opposition, to PASOK, with the real possibility of governing.

6. PASOK and NATO

PASOK views on the Greece-NATO relationship are well known and were a source of apprehension among some Western observers considering the continual gains that PASOK was

making at the polls during the period 1974-1981. It became part of party policy from the beginning that within the concepts of Greek national independence, of a united Europe without the "cold-war blocs," and of threats to Greek security, the Greek-NATO connection was counterproductive. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 supposedly had made it obvious to Papandreou that NATO "could or would" not support Greek interests but rather would support Turkey in the event of a Greek-Turkish dispute. He therefore called for the total withdrawal of Greece from NATO. The anti-NATO and anti-U.S. theme found considerable support among the populace. Papandreou apparently recognized and reinforced this. Throughout his political speeches, hardly an opportunity was missed to link NATO and the U.S. with the Cyprus problem, the junta government, support of the Turks and the invasion of Greek sovereignty. This xenophobic rhetoric touched the nationalist feelings of a large segment of the voters with effective political results.

As "evidence" of NATO's undesirability, Papandreou dwelled on the following themes:

1. NATO support, particularly from the U.S., during the Greek junta in deference to Atlantic interests.
2. NATO plans which were at the heart of the 1967 Greek coup and the 1974 coup against Makarios.
3. NATO desire to partition Cyprus and end its independent and, non-aligned status.
4. NATO/U.S. support of Turkey with armaments and aid.
5. NATO arms used in the Turkish Cyprus occupation and deployed against the Eastern Greek border in the "Aegean Army."
6. NATO support of Turkish control or partitioning of Aegean seaspace and airspace for military control.

Papandreou's anti-NATO rhetoric reached a crescendo in the months of government reintegration bargaining leading

up to the reacceptance of Greece into NATO in the Fall of 1980. The intricate, menacing connection between NATO, the U.S., the EC and Turkey, and its designs on Greek sovereignty were laid out clearly by Papandreou in 1979 before Parliament:

Europe is deeply eroded by the political military apparatus of NATO. In exchange for a protective nuclear umbrella, Europe has accepted the overlordship.

• • •

Strategic sectors of the West European economy, of the EEC, are controlled by the U.S. multinational businesses.

• • •

Western Europe is truly dominated by the United States; in all critical decisions the views of the United States must be borne in mind. Our participation in NATO and the presence of U.S. and NATO bases in our country guarantees continuation of our dependence on the United States.

• • •

EEC is nothing but another aspect of NATO, and the history of NATO in Greece is well known. NATO is responsible for the Cyprus tragedy. It is responsible for the 7-year dictatorship. It is responsible for the scandalous support of Turkish claims at our country's expense. [Ref. 30: p.59]

The most vehement PASOK criticism of the Rallis government's NATO policy surrounded the Parliamentary debate on the "Rogers Agreement" (see chapter 3). In listing the reasons for criticizing the agreement, Papandreou revealed the PASOK policies in regard to NATO reintegration:

1. The agreement must be submitted to the Parliament for ratification as a new treaty (rather than the vote of confidence proposed by the government) presumably to both change the amount of votes required for passage (from majority to 3/5 majority) and to force the government to make the agreement public. (NATO had classified the document secret.)

2. NATO membership would force the Greek military into deployments less effective against the Turkish threat. Defense would be "sacrificed on the altar of NATO interests."
3. The agreement puts in question the control of the Aegean airspace and leaves it up to trilateral negotiation to set up zones of responsibility for the 6th ATAF (Izmir) and the proposed 7th ATAF (Larisa). This PASOK believed was an acknowledgement of partial Turkish rights in Greek sovereign Aegean airspace which PASOK defined partly based on a novel interpretation of the meaning of the ICAO/Athens FIR arrangements.
4. In a clash between superpowers, NATO membership would not protect Greece but would instead invite annihilation by the Soviet Union.
5. NATO offers no automatic defense in case of attack on Greece. It is conceivable that Turkey might veto action to aid Greece or Turkey would be the attacker, in which case NATO would be at best in a paralyzing dilemma or, at worst (for PASOK), would side with the Turks.
6. Membership means "supplying useful information" (intelligence) to Turkey which could be used in a Turkish attack on Greece.
7. Cyprus becomes a "victim" of the agreement. By doing what the Greek government said it would never do as long as Turkish troops were on the island, it would be a sell-out and an acknowledgement of the Cyprus partition.
8. Greek sovereign airspace over the Aegean islands is violated by reducing airspace from ten to six miles for NATO purposes, giving Turkish warplanes rights within the former Greek boundaries.

9. NATO command of "seaspace" in the Aegean under the agreement reduced the authority of the Greek admiral and gave the U.S. admiral in Naples power to control forces in the area. [Ref. 31: pp.S11-19]

One could reverse these points in expectation of what PASOK might request as essential for further continued participation in NATO. The one concrete proposal PASOK guaranteed was that once it came to power (presumably in the next election) PASOK "would be in a position to abrogate the agreement, but, because we respect the Greek people, we want to say something else; when we come into government we will present the Rogers agreement for consideration by the Chamber of Deputies of that time so that the Chamber can decide in a sovereign manner." [Ref. 31: p.S18] It is apparent by this and later statements that PASOK has shifted away from the former unconditional demands of NATO withdrawal to a more cautious and conditional attitude toward any bold unilateral moves once in government.

It is understandable that Papandreou's views on NATO were distressing to the Alliance. However, one must remember that as the opposition party, criticism is "cheap" and politically beneficial. One might take the more optimistic view that there were two political motivations behind Papandreou's NATO stance.

1. Papandreou actually put pressure on NATO (albeit in a negative and indirect manner) to force the alliance to consider Greek positions regarding its security issues, especially Cyprus and the alleged Turkish threat. At least in keeping the NATO issue in the forefront of politics and public opinion, he did not allow the issue to die quietly without Greece asserting its own wishes. His opposition politics, to some extent, prevented the government from accepting reintegration too hastily without pressing Greek interests to the furthest degree.

2. Papandreou gained tremendously in political support because of his ultra-nationalistic views, unafraid to question the "all-powerful" United States and its NATO instrument. This not only brought him, as it turned out, a continual base of political policy support, but caused serious complications for the government. He was able to sustain this issue in speech after speech, touching the nationalist sympathies of the voters for seven years, until his election in 1980. The longevity and vitality of the issues were remarkable.

C. CHANGE IN THE PASOK PROGRAM

1. From Unknown to Power

It took PASOK barely over seven years to rise from its very modest beginnings to a position of power. In November, 1974, running on a platform of radical nationalism and sweeping reform, it polled only 13.6% of the vote and received only 13 seats. However, this poor showing could be accounted for, to a large extent, by the situation of the time. The Greek people, having the burden of the junta just recently lifted, exhibited caution and restraint in 1974.

By the 1977 elections, however, running on the same sort of platform, decidedly on extended issues with less mention of economic reform, PASOK increased its percentage to 25.3% and received 93 seats, making it the majority opposition party. This seemed to vindicate PASOK in its claims that the real feelings of the electorate were not adequately expressed in 1974. Had the voters wanted only change, they had other options in 1977, especially in EDIK, which held many views similar to PASOK but not to the same extreme. However, the shift went to Andreas Papandreou, not to the center, and the center collapsed. Additionally, in the

municipal elections PASOK continued to gain strength. One must conclude that at least part of this support was due to Papandreou's policies.

PASOK's growing support demonstrated other aspects of the post-junta political realities in Greece. First, the power of a single charismatic leader with large crowd appeal appeared essential, as it had been for generations in Greece. A new reality, though, was that the people were responding to a new political organization, one which reached down from the top and through a well-organized and pervasive structure, disseminated the party message to the masses. For the first time, a popular party had attempted to form an organization based on participation rather than on patronage. That this participation was severely restricted and uni-directional did not seem to matter at the time.

The rise of PASOK in opposition, then, could be attributed to these general supportive factors; the charisma of the leader, the party organization, and the perhaps radical but intriguing change it offered in its ideology.

When observing PASOK policies, one must consider the realities of the opposition system. (Europeans are usually better able to do this than U.S. observers.) To be flamboyant, assertive, and critical, even a bit radical is fine for an opposition party. But when it is faced with the possibility of being the government, other factors must be considered, not the least of which is gaining a majority base of support. The 1981 PASOK platform illustrates this effect.

2. The 1981 PASOK Platform and Policy Evolution

It has already been seen that a certain shift in some of PASOK's policies had begun to take place as the 1981 election year approached. Pursuing this by analyzing the

1981 PASCK Policy Declaration released in July, 1981, as a statement of the party government programs, will show some of the examples of policy evolution as PASOK moved from opposition toward power. The following points illustrate some of the consistencies and divergences reflected in the Policy Statement.

a. General Issues [Ref. 42]

- Of the seven main goals listed, only one, the first, deals directly with foreign security policy (listed first in the order)--"national independence and defense of our territorial integrity." The rest are suitably general, relating to economic development, cultural and social matters and the environment.
- The three main "ideological" foundations remain unchanged from the original September 3, 1974 statement.
- On relations with European socialists, "The movement [PASOK] cooperates closely with socialist and progressive forces of every country," including the socialist forces of Europe. Previously, the policy was non-association with Eurosocialism.
- "Peaceful and democratic" processes of change are emphasized. "We will reach authority through peaceful and democratic means...and we will decisively protect people's sovereignty and the democratic institutions." This has been a growing theme to allay suspicions of radicalism formerly associated with leftist Greek politics--calming the opposition and expressing moderation.
- Turkey remains as the arch-threat to Greece, "the concrete, guided Turkish threat against our national integrity and security." A different, hard-line

strategy will be used by PASOK to counter this threat. This "serious external danger...dictates the orientation of our foreign and defense policies."

- A secondary threat comes from "foreign and monopolistic capital" over the affairs of the country. The country's economic problems are the result of "foreign economic hegemony which must be broken down."
- What PASOK called "National Issues" (e.g., the supposed Turkish Aegean threat, Atlantic support of Turkey, Cyprus occupation, NATO reintegration, foreign bases, and EC integration) are linked with "strategic goals." From the previous hard line on these issues, they are now put in the realm of tactical maneuver toward long-range greater goals.
- The "Strategic Goals" are three: (1) shaping of a national defense policy, based on a strong defense organization and a "firm stand on national sovereign rights" to deter the threat and secure peace; (2) shaping an independent, multi-faceted Greek Foreign Policy; and (3) active contribution to disarmament and world peace (a new appearance in this priority slot).
- There is to be an incremental approach to change in the country. The pace of this change must be keyed to the balance of power as it is developing at every given instance, the tolerance of the Greek economy and above all the consent and participation of the people's forces. Unilateral and drastic PASOK action, feared formerly by many, especially the more conservative branches of the party, is precluded. The guiding principles are pragmatically based on political reality, economic feasibility and the decision of the electorate.

- Although goals will be set quickly, their implementation will be a gradual process so that "insecurity is eliminated." This bone was thrown in the direction of the existing government structure and bureaucracy.
- "Absolute priority in expenditures" is given for national defense. For a party which promotes European disarmament and independence from militant, arms-racing Atlanticism, PASOK seemed to subscribe to the older basic tenets of the Atlantic alliance, deterrence and military strength, to counter its threats within its Aegean microcosm.

b. Specific "National Issues" [Ref. 43]

(NOTE: The term "national issues" as used by PASOK refers to those issues which deal with the security and protection of the Greek national interests, including defense and foreign policy.)

- The basics are "a defensive arming of the country and a genuine multi-faceted foreign policy."
- A general caveat is included: "while the strategic goals are irrevocable, individual steps...will always bear in mind the arms requirements of the armed forces of our country as well as the development of the balance of power in the international area and specifically in our own area." Essentially, this says that tactical PASOK policies will be based on international and regional realities and security policy pragmatism.
- The strategic goal is "dissolution of both world war blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact." Greek withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance is limited to this contingency. The former call was for immediate exit from the entire alliance structure, military and political.

- Formerly PASOK called for total withdrawal from NATO. This has been changed to: "[PASOK] will bring the Rogers agreement to the Chamber of Deputies for its abrogation." This indicates that it is not the NATO involvement per se that is undesirable, but the terms of involvement. The only decisive move proposed is the removal of NATO nuclear weapons from Greece.
- The "peculiarity" of the Atlantic Alliance for Greece in the Turkish threat problem. If this difficulty were removed by securing Greece's borders against the supposed Turkish threat and a balancing of Aegean power, and if Turkey were restrained from its allegedly provocative acts, it follows that the position of Greece in the alliance would not be so "peculiar," and would be normalized.
- "Foreign bases" (not called U.S. bases any more) in Greece "create a direct interest by this foreign power in [formerly a threat to] our country's domestic affairs." They also cause local "social, economic and cultural disturbances." Formerly, they were "enclaves of imperialism and oppression." The terms used regarding the bases are considerably more conciliatory.
- Removal of bases will have a transition period. "For as long as these bases remain...within a specific timetable for the withdrawal of these bases [time not specified]--there will be guaranteed prerequisites that their operation will not be against our country's foreign policy...." The Greek government is to maintain the right to suspend and control their operation. This is a far cry from the immediate expulsion called for earlier. The policy here closely resembles the proposed 1977 bases agreement, negotiated by the Karamanlis Government.

- In the Aegean, the policy remains hard-line. Negotiations with Turkey are seen as non-productive and leading to Greek concessions. "Dialogue" with Turkey can only take place to the extent that inviolable, non-negotiable Greek sovereign rights are acknowledged. Land, sea and air boundaries and the Greek continental shelf are not negotiable. There was conspicuously no mention of extending Greek territorial waters, which had previously been PASOK's firm policy.
- Cyprus for PASOK is a "priority issue." It is also an international issue because of foreign (Turkish) occupation. Greece retains its "legal rights" as "guarantor power" to support the Cypriots (ethnicity not specified) in their efforts to remove foreign troops and bases and return refugees to their homes.
- The Cyprus intercommunal talks are valid only for producing a political modus vivendi for the island once its territorial integrity is reinstated. They cannot lead to agreements which would partition the island. These views have remained consistent for PASOK.
- PASOK foreign policy, based on the three identities of Greece--Balkan, European and Mediterranean--will be a policy of "realism" not "isolationism." All obligations will be made with provision for their abrogation if the national interest so dictates.
- Regarding alliances (presumably including the Atlantic Alliance), "there may be historic conditions that will force our country to ally itself defensively with other countries." They may be approved if the alliance "truly contributes toward national independence and defense of territorial integrity." Since the main Greek alliance possibility foreseen in the near future is that with the

West, Greek participation within the Atlantic structure as well as within a nexus of bilateral defense alliances (possibly with the U.S.) is not precluded. This is a considerable departure from former party rhetoric.

- Policies related to the reform of the military services were disproportionate to the rest. They were aimed mainly at personnel program improvements which would give the military more reason to support the government. They also led toward a "democratization" of the military services, breaking up pockets of power, providing more promotion mobility, and attempting to improve the general quality of the officer corps.

