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GEN. WASHINGTON takes Command of the
American Army at Cambridge July 3^d 1775.

Tisdale Sc.

GEN. WASHINGTON.

Engrav'd for C. Smith N-YORK.

THE
MONTHLY
MILITARY REPOSITORY.

RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED
TO
THE MILITARY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

By CHARLES SMITH.

VOL. I.



NEW-YORK:

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—1796.—

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Editor begs leave to inform his readers of the sources from which he means to draw the materials of the present Work.

Some rare and valuable manuscripts with which he has been favoured, will furnish him with a copious supply of original matter:

Extracts will be made from the histories of the several wars in Europe, and particularly of the battles of the late king of Prussia:

Of the principal battles and actions fought during the American revolution, descriptions will be given, accompanied with engraved military plans, designed by officers that were present at those actions:

Extracts will also be made from military Works of merit, in divers languages, and of every thing interesting in the several military periodical publications of

Berlin, Hanover and Paris, illustrated, when the subject requires it, by plans, &c. To which will be added, occasionally, the lives and heroic actions of the several brave commanders of the present age.

The Work will be enlivened with anecdotes, with history and historic plates; but nothing will be introduced that is trifling or unimportant in itself.

The Editor will be thankful for any hints of improvement, or valuable papers, that may be communicated to him.



THE

MILITARY REPOSITORY.

ON THE ADVANTAGE OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE TO THE
MILITARY.

IT has been asserted by some writers, that, by a false application of theory, a commanding officer may do more harm than good, and that he has little occasion for extensive knowledge, provided he has a good adjutant. A great extent of knowledge in a subaltern, they likewise say, may create discontent and envy, leading him to arraign the conduct of his commander, dispute his orders, and thus destroy subordination. An enlightened, well-informed subaltern, they continue, will thus become sensible of the unimportance of his own inferior station, and be discouraged at it; besides, an acquaintance with the finer arts, and a scientific knowledge, will so far refine his ideas, as to enervate his mind, and render him almost unfit for the field; and the standard-bearer's sense of his own insignificance, will lower that military pride, in which he otherwise would glory.

We will admit that the growing fire of the youthful warrior may have been thus, occasionally, damped; but it is certain, the more the soldiery are enlightened, the less frequently such consequences will occur. Some are of opinion, that any other branch of literature but what tends to the utility of a military life, must be so much loss of time; but this is not universally the case. If we instruct a soldier in moral duties, we teach him to be brave; for nothing, surely, has a greater tendency to render him courageous than to make him a good christian, and of course not afraid to die. If we teach him the duties of a citizen, he will naturally stand up in defence of his country and of liberty, and his breast will glow with patriotic warmth. If in every garrison there be a good military police; if nothing be there allowed against the rules of the service; if the field officers be but affable and condescending to the subalterns,

receive them as friends, and join them in their diversions and amusements, it will inspire them with mutual confidence, and induce them to act as one confederate body. There are many little duties connected with the military character, not so unimportant as they may seem to be. The better informed an officer is, the more he will see, that many things which the ignorant call trifling in his profession, do not deserve that appellation. No one would extol Newton or Locke for having been able to read; but would they have been such luminaries of the world, had they not first learnt to read?

A foldier, we will allow, may be considered as a piece of mechanism; so is a clock; but a clock will never go, unless wound up and put in motion. The centinel, even in time of peace, should be as diligent as if the house beside him was an out post of the enemy; and in time of war, as quiet as if before the guard of his own garrison. Both these habits are acquired by practice.

Though a foldier be a piece of mechanism in some respects, yet he is a man, a citizen, a husband, a father, and a friend. He becomes sometimes a commander, sometimes a military judge, and is often employed in civil life, in matters of importance; surely, all this requires that an officer should not only be taught the duties of a military life, but those of humanity also, and have a general knowledge of men and things. According to military law, every officer is judge of a foldier's crime or misdemeanor; and, can he decide on this without a knowledge of natural rights, and the morality of actions? It is necessary, therefore, that, whilst he is made acquainted with the duties of a foldier, he should be instructed in those of civil life; they should go hand in hand.

The business of a commanding officer is of great extent; his duty requires him to correspond with the first men of the country; to take care of his men, quarter them properly; and, in order to victual them well, he should be acquainted with the district he is in, and the productions, not only of the spot where he is, but of the places adjacent; he should know well the laws of the country, its national and natural situation. He should, by his own conduct, give such an example to the whole body of officers under his command, as would make them useful to their country, zealous in its service, esteemed by foreigners, and beloved by their fellow citizens; but, this can be done only by enlightening their minds, extending their knowledge, by practice, prudence, military strictness, fatherly admonition and an unblemished character.

Subordination is the very soul of military life; but an officer will, notwithstanding, execute the orders of his general with more alacrity, if he has reason to look up to his personal merits, and admire his virtues; not only the officer, but the private, will advance with greater intrepidity against the enemy, when convinced that his commander does not leave him to the chance of events, but ventures an action only with a moral certainty of success, or where necessity urges him to a desperate blow. The more enlightened an officer is, the more military knowledge he has acquired, the more contented will he remain in a lower station, until an opportunity of promotion offers. Knowledge of the world will teach him, that in the arrangement of things he must ever support a certain chain of connection, and cannot always fill the posts he would aspire to; for a great and noble mind, which every officer should possess, will pride itself more in having the knowledge of a general with the rank of a coronet, than to carry a marshal's staff with the abilities of a corporal.

The more a young officer studies, the more he will feel the want of that knowledge, necessary to make him an able general. Even among the privates, it is not what a soldier learns from the articles of war that can inspire him with a sense of duty; it is a due and impartial correction, an indefatigable attention in the commanding officer to the comfort and protection of his men, and a regular and unfailing supply for their daily wants. In short, where is the man without principle, without knowledge of his profession, that can discharge his duty as he ought?

There is no subaltern but looks forward to a command at some future time. Even the serjeant, as the chief of his guard, has many duties of a commander to perform. It must, therefore, be allowed, that an officer should be acquainted with the laws of war, and the knowledge of that profession he has taken up; nay, the honor of arms requires this of him, and when peace allows him to sheathe the sword, it must be a source of satisfaction to him to feel, that he has acquitted himself well in the service of his country, and can return with well-earned laurels, amidst the acclamations of his fellow citizens.

THE AMERICAN WAR, FROM 1775 TO 1783.

THE end I design in a part of this work, is to lay before my readers, with exactness, plans of the principal battles fought during the late American war. The reader is not to expect long historical details. I shall confine myself in the narrative to those explanations only, which are necessary to combine the great events. In voluminous works, in vain we seek descriptions that give clear, satisfactory ideas of battles; the chief part of those works are little else than compilations from public papers, and breathe, like them, a party spirit.

It is from facts and from events only, that we should decide on the merit or demerit of the actors. Of such facts and events I shall treat in the most simple manner; without remarks, without observations, without reasoning, and consequently without partiality.

INTRODUCTION.

THE discovery of America by Columbus, in 1492, has justly been ranked among the greatest and most beneficial events in the history of nations.

The subsequent settlements under the influence and protection of Great Britain increased in number, wealth and resources, with an astonishing rapidity. In the short space of 150 years, their number increased to almost three millions, and their commerce to such a degree as to be more than one third of that of Great Britain. They also extended their territories 1500 miles on the sea-coast, and 300 miles to the westward. From their first settlement in America, the colonies were devoted to liberty, enjoying a government which was but little short of being independent. The question, where parliamentary supremacy ended, and at what point colonial dependency began, had never been agitated. These colonies united with Great Britain their arms in war, their commerce and councils in peace; and, under these favorable circumstances, advanced to the magnitude of a nation, while the greatest part of the globe was ignorant of their progress. Till after the war, from 1755 to 1763, in which the colonies were distinguished parties, the colonial regulations seemed to have no other object but commerce; but Great Britain now thought proper to change the ancient salutary

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MERRIMACK HILL,*

the 1775.

AMERICAN FORCES,

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system. New regulations were adopted, which consisted in restricting the former commerce of the colonies, and in subjecting them to the taxation of the British Parliament.

Opposition to the several acts of the British Parliament soon became general. Debates, controversies and acts, one repealing another, on the side of the British Parliament, and reasonings and opposition on that of the colonies, kept equal pace from 1764 to 1774. At this period every thing assumed a bolder aspect; a continental congress having been convened, they agreed upon a declaration of their rights. An address to the king and to the people of Great Britain, was also drawn up; different plans for conciliation were brought forward in the House of Commons, but men, accustomed to uncontrouled sway, are not easily brought to regulate their conduct by the simple rules of reason and of justice. Solid revenue and unlimited supremacy were the objects of Great Britain. To accomplish them, the immediate coercion of the colonies were resolved upon; Parliament agreed on an augmentation of their forces; the mercenary circles of Germany were ransacked to dragoon the colonies into unconditional submission; domestic insurrections were excited among slaves, whose price of freedom was the murder of their masters, and even the relentless savages were brought down upon their defenceless frontiers.

Commencement of Hostilities.

BATTLE OF BREED'S HILL.*

[WITH A PLAN.]

IN the beginning of 1774, general Gage, the new governor, arrived at Boston from England, followed by two regiments of foot, a detachment of artillery and some cannon, which afterwards were reinforced by others from Ireland, New-York, Halifax and Quebec. The Bostonians, who were thought to be the first and most conspicuous in the opposition, were singled out as the first objects of military operations. The new governor fortified the neck of land that joins Boston to the continent, and seized the provincial powder and military stores at Cambridge and Charlestown. Nothing of any consequence, however, happened till April 1775, when the preparations throughout the colonies, to oppose by force the execution of the obnoxious acts of Parliament, determined general

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A PLAN
of the
ACTION at BREEDS HILL,
on the 17th of June 1775.
Between the AMERICAN FORCES,
and
THE BRITISH TROOPS.
** Erroneously called Bunkers Hill.*



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Gage to seize and destroy every thing that was collected for the support of a provincial army. With this view he detached a party to Concord, which was opposed in their way by a party of Americans near Lexington. A skirmish ensued, the result of which was, that of the British troops 65 were killed and 174 wounded, and 24 made prisoners; and of the Americans 49 were killed, and 39 wounded and missing. The British troops, however, executed their commission.

After this action, which roused all America, not only the arms, ammunition and forts in the colonies were secured for the use of the provincials, but regular forces were raised. A considerable army was assembled in Massachusetts, which formed a line of encampment from Roxbury to Mistic River.

About the latter end of May a great part of the reinforcements ordered from Great Britain, arrived at Boston; three British generals, Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton, also arrived about the same time. General Gage, thus reinforced, prepared for action, but before he proceeded to extremities, he issued a proclamation, holding forth the alternative of peace, or war:—Menaces on the one side, and promises on the other.

Confidence among men is of a nature so delicate, that when once it is violated, it is seldom restored. British menaces and promises had by this time lost all influence. The blood of those who were killed at Lexington had proved the firm cement of an extensive union. The Americans supposing this proclamation to be a prelude to hostilities, prepared accordingly.

Adjacent to the peninsula of Boston, on the North, is another of similar form, called the peninsula of Charlestown: They are separated from one another by Charles River. Over against Boston on the north bank of this river, lies Charlestown. The peninsula of Charlestown being bounded on the North by the river Medford or Mistic, and on the east by Boston harbour, is entirely surrounded by navigable water, except where it is joined to the main land by an isthmus; in the centre of the peninsula rises an eminence, called Bunker's Hill, with an easy ascent from the isthmus, but steep on every other side; and at the bottom of this hill towards Boston stands Charlestown; Bunker's-Hill was sufficiently high to overlook any part of Boston, and near enough to be within cannon shot.

The possession of that eminence was a matter of great consequence to either of the contending parties. Orders were therefore

issued by the provincial commanders that a detachment of 1000 men should intrench upon Bunker's-Hill. They moved from Cambridge, passed by Charlestown neck, in silence, and reached the hill unobserved; but, by some mistake, the eminence called Breed's-Hill, situated on the furthest part of the peninsula, was marked out for the intrenchment instead of Bunker's-Hill. Here the provincials threw up a small redoubt about eight rods square, and an intrenchment, reaching to the bottom of the hill towards Mystic River, both of which they had nearly completed in the night time of the 16th of June; their works being in many places cannon-proof. (Plan No. 1. *a.*) Although the peninsula was almost surrounded with British ships of war and transports, the provincials carried on the work with such profound silence that they were not discovered till the morning; when, at break of day, the alarm was given at Boston by a cannonade, begun upon the American works from the Lively ship of war. A battery of six guns was soon afterwards opened upon them from Copp's-Hill, in Boston. The provincials bore this with great firmness, and continued at their works.

About noon, a detachment from the army was landed upon the peninsula of Charlestown, under the command of Major General Howe, and Brigadier General Pigot, with orders to drive the provincials from their works. The troops were formed without opposition as soon as they landed, (*b*) but the generals thought it necessary to apply for a reinforcement. While the troops were waiting for this reinforcement, the provincials, who occupied the left of the breast-work, and the open ground stretching to the water side, pulled up some adjoining posts and rail-fences, and set them down in two parallel lines at a small distance from each other, and filled the space between with hay, which, having been lately mowed, remained on the adjacent ground. (*c*)

When the reinforcement arrived, the whole detachment, consisting now of near 3000 men, the flower of the British army, formed in two lines, moved on towards the provincials, with the light infantry on the right wing, (*d*) commanded by Major-General Howe, and the grenadiers on the left, (*e*) by Brigadier-General Pigot; the former to attack the provincial lines, and the latter the redoubt.—The attack was begun by a sharp cannonade from some field pieces and howitzers, (*f*) the troops advancing slowly, and halting at intervals to give time for the artillery to produce some effect. The left wing in advancing, received orders to burn Charlestown, in order

to deprive the Americans of a cover in their approaches, which, by the assistance of carcasses thrown from Copp's hill, in Boston, was soon effected.

The British moving on but slowly, gave the provincials upon the hill behind their works a better opportunity for taking aim. They reserved their fire till their adversaries were within ten or twelve rods, but then began a furious and unremitting discharge of small arms. So incessant and so destructive was this continued blaze of musquetry, that the British line recoiled, and gave way in all parts. Major-General Howe, it is said, was for a few seconds left nearly alone, most of the officers who were about him, being either killed or wounded; and it required the utmost exertions in all the officers, from the general down to the subalterns, to repair the disorder which this hot and unexpected fire had produced. The British returned to the attack, but the provincials reserving themselves again, put their enemies a second time to flight. At this juncture, General Clinton, who had arrived from Boston during the engagement, was extremely serviceable in rallying the British troops. He brought them back to the charge. By this time, the powder of the Americans began so far to fail, that they were not able to keep up the same brisk fire as before. The inside of the breast-work was by some cannon balls raked from end to end, the fire from the ships, batteries and field artillery were redoubled, and the redoubt was attacked on three sides at once. Under these circumstances, a retreat from it was ordered.

While these operations were going on at the breast work and redoubt, the British light infantry were attempting to force the left point of the former. The provincials here, in like manner, reserved their fire till their adversaries were near, and then poured it upon them with such an incessant stream and in so true a direction, as mowed down their ranks. The engagement was kept up on both sides with great resolution. The king's troops could not compel the Americans to retreat, till they observed that their main body had left the hill, when they gave way. This retreat was, with little loss, effected over Charlestown Neck, (g) though it was enfiladed by the Glasgow sloop of war and some armed transports and floating batteries.

The number of Americans actually engaged amounted only to 1500. The British did not push the advantages they had gained, contenting themselves with throwing up works on Bunker's Hill for their own safety. The provincials did the same on Prospect

Hill, in front of them; both were guarding against an attack, and both were in a bad condition to receive one.

The second continental congress met on the tenth of May, 1775, and, two days before this action, appointed George Washington, a native of Virginia, to the chief command of the American army. This general soon after joined the army at Cambridge, and, at the head of his troops, published a declaration, previously drawn up by congress, in the nature of a manifesto, setting forth the reasons for taking up arms. In this, after enumerating various grievances, it was added: "In our own native land, in defence of the freedom which is our birth-right, and which we ever enjoyed till the late violation of it, for the protection of our property acquired solely by the industry of our forefathers and ourselves, against violence actually offered, we take up arms, we shall lay them down when hostilities shall cease on the part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being renewed shall be removed, and not before."

When General Washington joined the army, he found the British intrenched on Bunker's Hill; they had three floating batteries in Mistic River, a seventy gun ship below the ferry, between Boston and Charlestown, and a battery on Copp's-Hill. They were also strongly fortified on the neck. The Americans were intrenched at Winter-Hill, Prospect-Hill, and Roxbury, communicating with one another by small posts over a distance of ten miles. This army, about 14,500 men strong, was so stationed round Boston, as to confine the British to the town, and to exclude them from the forage and provisions, which the adjacent country afforded. General Ward commanded the right wing at Roxbury, General Lee the left at Prospect-Hill, and the centre was commanded by General Washington

LOSS OF THE BRITISH.
1054 killed and wounded.

LOSS OF THE AMERICANS.
453 killed and wounded and missing.
5 pieces of cannon.

[To be continued.]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN FORMING CAMPS
OFFENSIVELY AND DEFENSIVELY.

IF an army assembles with a certain intention, and continues in any environs for some time, we call the position that army has taken, a camp: as we say, the army is encamped. There are camps in

peace, in which the troops of a state are assembled and instructed in grand manœuvres, and camps in war. Those are either march-camps, or such in which we continue for some time expecting the enemy's attack, or by which we cover the siege of a strong place. If we have recourse to the general principles of the art of fortification, it is not difficult to determine whether the camp, which the army has pitched, is such as the army encamped in it, may expect an attack from the enemy. It rests chiefly on the following points :

Is the camp commanded by hills at a small distance, for instance, 3000 steps? Can the camp be approached without being discovered? That is, are there in the front of it hollow ways, ravins, hedges, bushes and woods, in which the enemy may make its arrangements unobserved? Are the flanks of the camp well covered, or can we get round them? Is the front of the camp so situated that crossing fires might be applied? Is it in the enemy's choice to attack where they find it the easiest, or must they absolutely attack on one certain point; and can we give to that point all possible strength? How are the ways in the rear of the camp; and in how many columns may the army retreat, if it should be compelled to do it?

We should likewise be acquainted with all the ways before the right and left flank, and front of the army; that we may be able to march off to the right or left, or forwards, according to circumstances. And last of all we should be informed of the two following circumstances: How long the army may remain in such a camp, with respect to forage and other provisions; and whether it is possible for the enemy to cut us off from our magazines, by any little motion it may make.

In forming a camp we should take care to give every arm that ground, on which it can act. The infantry is therefore placed on hills, in villages, if these lay at a little distance before the front, or on the flanks of the camp, behind hedges, ditches, even in woods, if they can only keep a free prospect before them. If the camp is on a hill, the first line crowns the descent of the hill so, that it can perfectly see the foot of the hill. The second line is placed at a proper distance on the summit; here it is supposed, that at a distance of 3000 paces there is no other hill, which commands that where the camp is. But if the hills before the front of the camp are as high as the hills on which the camp is; then the first line places itself on the summit; and the second behind it, at such a distance, that it can go directly to the assistance of the first, if that should be compelled to give way.

The artillery advances at war before the infantry. The field-pieces remain with the field-guard, which, as it is known, throws up a *fleche* 300 steps before the front of every battalion. The batteries must be erected on such places, so as to see the foot of the hill, and so as to reach the plain below.

It is certainly a great military prejudice, if we are accustomed to carry the heaviest cannons on the highest hills, within the circumference of the camp, as such there, least annoy the enemy.

We must point out for the cavalry in the camp that situation where they will be able to act best. If the ground is level, we may place the cavalry on both the wings of the army; or on one only, if the other is properly secured. If both wings are defended by a river, morafs, great lake, or open ground, then the cavalry may be placed in the second or third line. If the center of the army be level ground, we must place the cavalry there; but, at all events, behind the infantry. For we never should place cavalry in the first line. But, if the ground is intermixed, then we place the cavalry in several parts, behind the infantry, in order to be every where at hand, when the enemy attacks. In intrenched camps, it is of course understood, that the cavalry takes the second or third line.

In a camp, the connection of the several parts of which the army consists, must not be subjected to interruption. A camp, therefore, must never be crossed or cut through by great rivers, or such as are difficult to be passed. Though the communication may be kept open by bridges, yet, it is certain, that the march of the infantry, artillery, and particularly the cavalry, over bridges is extremely slow and is subjected to many difficulties. That part of the army which is separated from the other by a river, is kept to itself, and must be looked upon as a corps by itself. If the enemy finds that out, and does not fall with all his forces upon that separate corps, it shews want of capacity and resolution. In camp, there should likewise be no great defile, particularly such as are inclosed by steep rocks. We must say the same of meadows, morasses and forests. If the army is separated by the latter, we have a double disadvantage; we cannot assist the part attacked soon enough, and do not see what happens on the other side of the road. The camp of an army, also, should not be crossed by villages, particularly when they are very long, as, should the enemy set them on fire, by howitzer-grenades, the communication in the camp would be for sometime interrupted, and would be also difficult in future.

But if a general is forced, by the situation of the war, to pitch his camp where the communication of the troops is interrupted by rivers defiles, &c. he should be particularly careful to supply the communication by bridges. If he has not a sufficient quantity of pontoons, he must make use of vessels, boats, or rafts. That part of the army which is separated by a river or defile, must be so strongly intrenched, that the enemy cannot attack it, without suffering great loss.

Each camp must be spacious. The troops must not only be able to stand with ease in the camp, but they must also be able to make those motions within it, which are requisite to an attack, without causing confusion. However, it may happen, that infantry are obliged to take post in hilly environs, where there is but little space. Sometimes they are posted as to be far extended, where the posts are of that nature, so that a small number can defend themselves, with advantage, against a superior force.

If an army is in camp, there should be no want of straw, wood, or water, particularly if it be necessary to stay a considerable time in that camp. The wells, in the neighbouring villages, may be sufficient for the infantry, but, for the cavalry, they are seldom sufficient. The place where they are to ride to watering should not be too far from camp; it is a good thing if there are watery ditches, rivulets, and rivers in the neighbourhood. But those places should be so situated as not to be liable to molestation from the enemy; particularly if we are at no great distance from it, and if it can at every hour in the day attack us; for, if the cavalry, and other horses in the camp, are obliged to go three or four miles or farther for water, the enemy may seize that opportunity to attack the army in reality, or at least trouble it very much, by feint attacks. In such a case we should be obliged to recal the cavalry suddenly, that were sent to watering, which would be injurious to the horses, and perhaps occasion disorder and confusion.

We must remark here, that the staff officers who choose the camp, and direct it for the army, must likewise point out to every brigade, as well cavalry, as infantry, where they are to ride to watering, and where to fetch it.

Let circumstances and situations be as they may, a camp can only be eligible, where we find forage for the army, and are not forced to quit the ground for want of it. If it is determined, therefore, in the plan of operations, how long the army is to remain in

such camp, or if we can nearly calculate the time, from the arrangements the enemy takes for the support of its position, we consider what quantity of corn, oats, hay, and straw, the army will want, in case we cannot forage green; and how many forage-bundles will be requisite, if the season is so far advanced that we can forage green. Such a calculation is not so very difficult; and it is better for every officer, sent by his general, to a magazine, with an order to make a calculation how long the army can be supplied from the corn, oats, hay and straw, in store, to do it himself, than be obliged to apply to a commissary for that purpose. We know from experience, that 75 pounds of flour will produce, when baked, 100 pounds of bread; two pounds is the daily portion for a man; and thus, by multiplication and division, we may soon find how many days an army, whose number we know, may be supplied from the quantity in store.

We know the daily portion for every horse, in oats, hay and straw, and, of course, it is easy to find, by multiplication and division, how many days the horses may be supplied by a certain quantity in store; or how much will be wanting, if the time we are to stay is determined.

It would not be unuseful, if every young officer would form tables on that subject, according to the specimen we have here given.

Let us suppose a bushel of flour weighs 75 pounds, and this to produce 100 pounds of bread. Suppose the daily portion to be two pounds a man, this, for a 100 men, is two bushels of flour. Suppose, further, the army to consist of 40,000 men, and it will require, daily, 800 bushels; we may, by the Rule of Three, say, If 800 bushels are sufficient for one day, for how many days will 144,000 bushels serve? This we shall find to be 180 days. Taking the month at thirty days, we can say, for an army of 40,000 men it requires,

144,000 bushels, for 180 days, or 6 months	
120,000 - - -	150 - - 5
96,000 - - -	120 - - 4
72,000 - - -	90 - - 3
48,000 - - -	60 - - 2
24,000 - - -	30 - - 1
12,000 - - -	15 - - 1-2

Now let us consider the case, when the season is so far advanced that we can forage green, or be supplied with green meat, how many forage-bundles an army wants, if they are to remain a certain given time in camp. We will suppose an army to consist of 12,000 horses; for each horse we must count, daily, three sheaves of oats, or any other corn. This army requires, therefore, 36,000 sheaves, daily; and, if the army is to be 20 days in camp, it will want for that time 720,000 sheaves. That quantity we must be able to get in the environs, that is, within seven or eight miles, at farthest, of the camp; as, otherwise, the procuring of forage is attended with too much trouble.

The providing a sufficient quantity of forage, is of more importance than many may think. From the want of it we are often obliged to leave a very good post, and place ourselves in another, where we give up great advantages to the enemy. Are we forced to quit such a camp, we may run the risk of being attacked on the march in a place where the situation of the ground is very much to our disadvantage.

The most essential thing in a camp is, that the enemy may not be able to attack it, in front, flank, and rear, at one and the same time. There certainly could be no camp where the enemy could not get round it, if they would take a great, round about-way; but, if the enemy risks the attempt to get at the flank, or rear of our army, the camp must be so made, that the enemy should run the risk of being cut off from their magazines, and forts, or of exposing a whole province to us. It is not probable that the enemy will venture such a step, if they have to fear one of the beforementioned cases, neither will they venture it, if they should be obliged to take a disadvantageous position, in our rear, or in our flanks, in which case they will be beaten, if we get directly at them. Has the enemy detached some corps from their main army? and do they venture, notwithstanding, to turn our camp? This, perhaps, may give us the best opportunity to get upon such a corps, and ruin it, before they can obtain any assistance: Now we say a flank is secured, if it be either absolutely impossible, or at least, very difficult, for the enemy to attack it, and must sacrifice, at the attack, many troops, without a prospect of good success. The following objects are very proper to cover the flanks of an army. Rivers, over which the enemy cannot pass: lakes, and marshes of considerable extent; hills, particularly when they are very steep, and if the foot of them may be

commanded by a battery sideways: long villages, particularly such, through which small rivers, or rivulets run, or which are surrounded by small lakes, and swampy meadows; or such as lie at the foot of hills, from whence they may be commanded; also lawns, forts, and woods, if they are very thick.

If rivers are to cover the flanks of an army, they must be such as the enemy can neither ride nor march through. All the fords must be made impassable. This is done by making them deeper; by throwing trees into them, with their limbs; or by putting cartropes; because the ground in rivers is always firm where we find fords. If bridges cross the river, they must be thrown down, or, at least, such measures must be taken, that we can set them on fire as soon as the enemy shews any sign to pass them. But if we are obliged to keep up a communication with the environs, on the other side of the river, it is necessary to raise a sufficient bridge-redoubt, in which some battalions may defend themselves against a superior power.

In many places we find small rivulets whose shores are lined with morafs. These may, likewise, be made use of to cover the flanks of an army. Should the enemy succeed, in passing their infantry over at some places, they cannot, however, get their cavalry and artillery along. Besides, as the infantry cannot pass in the best order, they may easily be repulsed, if we get at them vigorously, before they can form.

Some say we should draw up the flank of an army close to a river, as then we have an opportunity of keeping the opposite shore clear, and preventing the enemy's taking post near the river. If the shore on this side commands the opposite, if we know that the enemy is forced to fetch water for the cavalry, and for the army in general, from the river, it may be advantageous to place our flank near the river. But in other cases we should keep so far from it as not to be reached by cannon-shot, for otherwise we should be continually annoyed. If an army is often alarmed, it will soon get accustomed to it, and become careless and indolent. But as soon as a sly enemy finds this out, they will at last make a bold effort, and surprize the army at a time when we least expect it.

If a village is on one flank of the army, in which are many strong built houses; or a good burial ground, surrounded with a wall; these may be put in a state of defence, and occupied with light troops; but the camp must not be pitched too near the village, lest the enemy should set it on fire with howitzer gre-

nados, as the fire and smoke would be troublesome to the troops in the camp.

If heights are so situated as to form a hook in our flank, and level ground towards the enemy, or if they are commanded by other mountains, and are separated from them by defiles; we may very well use these to cover our flank. Vineyards are particularly good for this purpose, because the trees, hedges and fences, by which they are separated, throw the greatest obstacles in the enemy's way.

We may lean the flanks of an army on woods, if they are very thick and bushy, and have much cut ground; but we must not place the camp so near it that the enemy may, under the protection of the wood, find an opportunity to surprize us. If, for example, the wood is considerable, so that we can have no outposts on the other side of it; we shall not be able to get intelligence of the enemy's motions. The enemy may therefore get round our front and on our rear before we perceive it. But, as in mountainous environs, which generally are full of woods, we can seldom avoid leaning a flank on a forest; we should raise on our flank a strong barricade of trees, so situated, as to oblige the enemy to work sideways, under a heavy cannon and cartridge-fire. To these means already mentioned, for covering the flank of an army, we must every where add art, where more security is required. Thus we may cause inundations, where there is a small river easy to be passed; we may fortify heights, &c. We must remark also, that the same means, by which the flanks of an army are covered, will serve to cover the front of a camp. This, for instance, may be done by rivers, lakes, morasses, great defiles, villages, &c.

In a defensive war, each camp should be so situated, that by the position of the army in it, the frontiers of a state may be covered; this will render it difficult for the enemy to attempt any thing against the environs, either backwards or sideways, without danger of being cut off from their magazines and detached corps, and of being molested in their transports.

Should the enemy, by penetrating into our provinces, give our army an opportunity of penetrating with advantage into their states, and there take a firm post; should they not find an advantageous post in our country, in which they may wait an attack from us; should they after the loss of a battle be liable to be entirely cut off from their magazines and forts; if the loss of a fort

to them, or a whole province is the consequence, we may say, that the general understands the art of carrying on a defensive war well.

If our camp has such a position, that we may, by a slight movement, get into those environs where the enemy direct their intention, and where they, on the contrary, are forced to great motions; if we can move in a straight line, and they are obliged to make use of a round-about motion; then such a camp is well known to cover a whole province.

In a defensive war, it is a general rule to have rivers, rivulets, in short all sorts of defiles, before the front of a camp.

It is politic and wise to plan, ourselves, an attack on that camp where we wait, expecting the enemy's attack; and examine the points carefully, on which the attack can easiest be made. We should then see, perhaps, the faults we have made in our arrangements for defence, and have sufficient time to alter and improve them; but, if the enemy is already drawn up, and has planned all measures for the attack, we must not endeavour to alter any thing, for orders misunderstood, may produce wrong motions, and expose us to the danger of being beaten.

Camps, in an offensive war, should have the following requisites: We should be able to march to all the environs; at each new camp we should advance so far that the defiles may remain behind the front.

They must have such a situation as to force the enemy to quit their advantageous position. In this intention we shall succeed, if we can take a position on their flanks, for the enemy is then exposed to the danger of being cut off from their magazines and forts, or from a detached corps. It is very advantageous if we can pitch our camp so as to be able to detach several parties, to make the passage of the enemy's transports difficult, trouble them when foraging, threaten them with blockading up a fort, and put the enemy's country under contribution. But we must likewise take care that these detachments are supported by the main army, if attacked by a superior force. As it may happen that the enemy shall change defence into attack, as soon as they find it advantageous; we should, in the choice of our camp, in an offensive war, not lose sight of those rules of precaution which have been recommended for camps in a defensive war. This is particularly necessary if we are in the neighbourhood of the enemy; we should then proceed with all possible precaution, and not send away any detachment if we cannot support it properly.

As we are now upon an offensive war, we will insert some of the most important principles which should be observed at the attack of strong posts. The whole army should never be drawn into the combat. If the attack is made with one wing, the other wing of the army should be kept back. If the attack is made from the centre, both wings are kept back. The attacking wing must have all the strength of a military corps, that is, all the arms must there be connected in a proper manner. To this end are requisite a numerous artillery, several lines of infantry, which may support and relieve one another, in case the attack of the first line should not have good success; and on the side and behind the infantry a sufficient number of cavalry, if the ground is advantageous for the latter. That wing of the army which is kept back should be covered, that the enemy may not be induced to attack that wing. The more advantageous it will be, if we can lean it on defiles or mountains, which we must strongly occupy with heavy arms.

At the attack of heights, we must make use of howitzers, rather than cannon, because the grenades, which tear in pieces, by scattering more, cause greater terror among the enemy than cannon-balls, the greatest part of which fly over their heads.

If the hills on which the enemy stands, are so steep that we lose breath in ascending them; we must not attack with infantry, as such attack could not possibly be successful. But it is another thing with hills on which a soldier can rest himself, and take breath.

At the attack of a post we must know how to determine that point, which is the key of the enemy's position, that is, the hill which commands the enemy's camp. This hill we must attack first. If we have gained that, we are master of the whole post. It is certainly more advantageous to lead the troops in the first onset to the strongest post, whilst the battalions are perfectly closed, than when they are fatigued by the attack of a less considerable post, and are intimidated by a view of the dead, and the groans of the wounded.

The troops, which make this first attack, must have strict orders to overthrow the enemy at all events. Some late generals of great merit have proposed to lead on to the first attack, not the best troops of the army, but free battalions; in doing which, we must ourselves give the fire, if they will not attack with vigour, or give way. If the first attack be not successful, we may always renew it, with good troops, and continue it till we have carried our design.

KING OF PRUSSIA'S BATTLES.

BEFORE I enter upon the Third Silesian, or what is commonly called the *Seven Years War in Germany*, in which not only almost all the nations of Europe, but also some parts of Asia and America were involved, and during which the greatest military talents of the present century were displayed, it is necessary to give a short account of the two preceding Silesian Wars, in order to trace the origin of the last, and to combine all those great events.

After the death of the emperor, Charles VI. in 1740, Frederic II, king of Prussia, in order to maintain the rights of his house over some part of Silesia, assembled on the frontiers of that country, an army of twenty eight thousand men, under the command of marshal Shwerin. He offered his assistance to the daughter of Charles VI. Maria Theresa, queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in order to secure to her the possession of her other hereditary states, on condition, that she acknowledge the legality of his pretensions; but, in case of a refusal, he threatened to maintain his rights by force of arms.

The court of Vienna rejecting this proposition, the king entered and took possession of all Lower Silesia. On the 20th of April, 1741, a battle took place near Mollwitz, between the king, and the Austrian field marshal Neipperg, in which the Austrians were routed. George II. king of England, allied with Maria Theresa, assembled an army on the borders of Kent, and took both Hessian and Danish troops in pay. Maria Theresa, persisting in her resolution to give up no part of Silesia, in the month of September Frederic found himself compelled to join the French and Bavarians; and a strong army of the latter, with marshal Broglie at their head, marched into Bohemia. They took Lintz, and marched straight to Vienna. Maria Theresa took shelter at Presburg. The king, during this time, took the fort of Neisse, which accomplished the conquest of Silesia.

The second campaign of the first Silesian War, in 1742, was distinguished by the battle of Czaflau, in Bohemia. Frederic, after having been abandoned by his French allies, as well as by the Saxons, hastened to Czaflau, to save his magazines. There he was met by prince Charles of Lorraine, an Austrian general, whom, after a bloody conflict, he forced to take shelter in Moravia.

The result of this victory was the peace of Breslaw, by which Maria Theresia ceded to Frederic, Silesia and the county of Glatz.

In 1743, the elector of Bavaria was, by Frederic's influence, elected emperor, under the name of Charles VII. but found in his dignity no refuge against the misfortunes which oppressed him. Whilst he was crowned at Frankfort, his hereditary states were laid waste by the Austrians. In the next campaign of 1744, between the allied Austrians, English and Hanoverians, the former were forced to retire to their own country, and the new crowned emperor was likewise compelled to fly over the Rhine, where he died soon after. The misfortunes of the latter, in whose election the king of Prussia had interested himself, disposed him to accede to the union between the new emperor, France, the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse Cassel. He entered Bohemia, and took Prague, but the French again remaining inactive, he stood exposed, alone, to the whole Austrian force, and was obliged to relinquish Prague, and withdraw through Lusatia.

This event put Maria Theresia, queen of Hungary, upon attempting to retake Silesia. The Austrians, accordingly, made incursions into upper Silesia, and took the fort of Cosel by stratagem. Prince Charles of Lorraine assembled the Austrian troops, consisting of 92,000 men. Frederic, to oppose him, assembled about 50,000 men. On the 30th of May, 1745, Frederic marched to Jauer-nich, in order to meet prince Charles, and detached the vanguard to Strigau. This manœuvre brought down prince Charles from the mountains into the plains, where, exulting in the superiority of his numbers, he encamped, intending to surround the Prussians. On the 3d of June, at eight in the morning, Frederic left his camp, and, by a forced march, came suddenly during the night, to Strigau. At day-break the battle commenced, the result of which was that the Austrians were beaten. They counted 9000 killed and wounded, besides 9000 which the Prussians took prisoners. The Prussians counted about 2300 killed and wounded.

Want of subsistence, however, compelled the king to retire from one camp to another. The great detachments necessary for covering his convoys, diminished his army to 26,000 men. Prince Charles, whose army was above 60,000 strong, desirous of profiting by his superiority, projected an attack. He followed the king, and on the 30th of September, near Soor, a bloody battle took place. The Austrians were again beaten, with the loss of 10,000,

killed, wounded and prisoners. The Austrians and Saxons forming the project of a winter campaign, prince Charles, with a strong army, marched into Upper Silesia, in order to join the Saxon army. To prevent this junction, the king, on the 15th of December, gave battle to the Saxons near Kesselsdorf, over which he gained a complete victory.

A few days after, the peace of Dresden was concluded; in which Silesia, and the county of Glatz was again granted to the king of Prussia.

THE SEVEN YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR, FROM 1756 TO 1763.

By I. W. d'ARCHENHOLZ, Captain in the Prussian service.

[Translated from the German, by the Editor.]

THE peace of Aix la Chapel had, after a long continued contest, restored tranquillity to all the nations of Europe. The arts flourished again, and the revival of warlike scenes was thought to be very remote. However, the greatest potentates of Europe were at that very time far from being peaceably disposed. The cabinets were never more zealously occupied in bringing new offerings to the Dæmon of war. It succeeded. Alliances were formed; not on the foundation of a wise policy, but rather on private passions. The wish of making conquests was entirely subjected to the desire of gratifying hatred and revenge. Two princesses, who then reigned over numerous nations, thought themselves personally offended by a monarch, on whom the eyes of all nations were directed, who had ended two wars crowned with laurels, whose greatness of mind excited universal admiration, and who by his virtuous government, was celebrated as the pattern of kings. The most essential plans were made to humiliate him, or rather to extinguish his existence. Thus the fire was kindled of a war, which, on account of the great number of armed bodies of men, of such different nations and languages; on account of the generals and their actions; of the refined art of war, that was employed; of the bloody battles by land and by sea, with their consequences; of the extraordinary events of such manifold kinds; and on account of its extent over all parts of the globe, belongs to the most noted that ever desolated the world.

Silesia, a fine country, full of industrious inhabitants, which Frederic the second, king of Prussia, soon after his accession to the throne, had conquered, and which he had supported with his sword, as well in the peace of Breslaw as in that of Dresden, could not be relinquished by the empress, queen Maria Theresa. She was compelled to yield it to the conqueror, who, at the commencement of her reign, was, of all her crowned enemies, the first that appeared with sword in hand, and made unexpected claims. The value of that country became known then only, when Frederic, in a manner peculiar to himself, shewed how to make use of it. To reconquer it by formidable alliances, seemed to them a very easy enterprise. The king of Poland and elector of Saxony, Augustus III. who, by his powerful neighbour, was once before driven from his residence, and who hoped to be indemnified for that humiliation by the acquisition of new provinces and security for the future, was the first that joined the league. The same did Elizabeth, empress of Russia, who found herself highly offended by some expressions of Frederic on her private character; and at last Lewis XV. king of France, who was followed by the Swedes as being dependent on him by the subsidies they enjoyed.

This alliance between Austria and France, which astonished all the world, and which was considered as the greatest master-piece of policy, was a mere accident; for, France never wished the total defeat of the king of Prussia: the chief plans of that court were directed on England; they wanted to conquer Hanover, in order to obtain greater advantages in America. As by this Austrian alliance, France had now an opportunity of sending troops into Germany, the court of that country promised to the empress, Maria Theresa, to furnish her with 20,000 auxiliaries. But those troops were soon augmented from divers causes, by new principles, by changed plans, by intrigues, and by the fate of war, to more than 200,000 men.