As is evident by these examples, the practical side of PASOK in power was to be considerably more conservative (centrist) than some of the early leftist rhetoric might have predicted. The meaning of this could be seen from two different angles:

1. That the more militant leftist policies and "anti"-views were toned down and softened to gain votes and put the party in power without some violent conservative reaction. PASOK might then revert to more extreme policies once its power had been consolidated.
2. That the reality of Greek politics dictated that to come to power and remain there certain practicalities had to be considered. Opposition parties could afford to be critical and at times acrimonious, but the realities of government would dictate that policies be modified to match the particular Greek situation.

To discover which one of these applies, one must explore how these policies were implemented by PASOK in government. This is the purpose of the next chapter.

V. PASOK IN POWER, 1981-PRESENT

The political developments of 1974-1981 indicated certain trends among the two prominent parties, New Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). On this basis, some tentative conclusions might be drawn. However, one must see what trends predominated after the watershed political month of October 1981, when PASOK became the governing party--the first left-of-center majority ever installed into Greek government during its 30 years of constitutional history.

A. THE ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1981

Culminating a process which Papandreou said began in the 1960's, PASOK brought the left to victory on October 18, 1981. He had come to power on a platform of "allaghi" (change) based on a party program considerably more moderate than the Marxist, third-worldist rhetoric of PASOK's earlier years. (See Chapter 4 for details.) In a campaign which stressed economic and administrative reform and social justice at home and Greek national pride abroad, Papandreou had apparently achieved his goal of isolating the right, legitimizing the left and avoiding any association with the communist far left. The election results show the practical effect of Papandreou's trend toward moderation.

The right (New Democracy) was the big loser in the campaign. Even the fact that the far right National Rally Party decided not to contest the election in order to give more solidarity to the ant-PASOK vote, could not salvage much for ND. It is clear then that the losses came from the center side of ND, and may have been greater than indicated

by the vote since the far right vote most likely switched to ND. (The National Rally had received 7% of the vote in 1977.) With its lackluster campaign, lack of identifiable specific party programs, and lack of a truly charismatic candidate for Prime Minister, the ND vote was reduced to 36% giving it 115 seats in the Parliament. It appears from the election results that the loss was a result of the center group party moving left and being picked up by PASOK. Thus the PASOK campaign for a legitimate, moderate image had paid off. PASOK received a comfortable 42% giving it a single-party majority in the Parliament of 172 seats.

Of the other four significant contenders²⁵ only the Greek Communist Party (KKE) made any real headway. The KKE picked up 10.92% of the vote and 13 seats (independently of the other communist parties), a rise of 2% over its 1977 showing, but these gains were minimal since PASOK did not need a coalition for support. This shows that while PASOK picked up considerable support from the center vote, which had been set adrift in the 1977 elections, the far-left element of PASOK was probably not as inspired by the party's increasingly centrist policies. This effect can be seen even more vividly in succeeding municipal elections where the KKE seems to be slowly increasing its support. Thus, the PASOK policy shift alluded to in the previous chapter turned out to be a well-calculated risk for the time, but loss of some of the left vote could not be avoided.

The election results, however, were not necessarily the "landslide" that Papandreou has called them. As was evident in the concurrent European Parliament elections, there was still hesitancy among the voters. The vote for the

²⁵The main four here were KKE, 10.92%, Party of the Progressive 1.6%, KKE-Interim, 1.37% and the Party of Democratic Socialism--Agricultural Party Coalition, .72%. The latter three received no seats in the Greek Parliament, but each received one seat in the European Parliament.

Europarlament representatives was more evenly matched (PASOK received 10 seats and ND 8 seats, the other six being apportioned among four smaller parties). [Ref: 1, p.401] the message to Papandreou was that there were still a number of significant voter groups not willing to take the socialist plunge, especially in the international arena.

Out of the 1981 elections, several general observations are important. First, this was apparently a concrete expression of a general political trend in Greece which began in the 1960's, rising out of the modernizing forces of the 1950's and 1960's. The gradual political shift away from decades of rightist rule had now taken on a certain air of permanence. Second, it seemed that the gap in the center of the political spectrum which had opened after years of political extremism was finally being closed and the radical right and left were moved out to the political fringes. Thirdly, the traditional political mechanism had apparently broken down. Unable to modernize its political structure, forced to increasingly rely on the old forms of political patronage, and faced with a modern, grass roots political machine, ND had succumbed and with it some of the long-standing assumptions of Greek politics.²⁶ Finally, there seemed to be demonstrated a new ideological ingredient in Greek politics, as people were able to accept the principles of "change."

It must be pointed out that some considerations served to bring down ND over which PASOK had little control. Not the least of these were the worsening economy, with unemployment growing and inflation hitting 25%, and deteriorating social dislocation. Indeed, most commentators seem to agree that Papandreou came to power mainly on the

²⁶Of course some observers would say that the last word has not yet been written on political modernization and PASOK has and will revert to more traditional party-voter clientelistic relationships.

prospect of change within the domestic realm of economic, social, environmental and employment issues. Furthermore, the prospect of "change" per se offered by PASOK had a certain appeal among Greek voters, many of them being products of the great changes which have taken place in Greek society since the end of World War II. "Greek voters are not resistant to change because in post-war Greece, change has become an integral fact of life." [Ref. 2: p.93] Thus, since things were going relatively poorly for the typical Greek anyway, he might not be adverse to trying something new or seeking new opportunities. In summing up the trends represented by the October elections, Jennifer Noyon comments that:

Papandreou's election was of historic significance for Greece. The campaign was the first to be fought on economic and social issues and its results shifted Greek political equilibrium by legitimizing the left-of-center. From now on even the conservative parties will probably give more attention to domestic reform and social justice and take a more assertive stance on foreign policy issues. The biggest lesson however, both domestically and internationally was not to take the Greek voter for granted. [Ref. 2: p.93]

This last comment was to become a familiar refrain when Papandreou talked of international issues.

B. THE POLITICS OF PASOK, 1981-PRESENT

1. PASOK Political Style

It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with the vast array of domestic programs and actions which the PASOK government undertook. Inasmuch as internal strength, unity, and prosperity all form a firm foundation for the internal security of the country, these programs and policies should not be forgotten. Papandreou repeatedly acknowledged the far-reaching importance of domestic

strength in pursuing the "national issues," and often repeated the fact that they were a prerequisite for an effective foreign and security policy. However, Papandreu definitely exhibited an incrementalist attitude in internal reform.

Initial broad questions were in relatively inconsequential fields. The more difficult economic and social problems were found to be more stubborn. He preferred to support private enterprise on a broad scale, concentrating on the more critical, strategic industries for government intervention. It was not until the spring of 1983 that a "socialization bill" appeared in the Parliament. Government administration proved to be an equally tough nut to crack, Papandreu having to admit after one year in office that he had not achieved what he had expected. Finally, regarding the unions whom he had regarded as one of the pillars of democracy, while he had reduced some restrictions initially and offered the workers considerable increases in wages and benefits, by 1983 he was reacting quite strongly against disruptive strikes, introducing anti-strike legislation for workers in strategic industries and was calling for more productivity from the workers to help stabilize the economy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the economy played an increasing role in dictating (perhaps behind the scenes) the complexion of Papandreu's foreign policy. Ties with numerous countries were being pursued--most on the basis of "businesslike" economic cooperation lacking specific ideological content. This was especially true of relations with the Arab Middle Eastern states, selected states in North Africa and with the Eastern Bloc. Above all this, though, there was a significant shift in PASOK attitude toward the West, which was decidedly more conciliatory not only with the Southern European states but also with the

previously criticized "capitalist imperialists" of Central Europe. One cannot but imagine that Papandreou kept a watchful eye on the image Greece presented to the West both domestically and internationally. As an economist of note, Papandreou no doubt knew the importance of stability, internal security and legitimacy for much-needed foreign capital investments.

2. PASOK Internal Development

One would have expected that once the party was comfortably in power, there would be considerable desire to democratize the party and pursue its goals of decentralization and popular control. This was to prove as elusive as governmental decentralization. Papandreou has remained the central figure and as yet has allowed little questioning of his leadership. In essence the phrase "PASOK is Papandreou" still applies in many respects, as many critics and observers have pointed out.

The "autocracy" of Papandreou was indeed one criticism. A pair of events in the fall of 1982, may serve as examples. In July a law was introduced which called for a cabinet reshuffle. A new government, expanded and reorganized, was formed. As justification for this move, and apparently in the face of criticism that this reorganization was done primarily to consolidate Party control and weed out party members not sufficiently responsive to party wishes, Papandreou pointed out:

....that the important thing is a restructuring in the form of a cabinet that would insure complete coordination and efficiency. As regards the persons, I have many times pointed out that the PASOK cadre should not consider themselves permanent either as members of the party's Central Committee or the Executive Committee nor as members of the cabinet. [Ref. 3]

This was meant as a promise that PASOK would not start backsliding into typical Greek bureaucratic entrenchment, but by some it could be seen as a threat.

Indeed, in the following month, Evstathios Panagoulis found out what this sort of statement meant for those who chose to criticize the party policy. Tendering his resignation in criticism of party policies, he was immediately "struck" from the party by the disciplinary council. "The Prime Minister and PASOK chairman together with the movement's Executive Committee, decided that the views Mr. Panagoulis expressed in his resignation letter undermine the government's task of change and of the movement." [Ref. 4] There was no doubt in this case that Papandreou was in control, and by expressing disagreements within the party, Panagoulis was allegedly attempting to create a basis for internal rebellion. Later, in December, Papandreou also hinted at forces within the party which may be leading toward some divisiveness. In response he felt it necessary to reaffirm his role in the guidance of party affairs. In a joint meeting of the two guidance bodies of the party, he stated that:

I feel I have been away a long time from my duties as a member of the Executive Bureau and chairman of the movement. This is why I see my presence today in the joint meeting of the Executive Bureau and the Executive Secretariat as the beginning of my more active participation in the movement's affairs. [Ref. 5]

Seeing the need for a new organizational campaign, Papandreou, during this same meeting, set a date for the long-awaited first party Congress. It was to take place in November 1983. (The long awaited congress finally took place in May 1984.)

It is then the party organization and to a great extent Papandreou's leadership style which has maintained

PASOK's strength, a style which is "marked by assertive, flamboyant and calculatedly ambiguous rhetoric coupled with caution in action." [Ref. 2: p.91] He continues to pursue his "third road to socialism"²⁷ refusing to form close links with any other leftist or socialist movement. Specifically, he has rejected any connections with the KKE, although this Greek communist party has continually called for a unity of the left, and has stated that Papandreou will never be able to complete his programs without full support and participation of the far left. As he points out, "...some leaderships believe in an obsolete dogma: that without their presence there can be no change." [Ref. 6] He defined whom he meant by this reference to obsolescence later, growing more adamant toward the increasing criticism and pressure being put upon him from the far left. "The KKE," Papandreou announced, "follows an arteriosclerotic strategy and obsolete tactics." [Ref. 7] Papandreou was mounting a counter attack on those who would conspire to make inroads on PASOK's ideological autonomy. Characterizing the opposition as trying to hamper PASOK's independence as the only political and ideological alternative solution to the country's problems, he further stated that "for PASOK, a mild climate does not mean political disarmament...a mild climate does not mean slackening the confrontation and the struggle for declared principles...and the vision of social liberation." [Ref. 7] Papandreou intended to ally the movement with no one--PASOK was to make no political deals. This may show some insecurity, but with PASOK's majority and party

²⁷Papandreou defined his concept of Greek "socialism" as the "third road"--"for PASOK, socialism means a smaller role for the state and a greater role for the citizens within the framework of local self-government through the implementation of decentralization and democratization of workers' and farmers' trade unionsism." To accomplish his economic goals, incentives are used which are meant to stimulate especially the small and medium businessmen--"the backbone of the economy." [Ref. 9]

control, combined with Papandreou's continual personal popularity among the electorate,²⁸ this insecurity is only speculation until new elections are held.

C. PASOK FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, 1981-PRESENT

1. General Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of PASOK, according to Papandreou's November 22 policy statement before the Parliament, is as follows:

The primary concern of the government is the shaping of an independent, genuinely Greek multi-dimensional foreign policy. Our firm goal is development of friendly relations on a world wide scale and particularly with the Balkans, the people of the Mediterranean and with Europe--West and East alike--and with the Arab national [sic] which constitutes a dynamic factor in the course of the world. This is our firm goal: active contribution to detente, disarmament and world peace. [Ref. 10: p.53]

This policy is formed through two general considerations: (1) that Greece is simultaneously a state of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans (a recurrent theme in PASOK rhetoric), and (2) that Greece offers its support to any developing nation in the pursuit of its own national independence. In other words, PASOK places Greece theoretically as a middle man between the third world, the "peripheral" states and the industrialized countries of central Europe.

Looking at the above statement and those that Papandreou has issued in the past, the question of non-alignment could be raised. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the entire policy speech (nor for that matter in the

²⁸A popularity poll in May 1982 reported that Papandreou continued to have about 52% in favor of the way he handled matters. This was up from the April percentage (48%), the main increases were in the older, traditionally more conservative age groups while he lost support among the 17-24 crowd, which has formed the more radical section of PASOK. [Ref. 8]

PASOK party platform) is there any mention of "non-alignment" for Greece. The term non-alignment is mentioned only with reference to the solidarity with those countries who are struggling against superpower influence and trying to pursue a nonaligned course. Instead the question of alignment is moved into the nebulous realm of some future dissolution of the two global power forces, and the reversal of the effects of "Yalta and Potsdam" in dividing Europe. In other words, Papandreou sees Europe in essence non-aligning itself, but until that time he intends to base his foreign and security relations on the basis of international reality. Papandreou later acknowledged the limitations of Greece in referring to his lofty foreign policy goals, "We know that we are a small country and we have no high views about the prospects available to a small country." [Ref. 11] One could expect then that Greece, being limited in real international power, must continue to rely on realistic options until Papandreou's view of European utopia becomes a reality and the "cold-war" blocs melt away. As early as November 2, 1981, Papandreou explained in an interview with a French newspaper that "It is not that we feel tempted to break ties uniting us with Europe. Greece is of course a Balkan and Mediterranean country but it is also, and above all, a European country." [Ref. 12] This view evolved to where in September 1982, it was reported that in an interview with an Italian paper, Papandreou allegedly said that "Greece belongs to the Atlantic Alliance." [Ref. 13] While this could be a simple statement of fact, it is unusual coming from Papandreou and was reported in the Greek papers as being a variation of the former Karamanlis aphorism that "Greece belongs to the West." Finally, in 1983, Papandreou made the plunge and stated that within the geopolitical balance as it was established by the Yalta and the Potsdam agreements, Greece belongs to the West. [Ref. 14]

Papandreou's foreign policy since coming to power, as Noyan has pointed out, has generally two pervasive aspects: one pragmatic and the other ideological. The pragmatic side has to do with economic and political realities. Papandreou's multi-dimensional contacts with a diverse number of states--African, Middle Eastern, Eastern European, Western European and even with the United States--all have definite economic overtones. In the plethora of agreements that Papandreou has signed with countries of all these regions, economic cooperation is the key. They have to do with overseas markets and investments, providing for energy and new materials and development funds. The EC association holds particular benefits in the latter respect. But important also is Libyan and Arab oil, Balkan trade and electricity, Soviet oil and gas and the like. All are designed to support the weak but developing Greek economy.

Secondly, PASOK foreign policy is not devoid of its ideological and abstract overtones. This side is seen in the pushing of issues such as disarmament, European unity, anti-nuclear initiatives and the peace campaign. But these, too, must be measured with practical benefit:

1. They can enhance Greek security by bringing closer association with its Balkan neighbors and theoretically reducing the critical Northern threat.
2. They lend Greece a certain amount of international prestige, or at least notoriety, which appeals to the Greek sense of national pride and improves the party's public image.

3. They allow Greece to pursue tactical maneuver on sensitive issues by providing convenient caveats for relations with the West. Strategic goals can be upheld while realistic policies can be rationalized by citing certain presently unreachable pre-conditions.²⁹

The controlling element of political and economic pragmatism may be missed by some analysts as they become immersed in Papandreou's high-flying rhetoric. Even in the November 22, 1981 policy statement it is evident, however. Papandreou explained that:

....we will create a Greece which will be nationally proud, with a national foreign policy which will be independent and multifaceted. We have only one duty: the national interest. ...Our foreign policy is: a policy of peace, a policy of reality, a policy of solidarity for the people struggling for their national independence.... [Ref.10: pp.51-3]

This attitude even spills over into Papandreou's views on the United States--Greece's alleged former arch enemy. In 1983, in the context of an imminent bases agreement, Papandreou explained that the primary issue was not the presence of the bases themselves, but their value to the Greeks. In a particularly conciliatory public tone, he stated:

We [the PASOK government] always recognize--otherwise we would lack realism--that the United States is a great power, perhaps even the greatest power, and that it has strategic interests of primary importance in the area. We know what our strength is and what its limits are. Consequently, we do not aim for confrontation. Our aim is not to [end the operation of U.S. facilities in Greece] unilaterally, but in consultation with the United States, provided it shows the minimum understanding and respect for the Greek people's independence and sovereignty over their territory. [Ref. 15: p.52]

²⁹Thus Papandreou puts his disassociation with the Atlantic Alliance within the concept of the dissolution of East-West blocs, pulling out nuclear weapons with the creation of a Balkan Nuclear Free zone, and so on.

The measure of relations is now a matter of benefit to Greece. Presumably, the reality of Papandreou's foreign policy is that as long as Greece's actions do not visibly violate any principles which must be minimally guaranteed, then associations may proceed on the purely pragmatic basis of benefit to the Greeks.³⁰ It is this basic "Realpolitik" outlook which must be taken into consideration when viewing the PASOK government's foreign and security policies.

2. The Greek-Europe Connection

As has already been mentioned, Greek foreign policy under PASOK has demonstrated an increasing association with the West. Supporting this new PASOK outlook is the evolution of the Greece-EC relationship. Abandoning its former position which called for severance of EC ties, Papandreou has sought advantages within the European framework. Immediately after the election, he reassured reporters that relative to leaving the EC:

We have not reached that point. We are not even asking for the status of a mere foreign external associate. We are prepared to remain closer to our partners, but on different bases which will have to be established with us. We must negotiate a special status for Greece which takes its economic characteristics into account. [Ref. 12]

This view was reinforced in the November 22, 1981 policy statement. In it he recalled that Greece has an obligation to fulfill in relation to its accession agreement. However, he did not totally drop his former ideas about the plebiscite on membership, stating that it was, however, the President's prerogative. He did not push the issue.

³⁰For a good treatment of this idea, see Ref. 16 and Ref. 2.

Instead, Papandreou, citing the British example, is seeking to renegotiate the terms of accession. To this end he submitted a memorandum asking that the EC consider Greece's special situation and problems. This was acknowledged by EC the in June 1982. He has also enlisted the support of other Southern European countries in forming a bloc to deal with Mediterranean issues. Placing his policies toward the EC in the context of a growing North-South division within Europe, Papandreou's initiative has gained him some notoriety and has also gained some acceptance within the community. In speaking to the socialist Europarliamentarians, Papandreou reportedly explained that:

The time has come for all of us to think about the possibility of a rapprochement between East and West Europe, that when we refer to North and South relations we must mean not only relations between Europe and Africa but also Northern Europe and Southern Europe.
[Ref. 16]

The extent to which Papandreou is prepared to seek political and practical advantage is indicated by his assumption of the EC presidency for the period 1 July to 31 December, 1983 and his commitment that, among other issues, "progress should be made on the issue of complete Mediterranean programs." [Ref. 17] Papandreou, then, was attempting to work within the European structure to gain political and economic advantage. In the case of the former, he stated his intention of bringing the issue of Cyprus before the EC and attempting to involve the other nine more heavily in support of the Greek-Greek Cypriot position. (See below.) As for the latter, the PASOK leader has not let EC membership deter him in pursuing active economic relations outside EC. Most notably, the 10-year Greek-Soviet economic cooperation agreement signed in February, 1983, raised some Community eyebrows.

D. GREEK SECURITY ISSUES UNDER PASOK.

1. Defense and the Military

It was apparent from the beginning of the PASOK administration that a strong defense was to receive priority attention. This had been stated clearly in the party program. It was reemphasized when, on 21 October, 1981, Papandreou took over the Defense Minister portfolio himself. In addressing the military after this action, Papandreou stated clearly the message to be conveyed:

My decision to take over the National Defense Ministry, in addition to the prime minister's office, stresses the great importance I attach to the country's armed forces and their sacred role of safeguarding our national independence. [Ref. 18]

There are possibly several reasons for this move. Among them may be the following:

1. To emphasize the importance of defense in deterring the supposed Turkish threat.
2. To keep close track on the strengthening of the armed forces and better coordinate this program with his foreign policy.
3. To be closely involved in military circles and keep a wary eye on any political aspirations of its senior officers.
4. To carry out structural and personnel plans he envisioned for the services.
5. To allow himself dual entry into the NATO structure, both as head of state in NATO summits and as Defense Minister in ministerial and committee meetings, which would give him double opportunity for political maneuver and exposure.

In the November policy statement, Papandreou outlined in more detail his defense program. The following points were emphasized:

1. Development of a firm foundation for a strong military to deter aggression. Primary emphasis was to be placed on "strict preparedness and battleworthiness."
2. Coordination of foreign policy to support and "guarantee necessary military preparedness." In addition, this coordinated effort was to be pursued through internal planning and "correct" deployment of forces (obviously a reference to NATO and the supposed Turkish threat).
3. Improvement of military infrastructure (materiel organization, communication, and personnel support).
4. Military personnel program reforms, including changes in officer promotion systems, improved training and education, greater benefits for servicemen, etc.
5. Military equipment modernization in conjunction with diversified procurement sources.
6. Special attention to the development of a modern Greek war industry and coordination of other economic sectors to support its development.

[Ref.10: pp.S2-3]

These programs have been actively pursued by the government with some small success. Diversified procurement has led to such programs as the cooperation in APC production with Styr of Austria, procurement of jeeps from Rumania, and involvement in the European consortium to produce "Stinger" missiles. Finally, in deciding on an upcoming major fighter aircraft purchase, he has indicated that it may be a mixture of U.S. and European products, although this may not be feasible.

Papandreou has made it clear that in relation to the military aid connected with the 1983 U.S. bases agreement, Greece would like development and technological aid for its

infant defense industries. Greece has also pursued the development of its own industries but so far with little impact, except possibly in naval shipbuilding (Greece has produced and is producing its own missile boats.) Its expanding aircraft industry now has contracts with European aircraft industries and with the U.S. for repair of F-4 engines.

Papandreou's intentions for a strong defense, which correlate well to his hard-line regional policies, receive constant attention and priority, even to the detriment of social and economic goals. As he stated:

A government like ours wants to place health, education, social welfare and economic development in top priority. However, we know that all these will be meager hopes and aimless actions if we cannot secure peace and territorial integrity for our country...which means strong, war-prepared armed forces that can guarantee both our borders and peace, because these go together. [Ref. 10: p.52]

With this in mind Papandreou launched his 10-year defense plan in March, 1982, which was to be a coordinated effort to strengthen the defense forces through the year 1991, and included budgeting goals [Ref. 19: p.51].

Lingering sensitivity about the military and its historic potential in Greece to involve itself in politics partially prompted these measures. Concerns for the security of the democratic system have led Papandreou to keep a close eye on the military while attempting to gain support through his military improvements program. However, both PASOK and the populace still are nervous about the military as a result of the 1967-74 junta legacy. In a recent incident in Athens, the public was quite alarmed when police and military forces held a night "exercise" in the city. The government had to go out of its way to reassure the people. Also, there have been recurring rumors of plots

and coup attempts persisting up to the present. Occasional large retirements from the Army serve to strengthen these rumors.

Papandreou has maintained a firm policy on this aspect of military discipline. From the day he took over the Defense Ministry, he has praised the military for being the protectors of national independence and has actively visited military installations around the country, speaking to the troops directly. This no other Prime Minister has done to such an extent. However, he has always emphasized directly to his forces their duty in the following, often-repeated words:

I would like to assure you that all of you will find me a sincere supporter of every just and feasible demand, [and]...of course, you all have the right, as Greek citizens, to have your political affiliation. However, it is both dangerous and impermissible for politics to creep into the ranks of the armed forces, which have only one mission--the sacred mission of defending the nation. [Ref. 18]

2. The Northern Threat

PASOK has quite simply pursued an active policy of bilateral association with Greece's Balkan neighbors. Agreements providing for understanding and economic, political, cultural and technological cooperation have been signed with all the Balkan countries (although they are extremely limited with Albania). Exchanges of visits among leaders and ministers are regular occurrences.

Where Karamanlis had tried to encourage Balkan multilateralism with limited cultural and economic cooperation, Papandreou has launched his campaign for a "Balkan zone of peace" and a Nuclear-free zone as the context for intra-Balkan cooperation. That security is uppermost in the leader's mind was evident from the beginning:

In the Balkan area, the criterion for our foreign policy will be pursuit of firm friendship and constructive cooperation. The Balkan area has always been an area for threats by foreign powers and superpowers. We believe the special sensitivity of the area demands creation of a zone of peace so that the Balkans can become a nuclear-free area, not attached to a political-military coalition, and we will direct our efforts toward this end. At the same time, we will strengthen existing political relations for the purpose of creating institutions which will guarantee permanent cooperation. [Ref. 10: p.55]

With this effort, Papandreou most likely hoped he had found a common ground which would bring the Balkans together and thus drastically reduce the threat to Greece's border. He also hoped he had found a cause which the Soviet Union could support. In addition, he found a policy which could bring him international notoriety and within which he could bury the sticky issue of nuclear weapons in Greece. On 16 May, 1983, the formal letter went out from Athens. It outlined a format of cooperation among "experts" leading to an eventual summit meeting. Among the countries addressed (Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Albania) only Albania rejected the offer out of hand, while Turkey remained cool but accepting. The other countries were enthusiastic. As of this writing the outcome of these efforts is still in question. It is difficult to speculate as to the reaction of the Soviets. They may take a dim view of any Balkan cooperation, as they have in the past (especially during the efforts of the Karamanlis government) since it could be viewed as leading to more autonomy and less Soviet influence in the area. On the other hand, a Balkan nuclear-free-zone could legitimize the idea of such a zone in Central Europe, which is a long-standing Soviet goal and would create acute problems for NATO.

A brief mention should be made here of the PASOK government's relations with the rest of the Eastern bloc. Papandreou has pursued increasing contacts with the other

Eastern European countries. Most of these relations have centered on economic cooperation. These contacts have been made mainly in the light of pragmatic cooperation, pursuing detente, and establishing linkages among European countries in line with the PASOK vision of European unity outside of the military blocs.

With the Soviet Union, contact has been vigorous. These efforts have built upon contacts begun by Karamanlis in 1979. Numerous agreements have been signed between the two countries mainly dealing with economic, cultural and energy matters. The energy contacts include oil purchases, gas deals, a hydroelectric project and electricity sales to Greece. The culmination of this effort came on February 22, 1983, when Papandreou and Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov signed a 10-year economic trade agreement in Athens. Although this raised a stir in the West, especially in the EC, a survey of the provisions of the agreement as reported shows that it is strictly limited to economic and cultural matters. In spite of the Soviets' grand rhetoric about political cooperation and friendship with Greece, Papandreou kept his views conservative. He also made it quite clear that a basis of Greek-Soviet cooperation lay in the continued support by Moscow of Greece's positions on the Aegean and Cyprus. And while the agreement looks great on paper, Papandreou has proved to be a hard bargainer in respect to the implementation details of the agreement and in protection of Greek economic interests. Consequently the agreement has yet to be fully implemented.

On Soviet foreign policy, the PASOK chairman has made it quite clear where he stands. He has unequivocally condemned the Soviets for the Afghanistan invasion. And while some Westerners were put off by Greece's refusal to support sanctions against Poland, Papandreou did, in fact, strongly condemn martial law in Poland. His position on

Poland, however, was meant to make certain points, among them: (1) that he felt that the sanctions would not have the desired effect on Moscow, would degrade East-West relationships and would not help the people of Poland; and (2) he chose to remind the EC and NATO that while they condemned martial law and external intervention in Poland, they supported it in Greece in the past and continue to support it in Turkey, while they have not taken a firm stand on Cyprus, suffering under occupation of foreign troops for nine years. [Ref. 20]

3. Cyprus

PASOK policy on Cyprus has shown a change from the previous government. That the Papandreou regime intended to involve Greece more positively in the Cyprus issue, was demonstrated by the numerous meetings between the Greek Prime Minister and Cyprus President Kiprianou. (At least seven major summits have taken place up until June, 1983.) In fact, Kiprianou was the first "chief of state" to visit Papandreou after the election, and Papandreou, in March, 1982, became the first Greek chief of state to visit the island, a visit which was meant to vividly demonstrate Greek solidarity with and interest in the problems of the Greek-Cypriots.

Papandreou's policy has remained very visible, outspoken, assertive and unwavering. Some of the main points of PASOK Cyprus policy are:

1. Greek National Interest In Cyprus this stems from two sources: (1) Athens, as the "metropolis of Hellenism" considers "Cyprus Hellenism as an extension of our nation [Greece]," which Greece is bound to support in its time of oppression; and (2) authority comes from the as yet not officially abrogated London-Zurich Agreement of 1959. ("We must

never forget that Greece is a guarantor power.")