Frederic's ruin, which, however, by his genius and his good fortune was afterwards prevented, would have been inevitable, if he had not, by treason, received information of that dangerous league. His dispersed states, his open provinces, and his security, invited the allies to begin a campaign, which afforded a prospect, not of a heavy war, but of a chain of easy triumphs. But the timely discovery of those political designs, weakened extremely the danger of a prince, who, in a manner hitherto unknown, was always prepared for war; who possessed the great talent of a general in an extraordinary degree; who had 200,000 of the best disciplined sol-

diets, and a treasury richly filled. His great mind knew how to improve upon those advantages, and as the court of Vienna repeatedly refused giving him the desired assurances of peace, he suddenly resolved to anticipate his enemies, and draw his sword the first.

The allies had then hardly begun their preparations; money was every where wanting, and the troops destined for the war were for the most part still in their cantonments, from the Pyrenees to the Caspian Sea, when the king of Prussia, in the month of August 1756, rose like a lion from his couch, and entered Saxony with 60,000 men. To invade Bohemia, it was unavoidably necessary first to take possession of Saxony. He had no other ally but the king of England, George the second, who, on account of his electorate of Hanover had entered into an alliance with Frederic, of which, however, the advantage appeared at a distance only. The preservation of the king of Prussia depended, therefore, solely on the promptness and on the effect of his war operations. The march into Saxony was effected in three columns, the commanders of which were the king, the duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the duke of Bevern, all which were to join at Dresden.

The consternation of that court was extreme on the news of Frederic's march. They kept secret counsels, at which count Bruhl presided, a minister, whose greatness consisted, not in a sound policy, but in the talent of making a royal show and in governing his royal master entirely. In this dangerous situation, therefore, they took of all possible measures the most unwise. They in haste collected the Saxon troops, who formed an army of 14,000 men, and pitched a camp on the frontiers of Bohemia, near Pirna. The situation of this place was strong by nature, and with the assistance of art they made it invincible. But they thought only on putting themselves in a state of defence against the Prussian sword, and forgot to provide against a far more powerful enemy; an enemy who for thousands of years has conquered so many armies, has put to flight so many generals, who has deluded so many victories, and at once ended many a long extended war. The word hunger could not fail to be strange to a minister, who, accustomed to an Asiatic abundance, never had a notion of want, who, therefore, took the most insignificant measures for the provision of his brave and courageous troops, and who kept, even during that difficult situation, a magnificent table. The army had but a fortnight's provision in their camp. They provided themselves with palisadoes but not with

bread, and relied on the Austrian troops, who were hastily assembled in Bohemia, under the command of Field-Marshal Brown.

During this, Frederic had entered Saxony, where he took every measure to keep firm ground; giving, however, the assurance that he would take it in *depot* only—an invention of modern policy, to obviate from such a proceeding the appearance of an inimical invasion; which, however, the enemy commonly calls by its proper name. Contributions of corn, cattle, and forage, were demanded for the Prussian army: They fortified the city of Torgau, and occupied it with cannon, which they found in several Saxon towns. Some thousands of citizens were obliged to work at these fortifications; for which, however, they were at first paid. In this place they put the Prussian commission of war, and the treasury of war: all the contributions of the country were likewise carried thither.

The king of Prussia himself entered Dresden, the 10th of September, without resistance, and occupied the town and the royal palace. His conduct, and that of his soldiers, characterised on that occasion, the spirit of our age, where they endeavour to employ refined morals, sensibility and civility, even in war, in the midst of hard humiliations, and under terrible scenes. Frederic took his head-quarters in a garden of the suburbs, in the neighbourhood of which his army was encamped. Every measure was taken to soften the frightful picture of war, in the eyes of the consternated Saxons, and to shew their new commander in an amiable light. He wished to be looked upon as a friend, as a future ally, and as a guest. Nothing was therefore wanting to make his conduct gracious. He held levies for the foreign ambassadors, at which all seemed to be in good spirits. Almost all people of distinction came to pay their respects; the same did all the magistrates of the town. All were well received. The king gave public dinners, at which the Saxons appeared in great numbers as spectators. He frequently sent his compliments to the royal family, and the latter extended their civility so far, as to invite him to dinner, and to offer chamberlains to attend him, which, however, he declined. Notwithstanding all those civilities, the public offices at Dresden were all sealed up; the treasury was locked; some of the civil officers discharged; all the artillery and ammunition taken from the arsenal of the Residence, and carried to

Magdeburg, and all the money in the different treasuries of the country, belonging to the elector, was appropriated. The communication between Dresden and the Saxon camp, was entirely cut off, so that it was open only to the transport of victuals, for the king of Poland's own table, and to the couriers and trumpeters, that were sent.

This alliance, which was planned for the destruction of the king of Prussia, was, it is true, revealed to the king; he likewise had copies of many important papers respecting it, but many a thing remained dark to him. Nevertheless, it was, for his safety, of the utmost importance to know the formed plans thoroughly. To this was added, the political duty, to justify, by indisputable documents, his invasion into Saxony, which astonished all the courts of Europe. These considerations imposed on him the duty to gain possession of the Saxon archive. They foresaw his desire, and transported those political secrets into the apartment of the queen of Poland. She herself had the key to it, and guarded it as a treasure of the greatest value. Frederic's request to deliver it up, was, therefore, refused by that princess, who was his declared enemy. The Prussian general Winterfield, a favourite of the king, a man equally great as a warrior, as he was polite as a courtier, was then sent to her. But all his propositions were nugatory, she remained firm, though Winterfield let himself down upon his knees before her, in order to dispose her to comply with the king's wish. He left her, but soon after, other messengers appeared, who proceeded in a military manner and made signs to open the chest with the help of instruments. The queen thought she could sufficiently defend it by her own body, and placed herself before it, extending her arms across it. But this firmness served only to humiliate her the more. They carried her from her post, in spite of her screams and her personal resistance, and Frederic obtained the desired papers.

This disrespectful conduct against a royal personage, though perfectly justified by circumstances, was considered as a particular cruelty. This event, which with great exaggerations, by the sufferers was spread all over Europe, and Frederic's conduct in Saxony, which was painted with the blackest colours, did not a little contribute to increase the number of his enemies, and to alter the sentiments of many of his friends. It is well known that the then Dauphine, mother of Lewis XVI of France, a daughter of the

offended queen of Poland, fell upon her knees, melted with tears, before Lewis XV, and entreated his assistance to save her royal parents and her native country. The court of Versailles now began to lose sight of the principles of policy, and took a serious part in a war that so much opposed her true interest, and which she had hitherto considered as a mere political farce.

However, they continued in the endeavour to effect peace between the kings of Prussia and Poland. The English and Dutch ambassadors, Lord Stormont and Mr. Calkoen, used all their abilities to accomplish that beneficial business. Frederic required of the king of Poland a strict neutrality and as a proof of it, he desired that the Saxon troops should be disembodied and go to their quarters. Augustus promised to remain neuter, but he refused confirming his assurance by facts. He encouraged his troops by a public proclamation to save the honor of their king, and to defend themselves to the last drop of their blood. The faithful Saxons, who love their regents to a high degree, whatever their character may be, manifested their readiness to comply with the expectation of Augustus. In their camp they already began to suffer by want, so that the daily portions for men and horses were shortened of one third. Their courage, increased however, when they heard of the approach of the Austrian army, that was in Bohemia already 70,000 men strong.

Brown had positive orders from his court to risk every thing, to dislodge the Prussians and give assistance to the Saxons. The junction of those two armies, under so experienced a general, would then have given another appearance to the war. Frederic was sensible of this, and therefore doubled his assiduity to confine the Saxon camp, and to cut off every assistance that might be given to the troops in it. In order to gain that point the better, Field-Marshal Keith received orders to advance with a considerable corps into Bohemia, to observe the movements of the Austrians. The Prussian Field-Marshal, Count Schwerin, had already entered Bohemia with 35,000 men from the side of Silesia, having encamped himself near Koniggratz. Both these Prussian armies were to occupy the Austrian in their own country, according to Frederic's plan, so that they could not think of the Saxons. He, himself expected daily their surrender, not finding it prudent to go before into Bohemia, where he had no magazines. He would by such a proceeding, likewise have given the Saxons room to make

themselves masters of the Elbe, and to remain in his rear. Besides, he was at that time in want of waggons, &c. for the transportation of provision; and the terrible defiles that cover the avenues to that country on all sides, required many other measures.

Brown, in order to give assistance to the Saxons, was obliged to pass the river Eger; but then he had not the necessary pontoons. They did not arrive with the artillery in his camp till the 30th of September, after which he put himself instantly in motion. It was now Frederic's intention to compel him by a battle to retreat; he therefore, rose the 30th of September, on the same day in which Brown had passed the Eger. The next morning, after day break, the two armies met near Lowositz, a Bohemian village. The Austrians were 52 battalions and 56 squadrons strong, and they had one hundred and two pieces of cannon. So thick a fog happened at that time, that they hardly could see three steps before them. The heights of Lobosch and Radostiz, that commanded the position of the Austrians, were not occupied by Brown. This circumstance caused Frederic to think that the Austrians had passed the Elbe, and that he only had touched their rear. Some thousands of Croats and Hungarian infantry, who were posted at the foot of the mountain of Lobosch in vineyards, and who made a losing fire on the approaching Prussians, confirmed that opinion, as a retreat is generally covered with such light troops. The Austrian cavalry, which had exposed itself to the fire of the Prussian cannon, and which kept ground as if they wanted to effect it by another intention, completed that error. They fought in the fog without seeing one another. During this, the king caused the heights to be occupied.

Brown's position being secured towards the middle of his line, and on his left wing, by a morass and other impenetrable avenues against every attack, he directed his intention entirely on the village of Lowositz, which covered his right wing, having posted there his best infantry, with a large quantity of heavy arms; there was likewise before it a strong battery and redoubts. Towards the middle of the day the fog dispersed, and they saw one another. The Prussian cavalry made now a regular attack, and overturned that of the Austrians, but they pursued them with too much ardour, till they came under the cannon of Lowositz. The violent fire of the artillery mounted there, repulsed them with great loss. The next undertaking of the Prussians now was, to drive the Croats from the vineyards, the fences and walls of which served those troops as bulwarks. They succeeded with a great deal of trouble.

Brown now sent his best infantry to attack the heights; but the Prussians who were posted there defended themselves like lions, and some regiments, after having fired away all their cartridges, fell, with their bayonets, on the enemy. This terrible scene lasted till the Austrians were pushed down from the heights, and into the village of Lowositz. The Prussians seized this time of confusion to set the village on fire, and to drive the enemy entirely from thence, whereby the fate of the day was at last decided. Brown made a masterly retreat, and left the field of battle to the king, without giving up his pretensions to the victory. This, however, was not doubtful, as was proved by the consequences; though the Prussian army had lost more men, and both parties counted their prisoners.

Such was the first battle in this memorable war, which lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till three in the afternoon, and which was, as we may say, the signal of the Prussian valour for the subsequent battles. The loss of the conquerors was 3300, dead, wounded and prisoners. The Austrians lost a few hundred less.

Brown was now compelled to retire over the Eger and obliged, entirely to alter his plan of liberating the Saxons. It was resolved, that these allies should go over the Elbe in the night of the 11th of October, and then they intended to attack the Prussians from both sides. But very rainy and stormy weather caused this passage to be deferred. They determined to effect it two days after. Frederic made use of that precious time; reinforced the posts on the Elbe, and fortified them by intrenchments and barricades. The right side of this river, near Pirna and Konigstein, is full of mountains, covered with woods. The deep declivities that separate them, present nothing but impracticable environs, not made for the march of an army, particularly when a powerful enemy is in the neighbourhood, having the heights in their possession. The Saxons, after having passed the Elbe, hoped to hear something of the approach of the Austrians; but they could not perceive any thing of their allies, who were prevented from advancing farther by a Prussian corps; they perceived on the contrary that the Prussians were masters of the defiles, which they were obliged to pass, in order to reach Bohemia. However, they tried to form themselves at the foot of the mountain Lilienstein, but it was impracticable, on account of the small space, wherefore they encamped themselves, full of dismal expectations of their sorrowful

fate. This fatal situation had its source entirely in the Austrians as well as the Saxons being ignorant of the ground, and who, therefore, made hazardous plans.

The Prussians instantly took possession of the camp which the Saxons had left; they touched on their rear, took them prisoners, with the most part of their baggage and artillery. This was a considerable transport, which could not reach the troops, the bridge being broke.

Never was a well disciplined army of a valiant nation in a more deplorable situation. It was quite the history of Caudinum. Hunger plagued the Saxon troops; to this was added the severity of that rough season of the year and the loss of their baggage. They were three days and three nights successive under arms without any victuals; they even were in want of ammunition. They laid in the open air, surrounded by vigilant enemies, deprived of all means and of every hope to save themselves. Their fate depended now entirely on the conqueror's grace, to whom they at last offered a capitulation, with the consent of Augustus. The conditions of it were hard, as well for the Saxon troops as for their king. The whole army was obliged to lay down their arms. The officers were dismissed, but the non-commissioned officers had no choice; they were forced to swear allegiance to the king of Prussia.

The king of Poland now suffered a humiliation which for some centuries since has not been the fate of an European prince. He lost at once his whole Saxon army that was faithful to him, and a few of his body guard only were left to him who were with him at Konigstein. His endeavors to gain better conditions from the conqueror were in vain. Frederic himself, gave the answers on the articles of capitulation of that memorable treaty. Some of those answers, which respect the great want of the troops, are quite laconic, and are signified only by the word *good*, but all denote the decisive tone of the conqueror, who thinks to comply with more than they had reason to expect. Augustus begged he would leave him his guards at least. But Frederic's answer on that head was extremely humiliating, and manifested the right of the stronger over the weaker in a striking manner. It was this: "They should have the same fate as the other troops, as he should not wish the trouble of taking them prisoners a second time."

Ten Saxon regiments remained entirely together, with this difference only, that they received Prussian uniforms, colours and com-

manders; but the rest were with the whole cavalry distributed among the Prussian regiments.

This action of Frederic, to force a whole army of a foreign prince, to serve the conqueror in close columns, is perhaps without example in the history of the world. However, they relied too much on Augustus' impotence of keeping an army, and on the wants of the troops who were without a master. They did not pay any attention to the attachment which the Saxons naturally have to their princes and their native country. But this shewed itself soon to Frederic's astonishment. Though they expected some desertions among the Saxons, they did not think that whole regiments would run away with order and resolution. Most of them set off with all the military signs of honour, and went either to Poland or joined the French army. The king of Prussia had given commissions to many non-commissioned officers of the Saxons, in order to make his service agreeable to them. But this measure was not sufficient; for those officers were at the head of those deserters; and those who would not go with them they forced to go out of the way.

The fort of Konigstein was declared neutral during the war, and the king of Poland, who on that rock waited for the decision of his fate, received passports for himself and his suite to go safely to Warsaw, whither he went without delay. This monarch was extremely humbled by his great misfortune; he wrote, the 14th of October, to his Field-Marshal Rutowsky: "We must resign ourselves to providence—I am a free king—As such I will live and die. I leave the fate of my army in your hands; your court marshal may decide, whether to surrender or to chuse death, either by hunger or by the sword." He had carried on a correspondence with the Prussian monarch from Konigstein, which, from the first offered neutrality, came by degrees to a proposal of an alliance, and as Augustus remained immovable, Frederic gave him a kind letter as a companion on his journey. The title in those royal letters was, on both sides, *my brother*; a tender expression which, under such circumstances, deserves a place in history. They shewed to the departing king all possible respect; they removed even the troops from the road in order to prevent disagreeable objects from the eyes of the unfortunate king.

The campaign was now at an end. The Austrian army drew farther into Bohemia, and the Prussians went into their winter quarters in Saxony and Silesia. Frederic remained during the

winter at Dresden, and now treated his deposit as a conquered province. He often gave audience to the Saxon ministers, issued his orders on all subjects relative to the administration of the country, and demanded of the representatives 10,000 recruits.

The preparations of all the powers connected in the war, were great for the next campaign. Frenchmen and Swedes, Siebenburgians, Maylaneses, Wallones, Cofaks and Calmuks, put themselves in motion, and as money was in great demand, they used every art, partly to make loans, and partly to dispose monied people to furnish necessities in advance. But the king of Prussia had the advantage over his enemies, not being in need of such means. His great treasury and rich deposit afforded means to the Prussians, with every thing abundantly provided, to open the next campaign. The Saxons, who, on account of the likeness of their religion, language, morals, and their way of thinking, had far more inclination to the Prussians than to the Austrians, were wishing that their royal master (war being inevitable) might ally himself with the former. They were yet not treated with any shadow of severity. The only thing they felt of the war was the contributions of provision, which, however, were not burthensome. They lived quite amicably with the Prussians. They had comedies, balls, masquerades and concerts at Dresden; the king himself gave, almost daily, concerts, which that so powerfully threatened monarch accompanied on his German flute.

This tranquillity of mind, the result of his philosophical way of thinking and of the knowledge of his forces, was, however, disturbed in divers manners. Among other things there happened, during that winter, an event, of which the particulars are known by a few only. Before the nineteenth century it will hardly be allowed to any historian to communicate them to the world. Frederic was to be poisoned. A page, Glasau by name, whom the king liked particularly, was hired to send the monarch out of the world. The plan was known to a few only, and a discovery was not to be feared from those. However, an accident discovered in the hour of the execution to the king, that a scheme was laid against his life. Glasau fell upon his knees before the king, and begged his forgiveness, which, however, could not be granted. He was put under arrest, examined in the king's presence, and sent next day in irons to Spandau, where he soon after died in prison in a lamentable manner. It seemed the king was so anxious to keep the

affair secret, that he even would not give leave to a physician to attend him in his last moments.

The moderation which the king had hitherto observed in Saxony, had its cause in the hope which was still entertained, that Augustus might be disposed to a peace; but the wound was too deep: the alliance with Austria and Russia too close; and his expectations of a happy change too great for him to listen to the Prussian proposals. On the contrary, the complaints of his ambassadors, supported by his powerful allies, were at Ratisbone before the German diet, and all the European courts without limits. Passion suppressed all prudence, and weakened the faculties of learned men so far, that they represented Frederic's march into Saxony, in all political publications, as an undertaking without example in the history of the world. They obtained their point. All the allied courts doubled their zeal in their enormous preparations and the Germanic diet at Ratisbone made use of a punishment that for many generations had not been put in force. They pronounced against the king of Prussia the anathema, and declared him thereby to have forfeited his states and dignities. To execute this sentence they called together, notwithstanding the cries of Prussia's friends, an army of all the nations of Germany, which under the name of the execution-army of the empire, was to give effect to the decree of the majority. In this manner a new army united itself to the many others, among whom Frederic's destruction was the motto, and they began already to determine the approaching moment when the war should be ended.

Frederic, to whom nothing was left but to face every where the thunder of war by the most effectual use of his arms, now began to direct his finance-operations in Saxony with more effect. The pay of all the electoral servants was curtailed or entirely taken away. Hitherto 190,000 dollars were annually paid for the public offices at Dresden; this sum was reduced to 30,000, and in this manner he proceeded. This finance reform extended itself over every thing. Two important personages at the court of Dresden were the queen's confessor and the director of the opera. The former had 12,000 and the latter 15,000 dollars annually; but now they were obliged to content themselves with 2,000 dollars. The enormous quantity of porcelain in the electoral manufactories was sold as property taken at war. A Saxon merchant bought it for 200,000 dollars, and laid thereby the foundation of an enormous fortune. He rose to the dignity of a Danish minister of state, and died as the richest man of the northern empires.

Frederic, however, left the royal palace at Dresden untouched. He often visited the excellent collection of paintings, but without appropriating any thing of it; he made, on the contrary, great presents to the inspectors of the gallery. But this moderation left him entirely, with respect to Count Bruhl, whom he considered as the cause of the alliance between Saxony and his enemies. The magnificent palace of this minister, and his garden, an ornament of the residence and open to every body, was razed; and to this very day the ruins of a beautiful pavillion are monuments of a revenge which that crowned philosopher was not thought to be capable of. The Saxon recruits for the Prussian service were now demanded. The hereditary prince of Saxony made urgent representations against it, but Frederic requested of him, in his answer, with all possible civility, not to trouble himself with those affairs.

In all the provinces of Germany there reigned now a warlike activity, which for centuries was not so universal. In all the wars of modern times, even when under Charles V. and under Gustavus Adolphus, the Germans cut each others throats from a religious zeal, they did not make such powerful preparations as now; when all the nations of Germany, great and small, took up arms, in order to fight either for the single or for the double headed eagle. The army, before-mentioned, of the empire, was now assembled, which presented that respectable Germanic union in a ridiculous light. Those troops were, perhaps, not unlike the crusaders. The contingents of Bavaria, of the palatinate, of Wirtemberg and some other imperial states excepted, the rest of that army was a collection of undisciplined hords, divided into bodies which formed a variegated mass. In Swabia and Franconia there were states of the empire which had but a few men to furnish. Some had to give but a lieutenant without soldiers, who not seldom was a fellow just taken from the plough; some furnished but a drummer, and gave him a drum from their old magazines. Cattle-drivers were converted into sifers, and old cart-horses destined to carry dragoons. The prelates of the empire, proud of being the allies of such great monarchs, changed the cloth of their convent servants and sent them to the army. Arms, cloth, baggage, in short every thing differed among those fellows whom they stiled soldiers, and of whom they expected great doings.

During all this Prussia took the most necessary measures for opening the campaign early, in order to anticipate her enemies. The

most formidable of them were the Austrians. Frederic resolved, therefore, to fall upon them with united forces, in order to strike a great blow, before the armies of the other nations could approach. The Imperial court adopted an opposite system; wishing to act defensively, till, after the junction of all the allies, they could all at once fall upon the king of Prussia and destroy him. In consequence of this arrangement, Brown divided his army into four great bodies in order to cover Bohemia. Frederic, notwithstanding this, entered that kingdom in four columns. The duke of Bevern led one of those columns, which consisted of 16,000 men; and soon fell in with one of the enemy's, of 20,000, which, under the command of count Konigsegg, had intrenched themselves near Reichenberg. The Austrians were instantly attacked, and forced to retire, with the loss of 1000 men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. After this battle the duke advanced; and soon after joined the army of Field Marshal Schwerin, who had entered Bohemia by the way of Trautenau.

The king of Prussia passed the Moldau soon after, in sight of the enemy, who neglected the precious moment to attack Frederic's small corps, notwithstanding the advantages of superior force, and the prospect of certain victory. Jealousies had arisen among the chiefs of the Austrian army, which appeared in a variety of shapes and in a very striking manner: for Brown was now under the command of prince Charles of Lorraine, who had the command in chief.

On the 6th of May the Prussian army was assembled in the vicinity of Prague, to the number of 100,000 men strong. They formed a junction near that capital, except the corps commanded by Keith and Moritz, who remained on the other side of the Moldau, and some hours after commenced one of the most memorable battles that ever was recorded in the annals of the world. The Prussian army that effectively came to action, consisted of 68,000, and the Austrian of 76,000 men. The latter stood on fortified mountains. The avenues to them were swampy meadows, ditches full of morasses, very narrow ways, and small wooden bridges, over which the soldiers could pass but one by one. The Austrian infantry stood quiet in this strong camp, and the cavalry was out on foraging parties, when Frederic appeared. Prince Charles now recalled hastily the foraging troops, who partly fought in their undress with the Prussians. In spite of the badness of the ground, the

attack of the Prussians was conducted with an astonishing courage. Those who were obliged to pass the meadows sunk into the morafs at every step; some regiments fell in to their very knees; it was with great trouble they could extricate themselves. In this situation they endeavored to assist and encourage each other. Several battalions were obliged to leave their cannon behind, though they were in great want of them. At one o'clock in the afternoon those obstacles were at last surmounted, and the Prussians began ranging themselves in order of battle. Without even taking breath after the great fatigue, they fell impetuously on the enemy, who received them with a terrible discharge of artillery. The king had given orders to attack the enemy with fixed bayonets, and not to lose time with a musquet fire: but the fire from the Austrian artillery was so horridly destructive, that humanity put limits to valour. The Prussians retreated.

During this the cavalry of both armies came likewise to action. The prince of Schoneich, who commanded the Prussian cavalry, attacked with a part of his the whole Austrian cavalry, and overturned their first line: but he was outflanked and repulsed by the enemy's second line. However, the Prussian cavalry formed itself again, received reinforcements, and fell afresh on the enemy. The attack was decisive. The Austrian cavalry was entirely overpowered and pushed upon their own infantry, which thereby became disordered, and the Prussian hussars made use of that opportunity to rush in amongst them and increase the confusion.

Field marshal Schwerin, was, during this, zealously occupied to form the repulsed infantry again; and he caused them to advance against the enemy. He dismounted his horse, put himself at the head of his regiment, and took hold of a stand of colours, which in his hand was to open the way to victory. The Prussians found that way; but their noble leader fell to the ground, killed by three musquet balls. Several Prussian generals followed this glorious example, and led their brigades on foot; Even Prince Henry of Prussia leaped from his horse, and at the head of his brigade forced a battery of the enemy. Now the whole Prussian line fell upon the Austrians, who were in great disorder, and whose wings were somewhat separated. Frederic made proper use of that advantage. He advanced into the open space, and the separation was completed. The Austrians now formed two large armies; of which the one fled, and the other threw itself into Prague. They chose

this asylum in haste, without reflecting on the consequences. However they soon saw the terror of that situation. They even tried, the very same day, to draw themselves out of it again; but the Prussians had occupied all the forties from the town, and forced the Austrians back into their confinement.

This was the history of that memorable day, which, on account of the great armies that fought, the quantity of blood that was spilt, the valour shewn by both parties, and the consternation caused by the defeat, was not unlike that of *Rome*. The Roman decided the fate of all Italy, Rome alone excepted; and the German would have decided the whole war, if a very insignificant circumstance, a pair of miserable pontoons, had not determined the fate of so many nations. The army of prince Moritz of Dessau, was on the other side of Prague, and on the other side the Moldau, over which this general endeavoured to make a bridge, in order to fall on the enemy in the rear. This river was swelled; they had not provided for that accident, and some pontoons were wanting to complete the boat-bridge. These courageous Prussians remained, therefore, mere spectators of the battle. A few pontoons more, and the entire destruction of the great Austrian army was not a moment doubtful. This day would have been immortal in the history of the world. In that case, there would have been no battle of Collin, no battle of Hochkirch; in short, a history quite different from that which we now read in the annals of the eighteenth century. All that Moritz could do, in this disagreeable situation, was to cannonade those beaten Austrians, who were retiring towards the army of Daun.

The loss of the Prussians on that day was 11,000 men killed and wounded, 1500 were taken prisoners. The Austrians counted 12000, killed and wounded besides 8000 men, which with sixty cannon, the treasury of war, and a quantity of baggage, fell into the hands of the conquerors. From the field of battle the king wrote to his mother, "I and my brother are very well; the Austrians have lost the campaign, and I have free hands with 150,000 men. We are master of a kingdom, that will afford us men and money. I shall send a part of my troops to pay a compliment to the French; with the rest I will pursue the Austrians."

Bloody as this battle was, and great as the expectations were that all Europe had formed, matters however turned out quite different. This dreadful defeat is therefore the more remarkable, on account of the consequences it did not produce. All the world

thought the flying Austrian army would be pursued and annihilated, and the confined part forced to surrender from hunger and fire: but the fortune of war suddenly disappointed the hopes of the Prussians, and inspired their enemies with new courage. At the battle of Prague each army lost an excellent general. Frederic lamented the death of Shwerin, his tutor in military tactics, to whose memory he erected a statue at Berlin at the end of the war. Field marshal Brown died of his wounds; and beheld before his dissolution the distressful scenes which had been exhibited at Prague.

A whole army was now within the walls of this large city. There were, besides the garrison of Prague, 50,000 men assembled, among which were all the principal commanders, the princes of Saxony, the duke of Modena, and even prince Charles of Lorraine. So powerful an army had not been locked up in a city in that quarter of the globe since the siege of Alesia. All the nations of Europe, allied or neutral, expected scenes of an extraordinary nature. Frederic now blockaded this city, which is ten miles in circumference, and occupied all the forties with batteries. They thought at first, at Vienna, that so powerful an army as the Austrian would soon break the bolt of their prison; however, all their vigorous and repeated attempts, though planned with prudence and executed with desperate efforts, were fruitless; and the Austrians, repulsed by numerous batteries, were always obliged to return to their allowance of horse flesh. This was the food of the blockaded army from the very first week: artillery and cavalry horses were butchered, and the flesh sold in the beginning for two pence, and afterwards for four pence per pound. No preparations were made for so extraordinary an accident: the magazines in the city were but indifferently filled: the troops in want of every thing, and 80,000 inhabitants in danger of perishing by famine.

Prague was now regularly besieged, and more and more enclosed. Bombs and red-hot balls were thrown into the city, which set many houses on fire and kept up a continual burning. The screams and lamentations of the inhabitants were heard in the night time by the Prussians. 12,000 of the inhabitants were expelled the city to lessen the famine, but the cannon balls of the besiegers drove them back again. After a siege of three weeks the whole new town, and the quarter occupied by the Jews, in which were

several store-houses, were reduced to ashes. Many people, who had nothing to do with the war, old men, women, and children, were killed by the bombs, and by the falling in of the houses. The confusion in this unhappy city was inexpressible. The streets were filled with waggons and horses, the churches with sick and wounded, and death like a destructive pestilence, committed dreadful ravages, among men and beasts.

The clergy, the magistrates, and the citizens, intreated prince Charles' compassion; which, willing as he was, he could not shew to any effect. A capitulation was proposed, and a free departure required. Frederic was deaf to this offer; and, in return, suggested terms which they could not accept of. The hope of the troops, to force their way out of the city, was vanished; and their reliance on the army of Daun, that stood near Collin, was very doubtful. Nothing, therefore, remained to the blockaded but to resign themselves to their fate.

Such was the critical situation of the empress Maria Theresa. All the passes of her kingdom, Bohemia, towards Lausatia and Vogtland, towards Saxony and Silesia, were in possession of the Prussians. The flower of her army, with the principal generals, blockaded at Prague; the remainder of her troops defeated, disheartened, and scattered about in small parties, and in want of subsistence in their own country; the capital of Bohemia reduced to the last extremity by famine and fire; the confined army on the point of surrendering; and the whole kingdom as well as the adjoining Austrian provinces, approaching to the fate of being subdued by the conqueror. From the side of Saxony every assistance was cut off, all the Imperial hereditary dominions were open and exposed to the enemy: even Vienna itself was not secure from being besieged. The Prussians, who since the year 1741 had been victorious in eight battles, without losing one, were now considered invincible, and nothing was thought impossible to the king. The consternation in that capital was therefore beyond description; they already imagined the victor to be before the gates of that residence, and already were means devised to offer to him peace with great sacrifices.

Frederic himself lost that favorable situation by a precipitate resolution, which can be excused only by the danger that surrounded him. The siege of Prague lasted longer than he thought; he knew that the Russians, the Swedes, the French, and the troops

of the empire approached his states from all parts. Each day was precious to him. Having never been conquered in the field of battle, he could not entertain an idea of the possibility of a defeat. He left the best part of his army about Prague to continue the siege, and marched with 32,000 men to attack Field Marshal Daun, in order to delude at once every hope of the besieged.

This general came from Moravia with a strong army, intending to join the main army of the Austrians. On the day of battle, he was but four German miles from Prague. This was favorable for those Austrians that fled; Daun received them, and formed an encampment of 60,000 strong on the mountains near Collin, where he entrenched himself. The cautiousness peculiar to this general, and his limited knowledge of an offensive war, made it extremely probable that he would not have undertaken any thing of moment, or at least that he would have done nothing effective for the deliverance of the besieged, though the orders of his court were very strict on that point. Add to this that his troops became discouraged, the Prussian name sounding terrible in their ears. The duke of Bevern, who was sent towards him beforehand with 20,000 Prussians, made use of those advantages, taking before Daun's eyes some considerable magazines. The king, at the head of a strong corps of his best troops, joined at last the army of the duke of Bevern, and advanced on the 18th of June towards the enemy.

Daun, in the mean while, had altered his position; one of his lines stood on the declivity, the other on the summit of the mountains. Before his front were villages, ravins and perpendicular heights, partly insurmountable: a numerous artillery, which made a tremendous fire, seemed to put limits to any attack. However it was executed, after the king had turned that post, with a courage never excelled by any nation upon earth, and which filled the enemy with astonishment. This great day was worthy of the Prussian name. Since the battle of Arbela, where, on the fields of Persia, Grecian tactics decided the fate of numerous kingdoms, perhaps heroism and warlike skill, were never united to a higher degree. The Prussians attacked the enemy seven times, although very advantageously posted, and when the terrible shower of balls overturned every thing, and constantly repulsed the battalions, it was not as if they gave way; but only fell back, in order to rally and renew the attack. Full of warlike enthusiasm, they scrambled

over the heaps of the slain, as over hillocks of earth. Not valor or skill, but accidents, decided the fate of this memorable day. The Prussians gained several important advantages; the enemy's right wing was defeated, the cavalry there posted was overturned, and Daun thought already of retreating. The adjutant hastened with the orders for that purpose, from wing to wing, when the scale, in which the fate of men and empires is decided, suddenly and unexpectedly preponderated to Frederic's disadvantage. The wise disposition of his army was not executed. One of his best generals broke the line, induced by military ardor; he stopped with his battalions at a time, when, without fighting, he should have moved forwards with the whole war-machine, in an inseparable connection. The Prussian army became thereby a false direction, and some Saxon regiments of cavalry that were with Daun's army, and who burnt with ardor to cope with the Prussians, broke their line without waiting for orders, and fell upon the enemy.

Till the battle of Collin, where the high discipline of the troops kept pace with their valour, it was an invariable principle among all nations renowned in war, that if the cavalry can by any means penetrate into the infantry, the latter have no other alternative but to fly, to prevent imprisonment or death. Here they suffered entire squadrons of Saxon horse to penetrate; and in the midst of that tumult of men and horse, which threatened death and destruction, whole Prussian regiments formed close squares, with an astonishing presence of mind and charged the enemy in platoons with an admirable order, as if they were on the place of exercise. Confined within those living walls, that spread destruction, horse and men fell in crowds, and formed hills of slain. Those courageous squadrons saw nothing but certain death before them. But more cavalry came to their assistance, attacking the Prussians at once in front and rear, so that they were at last forced to yield to numbers. The Saxons were eager after vengeance. The defeat which they experienced twelve years before, in conjunction with the Austrians in Silesia, where the fate of the Saxons was so mournful, was still in the memory of those warriors; and hence many cried out, whilst their swords cut down every thing before them, "This is for Strigau!" All that their swords could reach were cut to pieces or taken prisoners. Among the former were Frederic's life guards, consisting of a thousand of his ablest men, brought up in the military school of Potsdam and richly provided with military ambition. They fought till every man was killed, and the bloody field was

covered with their bodies. Theresa's generals beheld the slain Prussians with the same sensations which animated Pyrrhus on beholding the slain, when he first fought with the Roman legions.

The Prussians left the field of battle to the Austrians. It was evening; and a part of the Prussian army, which had conquered, made themselves ready to encamp, and to celebrate the victory. Some regiments of horse were even on the point of unsaddling, when the dreadful news reached them, that the battle was lost, and that they were to retreat. This retreat of Frederic, with baggage and artillery, was effected with so much military prudence that the great exploits of the day were outshone thereby. The enemy, to whom a Prussian retreat from the field of battle was a prospect entirely new, calmly beheld this spectacle, and suffered Frederic to retreat uninterrupted in good order. His loss was 11,000 men. The Austrians counted 9000 killed and wounded. Only 43 pieces of cannon fell into their hands.

(*To be continued.*)

*Relation of CHARLES XII. King of Sweden, being taken
Prisoner at Varniza, near Bender.*

HAVING never found a circumstantial account, in the English language, of this extraordinary defence of a house, we here relate it from Lieutenant General Steel, who was present with the king in that affair. It is translated from the Swedish Bibliotheque into French, and here, from the Encyclopedie Militaire (December 1772) into English.

After the Turks and Tartars had blockaded the house in which the king was, for three weeks, they resolved to storm it. They fired at it with cannon, the first of February, 1713, and attacked the intrenchments at the same time. They had just ended divine service when the attack began: each ran, at the first shot, instantly to his post and the king mounted his horse, and hastened to the redoubt, which some Swedes defended with great vigour. Notwithstanding this, they were all taken prisoners, and the king only escaped.

He was pursued to the very house, and nothing but his valour saved him. He did not dismount till he came before the door of

his apartment, within the court-yard. Mr. Rooſe intreated him to enter, “*No,*” ſaid the king, *I will ſtay here, and ſee what the “Turks intend to do.”* But, as they did not ceaſe firing at him, Mr. Rooſe endeavoured to perſuade him to go in. He would not; but wanted, abſolutely, to jump through a window, into an outer court, on the other ſide, where many thouſand Turks kept up a terrible fire againſt the houſe, whilſt others had forced ſeveral windows, and fought with the Swedes, in the ſaloon, and in the apartments below. When the king perceived this, nothing could retain him; Mr. Rooſe caught hold of him by the ſword-belt, but the king unbuckled it, and got from him; Mr. Rooſe caught hold of him again, and threw his arms round him, ſaying, with warmth, “*Now your majeſty ſhall not eſcape me.*” Two Swedes came to the aſſiſtance of Rooſe, and drew the king into the apartment, which ſome others immediately barricadoed. The king then got into the ſaloon, in which, as before mentioned, they were fighting. The apartment was full of Turks, and it was ſome time before they could drive them out. Some were killed, and others took flight, through the windows and the doors. The king placed then, five or ſix men before every window, and, in this manner, he withſtood, with a handful of men, an army of Turks and Tartars, for eight hours. He went from one room to another, and animated his men to a vigorous defence; carrying them powder and balls in his hat. Even from the killed, he took the ammunition they had about them, and divided it among the living.

Whilſt he was thus occupied, he went into an adjoining apartment, and ſhut the door behind him; the next to this was the apartment of Marſhal Duben, which, from want of men, could not be occupied. Mr. Rooſe, being informed that they had loſt the king, went in ſearch of him; ſcarce was the door of the ſaid apartment opened, when he ſaw the king fighting with three Turks. Rooſe inſtantly ſhot one of them, who had his back towards the door. The king did not perceive this till the man fell; he could ſcarce know Mr. Rooſe for the ſmoke; he looked at him, without ſaying a word, and cut one of the Turks to pieces. The third during this, was killed by Mr. Rooſe’s ſecond piſtol. “*Are you now,*” ſaid the king to Rooſe, “*come to my aſſiſtance? I ſee you have not forgot me.*” This ſaying, he wiped away the blood which ran from the wounds, he received from the Turks, and enquired

after his other people whom he thought had left him; but, learning they were mostly killed or taken prisoners, he said: "*Let us now occupy the saloon only.*" The Turks had endeavored, during this, to force the windows, but were repulsed; they now approached with moveable parapets, filled with dung, which they shoved before them upon wooden machines. These machines were made so that they could stand behind them and fire. They approached in this manner, without much loss, but were forced, by the fire of the Swedes, to quit these machines. The cannonade continued, however, uninterrupted, but this, also, could decide nothing, the building being very strong.

Towards evening they began to throw combustibles, and fire red hot balls. This, likewise, had no effect. At last the Turks brought to that side of the building where Mr. De Duben's apartment was, and which was not occupied, a quantity of straw, set it on fire, and thus set the house on fire also. The Swedes scarce perceived this, when the king took some men with him, and endeavoured to extinguish the fire; but, when they opened the door, in order to go up stairs, they found themselves in the midst of flames, and some of the Swedes had their faces and clothes burnt. The king ordered the roof of the house to be pulled down; but as there were no instruments necessary for such a work, they could not do it. At last they were obliged to quit this intention, and the more so, because the Turks fired continually at the place where the Swedes stood, with cannon and small arms. During this, the fire had spread so far, that the king and the rest were obliged to run through it, covering their faces with their clothes, to prevent their being burnt. Even the *saloon*, the chief place of defence, was also on fire. The king now wanted to defend himself in another apartment, that had not caught fire, saying: "*Let us go in my bed-room; there we can defend ourselves.*" Scarce had he spoke these words, when he saw four Turks approach him; though continually fighting with his sword, he took the carbine from Mr. Roose, and shot the first with it, who fell; but the others approaching nearer; Mr. Roose intreated the king not to expose himself, but, as the king did not pay any attention to his advice, Mr. Roose ran between the king and the window; where the Turks approached, and fired their pistols. A ball grazed Mr. Roose's head; he fell into the arms of the king, but soon recovered; whilst the three Turks were killed by the Swedes. The Turks now undertook another storm, but in this also were repulsed.