[Ref.21]

2. Intercommunal Talks These are rejected by Papandreou. "The dialogue taking place in Cyprus is feigned and nonexistent...it is a dialogue between Nicosia and Ankara...[the latter of] which is presently there with a considerable modern military force and is holding 36.4% of Cypriot territory." [Ref. 22] Papandreou will recognize the dialogue solely between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, only on internal matters, and only after Turkish forces have been withdrawn. He and Kiprianou (the Greek-Cypriot leader) have had occasional disagreements on this point.
3. Internationalization. Papandreou maintains that the problem of Cyprus is "basically a question of foreign occupation." "It has developed into a major international problem following the Turkish invasion and occupation of a large part of an independent and nonaligned U.N. member state." Therefore, it is Greece's duty as guarantor to seek international support for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. This is the prerequisite of intercommunal talks. [Ref. 10: p.53]
4. The Cyprus Dossier The Greek Prime Minister has pledged to open the "Cyprus dossier", which means opening investigations into responsibilities for the Cyprus affair. "This will happen because I must confess that irrespective of who then shoulders this very great historical responsibility, we must confess that our nation, in order to free itself from being a culprit, is compelled to proceed with uncovering the issue." [Ref. 23]

In pursuing the Greek Cyprus policy, Papandreou has taken the initiative whenever possible. Within NATO he has brought it up in the context of Greece's full reintegration (as an indication of Turkish aggression), and in connection with the Polish and Falklands issues. In 1981, immediately after the elections, he announced that Greece would double its aid to Cyprus, to the sum of 2 billion drachmae. He has made proposals that the U.N. forces be increased to replace Turkish troops as protectors of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, and for Greece to shoulder the increased financial burden for the additional forces [Ref. 24]. With this policy he has also offered the concurrent withdrawal of all Greek forces from the island should the Turks respond likewise. There has also been indication of increasing military support coming from the Greeks to the Cyprus government.³¹ Finally, Papandreou, during his 1983 presidency of the EC, has brought the matter formally before the European Parliament and the ministers' meetings [Ref. 26].

A recent initiative in the U.N., sponsored by a group of non-aligned states, was passed concerning the Cyprus situation. This was the most comprehensive statement issued so far. Not only did it reaffirm previous U.N. resolutions calling for withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island, but it also dealt with the problem of the former property holdings of the Greek-Cypriot refugees, making void all Turkish deeds and claims against them. It appears, then, that Papandreou's hard line has made some headway on the Greek side of the Cyprus issue. It has at least brought the issue back into focus and reasserted Greece's active and uncompromising role in its solution. It remains to be seen,

³¹Officially there are 950 Greek national forces on Cyprus plus a Greek-Cypriot National Guard force of 11,000. Estimates, however, of the Greek forces go as high as 3,000, and there are reported indications that there is a "possible incremental buildup of forces on both sides." [Ref. 25]

however, what concrete support Greece will be able to give, particularly in the light of possible Turkish reaction to Papandreu's new militancy and greater involvement in the issue, the policy he has recently dubbed the "new mobility" on Cyprus.

4. Aegean issues

The second fundamental Greek security issue under Papandreu's government and the issue which has received continual attention is the perceived Turkish threat in the Aegean Sea region. Papandreu's position has been relatively consistent on this issue also. Never has he wavered, at least in his rhetoric, from his adamant line that the issues involving Greek "sovereign rights" in the area, especially surrounding the islands, are fundamentally non-negotiable. Common Greek fears, as they had been iterated in the past, were supposedly strengthened in Papandreu's eyes by the continual "violations" of the air and seaspace by the Turks.

With regard to possible negotiations between the two countries Papandreu has publicly stated that he sees no need to conduct talks with the Turkish government as long as it retains its designs on changing the status quo in the area and as long as it continues the use of military force in Cyprus. The firm PASOK policy remains that in no context will the Greek government concede "one inch" of Greek sovereign territory whether it be in, on, around or below the eastern island territories of the Greek motherland. He has adamantly stated that he will protect the "land of the Greek ancestors" at all costs. He lays full blame for the seemingly intractable situation on the revisionist attitude and designs of the Turks. To emphasize his resolve, he has travelled to many of the islands and spoken to the people, reemphasizing his firm security guarantee of the islands.

In addition to visits to the Dodecanese, he paid a much-publicized visit to the island of Limnos, which has the largest military contingent and is a continual source of controversy between Greece, Turkey and NATO over the problem of island militarization. In addressing the troops, he said:

Exactly when the Limnos issue is acquiring international importance and dimensions, we are visiting Limnos and this is the first time a prime minister has visited Limnos. I really feel a great national emotion. I am here near the conscripted sons of our people, the armed forces.... I am particularly moved by the existing unity, what we call reconciliation between the people and the armed forces....[Ref. 39]

In a change of procedure from the policies of the last government Papandreou has publicly rejected any bilateral discussions with the Turks. Instead, his approach has been to link the Aegean issues with other issues which involve the Greek association with NATO and the U.S. The three most important facets for Papandreou have become the protection of the pre-1974 status quo, control of airspace and seaspace, and the critical preservation of the "balance of power" in the region. The former two have been tightly linked to negotiations with and participation in NATO. The latter has almost exclusively been linked to the negotiations over the status of the U.S. facilities in Greece. The connections will be discussed in the appropriate sections below.

The reality of the Greek-Turkish relationship (to a great extent consumed by Aegean issues) is apparently not as confrontational as it may seem. Indications of this can be seen in occasional references made by the PASOK leader about possible points or conditions of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. An example of this was the announcement of a "moratorium" between Greece and Turkey after a series of twelve

meetings between Greek and Turkish lower level ministers. Announcing the agreement publicly on 22 July, 1982, Papandreu explained that:

....a moratorium has been agreed upon with Turkey. As you know, since this spring [1982] an effort has been started toward the moratorium. ...I am particularly pleased about this development. It is truly extremely simple. Both governments have agreed that over a period of a few months they will not proceed to make statements that are provocative or carry out violations that could undermine the climate, the imperative climate, if there is to be contact and dialogue around various aspects of certain issues. [Ref. 28]

Showing his sensitivity on this issue and not wanting to appear appeasing to the Turks, Papandreu felt the need to fully qualify the event by saying:

I must stress that nothing over and above this is provided for under the agreements. In other words, neither the one side--Greece--nor the other side--Turkey have in any way altered their positions.... They were simply efforts to formulate and facilitate the context of this term, the truce, the moratorium.... The exact context will consist of a discussion of a framework within which the two countries could, perhaps, move in order to solve their differences peacefully. I wish to conclude by stating that there must be no feeling that the great issues are being solved. ...a climate has been created which will permit a dialogue....[Ref. 28]

The similarity of this framework to portions of the Berne Protocol are apparent.

This maneuver, in addition to acknowledging that there probably would be no progress on the Aegean issues, which were turning into a prohibitively expensive arms race between Greece and Turkey, and other Greek contacts with Turkey were possibly meant to enhance the Greek claims in the region. It also made cosmetic points for the Greeks in that they now had a framework within which they could characterize the inevitable Turkish "violations" as all the more provocative. Papandreu, therefore, did not rule out meaningful contact with Turkey, although this possibility was

strictly qualified. However, when he was asked by a foreign journalist, who noticed on this apparent new attitude of reconciliation toward the Turks, whether the party leader envisioned a Sadat-style move in the future, Papandreou answered dryly that he had never cared for the politics of Sadat.

Thus, while Pasok had taken a firm and consistent stand on the Aegean issues, the party position apparently does not leave out a certain flexibility which was missing in early party rhetoric. Specifically, by linking the airspace and sea control issues with NATO and the Rogers Agreement negotiations, there seems to be some chance at resolution in the future, given certain preconditions. Also, the increasing dialogue, although usually not played up, seems to be an integral part of PASOK Turkish and Aegean policy. It is noteworthy that to date, PASOK has not made good its former calls for extension of Greek territorial waters. Neither has it unilaterally abrogated any of the airspace arrangements made by its predecessor government which it had so severely criticized previously. It appears, then, that PASOK intends to follow the line expressed in the 1981 policy statement:

We have clearly explained to Ankara our desire that our people may live in peace and friendship. At long last, the two countries must seriously think someday to put an end to expense [sic] armaments and to use the funds spent on armaments for health, education and the elevation of their people's standard of living. But we have also made it clear that we are not inclined to concede even 1 inch of Greek territory. The dialogue with Turkey has sense and can be welcomed in the measure that it would not concern unacceptable concession of national sovereign rights as well as of arrangements based on international agreements which have delegated to Greece jurisdictions or authorities. ...it must be made clear both to the neighbors and the Atlantic alliance that our land, sea, and air borders as well as the Greek continental shelf limits in the Aegean are not negotiable. They are safeguarded by international agreements as well as by international practice. [Ref 10: p. S3]

5. THE PASOK Government and U.S. Bases

Greek-U.S. relations have been centered around the negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement which would replace the 1953 agreement, perhaps amend some of the hundreds of existing bilateral agreements and clarify the role of the bases in Greece for the immediate future. As has been seen in the previous chapter, the PASOK policy regarding these facilities had been that they should be unequivocally removed. Therefore, there was some question and anxiety in the West as to what Papanđreou would do to effect their removal and what the timetable would be. In the 1981 policy statement the PASOK chairman indicated that he was not going to take any drastic unilateral moves. Instead, he indicated that their status would be the subject of U.S.-Greek negotiations which would start in the first months of 1982. The negotiations were to take place in phases. The first phase would set parameters in which future negotiations would take place. The second phase would be a political one, in which the definite guidelines would be worked out, and the third phase would produce the specifics of the final agreement.

According to 1981 PASOK policy, there were to be three main considerations for any operation of the bases on Greek soil, while they were awaiting removal. The three main considerations were:

1. Ensured Greek control and supervision of the facilities.
2. Provisions for annual review and abrogation of any agreements.
3. Proscription of any activities on the bases which would curtail Greek sovereign rights or in any way affect the interests of Greece, either domestic or external.

As this position evolved, however, it became more clear. Papandreou put this into perspective in an interview with a reporter from Der Spiegel as follows:

[The negotiations]...that started on 27 October have one objective only, namely to agree upon a timetable for the closure of these bases and to fix and conditions for their operation until then. We do not determine this unilaterally; we will try to settle the matter, if possible, through an agreement. But one thing is absolutely clear; if the negotiations do not achieve any positive results in a period of time still to be determined, then the bases must disappear. [Ref. 29: p. S2]

Papandreou continually emphasized that the bases, with the possible exception of the Souda complex which served the U.S. and NATO-assigned Sixth Fleet, were only serving U.S. interests. Therefore, during their limited tenure, they would have to be brought more in line with Greek interests and security needs. The direction of this reasoning became apparent toward the end of 1982. In the same interview quoted above, the persistent German reporter asked Papandreou directly about the "price" the U.S. would have to pay to retain its Greek facilities. The PASOK leader replied:

There is no question of a leasing fee as in the case of Spain. What matters in our case is national security and this must be seen quite practically. ...a vague statement by the United States...would not be of any worth to us. A binding guarantee would require a treaty between Greece and the United States which would have to be ratified by Congress...but this is not realistic. Arms deliveries are much more realistic. [Ref. 29: p. S2]

This direction became even more clear in a reported statement by the Foreign Minister Kharalambopoulos. In addition to reassuring the press that Greece was merely concerned with its national interest and would not unilaterally remove the bases, he connected this statement with the fact that Greece receives 80% of its military hardware from the United

States and would receive \$280 million in U.S. military credits in 1983 [Ref. 30]. It had become clear that within the discussion of the U.S. bases, the matter of U.S. military aid to Greece was to play a significant role. When the negotiations started up again in January, 1983, the issue was made even more clear. Papandreou pointed out that he was definitely not asking for a "written guarantee" from the U.S. against "Turkish expansionism in the Aegean," but that he expected the U.S. to maintain the balance of power in the region between Greece and Turkey [Ref. 31]. This phrase has become a code for the supposed equity of military aid in the region, usually based on the 7:10 formula. Of probable concern to Greece was the 1980 5-year Defense and Cooperation agreement signed between U.S. and Turkey, which brought the ratio of aid to approximately 3.6:10 in Turkey's favor. Through the leverage of the bases, Papandreou hoped to change this.

The issue of aid came to the forefront in February, 1983. The Greeks had noted a significant disparity in President Reagan's 1984 budget request. No matter how Papandreou calculated the figures, they came up indicating that there was to be a significant reduction of aid to Greece compared to that for Turkey. He therefore sent a letter, released to the press on February 5, which reportedly read as follows:

Mr. President, the proposals of the U.S. Administration to the U.S. Congress in reference to the program for economic and military aid for the 1984 fiscal year have created, as expected, profound dissatisfaction among the Greek people.

I wish to stress that my government's concern has increased as a result of the fact that the U.S. Administration appears to be drawing away from the long practice established by the 1978 amendments to the 1961 law on foreign aid which provides for the preservation of the balance of power in the Aegean. At the same time, it directly links the amount of aid to Greece with the results of the negotiations being conducted for the signing of a new agreement for defense and economic aid.

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The Greek government cannot ignore the fact that if the balance of power in the area is not preserved, then the already fragile stability in our area will be disrupted, with unforeseeable consequences.

As you are aware, this fact creates a climate which does not help the negotiations for the signing of a new defense agreement and which could have negative repercussions on the relations between our two countries.
[Ref. 32: p. S1]

Papandreou further clarified his intentions by stating that he specifically "insisted" on maintaining the 7:10 ratio. He indicated that since the bases did not serve Greek interests directly, they fell under the provisions of Article 28, paragraph three of the 1975 Greek Constitution which linked aid to the preservation of the Aegean balance. The Greek government figured the aid to Turkey to be \$930 million, while the Greeks were to only receive \$280 million. The figure for Turkey was calculated by including all aid--military credits, military direct aid and economic aid. This was to be matched by the U.S. to preserve the "qualitative and quantitative" balance at a 7:10 ratio. [Ref. 32] The response by the U.S. President was to indicate that a request had been submitted to Congress which would, in the event of the signing of an agreement, increase security assistance levels to Greece by \$220 million. This would raise the Greek total to about \$500 million, about 7/10 of the military portion of Turkish aid.

A final set of requirements for the bases agreement was unveiled at the same time. Some of these had to do with secret or sensitive information and information sharing. The Greek position was that all intelligence information gathered by the U.S. facilities was to be shared with the Greek military but that sensitive information was not to be shared with Turkey. Finally, the specific method of operation of the bases, the legal status of the U.S. personnel and specific methods of control were to be agreed upon, which would include the possibility of curtailing operations in the event of a national emergency. [Ref. 32: p. S2]

Papandreou came under increasing criticism from some of the more leftist elements as an agreement with the U.S. apparently drew near. In the newspaper, I Kathimerini, an editor pointed out that it was now time that Papandreou would have to deal directly with the public, he would not be able to cover up his actions with "victorious verbalism." "On the contrary, the outcome of these two unresolved issues [U.S. bases and the EC] will be interpreted as confirmation by the Greek socialist government of our country's permanent ties with the West and interpreted as Papandreou's return to the path of the West." [Ref. 33: p. S3] The sentiment was further expressed with numerous demonstrations calling for the closing of the bases. Although Papandreou had apparently become more flexible on the issue, it was possible that his constituency was still thinking in terms of his former rhetoric--that he was perhaps about to become a victim of his own former policies. Sensing this, he was repeatedly obliged to clarify his position. His statement to a reporter from the Berliner Zeitung was typical of his reasoning:

The overwhelming majority of the Greek people have said no to the bases. The government also says no. However, there are differences between the two nos; the agreement cannot be implemented immediately. ... We seek neither confrontation nor conflict with the United States. We simply want the United States to understand that the Greek people are their own masters. They will allow the bases, but only for a short time now. That is a question of principle and the Greek Government will not yield on this. [Ref. 34: p. S12]

These sentiments were echoed in the Greek press.

Early in the morning on July 15, 1983, an agreement on the status of the U.S. bases initialed by the Greek and U.S. foreign ministers. After briefing the government and the opposition, Papandreou, in a joint Greek-U.S. broadcast

explained the provisions of the agreement.³² In his statement, Papandreou declared that with the signing of the agreement, "We [PASOK] keep the contract of honor with the Greek people. At the same time, we believe that critical national interests are served in the best possible manner." [Ref. 35: p. S2]

The provisions of the agreement can be divided into six major sections:

1. **TIMETABLE** The agreement is to have a restricted five-year duration. Since it must go into effect by the end of 1983, this means that the latest the bases would remain in Greece is December 31, 1988. At the expiration of this five-year period, there is a 17-month dismantling period. The Greek government is also required to give notice five months in advance of the agreement expiration date as to whether the agreement is to be terminated. Apparently, if this notice does not come, then the U.S. will assume that the bases are to remain in operation.
2. **NATO CONNECTION** The agreement disconnects any association of the bases with NATO interests. They are not to be considered NATO bases nor are they considered as serving mutual defense interests of the two countries. This accomplishes two aims: (1) that the agreement can be abrogated at any time without deference to any NATO requirements whereas under the 1953 agreement Greece did not have the right to do

³²The official text was to be released pending an acceptable translation which would be approved and signed by both parties. This originally was to happen within 15 days, but apparent difficulties especially in finding mutually acceptable terms in describing the Aegean military balance pledge, delayed the release. The text of the DECA were signed finally on September 8, 1984 and released to the press on the following day. The agreement was ratified by the Greek parliament on November 7, 1984.

- this, and (2) that the new agreement will not be tied to any NATO financing scheme thus eliminating the need for the Greeks to share in the expenses of their operation.
3. **CONTROL** The bases are to be only used for defensive purposes and therefore cannot be used (theoretically) for possible U.S. activities in the Middle East or anywhere else the Greeks deem improper or counter to their international interests. There is therefore strict control over the kind of activities as well as the use of their armaments. The Greek government has the right to suspend activities of any kind on the bases in time of national emergency.
 4. **U.S.AID** By the agreement the Americans are committed to grant military aid to Greece in return for the use of the bases. Amounts are to be determined on the basis of upholding the balance of military power in the Aegean, and the agreement can be abrogated if the Greeks determine that the U.S. has upset the balance in favor of Turkey. The figure mentioned, \$500 million, represented 70% of the military aid to Turkey. This was presumably to set the precedent, although the word Turkey was apparently stricken later from the agreement in the process of "translation."
 5. **STATUS OF FORCES** The status of U.S. military forces assigned to the bases was to be put more in line with other NATO countries. Extraterritoriality privileges for the U.S. troops were to be severely limited and the Greek authorities would give up legal jurisdiction over them only in very special circumstances.
 6. **SUPERCESSION** The 1953 U.S.-Greece agreement is superceded by the new agreement upon its signing.

This is to include the major portion of the "secret appendix" to the former agreement. Some of the former 108 individual agreements were either abolished or amended, and they were all to come under review in the future. Specific new operating procedures are to be developed for each of the major bases. New economic agreements are to take the place of the old arrangements which would reportedly include direct compensation by the U.S. for their operation.

Papandreou presented this agreement to the people in the following general terms:

....the signing of this agreement constitutes a historic step in safeguarding our country's national independence, in establishing the principle that--irrespective of the size of power of countries--Greece is an equal member of the international community. [Ref. 35: p. S4]

The Soviet Union seemed to agree that this was the case and in a communique congratulated the government for its strong anti-U.S. stand. The Greek left, particularly the communists, were not thrilled by the announcement and asked Soviet sources to retransmit the message thinking that a mistake had been made, and questioning its authenticity. (The same message was retransmitted.) In Ankara the reaction was belligerent, and it informed the U.S. that there must not be any direct or indirect allusion to Turkey in the agreement. [Ref. 36] What is most striking about the new agreement is that it seemed to finally fulfill the provisions of the agreement on the bases negotiated by the Karamanlis government in 1976. Papandreou had succeeded in perpetually linking the issue of aid to the longevity of the bases, but had accepted certain political risks in doing so. This action could now be held up by the slowly growing far-left opposition as a qualified sell-out of Greek interests.

PASOK was bound to see its further left branch begin to erode in the future, as continuing pressure from the people demanded more "freedom from the U.S. imperialists." It is ironic that Kharilaos Florakis, Leader of the KKE, turned Papandreou's former rhetoric against him and called for a national referendum on the issue [Ref. 35: p. 56].

6. Nuclear Weapons in Greece.

The issue of NATO/U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Greece has been linked in the past to several issues. Specifically, PASOK tended to include them with their arguments concerning the bases and the U.S. violation of Greek domestic and security interests. They therefore often called for their removal and on more than one occasion stated that they would be removed when PASOK came to power. A significant shift has taken place on this issue since the election of 1981. It is significant to examine this separately since the issue affects several other security issues. Not only does the issue have to do with their presence under what Papandreou has called total American control, but they also have to do with the general NATO issue and with more general foreign policy issues, particularly in the Balkans. This seems to be a quite clever maneuver, and solves several conflicting policy problems at once.

With regard to the bases, by taking the nuclear weapons away from this issue, Papandreou was allowed more flexibility for negotiation while he could simultaneously expound on his anti-nuclear, anti-missiles and Balkan and Mediterranean "zones of peace" policy. Furthermore, since Greece remains within the NATO structure, the existence of nuclear weapons, supposedly for NATO use against Warsaw Pact forces, at present does not cause a policy contradiction as they did when Greece withdrew from the NATO military integration in 1974.

Instead, PASOK has linked the issue of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Greece with the issue of the Balkan nuclear free zone proposal. (See above.) In the November, 1981, policy statement, Papandreou told the newly elected deputies that:

....as a first step toward specific geographic areas, the government proposes creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. Greece, after the necessary consultations, will be the first to implement, and in a very short time, this principle for withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory. [Ref. 10: p. 55]

The actual meaning of this policy has been ambiguous during the past two years. At one time it will be interpreted that Greece will take the initial step to show good faith and strength of interest in creating the nuclear-free zone. At other times it is interpreted that the withdrawal of the weapons is contingent on the establishment of the zone and the removal of weapons such as may exist from other Balkan countries.

Probably the best interpretation of the PASOK nuclear weapons policy is that since the Soviets could destroy Greece with SS-20 missiles (and many other delivery systems) located in the USSR, the question of nuclear weapons in the Balkan area is immaterial defensively. However, it seems that Papandreou has been hesitant to renounce the weapons unilaterally for he may fear that this would send the wrong signal to both the Atlantic Alliance and to Moscow. (This is seen in the light of the well-known general proposal from the Soviet Union that it would agree not to use nuclear weapons against any country which would unilaterally renounce the weapons on its soil. This proposal was specifically directed to Greece shortly after the election of Papandreou.) Most likely, with the new U.S./NATO intermediate range weapons being deployed in Europe

and with certain types of older weapons becoming obsolete and falling within the October 1983 NATO decision to withdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe, Papandreu would prefer to avoid the issue for a while to see whether the U.S. might decide to pull them out of Greece anyway.

7. NATO Integration

It appears from the preceding sections that Papandreu has embarked on a very interesting policy development program especially in the realm of security issues to segment his policies in discreet packages. This is true of the issue of NATO integration also. While the former party policy seemed to call for definite reassessment of the Greek association with NATO and specifically that Greece would lean toward total withdrawal if the Cyprus issue was not brought to a favorable conclusion it appeared that now the issue had been narrowed down to the renegotiation of the Rogers agreement which had brought Greece back in in 1981. In his 1981 policy statement, Papandreu toned down his previous rhetoric which hinted at a supposed NATO-U.S. conspiracy against Greek interests. Instead, he firmly placed the Greek position within the concept of the dissolution of the two opposing blocs in Europe--i.e., until such time as the blocs disappeared, the practical thing to do was to stay with NATO, but only under terms favorable to Greece. The actual text is interesting in that it points out some new characteristics of the new Papandreu tendency to separate the issues. First, the statement makes no mention of NATO being the instigator of the events of 1967 and 1974. Instead it merely states that NATO "supported" the junta, which to a limited extent it did. It also states that "NATO did nothing to intervene to stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus," which has some truth to it, since NATO did not overtly threaten Turkey with reprisal. Most uncharacter-

istic, was the fact that there was no mention of the U.S. in conjunction with NATO, which was the standard line formerly. [Ref. 10: p. S4] In surveying the statements concerning NATO, it is apparent that since the election there has been a separation of issues: The United States is associated with the bases and the Aegean "balance of power," and NATO is associated with the renegotiation of the Rogers agreement and the Aegean sovereignty issues.

As there are two general divisions of NATO, the military and the political, so Greek-NATO relations can be viewed. The first consideration, that of military defense, has specifically been linked with the Greek-Turkish issues of the Aegean. These of course are most generally spawned, in Papandreu's view, by Turkish aggressive designs on Greek territory. Accordingly, Greek proposals for participating fully in the NATO military structure deal exclusively with the perceived Turkish threat. Papandreu's first desire is that NATO endorse his view that the overriding threat to Greece comes from the East not from the North. He brings this idea up at every chance possible and it has been the object of considerable discomfort during NATO ministerials where Papandreu's proposals are always met with counteraccusations from Turkish ministers. The often repeated Greek position is that in return for the full participation of the country in the alliance, NATO should guarantee all borders from aggression from all sources.

The specific details of the Rogers agreement negotiations focus on the issue of control over areas which Greece considers "sovereign." With the agreement of 1980 the outstanding issues of Greek-Turkish disagreement as to command and control have been objects of discussion. The Greek side maintains that until Greece is guaranteed full control over Aegean airspace and seaspace or until a reasonable compromise can be found, the Rogers agreement remains,

according to the Greeks, in abeyance. In a May, 1983 press conference, Papandreu first dealt with the question of control of the airspace. His views were quite clear:

The Rogers agreement...contains paragraphs which appear to create the possibility of very different interpretations by Greece in relation to Turkey.... [It] envisages the establishment of a headquarters in Larisa whose area of operations control is to be determined. These are practical issues. We maintain that this area includes the entire Aegean airspace that was covered before 1974. To a great extent, this coincides with the Greek Flight Information Region [FIR]. No government, and certainly [not] ours, should question the right of control of the Aegean operational area by the Greek Air Force. [Ref. 37: p. S5]

The prime minister then clarified the Larisa headquarters issue by stating that as long as there is no agreement within NATO that the demarcation line for Greek airspace control which is acceptable, the headquarters will not be established, and "the Rogers agreement is inactive at this point." [Ref. 37: p.S5]

The Greek Ministry of National Defence interprets the issue of Aegean sea control "differently" than NATO officials and the Turks:

We do not accept what is called the task force. ...There will be further consequences. When exercises are prepared in the Aegean, in almost all cases these exercises are being prepared by NATO in order to create precedents in favor of Turkey and against Greece. Under these conditions we cannot participate in common exercises. Therefore, my reply is that to a great extent the Rogers agreement is inactive.

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Basically the issue can be resolved if the following happened: Either Turkey withdraws its claims in the Aegean, or NATO ceases to support the Turkish claims in the Aegean. At present, I am not hopeful of either happening. [Ref. 37: p. S5]

In accordance with these views, the Greeks have pulled out of numerous exercises in the past two years, notably in October and November, 1982 and in February, March and

October, 1983. A particularly sensitive issue between the Greeks and the Turks relative to the exercises is the militarization of the island of Limnos. The Greek side demands that the island be included in the exercises since it is of strategic importance to them. Turkey, however, rejects this idea since they feel that it would be tantamount to admitting to the island's militarization. This issue is not novel, however, for the same arguments and the same pull-outs were prevalent during the former Greek administration.

It is perhaps in the second aspect of the NATO structure, the political side, that Papandreu has had the most effect. While the issues of the Rogers Agreement are relatively constant, Papandreu's personal style within the NATO political structure has changed the Greek image drastically, sometimes to the irritation of the other members. A good example of Papandreu's attitude and its effect was demonstrated in the December, 1981 NATO ministerial, which he attended as Greek Minister of Defense. It was the first ministers meeting to fail to produce a final communique. Since the Greek Prime Minister insisted that some language be included recognizing the Greek eastern threat, the required unanimity was never reached. Some observers saw this as an embarrassment to the body. However, Papandreu saw it differently. In a speech to the Greek press in Brussels, he stated his position and gave an indication of what was to come:

The Greek position clearly presented Greece's defense problem to international opinion and was incorporated in NATO's records [the minutes of the meeting]. The Greek delegation is proud of the position it maintained at the Brussels meeting. Now, the entire alliance understands that there is a question of Greece's national security. At the same time, it became apparent that NATO is unable to help on the question of our country's frontiers. [Ref. 38: p. C3]

Similar issues presented themselves at the December, 1982, ministerial. Although NATO Secretary General Luns tried to play down the Greek position, Papandreou was again vocal about his recording of reservations in the decisions of both the joint communique of the Nuclear Planning Committee, his expression of the "Greek position" in the Defense Planning Committee and the fact that Greece had reserved its support for several paragraphs in the ministerial final communique, notably on the Euromissiles. He stated that Greek "reservations were general and our positions have both consistency and continuity through our policy in support of detente, peace and disarmament. ... Papandreou stressed that Greece now has a viewpoint, something that the alliance was not accustomed to, and that was time it did [sic]." [Ref. 39]

The Greek position on NATO membership essentially turns on two issues: the special relationship Greece seeks with the renegotiation of the Rogers agreement, and the political forum and notoriety that Greece seeks in trying to become an "equal" among its European partners. At present, for purely pragmatic reasons apparently, Greece remains with NATO and no longer speaks of either full-scale exit from the organization or non-alignment.

8. Summary.

In surveying the information presented here one would begin to see what an Economist writer was referring to when he titled his article about the Greek Prime Minister, "Mr. Papambiguous." Other columnists have criticized the new Greek government saying that the only real "change" brought in by the PASOK party was the change in party policies. There are several conclusions to be drawn from this information. First, despite the liberal rhetorical virtuosity of the party's leader, he has based his policies on a realistic assessment of Greece's problems and its situation

within the greater international environment. Indeed, it may be that Papandreu's real virtuosity has been in his ability to flexibly use his authority to posture himself to the greatest advantage possible, within the realization that Greece is a small country; is not, at least for the present, economically strong; is in the first stages of development in many areas; is therefore using what limited power it has available to secure its position. One would be forced to admit that in the face of perceived danger, it could be extremely detrimental to show signs of weakness. It is probably to a great extent true that Papandreu believes that Greece was and is still threatened by Turkey and he has shaped his security policy accordingly.

Also, in the foregoing, one detects a strong element of political pragmatism and finesse. Papandreu has been able to use his popularity and his strong party control to subtly manipulate the issues to his greatest advantage. He has managed to encapsulate and separate the issues to give himself greater capability for political maneuver. By dividing up the issues in this manner, he may appeal to all practical and ideological issues in isolation and therefore with greater effect. In encapsulating the nuclear weapons issue in the nexus of Balkan relations and detente; the Aegean frontier issues with NATO; the bases issue with U.S. aid; and the Cyprus issue with the U.N. he has somewhat deftly disentangled these issues so that he may seek a realistic posture concerning them. This is perhaps Papandreu's most significant political contribution so far and it has apparently brought results.