During all this, the fire spread every where through the wain-scot and doors, and they were obliged either to get out of the room or perish. They accordingly jumped into the court, which was filled with the enemy. The king cried: “ *Courage; let us defend ourselves as long as we can, let the consequence be as it may.*”

They now placed their backs against the wall of the house, in which position they fought desperately, for an hour; but, the roof falling in; “ *Follow me, to the chancery,*” cried the king, and doubled his steps, with an intention, if possible, to get through the Turks; but, unfortunately, his spurs entangled together; he fell, and the Turks got upon him, and upon all the rest of the Swedes, and they were taken prisoners. This was at eight o’clock in the evening.

Extract from an Order Book of an American Colonel, who was taken Prisoner in the Battle of Flatbush, Long Island.

Order of GENERAL WASHINGTON.

New-York, Aug. 23, 1776.

I HEAR the enemy is arrived at Long Island, and approaches every hour nearer. The honor and success of the army, and the good of our bleeding country, depend on our conduct.

Remember, officers and soldiers, that you are a free people fighting for blessed liberty—that slavery will be the lot of you and your following generations, if you do not conduct yourselves like men. Remember, how your cruel destructors have laughed at your courage and zeal, though they know from experience at Boston, Charlestown, and other places, what a few, who voluntarily fight in their country’s cause, can do against mercenary troops. Be composed, yet firm: fire not at too great a distance, but wait for the command of your officers. It is the command of the general that those, who secrete themselves, lie down or retreat without orders, shall be instantly shot for the example of others. He hopes there is no such coward in the army, but on the contrary, that every man is resolved, either to conquer or die; and that he will fight, sure of the approbation of God, in so just a cause, with courage and firmness. Those who distinguish themselves by a good conduct, may be certain of reward, and sure of being distinguished. If they imitate their countrymen in other American virtues, the general doubts not but that they will save their country by a glorious victory, and acquire immortal honor.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MILITARY REPOSITORY.

SIR,

AS it will, no doubt, be agreeable to your plan, to collect the portraits of the most distinguished military characters in our country, I send you a sketch of one, who ranks high in the scale of public opinion, not only for the part he acted during the war of independence, but also for his late brilliant successes against the confederate Indians and British at the Rapids of the Miamis. I could have wished that this product of a few hours amusement had been rendered more perfect and pleasing to the eye of a true artist; but the unfinished state of the original from which this was taken, and the want of sufficient practice in the executor have prevented; however, he conceives it will be gratifying to some, to be presented even with the caricature of a man of such extraordinary skill and undaunted courage. While we deprecate the horrors of an Indian war; while we revere the characters of those men, who, in times past, encountered the severest trials, and braved death in every shape, in order to establish our freedom and independence, the Hero of Stoney-Point, and the Victor at the Rapids of the Miamis, will not be forgotten.

January 25th, 1796.

W.

ON THE INTERNAL DEFENCE OF FORTS.

MAJOR General Bernhard Virgin who has the superintendency of the fortifications in Sweden, has in his work entitled '*La defense des places mises en equilibre avec les attaques savantes et furieuses d'au jourd'hui,*' given a more full and satisfactory account of the manner in which forts ought to be defended, than ever was done before. His plans and remarks for putting forts in such a state, that they may resist a superior force as long as possible, are new, and merit the attention of every engineer who wishes to rise in his profession.

In my opinion, therefore, I cannot render my readers a more acceptable service, than to give them the outlines of the work. It is divided into two parts.

The first part treats of the errors committed in the modern system of fortification; of the use and preservation of cannon and mortars in forts—and of the choice of places proper to be fortified, with general remarks on the manner in which forts ought to be constructed.

The second part shews how to fortify a square, whose sides are two hundred toizes and treats of the different modes of erecting fortresses

The most important articles of this work, shall be given in this repository with occasional strictures. I mean to begin with the introduction to the first part, because the author there relates many important truths with great candour. General Virgin who has written the above work, is now far advanced in age, and was present at no less than eight sieges in 1745 and 1746 in the war of the Low Countries.

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART.

It has been a general remark for this century past, that forts never hold out long. Count Pagan, in a treatise written so long ago as the year 1645, on the construction of forts, observes, that all Europe was surpris'd at the little resistance they were able to make; that the strongest fort could not hold out longer than a month or six weeks, and yet no one had thought it worth while to endeavor to remedy an evil, upon which the safety of a state often so much depended. The engineers of the present century merit also censure, in not having paid some attention to the art of constructing and defending forts, as well as that of attacking them; the latter is brought to a very great degree of perfection, whilst the former has been totally neglected.

The ancient mode is still adopted in the construction of forts, as well as in the repair of old ones; the absurdity of which, though formerly in great vogue, has been confirmed by subsequent experience. The mode of attack, besides, has been susceptible of improvements unknown to our ancestors. These improvements have been so rapid, that the strongest fortresses have been obliged to open their gates in the course of a few weeks to the besiegers. For instance, Ostend, Mons and Namur, three of the strongest garrisons in the Austrian Netherlands, which were taken after a short siege in the years of 1745, and 1746.

It is the nature of the art of attack, that its progress can go on more rapidly, and sooner attain perfection, than the art of defence;

for, in the course of one campaign, we may take three, four, or more fortified places. Faults, therefore, committed in the siege of the first, may be repaired in those of the succeeding ones. Should the war continue for any time, it is excellent means of improving in the art of besieging, without being exposed to suffer a heavy loss. Quite different is the internal defence of any place. Forts already constructed, cannot easily be altered or converted. For this purpose, very considerable sums are necessary, besides more time and labour than political circumstances will sometimes permit. The defence, therefore, remains imperfect, as the works will not hold out against a regular and obstinate siege. With this evil another is connected of no less importance. The art of defending our modern imperfect works, as far as their situation allows them to be defended, is not easily to be acquired; because the engineers who are not killed during the siege, are made prisoners with the garrison, and consequently cannot be employed in defending any other place. The knowledge, therefore, they may have acquired in the first place, wherein they have been besieged, they can neither apply nor bring to further perfection. These are the impediments which have occasioned the art of defending fortresses to be so very imperfect. It is not, therefore, surprizing that places do not hold out longer, and that they are seldom or ever well defended. And this is, in no small degree, connected with the best method of fortifying posts or garrisons. For if it was equally well known how to defend a place that is besieged, as it is, how to attack it to the greatest advantage, the art of fortifying any place would soon attain its utmost point of perfection.

It seems, however, that those only, will bring the art of defending forts to this wished-for perfection, who have attained the greatest skill in the attack of forts. For before a place can be well fortified, it should be known how it can be best attacked. But it is very singular, that the greatest masters in the art of attack have not been so fortunate in their manner of fortifying; which, for instance, the new system adopted by Vauban, at Landau and New Brisac, (two forts in Alsace) clearly shews. The baron de Landsberg is likewise an engineer of no less celebrity, who possessed in the art of attacking forts a judgment confirmed by experience. Though his principles for his new manner of fortifying are excellent, their application seems liable to many obstacles. In the course of this work, reason will be given why these new modes of

fortifying are not to be held up as perfect systems of fortification. It may be asked whether it is absolutely necessary to have been engaged in the defence of forts to invent a new and more perfect manner of fortifying them. It is true the siege of Landau, so much celebrated in history, which continued near three years, was the means of Reiniers giving to the world his incomparable system of fortification. But it is equally certain that Mallet and Schetier, who were present at that siege, have in their rules for the defence of forts, given nothing new on the subject.

Whatever experience we may have in besieging and in being besieged, or whatever practical knowledge we may have acquired by the number of new forts erected, these will never lead to any thing excellent, if not aided by a creative genius who can labour with indefatigable industry, who can throw away the yoke of prejudice, and disregard the path in which his predecessors have uniformly trodden. Neither must he set too great value on the first production of his genius which would infallibly lock up the door to all future enquiries.

But where shall we find so fertile a genius, blessed with such talents? Who will be answerable, that he shall not be looked upon as an enthusiast, by the military vulgar, who vociferate like geese at the appearance of every novelty?

Until such an exalted genius shall appear, we will do all in our power to labour for the present age, and that of an impartial posterity. All progress in the sciences is attained but by slow degrees, and little is performed at the first outset. We will, however, try to be fortunate enough to contribute something at least for the amelioration of the internal defence of forts.

Very considerable alterations will be necessary in the present system of fortification, to prevent the danger accruing to a state, by the speedy surrender of its forts, if they may be so termed. Times have changed, and *Machiavel* and sound reason teach us, that we also should change our system not to be unfortunate.

The invention of gun-powder, of bombs, of the manner of firing cannon with balls, a *ricochets*, (i. e.) balls which continue bounding after they touch the ground, and the secure manner in which trenches are opened, have given such a decided superiority, over the system of defence; that if means are not found to resist force with force, to oppose subtlety by subtlety, and overpower skill with a greater degree of skill, our forts will, in a short time, be of

no more service than the common walls round a town. Of what use are such forts as will scarce hold out as many days as they have cost millions to construct them? What advantage do they offer if an enemy can in a single campaign, take half a dozen of them only with detachments from the main army? In this manner, more provinces are lost in one campaign, where scarce a single fort ought to have been taken. Ostend and Candia have sustained sieges of from two to three years continuance. But if fortresses are to be surrendered to an enemy every three weeks with several hundred pieces of cannon; if the enemy, in the course of a campaign by taking of these forts, makes a whole army prisoners; if this is followed by the laying waste of the state, and the loss of thousands of its best subjects; it may be asked where is the advantage of such forts? To what end tend the enormous expences for their construction and repairs? Obstinately to persist in the erecting of them, must be followed by the destruction of the army and the impoverishment of the state, in having furnished such useless expences for its own subversion and desolation.

It is not here intended to declaim against the use of forts in general. Forts should be erected, but such only as deserve that name. A single one ought to be able to set limits, during a whole campaign, to the progress of the most powerful army. This is not so difficult as might at first be imagined; and it is what we shall take upon us to explain, with such perspicuity as clearly to convince all those whose minds are not biased by prejudice, and who possess the previous knowledge necessary to form a right judgment on the subject.

But before we proceed, it will be necessary to remark that the short time which forts have held out, must not always be attributed to their not being well constructed; for it is too true, that in spite of any errors in this respect, which we shall examine into more critically, in the sequel, there are many forts that might have held out much longer, had the persons to whom their defence was committed had the knowledge and experience necessary. To know whether a fort has been well or ill defended, the following circumstances will decide. First, has the fort been well provided with victuals and ammunition? Was the garrison strong enough to occupy all the works, or did the number of the garrison bear no proportion to the extent of the fortress? Was the garrison composed of veteran troops inured to the service, who support the fatigues and

hardships of a siege with unremitting labor? Or was it wholly made up of the worst of troops, of deserters? What was the character of the governor? Was he a man whose courage grows warm with danger, or one whose head and heart fail on the smallest reverse of fortune? Were there engineers in the fort who knew how to defend one, or was its defence entrusted to those whose *ne plus ultra* was the science of drilling a recruit? To understand the art of defending a fortress to the last extremity, is the only way by which in the present age, an officer can immortalize his reputation.

Few officers ever attain to the rank of lieutenant general, and if they should once be so fortunate to beat the enemy at some favourable moment, the glory of the action soon dies away. But the case is widely different in understanding how to defend well a fortress. More knowledge more fortitude, more lasting courage is required in conducting this latter object, than to come off victorious in a skirmish or even in a general engagement. It is true the first arrangement or plan of the battle is the work of the general, but the result is that of chance. Excellent as the measures may have been which the general has taken, one lucky or unlucky instant is often sufficient either for gaining a victory or for an army's being routed. At a siege we are for months with our enemies in view. Every advance which they make is attended with danger and the loss of their best troops. Then only, if they convert the fort into a heap of rubbish, if they demolish the houses, if the whole garrison is buried under the falling materials it is allowed for the enemy to raise their standard on the ruins. (*See an account of the siege of Elmo in the history of the knights of Malta.*) It has not without reason, therefore, been asserted that the colonel of a corps of engineers to whom the defence of a fort is entrusted, may acquire infinitely more glory, than a field-marshal, who has the honour to command under his sovereign the first line in a day of battle, and whose name will soon sink into eternal oblivion, whilst the names of the glorious defenders of Grave, of Mentz, and of Kolberg, will be recorded in military annals to the latest posterity. Perhaps a time will come when statues shall be erected to the valiant defenders of a fortress, as well as to the field-marshal, who with the colors in his hand, dies the glorious death of a hero.

I could demonstrate, remarks general Virgin, by the history of the eight sieges at which I was present in the years 1745 and 1746, were I disposed to make critical remarks, how seldom forts are well defended. The artillery in those towns was neither suffi-

ciently covered, nor was it distributed in those parts where it could be used to most advantage. It is true, a brisk fire was, at first made upon the besiegers, but this the enemy soon silenced, and the entrenchments were afterwards suffered to go on with little or no opposition. I have myself seen the sappers digging in the trenches in broad day-light, without one shot being fired on them from the fort, in order to make the men cease working. This made the enemy so bold, that they carried on the entrenchments without the least apprehension, and with much greater rapidity than they otherwise could have done. The aim of the besiegers was not discovered till it was too late to counteract them. The besieged were surpris'd at the breaches that were made, which they did not occupy and therefore defended them badly. Much might be said on the many errors committed by those who had the defence of those places. I touch upon them only to shew that the sudden surrender of a fort must not always be attributed to the present mode of fortifying. It is in vain to expect a fort will hold out to the last extremity, however well constructed, if those who have the command of it, are not men of skill and experience. How can a general who was never before at a siege, and assisted by engineers of as little experience as himself, defend a fort against an artful and able attack? Profound knowledge, and not a little experience, are necessary to fill with honor the post of commanding officer in a besieged fort. Such kind of officers are not every where to be met with. To defend a fortress well, says Cohorn, requires as much skill as to erect one. To compensate as much as possible for the want of able men, there should be, in every fort, written instructions, explaining how it may be best defended. These instructions should be drawn up by an able officer, and remain sealed up till the fort is besieged. In this manner there would still be much judgment required, to execute the plan that had been laid down; but a man of genius or information would always be able at least to derive from it some utility.

The commanding officer of a fort has still further means of acquiring knowledge on the best means of defending a place, by reading the accounts of the sieges it has already sustained, and remarking the mode in which it was formerly attacked. It would be unpardonable in an officer who would not endeavour to acquire such knowledge, especially if those accounts had long been published to the world. If the governor of Namur, when that city was besieged in the year 1746, had read the critical remarks of the

marquis de Feuquiere, on the siege of that place in 1695, he would soon have discovered the intention of the besieger, who made a breach in the horn-work before St. Nicholas's-gate, by which they entered and surpris'd the garrison on that side.

At this latter siege the very same stratagem was made use of that had been practis'd in a former one. The counterscarp was storm'd from the front of the horn-work, and troops were at the same time sent along the Meuse to a place which joins to the wing of the horn-work. At last these troops penetrated a breach made by the batteries on this part from the other side of the river. By this feint, those who were defending the horn-work were attacked in the flank, and four or five hundred men were thus cut off from the town and made prisoners. The taking of the horn-work soon followed by that of the town as a necessary consequence.

Upon the Dutch officers who were taken prisoners being introduced to marshal Lowendahl, one of them said to him with no small degree of simplicity: "We did not think, marshal, you would have attacked us in that quarter;" to which the general, laughing, replied; "I beg your pardon, gentlemen, for not having given you notice before hand of the side on which I meant to attack you."

It is very amazing, that in such an important fortress as Namur, which pass'd under the inspection of Vauban and Cohorn, those weak places on the borders of the Meuse near St. Nicholas's-gate have not been put into a better state of defence. The front of the horn-work should be so constructed, that it could not be taken in flank, and this is the more necessary, as the fortress has been several times gain'd by that means.

There are no obstacles to prevent this being accomplished. It would be a work worthy of an able engineer, who possesses a thorough knowledge both of the art of attacking and that of entrenching fortresses. If he did not possess both these, he would never accomplish the object. With respect to the defence of forts, it would be a very instructive work, if exact and regular journals were published in every fortress that were besieged, of all the orders that were given from time to time, and the different manœuvres of the enemy. Those written by Landsberg are excellent in their kind; what makes them so valuable, are the critical remarks of that able engineer on the different faults committed in the sieges at which he was present.

This would make us amends for the want of sufficient information respecting any single parts of a good defence, which is to be fought for in vain, in the writings of engineers. The brilliancy of an attack seems to have inspired them with a kind of enthusiasm and their memoranda and prescriptions on that part of the art of war are abundantly ample. But of the defence of forts, they speak only in general terms, as if a brave defence was not equally meritorious with a spirited attack; nay, I will aver it is still more so: because it is more honourable to have withstood a superior power with less force, than to contend with equal strength. Besides justice is more frequently on the side of him who defends; yet the doctrine of the defence of forts has never been so fully laid down, as that of the attack. *Vauban*, in his treatise on the attack and defence of fortifications, dwelt very superficially on the latter. To aid the attack, it was he who invented the *ricochet*-shots, which are so destructive to guns of the enemy. But he thought so little of the art of defence in forts, that he proposed no means of obviating the fatal effects of these shots. Yet these means are very simple, and consist only in raising the outward angles of the works, which would in other respects be very useful, and in cross walls at different distances on the ramparts of the work.

It is very surprising that we should have been so long exposed to the destructive powers of this artifice; which owed its invention and success to the carelessness of engineers in constructing their forts, and the ill consequence of which might have been obviated by the most simple means. No doubt *Vauban* had his reasons for not immediately publishing these counter-means. Most probably he did not like to stifle in its birth this invention of the *ricochets* which gave him so great a name, and to which he was indebted for having taken so many forts. Besides, he set out with this invention at a time when all the first heads in France were filled with the spirit of conquest, it is not therefore, so very astonishing, that he should be so reserved in laying down rules for a defensive system of fortification.

Although our most celebrated engineers who have written on the science of fortifications have left no instructions as to the best means of defending forts, they have not been deficient in laying down a multiplicity of rules for making them as impregnable as possible. But unfortunately, scarce any two writers agree in their

sentiments on this subject. Each endeavours to convince the public that his system of fortification is preferable to that of others. Hence have arisen literary contests to the detriment of the science, which the public has imagined to be founded on no fixed and certain principles. To be enabled to form any judgment in matters of this kind requires a very general knowledge of fortification as a science, aided by long experience in the practical part; that is in having been present at the attack as well as at the defence of different fortresses. Even to understand the very terms used in fortification some knowledge is necessary. It is in vain to attempt to explain to a blind person the doctrine of colours; nor can the best reasoning upon any subject convince one who has no knowledge of the matter proposed to him. Neither kings nor their ministers have the leisure to examine into the different systems of fortification. Even generals enter into this examination no further than as it respects the defence of the country, and the places most proper to be fortified. The arrangement and erection of the works is what they never look into. And if there be some whose vanity may prompt them, although they never were at any siege, to expatiate on the attack and defence of forts, such persons, if allowed to interfere in these matters, only make the evil still worse. But should they have ever been present at the attack or defence of any forts, and thereby acquired practical knowledge and experience in the different manœuvres, they then may be allowed to form some opinion on the manner in which they may be best constructed. Even the advice of an engineer whose knowledge is all theory, and who never has been present at any siege, is little to be depended on.

Speckle and afterwards *Coborn* mention an anecdote that is well worth relating, which happened at the time of building the fort at Antwerp, during the reign of *Charles* the V. This monarch had some very good generals; although they were bad engineers. However, the engineer to whom the erection of the fort was entrusted, found himself obliged to submit to their directions, contrary to his own judgment. Of this the Emperor afterwards repented very much, as the remarkable expression he made use of at the time sufficiently testifies. The absurd directions given in constructing the fort by those generals, is the cause of its weakness at this present period, and in the year 1746 obliged the garrison to evacuate it, and confined their sole exertions to the defence of the citadel.

The reply made by *Charles V.* is given in the 18th page of *Speckle's* Treatise on the architecture of Forts, published at Strasburg in 1619, and, likewise, in the introduction to *Coborn's* new system of fortification published at Wesel in 1706.

It seldom or ever therefore happens, that Sovereigns make a wise choice in those systems of fortification they adopt. And nothing but calamities are to be expected from those, who, puffed up with the vain conceit of possessing the theory of this science, think that alone sufficient to form their decisions on whatever may occur. This naturally makes an engineer, however skilful and confident in the rules of his art, cautious and circumspect in contradicting or thwarting the will of his Sovereign, or his Ministers.

I will not here make any remarks on the custom of free states to examine and deliberate upon the plans of fortification that are laid before them. It must be obvious to every one, how inaccurate will be their decision, which rests on the opinions of the Committees they appoint, not one of which are oftentimes engineers, and sometimes not two thirds of them holding any military office. Deliberations formed on the result of such committees must necessarily, at the best, be inaccurate.

It is therefore expedient, for the Sovereigns, as well as for republican governments, that all improvements in fortification should be entrusted to engineers alone of approved experience, zeal, and fidelity. Their honour is too much concerned, and the danger of losing their employments, should their labours not be crowned with success, is alone sufficient to make them exert themselves to their utmost, in the discharge of their duty. But should they not answer the public expectation, what matters it whether the state be ill served by their engineers or by others? The former at least are not likely to commit such great errors as the latter, who are without experience, and therefore cannot be called upon to account for their conduct in this respect, like the engineers who are most unquestionably liable to a strict examination.

From what has been laid down, we may draw the following conclusions; first, that it is not always the fault of the engineers, that forts are not better defended; nor does it altogether arise from a defect in the modern system of fortification, and want of skill in those who were appointed Governors of the fort. In the second place, the plans to be adopted in erecting any new fortifications do not always depend on the ability and judgment of the engineer, but on

the will and pleasure of those who are at the head of affairs, who will oftentimes dismiss the ablest and best concerted plan.

In these two instances, the engineers stand fully exculpated. But there is another circumstance in which they justly merit censure, and that is respecting an error of as long standing as the time in which the towers built by our ancestors were transformed into bastions.

The invention of cannon and mortars which followed that of powder, made this change indispensably necessary, in order to oppose to such terrible and instantaneous engines of general destruction, strong and solid bodies which would not only make a powerful resistance, but also enable the same means to be made use of in defending forts, as were employed in getting possession of them. This end seemed best answered by the invention of bastions, and the engineers have been for these two centuries continually labouring to bring them to greater perfection. It must be admitted, that there were sufficient reasons for changing the ancient system of fortification, but the inventors of the modern, are censured for having overlooked the intentions of our ancestors, and for neglecting those excellent principles which guided them, and are as essential at the present instant, as they were in former times. It is to this want of a proper application of the principles of our ancestors, that we may attribute our not being able to repair any breaches made in the principle ramparts, and that our forts are so much exposed to their being taken by surprise, or by scaling ladders; and that though we build works without number, they are frequently surrendered before a single shot has been fired at them.

Fort St Philip, in the island of Minorca, was, notwithstanding its out-works and mines, taken by assault, and what is still more remarkable, this fort was taken, before even the trenches had been opened, as the letter written by Marshal *Richelieu* to the Spanish general *de la Minas* publicly testifies. We have beside, still later instances of other forts taken in like manner.

Against accidents like these, our ancestors had taken wise precautions. The towers they constructed, defended the town, not only outwardly, but even when the enemy had already penetrated into it; they could not mount upon the wall and extend themselves on the ramparts, till they had previously taken the towers. It must have been by the greatest chance that the enemy could de-

scend from the walls into the town, as the ramparts in most towns were likewise encircled by a wall of considerable height. It was oftentimes more difficult to get over this second wall than upon the outward one. If the enemy had got possession of one gate, or by any means had introduced themselves into the town, they were obliged to commence an attack upon the towers, in order to be entirely masters of the town, as was the case at the siege of Stockholm in 1495. At that period of time we were not considered as masters of a town, for having had a polygon in our possession.

Ancient history records many instances of such a brave and valiant defence. We will indulge ourselves in the liberty of adducing one from the annals of Sweden.

In a very severe winter, in the year 1496, the Swedes were besieged by the Russians at Wyburgh, in Finland. Two towers had been converted into a heap of rubbish, and a considerable breach made even in a third. The Swedes entrenched themselves behind the breach, which was attacked with the utmost fury by between two and three thousand Russians. At the same time, scaling ladders were fixed against the walls between the towers that had been demolished. The assault was carried, and the Russians mounted the ramparts. Not being able to extend themselves on account of some adjoining towers which the Swedes still had in their possession, they endeavoured to make their way into the town. As the rampart, however, had a very high wall running round it, the Russians could only descend it on the other side by ladders, which they in vain attempted to fix. The people in the town, who posted themselves at the foot of the rampart, instantly pulled them away, and killed the Russians from above, whom this lower and internal wall obliged at last to retire from the rampart with considerable slaughter, after an attack which lasted seven hours.

Let us here pause to reflect on such an obstinate and spirited defence; as well as on the prudent arrangement of ancient fortification. We cannot deny, that the internal defence of towers, and the high wall on the rampart were the means that enabled the Swedes to make so good a resistance, and that saved the town, after the enemy had collected all their forces on the ramparts. * Let

* See the first part of the *Memoirs of the Academy of Sciences of Sweden on the progress of the art of War during the reign of Charles XII.* page 221.

us now apply these ancient systems to our modern ones of fortification. What an obstinate resistance might we not be able to make, if instead of these weak towers, proof against arrows and musketry, we were to erect solid and spacious works, on which cannon might be planted that should command the ramparts? What advantage might we not reap in defending any fortrefs, if to the simple internal wall at the ramparts we were to add a side defence, with a ditch before it which might besides be defended by about thirty pieces of cannon that were planted unknown to the enemy? Might we not, by a prudent application of these principles in the modern system of fortification, still assert, that it would be practicable to give to the defence of forts, at least a kind of equilibrio, perhaps even an overbalance to the present artful and powerful mode of attacking them?

We have therefore acted extremely injudicious in losing sight of the principles of our ancestors, respecting the defence of forts. We should render more justice to those respectable old times, and candidly allow that every art and science would still be in its infancy, did we not make use of the knowledge of our ancestors. It is time alone, that brings all arts and sciences to any tolerable perfection. But if we reject principles founded on reason and experience, this is the sure road to error.

Finally. As the greatest generals of the present century have not been above recurring to the experience of past ages, to improve our tactics;* engineers should act in like manner in order to bring the science of fortification to greater perfection, and not have the loss of entire provinces attributed to their ignorance, which they had before exhausted by the enormous expence of works, and which, after all, have proved scarce of any utility whatsoever.

Reinplern was the first who recalled our attention to the principles of our ancestors. But this able and experienced engineer had, like all great men, the fate of being treated ill and calumniated. Every engineer pronounced his anathema against him. His system was ridiculed as the height of enthusiasm, although he evidently demonstrated that he only wished to bring things back

* *It is true, indeed, that modern tacticians have proposed to adopt different plans from our ancestors, but the most important of their regulations, which we find to be clearly shown, are now nugatory in that excellent work entitled, Un Essai sur l'influence de la poudre a canon dans la tactique moderne.*

to their ancient principles, and apply them to the present defence of forts.

The leading feature in Reinplerns system is the internal defence of forts. It is a successful application of the ancient principles we have already described. Reinplern has improved upon them by recommending an internal ditch, which he shews in what manner it may be defended; and likewise by placing a parapet on the rampart next the town. Consequently, before the besiegers can get entire possession of the fort, they must attack and conquer one polygon after the other. In engagements, either by land or by sea, we have not always come off conquerors by having defeated one or two battallions, or having taken a ship or two of the line. Neither ought the loss of one or two bastions to be followed by that of a fort as a necessary consequence, any more than the defeat of a battallion or two, by that of the whole army. Why should ten bastions surrender, one after another, without making the least resistance, because two of them happen to have been taken by the enemy? Is not this sufficient to shew the weakness of our forts? Does not this sufficiently demonstrate how far we are, in this respect, behind-hand with our ancestors?

Reinplern also proposes, for the internal security of great forts, fortifying different parts of the town. This thought, however, is by no means new. A plan of this kind is laid down with great minuteness in a history of the Northern states, written above three hundred years ago. The author, after remarking the superior skill of our ancestors in fortifying and intrenching themselves, as well as in defending their trenches, and disputing every inch of ground with the enemy; adds, if all the outworks were taken, they then defended themselves against the enemy, by retiring into the town, and barricading the streets and the houses. Each house had but one entrance, and therefore, in case of necessity, they might be considered as separate redoubts.

Speckle, in his Treatise on Military Architecture, tells us, that at La Valette, in the island of Malta, in the year 1566, the whole town was fortified with towers, which not only defended each other, but also the houses; and that by these means it was thought, that an army of fifty thousand men might be repulsed, even though they should have penetrated into the town.

The result would perhaps have lessened their admiration of this new system of fortification, had they not devised means to pre-

vent the enemy's forming themselves on the rampart, which would, in the end, have ensured them the entire possession of the place. But if they had connected the towers they had erected in different parts of the town, with the internal wall of the ramparts, so that they both commanded the streets, and gave a side defence to the internal wall, the intention would then have been completed of having given the town an internal defence, and La Valette would have been the strongest fort in Europe. It is a very humiliating remark to make, in favour of the human understanding, that the mind often perceives a truth which it instantly loses, and does not recover again till after it has made many circuitous paths.

From all these considerations it is evident, that Reinpler's plan of fortifying the different quarters of a town was not unknown to our ancestors; nor was that of his internal ditch, which, according to De Ville in p. 133 of his work, had been proposed by an engineer, when Leghorn was fortified, with this difference however, that no parapet was placed on the side of the town. It was intended to place this parapet on the opposite side of the ditch, which would have increased the works unnecessarily; a proof how difficult it is, sometimes, to perceive the truth, even when it is before our eyes.

AN EULOGIUM, SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF THE LATE MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN, WHO FELL *June 17th*, AT THE BATTLE OF BREED'S-HILL.

WHEN an amiable man with a promising family of children perishes in the bloom of life, every friend to humanity must share in the distress which such a calamity occasions in the circle of his acquaintances. This distress is heightened when we hear that the virtues of the man were blended with the exalted qualities of the patriot. We rise in our expressions of grief, when we are told that he possessed not only the zeal of a patriot, but the wisdom, the integrity and eloquence of a senator:—But, when we hear that those shining qualities were crowned with the patience, the magnanimity, and the intrepidity of a warrior, we are led to contemplate one of the most august characters in human nature. When such a

man falls, grief is dumb—and eloquence is obliged, for a while, to muse eulogiums which it cannot express.

Such were our feelings upon hearing of the death of the illustrious General Warren, who fell on the 17th of June at the head of a detachment of the American army near Boston. It is impossible to do justice to his full-orbed character. He filled each of the numerous departments in life that were assigned to him so well, that he seemed born for no other. He had displayed in the course of three and thirty years all the talents and virtues of the man, the patriot, the senator, and the hero. He was unlike the Spartan General only, in not expiring in the arms of victory. But even in this unfortunate event he has served his country, for he has taught the sons of freedom in America, that the laurel may be engrafted upon the cypress, and that true glory may be acquired not only in the arms of victory, but in the arms of death.

If our pleasures are exalted in proportion to the extent and degrees of our benevolence, how shall we decide those pleasures which the hero feels who performs the highest act of benevolence to mankind, in dying in defence of the liberties of his country. He enjoys a prelibation the most like the joys of heaven that mortals can taste upon earth. He partakes of the nature and happiness of God.

Say illustrious shade! What new resentments kindled in thy bosom at the prospect of executing vengeance upon the foes of liberty?—Say, what were the transports of thy mind when the twice repulsed enemy fled before thy powerful arms?—But when, alas! born down with numbers, thou wast forced to retreat, and death shewed his commission to the ball that pierced thy bosom. Oh! say, what joy thrilled after it, at the prospect of having thy brows encircled with the patriots crown of martyrdom?—Tell me ye brave Americans who beheld our hero fall.—Did he not in his last moments pour forth his usual expressions of loyalty to the crown of Britain, and his wonted prayers for the welfare of his country? Did he not in flattering accents call upon his fellow soldiers to forget his death, and to revenge his country's wrongs alone?—Oh! he breathes his last?—Croud not too closely on his shade ye holy ministers of heaven. Make room for yonder spirit. It is the illustrious Hampden who flies to embrace him, and pointing to the wound that deprived him of life, in a conflict with arbitrary power above a hundred years ago, he claims the honour of conducting him to the regions of perfect liberty and happiness.

How ineffable are the delights of heaven to a virtuous lover of liberty? To behold the power of the sovereign of the universe, directed by unerring wisdom, and limited by the eternal laws of justice!—To see perfection in government, consisting in the happiness of every member that composes it! To enjoy the most perfect freedom, and yet to chuse nothing but such things as are agreeable to the will of the Supreme Being. These, blessed shade, shall now constitute a part of thy enjoyments. Oh! couldst thou tell us what other pleasures now occupy thy capacious mind! Dost thou still direct by an invisible influence the councils of thy native colony? Dost thou still inspire whole battallions of thy countrymen with courage, and lead them on to danger and glory?—These we know would be a happiness suited to the benevolence and activity of thy spirit, and we hope not an inferior part of the happiness of heaven. But it is not for mortals to pry too minutely into the secrets of the invisible world.

What a noble spectacle is the body of a hero who has offered up his life as a ransom for his country! Come hither ye vindictive ministers, and behold the first fruits of your bloody edicts. What atonement can you make to his children for the loss of such a father? And to your country for the loss of such a member of society? You may now recall your military executioners. There you may satiate your lust for arbitrary power; you have slain its most implacable enemy.

Come hither ye mercenary wretches who are hired to commit murder upon your fellow-subjects, and behold the victim of your cruelty. You have no tears to shed over a brother whom you have butchered, for you have given up your title to humanity. You have ceased to be men, and we have nothing to expect from you but the vices of slaves. We only beseech you not to insult the body of our departed hero. Spare the anguish of an aged mother, whose affection extends to the corps of her beloved son. You have nothing now to fear from his eloquence or his arms. Sheath your swords. You have performed an exploit which has filled up the measure of your infamy, and while the name of liberty is dear to Americans, the name of *Warren* will fire our hearts, and nerve our arm against the execrable mischief of standing armies.

Come hither ye military champions for American liberty and glory, come and behold a spectacle that shall rouse in your bosoms new principles of courage and ambition. Mark! the widening lustre of that path of glory which he trod.

Come hither American fathers and mothers, and behold the sad earnest of arbitrary power, behold your friend, your fellow-citizen, one of the guardians of your liberty, the pride of your country, the pillar of your hopes, behold this hero covered with blood and wounds. But pause not too long in bedewing his body with your tears. Fly to your houses, and tell your children the particulars of the melancholy fight. Chill their young blood with histories of the cruelty of tyrants, and make their hair to stand on end, with descriptions of the horrors of slavery, equip them immediately for the field, shew them the ancient charter of their privileges. Point to the roofs under which they drew their first breath and shew them the cradles in which they were rocked. Call upon heaven to prosper their arms, and charge them, with your last adieu, to conquer, or, like *Warren*, to die in the arms of liberty and glory.

AMERICAN WAR.

[Continued from page 13.]

AFTER the battle of Breeds-hill, which did not last above an hour, and which, on account of the small number of troops engaged, the great numbers killed, and the bravery shewn on both sides, belongs to the most extraordinary in the history of wars, the colonies cast their eyes on the province of Canada. Surrounded by rivers and lakes, and stretching from Nova Scotia in an oblong direction, almost to the southern extremity of Pennsylvania, it was conveniently situated for hostile invasion; and would, if reduced, prove a most important acquisition.

Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the former situated at the north end of Lake George, and the latter near the southern extremity of Lake Champlain, form the gates of that quarter of Canada. These posts had already been secured in the following manner. A number of volunteers in Connecticut planned the scheme for obtaining possession of these valuable posts. Having made the necessary preparations, and collected 270 men, chiefly of that brave and hardy people, called green mountain boys, they rendezvoused at Castleton, where they were joined by Colonel Arnold from Cambridge. Having arrived at Lake Champlain opposite Ticonderoga, in the night, Colonel Arnold and Allen, with 83 men, crossed over at the dawn of day, entered the fort without resistance, and called upon the commander, who was yet in bed, to surrender the fort.

He asked by what authority? Colonel Allen replied, I demand it in the name of the Great Jehovah, and of the Continental Congress. Thus the fort was captured with its valuable stores and forty-three prisoners. Crown Point was taken at the same time by Colonel Seth Warner, and, Colonel Arnold got by surprise possession of a sloop of war, lying at St. John's, at the northern extremity of the Lake. In this rapid manner the command of Lake Champlain was obtained without any loss, by a few determined men.

The exertions of the King's governor in Canada, which were principally made with a view to recover Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and the command of Lake Champlain, induced Congress to believe that a formidable invasion of their north western frontier was intended from that quarter. They were sensible that the only practicable plan for warding off so terrible a blow, was to make a vigorous attack upon Canada, while it was unable to resist the unexpected impression.

Congress had committed the management of their military arrangements in this northern department to General Schuyler and General Montgomery. The Americans, about one thousand in number, effected a landing at St. John's; which, being the first British post in Canada, lies only 115 miles to the northward of Ticonderoga. The British piquets being driven into the fort, they reconnoitred the environs, and found the fortifications to be much stronger than they suspected. This induced the calling of a council of war, which recommended a retreat to Isle aux Noix, twelve miles south of St. John's, to throw a boom across the channel, and to erect works for its defence. General Schuyler, on account of his bad state of health, retired soon after this event to Ticonderoga, and the command devolved on General Montgomery.

This enterprising officer in a few days returned to the vicinity of St. John's, and opened a battery against it. He also detached a small body of troops, to attempt the reduction of Fort Chamblee, only six miles distant. Success attended this enterprise. By its surrender six tons of gunpowder fell into the hands of the conquerors, which enabled them to prosecute the siege of St. John's with vigor. The garrison, though straitened for provisions, persevered in defending themselves with unabating fortitude. The governor of the province, with about 800 men, chiefly militia and Indians, endeavoured to cross the river St. Lawrence, and to land at Longueil, intending to proceed thence to attack the besiegers, but Colonel Warner with 300 green mountain boys, and a four pounder,

prevented the execution of the design. The governor's party was suffered to come near the shore, but was then fired upon with such effect, as to make them retire with great loss.

After this the garrison of St. John's surrendered. About 500 regulars and 100 Canadians became prisoners to the provincials. They also acquired 39 pieces of cannon, seven mortars, two howitzers, and about 800 stand of arms.

While the siege of St. John's was pending, Colonel Allen, who was returning with about 80 men from a tour on which he had been sent by his General, was captured by the British near Montreal, loaded with irons, and in that condition sent to England.

General Montgomery now proceeded towards Montreal. The few British forces there, unable to stand their ground, repaired for safety on board the shipping in hopes of escaping down the river; but they were prevented by Colonel Easton, who was stationed at the point of Sorel river with a body of continental troops, some cannon, and an armed gondola. General Prescott, who was on board, with several officers and about 120 privates, having no chance of escaping, submitted to be made prisoners on terms of capitulation. Eleven sail of vessels, full of ammunition, provisions, and intrenching tools, fell into the hands of the provincials. Governor Carleton escaped in a boat with muffled paddles, by a secret way, to the Three Rivers, and arrived in a few days after at Quebec.

General Montgomery, after leaving some troops in Montreal, and sending detachments into different parts of the province, advanced towards Quebec, where his little army arrived with expedition. Nothing could damp the ardour of the Americans. Notwithstanding the depth of winter was at hand, Colonel Arnold formed a design of penetrating with a detachment of one thousand men, through woods, marshes, and the most frightful deserts, from the camp of Cambridge to Canada, by a nearer way than that which Montgomery had chosen; and this he accomplished, in spite of every difficulty, to the astonishment of all who saw or heard of the attempt. In ascending the river Kennebeck, the troops were constantly obliged to labour against an impetuous current. They were often compelled by cataracts or other impediments to land and to haul their bateaux up rapid streams, and over falls of rivers. On their march by land, they had deep swamps, thick woods, and craggy precipices alternatively to encounter. At some places they had to cut their way for miles to-

gether, through forests so embarrassed, that their progress was only four or five miles a day. Incessant fatigue, and the want of provisions, caused many men to fall sick. From this cause, one third of the number which set out were obliged to return; the rest proceeded with unabated fortitude and constancy. Having spent thirty one days in traversing a hideous wilderness, without ever seeing any thing human, they at length reached the inhabited parts of Canada.

Arnold arrived at Point Levy, opposite to Quebec, before Montgomery left Montreal. Such was the consternation of the garrison and inhabitants at this unexpected appearance, that had not the river intervened, an immediate attack in the first surprise and confusion, might have been successful. The bold enterprise of one American army marching through the wilderness, at a time when success was crowning every undertaking of another invading in a different direction, struck terror into the breasts of those Canadians who were unfriendly to the designs of Congress. In a few days, after Arnold had arrived at Point Levy, he crossed the river St. Lawrence; but his chance of succeeding by a *coup de main* was in that short space greatly diminished. The critical moment was past. The panic occasioned by his first appearance had abated, and solid preparations for the defence of the town were adopted. At the time the Americans were before Montreal, General Carleton, as has been related, escaped through their hands, and got safe to Quebec. His presence was itself a garrison. The inhabitants, both English and Canadians, as soon as danger pressed, united for their common defence. The sailors were taken from the shipping in the harbour, and put to the batteries on shore. As Colonel Arnold had no artillery, after parading some days on the heights near Quebec, he drew off his troops, intending nothing more, until the arrival of Montgomery, than to cut off supplies from entering the garrison.