There is another side of this flexibility which must be pointed out here. Papandreu, who is now sitting in the top seat looking out rather than standing in the square looking in, is now faced with a dilemma. It is a dilemma of

how to reconcile his ideology with the realities of government, and even more difficult now to reconcile his political hyperbole (so effective while striving for power and a habit hard to break) with the necessity of pulling together broad and at some times divergent views within the party. He must accept that in trying to juggle the center and left ends of his party toward the middle, he is going to lose supporters here or there. Given the present lingering generally cautious views toward the Soviets and their KKE representatives of Marxism-Leninism, the possible losses to the communists may not be too serious. However, to try to hang on to the far left could be disastrous were New Democracy able to create for itself a more centrist image.

But there is a third part to this dilemma, and this may well be the most harmful to Papandreou and Greek political stability. This is the potential that PASOK, by moving toward a more incremental approach on domestic issues, by continually hedging on "national issues," by claiming tactical necessity for its policy diversions, and by softening his anti-West line, may become victim of its own policies. While Papandreou initials agreements with the U.S., the demonstrators continue to march outside the bases and the Chamber, continuing to chant the old PASOK slogans. As Papandreou continually must deal realistically with the Greek situation, his leftist opponents may start picking up some of the old PASOK slogans for themselves. One must now recognize that perhaps the true concern for Western policy makers is, and formerly should have been, not what will happen with PASOK in power, but what is the future general direction for Greece. The trends to increasingly shorter tenures for Western governments and the increasing difficulty in governing in the face of increasing international and economic problems, are accentuated in Greece by the tradition, yet to be broken, of single-leader parties and

governments. For a country wrestling with the problems of modernization within an aging global system and feeling strains both from within and without, each election and each change of government becomes critical. Each successful, peaceful change in Greece points to increased stability and viability of the maturing state.

In summing up the policies of PASOK in power, one author has noted the following:

Pragmatic considerations have, to date, prevented serious disruptions in Greece's foreign relations. ...In Athens, party supporters regret that Papandreou's ideas have been misinterpreted as rigid policy prescriptions. They believe that Greece's allies are uncomfortable dealing with a man of vision who openly declares his support for a nonpolar world, a unified Europe, a nuclear-free Balkan zone, and a neutral Greece. The fact that he proclaims these goals does not, for PASOK officials, mean they will be realized in the near future. Papandreou has no intention of harming his country's national interest, and will pursue only those policies that protect Greece in the immediate as well as in the long run, in their analysis. [Ref. 25: p. 22]

In the end, perhaps his assertiveness, coupled with his impeccable nationalistic rhetoric, have brought him more success than might have otherwise occurred. At least he has been able to preserve the Greek sovereign status quo in a cloudy international climate. Of course, the deciding factors in preserving the Greek state from turmoil will probably be largely economic. All programs hinge on this and unfortunately the Greek economy is extremely sensitive to the international economic situation. Nevertheless, Greece has come through one of the most momentous periods of change in its history seemingly stronger, more stable and more unified.

VI. ANALYSIS

Considerable analysis of the details of Greek political and security issues has already been accomplished within the previous chapters. It remains, however to take a broad overview of the principal issues examined in order to relate them specifically to the questions proposed in the introduction. In this section, the general policy trends are surveyed for the entire ten-year period. As an important example, the issue of the United States facilities in Greece is covered in more detail. Finally, the findings are considered from a broader conceptual point of view.

A. THE ISSUES

1. "Northern" Issues

A survey of the policies of the Greek governments with regard to the Eastern bloc nations (Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) shows a single trend. From the break in 1974 in the officially strong anti-Communist policy of the dictatorship, relations have steadily been improved through efforts of both the New Democracy governments (ND) and PASOK. In recognizing the legitimacy of the Communist Party in Greece, Karamanlis, in 1974, paved the way for the establishment of official relations with the Eastern bloc. Out of security and economic considerations, Karamanlis pursued an active foreign policy with the Balkan states to reduce tension along Greece's northern borders and expand exchange of mutually beneficial goods and services. His efforts culminated in his attempt to create intra-Balkan cooperation on the economic level, with the hope that Balkan unity could be improved. He was also the first Greek head of state to

pay an official visit to the Soviet Union, a visit which established the bases for Greek-Soviet cooperation and economic exchange.

Papandreou, who cultivated relationships with the Eastern Bloc early during the formation of his party, has continued this trend. He has kept up active relations with the Soviet Union and has expanded economic cooperation between the two countries. He has been very active in seeking agreements with most of the Eastern European countries and has particularly focused on the continuation of improved intra-Balkan relations, which have culminated in his appeal to unite the region under the concept of a "Balkan Nuclear Free Zone."

In general, then, there is no noticeable change in the facts of Greek-Communist bloc relations. They have been continually developing within the framework of mutual advantage. This can be seen as the result of a political outlook which has taken Greece into the era of "detente" relations with the East which are now on a par with those of many of its European allies. It is reasonable to expect these relations to continue and not be greatly influenced in substance regardless of right or left trends in Greek politics, given no dramatic change in the world situation. It is natural for Greece to turn economically to the countries of Eastern Europe and to the USSR for trade. Beset by trade problems, and having difficulty competing with the more advanced Western European economies especially in a period of general economic difficulties, exploring all advantageous trade routes is essential. One must also not disregard the political advantages accrued from Greece's openings to the East. Primarily, it diversifies Greek foreign policy, making it appear less dependent on one side within the world community. This enhances the appearance of progress toward true independent state maturity desired by both parties as an

ultimate goal for Greece. Secondly, it gives Greece policy options which can also be used to possibly influence Greek-Western relations and give Greece a stronger bargaining position on important Greek issues.

2. The Cyprus Issue

There can be no doubt of the importance of this issue to all the parties involved--particularly Greece and Turkey. Both have made it central in their dealings with the Western Alliance, with the U.N. and in other international issues. Cyprus has been the catalytic event which opened this recent era in Greek politics and finding a solution to the problem has become central in the security policies and relations of both parties. This is not to say, however, that it is the most volatile issue in the region. Rather, it has become symbolic of the problems which Greece perceives as existing within NATO, with its relations with the United States, and the contentious issues in the Aegean Region. It was the seriousness of the issue which caused Greece to drastically alter its position within NATO. It is its continued existence which has become elementary in all Greek foreign policy dealings and has become axiomatic in the formation of Greek security policies. There can be no difference perceived between the general goals of either party relative to this issue, only differences in the approach to the solution of the problem. Both parties have been equally emphatic about the need to end the partition and both have sought support from any quarter they deemed might be productive. It can be generally said, then, that Cyprus, being a representation of some of the problems in Greek-Turkish-NATO relations, will remain continually on the top of the foreign and security policy agenda regardless of political party governing, until a solution is found.

3. Aegean Issues

If Cyprus has become symbolic of regional conflict, the Aegean Sea issues have become the concrete facts. Arising out of the events of 1973-74, the continual contention between Greece and Turkey over the issues has become basic to foreign and security policy formation for both Greek parties. Both Greek parties have identified the principal security threat to Greece as coming from the East (Turkey) and have colored their dealings with all actors within the area on this basis. They have both seen the "threat" in the Aegean as being one of primary national importance. They have both considered it an issue of territorial sovereignty of Greece's eastern island territories and the rights which are associated with them which Greece attempts to protect. They have both categorically stated that Greece is not prepared to make any concessions to Turkey on the territorial issues or on airspace, seaspace, or defense control in the area.

4. NATO and U.S. Relations

The relationship of Greece to NATO and the United States has been the subject of much consideration since the events of 1974. This probably has much to do with the changes which have taken place in East-West relations since the founding of the alliance and the ensconcement of the U. S. as one of its primary security guarantors. In the light of diminishing perceptions of an immediate and dangerous threat from the Warsaw Pact which has begun to more and more characterize the peripheral regions of the alliance, regional issues for Greece have appeared more important for its security. The tendency has been to see the superpower balance as more of an abstraction while regional issues have become more concrete. Thus, Greece has questioned its rela-

tionship with NATO and sought to readjust it to try to meet its own perceptions of Greek security requirements. Thus, we have seen that the allegedly more pro-West government of New Democracy pulled Greece out of the military command of NATO for six years. It spent the interim trying to renegotiate the position of Greece within the alliance, so that it would take into consideration what Greece saw as its overriding security concerns. Full integration was never achieved and the situation has not changed since the change of government. Thus, while PASOK has always been vocally against the NATO alliance, it has not taken any steps to completely sever the Greek-NATO ties. Rather, Papandreou continues to represent his country within the alliance and is attempting to build a new "special" relationship with the alliance which will take into consideration what Greeks perceive as their special security needs. Despite the at times acrimonious rhetoric against the alliance and the United States, both of the parties have remained generally aligned with the West, have sought solutions to their problems through the use of the general alliance framework and have never completely rejected the notion that attachment to the West, given present circumstances, seems to still be the best policy for the country.

5. U. S. Military Facilities in Greece

It might be assumed by someone who follows the political action in Greece that there have certainly been some serious effects on this issue arising out of the 1981 change of government. It is generally assumed that the New Democracy government was pro-U.S. and from the sometimes caustic anti-American rhetoric of Papandreou one would assume the opposite from his party. This issue, then, can serve as a good central example of the effect of the political environment on one of the central security/foreign

policy issues in Greece. By comparing the documentation of the agreements negotiated by the respective governments, the difference should be apparent. For this purpose, I will use the statement of "Principles to Guide Future United States-Greek Defense Cooperation" (State Department press release, April, 1976) negotiated by the Karamanlis Government with the U.S. Department of State preparatory to a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries (which never materialized). This will be compared to the text of the "Agreement of Defense and Economic Cooperation" between the U.S. and Greece, which was negotiated early in 1983 and signed by the Papandreou government on September 9, 1983. (These two documents are included as Appendix A and Appendix B to this thesis, respectively.)

The concept expressed in the first lines of each agreement indicates that there is no thought of a patron-client relationship between the two countries, but that the agreement is based on mutual advantage. Both agreements emphasize that, for purposes of this relationship, Greece and the U.S. are equal partners. The major conceptual difference here is that the 1976 agreement links the operation of the bases to the functioning of NATO while the 1983 one affirms the independence of the U.S.-Greece relationship from any other considerations. Both agreements state that the installations shall be under a Greek commander. The difficulties in this arrangement due to the nature of the activities on some of the facilities have been worked out in the 1983 agreement by assigning specific authorities to the base commander and providing for a consultative procedure for control and review of the functioning of the two contingents on each facility. Thus, the later agreement essentially conforms to the general trend throughout the NATO area that bases formerly belonging essentially to the U.S.

now come under national control of the hosts and the U.S. forces have a tenant relationship. Both agreements affirm the concept that the operations and activities of the bases are strictly under the control and limitation of the Greek Government and in no case will they be allowed to carry out missions which are not agreed to specifically by the Greek government. Both agreements have provisions for the employment of Greek personnel, although the 1983 one does not mention any specific ratio where the earlier one insisted of a minimum of 50% Greek manning. While the earlier agreement insisted on full sharing of intelligence data collected on the facility, the 1983 agreement limits Greek access to these facilities and does not specifically deal with information sharing. In regards to general administration, the earlier agreement simply stated that operation of the facilities would be in the hands of the Greek commander and was not qualified. In the later agreement, the Greek contingent was given specific duties as far as perimeter protection and the rest of the authority was tempered by the operation of a council which would represent both sides to determine the administration of certain portions of the facility. Also, all activities and provisions specifically set forth in the annex to the 1983 agreement were left open for renegotiation with procedures specifically set up for this purpose. As for the expiration of the agreement, it was the intent of both governments to have the ability to review and renegotiate the agreements periodically. There are obvious advantages in this, especially since both agreements are linked to economic and defense aid from the U.S. to Greece. However, the earlier agreement was to have only a four-year term with provisions for its termination at an earlier date. The later agreement has a five-year duration period with an additional seventeen months given for removal of U.S. forces if the agreement is terminated at the end of this period.

There is no specific provision for the early termination of the later agreement except for the national emergency provisions under which the Greek government can cease all operations on the facilities as it sees fit. (This does not mean withdrawal.) Finally, both agreements mention military assistance as being part of the relationship between the U.S. and Greece, meaning that Greece receives military aid as a result of the agreement. However, the 1976 agreement included a figure, \$700 million, in the form of grants and loans which became the source of the famous 7:10 aid ratio which was supposed to balance Greek and Turkish military capabilities in the Aegean Region. The later agreement does not mention any specific ratio of aid vis-a-vis Turkey nor does it stipulate that any of the aid be in the form of grants. It does, however, outline broader U.S.-Greek economic cooperation in developing the Greek defense industry. Both agreements undertake to define the activities which are approved on each of the facilities. The 1983 agreement went further to define a new status for the United States and associated forces assigned to the facilities. However, although Papandreou has continually inveighed against the "extraterritoriality" of American troops in Greece, the 1983 agreement merely brings their status in line with the status of forces in other NATO countries. Indeed, except in special or severe circumstances, the U.S. authorities continue to exercise quite a bit of control over their troops.

In general, it appears that perhaps the agreement envisioned by the "conservative" New Democracy government was perhaps more strict than the one put into effect by the PASOK government. This distinction is even more vivid when one considers that in later negotiations between the Rallis New Democracy government and the U.S., reporters attributed the breakdown of negotiations in mid-1981 to the fact that

the U.S. could not agree to some of the Greek demands, which reportedly included a provision that the agreement could be abrogated by the Greek government at any time, that the facilities would be under the unqualified control of the Greek commander, and the U.S. formally accept and include the 7:10 Greek-Turkish aid ratio in the agreement. [Ref. 1, p. 80]

It therefore appears that, despite his rhetoric, Papandreou entered the negotiations with a very pragmatic attitude, with the intent of trying to get the best possible deal for Greece given the situation, and did not let his anti-U.S. rhetoric figure in his negotiating stance. Instead, the present agreement essentially provides for the needs of both countries in an atmosphere of cooperation. It may be that some of the recently more outspoken anti-Americanism of Papandreou is partially a screen to placate the far left in light of the continued existence of the U.S. facilities in Greece. Coulombis sums up the realities of the bases negotiations in several succinct statements. Talking about the bases negotiations under the Karamanlis Government, he points out that "...for Greece, a bases agreement with the United States remained the most important available bargaining chip that it could link to other important objectives such as re-entry into NATO (on acceptable terms) and the U.S. aid balance to Greece and Turkey." [Ref. 2, p. 113] Later, speaking of Papandreou's policies, he points out that "on the most vital issue as far as the United States is concerned, the maintenance and continued operation of U. S. bases in Greece, Papandreou also adopted an approach that was built upon the Rallis government's position.... Papandreou's main concern has been that the bases be used to mutual advantage, that Greece would retain enough control over them..., and that future operations of these bases would be linked to modernization of Greece's defense establishment

in a fashion that would not disturb the military equilibrium in the Aegean...." [Ref. 2, p. 149]

B. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

It has become apparent from the data presented in this thesis that a survey of the policies over the last ten years indicates that there has been little concrete or drastic change resulting from the change from an alleged "rightist" government to one said to be "leftist." Indeed, it seems that generally, the parties, irrespective of their ideological heritage or programs, have generally seen fit to modify their positions on the basis of some other force. Thus, we have a New Democracy government, generally considered to be pro-West and right-wing, withdrawing its troops from NATO, threatening the closure of U.S. facilities in Greece, establishing firm and long-lasting relations with the Eastern Bloc, and generally taking a non-conservative attitude with regard to its security policies and relationships. On the other hand, we see the leader of PASOK move from being a violently anti-West, far-left oriented ideologue in opposition, to a position of authority. In office, he has adopted positions essentially comparable to those of his predecessor, preserving the basic Western orientation of the country, pragmatically using the available resources to achieve advantage for Greece without destroying any of the basic structure of its foreign or security policy. To account for this, there must be another force within Greek policy formation which transcends political ideologies and governs policy practices, disregarding political labels and leading the party practices to converge on a central nationalist, Western-oriented track.

The concept I find useful here comes from the political scientist Roy Makridis. When he speaks generally of the

Greek political situation, he attempts to deal with a concept he labels the "Mediterranean Profile." [Ref. 3, p. 2] Referring to the characteristics of the nations of the Mediterranean littoral, he describes the instability and the problems of development of the nations which are in the midst of the modernization process. To study this developmental profile, according to Makridis, one needs to evaluate the process and progress of modernization from two basic angles, economic (associated with social), and political. Although these two are intricately interrelated, it is the latter which is of interest here. Makridis is thinking mainly of internal political matters when he further divides the political modernization concept into three basic divisions: "(1) participation and participatory mechanisms including the formation of national and integrative political parties, (2) the development of rational governmental and bureaucratic structures, and (3) regime-acceptance--legitimacy." [Ref. 3, p. 3]

However, when one is considering security policy in relation to internal politics, which essentially deals with how the specific country relates to its international political environment, these divisions take on additional meaning. For a country in a developing stage and not self sufficient, the establishment and maintenance of participatory mechanisms and participation in the extra-national community and the further development of policies which will integrate it into the larger community in a manner which is acceptable both to the domestic perceptions of the country's role and to the realities of the international system, become imperatives in the maturing process of the state as member of this community. Penniman's second point applies more to the process of internal change with which the two major parties have been struggling. The maturation process in Greece has meant the modernization and rationalization of

the governmental structure, which has lagged far behind internal social and economic reality. It is precisely the resistance to change of these governmental institutions which was partially responsible for the downfall of the New Democracy government and is proving difficult to change for PASOK. On the other hand, it is precisely these institutions which the policy must coordinate with and secure.

However, it has been shown, I believe, in the last ten years in Greece, that with the destruction of the far-left after the civil war in 1949 and self-destruction of the far right with the fall of the junta in 1974, that Greece is generally in a new stage of political development. The political center has become the predominant force and the source of political power. It is this mass of opinion which I believe best expresses the slow movement toward maturity of a state. It can be seen as a broad belt moving upward on a graph, toward which policies tend and toward which the political parties gravitate if they wish to maintain the support needed to survive in a democratic society. In the past, non-democratic forces basically prevented the fulfillment of this process, and thus created the typical instability and praetorianism of developing nations. However, it appears that no nation can remain static, and basic movement toward a mature, stable state definition continues to occur. For the developing nations, this movement expresses itself internationally as well as internally as mutual acceptance of and by the domestic and international regime or what Makridis labels as legitimacy. It is this concept which speaks most strongly to the present Greek situation.

Each country develops and matures at its own rate. However, in the "free world" a pattern seems to be consistent and almost unavoidable. It appears that Greece has gone through many of the common stages, that of colonial subjugation, of revolution, of monarchy and dependence, of

chaotic centrifugal political developments, of dictatorship and finally of consensus. It is this last stage in which I believe legitimacy becomes most important. It is in this stage where the country tries to become a truly independent actor and in which it is imperative in a democracy to have the majority support of the people. Thus the developments of the last ten years show not the former political acrobatics of Greek politics but a trend toward the attempt to complete the final stages of state legitimization. Thus we see leaders, disregarding their apparent political differences, attempting to accomplish the same general goal. The need of the modernization process in Greece appears to be political stabilization, elimination of the dependency which frustrates the desires of the populace, and securing for the state a legitimate, respected and secure position within the world community. Thus pragmatism dictates that the leaders of Greece guide the country from being acted upon to being an actor in the international community. This requires that Greece be integrated with international regimes while maintaining the political and economic strength to stay viable as an entity. It is, then, this drive for national legitimacy that I believe is behind the policies of Greece and forms the basis for its security policy, not the programs of the party ideologues. Bounds of legitimacy have been set within the areas of both domestic and international tolerance, and while rhetoric may occasionally exceed these bounds for political expediency, it is politically dangerous to proceed outside these vague limits in action. Thus, we have seen that there is a central tendency within Greek politics which matches policy formation and which is dictated by external and internal political, economic and social realities which are part of the modernization process.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The political changes that have taken place in Greece since 1974 have at times been cause for alarm within Western and U.S. policy making circles. Indeed, the most recent pronouncements of the Greek Prime Minister have caused a small uproar within the alliance and have done considerable violence to United States public perceptions of Greece as an ally. One therefore naturally questions the direction in which Greece may be heading. It has been the purpose of this study to explore in detail the political developments in Greece as they relate to the formation of Greek security policy and therefore the Greek role within the Western political and security regimes. It has been found that despite the at times hyperbolic rhetoric coming from the leading politicians in Greece, their domestic political support seems to be coming from the political center. This is a sign of a trend toward political stability within a country which has in the past been plagued by every manner of political chaos and exploitation. It is apparent that the true political extremes of right and left have been relegated to a peripheral role. The two major parties have vied for the center votes and have sought to maintain their support by following very similar policies regarding important facets of Greek internal and foreign policy.

It is therefore apparent that of greatest importance is not the proclaimed ideologies of the parties in question but their actions in trying to move Greece into the modern era as an independent and legitimate actor. The overriding forces of nationalism, independence and development are characteristic of countries which are trying to shed their former client or protectorate status and move toward playing

an equal role within the international environment, while expressing the needs and desires of a populace which is rapidly pushing toward modernization. The basic needs of this stage of development have been perceived by the political structure, and it has begun to respond. The positive result is that Greece is apparently maturing into a stable democratic state, responsive to the needs of its people and aware of the international forces which must be considered in the formation of its policies. The unfortunate side of this development is that it has met with difficulties arising from unresolved conflicts within the region which in the Greek perception continue to threaten the integrity of the state, and from problems of economic development which are aggravated by the so-called Aegean arms race. This has caused the policies of Athens to diverge at times from those of its allies, and has resulted in tense relations between Greece and the United States.

The fact remains, though, that in defense planning no critic or commentator has ever denied the strategic importance of Greece to the West and to NATO. As Veremis points out, "If Greece were lost to NATO the implications to the Alliance would be serious:--the continuity of defence in the Southern Region would be disrupted, --the defence of neighboring countries would become untenable, --the Middle East would be isolated from the West." [Ref. 1, p. 72] Indeed, while even most Greek commentators admit that Turkey may be overall even more important to the Alliance, the defense of that ally would be much more difficult if Greece were lost to the West. If Greece were to sever its relationship with the West, the results would be unpredictable for both the NATO alliance and for the general stability of the Balkan region. What has been shown by this study, however, is that this eventuality is highly unlikely, barring other major changes in the international situation. Even Prime Minister

Papandreou, at times extremely critical of the United States and NATO, predicates any drastic change in the Greek-West relationship on the unlikely eventuality of the total dissolution of the East-West division in Europe. It is therefore apparent that we can expect no drastic changes in security relations with Greece or in Greek security policy. What must be realized, however, is that NATO was formed during considerably different circumstances than exist today and that Greece acceded to the alliance under vastly different internal and external conditions. What we must expect, then, is that no state can remain static and that its policies and relationships must change with other aspects of its development. It is therefore apparent that Greece is not trying to destroy its relations with the West but to change them to coincide more with domestic and international priorities and realities. The political change in Greece therefore has not been the crisis that some foresaw. What is apparent from this study of the past ten years of Greek policy, is that Greece seeks to deal with what it perceives as the realities of its existence while seeking the most benefit for Greece. It therefore seeks redefinition of the relationship with its allies and within the European community which will take into consideration special Greek problems and needs. This seems to follow the pattern of the growing North-South debate which has begun to have effects within Europe.

To those who fear the dissolution of the alliance and the impending fall of Europe, perhaps this study is instructive. Greece, for all its vacillations, remains tied to the NATO alliance, Athens is represented in the EC and continues to play an active role in the organization, Greece still retains strong defense ties with the United States, the military facilities of the United States now operate under a new agreement with the Socialist government and Greece has

taken no drastic action to force a solution of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus issues but has rather relied upon the U.N. and other negotiations to try to solve the problems. Indeed, it is probably an indication of the strength and success of NATO that Greece has felt secure to pursue its national and regional interests to such an extent. If Greece is to remain a strong member of the Western community, then, given the present international situation, it must foresee an advantage gained by this association in the amelioration of regional and internal issues.

For the United States I believe that this study has made its policy course more clear. It is apparent that it is not necessarily beneficial to dwell solely on political rhetoric or react too strongly to political ideologies. It is probably more important to attend to the underlying forces within a country--those forces which are trying to lead the country into the modern age as an independent actor which can provide for the needs of its people and play an important and productive role in the international community. For Greece this means the reduction of the perceived threat from its ally Turkey, a diminution of the perception of fear for the sovereignty of its Aegean island territories, the solution to what is thought of as the unjust derogation of the rights of the Hellenic community in Cyprus and the alteration of the national status of that country. Finally, the course must be toward a policy which aids in the strengthening of the country economically and politically with sufficient attention to assistance which would insure the further development of a stable economy and government. These are the imperatives of Greek policy and Greek security revolves around them, not around the superpower concerns of global bipolar politics. The apparent stalemate in the global balance of power has made other concerns come to the fore within the various regions. Predicated on the general

stability of the global balance, regional concerns must be taken into consideration. We must realize that we cannot expect a small, developing country such as Greece to have the same priorities for policy formation as a large developed country like the United States. However, we can expect that our allies will also show some sympathy for the priorities we must consider in formation of our policies. In the final analysis, if the basic needs of each country and the basic priorities were better understood and put into proper perspective, it would be simpler to form a more mutually beneficial relationship. This study has shown that behind the actions of the various governments of Greece in the past ten years, there has been a consistent set of national priorities based on national aspirations and perceptions which have determined the concrete policies (those put into practice). It is this level which must be considered in forming our policy toward Greece.

In a recent report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign relations, it was stated that the central issue in the continuing viability of NATO is:

whether, under today's conditions, the alliance will be able to accommodate U.S. and European differences in a way that rehabilitates NATO's role as the coordinating mechanism for Western security policies. The answer will depend in part on how well the United States and the allies understand the factors that lead to policy and perceptual differences. Any new consensus which fails to acknowledge that there are fundamental differences will be doomed to obsolescence....[Ref. 2, p.1]

This same report continues by pointing out that it is important to understand that "divergent perspectives are not the product of malicious intent or irrational reactions. They derive from profound and, to some extent, immutable factors over which leaders on either side of the Atlantic have little control." [Ref. 2, p. 29] This is, of course, referring to underlying realities within the nations. It is not

to say that the double standard between political rhetoric and actual policy, such as is exhibited in Greece quite often, is not ultimately dangerous. It can create undesirable imperatives where the leaders become victims of their own rhetoric in order not to lose an artificially generated support based on false perceptions. This has and continues to be a particularly persistent problem among Western allies and cannot but weaken relations.

It has been the intent of this study to point out exactly this fact and serve as a basis for consideration of possible alternatives in Greek-American relations. It has been shown that the security policies of the Greek governments have in practice shown consistencies based on the realities of the Greek situation-- domestic, regional and international. It is these basic developmental needs which must be attended to (by allies and Greek leaders) if a mutually beneficial relationship between Greece and its allies is to be continued. One would expect that, were more assistance brought to bear on the underlying sources of economic, political and territorial threat perception, Greece could divert more of its attention to more long-term security considerations.

In summary, this study has provided a great deal of specific information on the basic security policies of the two major Greek political parties, New Democracy (1974-81) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, 1981-present). It has shown that despite the apparently great divergence of ideologies which some observers like to point out, there has essentially been a confluence of policy which has corresponded to the general preferences of the populace in its perceptions of priorities for Greece. It is instructive that this seems to indicate a political maturation which tends toward political centrality and tends to preclude arbitrary policy formation.

Finally, as was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, to get an accurate perspective on the totality of the security issues discussed, one would be forced to consider them from other points of view. This of course is the major dilemma of the United States and NATO in policy formation-- that the regional actors tend to mirror each other in their needs and policies. However, the general findings of this study are applicable to many diverse situations and locales; that is, in forming policy one must search for the deeper concerns and forces which motivate policy formation in democratic countries. To deal with these is to provide meaningful assistance and build lasting and secure relationships, to ignore them is to risk disaffection and pave the way for growing difficulties and dilemmas and ultimately policy failure and crisis--similar to the situation in 1974. The latter scenario should not be repeated.

APPENDIX A

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE NO. 180

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE ON PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE FUTURE UNITED STATES-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION, April 15, 1976. 33

The Governments of Greece and the U.S. will complete as soon as possible a new defense cooperation agreement to replace the 1953 U.S.-Greek military facilities agreement and other related agreements. The U.S. Government will submit this agreement to Congress for approval.

II. The new agreement will be designed to modernize the U.S.-Greek defense relationship reflecting the traditionally close association between the U.S. and Greece and the mutuality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic Alliance.

III. This new agreement will define the status and set forth the terms for operations of military installations in Greece where U.S. personnel are present. It will be similar to the U.S. Turkish agreement and will embody, inter alia the following principles:

(1.) Each installation will be a Greek military installation under a Greek Commander.

(2.) The installations shall serve only purposes authorized by the Government of Greece. Their activities shall be carried out on the basis of Mutually agreed programs.

³³The text is taken from Annex K, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, Report for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, 95th. Congress, 1st. Session, March 27, 1977, p. 87. (Not Original Format.)

(3.) There shall be participation of Greek personnel up to 50% of the total strength required for agreed joint technical operations and related maintenance activities and services of the facilities and there shall be provisions for the training of such personnel for this purpose.

(4.) All intelligence information including raw data produced by the installations shall be shared fully by the two Governments according to mutually agreed procedures. A joint use plan for the U.S. forces communications system in Greece shall be agreed upon.

(5.) The agreement shall remain in effect for four years and there shall be provisions for the termination thereof before its expiration, as well as for its renewal.

(6.) Within this framework there shall be annexes to this agreement covering each major installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion), the U.S. element at the Hellenikon Greek Air Base, as well as annexes dealing with status of forces (SOFA) and command and control.

(7.) The annex covering Souda Bay will be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay agreement. Meanwhile it is understood that U.S. operations at this airfield will be in accordance with the 1959 agreement.