On the first of December General Montgomery effected a junction with Colonel Arnold at Point aux Trembles.

The siege of Quebec was then commenced; but it may first be necessary to give a short description of the town, in order to convey a better idea how it was attacked, and how defended. That part of it which is called the Lower Town, is separated from the Upper, by an inaccessible precipice, in the centre of which is a narrow road, cut out of the rock that leads to the Higher Town. The distance at this place to the edge of the river, is somewhat better than one hundred yards; from thence to the extreme ends, the rock grows gradually narrower, till the precipice admits only of one or two of houses below it.

The Lower Town forms nearly the figure of a half moon; this is, likewise, the shape of the Higher Town, with regular bastions and curtains facing the country, running across from the precipice on one side to the precipice on the other, from (*a* to *f*. See Plan No. II.) No place can be better situated for a defence. There are three gates out of the Upper Town. St. Lewis gate, marked (*fig. 1.*) St. John's gate (*l*) and Palace gate (*m*), all built with stone and brick. Between the Upper and Lower Town is a stockaded gate.

In the Lower Town, the merchants chiefly live, and have their ware houses, shops, &c. for the convenience of receiving goods from the ships. In it also is a *Cul du Sac*, (*fig. 3.*) where the shipping winter with safety from the ice. Directly facing this, on the south shore of the river St. Lawrence, at the distance of nearly one English mile, is Point Levy, on which Gen. Monkton the preceding war had his batteries, and from whence he almost destroyed the Lower Town. Here the Americans, in the course of the siege, (April 4.) brought four pieces of cannon, which did but little damage to the shipping, and none to the town, their guns being only 12 pounders. About half a mile to the northward is the river St. Charles, where is an old French work, called St. Roche.

General Montgomery, upon his arrival before Quebec, found, that this place was not to be taken by raising batteries; however, to intimidate the French inhabitants and merchants, he began by opening a small battery of five six pounders and one howitzer, within seven hundred yards of St. John's gate. At the same time, he wrote a letter to the British governor, recommending an immediate surrender, to prevent the dreadful consequences of a storm: but the inflexible firmness of the governor could not be moved either by threats or dangers.

The garrison of Quebec at this time consisted of about 1320 men, of which 800 were militia. The American army were not above 800 strong. Some had been left at Montreal, and near a third of Arnold's detachment, as has been related, had returned to Cambridge. This force was too insignificant to attempt the reduction of a place so strongly fortified. General Montgomery, however, from a native intrepidity and an ardent thirst for glory, overlooked all dangers, and resolved at once either to carry the place or perish in the attempt. Trusting much to his good fortune, confiding in the bravery of his troops, and depending somewhat on the extensiveness of the works, he determined to attempt the

town by assault. He held his men in constant readiness, to take the advantage of the first bad night ; hoping then to find the garrison off their guard. Arnold, who commanded about 350 men, was to enter the Lower Town, at the north end, called the *Saut du Matelot*, (pretty near to z.) and Montgomery was to attack and enter at the south end, just under the precipice called Cape Diamond. (a) At length the night of the 3rd of December presented them with the wished for occasion ; it was very dark, and there was a great fall of snow. Gen. Montgomery then made his disposition, which consisted of four different divisions ; two inconsiderable ones, to make a false attack on the bastions, facing the country from (b to e) and two real ones, on the Lower Town. He had ordered rockets to be thrown up by Arnold's party and his own, to let each other see, from time to time, how far the parties were advanced. This was undoubtedly what they might have wished to know, yet the distance from their head quarters, was not so great but each division might have ascertained what time it would take to get to the different barriers. The lights that were thrown up, naturally gave the alarm ; the bell was rung, and most of the garrison ran to their posts.

About four in the morning, Col. Arnold, at the head of his party, approached the bars at Saut du Matelot on the north. He attacked a two-gun battery, and carried it, but with considerable loss. In this attack Arnold was shot through the leg, which made it necessary to carry him off the field of battle. His party, nevertheless, pushed on. Some part of the way they were under shelter from the fire, by a row of houses, but passing some openings, several of the Americans were killed and wounded from the pickets above. They, however, passed these intervals, with their scaling ladders on their shoulders, with spirit and perseverance. They made themselves masters of a second barrier, and sustained the force of the whole garrison for three hours ; but at last, finding themselves hemmed in, and without hopes either of success or relief, they yielded to numbers, and the advantageous situation of their adversaries.

It is generally thought, that wounding Arnold in the beginning of this affair, was the saving of the Lower Town. He certainly had arranged matters in his own mind previous to the attack ; determining what to have done, in case he found things in such or such a state. He knew the town perfectly, which, perhaps, his successor in command did not.



- A Cape Diamond
- B The Glaciens
- C S^t Lewis
- D S^t Ursula
- E S^t John
- F The Potasse
- G Redoubt of Cape Diamond
- H Royal Redoubt and Barracks
- I Dauphine's Redoubt and Barracks
- K Jesuits Church
- L S^t Johns Gate
- M Palace
- N Fort S^t Lewis and Governors House
- O New Gun Battery
- P Great Battery
- Q Cathedral

RIVER S^t CHARLES

CAPE DIAMOND RIVER S^t LAURENCE

R
S
T
H
V
W
X
Y

Y of
EC

Point Levi






- A Cape Diamond
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- L St. Johns Gate
- M Palace
- N Fort St. Lewis and Governors House
- O New Gun Battery
- P Great Battery
- Q Cathedral
- Point Levi

- R Seminary
- S Jesuits College
- T Recollets
- H Parade
- V Market Place
- W Market Place in the lower Town
- X Ursulines
- Y Hotel Dieu

- Z Intendant's Palace
- 1 St. Lewis Gate
- 2 Intrenchments along St. Charles River
- 3 Cul de Sac
- 4 The Kings Yard
- 5 Narrow Entrance into the Lower Town

MAP
of the CITY of
QUEBEC

Scale of 3000 Feet



Published by C. Smith N. York

Roberts sc.

General Montgomery, in the mean time, attacked the other end of the Lower Town, (*a*, in the Plan, or 5 *birds* in the view). He passed the first barrier, and was just opening to attack the second, when he was killed, together with his aid-du-camp. At this barrier were seven small pieces of cannon, all pointed to defend the pass, below the precipice, the only place where it was possible for the Americans to approach. As soon as the centries gave intelligence of the lights in the air, all the men stood to their guns. The river not being frozen over, the narrowness of this pass, from the rocks on one side, and the river on the other, admitted only of four or five men to advance in front, (See *fig. 4.* in the Plan.) Montgomery was at their head, and the heavy fall of snow and darkness prevented their being perceived by their enemies till they came within a few yards of them. They were then fired upon with cannon and musketry at the same instant. Montgomery's fall so dispirited the men, that Col. Campbell, on whom the command devolved, thought proper to draw them off.

The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded, in the different attacks, was about one hundred, and three hundred were taken prisoners. The garrison had only five killed and thirteen wounded. Few men have ever fallen in battle, so much regretted by both sides, as General Montgomery. This amiable qualities had procured him an uncommon share of private affection; and his great abilities, an equal proportion of public esteem.

The issue of this assault relieved the garrison of Quebec from all apprehensions for its safety. The provincials were so much weakened, as to be scarcely equal to their own defence. However, Colonel Arnold encamped within three miles of the town; and, difficult as his situation was, impeded the conveyance of refreshments and provisions into the garrison. The sufferings of his troops were great; they were exposed in the open air to the extreme rigour of the season.

On the 23d of April, the Americans raised a battery on the heights opposite the gate of St. Lewis, but it was soon silenced by the besieged. An attempt to burn the Lower Town and the shipping was made on the 3d of May by the besiegers. Their plan was well conceived. They had prepared a fire ship, charged with combustibles proper for the occasion. About ten in the evening, she stood in for the *Cul du Sac*, and was hailed at the distance of about one hundred yards. The men on board very imprudently

made no answer ; had they replied from England or Halifax, they would have come in unmolested. Their silence made them suspected, and a shot was fired to bring them to. The three men who had charge of the vessel, then thought it high time to escape ; they slipped into a boat they had along side, after lighting the match, and made the best of their way back to the other shore. They had set off with the ship rather too late for the tide ; had it flowed five minutes longer, the light wind, and the flood would have brought her straight to the *Cul du Sac*, and into the midst of the shipping, which would instantly have been in flame, and that must inevitably have communicated to part of the Lower Town. She was driven down the stream to the Isle of Orleans, where she consumed to the water's edge.

The morning of the 6th of May the van of the long expected reinforcement from England arrived before Quebec. They made good their passage through the ice up the river St. Lawrence. The expectation of their coming had for some time induced the besiegers to think of a retreat, which now was carried into execution with great precipitation.

(To be Continued.)

DIRECTIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF PONTON-BRIDGES,
*Addressed to those who wish to acquire some general knowledge on
this subject.*

[By an Officer in the Prussian Artillery.]

THOUGH the construction of bridges, the putting them together and taking them to pieces does not absolutely belong to the department of engineers, yet, as it has been the custom in the different European armies that the artillery should construct the pontons, take care of every thing belonging to them, and carry them along with them, it may not be amiss to point out what an artillery and every other officer ought to know respecting them.

The pontons are of different materials : of copper, tin, leather or sail cloth ; and are carried with the army in carts or waggons, in order to be ready at hand if there should be any rivers to pass. They are made with flat bottoms, and the bottoms with separations in the length, each six inches from one another ; that if there should be a hole, and the water penetrate the ponton, it may not sink and go to the bottom.

The pontoons are carried reverfed, that they might not be filled with water if it fhould rain; and that in cafe of neceffity, the men might lie dry under them. They may alfo be ufed to cover the ammunition and other things.

Thofe made of copper and block tin are the moft in request; the other two forts being more remarkable for their fingularity than utility, they being neither fo durable nor fo eafily carried.

The French, and fome other nations, have them made of copper, and carry them on waggons; but in the Pruffian and Dutch armies they are made of block tin; in the latter carried in carts. They were formerly carried in carts in the Pruffian army, but at prefent in waggons, the fore-wheels of which are like thofe of a carriage, that by turning about the wheels may go underneath.

This fpecies of boat bridges, made of block tin, became known to the Pruffians through the Dutch, whom they copied after in this particular. They are not approved by many perfons, both on account of the materials from which they are made, and the mode of carrying them, from which arife many inconveniences.*

Disadvantage of Boat-Bridges made of Tin.

1. Block tin is not durable, and very liable to be rufty, by which it is eaten through and full of holes; while, on the contrary, copper is more lafting, and does not ruft fo foon.†

2. If any ponton is damaged, it cannot be applied to any other purpofe; on the contrary, in thofe of copper, nothing is loft but the fhape.

3. There muft be perfons constantly employed; fuch as tinmen, to keep them in proper order.

4. As thefe pontoons are carried on carts, which are more likely to overturn than waggons, they are fooner damaged than thofe of copper.

5. That carts are more liable to break down, particularly in going down hill, when the whole weight lies on the fhafthorfe, by which every thing is rendered unferviceable.

6. That pontoons are much eafier carried on waggons, where the weight refts on two axles, and where more fpace is allotted for the whole carriage.

* Every one knows the many wars in which the Pruffians have been engaged, yet they never made ufe of any other pontoons but thofe made of tin, and have made good and durable bridges over the largeft rivers without any accident ever happening, even when the bridges have been fome weeks in the water.

† As the pontoons are painted over feveral times in oil colours, the tin will refift the ruft as long as the paint adheres to it; beſides, it is ſtrongly fodered, which is, likewife, a preſervative againſt ruft.

Advantages which Boat-Bridges of Tin have over those of Copper.

Those of Copper, on the contrary, are :

1. Much more expensive than those of tin.
2. Their weight is likewise much greater—therefore,
3. They cannot carry so many of them.
4. If these pontoons are lost, the loss is much more than if they were made only of tin.

As pontoons of tin, besides other advantages, are much more commodious and better calculated for carrying heavy loads, which is what they are particularly designed for, and which is confirmed by experience; the abovementioned disadvantages, except as far as relates to the carriage, are not of any great moment, and we have only to look out in what manner they may be best transported.

How bridges are made over rivers and marshy ground, is known from the usual practice : It will not be amiss, however, to mention what is to be particularly observed in placing them.

Precautions to be observed in making a Ponton Bridge.

1. Boat bridges must not be made in those parts of a river where the current is most rapid.
2. Such place, likewise, must be avoided where the river is very broad, or very deep; as in the first instance more pontoons are requisite, and in the other, the usual length of the cable work for the anchors, will not be sufficient.
3. Such places must be chosen where the shore is flat, and where trees may also be found to which the ropes may be fastened that hold the bridge, otherwise stakes must be driven into the ground for that purpose, which often give way, by which means the bridge is loosened and unsafe.
4. The boats must not be too near each other, that the water may pass easily between them without any obstruction; and likewise if the enemy should send down trunks of trees, pieces of timber, or other things to break and force away the bridge, that we may be able, by long poles or oars, to direct them so that they may pass between the boats without any damage or inconvenience.
5. At both ends of the bridge, and also at some little distance sentinels should be placed to give notice if any parties of the enemy should make their appearance, or if they should attempt to put the abovementioned manœuvres in execution, or even to send

combustibles down the river in order to set the bridge or the cable work on fire; and of which they must instantly inform their officers, who must immediately take all possible precautions to prevent the enemy from obstructing their plans.

6. In order to secure bridges properly, half and whole redoubts should be thrown up; that the troops who are to defend the passage of the bridge, may, by being sheltered behind them, be better able to resist the attacks of an enemy, and defend the bridge, and these redoubts will be the more formidable if they are occupied by cannon. The back redoubt on the opposite shore is made, that if the troops who cover the bridge are obliged to retire on account of the superiority of the enemy, they may post themselves against it, for which reason the first intrenchment should consist of half redoubts only, that in case of a retreat no place of shelter may be left for the enemy.

7. During the retreat, we must take away the boats as quick as possible from the three or four pontoons next the shore, and carry them with the pontoons to the opposite side. We should likewise take off the boards from the middle of the bridge, to stop the enemy, if the flatness of the shore should enable them to get footing on the bridge while they are in pursuit.

The boards being thrown off, are to be heaped up before the opening, behind which as many men from the piquet are to be placed as the space will admit, in order to fire at the enemy and defend the bridge, whilst the others retreat to the back redoubt, and endeavour to force the enemy to retire by keeping up an incessant firing.

As, in general, no time is to be lost in a retreat of this sort, it would be dangerous, and take up too much time to disengage one pontoon after another, and carry them away; the best method is, as soon as the boards and timbers at the extremity of the bridge are taken off, to untie the ropes which fasten the bridge on that side of the river where the enemy is approaching, and to pull up all the anchors on the opposite side of the bridge, and let it drive round, as it remains, to the other side.

Also, in constructing the bridge, we may make use of this advantage, by putting it together on the side where we are, and then pushing it from the shore, let it drive round of itself to the opposite side, where it must be instantly made fast by letting go the anchors. This will enable us to work at it with more safety and expedition, and without being discovered.

Manner in which Bridges are constructed.

First of all, if trees are not to be found on the banks of those rivers where we have occasion to throw over a bridge, we must drive into the ground obliquely towards the water, four strong posts at the distance of 20 or 21 feet according to the length of the ponton, in order to fasten the ropes to them, which are to go across the river.

The pontons must then be taken down from the carts by ten or twelve men, and placed in between the two ropes that go across the river one after another. They are put between them cross-ways, at a proper distance, and parallel to each other, and then fastened by their four rings to the principal rope that goes across the river.

Formerly it was usual to draw the principal rope that goes across the river through the rings which are fastened to the pontons, and not tie the rings to the rope, but the above method is preferable, because if a ponton is damaged, it may be removed, and another put in its place, without being obliged to remove all the rest, and loosen the whole bridge; besides, the pontons by the method now adopted, cannot move out of their place, and get all together, when they are shook by the stream, or by any heavy weight.

The distance of the pontons from each other varies partly on account of the current, which, being more or less rapid, gives a proportionable motion to the bridge, and partly from the intention with which it is constructed, whether as a passage for infantry, cavalry or artillery.

For infantry and light baggage, and likewise for cavalry if dismounted, the pontons may be six feet apart; but if the cavalry does not dismount, and heavy baggage or heavy artillery is to be transported, the pontons must be only as far distant from each other, as they are wide, which is four feet.

When the pontons are properly arranged, according to the weight that is to be carried over, and fastened to the principal cable that goes across, the anchors must then be let down in the following manner: we either take a ponton on purpose for this business, or that which is the last placed on the bridge, and putting the anchors with their cables into it, push off with them to a proper distance from the shore, and then throw out the anchor opposite to that ponton to which we intend to fasten it, we then row to the ponton, and fasten the cable to the ring, and continue in the same manner with the other pontons.

But if the stream is not deep or very rapid, we then make one anchor serve for two pontoons which is fastened to the middle of the rope, and both the ends are then fastened to each of the pontoons, in order to keep them steadier, and this must be done on both sides of the bridge. In fastening them to the anchor ropes, the pontoons may be drawn in a straight line, if there is a man on shore to direct them.

Afterwards the timbers are placed along over the pontoons, and properly fastened through their holes, and placed at a proper distance from each other. Each timber reaches over two pontoons, and touches at its extremity the band of the third.

The number of timbers to be placed in a row with each other depends upon the width of the burden which the bridge has to support, and sometimes six, and even eight, or perhaps fewer, are placed along side each other. In order to get these timbers from one ponton to another, long boards are made use of.

When the timbers are properly placed and linked together like a chain, then the boards are laid over them, and secured at both ends with long boards placed lengthways and fastened down with a few nails, that the boards which cover the timbers, and are placed cross-ways, may not be moved out of their place by the horses or waggons going over them; this, however, is not always done, as it is a great hindrance in removing the bridge.

To cover the bridge with earth might not be amiss, as it would prevent the boards from being injured by the horses feet, but as it makes the bridge so much heavier it is generally omitted.

Bridges of large boats or barges.

If the pontoons which the army carries with them are not sufficient, or if several bridges are to be constructed, and we can procure large boats or barges, the bridges may be made likewise with them; and for bearing heavy loads they are far better than the pontoons. Anchors, cables, timbers and boards are equally necessary for these, and what we have not with us, must be procured from the place where the army is.

If the boats cannot be brought with safety by water to the spot where the bridge is to be erected, they must be carried by land on waggons.

The same methods are to be used in building bridges of large boats or barges, as if they were built of pontoons, with this difference only, that if the timbers are very strong they may be placed ten or twelve feet apart, and that half the number of large boats will suffice, and yet the bridge will be both firmer and stronger.

A LETTER, on the conclusion of *Monsieur l'Abbé Carlier's* Work, which gained the Prize of the Royal Academy of Antiquarians at Paris; to Mr. Rey, publisher of the *Journal des Savans*, at Amsterdam, July 25, 1781.

SIR,

IN your journal of this month, page 288, a learned Abbé says, the ancients knew America; and, that from the little the ancient authors have left us on the long voyages of the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Marseillois, and Vannois, there is no doubt of their intercourse with the Americans; and likewise, that Julius Cæsar intended to reform the Roman Navy on the Rhodian and Vannois plan.

Though I believe easily in history, when it has an air of truth, yet I cannot but look on these assertions as strange hypotheses; they appear the more so, as the most experienced sea-faring gentlemen can give no probable conjecture on such matters, not even how the ancients worked their ships, nor the manner of managing the number of oars on their ships of war.

But, Sir, as I have some practice in the nautic arts, and know most of the methods for working ships in the known world, and what has been done for shortening voyages to the East Indies, and the western parts of the South Seas, I make bold to hazard some objections on the opinion of this learned antiquarian.

I agree that the ancients built large ships, and some much larger than necessary, to cross the Atlantic ocean, though not of a proper figure for that purpose; and that the Greeks constructed vessels double the length of our first rate men of war, as may be seen by Ptolemy's ship of 500 feet long, and 50 broad in the mid-ship, with a proportionable height; (Rollin) it had 4000 men for rowing, 3000 soldiers, and 200 sailors; this number proves that Ptolemy preferred oars to sails, which in all likelihood were small in proportion to those made use of in our days, though his ship was double the length of our largest which have six times as many sailors.

To give a farther proof of the largeness of some of the ancient ships of war, I shall mention what a French author says in his *Commerce des Egyptiens*.

“ The military navy of Ptolemy was two ships of 32 rows of
“ oars, one of 12 rows of oars, four of 13 rows, fourteen of 11

“ rows, thirty-nine of 9 rows, with a double number of quadri-
 “ remes, and others of less size.”

Hiero, king of Syracuse, had a ship built under the direction of Archimedes, it was of a very extraordinary size, and had such a number of conveniences that we can have no notion of them, being so different from those of our time.

But to speak of ships not so extraordinary, and which were more proper for the Mediterranean sea, than any of those built by the Armonicans, or ancient Gauls, we have but to look on those constructed by Demetrius for the siege of Rhodes, which, as far as we can conjecture, were such as could contain twelve hundred men.

Here is what Plutarch says of those vessels: “ Demetrius built
 “ large ships, which had so majestic an appearance that they fasci-
 “ nated the eyes of all those who perceived them, and in such a
 “ manner, that his very enemies were struck with admiration when
 “ they saw this king’s ship, with fifteen or sixteen rows of oars,
 “ pass so quick along the shore.”

The learned Abbé Caffier says, “ That the death of Cæsar
 “ hindered the reform he intended to make in the Roman navy ;
 “ Mark Anthony, at the battle of Actium, followed Cæsar’s prin-
 “ ciples, and it is known that he would have gained the day had
 “ not Cleopatra fled with her ships.”

To such assertions we make bold to answer, that such a man as Mark Anthony, engaged in continual civil wars, running from Rome to the Alps, then to Lombardy, from thence to the capital, and again to Asia, against the Parthians and Egyptians, and at last plunged into perpetual feastings, &c. such a man, we must think, was very improper to make reforms in matters which had been found useful for many centuries, since we see, that in our days, we have been more than fifty years in finding the proper length of our naval canon.

I shall not pretend to decide on Cæsar’s intention, but I leave you to judge if such an account as Monsieur l’Abbé gives on Cæsar’s intended reform is probable ; what Plutarch says of the battle of Actium, may be a little in favour of Anthony’s preferring heavy ships ; but his conduct proved his wrong judgment. His ancient author says, “ Mark Anthony had no less than five hundred ships,
 “ among which were several of eight and ten rows of oars ; his
 “ vessels appear more fit for triumph than battle.

“ Cæsar had two hundred and fifty ships, all light and easy to work, but without the least appearance of pomp.”

“ Mark Anthony burnt all his small vessels, but reserved his best and largest, from three to ten rows of oars, and sixty Egyptian ships. When every thing was in order, he went round his fleet in a light frigate, encouraging his men to keep their post in the Straights, and think themselves upon firm ground, from the weight and steadiness of their ships. After much stay in the same place, Mark Anthony’s men, impatient to attack, from the opinion they had of the strength of their vessels, made their left wing advance, which Cæsar perceiving, made his right wing fall back to decoy his enemy out of the Straights. Anthony’s motion was very agreeable to Cæsar, as he knew Anthony had not hands enough to move his ponderous vessels, for which reason they could not strike with their beaks as was usual in sea-fights; thus Octavius, taking the advantage he had over his antagonist, gained the victory.”

This battle shewed the judgment of Cæsar, and the little understanding of Mark Anthony, in what was necessary to work heavy ships; for if he had had men in proportion to the size of his vessels, he would have sunk Octavius’s ships at the first shock; but what could be expected from such an imprudent man?

Let us now see if the Romans thought the Gallic ships preferable to theirs; when Julius Cæsar’s fleet was built on the Loire, and had the necessary quantity of men for rowing, as well as pilots and sailors, in order to attack the Vannois, he says, “ The enemy had an advantage from the make of their ships; their bottoms were flatter than ours, and of course, they were less liable to be damaged, when the tide left them on shallows: their heads and sterns were high, and better fitted to withstand the violent waves of the ocean: they were built with oak, their cross timbers were a foot square, and fastened with nails of an inch thick. Their anchor fastened with iron chains; * their sails were made with pliable, and well prepared skins, more proper to endure the tempestuous winds of the ocean, and give motion to such heavy bodies. It was against such ships, (said he) our fleet was to engage; but we surpassed them in quickness of motion, though we could not hurt them with our beaks, they being too strongly built for us; nor could we safely attack them, on account of their height; for the same reason, they were not afraid of shal-

* These iron instruments prove that the Gauls had iron works.

“ low water, nor being left ashore, when the tide went off, all
 “ which our vessels dreaded.”

To shew how much fitter the Roman ships were for their purpose, than those of the Gauls, we see that when Cæsar first appeared on the British coast, the natives were astonished at the shape and manner of going of the Roman ships, and at the effect of the Roman engines, which made them fall back, and give Cæsar’s army time to land. This demonstrates that the Roman manner of building was fitter for their purpose than Monsieur *l’Abbe Carlier* thinks; from which we may conclude that Cæsar thought little about changing his manner of building to copy an inferior one.

A farther proof that the Romans would never have copied the Gallic method of building ships is the slow manner in which the Gauls made their vessels. The ancient Romans had sure rules by which every carpenter could work properly, as may be conceived by the great number of ships they built when wanted, and as it appears by what these conquerors did on the Gallic shore, where Cæsar ordered his army to build * as many vessels as they could, while he was in winter-quarters; but, as he had observed, “ that
 “ the waves on the ocean were lessened, by going in and out of the
 “ tide, he ordered his ships to be less lofty than those built in the
 “ Mediterranean, in order to have them drawn on shore, with
 “ less difficulty; and that they should be broader, in order to carry
 “ more burden, and be lighter for rowing, as well as for sailing.”

At Cæsar’s return from winter-quarters, he found upwards of 600 ships and 28 gallies† built, though his men had had a hard winter; so desirous were they to follow his orders.

“ Cæsar, at the head of five legions, left the Gallic shore, with a
 “ gentle southerly wind, which fell at midnight; this made the tide
 “ carry him to the right, and, at day-break, he perceived Britain
 “ on his left hand, which made him tack about, to regain what he
 “ had lost in the night, in order to land in the same place which

* This shews that every man could work at ship-building, from easy rules, very different from our method, which is attended with an infinity of costly moulds.

† At first sight, it is surprising how the Romans could build such a quantity of ships in a winter; but, if it be rightly considered, it will be seen, that all the soldiers could make use of saws, axes, augurs, and all the necessary tools for working wood: and as every man who can make use of such instruments can figure timber as he pleases, all the army could be ship-carpenters; and the more so, as the ancients had general and simple rules for ship-building, of course the officers, in winter quarters, filled up their time with superintending those works.

“ had been so fortunate for his return last campaign ; on this occasion, his soldiers shewed their desire to make up for lost time, and rowed forward the heavy transports, with as much quickness as if they had been galleys, for which Cæsar praised them much.”

This single instance shews how the Romans could make use of oars on their ships of burden ; and that the ancient vessels were made so as to employ sails and oars at the same time, and of course, to keep up to the wind, nearer than we can, in moderate weather.

The better to prove the improbability of the Romans copying the heavy Gallic ships, we have but to look at the sea-fight before Marseilles, were they had much trouble with twelve great vessels, built in thirty days after they had cut down the trees ; the greenness of the wood rendering them so heavy that they could hardly be managed.

From these premises every one will conclude, that Cæsar never dreamed of changing his manner, for that of the clumsy Gallic mode, since, three centuries after, as Appian says, “ the Romans had two thousand light ships, and fifteen hundred vessels, with five and six rows of oars ; they had also eight hundred large ships, which they named Ptolemiques, for their Emperor’s pomp, carved and gilt from head to stern.”

Having said something of what is most remarkable in the ancient ships of war, we must take a little notice of their mercantile vessels. As far as we can discover, their proportions were four breadths for one length, as may be seen in the Wishes of Lucian, when he mentions a large ship which carried corn from Alexandria to Rome, which, from bad weather, was driven into the Pyreum the port of Athens.

As the Grecian and Roman seas were not so extensive as those of the ocean, their ships had no need of such strong timbers as we make use of at present ; for which reason, we may safely say, that neither the Grecian nor the Roman merchant ships, could cross the long space, in the Atlantic ocean, which separates Europe from America, though they went over the Black Sea, as appears by what follows.

An ancient author, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, says, that “ from the northernmost part of the Black Sea, where the Scythians dwelt in ice and snow, ships have been seen to come, with a good wind, from those frozen countries, and arrive in ten days ; after which they have been at Alexandria in four days ; in ten days more went up the Nile into Ethiopia.” *Commerce des*

Egyptiens. And thus they could run, in the space of 24 days from the coldest regions to the hottest.

From what has been seen, ship-builders, in those days, knew how to make their vessels run from the north part of the Black Sea, to Egypt, in 14 days, which shews that the ancients had more knowledge in maritime affairs than generally our sea-faring gentlemen think, who seldom give themselves the trouble of looking into antiquity, where they would find our forefathers had some understanding in the arts as well as ourselves. From what has been said, the Romans had no need to change their system of ship-building for that of the Gauls.

We allow that Monsieur l'Abbé Carlier's remarks may be curious; but, from the little which the ancient authors have said on these matters, how could he imagine such a problematic proposition could be believed by the members of the Academy? Yet they did believe it; but, from what has been shewn, any body may boldly say, that nineteen hundred years past, our forefathers could never cross the Atlantic ocean, and, of course, could not know America. I have heard, indeed, forty years ago, that an Irishman, taken by the savages, in America, cried out in his native language; and that the words he spoke had such an effect upon those people, that they thought there was some connection between the Irish tongue and their own, which induced them to give him his liberty. There, Sir, is one more discovery for your inventive antiquarians; it may lead them to the analogy of the Hibernian grammar, with that of the Americans; as well as on the arts and sciences, manufactures, and commerce of these wild people.

But, to shew how cautious writers should be in advancing hypothetical notions, the shortest way to America is more than 30 degrees in longitude, through strong currents, and tempestuous oceans, large enough to swallow ten millions of Gallic flat bottom ships, rigged I know not how, *with pliant, well-dressed skins, and anchors fastened to iron chains.*

Besides they must have had other methods of working their ships, than those they have left us a notion of, to navigate in those dangerous seas, which make the boldest mariners tremble. But to come from that new world, how could they find their way, in latitudes where fogs are so thick as to hinder one man's seeing another half way over the ship.

From what you have seen, Sir, it must appear very extraordinary, that Monsieur l'Abbé Carlier should conclude, so positively,

from, as he says, the little documents, to hint the ancient authors have left us; but it is still more extraordinary, that an Academy of Antiquarians should have crowned such a work, especially when most of the sea-faring gentlemen of our days, are of opinion that all that has been said of the ancients, on their ships of war, is fabulous.

Let these gentlemen remember that Julius Cæsar, in his Commentaries, is very particular in the description of his engagement with the Egyptian ships before Alexandria.

I do not pretend to give reasons why our writers and mariners do not believe what the ancients have said, but I am persuaded that those who generally comment on ancient arts, have very little experience, in those of our own times, being more conversant in style, than in the experience arts require, as may be seen in the Encyclopedies, which are almost written and copied by men, who make it their business to write on arts they have never practised.

From this we may conclude, that the knowledge of the ancient arts is not easily obtained from the works of our present writers, who, for instance, name three-banked ships, &c. those with three rows of oars, for want of understanding the practical part; like those translators, who understand not the true stile of the language, and much less the technical terms of arts, which will ever put in confusion the greatest orator in the world, if he has not experience in the art he speaks of.

As you see, Sir, I have given some reasons to shew how far we are from having a thorough knowledge of the ancient maritime arts. I hope to be excused if I venture an opinion on what I think is very material for saving of ships, in many cases, together with a great number of men's lives. I mean to take something from the ancients, and apply it to our manner of acting, for which I should propose a premium; "For the best manner of tacking about, without sail, and with sail, to go in and out of port, backwards and forwards, without turning, in all weather, except storms and strong winds, as the ancient Greeks and Romans did; this to be done without obstructing the present manner of working ships, one thousand pounds."

Many think the French are the best theorists in naval architecture; but their method, as well as those of other nations, appears not to be founded on plain and fixed principles; for the dimensions of their ships are at variance one with the other. For example, says a builder at Brest, a ship ought to be from one hundred and seventy-five to one hundred and eighty feet long, by forty-se-

ven to fifty broad, and twenty-two to twenty-five in the hold. Vessels of other sizes have no better rules; a frigate of thirty-six guns, they say, ought to be one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty feet in length, by thirty-three, or thirty-four in breadth, and sixteen or seventeen in the hold

I shall not say that such a diversity of dimensions proves their not having just ideas of the proportions of their art, but I shall make bold to put a few questions to these gentlemen.

What inconvenience would there be, in making a first-rate ship, of 200 feet long, and 50 broad, with a hold of 25 feet? It would carry more sail and go quicker. Such dimensions are so simple, that a child could put them in practice; since they give four breadths for one length, and the hold half the midship. All ships should be made in these proportions, that is, in aliquot parts; then we should be certain which would be best for different uses.

To build frigates of 108 or 110 feet long, for thirty guns merely for the accommodation of the metal, is like being guided by accessory parts, to find principles for the direction of the whole; whereas, it should be the subject which governs the attribute. Nothing, in short, is more apt to lead into difficulties than reasoning from random principles, instead of founding them on harmonious rules, which lead to true maxims, and give the first ideas of the parts which compose an invention. This ancient manner of reasoning is not easily to be found in the modern contrivers, who seldom, or never look out of the track they are in, and even offer premiums to understand a part more of the wrong *routine* they have been born in.

I am, my good Friend,
Your humble servant,
W. BLAREY.

THE SEVEN YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR,

FROM 1756 TO 1763.

[Continued from page 45.]

FREDERIC wrote, soon after this battle, a very remarkable letter to Lord Marshal, expressive of his feelings; he said, "success, my Lord, sometimes betrays us into a fatal confidence. Twenty-three battallions were not enough to beat sixty thousand men out of an advantageous post. Another time we shall do it better.

Fortune shewed her back upon me that day. I should have expected she is a woman, and I am not gallant. She declared in favour of the ladies who are at war with me. What do you think of a league against the Margrave of Brandenburg? With what astonishment would the great Frederic William behold his grandson engaged in a war with Russia, Austria, nearly all Germany, and an hundred thousand Frenchmen. I do not know whether it is a shame for me to be overcome; but certain I am, that it will be but little honour to conquer me."

This philosophical manner of thinking on a change of fortune disarmed his censurers and increased his admirers. From this single day his situation became dreadful; his good prospects vanished, and his destruction seemed to be inevitable.

The battle of Collin decided the fate of Prague, the siege being immediately raised. The departure of the Prussians was with great order, and not secretly. They quitted the trenches and entrenched posts early in the morning, with colours flying and drums beating, though not without some loss. A number of wounded and some cannon were left to the enemy; who now hastened out of their confinement, and fell upon the retreating troops. The fatal situation of the latter was, however, much amended by Frederic's disposition, who divided his forces skilfully into several separate corps and misled the enemy in that manner, facilitating thereby greatly the march of his troops over the Bohemian mountains. The king's attention was now directed towards his own provinces, which required protection: for Collin was in a manner the signal to the French, Russians, Swedes, and the troops of the Empire, to invade vigorously the Prussian dominions; and he was now formally outlawed by the grand council of the Empire. The French, under the command of Marshal D'Etrées, took possession of Westphalia, and defeated the Hanoverians under the Duke of Cumberland. The Russians entered the kingdom of Prussia with an army of 100,000 men, which field Marshal Lewald endeavoured to protect with 30,000. Prince Soubise, with a second army of French, joined the troops of the Empire with the view of entering Saxony, and the Swedes crossed the Baltic to invade Pomerania.

Brown was now dead, and the Austrian troops were under the command of Prince Charles and Daun. These generals invaded Lusatia. The corps of the Duke of Bevern, which were to protect that province, being too weak to make head against such a power,

were forced to retreat continually. The Austrians pursued the Prussians, step by step, through Saxony and Silesia, to the very gates of Breslaw. Another Austrian army in the mean time besieged Zittau, one of the most flourishing manufacturing cities in Germany. The rage of the enemy was so great, that, in order to gain possession of that place, which was open and only occupied by some Prussian battalions, they threw bombs and red hot balls into the town; so that it represented, after a few hours, a mere heap of ashes; a barbarity to which they were animated by Prince Xavier of Saxony himself. The Prussian troops cut their way through the enemy that surrounded them, and a few only were taken prisoners.

Already in the spring an army of observation had assembled in the northern part of Germany, which consisted of Hannoverians, Hessians, Brunswicks, and some battalions of the troops of Gotha and Bukeburg. These were joined by a few thousand Prussians, so that this army was 50,000. But it was too weak to resist the French army, whose numbers were greater. After the latter had passed the Weser, taken Emden, and put Hannover under contribution, a battle ensued near Hastenbeck between Marshal D'Etrees and the Duke of Cumberland, in which the latter was beaten. The victory was, however, in itself insignificant, and would not have had any material consequence, if the Duke, from an apprehension for the archives of Hannover and other things of value, conveyed to Stade, for security's sake, had not been disposed to withdraw with his army to the north, in order to cover that town. But he was soon enclosed by the French, cut off from the Elbe, and put in a situation that left nothing to him but to capitulate, which was done the 8th of September, near Closter-Seeven, under the grant of the king of Denmark. The chief article of it was, "that all the troops, Hannoverian as well as Hessian and Brunswicks, should be disembodied." This was done. The soldiers went home, and their commander returned to England. Frederic lost thereby an auxiliary army, which hitherto had occupied the French in the field, and who now could direct their whole force against him.

They had, besides Hanover, likewise occupied the Hessian states. The French commissary of war, Foulon, reigned at Cassel like a grand Vizier. The Landgrave, that he might not be a spectator

of the tyrannies committed in his own residence, was gone to Hamburgh, where he remained during most part of the war.

The civil proceedings of the French were, however, moderate, as long as the Marshall D'Etrées had the chief command. He manifested on every opportunity his generosity, as well as his military talents. The University of Gottingen requested his protection. D'Etrées' answer deserves a place in this history.

“ Gentlemen, .

“ The university of Gottingen, on account of the many great men it has produced, who have confirmed its renown, is in too great a repute to let this opportunity escape, without shewing the particular esteem I entertain towards it. The university may be easy about the hardships the war carries along with it. I shall keep them at a distance from it, as far as it depends on me. I know very well how disadvantageous they are to the sciences; and I shall take care that the troops do not molest so excellent an academy. With these sincere sentiments, I am, in reality,

Your most humble Servant,

MARSHAL D'ETREES.”

*Holzmunten, the }
16th July, 1757. }*

The very same month D'Etrées received a royal letter from Versailles, with orders to give up the command to the duke of Richélieu, a creature of Madame de Pompadour; but he was given to understand that the king would be glad if he would nevertheless stay with the army. D'Etrées obeyed the order without paying any attention to the king's wish. He departed as soon as his successor arrived.

Richelieu, therefore, reaped the fruits of the prudent measures of his predecessor, as he forced the allies to the before-mentioned capitulation. He had now formally taken upon him the command of the whole French army, and occupied Brunswick, from whence he sent a great part of his troops (among which were the gens d'armes) to the army of Prince Soubise, who now, in conjunction with the troops of the empire, marched towards Saxony. Richelieu himself entered the Prussian provinces; the towns and villages he either plundered and devastated, or threatened them with fire and sword, in order to extort enormous contributions from the harmless inhabitants. The excesses of those Frenchmen were so great, that they almost outbalanced the cruelties of the

Cossacks. Many rich people were dreadfully beaten by order of the French officers, to oblige them to pay contributions for their fellow-citizens; they violated young virgins and married women, and sported with the lives of men. Nothing was more frequent among them than hanging up innocent people as spies, on the most frivolous pretexs and groundless suspicion, without the least shadow of evidence. This was the fate of many hundred Germans during the war, without respect to rank, age, or situation.

The motto of the new French general, was *extortion*; not so much for the service of his king, as for his own emolument. Protected by his royal mistress, he committed the most scandalous actions; and very often arranged his military operations according to his private interest. Of all the generals, who commanded during the war, none, of any nation, enriched himself so much as Richelieu. He was so far from concealing it, that, even before the end of the war, he built, in the capital of France, a magnificent palace, which the Parisians called, *Le pavillon d'Hannovre*.

Frederic divided his army in many corps, in order to lay obstacles in the way of the several armies, that advanced from all parts towards Saxony, and towards the center of his states. He, however, did not confine himself to defence only; he operated offensively wherever an advantageous opportunity occurred. Colonel Mayer entered the Palatinate, collected contributions, passed the circle of Franconia, and threatened Nuremberg. The inhabitants of this city, in their anxiety, made application to the assembly of the circle, requesting protection. This Franconian assembly manifested its wisdom on that occasion. They desired of Colonel Mayer to legitimate himself about his invading Franconia; and that he should make good all damages. The Prussian general was not provided with parchment; but he had ammunition and courageous soldiers. He, therefore, shewed to the delegates his companions in arms, and asked them whether they required a better legitimation? after having obtained his design, he retreated; but took hostages along with him.

The Austrians made use of that division of the Prussian troops; and General Haddick ventured with 4,000 men to the gates of Berlin. This residence, being without a rampart, partly without a wall, and only provided with palisades, was then occupied only with 2000 militia, besides a few recruits and other soldiers. The royal family retired to Spandau, as soon as they heard of the approach of the Austrians. They had therefore not much to fear

from a flying corps, that was deprived of every means to disturb the Metropolis, and which had to fear the being cut off. Haddick challenged the town, attacking two gates at once. The palisades of the one were fired to the ground, and now the Austrians entered the suburbs in crowds. The inhabitants shewed themselves worthy of the name of Brandenburg—whole liveries joined and offered to repulse the enemy; but the commander, General Rochau, would not allow any such trial. At the suburbs of the gate of Copenick only, a skirmish happened between a Prussian detachment and the Austrians, but nothing decisive.

However, the news of the approach of Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Deßau disquieted the enemy. Haddick, who knew the danger of a delay, was moderate in his demands, which at last were agreed to, not so much from fear, as from a wish to put a period to the existing troubles. They paid to the enemy 200,000 rix-dollars, with which they marched off in great haste.

In the kingdom of Prussia the scenes of war were likewise opened. The Russians arrived there to the number of more than 100,000 men under the command of Field-Marshal Apraxin, and had taken possession of Memel. Their light troops, Cossacks, Calmucks and Tartars, devastated the country with fire and sword, in a manner unknown to Europe since the time of the Hunians. Those barbarians either killed or disfigured harmless people from a diabolical pleasure. They hung many on trees, or cut off their ears and noses; of some they amputated the legs; whilst others had their bellies ripped open, and their hearts torn out. Even tombs were ransacked, and the bones of the dead thrown about in wanton cruelty. Noblemen and clergymen were terribly beaten, laid naked upon burning coals, and murdered in every possible shape which the most infernal barbarity could devise. They took children from their wretched parents and massacred them before their eyes. Married women and virgins were violated. Many a lady killed herself in order to escape the brutality of those monsters. Numbers of people fled to Dantzic, whither the royal archive from Königsberg were carried. The Prussian General Lehwald, could oppose the enemy with 30,000 men only. He attacked them, however, on the 30th of August, near great Iagerdorf in their entrenchments. Success declared at first in favour of the smaller army, which this time did not fight for the gratification of the ambition of a monarch: they fought against barbarians for their own sake, for their lives, and for their welfare. The Prussians had al-

ready taken many Russian cannon, had overturned their cavalry, and beaten one wing of the main army; when suddenly victory declared against them. The Prussians had set fire to several villages, laying within the field of battle. The smoke confounded them; they attacked in confusion and were outflanked. Lehwald had here the same good fortune as Frederic had at Collin. He was suffered to depart unmolested. His loss was 5,700 killed and wounded. The Russians counted 7000. But their victory brought them very little advantage. They had no hopes of finding provision for their enormous army in that kingdom, already reduced to a desert. Apraxin, therefore, left but 10,000 men to occupy Memel, marching off with his army a few days after the battle. This retreat was like a flight; and happened so precipitately, that 15000 men, sick and wounded, eight cannon, and a quantity of war-stores, were left behind. The march was effected in two columns, and both the routs marked with fire, plunder, and every imaginable cruelty.—All towns and villages, where those infernal hordes passed, were destroyed by fire and the roads were covered with dead bodies of men and cattle. The Prussian peasants, driven to despair, defended themselves, and thereby augmented their misfortunes. The beaten, but not conquered Prussians, pursued the Russians to the frontiers of Frederic's states.

At this retreat a singular accident happened. The King of Prussia received an ally, which he never could have thought of, whereby he got rid of some thousands of Calmucks. This active ally was the *small-pox*. The Calmucks who, in their country, had lived without the knowledge of that disorder, became acquainted with it here, to their astonishment. Many fell a sacrifice to it. Even their commander was attacked by it, and now nothing could retain them any longer. The whole corps of this wild people returned to their homes.

The Russian generals suffered them to depart quietly. They were glad to get rid of those monsters who were worse than the Cossacks, and would not be governed at all. A few only of them, guided by rapacity, quitted their countrymen, and remained with the Russian army.

That nation, who, for the first time, came into the field against Germans, was the wildest of all Frederic's enemies; they were as unworthy to be led against a cultivated state, as to support a disciplined army. Incapable of giving aid by their arms to any victory of the regular army, the latter rather suffered by their de-

vastations, being obliged to share in the scandal occasioned by the cruelties of those hordes, who approached the state of wildness nearer than that of barbarity. Those Calmucks live along the Caspian sea, and the river Wolga. They are a free people; being, however, under Russian protection, for which they are obliged to take the field whenever the monarchs of that empire require it. They have no pay; but each of them receive annually one ruble and a fur coat of sheep skin. They are Monades, having neither towns nor villages. Their habitations are tents. They are continually roving about with them from place to place, wherever they find a situation which affords food for their cattle; for in this only consists their whole wealth. They are extremely ugly; resembling one another so much, that it is very difficult to distinguish them. Their faces are very flat, and almost square. Their eyes like those of the Chinese, are very little and deep in the head, the nose flat, mouth and ears extremely large, the latter projecting from the head. They carry bows and arrows, which they throw very far and very exact. Their religion is the heathen.

Frederic now called Lehwald from Russia, ordering him to march against the Swedes. These French allies were at that time arrived in Pomerania to the number of 22,000 men, among which they had 4000 horse. The warlike spirit of that nation threatened the Russians with a formidable enemy. But the honour of a crown, and the glory of brave troops, were perhaps never more exposed than on this occasion. The equipment of the Swedish army, as it appeared at that time in Germany was a perfect satire on the modern art of war. There were soldiers ranged in rank and file well exercised, and full of eagerness to fight, but they were in want of every thing else. Without a commissary, without a bakery, without magazines, without boat-bridges, no light troops, no subordination, leaders without experience in the art of war, to whom, however, every step was minutely prescribed by the Swedish council of war, who never were unanimous among themselves, and at every undertaking threatened with being made answerable for the consequences. In this manner it appears plain, why the warriors of this nation, which more than once decided the fate of Germany, sword in hand, and in the Westphalian peace dictated laws to Europe, returned after five campaigns to their homes disgraced and ridiculed.

The want of light troops, forced the Swedes often to relinquish the best designs: for the Prussians mocked them from all sides and

they were constantly cutting off their supplies. For want of magazines and pontons they could not penetrate far into the Prussian dominions, and their junction with the French, Russian, or Austrian armies which was their constant object, was always exposed to so many difficulties, that they even did not once attempt it. The Swedish theatre of war was therefore confined to a small corner in the north of Germany. Those troops moved about in Pomerania and a part of the Mark, without ever attempting any thing worth notice, and thus they acted during the whole war.

The king now endeavored to bring the French and the troops of the empire to action, directing, for this purpose, his march towards them. His situation was terrible—Far and near surrounded with enemies, who daily multiplied, his victories availed him nothing. It was like cutting off the head of the hydra; for as soon as he had defeated one army, two others marched against him.—By a decree of the empire, he was declared to have forfeited not only his dominions but also his Electoral dignity. The design and the power to overcome him entirely were stronger, and therefore his hopes were weaker than ever. Yet at that very moment the serenity of his mind was great enough to enable him to compose his will in French verses. Just as his apprehensions were, that he should be subdued by numbers, he nevertheless took all necessary steps to conquer. His army, reduced by so many engagements, consisted only of 22,000 men; that of the enemy 60,000. The latter had already experienced a proof of Prussian valour near Gotha. All the French general officers, with their commander Soubise at their head, and a body of 8000 men, had selected Gotha for their place of recreation, to refresh themselves from the fatigues of war. The duke held a grand court-day, and mighty preparations were made at the palace for the suitable entertainment of those great and warlike guests. It was dinner-time; the tables were laid and the French shewed great appetite, when the Prussian general Seydlitz appeared at the gates with 1500 horse. The 8000 Frenchmen relinquished without resistance the smoking dishes, and fled out of the city. A few soldiers only were taken prisoners; but a number of valets, footmen, cooks, hair dressers, mistresses, field-chaplains, and players—commodities inseparable from a French army. The equipage of many generals fell into the hands of the Prussians, among which were found whole chests of perfumed waters and pomatums, a number of powdering gowns, hair-bags, umbrellas, night gowns, and parrots. Seydlitz left to his

hussars that toilet-booty, and sent back the dregs of gall . . . without ransom.

The French were as much pleased to find themselves once more in possession of those pressing necessities they had lost, as if they had gained a victory. Their courage for fighting increased so much, that they were solely concerned lest the king should escape them. Several of his marches and positions confirmed this conjecture: they knew the promptness of his movements, his manœuvres, and his art of war, hitherto, merely from reports; which, however, made so little impression on their minds, that they took courage to attack him on a ground, where he had an opportunity of displaying his tactical knowledge. Their expectation was not only to beat him, but to take his whole army. They even started the question in the French camp, whether it would be an honour to engage so small a body? There never existed a more ridiculous military prejudice, and never was it more suitably punished.

It was on the 5th of November, near the village of Rosbach in Saxony, one mile distant from Lutzen, where Gustavus Adolphus fought and died for the liberty of Germany, that one of the most extraordinary battles was fought. The king, by a motion of retreat, drew the French out of their advantageous position. They thought he endeavoured to save himself from their hands, and strove to fall upon his rear. Frederic, who was again encamped, depending on the alacrity wherewith he could range his troops in order of battle, viewed the movements of the enemy calmly, even without suffering his troops to draw out. The Prussian camp stood immovable; and, as it was just dinner-time, the soldiers were busy at their meals. The French seeing this at a distance, could hardly believe their own eyes: they considered it as a stupor of desperation, in which even the idea of defence is given up. This deception, wound up to the highest pitch, was not a small cause of the trifling resistance, and the dreadful panic which made that day so renowned.

General Seydlitz at once rushed forwards with the Prussian cavalry from behind a hill, and fell like a thunder-storm with a masterly manœuvre upon the enemy, who was intoxicated with hopes. Here was performed what never before was seen on a field of battle. The light horse charged and overturned the heavy one. The hussars with their swift horses had the boldness to attack the French gens d'armes. Neither the courage peculiar to that corps, nor their Colossian horses, were here able to decide.

All was pushed. Soubise ordered the corps-de-reserve to advance, but it no sooner appeared, than it was beaten out of the field. At the same time the Prussian infantry, who till now had remained inactive, advanced suddenly in order of battle, and received the French with a tremendous fire of cannon, followed by a regular discharge of musquetry, the same as at reviews. The French infantry were now forsaken by their cavalry, and attacked by the enemy in the flank. Soubise attempted French experiments in vain. His columns were easily dispersed, and nothing remained but a general flight. The French, as well as the troops of the empire, threw away their arms, in order to facilitate their safety. A few regiments of Swiss only fought a little longer, and were the last on the field. The victory was so quickly decided, that the vanquished could not even lay claim to the honour of a spirited resistance; on the contrary, they accused themselves with being panic-struck; not omitting, at the same time, to lay all the blame on the troops of the empire.

Schwerin died a month too soon, to have the pleasure of beholding this triumph of the Prussians. In his opinion, which he often declared, a victory over the French was the only thing to crown the military glory of Prussia. Several singular occurrences augmented the remarkable events of that day. Frederic found on the field of battle a French grenadier, furiously defending himself against three Prussian horsemen, to whom he would not surrender. Frederic's command put an end to the unequal combat. He asked the grenadier whether he thought himself invincible? "Yes, Sire," said the grenadier, "under your command." The king walked about the field of battle, consoling the wounded French officers; who, moved by his condescension, hailed him as the most accomplished warrior, who, not contented with having vanquished their bodies, had conquered their hearts likewise. The booty of the Prussians was very considerable. Among other things, a number of St. Lewis' crosses fell into the hands of the Prussian hussars, who decorated themselves with them. Seventy-two cannon, and seventy-two standards were taken with 6,220 prisoners. The combined armies counted 3,560 killed and wounded, and the Prussians 300. Prince Henry of Prussia and General Seydlitz were among the wounded. So cheap and complete a victory over a warlike nation is a phenomenon in modern history. The shortness of the days at that season of the year saved the flying army from total de-

struction; for it was not a retreat, but a flight in the greatest confusion.

The German nations, large and small, without respect to party and private interest, were satisfied with this victory over the French, which was looked upon as a national triumph.

Of all human transactions there is certainly none more serious than a battle where thousands of men murder one another: but the battle of Rosbach was considered as a mere farce both by friends and foes; even the Parisians were not the last to entertain such an opinion. Soubise was particularly ridiculed by the Parisian wits who were perpetually making epigrams and ballads on him. In the French capital, where new objects were panting for, time at length nearly obliterated the humiliation of this French General: but in Germany it remained in lively remembrance; and the word Rosbach resounded from the Baltic to the Alps, without respect to rank, in the ears of every Frenchman whom they wanted to insult.

The great prepossession of Frederic towards that nation, which manifested itself upon this occasion, could not weaken the derision. Several hundred French officers were taken prisoners, who were sent to Berlin with leave to appear at court. A few of them only had seen the court of Versailles; the royal palace at Berlin was therefore to them a strange region. To that came the idea of a marquis de Brandenburg, to whom, as the fashion was at Paris, they did the honour, *de faire une espece de guéree*. This was the reason why those French officers forgot Rosbach and their confinement, and conducted themselves in that residence in so unbecoming a manner, that it was thought necessary to remove them. They were carried to Magdeburg.

To this circumstance the following trait belongs: A lady at the Prussian court, who in the queen's apartment was present with a French Colonel, asked him his opinion of Berlin. The Frenchman answered: "I consider it as a large village." The lady, offended by this unexpected insolence, had presence of mind enough to give him the following excellent answer: "You are in the right, Sir; since the French peasants arrived at Berlin, it has greatly the appearance of a village: otherwise, it is a very magnificent city."

The news of the battle of Rosbach had such an effect on the queen of Poland, in whose soul the strongest passions raged, that she was found dead the next morning. She had been sickly some time before, but not so much as to create any apprehensions of her

death. She had left her courtiers the evening before full of grief; and, when they made their appearance next morning, she had expired. Frederic lost in her an irreconcilable enemy, who, guided by fanaticism, had not a small share in that disastrous war which made her subjects so miserable.

Of the defeated French, and the troops of the empire, there was not a vestige in Saxony and the adjacent provinces. They destroyed all the bridges behind them lest they should be pursued and dispersed thereby; so that many bodies of them did not halt till they came to the Rhine—continually in dread of having the king at their heels. But Frederic was called to Silesia by the progress of the Austrians. The French army under Marshal Richelieu, which he left at the frontiers of his dominions, he hoped soon to keep in awe, with an army that began assembling in an unexpected manner.

[*To be continued.*]

LIFE OF NADIR KOULI, A PERSIAN HERO, FROM 1687
TILL 1747.

THE birth and beginning of this man, who is often called the second Alexander, are as obscure, as his actions are known, and must excite the curiosity of those who are inquisitive into the objects of history.

Nadir was born in the year 1687, probably in a tent not far from Mesched. The name of his father was Iman Kouli, who earned his bread by making sheep-skin coats, the apparel of the lowest people in Persia. Nadir himself was bred up to the employment of a shepherd. He was but thirteen years of age when Iman Kouli died, who left him in so poor a condition, that he was obliged to gather sticks in the woods, for the support of himself and his mother, and to carry them to market on an ass and a camel, which were his only patrimony. In the year 1704, when he was seventeen years old, the Ousbeg Tartars made an irruption into Khorasan; among the number of inhabitants, whom they carried into slavery, was Nadir Kouli and his mother; she died in captivity, but he made his escape in 1708, and returned to Horasan. By all accounts he lived by robbery, till the year 1712, when he entered into the service of a Beg, by whom he was employed as a courier. He was sent with dispatches of import to the Persian court at Ispahan, in com-

pany with another courier, whom he killed on the road ; however, he knew how to tell his story so well at Ispahan, that he received presents, and was sent back with answers. His master, notwithstanding, received him so indifferently, that Nadir suspected he was distrustful ; this, and a violent passion he had conceived for his master's daughter, whom he had asked in marriage, but was refused, led him to the murder of his master : which done, he took the lady away, and retired into the mountains, where he again resumed his former profession of robbing. In 1714, Nadir found an opportunity of entering into the service of Babulu Khan Governor of Khorasan, three or four hundred miles distant from the place of his robberies. In 1717, the Ousbegs, in a body of 10,000 men, beginning to lay waste the fertile plains of Khorasan, Babulu Khan collected his forces, which did not exceed 6000 men, and Nadir Kouli, who, by his genius, became a favourite of his master, was put at the head of them, and though much inferior in number, declared that he would pledge his life for the success of the expedition.

The Ousbegs were already within a few days march of Mesched. Nadir, with great application, provided every thing necessary, and went in search of the enemy, who was almost double in number. The Tartars charged with great fury ; Nadir chose a proper ground, and stood the shock ; and when the Tartars by their own impetuosity were in some disorder, Nadir's troops made a general attack, and falling on the enemy with their sabres and battle-axes, put them to flight, destroying 3000, and retaking their plunder and captives.

Nadir returned in triumph to Mesched. His fire of ambition now began to blaze, and he demanded a confirmation in his office of general. But for one reason or other he did not succeed, and the command was given to a relation of Babulu Khan. Nadir, with a ferocity peculiar to him, declared that the Khan had not acted as a man of honour. In consequence of which he was condemned to be beaten in the severest manner, on the soles of his feet. A man of so imperious a spirit, could not brook such indignities ; he therefore left Mesched, in search of some new adventure.

The mind of a man like Nadir, could not long be idle. His uncle a chief of the Afghans, commanded at Kœlat, a strong place : to him he applied, but without success. It is probable that he had already, at this time planned a design of getting possession of Kœlat ; however, he retired for the third time into the mountains, and took to his old trade of robbery. He soon found means to collect a

a body of desperate fellows, and by robbing several caravans, he acquired riches enough to bring together a number of about eight hundred men, who laid part of Khorasan under great contribution.

The Afghans had at that time invaded Persia, and compelled Husein to yield up his capital and his diadem. Toehmas, his son, had nothing left him but the province of Mazauderen, where he took the title of Shah, whilst Nadir extended his lawless sovereignty in the eastern frontiers of that country, living on spoil. In 1727, Toehmas collected a little army, but one of his generals fled from his camp, with the troops under his command, and joined Nadir Kouli, who now had under him, between 2 and 3000 men, not more than thirty leagues distant from Kœlat. Nadir's uncle, through fear, wrote to him, intimating that he and his followers had now a fair opportunity of receiving pardon of his lawful sovereign, Shah Toehmas, by engaging in his service. Nadir relished the proposal, and the Shah being in need of so experienced an officer, immediately sent his pardon to Kœlat. Nadir Kouli entered that place with 100 of his men, and found now a good opportunity of exercising his genius in the art of treachery. His uncle meant him no harm, but Nadir was determined to revenge himself for the indignities he had received from him five years before. Having left orders that 500 of his best men should follow him the next day, and keep themselves in readiness near Kœlat; he ordered his women within the castle, on the second night, to assassinate the centries, and shut up the rest of the garrison in their barracks, whilst he went himself into his uncle's chamber and murdered him. His 500 men were let in, and he became absolute master of the place. Nadir relieved his relations and friends in that neighbourhood by his bounty; and many of the inhabitants, induced by his humanity, enlisted themselves in his service.

Nadir, thus become formidable, aspired to be the deliverer of his country, and to drive out the Afghans, who, for five years past, had treated the Persians with the utmost barbarity; but conscious that Shah Toehmas must resent his murdering of his uncle, he resolved to achieve some signal action in behalf of the king, in order to obliterate his conduct at Kœlat.

He prepared, therefore, for an expedition against the Afghans, who, secure in the neighbouring city of Nicabar, where they had a garrison of 3000 men, had no great danger to apprehend. Nadir, unaccustomed to sieges, made use of a stratagem to draw the enemy out of their garrison: the Afghans, to the number of 600,

were marauding, when Nadir detached some of his cavalry, who attacked them and cut them to pieces; upon this the governor, with his whole garrison, made a sally, but the Persians retreated towards Banrahad, a defile in the mountains, this was the rendezvous appointed. The Afghans pursued them for several leagues, till they came to this defile. Nadir, in the interim, marched with 1500 of his men, and concealed them in a wood, at the entrance of the defile. The Afghans, not suspecting any other enemy, followed those before them with impatience to revenge the loss they had just sustained; and as soon as they had entered the defile, the Persians faced about, whilst Nadir with his 1500 men fell upon them in the rear, with such impetuosity, that the astonished Afghans, suspecting themselves surrounded by a great army, became an easy prey, and few of them escaped the slaughter. Nicabar surrendered in consequence of this to Nadir, of which he took possession in the name of Shah Tœhmas. The effects of the Afghans he divided among his soldiers, and the humanity with which he treated the inhabitants, procured him, from them, a reinforcement of 1000 men.

Shah Tœhmas was, at this time, reduced to great extremities, and Nadir's military reputation was greatly increased. Tœhmas had his quarters at Farabad, and received Nadir's offer, to keep himself and his troops in readiness for his service, with pleasure. Nadir was introduced to the Shah, by Tatey Ali Khan Khagar, the chief of Tœhmas's small army, and matters were adjusted to their mutual satisfaction. Nadir's troops now, to the number of five thousand entered the province of Mazanderan, and joined those of Tatey Ali Khan, so that the whole was an army of eight thousand men. Nadir made it his study to cultivate a good understanding with the Khan, but not being able to bear an equal, much less a superior, he instigated his creatures to complain of the conduct of the Khan, and he, himself, took a proper opportunity of acquainting his Majesty with a treacherous correspondence, carried on between the Khan and Meluck Maghmud, the rebel-governor of Mesched. Tœhmas, who had the misfortune not to be wiser than his father Hussein, believed the fact, and the ruin of the Khan was resolved on. He was put to death at Court by a servant, and Nadir carried forth the head on a spear to the soldiers, declaring the reasons of the Khan's death.

In 1728, Nadir having thus removed the bar to his ambition, was instituted Khan, and received the command of the whole army: he now began to display all the talents of an able minister

and a great General. He was master in the art of improving advantages. One of his peculiar characteristics, was a piercing knowledge of men, and he gained the affections of the common soldiers, by an unwearied attention to every circumstance that could promote their interest. His first care was to engage his master to march his army into Khorasan, and Tœhmas made his entrance at Nicahar, the 15th of May, Nadir found no difficulty to augment the Shah's army to the number of eighteen thousand men.

Nadir prepared to march against the Abdallees, who had taken possession of Mesched; where the Shah found no resistance and retook it, and Nadir, who was personally known in that city, where Babulu Khan had some years ago treated him with indignities, was now loaded with honours. As the highest mark of dignity, which Tœhmas could confer upon him, according to Persian custom, was, to give him his own name; he ordered him to be called Tœhmas Kouli Khan; by which name we shall distinguish him, till he wrested the diadem from his master's head.

He next marched at the head of a considerable body, to reduce the other cities and towns of the province, and before the end of that year, all the vast country of Khorasan was subjected, and the Afghans obliged to retire, without daring to give battle.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan made now a proposition to reduce Herat, the inhabitants of which, had ten years ago shaken off the Persian yoke, and obtained permission to march to that province, with about 12,000 men. This city surrendered without resistance, not wishing to come to an engagement with a General of Tœhmas Kouli Khan's valour. Returning victorious, he began to form a more important enterprize.

In 1729, Ashreff, the usurper of Persia, who had hitherto dreaded no evil from the fugitive Tœhmas, and the less so, being acknowledged by the Turks, as the sovereign of Persia, began now to look about him. Shah Tœhmas was so much the ridicule of the court of Isfahan, that though the news of his success in the eastern part of the empire, did not seem to give the least alarm to the soldiers, yet he began now to change his opinion of Tœhmas Kouli, whom he had considered merely as a robber, and thought it high time to provide for the storm that threatened him.

After having made some proper dispositions, he encamped his army in the beginning of September, without the walls of Isfahan. In a few days he began his march, and at the end of the month, after a march of 400 miles, arrived in the plains of Damgoon.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan had this year collected an army of twenty five thousand men, in the completing and disciplining of which, he had given the highest proofs of his abilities. The Shah proposed to march to Ispahan, but his sagacious General prevented it, by representing the length of the march, and the disadvantage of attacking the Afghans at such a distance from Ispahan, and the difficulty of their retreat. However, not wishing to bring the war into Khorasan, it was determined to advance and meet Ashreff. They arrived near Damgoon before Ashreff had entered those plains. This situation was not far from the mountains, along the south coast of the Caspian sea. Tœhmas had already encamped his forces, when Ashreff approached with his whole army. Ashreff soon discovered from the advantageous position of the Persians, that he had to do with a General of experience; he, however, made the attack with that impetuosity, which the Afghans often found successful. The Persians stood the shock, so that the Afghans could make no impression on them. Ashreff detached two bodies, ordering them to take a circuit, and charge the enemy in rear and flank, whilst he attacked them in front. Tœhmas Kouli Khan was prepared to receive the enemy, and repulsed them with such valour, as put them into great confusion. It was now his turn to attack; and falling furiously upon the Afghans, he obtained an easy victory. The Afghans retired by forced marches to Ispahan, and encamped themselves in an advantageous situation near Mourshatkor.

In 1729, Tœhmas Kouli Khan's army was considerably augmented, and followed the Afghans; a hot battle ensued, wherein the latter were again beaten, with the loss of 4000 men. Ashreff, who returned with his troops to Ispahan, took his revenge by killing Shah Hussin, after having reigned as conqueror of Persia seven years and twenty-one days, and quitted that place with about 12,000 men.

Shah Tæhmas now made his entry into Ispahan. Going into the haram, an old woman threw her arms about his neck in great transports of joy; this woman was his mother, and had, ever since the invasion of the Afghans, disguised herself in the habit of a slave.

The army of Tæhmas amounted now to 40,000, and Shah Tœhmas yielded to the demand of Tæhmas Kouli Khan, and granted him the power of levying money for the payment of the army. Having thus obtained his point in so important an article, he took the field, and before the end of December, the Persian

army began their march towards Shirafs. The Afghans had fixed their camp in an advantageous situation. and the Persians, who, on their march, were much reduced by the rigour of the season, were impatient to give them a finishing stroke. A battle ensued the 15th of January, 1730; in which the Afghans were put to flight. Tœhmas was too circumspect a General to separate his troops in order to pursue them: too great caution may certainly bring on the same consequences as too much rashness, but the Khan resolved to leave nothing to unnecessary chance, since it was plain that the pride of the Afghans was much humbled.

Ashreff made a sudden and secret flight from Shirafs, and the aunt and sister of Shah Tœhmas, who were among the captives of the former, were conducted to the court of Ispahan, and the Shah's aunt was given to Tœhmas Kouli Kahn in marriage. Ashreff was in his flight, cut to pieces with 200 men, by a body of Baluches; and thus ended the usurpation of the Afghans, but not the calamities of Persia. The death of Ashreff was but a prelude to those mischiefs which Nadir was about to bring on that country.

The Turks had, during the troubles of Persia, conquered several Persian dominions, and Tœhmas Kouli Kahn, whose security was absolutely inconsistent with peaceable measures, directed his march towards Hamadan, where he defeated the Turks and took the town. After putting garrisons in these places, he marched for Tauris and Ardeville, and out-marching the Turkish General, who was to defend it with 40,000 men, took these places. The Turks demanded a truce, to which Tœhmas the more readily consented, as his presence was wanting near Herat, where the Abdallees had revolted, whom he, however, after a fatiguing march, in a pitched battle defeated. The Turks took advantage of the absence of Kouli Khan, and prepared for the march of the Ottoman army. In 1731 Tœhmas Shah left Ispahan in October, with an army of 20,000 men, and marched towards Tauris. After having joined the troops left there by his general, Tœhmas Kouli Khan, he passed the mountains of Armenia, and reached Erivan in February. In divers battles the Persians were beaten. The Shah returned to Casbin, and Hamadan fell again into the hands of the Turks. Thus the Ottoman army gained this year, what they lost the year before. During these transactions in the field, the situation of affairs in Turkey was changed by intestine commotions. Peace was become very desirable, the more so, as the return of Tœhmas Kouli

Khan might render the success of another campaign, very different from the last. The 16th of January, 1732, articles of peace were signed.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan, being possessed of royal authority so as to be able to raise money, established already a kind of independency; for the support of which, he engaged in his service a considerable number of Abdallees, Afghans, Ousbegs, and Turko-men. These were most likely to be at his devotion, so long as he paid them well. He no sooner heard of the peaceable turn of affairs, than he wrote to his Majesty, saying he soon would join him, with an army of victorious troops. From motives of policy, however, peace was concluded, and Tœhmas Shah desired his General to disband the army, and repair to Ispahan.

He who, in lower rank of life, had been accustomed to follow the dictates of his own passion, could hardly be expected to show a passive conduct at the head of a victorious army, entirely devoted to his service. He represented to his chief officers the conduct of the Shah, as inglorious and impolitic, and made them sensible, how much superior their valour and knowledge in the art of war, was to that of the Turks. To the common soldiers he took care to make the consideration very sensible, that no particular gratuity was promised them on their dismissal, after their great and signal services. Under these circumstances, a man of less art and resolution than Nadir, might have tainted their minds with rebellious sentiments; however, it was necessary to conduct his designs to an issue with great circumspection. Of every intrigue and private commotion at court, Nadir was acquainted by his creatures, and was therefore better qualified how to act his part, when he should return to court.

He had employed the end of the last year, and the beginning of this, chiefly in levying men, and disciplining his army; which now amounted to seventy thousand men. The government of the province of Khorasan, he gave to his son Riza Kouli.

About the month of June he set out, making slow marches towards Ispahan, where he arrived in August. He waited upon the King, and took care to extol what he had already done, and how much he had his Majesty's interest at heart. The Shah did not suspect any of his treacherous designs, but Nadir feared the more that his destruction was resolved on. He acquainted the chiefs of his army, with his apprehensions, and possessed them with an opinion, that their interest and safety, were inseparably connected

with his own. He then communicated the project he had formed of deposing Tæhmas, and putting that Prince's son Abas Myrza, an infant of six months, in his place. The matter being agreed to, under an engagement of secrecy, the Shah was invited to see his army in review, and the evolutions, and appearance of his soldiers, gave him great satisfaction. After the review was over, the Khan invited the Shah to a repast, which was the snare to entangle his sovereign, who was soon overpowered by the infusion of a drug; a small quantity of wine intoxicated him. In this condition he ordered him to be removed to an apartment in the gardens of Hazar Jerib. His attendants were seized by the guards, and put under confinement.

Tæhmas Kouli Khan having corrupted the great officers of state, as well as his own Generals, called an assembly, the issue of which was, that the King should be removed to some remote part, in the eastern provinces of the empire. Preparations were then made, for the inauguration of the young Prince Abas. Tæhmas Kouli Khan entered Isfahan with great pomp, and public notice was given, that the great officers of state had found Shah Tæhmas incapable of holding the reins of government; and therefore had chosen his son Abas, the third of that name, Emperor of Persia.

The young infant was accordingly brought out in his cradle, and the diadem fixed to the right side of his head, as a mark of his sovereignty.

Kouli Khan and his creatures, now gave the blow. His eldest son, Riza Kouli, we have observed, was appointed governor of Khorasan; and his second son, Nezir Ali, was now made governor of Herat; his elder brother, Ibrahim, one of the followers of his fortune, was made a Khan, and the government of Tauris was assigned him; Kherman was conferred on his next brother. All this passed in the month of August.

Thus did this great and wicked man, under the pretence of promoting the honour and interest of his country, prepare the way to ascend the heights of his ambition. The activity of his genius, suffered not a moment to be lost, he published a manifesto, disclaiming the peace which had been lately made with the Turks. It was addressed to the Bashaw of Bagdat, and conceived in these terms: "Be it known to you, the Bashaw of Bagdat, that we
"claim an indubitable right of visiting the tombs of the Imans,

“ Ali, Cherbellai, Mahallade, Mauza, and Huffein *. We demand the delivery of all the Persians, who have been taken prisoners in the late war ; and as the blood of our countrymen yet smokes, and calls upon their sovereign for vengeance, there ought to be so much shed of the subjects of the Grand Signior, as these have spilt of the subjects of the king of Persia. We make these our sentiments known, that you may not accuse us of the dishonour of taking you by surprize. We are going soon, at the head of our victorious army, to breath the sweet air of the plains of Bagdat, and to take our repose under the shadow of its walls.”

The Turks in consequence made preparations for war, and the troops marched to the succour of Bagdat. Tœhmas Kouli Khan affected great unconcern at the menaces and preparations of the Turks, he knew that the fortune of war did not so much depend on numbers, as on the valour and experience of soldiers. He thought it, however, his interest to cultivate a good understanding with the Russians, and the natural interest of Russia, but could not render it agreeable, to find that the Turks were threatened to be humbled by Tœhmas Khan.

The Persian General collected all his forces, and engaged a body of Arabians. His army consisted of 80,000 men, and the first operation of the campaign, was the siege of Kerniansha, which the Shah had yielded up to the Turks, but the inhabitants opened the gates to him, and the governor was put to death. Tœhmas began his march towards Bagdat, the favourite object he had in view.

The Turks sent detachments to guard the defiles on the Persian side, which cover the plains, towards the frontiers of Bagdat; these, however, were easily forced. Traversing the forest, between the cities of Mendeli and Nezerth, he passed the river Synce. Then coming into the plains of Bagdat, he crossed the river Kentaul, and after a march of twenty days, arrived the 10th of April. 1733, under the walls of Bagdat.

This fortification is so composed, that under an experienced commander, it could scarcely be taken by an eastern army, any otherwise than by famine. Its happy situation on the Tigris, is an advantage which enables it to lay in a large supply of provisions.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan made his advances with great confidence. However, being in want of artillery, he was not capable of making

* *These are Prophets, who are held in veneration by the Persians, and whose tombs are near Bagdat.*

regular approaches. His great business was, to invest the city and force the inhabitants to submission, by famine, or subdue them by stratagem. Myrza Khan was sent with 10,000 men, a league up the Tigris, which they passed near the suburbs of Kouch Kalleffi, where they found a piece of cannon of a very great size, which the Bashaw had neglected to bring away. This was the only battering cannon in the Persian army, and was by no means sufficient to make a breach.

Bagdat was now closely blocked up, on both sides the Tigris, by an army of 80,000: The Turkish garrison, within the walls, consisted of about 20,000 men. Tœhmas expected now to oblige Achmed Bashaw to a surrender by famine; nor could he well have failed, if his vanity had not got the better of his prudence.

Topal Osman Bashaw was appointed Seraskier of the Ottoman army; but as the succours and reinforcements were sent in a very irregular manner, he was obliged to remain several months in a state of in-action. The blockade lasted three months, and the place was on the point of falling into the hands of a cruel and enraged enemy.

Tœhmas having advice of the march of the Turks, detached 30,000 men, mostly cavalry, to surprize them; but as he understood that Topal Osman had an army of 100,000 men, he marched immediately at the head of his forces, near 70,000, leaving a considerable body of his men before Bagdat.

The 18th of July, the advanced guard of the Turkish army, met a detachment of the Persians, and a skirmish ensued. The Turkish general, having reached the plain, ranged his forces in line of battle, dividing them into five different bodies. Tœhmas divided his men into ten different columns. The Turkish cavalry advanced with great fury, but were repulsed as far as their infantry; but these were so firm, that the fury of the Persians was stopped. The battle was for some time undecided, till a body of Arabs, bribed by the Turks, fell on the main body of the Persians in flank. The Persians could not support the shock, a total rout ensued. Their loss was not less than 30,000 men, with all their baggage. The Turks, however, paid dear for this victory, for they lost near as many men as the Persians. In the mean time the garrison of Bagdat made a sally, and the Persians were obliged to yield to numbers.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan retired with the remains of his army to Hamadan, from whence he wrote to the governor of Bagdat, say-

ing, he was determined to make war like a generous enemy, therefore acquainted him, that he might be prepared; for, that early next year he would take the field with a more numerous army, and meet him once more at Bagdat.

His real design was, however, to return as soon as possible; and he ordered his son, Nezir Ali, governor of Herat, to join him with all his forces, and thus soon completed again a formidable army.

Topal Osman, on his part, was in want of every necessary for his army. He sent, however, a Bashaw with 6000 men, to take post at the pass of Takayer, but the already advanced Afghans, drove them from thence. Topal Osman entrenched his army, consisting of near 100,000 men, in the plains of Aronia, in an advantageous situation. Tœhmas marched towards them, and came within sight of their army the 21st of October. The next day a part of the Turkish army sallied from their entrenchments, and the Persians were routed with the loss of 4000 men.

The Persian General now prepared for a decisive stroke. He fought the first battle in his own name, as General; the second in the name of the young king, Shah Abas III. Both these being unsuccessful, the army began to be superstitious. Kouli Khan resolved to make his decisive blow in the name of Shah Tœhmas. The 26th of October he advanced, and the two armies were soon near enough to one another, so that the battle became general, in which the Persians were victorious, and Topal Osman slain. The Turks lost all their baggage and artillery, and near 40,000 men. Tœhmas Kouli was preparing to besiege Bagdat again, when the news arrived, that Seefle Mahomed Khan governor of Shirafs, had collected an army of 30,000 men, and proclaimed Shah Tœhmas their lawful king. Tœhmas Kouli marched back into Persia, with forced marches, and put them to flight; Mahomed Khan, who fell into Tœhmas' hands, hanged himself in prison. Tœhmas Kouli Khan returned to Ispahan, where he remained till the next spring. In the mean time the Ottoman court made all preparation possible, to defend themselves against this formidable enemy.

Kouli Khan having recruited his army to near 100,000 men, opened the campaign this year, by marching directly to Tauris, from whence he sent his son, Nezir Ali, with a body of forces, to the banks of the Keira, to drive the Lefgees back again into their

mountains, which soon was accomplished, but he himself penetrated into Georgia, as far as Teflis. Kouli Khan, in the exultation of his heart, declared that he would carry his victorious arms to the Hellespont, with a more formidable power than that of Xerxes. All the dominions of the Grand Signior, did, indeed, tremble at his name. Georgia and Armenia, fell a prey to him, and towards October he came before Ganja, which place, though well provided and garrisoned, soon submitted at discretion. From thence he directed his course to Shamakle, a very flourishing place, the inhabitants of which he drove into the mountains, and the place he razed.

The Turks desired peace, but Kouli Khan proudly despised any accommodation, and the Russians yielded up to the Persians, all the districts situated on the coast of the Caspian Sea, which had been conquered by Peter the Great. The Grand Signior gave orders to the new Seraskier Couprouli, who received great reinforcements, to give battle to Kouli Khan.

On the 10th of June, Tœhmas Kouli Khan appeared with 55,000 men, in the valley of Arpakari. The Seraskier had an army of 80,000. At the approach of the Turks, the Persian General broke up his camp, with a seeming precipitation, retired to Erivan, and concealed a body of men in a wood, whilst another party was covered in a valley. In this situation he prepared to receive the Turks. The van of the Turkish army saw themselves at once attacked in flank and rear, by the Persians. The action was very bloody. The Seraskier was killed with twenty thousand men, and every thing fell into the hands of the Persians. The Turks were again anxious for peace, and Kouli Khan was desirous of engaging Russia in a war with the Turks, as the most effectual means of promoting his own schemes.

If we consider to what a wretched state Persia had been reduced, six years before, when Kouli Khan appeared at the head of its forces, we must impute this rapid success to his military genius and fortune.

1736. The beginning of this year ripened the plot. The young Prince Abas died. The 10th of March, Kouli Khan assembled all the governors of the provinces, and the generals of his army, and in a long speech, passed many encomiums on the service he rendered his country, and how necessary it was now to choose a proper successor to the throne, and desired their answer in three days. These being expired, the deputies waited on the General,

and declared him king. The next day, being the 11th of March, he was proclaimed under the name of Nadir Shah.

Thus did this aspiring genius reach that point, which Cæsar could not obtain. He being arrived at the summit of his ambition, began to exert that boundless authority with which he was invested.

The coins which he caused to be struck, had these inscriptions :

Nadir, King of Kings, and glory of the age.