(8.) It is understood that, pending the conclusion of the new agreement within a reasonable time, U.S. operations now being conducted from facilities in Greece, which serve mutual defense interests, will be allowed to continue.

IV. As an integral part of the new defense cooperation agreement, provision will be made for a four-year commitment

to Greece of military assistance totaling 700 million dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. This commitment will be designed to further develop the defense preparedness of Greece and meet its defense needs in pursuit of North Atlantic Alliance goals.

APPENDIX B

GREECE-UNITED STATES DECA, 8 SEPTEMBER, 1983

AUTHOR'S NOTE:

This is reprinted from the text sent to the author directly from the U.S. Department of State. Format is similar to the original but not an exact duplicate for typographical reasons.

AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

ARTICLE I

The parties intend by this Agreement to restructure their defense and economic cooperation based on their existing bilateral arrangements and multilateral agreements, and in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and full respect for the sovereignty, independence and interests of each country.

ARTICLE II

1. In the furtherance of the purposes of this Agreement, the Government of the Hellenic Republic authorises the Government of the United States to maintain and

operate military and supporting facilities in Greece (hereinafter referred to as the facilities) and to carry out missions and activities at these facilities for defense purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. These facilities, missions and activities shall be those identified and described under the Annex to this Agreement.

2. The major items of equipment, arms and ammunition located at the facilities shall be identified to Greek authorities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Any expansion, change, modernization or replacement thereof which will alter the mission capabilities of such facilities shall be subject to the prior concurrence of the Government of the Hellenic Republic.

3. The missions and activities authorized by this Agreement and its Annex include the performance of technical operations at the facilities. Such technical operations and related activities shall be manned by United States personnel.

ARTICLE III

1. The status of the United States forces, members of the force, members of the civilian component, and dependents shall be governed by the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces: and related bilateral arrangements between the Governments of the Hellenic Republic and the United States of America.

2. Members of the force, members of the civilian component, and dependents shall be recognized to have this capacity only upon being officially announced to the Greek

authorities, who will issue special identification cards signed by the competent Greek authorities.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of the Hellenic Republic shall assign Greek personnel to each of the facilities. The senior Greek official so assigned to each facility shall be designated as the Greek representative. The Greek Representative will exercise command and control of Greek personnel, and the premises used exclusively by them, at each facility. The Greek Representative shall be responsible for liaison and coordination with appropriate Greek authorities to include those responsible for the security of, and maintenance of order on, the perimeter of the facility. The Greek Representative will be responsible to report to the Greek authorities on the implementation and observance of the provisions of this Agreement relating to the facilities.

2. The Commander of the United States forces at each facility shall exercise command and control over the facility and personnel of the United States assigned thereto, including their equipment and material and the premises used by them, and shall provide for the security and safety thereof.

3. The Greek Representative and the Commander of the United States forces shall, as required, report through their respective authorities to the Joint Commission established pursuant to Article VI of this Agreement and submit any questions or differences concerning interpretation or implementation of the Agreement or other arrangements to the Joint Commission.

ARTICLE V

1. With the exception of national cryptographic (code) rooms, and Greek Representative shall have access to all areas where technical operations and other United States activities are performed shall be on a non-routine basis and in accordance with agreed procedures.

2. The location of national cryptographic rooms and classified areas will be identified by the two Parties, and any change thereafter will be as mutually agreed.

ARTICLE VI

A joint Commission will be established to deal with and to resolve if possible any question or difference which may arise concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Agreement. Any issue not resolved shall be dealt with by the two Governments.

ARTICLE VII

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be in derogation of the inherent right of the Government of the Hellenic Republic under international law to take immediately all appropriate restrictive measures required to safeguard its vital national security interests in an emergency.

2. In the event that, in the view of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, such an emergency exists, the appropriate Greek and United States authorities shall immediately

enter into communication concerning such measures. This process of communication shall not derogate from the right referred to in paragraph 1.

ARTICLE VIII

In accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and consistent with its constitutional procedures, the United States shall assist in the modernization and maintenance of Greek defense capabilities through the provision of defense support to the Government of the Hellenic Republic. Such United States assistance shall also be guided by the principle set forth in United States law that calls for preserving the balance of military strength in the region.

ARTICLE IX

1. The Governments of the Hellenic Republic and the United States will seek opportunities to cooperate in the research, development, production and procurement of appropriate defense materiel as well as in the related logistic support. Both Parties undertake to encourage joint investment in the aforementioned areas and to devote particular attention to promoting new cooperative projects and reciprocal procurement of defense materiel.

2. For this purpose the Government of the United States shall assist the Government of the Hellenic republic in mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing and research, development, production, maintenance, repair and modernization of defense materiel and equipment in Greece and at

assisting the Hellenic defense industry, and will encourage new defense production projects and two-way trade in defense materiel.

3. Both Governments intend to facilitate the mutual flow of defense procurement for their armed forces, aimed at assuring a long-term equitable balance in their exchanges.

4. The Governments will permit the sale of defense equipment produced under license, co-production agreements and/or joint development projects to allied countries and to appropriate third countries, subject to the prior written agreement of the government that made available the defense articles or technical data.

5. Acquisition of items of defense equipment developed or produced by either Party shall be on the most economical terms and based on competitive contracting procedures, and based on agreed procedures for defense industrial cooperation.

6. The Parties shall promptly develop a framework agreement to facilitate the achievement of the purposes of this Article.

ARTICLE X

The two Governments, considering the relationship between defense capability and economic growth and stability, will exert maximum efforts to develop cooperative economic, industrial, scientific and technological relations between the two countries, including mutually agreed United States technical assistance and, as conditions warrant, other assistance.

ARTICLE XI

1. Procedural and implementing arrangements called for under this Agreement, as well as such other arrangements as the Parties deem necessary for the purposes of, and otherwise consistent with, this Agreement, shall be addressed by the Parties, through the Joint Commission as appropriate.

2. All terms and conditions relating to the use of facilities under arrangements existing as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement shall, to the extent consistent with this Agreement and its Annex, continue in force until modified or terminated by agreement, through the Joint Commission as appropriate. Previous bilateral arrangements related to the purposes of this Agreement shall be submitted at the initiative of either Party to the Joint Commission for review and mutual consideration. This process of review will be completed within one year of the signature of this Agreement. If necessary this period can be extended by the Parties.

ARTICLE XII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force no later than December 31, 1983 upon an exchange of notes between the Parties indicating that their respective constitutional requirements have been satisfied. This Agreement is terminable after five years upon written notice by either Party to be given five months prior to the date upon which termination is to take effect.

2. The Government of the United States shall have a period of seventeen months commencing of the effective date

of termination within which to carry out the withdrawal of United States personnel, property and equipment from Greece. All terms and conditions pursuant to this Agreement shall apply during such period.

Done in Athens, this 8th day of September, 1983, in duplicate, in the Greek and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(signed)

ALAN D. BERLIND

Charge d'Affairs ad interim

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

(Signed)

YIANNIS P. CAPSIS

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

ANNEX

IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

A. Article I of the Agreement

This annex is pursuant to Article XI of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement) and shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Agreement.

B. Article II of the Agreement

1. Consistent with the purposes of the Agreement and pursuant of Article II thereof, the Government of the United States is authorized to maintain and operate the military and supporting facilities currently used by the Government of the United States under existing arrangements, as identified below:

a. Nea Makri Naval Communications Station Complex, consisting of : Headquarters, support and operational complex at Nea Makri; transmitting site and microwave reflector at Kato Souli; and water facilities at Marathon.

b. Iraklion Communications Station Complex, Crete, consisting of: Headquarters, support and operational complex at Gournes; transmitting site at Hani Kokkini; and water facilities at Mallia.

c. Souda Air Base, Crete, consisting of: Headquarters, support and operational complex (including the naval communications detachment).

d. Hellenikon Air Base, consisting of: Headquarters, support and operational complex at Hellenikon Airbase; dependent educational facilities at Bari and Glyfada and child care facility at Sourmena; exchange facilities, including annexes at Glyfada and Kastri, administrative offices at Argyroupolis and warehouse and open storage areas at Aegalecs; commissary facilities, including commissary store at Neos Kosmos, warehousing and cold storage areas at Pireaus and administrative offices at Glyfada; contracting offices at Argyroupolis; and Military Transportation Terminal facilities at Pireaus.

e. Nodal Communications Sites, consisting of: Facilities on Mount Pateras, Mount Parnis, Mount Hortiatis and Mount Ederi, and on Lefkas Island.

2. Pursuant to Article II of the Agreement, the Government of the United States is authorized to carry out, at the facilities identified above, the missions and activities currently being carried out under existing arrangements, as identified below:

- a. Nea Makri Naval Communications Station Complex
- Communications for command and control and administration primarily for United States forces in the Mediterranean region.
 - Supporting administrative, communications (intra-and extra-station), and logistic activities.

- b. Iraklion Communications Station Complex
 - Communications and scientific research and analysis and communication of data.
 - Supporting administrative, communications (intra- and extra-station), including local AFRTS present services, and logistic activities.
- c. Souda Air Base
 - Operations, maintenance and support of United States maritime Patrol Aircraft.
 - Operations, maintenance and support of airborne logistic support missions.
 - Use as a carrier aircraft divert airfield.
 - Storage, maintenance and assembly of prepositioned mine stockpiles.
 - Storage and maintenance of conventional munitions.
 - Communications
 - Supporting administrative and logistic activities.
- d. Hellenikon Air Base Complex
 - Operations, maintenance and support of airlift and logistic support, including associated terminal facilities.
 - Stationing, operations, maintenance and support of United States liaison aircraft.
 - Operations, maintenance and support of reconnaissance aircraft and conduct of technical ground processing.
 - Communications, including ARFTS present services.
Administrative and logistic support.
- e. Nodal Communications Sites
 - Operation and maintenance of ground-to-ground and ground-to-air relay communications.

- Administrative, communications (including television relay at Ederi) and logistic support.

3. Flight activities associated with the military and supporting facilities shall be in accordance with the Technical Arrangement dated November 17, 1977.

C. Article III of the Agreement

1. Status of forces arrangements between the United States and Greece shall be implemented in the same manner and spirit with which such arrangements are generally applied by States Party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. With respect to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction:

a. The Hellenic Republic recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by the United States military authorities over the members of the force and the effect which such control has upon operational readiness. The competent Greek authorities, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, paragraph 3 (c) of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, will therefore except in cases they consider of particular importance to them, in conformity with their sovereign discretionary right, give expeditious and favorable consideration to the waiver of their criminal jurisdiction upon request of the United States forces.

b. Requests by the United States authorities for a waiver by Greece of its criminal jurisdiction shall be processed in accordance with the following procedures:

(1.) A request shall be presented within a period of thirty (30) days from the date the United States military authorities become aware of the

initiation of criminal proceedings against an accused, to the Joint Commission established under Article VI of the Agreement.

(2.) The request shall be reviewed by the Joint Commission which shall submit a recommendation to the competent Greek authority within fifteen (15) days from the submission of the request.

(3.) The competent Greek authority shall make a decision on the request within thirty (30) days of receipt.

(4.) If Greek authorities do not waive their jurisdiction, the case will be given preferential treatment to complete the judicial proceedings in the shortest possible time in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 9 (a) of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.

3. With respect to custody of members of the United States forces:

a. The provisions of Greek law pertaining to pretrial detention or requiring confinement of the accused shall be discharged until the conclusion of all judicial proceedings by a duly executed certificate of the United States military authorities assuring the appearance of the member of the force before the competent Greek judicial authorities in any proceedings that may require the presence of such person.

b. When a member of the force has been convicted by a Greek court and an unsuspended sentence to confinement is adjudged, the United States military authorities shall maintain custody over the accused in Greece until the conclusion of all appellate proceedings.

4. With respect to the definition of civilian component:
- a. The term "civilian component" as defined in Article I, paragraph 1 (b) of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which may include dependents, shall also mean employees of a non-Greek and non-commercial organization who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in the United States and who, solely for the purpose of contributing to the welfare, morale or education of the force, are accompanying those forces in Greece, and non-Greek persons employed by United States contractors directly serving the United States forces in Greece. The number of positions for personnel to be accorded the status of members of the civilian component by virtue of this paragraph shall not exceed twenty-five (25) more than those established as of June 1, 1983 without the express consent of the Government of the Hellenic Republic. Such personnel shall not be considered as having the status of members of the civilian component for the purpose of Article VIII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
 - b. Resident documents or work permits shall not be required for the employment of members of the civilian component in connection with the facilities.

5. With respect to labor provisions:
- a. For each facility or activity, two schedules of positions shall be established, one for Greek personnel and the other for United States personnel, reflecting the number of positions under each category as of June 1, 1983. Any changes in excess of 3% to the proportionality reflected in these schedules will be mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

b. Pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 4, of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the standards contained in Greek labor legislation regarding conditions of employment and work, in particular wages, supplementary payments and conditions for the protection of employees as applied in the private sector, will be observed with respect to Greek nationals employed in Greece by the United States.

6. With respect to personal tax exemptions:

With respect to Article X, and in accordance with Article I, paragraph 2, of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, members of the force and of the civilian component shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar charges in Greece on the ownership, possession, use, transfer amongst themselves, or transfer by death of their tangible movable property imported into Greece or acquired there for their own personal use. One motor vehicle owned by a member of the force or of the civilian component shall be exempt from Greek circulation taxes, registration or license fees, and similar charges.

7. With respect to contracting:

The United States forces may award contracts to commercial enterprises for services or construction projects in Greece. In accordance with its laws and regulations, the United States forces may procure directly from any source; however, they shall utilize Greek contractors to the maximum extent feasible for the performance of construction projects.

8. In accordance with Article XI of the Agreement, it is the intention of the Parties to conclude a unified technical arrangement which will incorporate the provisions set forth in this Annex and modernize previous agreements and practices concerning the status of the United States forces in Greece.

D. Article IV of the Agreement

The responsibilities of the appropriate Greek authorities for the security of, and maintenance of order on, the perimeter of the facility stipulated in Article IV (1) of the Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with agreed procedures. The liaison and coordination responsibilities of the Greek Representative under that Article shall include liaison and coordination with customs, law enforcement, labor, immigration and municipal officials. .

E. Article V of the Agreement

The agreed procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall include case-by-case authorization by high Greek authority, identification and appropriate clearance of the individual, proper protection of the information gained during access, and prior notification.

F. Article VI of the Agreement

1. Both parties shall designate military and diplomatic representatives to the Joint Commission.

2. In addition to such other functions as may be mutually agreed, the Joint Commission shall receive information from the Greek Representatives and the Commanders of United States forces at the facilities; address any questions or differences concerning interpretation or implementation these officials may submit; and transmit agreed guidance to these officials through the respective Greek and United States chains of command.

G. Article IX of the Agreement

The long-term equitable balance in the mutual flow of defense procurement for the armed forces of both Governments, referred to in paragraph 3, shall take into consideration the relative technological level of such procurement and be consistent with their national policies.

Done in Athens, this 8th day of September, 1983, in duplicate, in the Greek and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(signed)

ALAN D. BERLIND

Charge d'Affairs ad interim

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

(signed)

YIANNIS P. CAPSIS

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

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