The assembly were dismissed, and the first arbitrary step he took, was to appropriate the revenues, and lands of the church, to the support of the army. Messengers were sent to Petersburg and Constantinople, and Nadir was acknowledged as sovereign of Persia ; all the conquered provinces were yielded back to that empire, and a full permission was granted for the Persians to visit the tomb of Mahomed. Nadir recruited his armies, and his secret designs against India was soon conspicuous. He nominated his son, Riza Kouli Mirza, regent of Persia.

In reviewing the expedition of Nadir Shah into India, the reader will indulge the inclination of making some comparison between this undertaking and that of Alexander the Great.

It appears that these ravagers of the eastern world, Alexander and Nadir, were actuated by the same predominant passion. Alexander had the strongest desire of fame and glory ; Nadir added to this, an insatiable thirst of accumulating riches. The one reigned by right of birth, the other by an usurped power ; Alexander was most beloved ; Nadir most feared. Both appear as objects of terror and astonishment. Alexander, born as a Prince, soon was led and instructed to his destination ; but Nadir, born and brought up in the lowest state, formed himself, and found his military and tactic skill, meerly within himself.

It is now 2144 years since Alexander made his expedition into India. In the month of December, 1736, Nadir began his march with a strong army, and his first expedition was the taking of Kandahar. He pushed on to Cabul, which is esteemed the gates of India, on that side, and which place he took by storm, in the month of June. From hence he marched through the large tract of country, between this place and Peishor. After having taken this place, he prepared to pass the Indus. The Mogul's court, struck with terror, resolved to prepare for resistance. Nadir Shah advanced to the bank of the Indus, and passed it the beginning of January 1739. He then traversed many small rivers, till he reached the Indian army, which was soon put to the rout.

Mahomed Shah, the Indian monarch, commanded his army in person, advanced towards his enemy, and after slow marches pitched his camp in the plains of Karnal. The pomp of the Imperial army was great. It was one of the most numerous and brilliant, that had for many ages appeared in the east; consisting of near 200,000 fighting men.

After a march of 25 months, and 1850 miles, Nadir arrived with his army in the neighbourhood of Karnal. We must notice here his method of passing rivers. He made use of two iron chains, to which he fixed the skins of beasts blown up; these floating upon the surface, supported the several parts of a small bridge of timber, which he carried with him. The chain, being secured on both sides of a river, served also to hold a regular bridge of boats.

Nadir's army amounted to 160,000 men. They came soon to an engagement with the Indians, in which 17,000 of the latter were slain. A peace ensued, and by this treaty, Nadir, whose object was gain, got all the jewels, military chests, and every thing else belonging to the Indian camp, that was worth his taking.

Nadir now continued his march towards Delhie, the gates of which were opened to him. His advanced guard consisted of 4000 men, who escorted his haram; and 20,000 of his best cavalry guarded them at a proper distance. About two miles behind followed Mahomed Shah, the Indian Monarch, attended by his courtiers, and escorted by 12,000 Persians. The Indian Lords, at the head of their troops, marched at the distance of a mile from each other, having great bodies of the Persians between them. Nadir himself brought up the rear, with the rest of his army; the whole composed a number of near 350,000 men, who covered near twelve miles of ground in length, and three in breadth. In this manner they proceeded five days march till they came to Sonput. This and many other places on the way were plundered by the Persians. From Sonput they advanced to the gardens of Shalemar; here a very solemn entry was made, and the articles of peace were regulated, in which all the countries, to the west of the Indus, were yielded up to Nadir. After this he gave again the Indian diadem to its legal possessor, having first raised enormous contributions, in which all the barbarities imaginable were committed.

The treasure amassed by Nadir is estimated as follows :

Jewels taken from the Great Mogul, and the Indian Lords.	Crores. } 25	} £. 31,250,000
The Peacock throne, with nine others, gar- nished with precious stones, value	9	
Gold, silver, plate, and money	30	37,500,000
Rich manufactures of many kinds	2	2,500,000
Cannon, warlike stores.	4	5,000,000
		Sterling 87,500,000

Besides this he took back with him 300 elephants, 10,000 horses, an equal number of camels, many of which were loaded with spoil. Most of the gold and silver was melted into large ingots, and slung over the backs of camels, horses, and mules. If we reckon one half part of the 30 crores to be in gold, and the other in silver, it would require 5700 camels, and 2050 horses and mules to carry it.

Let us compare the two eastern heroes a little further, I mean Alexander and Nadir. What just reason can be assigned for the invasion of India by Alexander, which happened 2144 years ago? Though his conquest of Darius may be censured by historians as rash and extravagant, as not guided by experience, and unsupported by wisdom; yet if we consider the events previous to it, we shall find his conduct correspondent with the rule of Princes in latter ages. The expedition of Xerxes, and other attempts made to enslave the Grecian republics, could not be easily forgotten. To prevent any future design of the same nature, was to take the first favourable opportunity of humbling the Persians. There was no other way to silence their scruples, to gratify their jealousy, or appease their resentment.

The Persian monarchy, in the reign of Darius, began to sink under its own weight. Luxury and corruption contributed to the effeminacy of the people, and if the unhappy circumstances of Persia, at that time, were a concomitant motive to Alexander's invasion, it did not invalidate the stronger reasons of self-preservation.

Nadir had been less criminal, if the same motives had carried him into India, but his expedition was certainly founded as much in avarice as ambition, or a fond notion of glory.

Alexander abandoned India entirely, probably because he could not keep it; but Nadir received a considerable share, on a

presumption that he could keep it. He now prepared to march back into his own country; he repassed the Indus, and by some pretext or other, took from the officers in the army, all their jewels and riches acquired in the Mogul's country. His discipline was rigorous, and his barbarities unparalleled. At the siege of Cabul, to convince the Indians of his determined resolution to preserve the excellent discipline, he caused eighty of his soldiers to be ripped up, for being present when one of their comrades forced an Indian woman; and when at Delhie, he delivered up the city without limitation to slaughter and pillage. A place taken by storm never exhibited a greater scene of horror. The Persian soldiers spread themselves, broke open houses and palaces, slaughtering with an unbridled fury, with very little distinction of either age or sex. The carnage lasted from eight in the morning to three in the afternoon. The unhappy Indians fought bravely, but being unaccustomed to the use of arms, had only the satisfaction of dying sword in hand. Four hundred Persians were killed, but of the citizens not less than eleven thousand. Many, who were jealous of their honor, killed their wives, others committed murder on themselves; numbers were burnt in their houses, nor did the sword spare the infant at its mother's breast. Horror and despair had plunged the inhabitants into such distress, that near ten thousand women threw themselves into wells.

Nadir, though returning in triumph, loaded with spoils, was now to suffer one of the bitterest calamities; as if Providence had ordered it as a punishment. His eldest son, Riza, whom he loved, entered into a conspiracy against his life. Nadir was shot at in a narrow pass, by a man, who had dug a pit to conceal himself, that he might take the better aim. He was shot in the left hand. A reward was offered to apprehend the assassin, and he was taken. It was soon discovered that his son was the person who hired this man to commit the murder. Riza being brought before his father, was intreated by him to repent of his crime, to ask pardon, and promise obedience for the future. "Consider," (says Nadir) "I am your general, your sovereign, your friend, and your father. Consider the duty you owe me in these several relations. Reflect on the small acknowledgement I ask. You are in my power, but I would not have you perish. Live, be happy, and a king, whenever Providence shall take me from the earth." But Riza, who was of his father's disposition, replied, "You are a tyrant, and ought to die. The most you can

“ do to me is to kill me, I am prepared.” The afflicted parents between rage and tenderness, said, “ No, I will not take your life, but I will make you an example to all the princes and the earth, I will put out your eyes.” This was accordingly done.

It was in February, 1740, that the Shah arrived again with his army in the neighbourhood of Ispahan, and he employed now some time in reducing the neighbouring tribes, who revolted in his absence. In 1741, he marched against the Lesgees, and was repulsed.

1742. The good understanding, supposed to subsist between Nadir Shah, and the governor of Bagdat gave the Turks no small inquietude; but the check Nadir met with from the Lesgees, brought the Ottoman court to an opinion, that Nadir was not so powerful an enemy as they thought. War against him was again determined on, and their army on the banks of the Euphrates were strengthened. The Persians began hostilities, and Bassorat and Bagdat were invested. During this, rebellions were excited in all parts of Nadir's dominions. He found means, however, to reduce some of them, but the flames of civil war spread themselves like a torrent.

1744, The fortune of this eastern spoiler seemed now fast to decline. He abandoned, for the present, his designs against the Turks and returned into the plains of Hamadan; but soon returned to the Turkish frontiers, and so divided his forces, that the revolts he had most to fear, were no longer dangerous to his designs.

1745. The Turks prepared vigorously for a new campaign, and at the end of July, the Persian army, about eighty thousand, and the Turkish army, above one hundred thousand strong, arrived in the neighbourhood of Erivan. A hot battle ensued, which lasted from morning till night, in which the Persians at last were victorious. Nadir proceeded in this action with the utmost caution, and displayed all the talents of a prudent and learned general. The loss of the Turks was enormous.

1746. Nadir saw too well the danger impending from intestine commotions in Persia, to entertain any thoughts of pursuing his victories against the Turks: he rather chose to enter into as speedy an accommodation with them as possible. The greater part of this year passed in negotiations, till at length peace was concluded, on the foundation of that of Amurath IV. The Court of Peterburgh now thought proper to send a formal embassy to Nadir, who

again got new business on his hands, for he received the intelligence that rebellion was breaking out on the borders of Khorasan, and that the Georgians were ready for the same.

1747. In this critical situation of affairs, Nadir took the resolution of marching to Meshed, where he arrived about the end of May, and left tokens of his barbarity and avarice every where. He next marched into the plains of Sultan Meydan, a day's journey from Meshed. Here he summoned some of the chiefs of the Ousbegs, Tukomans, and other Tartars, who composed a great part of his army, and having sworn them to secrecy and obedience disclosed his design of putting to the sword all the Persians in his camp, saying, he would play off a sky-rocket at twelve at night, as a signal to begin the massacre: that when this work was done, he would load the Tartar chiefs with money and great honours; proposing, when he had erected a huge pyramid of Persian heads, to retire and end his days at Kœlat.

A Georgian slave, in Nadir's tent, overhearing some part of the conference in which this bloody plot was resolved on, discovered the secret to a principal Persian officer, who sent for several others, and communicated the intelligence. Under this fatal extremity, what resolution could be taken, but that Nadir himself should die?

Saleh Beg, an officer of great intrepidity, and colonel of the body guard of Afghans, offered his service for this purpose, and demanded only four chosen men as his followers. The usual time of Nadir's going to rest being past, and a few hours before the signal for the intended massacre, Saleh Beg, and his followers, under a pretence of urgent business, passed the guard, and rushing into the outward partition of the haram, met a eunuch, whom they dispatched. Thence they proceeded into the haram, where they met an old woman, whom they also killed. They were yet at a loss in which of the tents Nadir slept, till by the light of a lamp they discovered some jewels; here they rushed in and found him. Either he had not yet slept, or was awakened by the cries of the woman, and rose from his bed. When the assassins approached, Nadir drew his sabre, and demanded what business they had. Saleh Beg made no answer, but immediately cut him with his sabre on the left side of the collar-bone. This did not prevent the Shah's collecting sufficient force, to kill two of the soldiers, who came up to him to finish their leader's business. He was then retiring out of his tent, when the cords of it tripped him up, and

Saleh Beg gave him a mortal wound. Nadir cried, "mercy, and I will forgive you all:" to which this officer replied, "You have not shewn mercy, and therefore merit none."

Saleh Beg having performed this important business, cut off Nadir's head.

The Tartars, no sooner heard that he was killed, than they took to their arms, upon which a general pillage and confusion ensued: so that before day light, above five thousand men on both sides were slain.

The whole army dispersed, after a continued campaign of eighteen years.

Thus fell this scourge of the eastern world, at the age of sixty-one, after a reign of eleven years and three months; leaving a fatal proof how much it is in one man's power, to plunge a whole nation into an abyss of misery.

The actions of this usurper made such a splendid figure in the European world, that it was doubtful, for many years, on what principles he acted; but time took off the disguise, and it was found to be ambition and avarice. To him, however, Persia was indebted for her deliverance from the Afghans. To him she owed the restoration of her legal sovereign, and, by his valour and conduct, the Persian monarchy recovered, in little more than eight years, the several dominions which had been torn from her; but it is plain from the issue, that he was influenced by motives which eclipse his last actions.

He was a strong, robust, handsome man, six feet high; had a voice so strong and so sonorous, as had great effect with his soldiers and enemies, and proved one great step to his advancement to regal power. His strength was not less instrumental to his fortune. He restored to use the battle-axe, and this weapon in his hand carried with it inevitable death. No part of his character was more distinguished than that of a general. He had lived in the field in the several characters of peasant, captive, servant, robber, soldier, general, and King. He was forward, bold, and enterprising. His intrepidity caused wonder, but his success confirmed his abilities. He was never wounded, but when shot by the assassin; and in the height of his grandeur he would, upon an emergency, out-march his baggage, and suffer any hardship incident to a common soldier. His quickness of observation, where his forces were weakest, and his presence of mind in succouring them, ever made him superior to his enemies. His resolution seemed to in-

pire his people with a determined purpose, either to conquer or to die; nor did even his officers behave ill with impunity. In action he generally tired many horses, being never long missing, where his presence was needful. On these occasions, he was accustomed to address his men in such familiar terms as seemed to demonstrate an opinion, that a soldier will never perform his duty well, when he has no regard for his general. He found it indispensably necessary to keep his army always in motion, in order to prevent those conspiracies, for which a great part of his soldiers were always ripe. By this means also, the people in the remotest parts of the empire were kept in awe, and he was ready to oppose the invasions of his neighbours, or make conquests. Never was a man more indefatigable, in personal application and attendance to every duty of a commander. He was punctual in the payment of his army, and took surprising care to supply his camp with the necessaries of life. In the conduct of his wars he ever preferred stratagem to force. His marches were always rapid, and his progress so contrary to the ordinary rule of war, that he confounded his enemies. Thus he often defeated their best laid schemes, and attacked them where they were least able to defend themselves. Yet, in matters of the greatest moment, his resolutions were generally so good, and surpassing ordinary apprehensions, that it seemed doubtful whether they were the effects of a solid judgment, or a blind temerity.

As to religion, it was uncertain what his notions were. Before a battle it was his constant custom to prostrate himself for a minute, and make an ejaculatory prayer. His mind was strongly backed with the notions of predestination, and this made him the more dauntless.

In his politics he was unfathomed, particularly in punishing; petty crimes he often chastised with heavy punishments, whilst offences of the blackest die escaped with impunity. But, as there is no good character without some shades and mixture of vice, so there is no bad character without some portion of virtue. Nadir had his vices and his virtues too, but unfortunately for himself and his people, the former were too predominant. But great was the corruption of the Persians, and this corruption was fostered and encouraged by the corruption of the monarch.

From his example we may learn, that the most ambitious prince can never arrive at the power of doing much mischief, till a people are devoted to a vain and luxurious life, corrupt to an extreme, and lost to all sense of virtue. Persia could not have groaned un-

der such a world of miseries, but by the iniquity of the Persians; that iniquity became the instrument of their tyrant's power; and never will there want a tyrant in any country, where the people are arrived to such an extreme of venality and corruption.

THE SEVEN-YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR,
FROM 1756, TO 1763.

[Continued from page 99.]

THE French gave to king George the Second the best opportunity to break the convention of Closter Sevenen. The Hannoverians flattered themselves with a kind of neutrality, according to that treaty: but they found themselves sadly deceived. The country was treated like a conquered province, and was termed so in the French edicts. Richelieu exacted not only large contributions in money and all sorts of necessaries for his troops, and likewise enormous sums for himself; but, besides this, a farmer-general was sent from Paris, to take the whole Electorate in farm, after the French custom; and thus to plunder it methodically.

This farmer general was also appointed over the German provinces which might be conquered. A French royal extraordinary edict of the 18th of October, 1757, published this resolution; in consequence of which the Frenchman Gautier erected his farming shop at Hannover. These proceedings drove the Hannoverians almost to despair. George had more love for his Electorate than for his kingdom; he was assisted by the British parliament, and decisive resolutions were taken. The convention was in England considered as broken; and the battle of Rosbach turned the scale. The Hannover troops, hitherto dispersed, were drawn together; and the Landgrave of Hesse was easily prevailed on to join them with his army, the French having given him great reason to complain. At first he was inclined to adhere to the convention of Closter Seeven, and recal his troops; the route of the march was even arranged: but Richelieu caused a change in that determination. He insisted upon their being totally disarmed, refusing to let them march off on any other condition. The Landgrave remonstrated in vain, that his soldiers, being free, armed, and provided with every thing, should not be considered as prisoners of war, whose arms might be taken away at pleasure. The Duke of Cumberland wrote on that account to the French general; and the

Danish ambassador, Count Lynar, by whose mediation the above mentioned convention was concluded, went in person to the French head quarters. He proposed removing the Austrians into Holstein, in order to make the French court easy on that subject. The landgrave consenting to it, Richelieu wrote to Versailles about it; but the French ministers refused this expedient, insisting upon the disarming.

The court of England put an end to the dispute by declaring that it would renounce keeping the Hessian troops in pay, if the landgrave would not immediately leave them to the disposition of the king of great Britain.

This prince hesitated now no longer giving his 12,000 Hessians to the disposal of king George, and exposed himself thereby to the whole fury of the French. A courier was sent from the French head quarters with the most dreadful menaces. They threatened that the residential palace at Cassel should be blown in the air, the city burnt, and the whole country destroyed by fire and sword, so that it should for centuries represent a desert. The landgrave despised these threats, went away, and the most terrible extortions commenced. Strange it was, that an Austrian commissary of the name of Christiani appeared at Cassel, in order to share with the French the contributions. Orders were given that within four and twenty hours all persons should deliver up their gold and silver coin. The arsenals were emptied; and the colours, kettle drums, and other trophies of Hessian bravery of former wars, deposited there were reduced to ashes.

Meanwhile the army of the allies began to form itself. The Hannoverians and Hessians were joined by the troops of Brunswick. The cavalry not being proportionable to the infantry, they were joined by some regiments of Prussian horse. Frederic could not spare many soldiers to give them; but he provided a general equal to an whole army.—Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick; one of those extraordinary men, in whom superior talents, greatness of mind, a generosity of heart, were united to an extraordinary degree, and added lustre to the human character. Richelieu threatened in vain to reduce all Hannover into a heap of rubbish, and even to destroy the royal palace, if the least inimical measure should be taken. Ferdinand answered very laconically, he would wait the consequences, and give a more distinct explanation at the head of his army. Immediately after this the operation of the allies began. Two French corps were attacked and

beaten. Richelieu became raving, and gave orders to plunder the city of Zelt and to burn the suburbs. The inhabitants supplicated for the preservation of the Orphan House only, but to no purpose; it was reduced to ashes. The inclemency of the season obliged at last both parties to go into winter quarters.

Frederic had in the mean time entered Silisia. The Duke of Bevern, who with 25,000 men endeavoured to cover that province was unable to resist the whole power of Austria, which was here united to conquer that country. A Prussian corps, with which general Winterfeld had maintained the communication between Silisia and Saxony, had, after a very hard engagement, been obliged to relinquish its post, and to retreat. This misfortune was heightened by the mortal wound which that general received, who was Frederic's favourite, a man of great talents, and one who possessed a noble heart. His crowned friend, the army, and the whole country, lamented him, and considered his death as a national loss.

The Austrian General Nadasti advanced now towards Shweidnitz, and took that fortress by storm, after a siege of sixteen days, which the Duke of Bevern could not prevent. The garrison of 6000 men, was taken prisoner, a large quantity of all sorts of stores, with 200,000 florins in cash, fell into the hands of the Austrians. This conquest facilitated the communication of the Austrians with Bohemia; and Nadasti joined the grand army near Bressaw.

The Prussians were here encamped. The Austrian generals thought it adviseable to attack them before the arrival of the king, who was on the march thither with his victorious army. The battle happened the twenty second of November. The Prussian entrenched camp was bombarded like a fortress, with the heavy artillery taken at Schweidnitz; and the attack happened on five different places at once. On both sides the combat was sustained with great bravery. Night approached—The fate of the day was not decided—The Duke expected the attack to be renewed at day break, and was concerned about the consequences, on account of the superior force of the enemy, he therefore marched during the night through Bressaw, and left the field of battle to Prince Charles of Lorrain, the Austrian General, much against his expectation. The army of the latter amounted on the day of battle to above 80,000 men; that of the Prussians to only 25,000. The Prussians had 6,200 killed and wounded, the Austrians 5,800. Of the Prussians 3,600 were taken prisoners. The Duke of Bevern himself was made prisoner two days after, when reconnoitring. He had no guard with him; and a great suspicion was therefore

excited that he had formed the design to avoid being responsible for what had happened.

General Zieten took the command, and led the remainder of the beaten army towards the king. The result of this retreat was the taking of Breslaw; which surrendered without resistance. A free march was allowed to the garrison of 3,000 Prussians. Frederic was so much dissatisfied with General Lestwitz, the commandant, that he punished him with imprisonment in a fortress. The Austrians gained a very considerable booty of provision, ordnance, and especially ammunition.

Silesia seemed now to be as good as lost to the king of Prussia. The Austrians formed great expectations: they had gained a battle, taken two forts, were in possession of the capital of the country, had a prodigious army to retain what they had conquered, and therefore the finest prospect of making in a short time an end of the war according to their own wishes. Such was the fortunate situation of the Austrians at the end of November. The winter season which had begun, was thought to have set limits to the farther operations of the Prussians, and the winter quarters were already the chief consideration; when, on a sudden, the whole scene changed, to the astonishment of all Europe. The approach of Frederic was looked upon as the last feeble effort of a despairing man, and his little army was among the Austrians called the parade-guard of Berlin. The Silesians of the Prussian party were without hopes; those of the Austrians totally without care.

Of this general opinion, Shafgotsh the Bishop of Breslaw gave a very glaring example. Frederic had exalted this priest to the rank of a prince, creating him a Bishop, and loading him with favours. He had been often a companion to the king at Potsdam, was honoured with the order of the Black Eagle, of which from the first year of his reign to the day of his death, Frederic was less liberal than of any thing else. All this was forgot by that ingrate, who now considered his benefactor as lost, and wanted to gain the favour of his enemies; he even set the most common forms of prudence and decency aside, scandalizing the king, tearing off and stamping upon the black Eagle; a behaviour at which even the Austrian officers revolted, and which drew upon him general detestation. He soon after fled to the mountains of Bohemia, to hide his shame; from thence he went to Vienna, where he met with contempt, and Theresa as well as the Emperor Francis highly disgusted with his conduct, denied him an audience. At Rome, where he was hated for his loose morals, he found likewise neither protection nor compassion; and now he lives in Bohemia as an exile.

The conquerors had already made many regulations for the government of the country, and a number of civil officers had professed their allegiance to the Empress Maria Theresa, when the Berlin parade-guard, as it was called, advanced near the Capital of Silesia. Frederic had upon the march joined the army of Bevern, that was fled; but they were always obliged to encamp at a certain distance, in order not to damp the spirit of his victorious troops. They daily approached nearer to the enemy, who was entrenched near Breslaw; when the king called all his generals and staff officers together, delivering to them a short but very energetic speech. He represented to them his perilous situation; calling to their memory the bravery of their ancestors, the blood of the warriors, who fell in the defence of their country, which ought to be avenged, and the glory of the Prussian name; declaring at the same time his firm reliance on their courage, their zeal and love for their country at a time when he was going to attack the enemy and to wrest from them the advantages they had gained. This speech inspired his warriors with an enthusiastic ardor. Some shed tears; all were moved. The most eminent of the generals answered in the name of that body of heroes, promising the king to conquer or to die. This animation soon diffused itself through the whole of the Prussian army; and as they learnt that the Austrians had left their advantageous position, in order to meet the Prussians, they considered the enemy already as good at vanquished.

It was on the 5th of December, that this battle, the greatest in this century was fought, near the village of Leuthen. The situation of the two armies were in every respect different: the Prussians were only 30,000, the Austrians 90,000 strong. The latter full of confidence in their great power, their Colossian alliance, and the possession of Silesia which they had already half conquered; the former, on the contrary, full of reliance on their superior skill in military tactics, and on their great leader. In the one army reigned plenty through the supplies, which without interruption could be brought from Bohemia; but in the other was the want of many necessaries. The one had enjoyed a long rest, the other was much fatigued by a long forced march. The Austrians were on this memorable day fitted out with only common warlike spirits; the Prussians inspired with heroism.

Thus both armies met on a plain, a better than which Frederic could not have desired. The Austrians stood in mighty lines, which the eye could not measure; and could hardly believe their senses, when they saw the small Prussian army advance to the attack. But now

Frederic's great genius broke forth. He chose the oblique order of battle, which gained the Grecians so many victories and by the help of which Epaminondas vanquished the almost invincible Spartans; a position that belongs to the master-pieces in the art of war, and rests upon that rule to bring more soldiers on the chief point of attack than the enemy, and thereby, as it were, to force the victory. Frederic made feint movements towards the enemy's right wing, whilst his design was directed on the left. He ordered a particular manœuvre, which other troops, have attempted to imitate, but which to this day has been executed by the Prussians only with the requisite order and alacrity. The art of that evolution consists in dividing a line into many bodies, to join those bodies close together, and thus to cause the whole mass of men to move on. Frederic invented that method. It was an imitation of the Macedonian Phalanx, which marched and fought in sixteen ranks, and was for many ages considered as invincible, till the sword of the Roman legions destroyed it, so that nothing but the name of it is remaining. This so contrived body of soldiers takes but a small space in proportion and shews at a distance a most confused lump of men promiscuously huddled together. However it requires but one signal of the general, to untie the knot with the greatest order, and with such rapidity that it represents the breaking out of a storm.

Thus Frederic attacked and overpowered the left wing of the enemy. Reinforcements came to the assistance of the beaten troops, but no time was given them to form: they no sooner appeared than they were repulsed. One Austrian regiment fell upon the other, and the confusion was inexpressible. Many thousand of Austrian troops could not come to a shot, but were carried along with the torrent. The strongest resistance was in the village of Leuthen, which was occupied by many Austrian troops and artillery. To those came a great number of fugitives, who filled all the houses and corners of the place, and made a desperate defence. At last they were obliged to give way. Terrible as the confusion was in the defeated army, some of their best troops endeavoured to form again under favour of the ground; but the Prussians soon put them to flight, and their cavalry, breaking in on all sides, made prisoners by thousands. At Collin it was neither skill nor bravery, but the iron vomiting machines, placed on inaccessible heights, that decided the fate of the day: but at Leuthen victory was determined by tactics and valour only. Twenty one thousand prisoners were made on the field of battle, 6,500 were killed and wounded, and 6,000

more went over to the conquerers after the battle. The loss of the Prussians was 5,000 killed and wounded.

The immediate consequence of that day was the siege of Breslaw, which was left to its fate by the defeated army, after they had strongly garrisoned it. There were gibbets erected in town for those who should talk of a surrender; however in a fortnight it was given up after the Prussians had made every preparation for a storm; and the garrison, consisting of 13 generals, 700 officers, and 18000 men, were obliged to lay down their arms. The Prussians made here a booty of a considerable magazine, a vast quantity of provision-waggons, and 144,000 florins in cash. General Zieten, who was pursuing the enemy, made besides, 2000 prisoners, and took 3000 waggon. Thus the Austrians lost in two weeks, nearly 60,000 men; and the rest of their army, a few weeks before so formidable, presented only a corps of fugitives, who, without cannon, colours, or baggage, oppressed with want, and petrified with cold, were creeping over the Bohemian mountains in search of a home.

The king's principal military talents consisted in repairing errors, and making the best use of advantages. The recovery of Silesia, which he had nearly lost, and more than 40,000 prisoners, would not have been sufficient to impede the victorious career of that restless general, had not the advanced winter season, and the deep snow put a stop to his farther progress. Even the siege of Schweidnitz was obliged to be deferred till the spring. The last operation in this campaign was the re-taking of Liegnitz. The garrison of 3500 men obtained a free march; but a large magazine of provisions and ammunition was left behind for the Prussians.

Frederic had at the end of this year the satisfaction of seeing all his dominions cleared from the enemy. The Austrians hastened to the Imperial hereditary countries to recover from their dreadful defeat. The Russians had evacuated Prussia; the French were driven from the frontiers of Brandenburg, and in possession of some small remote provinces of Westphalia only. The troops of the Empire were sent home, and the Swedes driven out of Prussian Pomerania by general Lehwald, whereby even Swedish Pomerania fell into the hands of the Prussians, who likewise took possession of Mecklenburgh, taking winter quarters in Saxony without interruption.

Thus ended a campaign unparalleled in the annals of the world. In this one year, seven capital battles were fought besides a number of great skirmishes, of which in past times many would have been

considered as battles. Great generals, who were among the phenomena of nature, Frederic and Ferdinand, appeared at once on the theatre of war, to perform actions, worthy the imitation of the warriors of future ages. Henry, the hereditary prince of Brunswick and Laudon, had also unfolded here the genius of superior talents; and some others, though less great, yet of abilities sufficient to found the military fame of a nation at any other period: Seydlitz, Keith, Fouquet, Bevern, Etrées, Broglio, Haddick, Romanzow, Wunsh, Zieten, Werner, and many other celebrated commanders of different corps had here the first opportunity of displaying their extraordinary capacities. Three other generals, renowned for the trophies they had gained, whose memory stands immortal in the journals of warlike achievements, fell in that ever memorable campaign; Schwerin, Brown, and Winterfield, sealed their glorious actions with their blood. More than 700,000 warriors had been in arms. And of what nations? Not of enervated Asiatics, who in former times covered the fields with numberless hordes, and afforded the Grecians, the Romans, and the Britons an opportunity of obtaining singular triumphs. They were not Crusaders promiscuously collected, who, like grasshoppers, overflowed whole provinces in monstrous swarms, fought without order, and murdered men from a fanatic zeal. No: they were all warlike nations, who fought here on German ground; none of them unworthy the high culture of the eighteenth century, and some of them equal to the most valiant nations of ancient times, and more than one of them by itself able to give laws with the sword to a great part of the world.

The extraordinary revolutions which happened within the short space of that campaign, were such as to bid defiance to all human precaution and experience, and seemed to deviate from the natural course of things. At the beginning of the year we saw the king of Prussia triumphant; the power of Austria almost annihilated; a large army blocked up in a city on the point of surrendering; the Imperial metropolis itself not secure; and Theresa's hopes almost annihilated. At once the scale of Austria sinks again.— The Austrians are victorious, gain battles, and make conquests.— On the contrary, Frederic is beaten, driven from Bohemia, forsaken by his allies, surrounded by enemies on all sides, and on the point of destruction. But suddenly he rises again to triumph more than ever. The armies of the Russians, the Swedes, the troops of the empire, the French and the Austrians, partly beaten and partly destroyed; whole armies are taken prisoners; and Si-

lesia, that was half lost, regained in the midst of the winter by one stroke of the sword. The Russians are victorious in Prussia and fly: they leave many thousands of their sick and wounded behind, and the beaten Prussians pursue them to the frontiers of Poland. The warlike Swedes, on their arrival in Pomerania, find no enemy; their soldiers pant for dangers, and their officers for glory. The fate of Berlin is in their hands. Nothing is done; and, soon after, they are forced to seek for safety under the cannon of Stralsund. The French army is in quiet possession of all the provinces between the Elbe and the Weser. The Hannoverians take up arms; Ferdinand puts himself at their head; and that mighty enemy flees, leaves considerable magazines behind, and is locked up in a corner of Northern Germany.

The Britons hitherto would hear nothing of a war by land; however, Hanover suffering in their cause, and the exploits of Frederic, which were no where more esteemed than among that nation, changed their former sentiments. The king of Prussia became quite the idol of the English. They celebrated his birth day in London, and in the provinces like that of their own beloved monarch. The parliament granted him an annual subsidy of 670,000 pounds sterling. It was agreed to send British troops to Germany; and the great Pitt, who soon after took the rudder of the state into his hands, and governed by the power of his great genius the British empire like a dictator, laid it down as a principle, that America was to be conquered in Germany.

(1758.) Both belligerent powers now had new hopes and new designs; both had gathered new strength; and so the campaign of 1758 was opened. The Russians were the first on the theatre of war. Apraxin was recalled, Fermor received the command with positive orders to take Prussia in possession, which he performed in the midst of winter. Frederic, not doubting but this enemy would advance farther, and having again recruited his armies, which were by so many battles greatly reduced, and having likewise provided them abundantly with every thing, was wishing to undertake something against the Austrians before he attempted any thing against the former. He therefore turned his views towards Moravia, beginning his operations with the siege of Schweidnitz. This fortress with its garrison of 5000 men, which was blockaded all the winter, surrendered to the Prussians after a defence of sixteen days. It was now his turn to besiege Olmutz. This fort was provided with a strong garrison, and all necessaries to hold out a long siege. To this fort came as the commander, General Marshal, a man of

experience, courage, and resolution; so that they had every reason to expect a vigorous resistance.

The many difficulties attending an invasion into Moravia were not a little augmented by the distance of the Prussian magazines from Olmutz, which was 82 miles. However, all obstacles were surmounted. The king made signs as if he intended to enter Bohemia; but deluded the enemy, and forced his way into Moravia. The enemy's corps, who attempted to stop the undertaking, were repulsed; and the siege was formally commenced. The commander took the most effective measures for defence, repaired the fortifications speedily, augmented his store of provisions, disburthened himself of all useless inhabitants, and demolished the suburbs. Field marshal Keith commanded the besieging corps. But the first measures they took augured an unfortunate result. Balby, the Prussian colonel of engineers, a Frenchman, committed the most extraordinary blunders whereby every thing was protracted. The first trench of the besiegers was 1500 paces from the fort, a distance which rendered all firing fruitless. They advanced by degrees in spite of the sallies and the vehement fire of the besieged, and the place was cannonaded with 50 pieces of ordnance.

The wants, in commencing and continuing a siege, according to the modern art of war, are immense; at this there was daily occasion for several hundred waggon loads of powder and balls. The necessary supplies for the Prussians were daily brought in large and small transports. They generally arrived safe; but the siege required much more; all depended, therefore, on a large transport, which was expected from Silesia by the way of Troppau, consisting of more than 3000 waggons loaded with ammunition and provisions. To prevent its arrival was Daun's chief design, in order to save Olmutz without engaging the king, to which he very seldom inclined; precaution being his leading character. He made use of the strength of his army, sending different corps to occupy the roads and environs through which the transports were to pass, many skirmishes happened. Fortune alternately declared in favor of both; but, on the whole, nothing was decided.

Frederic did every thing that his situation as besieger, and the weakness of his army would permit, to obtain the transports safely, on which all depended. Colonel Mosel, an experienced officer, commanded the convoy. This corps was 9000 men strong; and with this astonishing train he began a very tedious and difficult

march. From the rain and the continual passage, the roads were so much injured, that the waggons almost every moment stuck in the mud, and the train was thereby retarded and separated. Mosel was obliged to halt from time to time, notwithstanding which one third of the train was left behind. He could not wait for them, but proceeded on his march which led through hollow ways and near the enemy's batteries. Here Laudon was waiting for them, His Croats, posted in a wood, attacked the Prussians with great heat; but they pushed on into the wood, repulsed the enemy and made several hundred prisoners.

During this engagement the train was put into the greatest confusion. The peasants, who drove the waggons, were so frightened at the first cannon-shot, that they left every thing, and dispersed. Many took off their horses and hastened away. A great part of them never appeared again, but fled directly home. Even many waggons wheeled about regularly and returned to Troppau. Mosel made the best of this shocking disaster, and continued his march. The king detached general Zieten to meet him, who was lucky enough to join him; but there was not the half of the waggons, and many of those could not proceed for want of drivers, who were dispersed. A fresh halt was absolutely necessary, and this precious time the Austrians used to post 25,000 select troops amongst the bushes near Darmstadel. Laudon and Ziskowitz were their commanders. The train had hardly reached those mountaneous passes, when they were attacked on all sides. They fired with cannon at the waggons, killed the horses, blew up the powder waggons, and put every thing in the most dreadful confusion. However, the Prussians did not lose courage, defending themselves more than two hours in the most disadvantageous situation. They were divided in separate parties to cover the immense line of waggons; but the enemy could draw together at pleasure, making their attack in whole columns. The Prussians were at last overcome, and the whole transport separated. Zieten was cut off with a small part of the convoy, and obliged to retreat to Troppau under continual fighting. General Krowkow collected the remaining troops, and 250 waggons, with which he safely arrived at the king's camp. Amongst those were 37 waggons laden with money of which none fell into the enemy's hands.

All the bravery of the Prussians was fruitless in an engagement so unequal, for it was not difficult to destroy a transport which formed a line of waggons from fifteen to twenty miles, and where the troops were separated at the distance of a league. In this situ-

ation the Prussians did every thing that could be expected of the bravest warriors. A number of recruits were with the transports eighteen and twenty years old, drawn from the cantons of the Mark, and Pomerania, who never had seen an enemy, and who fought here like Romans. Out of 900, but 65 were taken prisoners, the bodies of the remainder were left on the field of battle.

[*To be continued.*]

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SCIENCES ON THE ART OF WAR.

“THE experience we may acquire from history, is the best instruction; for it enables us, at all times, and under all circumstances to form a correct judgement of whatever is good.”

AN ancient state,* which seemed to have a predilection, that it was one day destined by the sword of Mars, to become the regent of the earth, took the heroic resolution, to dedicate its life wholly to the fatiguing labours of warlike exercises. Convinced that in war not the mind but the body is most affected; the arts and sciences, which seemed only to contribute to the cultivation of the mind, and not to be in an immediate connection with military operations, were here despised, neglected, and even expelled. Accordingly they became what they endeavoured to be; Soldiers without troubling themselves with geometry, philosophy and the arts.

The life of this state was a perpetual chain of war and victory. Its triumph over beaten enemies, over conquered cities and provinces are innumerable. If we add the great list of its renowned generals, the number of its old and experienced soldiers, whose bodies were covered with wounds and scars, (glorious marks of their victories!) we have glaring evidences of the uncommon war experience of that nation. Yet this military state with all its experienced generals and soldiers, made not one progressive step in the improvement of the art of war. At the end of five warlike centuries, this art was at Rome on the same contracted scale on which it was at its beginning. Fabulous as this may appear, it is confirmed by history.

* *Rome.*

What was it then, we may ask, that kept the warlike spirit of that nation in so narrow a compass? was the greatness of those defenders of the sciences, founded on chance only? or upon their always having had enemies to oppose, who were more ignorant than they? But let us see what slight military tactics took among that nation,* who adored Minerva both as the goddess of wisdom and of the art of war; and who set out with the same degree of knowledge, but with different principles.

Geometry, philosophy, eloquence, history and poetry were at home among those people. They were the instruction of the youth, the study of the more advanced, and the entertainment of the experienced foldier. The officers cultivated by those sciences, regarded war with the same philosophical eye as Newton looked upon nature. Military objects were to them what physical appearances are to the mathematician. In the combat for their country and for liberty, they measured the effect of power were the common foldier thinks on nothing but killing and on avoiding being killed. Accustomed, in every campaign, to write down their experiences and observations, to deduct from them conclusions and rules for posterity, to them no event was lost, no misfortune without utility, no event without consequences. And so was the art of war, among that nation, at an early period raised to a science, and was publicly taught in their seminaries. The notions which they connected with the instruction of the art of war in their schools may best be conceived from some expressions of Socrates, who, at that time, was a common Athenian foldier, but who, upon the field of battle knew to observe with the eye of a sage, and to give even to generals useful lessons. Being informed that a certain Dionesidor had arrived at Athens, in order to give lectures on the art of war, he took an opportunity of thus addressing one of his young friends: "It would be a shame, if one who aimed at occupying the station of a commander in the army, should let this fine opportunity escape to study the art of war. The fate of a country, during a war, depends on the general; therefore, any one that should suffer himself to be elected to such a post without having acquired the requisite knowledge, ought to be severely punished."

This disposed the young man to take lessons of the beforementioned instructor. Socrates, some time after, meeting the young man again in company, addressed them in the following manner: "Is not this youth, in your opinion, more venerable since he has

* Greece.

studied the art of war? For, as a man may be a physician without practising his art, this young man is now a general, even though he should not have one voice at the election to the command; whilst, on the contrary, another who knows nothing of the art of war does not become a better general by having suffered himself to be elected."

Xenophon, who relates this anecdote, and who most likely was the very man alluded to, has, by his example, justified the judgment of Socrates. He was afterwards among the corps of ten thousand Greeks, as a volunteer without command. The terrible situation of that body of troops, after the loss of a battle, in the centre of the Persian empire, is well known. Before them an enraged monarch, whose empire and life they intended to take away, who could raise millions of men to his vengeance; in their rear large rivers, impracticable mountains, passes occupied by inimical nations, many hundred miles from their own country, without a guide, without the means to pass rivers, without provisions, without commanders. Who was it that in this perilous situation knew to give advice, take the necessary precautions, point out the road, the order of march, determine the attack and defence, and to conduct the whole corps safely to their home? It was the youngest of the five new elected generals—the scholar of Socrates.

The Greeks philosophised in the field and arranged battles in their studies; extending thereby their knowledge, and at every new war they made progress in tactics. In less than two hundred years they brought the art of war to the highest perfection; and after three hundred years they became the instructors of the Romans, who, with all their perpetual wars and victories, looked upon tactics as a trade, they having suffered this art to degenerate upon their field of Mars into a mechanical sameness.

An evident proof of the perfection of the Grecian tactics towards the end of the first period, is Alexander the Great; who from the 20th to the 25th year of his age, in his Asiatic campaign, already made use of all the tactical arts, which in the present century Frederic II. of Prussia has so excellently displayed. In the passage over the Granicus, in the battle of Arbela; in the passage over the Hydaspes, we behold the models of the battles of Prague, of Leuthen, of Collin, and of Crefeld. It is, therefore, not lessening the knowledge of Alexander if we assert that he had only weak Asiatics to combat; it suffices, that his plans were so wise that he might have adopted them against any nation on earth; his enemies possessed so much tactical knowledge that they opposed to

him the same, and often better manœuvres, as in the beforementioned battles, the Austrians to the Prussians, and the French to the allies.

A state may neglect or despise the arts and sciences, and the art of war, which always keeps equal pace with them; they at last prevail, and take a terrible vengeance of their opponents. This is what Rome experienced, to which we now return again. They already began to rank Regulus among his great predecessors, having beaten in their own country the army of Rome's powerful rival, Carthage; a state, which insignificant as its beginning was, now reigned over numerous provinces and seas, and which by the extent of its commerce, and its indefatigable industry, possessed immense riches, when the pride of the Roman warriors became humiliated, and the theory of the art of war, accompanied by the other sciences, began to shine in the occident with the same brightness as it had hitherto done in the orient.

At that time there was at Carthage a man, of a mean appearance; but he was educated in that warlike state, where they were accustomed, before every battle, to bring offerings to the amiable Muses, the protectors of the sciences. Xanthippus, who never before was heard of having been at the head of an army, was bold enough to declare among his friends, that the Carthagenians were not beaten by the art of the Romans, but by the ignorance of their own generals. The Senate, in their despair, placed the fate of the state and their army into the hands of this man. All were astonished, when they saw how he divided the undisciplined troops into spartan legions, and instructed them before the town in war manœuvres. All now were eager to combat under the lead of such a commander. The army of the Romans was beaten, and the proud Regulus taken prisoner.

Xanthippus, to avoid jealousy, the sure companion of merit, retired to his native country; but he left among the Carthagenians a light in the art of war, which afterwards spread death and destruction in Italy. He left his scholar, the Carthagenian Hamilkar, a worthy successor in his office, and heir of his arts. That able tactician, who defeated the rebels of the state by a skilful manœuvre on the river Macar, and who, according to the expression of Polybius, proved how great the difference was between generals who are masters of the tactics, and those of mere mechanical practice.

This zealous despiser of the Romans did all in his power to inspire his son, Hannibal, with the same sentiments of hatred against the Romans. When a boy of nine years old, he made him swear at the altar of jupiter, an eternal enmity against them.

Inflamed by hatred against the Romans, and instructed by a second Xanthippus, Hannibal, though not above 27 years old, was bold enough to declare war against the state of Rome. The greatness of this enterprize we see by considering the then situation of Rome. During 500 years she had carried on innumerable wars, and finished them all victoriously. They had 150,000 infantry and 6000 horse for the defence of their capital. Their whole force, with those of their allies, was 700,000 infantry, and 70,000 horse. Hannibal entered Italy, against all those forces, with less than 20,000 men.

Such an enterprize can be equalled only by the fortitude with which Hannibal performed this march, the most difficult that ever was made. Nothing was capable of impeding his course, neither rapid rivers, nor numerous foes. They endeavored in vain to annihilate his army between the precipices of mountains. Nature had, in vain, fortified Italy with the Alps, whose rocks and mountains, covered with snow, are lost in the clouds. In the midst of winter, and the severity of the season, he broke through these rocks and mountains of snow, a road never before trodden by man or beast.

When he arrived in Italy, the fortune of war among the Romans, their valour and experience melted away before him like bad metal in the refiner's furnace. Evidences of this are the great battles on the river Trebia, on the lake of Trasimene and of Cannae, in each of which he annihilated almost a Roman army. Rome was plunged into grief. In vain they recalled to their minds their former brilliant triumphs; they only served to augment their consternation. The most experienced generals seemed to have lost all presence of mind; Fabius alone acquired the praise of his countrymen, by having found out that it was impossible to attack Hannibal upon a ground favorable to war manœuvres. He saved his army by marching them on the side of Hannibal over mountains and almost impassable ground, while the latter devastated the fertile plains of Italy with fire and sword. But to conquer Hannibal, remained a secret to him as well as to his colleagues, who little knew that the art of war must be studied, and was not to be learnt by mere mechanical practice.

Archimedes, whose writings we still possess, and who laid the foundation of almost every modern discovery in mathematics, prepared, at this time, death and destruction to another Roman army. Archimedes, who thought practice to be the slave of theory, was often requested by king Hiero, his relation, to shew the utility of his studies by practical application. But now, the place of his

nativity being besieged by the Romans, he manifested it by inventions of war machines of all kinds. Sometimes he prevented the assault of a Roman army by a torrent of stones and arrows. Sometimes he annihilated the Roman vessels with rocks thrown by machines. Sometimes he destroyed those, who, by favor of the night, had approached the wall, by other machines, like drawing wells. With these he drew the boats, with the men in them, out of the water, and plunged them back into the abyfs. Marcellus, the Roman general, in vain made use of all his forces during three years before Syracuse, a city, which he thought to conquer by one single assault. All his skill and force availed him nothing against one single mathematician, till at last on a fast day, by the negligence of the guard, they were suffered to mount the walls, and Archimedes, amidst his mathematical instruments, in his study room, was killed by a Roman foldier.

Though the examples of Xanthippus, Hannibal, and Archimedes, and the loss of so many armies, gave to the Romans evident proofs of the influence which the sciences have over the art of war; yet they would not have found out their error, if one of their fellow citizens had not by an indisputable example, opened their eyes. To oppose Hasdrubal in Spain, a general was to be elected. The most experienced officers trembled at the idea of generalship in a country where death seemed particularly to persecute the leaders. Scipio alone (a young man of 24 years,) was not discouraged. From his infancy, according to the example of the Greeks, he had addicted himself to philosophy, elocution, poetry, the Greek language, and the study of their tactical writings, and was present at several campaigns. He was elected to the command of the Roman army in Spain, in consequence of an eloquent address to the people.

His first endeavor was to exercise his army in the grand manœuvres, which he had learned from the history of the Punic war; the less important manœuvres only being hitherto known at Rome in the same manner as they were at Carthage before Xanthippus, and in the present century before Frederic the second. The happiest consequences were the result of his skill and activity. He defeated the Carthagenian army in Spain, and formed the important project of passing over to Africa with his army, and attacking the Carthagenian state in its very bosom. He proceeded with the caution of a veteran general, passing a whole year in Sicily in making preparations for his African campaign, and in exercising his troops. At the review, the Roman inspectors beheld new evolutions by

land and by sea. Scipio safely landed his troops in Africa. The Carthagenians were defeated in several bloody engagements ; and, beginning to be terrified at the fame of Scipio's successes, they recalled Hannibal out of Italy, to oppose the Romans at home ; but nothing could resist the skilful manœuvres of Scipio. Even Hannibal was unable to stand against him. He who was sixteen years the terror of Rome, and their instructor in military manœuvres, was now, in a decisive battle, on which the fate of Carthage depended, defeated by his scholar.

This battle closed the second Punic war, the end of that powerful combat between theory and practice, which had lasted since the time of Xanthippus, and was decided in favor of the former. They began now to be convinced at Rome, what the mind of one man who is enlightened by the sciences, can do in war. Scipio's enemies were no longer able to lessen his actions and his merits. His triumphal entry into Rome was the triumph of the sciences. From the history of Scipio, as well as that of Alexander and Hannibal, it became evident that a young man, assisted by theory, and a few years experience, may take the command of an army to more advantage than any old general, whose knowledge is the result of practice only. Then they were convinced, says Sallust, that in war, the mind does more than the body.

The Roman youth, and particularly those who had formed pretensions to higher military posts, now endeavored to cultivate their minds by the sciences. We still have to regret the loss of the works of Cincius, Dimentus and Cato. The latter, as he declared himself, was more proud of his writings than of the many victories he gained as a Roman general.

The result, which was dearly bought with the ruin of so many flourishing provinces, with the blood of millions of men, with enormous expences, was, that the mind of the officer was to be cultivated by study as well as the body of the common soldier by exercises and manœuvres.

It is true, that common soldiers, who never had a scientific education, often distinguish themselves in war by a noble conduct. But who knows by what secret way the sciences often shew their influence ? And even if we allow that a man may bear with fortitude the greatest hardships of war, be active in his enterprizes, and valiant in danger, without taking, like Charles XII, Alexander as a pattern ; nay, without even knowing that Alexander ever existed ; yet the presence of mind and the resolution of a leader, as

far as we distinguish it from bluntness, depends entirely on the theory he possesses of the art of war, so as that theory pre-supposes a mind cultivated by the sciences. To deny that, would be the same as to assert, that the narrower a physician's notions are of the symptoms of diseases, the better he would be able to distinguish the diseases themselves; and that the less he has taken notice of what other physicians have found serviceable in similar cases, the greater would be his abilities to prescribe suitable remedies.

It is true, they want to supply all that by experience; as if a man would acquire a perfect knowledge of physic by visiting the patients for some time in company with a physician, without having previously studied medicine. Is the experience in war, on which many a one values himself so much, of another complexion? Do we know the situation of an enemy? Does the general communicate to us his intentions? Are we acquainted with all the springs, which he puts in motion? Do we know what in reality, has decided the action? Is the art of war so simple a thing, that we may penetrate the whole at one view, and foolishly imagine that from a few cases at which we were present we can judge of all its extent? Can it be possible, for any one to have the opinion of himself that he could supply all by the greatness of his own genius, when even Frederic the second, declares his great experience and exalted talents to be insufficient? The art of war, says that Monarch after he had astonished all Europe by his military exploits, "the art of war is not born with us. And even if nature has bestowed upon us the most extraordinary talents; yet a profound study and a long experience are required to bring them to perfection." I venture to add, that a profound study is the more necessary, the less liberal nature has been in her gifts. For no one is more in need to study the invention of others, and thereby, as it were, to make them their own, than those who have not the gift of invention. And many a one, who seemed to be without talents, became by continual application, a luminary which enlightened the world.

The many writings of Frederic the second, evince how much he was addicted to study, how many nights he must inevitably have passed among his books. But did that prevent him from surpassing the most active general in activity, the firmest in fortitude, and the most determined in resolution? Or was not all that a consequence of his studies? The Prussian tactics, in the space of 15 years, came to as high a degree of perfection as the Macedonian, in which the greatest geniuses, the most renowned generals, and the most learned men of Greece, employed almost 200 years. It was

the influence of the sciences that produced this astonishing progress. And even the Romans were at last convinced by the example of their fellow citizen, and were excited to study. All these examples ought to attract our attention, and excite imitation.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CHARACTER AND MILITARY TALENTS
OF CHARLES XII. KING OF SWEDEN, BY THE
LATE KING OF PRUSSIA.

I HAVE endeavoured, merely for my own information, to obtain a just idea of the character and military talents of Charles XII. I estimate his worth neither by the picture which have been drawn by his panegyrist, nor his critics. Occular witnesses, and memoirs, which are, by all authors, acknowledged to be authentic, have been my guides. We ought to suspect all those particular, and minute relations, which we too often find in history. Of a multitude of fictitious and satyrical remarks, few things present themselves which are worthy of notice.

Among the many turbulent spirits, which have been devoured by the passion of reigning, those rulers, who have sought to render nations happy, or to subject them to the yoke of servitude, none deserve to fix our attention, except such whose genius was capable of embracing all things, whose vast plans produced great actions, and whose powers of mind created circumstances, as it were, from nonentity, or profited by the most advantageous of those which presented themselves, to effect essential changes in the relations which exist between states.

Such was the genius of Cæsar. The services he had rendered the republic, his great defects, his still greater virtues, and his fortunate victories, all united to raise him to the empire of the world. Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Marlborough, in a sphere more confined, were animated by the same spirit. Some of these great men made their operations conform to the plan which they intended to pursue during the campaign; others connected all their labours, all the operations of various campaigns, with the plan of the war they carried on; and the end they endeavoured to attain is discovered, when we with attention pursue their enterprizes, which were conducted with prudence and seconded by audacity, and which often were crowned with splendid success.

Such was the plan of Cromwell, that ambitious assassin of a king, and of Richelieu, that adroit priest, who, in consequence of

his perseverance, obtained the power by which he governed the grandees of the kingdom, with the iron sceptre of despotism, almost extirpated the protestants, and humbled the monarchs of Austria, who were the irreconcilable enemies of France.

I do not intend to examine by what right Cæsar overthrew the republic, of which he was a member; nor is this the place to decide whether the cardinal, during his administration, did good or harm to France; nor yet to question how far Turenne merited reproaches for having served the Spaniards against his country. We shall here only speak of the real value of great qualities, and not of the proper or improper manner in which they have been employed.

The violent passions of Charles were, it is true, often obliged to cede to the estimates and sage measures of politics; but this king is, nevertheless, one of those singular apparitions that have excited the fear and astonishment of Europe. The grandeur and splendour of his actions surpass the expectation of the most ardent and determined warrior. King of a valiant nation, and arbitrator of the north, his succeeding misfortunes were excessive. Obligated to seek an asylum among barbarians, by whom he was finally made prisoner: he merits observation both during his good and ill fortune; neither of which can be indifferent to warriors.

My intention is not to diminish the worth of this hero. I only mean to observe him with greater accuracy, that I may exactly determine in what he ought to be imitated, and proposed as an example.

To imagine a man, who has attained the perfect knowledge of any science whatever, would be as ridiculous as to pretend that fire quenches thirst, and that water satisfies hunger. To inform the hero that he has been guilty of an error, is but to make him recollect he is a man. Kings, generals, ministers, authors, in a word, all you who are obliged to appear on the great theatre of the world, you are equally subject to the decision of your contemporaries, and to the sentence of unpardoning posterity.

The tooth of criticism can only make an impression on excellence; bad writings are not worthy the trouble. It is the same with all the paths which lead to the temple of fame. Common mortals are suffered to pass on without attracting attention; but the penetrating eye is fixed on those who endeavour, with uncommon talents, to open to themselves new roads.

Charles XII. is, from many considerations, excusable in not having possessed all the perfection in the art of war. This diffi-

cult art is not innate with man. Though nature should have bestowed upon us superior genius, profound study, and long experience are not the less necessary for the improvement of the most auspicious qualities. It is requisite the warrior should begin his career under the guide of a great captain, or be taught the principles of his trade at much expence and peril; and after having received many severe lessons. We cannot possibly deceive ourselves when we suppose all the capacity of a great general did not exist in a youth who was a king at sixteen.

Charles XII. first saw the enemy when he first saw himself at the head of his forces.

I shall here take occasion to remark, that all those who have commanded armies in their early youth have imagined that courage and rashness only were necessary to victory. Of this Pyrrhus, the great Condé, and our hero, are examples.

But since the discovery of gun-powder has changed the art of war, the whole system has in consequence been changed likewise. Strength of body, the first of qualities among the heroes of antiquity, is at present of no estimation. Stratagem vanquishes strength, and art, courage. The understanding of the general has more influence on the fortunate or unfortunate consequences of the campaign, than the prowess of the combatants. Prudence prepares and traces the route which valor must pursue; boldness must direct the execution; and abilities, not good fortune only, will acquire us the applause of the well informed. Our young officers may learn the theory of this difficult science, by the study of some classical works, and form themselves by frequenting the society of men of experience.

These were resources which the king of Sweden wanted. Whether it were to amuse him, or to inspire him with a love of the latin tongue, which he hated; he was obliged to translate the ingenious romance of Quintus Curtius; and it is possible, that this book awakened in him the desire to imitate Alexander; but it could not supply him with those rules which appertain to a more recent military art. Charles indeed, generally speaking, owed nothing to art, but all to nature. His genius was not resplendent with acquired knowledge, but his mind bore the stamp of audacity to excess, and fortitude not to be shaken, so that it was capable of forming the greatest resolutions. Fame was the idol to which all was sacrificed. His actions, singly, gain, when they are more nearly examined, in proportion as his plans suffer loss. The firmness with which he opposed misfortune, his indefatigable activity

in all his enterprizes, and an heroical courage, which was blind to danger, were certainly the characteristic traits of this extraordinary monarch.

By nature destined to be a hero, the young king followed the irresistible inclination which hurried him along, at the moment that the cupidity of his neighbours provoked him to war. His character, which, till then, had been mistaken, suddenly displayed itself. But it is time to follow the hero on his various expeditions. I mean to confine my remarks to his nine first campaigns, which open a vast field for observation.

The King of Denmark made war on the Duke of Holstein, who had espoused the sister of Charles. Instead of sending troops into Holstein, where they could only have aided in completing the ruin of the country he wished to protect, he ordered eight thousand men into Pomerania. He, himself, with his fleet, proceeded into Zealand, repulsed the enemy's troops that guarded the coast, besieged Copenhagen, the capital of his foe, and, in less than six weeks, obliged the King of Denmark to conclude a peace, which was very advantageous to the Duke of Holstein.

The plan and its execution were equally admirable. By this first essay, Charles raised himself to the rank of Scipio, who transported the war into Africa, that he might oblige Carthage to recall Hannibal out of Italy.

From Zealand I shall attend the young hero into Livonia, whether his troops marched with incredible speed; and the *veni, vidi, vici* of Cæsar, were perfectly applicable to the whole campaign. The same enthusiasm which inspired the King in his enterprizes, animates our imagination, at the recital of the memorable victory he gained.

The conduct of Charles was sagely audacious, and by no means rash. It was necessary to succour the town of Narva, which the Czar besieged in person; and for this purpose he was obliged to attack and to vanquish the Russians. Their army was numerous, but it was only a swarm of ill-armed barbarians, without discipline, and destitute of commanders. The Swedes, therefore, might expect to gain the same advantages over the Muscovites, as the Spaniards obtained over the savage nations of America. Their success was perfectly correspondent to their hopes, and Europe heard with astonishment, that eight thousand Swedes had beaten and dispersed eighty thousand Russians.

From this triumph, I shall accompany the hero to another victory, on the banks of the Duina, the only action in which he em-

ployed stratagem, and by which he profited like a consummate General.

The Saxons were on the opposite shore, and Charles deceived them by an artifice, of which he himself was the inventor. He concealed his manœuvres by the thick smoke of wetted straw, under favor of which, and an uninterrupted cannonade, he caused his troops to pass the river before old general Heinau, who commanded the Saxons, had time to suspect an action of such a nature. Scarcely were the Swedes on the opposite side of the water, before they were formed, in order of battle, to fall on the enemy. The cavalry made some attacks, and the infantry a few discharges, and the Saxons were dispersed and took to flight.

How splendid was such conduct! On passing the river, how great was the presence of mind, the activity which Charles displayed, while he put his troops in order of battle, at the very moment they progressively landed! What valour he demonstrated in gaining the victory so rapidly, and with so much honour! Measures taken and executed after this manner, merit the praises of all ages, and of all nations.

But it is inconceivable to recollect, that we are obliged to seek master strokes of Charles in his first campaigns. Was it that he was spoiled by the interrupted favour of fortune? Or could he suppose that a man whom nothing resisted, had no need of art? Or did his courage, as admirable as it was astonishing, so far mislead him, as to entail on him the defects of those warriors, who possess no virtue but rashness?

Hitherto Charles had turned his arms only against foes whom he was obliged to combat, in his own defence. But after the battle of Duina, we lose sight of the clue by which he was conducted. We perceive a great number of enterprizes, without connection and without design, intermingled with brilliant actions, but which in no manner contributed to produce that great effect, he might have reasonably proposed to himself in making war.

The Czar, past contradiction, was the most puissant and most dangerous enemy of Sweden. Should not the hero have returned in search of him, immediately after the defeat of the Saxons? The remains of the army beaten at Narva were not yet reunited.

Peter I. had hastily assembled thirty or forty thousand new raised men, who were not of greater worth than the eighty thousand, whom Charles disarmed. He ought therefore again vigorously to have attacked him, to have driven him out of Ingria, and not to have given him time to recollect himself, but have profited by this situation, and have forced him to peace.

Augustus who had recently been elected, but not unanimously, beheld himself seated on a tottering throne. Deprive him of the aid of Russia and he must fall. Or Charles might dethrone him whenever he should please, supposing this to be a real advantage to Sweden. But instead of acting thus prudently, the king seems to have forgotten the Czar, and the Russians at bay, that he might give chase to I know not what Polish-magnate of the contrary party. The pursuit of individual vengeance made him neglect real advantages, and lose sight of the principal object.

After he had seized on Lithuania, his army entered Poland like a torrent which overflowed and inundated the whole kingdom. The king was to-day at Warsaw, to-morrow at Cracow, and the next day at Lublin or Lemberg. His troops spread themselves through Polish Prussia, again appeared at Warsaw, dethroned king Augustus, pursued him into Saxony, there peaceably to take up winter quarters.

We must recollect that these campaigns, which I hasten over, afforded Charles employment during several years. Here I shall stop a moment to examine his conduct. Let me however remark, that, during the interval of these marches and counter marches, the victory of Cliflow was gained, for which he was indebted to an able manœuvre to take the Saxons in flank.

The method which Charles pursued in the war of Poland, was certainly very defective. The conquest of Poland, which is every where an open country without fortresses, is a thing of no difficulty; but its preservation as Marshal Saxe well observes, is very precarious. The easier it is to be conquered, the more difficult it is for a conqueror there to fix and maintain himself; the method the Marshal proposes, no doubt appears to be slow, but it is the only one which can be followed by those who would act with safety.

The king of Sweden was by nature much too hasty to make profound reflections on the country in which he made war, and on the dispositions suitable to his military efforts. Had he first established himself in Polish Prussia, had he progressively secured the Vistula and the Bog by throwing up entrenched places of arms, at the confluence of the rivers, or in other proper places; had he acted in the same manner on the other rivers which traverse Poland, he would have obtained points at which to rally, would have guarded the conquered districts, and the places he occupied would have enabled him to raise contributions, and form magazines for the army. By this conduct the war would have become more regular, and he would have prescribed bounds to the inroads of the Russians

and the Saxons. The posts well fortified, would have obliged his enemies, if they would act effectually, to undertake distant sieges, to which it would have been very difficult to transport the artillery necessary, on account of the badness of the roads in that country. His situation never could become desperate, should misfortune happen; his rear would have been open, and by his posts he would have gained time to repair the loss, and to retard a victorious enemy.

By a contrary conduct which Charles preferred, he was only master of the country which his troops occupied; his campaigns were continual marches; and the least unfortunate accident endangered the loss of his conquests. He was obliged to fight innumerable battles, and by the most glorious victory, only gained the uncertain possession of provinces, from which he had long before expelled the foe.

We insensibly approach the period when fortune began to declare against our hero. It is my intention to be still more circumspect than I have been, in judging events, the termination of which was so unfortunate.

We ought not to pass judgement on the goodness of the plan, by the issue of the undertaking. Let us carefully guard against placing that reverse of fortune, which happens in execution, to the account of want of precaution. It may be produced by invisible causes, which the multitude calls blind fatality, and which notwithstanding their great influence over the destiny of men, from their obscurity and complication, escape the most profound and most philosophic spirit of remark.

We cannot in any manner accuse the king of Sweden, of having been himself the cause of all the misfortunes which befell him. The success which had seconded his enterprizes, during the war in Poland, did not permit him to observe, that he often departed from rules of art; and, as he had not been punished for his errors, he was unacquainted with the danger to which he had been exposed. His constant good fortune rendered him so confident, that he did not even suspect it was necessary to change his measures.

In what relates to his projects on the duchy of Smolensko and the Ukrain, it appears, he may be accused of not having taken the least precaution. Supposing he had dethroned the Czar at Moscow, the execution of his plan would not have done him any honour; since success would not have been the work of prudence, but the effect of chance.

The subsistence of his troops should be the first care of a general. An army has been compared to an edifice, the basis of which is the

belly. The negligence of the king in this essential point, was what most contributed to his misfortunes, and most diminished his fame. What praise would the general merit, who in order to vanquish, must have troops that have no need of nourishment, soldiers that are indefatigable and heroes who are immortal?

Charles XII. is accused of having too inconsiderably depended on the promises of Mazeppa, but he was not betrayed by the Cossack. Mazeppa on the contrary, was himself betrayed by a fortuitous concurrence of unfortunate circumstances; which he could neither foresee nor avoid. Besides, minds of the power of that of Charles, are incapable of suspicion, and are never diffident, till they have been taught the wickedness and the ingratitude of mankind by repeated experience.

But I return to examine the plan of operations which Charles intended to execute, during his campaign. True it is, I cannot say, with Corregio, "I also am a painter," yet I will venture to present my ideas to the connoisseur in the art of war.

That he might repair the error he had committed, in having so long neglected the Czar, it appears to me, that the king should have penetrated into Russia, by the most easy route, as the most certain means of overwhelming his all powerful adversary. This route, undoubtedly was not that of Smolensko, nor the Ukrain. There were in both, impracticable marches, immense deserts, and great rivers to pass, before a half cultivated country could be entered, and the army arrive at Moscow. By taking either of these routes, Charles deprived himself of all the succour he might have received from Poland or Sweden. The farther he advanced into Russia, the farther he found himself from his kingdom. To complete such an enterprize required more than one campaign. Whence was he to obtain provisions? By what road were his recruits to march? In what Muscovite or Cossack avenue could he establish a place of reserve? Whence could he obtain arms and clothing which are continually to be renewed in an army with numerous other things of less value, but which are absolutely necessary?

So many insurmountable difficulties, should have taught him to foresee that the Swedes were undoubtedly exposed to perish by fatigue and famine, and that they must diminish and melt away, even if victorious. If, therefore, the aspect of success was thus gloomy, how dreadful must be the picture of possible misfortune! A loss easy to be repaired, in a different situation, must become a decisive catastrophe, to an army abandoned to chance, in a desert country, without strong holds, and consequently without retreats.

Instead of exposing himself to so many difficulties, with so much temerity, instead of braving so many obstacles, a much more natural plan presented itself, which might have been conceived and executed without effort. Charles should have proceeded immediately to Petersburg, through Livonia and Ingria. The Swedish fleet, and the necessary transports, with a supply of provisions, might have followed by the gulph of Finland; the recruits and other things necessary, might have been sent on board this fleet, or marched through Finland. The king would thus have covered his best provinces, and not have removed from his frontiers. Success would have been more splendid, and the utmost adversity would not have rendered his situation hopeless. Should he have seized on Petersburg he would have destroyed the new settlement of the Czar; Russia would have lost sight of Europe, and the only link which connected that empire, with the quarter of the globe we inhabit, would have been broken.

This point gained, he would have been able to profit by success, and proceed farther; though I do not perceive it was any ways essential, he should sign the articles of peace at Moscow.

Let me be permitted, for my own information, to compare the conduct of the king of Sweden, during these two campaigns, to the rules which the great masters of the military art have given.

Those rules are that a general should never endanger his army; nor advance with any corps which is not sufficient sustained. Charles, as it were, buried himself in the duchy of Smolensko, without thinking of preserving a communication with Poland. Our instructors have established it as a law, that we should form a defensive line of communication, and cover it by the army, that our rear may be open, and our magazines in safety. The Swedes found themselves near the town of Smolensko, with only provisions sufficient for a fortnight; they drove their enemies before them, beat their rear guard, and pursued them at a venture, without exactly knowing whither the fugitive enemy was leading them.

We know of no precaution which the king took for the subsistence of his army, except that he ordered general Lowenhaupt to follow him with a considerable convoy. He, therefore, ought not to have this convoy, which the army could not do without, so far in the rear; nor to have begun his march to the Ukrain before its arrival; for the farther he removed from it, the more he exposed himself to defeat. He should rather have chosen to return with his forces into Lithuania. He, on the contrary, continually pushed forward, and thus accelerated the loss of his army.

To such a conduct, so opposite to all the rules of the art of war, and which alone was sufficient to incur ruin, misfortunes were added, which can only be attributed to fatality. The Czar, thrice attacked Lowenthaupt, and at length obliged him to destroy a great part of his convoy.

The king of Sweden, therefore, was ignorant of the views and motions of the Russians. If this were negligence on his part, he ought bitterly to have reproached himself; but if it were occasioned by invincible obstacles, we must once again place this disaster to the account of inevitable destiny.

When war is made in a half barbarous and almost desert country, it is necessary to build fortresses in order to keep possession. These are, in some sort, creations. The troops must aid in constructing roads, mounds and bridges, and in raising redoubts, according as each shall become requisite; but a method so tedious, was little correspondent to the impetuous and restless spirit of the king. It has been rightly remarked, that, in what depended on bravery and promptitude, he was incomparable; but he was no longer the same man on occasions when regular plans or slow measures were to be observed, which time only could reform.

These considerations prove how necessary it is that a warrior should be master of his passions, and how difficult it is to unite, in a single person, all the talents of a great general.

I shall pass over the battle of Holofzin, as well as other combats of that campaign, because they were as ineffectual, relative to war, as they were fatal to those who fell the sorrowful victims. Charles, in general, was prodigal of the blood of men. There are, now doubt, occasions on which it is necessary to fight; as, when more may be gained than lost, when an enemy discovers negligence in his camp, or on his march, or when a decisive blow may oblige him to make peace; but many generals only fight because they do not know how, otherwise, to rid themselves of their embarrassment; therefore, such conduct is not attributed to them as a merit, but rather to the want of genius.

At length we approach the decisive battle of Pultawa. The errors of great men are exemplary lessons to those possessed of less abilities, and there are few generals in the world to whom the fate of Charles may not teach prudence, circumspection, and wisdom,

Marshall Keith, who afterwards commanded in the Ukrain, as a Russian general, and who has seen, and examined Pultawa, has assured me, that the fortifications of that place were only of earth, surrounded by a bad ditch. He was persuaded that the Swedes,

on their arrival, might, without further preparations, have carried it sword in hand, had not the king purposely prolonged the siege, in order to attract, that he might vanquish, the Czar.

It is certain that the Swedes did not there discover the same ardour and impetuosity for which they were famous, it must also be allowed, they did not make an attack till Menzikoff had first thrown succours into the town, and till he had encamped near it, on the banks of the Worshla. But the Czar had a considerable magazine at Pultawa. Should not the Swedes, who were in want of every thing, have seized, with all possible expedition, on this magazine, that they might, at a blow, have taken it from the Russians, and have abundantly supplied themselves? Charles XII. had undoubtedly the most powerful reasons to push the siege with vigor, and he ought to have employed every means to have rendered himself master of this trifling place, before the arrival of succour.

Without including the rambling Cossacks of Mazeppa, who, on the day of battle, did more harm than good, the king had no more than 18,000 Swedes. How was it possible he should think of undertaking a siege, and giving battle at the same time, with so small an army?

On the approach of the enemy, it was requisite either to raise the siege, or to have left a considerable corps in the trenches; the one was disgraceful, and the other much diminished the number of his combatants. This enterprize, which was totally contrary to the interest of the Swedes, was highly advantageous to the Czar, and seems unworthy of our hero; it scarce could have been expected even from a general, who had ever made war with reflection.

Without seeking to discover stratagems where there were none; without attributing to the king views, which he never entertained, we ought rather to recollect, that he was very often uninformed of the march of his enemy. It is to be presumed that he had no intelligence of the march of Menzikoff, nor of the approach of the Czar; and that, consequently, he did not think it necessary to hasten the siege, because he imagined Pultawa could not but surrender. Let us further remember, that Charles always made war in the open field, that he did not understand making sieges, and that he never had opportunities of acquiring knowledge by experience; when we consider too, that the Swedes lay three months before Thorn, the works of which were no better than those of Pultawa, we may, without injustice, pronounce what their abilities were for carrying on a siege.

When Mons, Tournay, and the works of Cohorn and Vauban, scarce impeded the progress of the French for three weeks; and

when, on the contrary, Thorn and Pultawa occupied the Swedes for several months, may we not well conclude the latter did not understand the art of taking towns? No place could resist them, if it were possible to carry it by assault, sword in hand; but they were stopped by the most insignificant fortrefs, before which it was necessary to open trenches.

Should these proofs be insufficient, I will ask, would not Charles, hot and impetuous as he was, have besieged and taken Dantzick, that he might have made the city feel the whole weight of his wrath, on account of an offence which he had received; or would he have been satisfied with a sum of money, if he had not supposed the siege to be an enterprize above his strength?

But let us return to the principal object of this essay. Pultawa was besieged, and the Czar approached with his army. Charles still had it in his power to chuse his post, and there to wait for his arrival. This post he might have taken on the banks of the Worskla, either to dispute the passage of the river, or, the foe having passed it, immediately to have attacked the Czar. The situation of the Swedes demanded quick determination. Either they must fall on the Russians, the moment they arrived, or entirely abandon the project of attack. To suffer the Czar to chuse his post, and to give him time necessary to put himself in a state of defence, was an irreparable fault; he already had the advantage of numbers, which was not a little; and he was allowed to acquire the advantage of ground, and of military art, which was too much.

A few days before the arrival of the Czar, the king was wounded in visiting his trenches; the greatest blame, consequently, fell on his generals. It nevertheless appears, that as soon as he was resolved to give battle, he ought to have abandoned his trenches, that he might have been able to attack the enemy with more vigor. Were he victorious, Pultawa would surrender itself; were he vanquished, he would equally be obliged to raise the siege.

So many mistakes united, announced the issue of the unfortunate battle, the approach of which was daily perceived.

It seemed as if fate had previously disposed every thing to the disadvantage of the Swedes, and thus prepared their ruin. The wound of the king, which prevented him from personally heading his troops as usual, and the negligence of the generals, who, by their erroneous dispositions, sufficiently shewed that they were unacquainted with the position of the enemy, or at least that their knowledge was imperfect, greatly contributed to that remarkable catastrophe. The attack, also, was begun by the cavalry; whereas

it was the business of the infantry, and of a well directed artillery.

The post of the Russians was very advantageous by its situation, and was made stronger with redoubts. A part of their front only could be attacked, and the small plain, on which it was possible to form for the assault, was flanked by the cross fire of three rows of redoubts. One wing of the Russian army was covered by an abatis, behind which there was an intrenchment and the other was defended by an impracticable marsh.

Marshal Keith, who personally examined this so famous ground, maintained that, even with an army of an hundred thousand men, Charles could not have vanquished the Czar thus posted, because the various difficulties that were successively to be overcome, must have cost an infinite number of men, and it is known, that the bravest troops at length lose courage, after a long and murderous attack—when they are opposed by new and unceasing impediments.

I know not what were the reasons, which induced the Swedes, in a situation so critical as they then were, to hazard an attempt so dangerous. If their necessity was absolute, the error of obliging themselves to risk a battle in their own despite, and under the most disadvantageous circumstances was great.

All that might well have been predicted happened: a considerable army diminished by labour, want, and even victory, was led to the slaughter. General Creutz, who by a circuitous rout was to have taken the Russians in flank, lost himself in the woods, and never appeared on the field.

Thus twelve thousand Swedes attacked a post, defended by eighty thousand Muscovites, who no longer were that multitude of barbarians whom Charles had dispersed at Narva; they were metamorphosed into well armed and well posted soldiers, commanded by able foreign generals; well intrenched, and defended by the fire of a formidable train of artillery.

The Swedes led their cavalry against the batteries, and, as might have been expected, were obliged to retreat in valour's despite.—The infantry advanced; and though it was received by a most dreadful fire from the redoubts, they seized on the two first of them. But the Russians attacked the Swedish battalions at once, in front, flank, and rear; repulsed them several times, and obliged them to relinquish the field of battle. Disorder then spread through the army; the king being wounded, was unable to rally his troops, and there was no person who could collect the fugitives soon enough, because the best generals had been made prisoners at the beginning

of the battle; and, as the Swedes had no place which covered the rear of their army, it was their fault that these troops, who fled as far as the banks of the Borysthenes, were obliged to surrender at discretion to the conqueror.

An author of considerable wit, but who probably studied the military art in *Hömer* or *Virgil*, imagines the king of Sweden ought to have put himself at the head of the fugitives whom general *Löwenhaupt* had collected on the banks of the *Borysthenes*; and pretends that the fever which his wound received, and which, as he truly observes, was little calculated to inspire courage, was the reason that he neglected the only means which, according to him, remained for repairing his loss.

Such a determination might have been proper in ages when men fought with the sword and the club; but after a battle, the infantry is always in want of powder. The ammunition of the Swedes formed a part of the baggage, which the enemy had already taken; therefore, if *Charles* had been unwise enough to have headed these troops, destitute as they were of powder and bread, two things which oblige even fortresses to surrender, the *Czar* would soon have had the pleasure of giving audience to his brother *Charles*, for whom he waited with great impatience; consequently, in a situation so desperate, the king, had he been in perfect health, could do nothing better than to take refuge among the *Turks*.

Monarchs, no doubt, ought not to fear danger; but their dignity equally induces them carefully to avoid being made prisoners; and less from personal consideration than from the dreadful consequences which result to their state. French authors should recollect the considerable injury which their nation suffered by the captivity of *Francis I.* The wounds which France then received still bleed, and the venality of state dignities, which was inevitable, in order to raise the sum for the royal ransom, is a double monument of that disgraceful epocha.

In flight, itself, our hero is worthy of admiration. Any other man would have sunk under a blow so severe; but he formed new plans, found resources even in misfortune, and, when a fugitive in *Turkey*, meditated to arm the *Porte* against *Russia*.

It is with pain I behold *Charles* degrading himself to the rank of a courtier of the *Sultan*, begging a thousand purses; and perceive with what headlong, what inconceivable obstinacy he persevered in wishing to remain in the states of a monarch, who would not suffer him there to remain. I could wish the strange battle of *Bender* might be blotted from his history. I regret the precious time he

lost in a barbarous country, feeding on delusive hope, deaf to the plaintive voice of Sweden, and insensible of his duty, by which he was so loudly summoned to the defence of his kingdom, which he, in some manner, seemed, while absent, voluntarily to renounce.

The plans which are attributed to him after his return into Pomerania, and which certain persons have made originate with count Van Goertz, have always appeared to me so indeterminate, so monstrous, and so little consistent with the situation and exhausted state of his kingdom, that my readers will permit me, in behalf of the fame of Charles, to leave them in silence. That war so fruitful in fortunate and unfortunate events, was begun by the enemies of Sweden; and Charles, obliged to resist their plan of aggrandizement, was only in a state of defence. His enemies attacked him because they misunderstood and despised his youth. While he was successful and appeared to be a dangerous enemy, he was envied by Europe; but when fortune turned her back, the allied powers shook the throne of Charles, and parcelled out his kingdom.

Had this hero possessed moderation equal to his courage, had he set limits to his triumphs, had he reconciled himself to the Czar, when an opportunity of honorable peace presented itself, he would have stifled the evil designs of his enemies; but, as soon as they had recovered from their panic, they only thought of the means of enriching themselves by the ruin of his monarchy. Unfortunately the passions of Charles were subject to no controul, he wished to carry every thing by force and haughtiness, and despotically to lord even over despots. To make war, and to dethrone kings was to him but one and the same act.

In all the books which treat of Charles XII. I find high sounding praises bestowed on his frugality and continence; but twenty French cooks in his kitchen, a thousand courtesans in his train, and ten companies of players in his army, would not have occasioned his kingdom the hundredth part of the evils brought on it by his ardent thirst of glory, and desire of vengeance. Offences made so deep and so durable an impression on the soul of Charles, that the most recent effaced all traces of those which had preceded. It may be said, we see the different passions which agitated the irreconcilable mind of this prince with so much violence, disclose themselves by degrees, when we observe and attend him at the head of his armies.

He began by making war on the king of Denmark; he afterwards persecuted the king of Poland without measure or limits; presently, the whole weight of his anger fell on the Czar; and at

length his vengeance selected the king of England as its only object; so that he forgot himself, so far, as to lose sight of the natural enemy of his kingdom, that he might course a shadow, and seek an enemy who was become his foe by accident. or rather by chance.

If we collect the various fruits, which characterize this extraordinary man, we shall find him less intelligent than courageous; less sage than active, less attentive to real advantage, than the slave of his passions; as enterprising, but not so artful, as Hannibal; rather resembling Pyrrhus than Alexander; and as splendid as Condé at Racroi, Friburg, and Nordlingen. But he could not at any time be compared to Turenne, if we observe the latter at the battles of the Downs, near Dunkirc, and at Colmar; and especially during his two last campaigns.

Though the actions of our hero shine with great brilliancy, they must not be imitated, except with particular caution. The more resplendent they are, the more easily may they seduce the youth full, headlong, and angry warrior; to whom we cannot often enough repeat that valour, without wisdom is insufficient; and that the adversary, with a cool head, who can combine and calculate, will finally be victorious over the rash.

To form a perfect general, the courage, fortitude and activity of Charles XII. the penetrating glance and policy of Marlborough, the vast plans and art of Eugene, the stratagems of Luxemburg, the wisdom, order, and foresight of Montecuculli, and the grand art which Turenne possessed, of seizing the critical moment, should be united. Such a phoenix will with difficulty be engendered. Some pretend that Alexander was the model on which Charles XII. formed himself. If that be true, it is equally so, that the successor of Charles is Prince Edward; and if unfortunately the latter should serve as an example to any one, the copy, at best, can only be a Don Quixote.

But what right have I to judge the most celebrated and the greatest generals? Have I myself observed the precepts I have just prescribed? I can only reply, that the faults of others, on the slightest effort of the memory, start to view; and that we glide lightly over our own.

AMERICAN WAR.

(Continued from page 74.)

BEFORE the end of that memorable year, lord Dunmore, the governor of Virginia, gave proofs that he was but illy fitted to be at the helm in this tempestuous season. His province, though there was not a single British soldier within its limits, was, by his indiscretion, involved, for several months, in difficulties but little short of those to which the inhabitants of Massachusetts were subjected. In common with the other provinces, they had taken effectual measures to prepare their militia for the purposes of defence. Lord Dunmore, about this time, engaged a party belonging to a royal vessel in James' River, to convey some public powder from a magazine in Williamsburg on board their ship. This alarmed the inhabitants—They assembled with arms, and demanded its restitution. Extremities were prevented; and, for this time, the affair ended in a negotiation.

Lord Dunmore, however, thought proper to send his lady and family on board the *Fawey man of war*, in James' river, and to fortify his palace. The assembly, who then was convened, appointed a committee to examine the state of the magazine. They found most of the remaining powder buried; the muskets deprived of their locks, and spring guns planted in the magazine. These discoveries irritated the people, and the governor privately retired on board the *Fawey man of war*. The royal government in Virginia from that day ceased. An armed force was now raised, and other measures taken for putting the colony in a state of defence. Lord Dunmore, whose passions predominated over his understanding, was precipitated into farther follies. With the aid of some Tories, run-away negroes, and some frigates that were on the station, he established a marine force. By degrees, he equipped and armed a number of vessels of different kinds and sizes, in one of which he constantly resided, except when he went on shore in a hostile manner. On the 25th of October, he made an attempt to burn Hampton; but the crews of his vessels were so annoyed by riflemen from the shore, that they were obliged to quit their station. Soon after, lord Dunmore, after having proclaimed liberty to the slaves, was joined by several hundreds, both whites and black, at Norfolk, and having once more got footing on the main, he amused himself with hopes of acquiring the glory of reducing one part of the province by means of the other. The pro-

vincials had now an object against which they might direct their arms. An expedition was therefore concerted against the force which had taken the post at Norfolk. Lord Dunmore constructed a fort at the bridge, on the Norfolk side, and furnished it with artillery. The provincials, also, fortified themselves near to the same place, with a narrow causeway in their front. On the 9th of December, the royalists commenced an attack. Captain Fordyce, at the head of about 60 men passed the causeway, and boldly marched up to the provincial entrenchments with fixed bayonets. They were exposed to the fire of the provincials in front, and enfiladed by another part of their works. The Captain and several of his men fell, the Lieutenant with others were taken, and all who survived were wounded.

The royal forces, on the ensuing night, evacuated their post at the bridge, and Lord Dunmore shortly after abandoned Norfolk, and retired with his people on board his ships. Many of the Tories, sought the same asylum. The Provincials took possession of Norfolk and the fleet with its new incumbrances, moved to a greater distance. The people on board, cut off from all peaceable intercourse with the shore, were distressed for provisions and necessaries of every kind. At length on the arrival of the Liverpool man of war from England a flag was sent on shore to put the question, whether they would supply his Majesty's ships with provisions? An answer was returned in the negative. It was then determined to destroy the town. This was carried into effect, and Norfolk was reduced, to ashes. The whole loss was estimated at 300,000 Pounds sterling. The provincials, to deprive the ships of every resource of supply, destroyed the houses and plantations that were near the water, and obliged the people to move their cattle, provisions, and effects, farther into the country. Lord Dunmore, with his fleet, continued for several months on the coast and in the river of Virginia. His unhappy followers suffered a complication of distresses, which induced him sometimes after to burn the least valuable of his vessels, and to send the remainder amounting to 30 or 40 sail, to Florida, Bermuda and the west Indies.

While these transactions were carrying on, another scheme, in which Lord Dunmore was a party, in like manner miscarried. This scheme was formed by one Conolly a Pennsylvanian. The first step of his plan was, to enter into a league with the Ohio Indians. He set out, and actually succeeded in his design. On his return he was dispatched to general Gage, from whom he received a Colonel's commission. The plan was, that he should return to the Ohio,

were by the assistance of the British and Indians in these parts, he was to penetrate through the back settlements into Virginia, and join Lord Dunmore at Alexandria. But by an accident he was discovered and taken prisoner.

In South Carolina, regiments were raised—forts were built—the Militia trained, and every necessary preparation made for that purpose. Lord W. Campbell, the royal governor, having endeavoured to form a party for the support of British government, was obliged to take up his residence on board of an armed vessel in the harbour. Governor Martin of North Carolina, who was also very zealous for the royal interest likewise consulted his safety, retiring on board a sloop of war in Cape Fear river. He attempted to raise the back settlers, consisting chiefly of Scots Highlanders, against the Colony. He sent commissions among them for raising and commanding regiments; and he granted one to Mr. M'Donald to act as their general. Upon the first intelligence of their assembling, Brigadier-General Moore, with some provincial troops and militia, and some pieces of cannon, marched to oppose them. He took possession of Rock Fish bridge, and threw up some works. He had not been there many days when M'Donald approached and endeavoured to join governor Martin, but colonel's Tillington and Caswell, with about 1000 militia men, took possession of Moore's creek bridge, which lay in their way, and raised a small breast work to secure themselves.

On the next morning, the Highlanders attacked the militia, posted at the bridge; but M'Leod, the second in command, and some more of their officers being killed at the first onset, they fled with precipitation. General M'Donald was taken prisoner, and the whole of his party broken and dispersed.

At the end of the year 1775, there was a general termination of royal government, and Britain beheld the whole of America united against her in the most determined opposition.

Second Campaign, 1776.

AT the beginning of this year, the vast possessions of Great Britain in the western world, that now form the fifteen United States, were reduced to the single town of Boston, in which her troops were suffering the inconvenience of a blockade. From the 19th of April, they were cut off from those refreshments which their situation required. Their supplies from England did not

reach the coast for a long time after they were expected, and were partly taken by the American cruisers.

In the month of February, the American army before Boston was, by reinforcements, augmented to 17,000 men. General Washington stated to his officers that he had not powder sufficient for a bombardment; and asked their advice whether, as reinforcements might be daily expected to the enemy, it would not be prudent, before that event took place, to make an assault on the British lines. The proposition was negatived; but it was recommended to take possession of Dorchester Heights. To divert the attention of the garrison, a bombardment of the town, from other directions, commenced, and was continued for three days. The night of the 4th of March was fixed upon for taking possession of Dorchester Heights. A covering party of about 800 men led the way; these were followed by the carts with the intrenching tools, and 1200 of a working party, commanded by general Thomas. In the rear there were more than 200 carts, loaded with fascines and hay in bundles. While the cannon were playing in other parts, the greatest silence was kept by this working party. The provincials completed lines of defence by the morning, which astonished the garrison. The admiral informed general Howe, that if the Americans kept possession of these Heights, he would not be able to keep one of the king's ships in the harbour. An engagement was hourly expected—It was intended by general Washington, in that case, to force his way into Boston with 4000 men, who were to have embarked at the mouth of Cambridge river. They were reminded that it was the 5th of March, and were called upon to avenge the death of their countrymen killed on that day. But general Howe did not intend to attack till the next day. In order to be ready for it, the transports went down in the evening towards the castle. In the night a most violent storm, and towards morning a heavy flood of rain, came on, A carnage was thus providentially prevented, that would probably have equalled the fatal one on the 17th of June at Breed's-Hill. In this situation, it was agreed by the British, in a council of war, to evacuate the town as soon as possible.

General Howe issued a proclamation, ordering all woollen and linen goods to be delivered to Mr. Crean Brush. Shops were opened and stripped of their goods. A licentious plundering took place; much was carried off, and more was wantonly destroyed. These irregularities were forbidden in orders, and the guilty threatened with death, but nevertheless, every mischief which disappointed malice could suggest it was committed.

The British, amounting to more than 7000 men evacuated Boston, leaving their barracks standing, a number of cannon spiked and stores to a high amount. On their departure, a great number of the inhabitants, afraid of public resentment, followed them. From Boston, they sailed to Halifax; but all their vigilance could not prevent a number of valuable ships from falling into the hands of the American privateers. Some of the vessels which they captured, were laden with arms and warlike stores. Some transports, with troops on board, were also taken. These had ran into the harbour, not knowing that the place was evacuated. The embarkation of the British troops was scarcely completed, when general Washington, with his army, marched into Boston, where he was received with marks of approbation more flattering than those of a triumph.

The progress of general Montgomery in Canada, induced congress to reinforce the army under his command. There was a fair prospect of expelling the British from thence, and of annexing that province to the United Colonies. While this was in agitation, the army in which they confided was defeated, and the general whom they adored was killed. This, however, did not extinguish the ardour of the Americans. Congress resolved that nine battallions should be kept up, and maintained in Canada. The colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New-Hampshire were requested to raise three regiments, and forward them to Canada. It was also resolved to raise a corps of artillery for this service, and to take into the pay of the colonies one thousand Canadians, in addition to colonel Livingston's regiment; Moses Hazen of Massachusetts, who had resided many years in Canada, was appointed to the command of this new corps.

Though congress and the states made great exertions to support the war in Canada, yet from the fall of Montgomery, their interest in that colony daily declined. Their unsuccessful assault on Quebec made an impression, both on the Canadians and the Indians, unfavourable to their views.

The small force which arrived at Quebec early in May, was followed by several British regiments, together with the Brunswick troops, in such a rapid succession, that in a few weeks the whole was estimated at 13,000 men.

The Americans, in their retreat from Quebec, marched to the Sorel, at which place they threw up some slight works for their safety. They were there joined by some battallions coming to reinforce them. About this time general Thomas died, and the

command devolved at first on general Arnold, and afterwards on general Sullivan. An attack was now projected on the British post at the Three Rivers. With this view, a detachment of 600 men was put under the command of colonel St. Clair. At their head he advanced to the village of Nicolette. When every thing was ready for the enterprise, intelligence was received that six transports, escorted by two frigates from Quebec, had arrived, and brought a large addition to the late force at the Three Rivers. This caused some new movements, and a delay till more troops could be brought forward. General Thompson then came on with a reinforcement, and took command of the whole. It was determined to make the proposed attack in four different places at the same time. One division, commanded by colonel Wayne, was to gain the eastern extremity of the town; one under colonel Maxwell was to enter from the northward, and the other two divisions, commanded by colonels Sinclair and Irvine, were to enter from the westward. The whole having embarked at midnight, landed at the Point du Lac, about three hours before day. At some distance from this Point there are two ways of approaching Three Rivers. Intelligence was brought to general Thompson, soon after his landing, that a party of three or four hundred men were posted at three miles distance. The troops were instantly put in motion to dislodge them. The intelligence proved to be false, but it had carried the detachment some distance beyond the point where the roads separated. To have returned would have consumed time that could not be spared, as the day was approaching. It was, therefore, resolved to proceed in a diagonal direction towards the road they had left. They arrived at a morass which seemed impassable. Here the day broke, when they were six miles from their object. General Thompson, reversing his march, again reached the road by the river. He had not advanced far when he was fired upon by two armed vessels. All expectation of succeeding by surprise was now at an end; it was, therefore, instantly determined to make an open attack. They advanced with the greatest alacrity—the van struck into a road on the left, which also led to the town, and was covered from the fire of the ships. This last road was circuitous, and led through a vast tract of woodland at that season almost impassable. They nevertheless entered the wood, and the rest of the detachment followed. After incredible labour, they gained the open country north of the village. There they discovered a party of the English between them and the town. Colonel Wayne immediately attacked them. The onset was vigorous, but the

contest was unequal. The Americans were soon forced to retreat. The British being then discovered on the river road, advancing in a direction to gain the rear of the Americans, a retreat of the main body was ordered. This was made by treading back their steps through the same dismal swamp by which they had advanced. The British marched directly for the Point du Lac with the expectation of securing the American batteaux. On their approach, major Wood retired with them to the Sorel. At the Point du Lac the British took a very advantageous position, and a party of them pursued the Americans, who, at their arrival near the place of their embarkation, found a large party of their enemies posted in their front at the same time that another was only three quarters of a mile in their rear. There was an immediate necessity either to lay down their arms, or attempt, by a sudden march to turn the party in front, and get into the country beyond it. The last was thought practicable, and the greatest part of the detachment arrived safe at the army of the Sorel.

The British forces having arrived, and a considerable body of them having rendezvoused at the Three Rivers, a serious pursuit of the American army commenced:—The distresses of the retreating army were great. General Sullivan, who conducted the retreat, nevertheless acted with so much judgment and propriety, that the baggage and public stores were saved, and the numerous sick brought off. The American army reached Crown Point on the 1st of July, and at that place made their first stand.

General Gates was about this time appointed to command in Canada, but on coming to the knowledge of the late events in that province, he concluded to stop short within the limits of New-York. The scene was henceforth reversed. Instead of meditating the re-commencement of offensive operations, that army which had lately excited so much terror in Canada, was called upon to be prepared for repelling an invasion threatened from that province. It was therefore resolved to erect works of defence, east of Ticonderoga, and especially by every means to endeavour to maintain a naval superiority on Lake Champlain. In conformity to that resolution, general Gates, with about 12,000 men, which were collected in the course of the summer, was fixed in command of Ticonderoga, and a fleet was constructed at Skenesborough. This was carried on with such rapidity, that in a short time there were afloat in Lake Champlain, one sloop, three schooners, and six gondolas, carrying in the whole 58 guns, 86 swivels, and 440 men. Six other vessels were also nearly ready for launching at

the same time. The fleet was put under the command of general Arnold, and he was instructed by general Gates to proceed beyond Crown-Point, down Lake Champlain, to the split rock; but most peremptorily restrained from advancing any farther, as security against an apprehended invasion was the ultimate end of the armament.

The expulsion of the American invaders from Canada was but a part of the British designs in that quarter. They urged the pursuit no farther than St. John's, but indulged the hope of being soon in a condition for passing the lakes, and particularly through the country to Albany, so as to form a communication with New-York. Before they could advance with any prospect of success, a fleet, superior to that of the Americans on the lakes, was to be constructed. It was so late as the month of October before their fleet was prepared to face the American naval force on Lake Champlain. The former consisted of the ship *Inflexible*, mounting 18 twelve pounders, one schooner, mounting 14, and another of 12 six pounders; a flat bottomed radeau, carrying six 24, and six 12 pounders, and a gondola with seven 9 pounders. There were also twenty smaller vessels with brass field pieces, and some long boats; besides a vast number of vessels detained for the transportation of the army, its stores, artillery, &c. The whole was put under the command of Capt. Pringle. The naval force of the Americans was far short of what was brought against them.

The British proceeded up the lake and engaged the Americans. The wind was so unfavorable to the British, that their ship *Inflexible*, and some other vessels of force, could not be brought to action. This lessened the inequality between the contending fleets so much, that the principal damage sustained by the Americans was the loss of a schooner and gondola. At the approach of night the action was discontinued. The vanquished, during the night, made their escape, but the wind becoming more favorable, the British, next morning, overtook the Americans, when a smart engagement ensued, which was well supported on both sides for about two hours. Some of the American vessels escaped to Ticonderoga. One of the galleys was taken, and general Arnold, determined that his people should not become prisoners, ran the Congress galley, a fine gondola, on shore in such a position as enabled him to land his men and blow up the vessel.

The American naval force being nearly destroyed, the British had undisputed possession of Lake Champlain, which terminated the northern campaign of 1776.

The British had cleared Canada of its invaders, yet from impediments thrown in their way, they failed in their ulterior designs. General Gates, by well contrived delays, retarded the British for so great a part of the summer, that by the time they had reached Ticonderoga, their retreat on account of the approaching winter became immediately necessary. On the part of the Americans, some men and a few armed vessels were lost, but time was gained, their army saved, and the frontier of the adjacent states secured from a projected invasion. On the part of the British, the object of the campaign, in which 13,000 men were employed, and near a million of money expended, was rendered, in a great measure, abortive.

In the session of Parliament, between the 26th of October, 1775, and the 23d of May, 1776, the ultimate plan for reducing the Colonies was completely fixed. They were declared out of the royal protection, and the king entered into treaties with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the Duke of Brunswick, for about 16,000 men, who were to be sent to America to assist in subduing the Colonies. The parliament also passed an act, forbidding all intercourse with America, and declaring all American property on the high seas, forfeited to the captors.

It was resolved to open the campaign with such a powerful force as would look down all opposition, and effectuate submission without bloodshed, and to direct its operation to the accomplishment of three objects. The first was the relief of Quebec, and the recovery of Canada. The second, was a strong impression on some of the southern Colonies. The third and principal was, to take possession of New-York, with a force sufficiently powerful to keep possession of Hudson's river, and form a line of communication with the royal army in Canada, or to overrun the adjacent country.

The first part of this plan was partly executed, and the execution of the second was committed to general Clinton and Sir Peter Parker, the latter of whom had sailed with his squadron directly from Europe and formed a junction with general Clinton at Cape Fear. They concluded to attempt the reduction of Charleston, having 2,800 land forces, which they hoped, with the co-operation of their shipping, would be fully sufficient.

For some months past, every exertion had been made to put the Colony of South Carolina, and especially its capital, Charleston, in a respectable posture of defence. Works had been erected on Sullivan's Island, which is situated so near the channel leading up to the town, as to be a convenient post for annoying vessels approaching it.

The 28th of July Sir Peter Parker attacked the fort on that Island, with two 50 gun ships, four frigates, each of 28 guns, 2 sloops of 20 guns and 2 of 8 guns each. On the fort were mounted 26 cannon, 24, 18, and 9 pounders. The attack commenced between ten and eleven in the forenoon, and was continued for upwards of ten hours. The garrison consisting of 375 men, under the command of Colonel Moultrie, made a most gallant defence. The ships were almost torn to pieces, and the killed and wounded on board exceeded 200 men. The loss of the garrison was only 10 men killed, and 22 wounded. General Clinton had landed with a number of troops on Long Island, but his crossing over the narrow passage which divides the two Islands, and attacking the fort in its unfinished rear was prevented by Colonel Thomson, who with 700 men was stationed at the East end of Sullivan's Island. The firing ceased in the evening and before morning the ships had retired about two miles from the Island. A few days after the troops re-embarked, and the whole sailed for New-York.

By the repulse of this armament, the southern states obtained a respite from the calamities of war for two years and a half. The effect of this victory, in animating the Americans, were great. It dispelled the gloom which overshadowed the minds of many of the colonists, on hearing of the powerful fleets and numerous armies which were coming against them.

On the 9th of June, a motion for declaring the Colonies free and independent, was made in Congress. The debates on that subject were continued for some time, and after a full discussion, the proposed measure was, on the 4th of July, approved by nearly an unanimous vote, which was expressed in the following words :

“ When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

“ We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men were created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it,

and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of those Colonies and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object, the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

“ He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

“ He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

“ He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature; a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

“ He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

“ He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.

“ He has refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining, in the mean time, exposed to all the danger of invasion from without, and convulsions within.

“ He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these states, for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

“ He has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.

He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.

“ He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.

“ He has kept among us, in time of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.

“ He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior, to the civil power.

“ He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation:

“ For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

“ For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States:

“ For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world:

“ For imposing taxes on us without our consent:

“ For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury:

“ For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences:

“ For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighbouring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies:

“ For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments:

“ For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

“ He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.

“ He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

“ He is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

“ He has constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.

“ He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the mercilefs Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.

“ In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms: our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

“ Nor have we been wanting to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts made by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They, too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

“ We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of right do. And, for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour.”

From the promulgation of this declaration, every thing assumed a new form. The Americans no longer appeared in the charac-

ter of subjects in arms against their sovereign, but as an independent people, repelling the attacks of an invading foe. The people were encouraged by it to bear up under the calamities of war, and viewed the evils they suffered only as the thorn that ever accompanies the rose.

The American army received the declaration of independence with unfeigned acclamations of joy. Though it was well known that Great Britain had employed a force of 55,000 men to war upon the new formed states, and that the continental army was not equal to one half that number, and only engaged a few months, and that congress was without any assurance of foreign aid, yet both the American officers and privates gave every evidence of their hearty approbation of the decree which severed the Colonies from Great Britain, and submitted to the sword, whether they should be free states or conquered provinces. "Now," said they, "we know the ground on which we stand; now we are a nation; no more shall the opprobrious term of *rebel*, with any appearance of justice, be applied to us. Should the fortune of war throw us into the hands of our enemies, we may expect the treatment of prisoners, and not the punishment of *rebels*. The prize for which we contend is of such magnitude that we may freely risque our lives to obtain it."

The command of the force which was designed to operate against New-York, in this campaign, was given to Admiral Lord Howe and his brother Sir William. To this service was allotted a powerful army, consisting of about 30,000 men. This force was superior to any thing that America had heretofore seen.

A few days after the declaration of independence, general Howe, arrived off Sandy Hook, which he had previously commanded at Boston, and was soon after joined by admiral lord Howe, with part of the reinforcement from England. The British general, on his approach, found every part of New-York island, and the most exposed parts of Long-Island fortified and well defended with artillery. It had early occurred to general Washington, that the possession of New-York would be with the British a favourite object. General Lee, while the British were yet in possession of Massachusetts, had been detached from Cambridge to put Long-Island and New-York into a posture of defence. Works were then erected in and about New-York, on Long Island, and the heights of Harlem. These, besides batteries, were field redoubts, formed of earth, with a parapet and ditch. The former

were sometimes fraised, and the latter pallifadoed, but they were in no instance formed to sustain a siege. Slight as they were the campaign was nearly wasted before they were so far reduced as to permit the royal army to penetrate into the country.

The American army in and near New-York amounted to 17,200 men. These were mostly new troops, and were divided into many small unconnected posts, some of which were fifteen miles removed from others. General Washington had early in April fixed his head quarters in New-York. The British force was increasing by frequent successive arrivals from Halifax, South Carolina, Florida, the West-Indies and Europe. But so many unforeseen delays had taken place that the month of August was far advanced before they were in a condition to open the campaign.

The royal commissioners, admiral and general Howe, thought proper before they commenced their military operations to try what might be done in their civil capacity, towards effecting a reunion between Great-Britain and the colonies. Lord Howe first sent ashore a circular letter to several of the royal governors in America informing them of the late act of Parliament "for restoring peace to the colonies, and granting pardon to such as should deserve mercy," and desiring them to publish a declaration which accompanied the same. Here, however, congress saved him trouble, by ordering his letter and declaration to be published in all the newspapers "that every one might see the insidiousness of the British ministry, and that they had nothing to trust to besides the exertion of their own valour.

Lord Howe next sent a letter to general Washington; but as it was directed "to George Washington, Esq." the general refused to accept of it as not being directed in the style suitable to his station. Some time after adjutant-general Parterson was sent by general Howe, with a letter addressed to general Washington, &c &c. a polite reception was given to the bearer, but general Washington replied, that a letter directed to any person in a public character should have some description of it, otherwise it would appear a mere private letter; that it was true the *Esq's* implied every thing, but they also implied any thing, and that he should therefore decline the receiving any letter directed to him as a private person, when it related to his public station. A long conference ensued, in which the adjutant-general observed, that the commissioners were armed with great powers, and would be very happy in effecting an accommodation." He received for answer, "that from what appeared

their powers were only to grant pardon; that they who had committed no fault wanted no pardon."

The British commanders then resolved to make their first attempt upon Long Island. They landed between Utrecht and Gravesend, The American works protected a small peninsula having Wallabout Bay to the left, and stretching over to Red-Hook on the right, the East-River being in their rear. General Sullivan with a strong force, was encamped within these works at Brooklyne. From the east side of the Narrows runs a ridge of hills, covered with thick wood, about five or six miles in length, which terminates near Jamaica. There were three passes through these hills, one near the Narrows, a second on the Flatbush road, and a third on the Bedford road, and they are all defensible. These were the only roads which could be passed from the south side of the hills to the American lines, except a road which led round the easterly end of the hills to Jamaica. The Americans had 800 men on each of these roads, and Colonel Miles was placed with his battalion of riflemen, to guard the road from the south of the hills to Jamaica, and to watch the motions of the British.

General de Heister, with his Hessians, took the 26th of August, post at Flatbush. In the following night the greater part of the British army commanded by general Clinton, marched to gain the road leading round the easterly end of the hills to Jamaica, and to turn the left of the Americans. He arrived about two hours before day, within half a mile of the road. One of the parties fell in with a patrol of American officers, and took them all prisoners, which prevented the early transmission of intelligence. At the break of day general Clinton advanced and took possession of the heights over which the road passed. General Grant, with the left wing, advanced along the coast by the west road near the Narrows; but this was intended chiefly as a feint.

The guard which was stationed at this road fled without making any resistance. A few of them were afterwards rallied, and lord Stirling advanced with 1500 men, and took possession of a hill about two miles from the American camp, and in front of general Grant.

On the 27th of August an attack was made very early in the morning by the Hessians from Flatbush, under general Heister, and by general Grant on the coast, and was well supported for a considerable time on both sides. The Americans who opposed Heister, were first informed of the approach of general Clinton, who had come round on their left. They immediately began to retreat to

their camp, but were intercepted by the right wing under general Clinton, who got into the rear of their left and attacked them with the light infantry and dragoons while returning to their lines. They were driven back till they were met by the Hessians. They were thus alternately chased and intercepted between general Heister and general Clinton. Some of their regiments nevertheless found their way to the camp. The Americans under lord Stirling, who were engaged with general Grant, fought with great resolution for about six hours. They were uninformed of the movements made by general Clinton, till some of the troops under his command had traversed the whole extent of country in their rear. Their retreat was thus intercepted, but several, notwithstanding, broke through and got into the woods; many threw themselves into the marsh, some were drowned, and others perished in the mud, but a considerable number escaped by this way to their lines.

The loss of the British and Hessians was about 450. The killed, wounded, and prisoners of the Americans, including those who were drowned or perished in the woods or mud, exceeded a thousand. Among the prisoners of the latter were two of their general officers, Sullivan and lord Stirling, and several other officers of distinction.

General Washington called a council of war, to consult on the measures proper to be taken, after which dispositions were made for an immediate retreat. This commenced soon after it was dark, from two points, the upper and lower ferries, on East River. The intention of evacuating the Island had been prudently concealed from the Americans, that they knew not whither they were going, but supposed to attack the enemy. The field artillery, tents, baggage, and about 9000 men, were conveyed to the city of New-York over East River, in less than 13 hours, and without the knowledge of the British, though not 100 yards distant. Towards morning an extreme thick fog came up, which hovered over Long Island, and by concealing the Americans enabled them to complete their retreat. In about half an hour the fog cleared away, and the British entered the works which had just been relinquished.

General Sullivan, who was taken prisoner, was immediately sent on parole, with the following verbal message from Lord Howe, to congress "that though he could not at present treat with them in that character, yet he was very desirous of having conference with some of the members, whom he would consider as private gentlemen; setting forth at the same time the nature and extent of his powers as commissioner. Congress replied, that the repre-

representatives of the free and independent states of America could not with propriety send any of their members to confer with Lord Howe in their private characters, but that ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee of their body, to know whether he has any authority to treat with persons authorized by congress for that purpose, on behalf of America, and what that authority is; and to hear such propositions as he shall think fit to make respecting the same." They elected Dr. Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, their committee for this purpose. They were very politely received by Lord Howe, but the conference proved fruitless, Lord Howe's commission not containing any other authority than that expressed in the act of parliament—namely, that of granting pardons. Lord Howe ended the conversation on his part, by expressing his regard for America, and the extreme pain he would suffer in being obliged to distress those whom he so much regarded. Dr. Franklin thanked him for his regard, and assured him, that the Americans would shew their gratitude, by endeavouring to lessen as much as possible all pain he might feel on their account, by exerting their utmost abilities in taking good care of themselves."

A council of war recommended to act upon the defensive, and not to risk the army for the sake of New-York. The public stores were moved to Dobb's ferry about 26 miles from New-York; 12,000 men were ordered to the northern extremity of New-York island, and 4,500 to remain for the defence of the city, while the remainder occupied the intermediate space. Before the British landed, it was impossible to tell what place would be first attacked: this made it necessary to erect works for the defence of a variety of places as well as of New-York. Though every thing was abandoned when the crisis came, that either the city must be relinquished or the army risked for its defence, yet from the delays occasioned by the redoubts and other works, a whole campaign was lost to the British and saved to the Americans. Congress had determined to raise 88 battalions, to serve during the war. To wear away the campaign with as little misfortune as possible, and thereby gain time to raise a permanent army against the next year, was to the Americans a matter of the last importance.

On the 15th of September, general Howe began to land his men under cover of five ships of war, between Kipp's-Bay and Turtle-Bay. As the different divisions landed, they posted themselves on the high grounds that stretch in an ascending direction from the sea shore. At the same time a detachment of Hessian





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troops advanced to New-York, and in their way fell in with a party of the Americans retreating by the pass at Blooming Dale. A skirmish ensued, in which the Hessians were victorious. About the same time, another detachment of the British troops made a movement to the right, in order to attack a body of the Americans, who however retreated to the main body posted on Morris's Heights. No attempts being made to defend New-York, it was taken possession of by the English. They had been a few days in possession, when a dreadful fire broke out and consumed a thousand houses.

After the Americans had evacuated New-York, they retired to the north end of the island on which the city is erected. On the morning of the 16th of September a detachment was sent out from the main body of the Americans, to a wood facing the left flank of the enemy. The British in order to dislodge them, dispatched three companies of light infantry, and three companies of Hessian riflemen. An action ensued, which was carried on by reinforcements on both sides, and became very warm. Many were killed on both sides, but the advantage was on the side of the Americans.

General Washington while retreating from New-York, posted his troops so as to make a line of small detached and intrenched camps on the several heights and strong grounds from Valentine's hill on the right, to the vicinity of the White-Plains on the left. The British troops employed themselves in throwing up a chain of redoubts on M^r Gowans Hill to cover New-York, and to render it capable of a vigorous defence. As soon as the redoubts were completed it was determined to attempt the rear of the Americans, by the New-England road, from which they received the most of their supplies. On the 18th of October the British troops re-embarking proceeded along the coast to Pell's Point, and disembarked there without difficulty. Soon after they landed a skirmish happened in an attempt to dislodge the Americans from a narrow pass, at which they had taken post with a strong corps. The latter retired. On the 20th of October the main division of the British army moved to New-Rochelle situated on the Sound that divides Long-Island from the continent. There they were joined by the second division of foreign troops, from England, under the command of general Knyphausen. The American army stretched along the ground parallel to that on which the British troops were marching; from Kings Bridge on the right, to White Plains on the left. The two armies were separated by the river Brunx, the



The Engagement on the WHITE PLAINS the 28th of October 1776.
between the American & British Forces.

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rear of the British was covered by the Sound, not far distant. With this relative arrangement the armies moved slowly towards the White Plains, where on the eastern side of the Brunx, a detachment had been fortifying a camp for the Americans, which camp they occupied with their whole army consisting of about 18,000 men, on the 26th. (See plate No. III. a)

The British army, 13000 strong, early in the morning of the 28th of October, in two columns marched from its encampment near Ward's house, on the banks of the Brunx, the left being commanded by general Heister, accompanied by general Howe. Sir Henry Clinton commanded the right. As they approached the White Plains the right column fell in with several bodies of the Americans whom they drove back to their works. The Americans were encamped on a long ridge of hills the brow of which was covered with lines lately thrown up. A bend of the Brunx protected their right flank, and by another turning in its course enveloped also the rear of their right wing. The point of the hill on their right, was exceedingly steep and rocky, and was covered by a strong abatis in front of the entrenchment. Their left was posted in very broken ground, difficult to be assailed. The weakest part was the centre. The slope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court-house. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockiness of the soil prevented the ditch from being made of any troublesome depth.

* The Americans on the approach of the enemy, kept up a sharp cannonade, which the British returned, but the distance was so great, that there was little effect on either side. Part of the British columns formed behind some rising ground, nearly parallel to the front of the Americans but the right wing of the British did not extend beyond the centre of the American lines. That part of the position of the Americans did not seem to be considered; all the attention of the British commander being fixed on another part of the field. A large party of Americans were posted on a hill (c) in a line with the right of their camp, but separated from it by the Brunx. † Against this hill all the efforts of the British army

* *Had an assault been made on the centre of the American works defeat would have been destruction to the Americans. The whole of their right must have fallen into the power of the British; for the Brunx not being passable in that part, cut off their retreat.*

† *The reason of the Americans occupying this posture is inexplicable, unless it be that they could not be contained within the works of their*

were directed. A part of the left wing passed the ford, which was intirely under command of their cannon. Previous to their attack, Col. Rall, commanding a brigade of the Hessians, on the left passed the Brunx, and gained a post which enabled him to annoy the flank of M'Dougal's corps. The Americans were drove from the hill. While they were engaged the American baggage was moved off, in full view of the British army. The main army of the Americans remained tranquil in their entrenchments.

On the night of 28th of October the British troops lay on their arms, and encamped next day with the left wing on the field of battle, and the right extending from the other side of the Brunx, which position enabled them to make a front parallel to a certain extent to that of the Americans. In the mean time the latter employed themselves in strengthening their lines. General Howe having been reinforced by four battallions from York Island and two from Mharonneck Post made dispositions for attacking the American lines early on the last of October. This resolution however, was abandoned, on account of rainy weather. On the 31st the weather proved fine about noon, but the British commander did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution. The Americans had rendered their lines sufficiently strong to resist an attack, but being informed by a deserter that the British army would march against them the next morning, they evacuated their lines on the morning of the first of November, and retired across the Crotton river to North Castle. Their position was now so advantageous, that any attack on them must have proved very unsuccessful; for the river Crotton stretched along their front, and their rear was defended by woods and heights.

camp. The possession of that hill would not enable the British to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Brunx that its crest was not within random cannon shot, as was proved by many of the British battallions lying upon it on their arms the whole evening after the action: nor had general Washington to apprehend that, from that quarter, an attack might be made on his rear, since the Brunx, deep and impracticable, would have been still between the two armies.

Though we should never judge on the merits or demerits of military dispositions from resulting events, yet the placing of a considerable body on that hill effectually disposed general Howe to commit the blunder of not assailing the centre of the American lines and to direct all his attention towards that post, which was the cause that their victory was not followed by a single advantage.

Within a few days, general Washington with part of his army, crossed the North River, and took post in the neighbourhood of Fort Lee. A force of about 7,500 men was left at North-Castle under general Lee.

The Americans having retired general Howe determined to improve the opportunity of their absence for the reduction of Kingsbridge and Fort Washington. This last post was of the utmost importance, as much as it secured an immediate intercourse with the Jersey shore to Fort Lee, and effectually obstructed the navigation of the North River. Sensible of the importance of this post, the Americans had garrisoned it under the command of Colonel Magaw.

On the fifteenth of November the British batteries being completed a summons was sent to the garrison to surrender, the commanding officer answered that he would defend the fort to the last extremity. It was determined therefore to commence a vigorous attack upon it next morning. The army was divided into four parts. The first on the north side was led on by general Knyphausen. The second on the east by general Matthews, supported by lord Cornwallis. The third was under the direction of Colonel Stirling, and the fourth was commanded by lord Piercy. The outworks being carried by the enemy, the Americans left their lines and crowded into the fort.* The garrison finding that it was not possible to defend the fort longer surrendered prisoners of war.

The number of prisoners amounted to 2700. The loss of the British, inclusive of killed and wounded, was about 1200. Lord Cornwallis with a considerable force passed over to attack Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey shore. The garrison was saved by an immediate evacuation, but at the expence of their artillery and stores.

The term of time for which the American soldiers had engaged to serve ended in November or December, the army having been organized the preceding year, on the idea that an accommodation would take place within a twelve months.

When it was expected that the conquerors would retire to winter quarters, they commenced a new plan of operations more alar-

* *It was an error in Col. Magaw, that he suffered his troops to crowd into the fort, after quitting their lines: for had they been posted on the brow of the hill, facing the north and south, the contest would have been prolonged, and the assailants have sustained a greater loss; but the grand error was in not withdrawing the garrison on the evening preceeding the assault. The possession of that post was in the then situation of affairs, certainly no longer useful.*

thing than all their previous conquests. The reduction of Fort Washington, the evacuation of Fort Lee, and the diminution of the American army, by the departure of those whose time had expired, encouraged the British, notwithstanding the severity of the winter, to pursue the remaining inconsiderable continental force with the prospect of annihilating it. To retreat was the only expedient left. This having commenced, lord Cornwallis followed, and was close on the rear of general Washington, as he retreated successively to Newark, to Brünswick, to Princetown, to Trenton, and to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware.

The British took possession of Rhode-Island without any loss, and in the mean time blocked up commodore Hopkin's squadron and a number of American privateers at Providence.

In this period, when the American army was relinquishing its general, the people giving up the cause, some of their leaders going over to the enemy, the British commanders succeeding in every enterprize, general Lee was taken prisoner at Baskenridge, by lieutenant colonel Hartcourt. This caused a depression of spirits among the Americans, far exceeding any real injury done to their essential interests. They had reposed great confidence in his military talents, and experience of regular European war.

By the advance of the British into New-Jersey, the neighbourhood of Philadelphia became the seat of war. Congress therefore adjourned themselves on the 12th of December, to meet in eight days at Baltimore, resolving at the same time, "that general Washington should be possessed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and the operations of war."

With the year 1776, a retreating army was to be dismissed, and the prospect of a new one was both distant and uncertain. The recently assumed independence of the States was apparently on the verge of dissolution. But in proportion as difficulties increased, congress redoubled their exertions to oppose them; they addressed the States in animated language; calculated to remove their despondency, renew their hopes, and confirm their resolutions. They at the same time dispatched gentlemen of character and in fluence to excite the militia to take the field. General Washington was empowered to raise and collect together in the most speedy and effectual manner from any or all of the United States 16 battalions of infantry in addition to those already voted by congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry, to raise officers, and equip 3000 light horse; three regiments of artillery, a corps of engineers, and to establish their

pay ; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary ; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places as he shall think proper ; to dispose and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general ; to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies.

About that time the number of troops under the command of general Washington amounted to 2 or 3000 men only. In this crisis of danger, 1500 of the Pennsylvania militia embodied to reinforce the Continental army. The merchant, the farmer, the tradesman, the labourer, cheerfully relinquished the conveniences of home to perform the duties of private soldiers, in the severity of a winter campaign. General Washington now formed the bold resolution of re-crossing into the State of Jersey, and attacking that part of the enemy which was posted at Trenton.

The British commanders in the security of conquest cantoned their army at Burlington, Bordenton, Trenton, and other towns in New-Jersey. Of all events none seemed to them more improbable than that their late retreating half naked enemies, should in this extreme cold season, face about and commence offensive operations.

In the evening of Christmas day, general Washington made arrangements for the recrossing of the Delaware in three divisions : at M'Konckey's ferry, at Trenton ferry, and at or near Bordenton. The ice in the river retarded their passage so long that it was three o'clock in the morning before the artillery could be got over. On their landing in Jersey, they were formed into two divisions, commanded by general Sullivan and Green ; one of these divisions was ordered to proceed on the lower or river road ; the other, on the upper or Pennington road. Col. Stark with some light troops, was also directed to advance near to the river, and to possess himself of that part of the town which is beyond the bridge. The divisions having nearly the same distance to march were ordered immediately on forcing the out-guards, to push directly into Trenton, that they might charge the enemy before they had time to form. Though they marched different roads, yet they arrived at the enemy's advanced post within three minutes of each other. The out-guards of the Hessian troops at Trenton, soon fell back, but kept up a constant retreating fire. Their main body being hard pressed by the Americans, who had already got possession of half their artillery, attempted to file off by a road leading towards Princetown, but were checked by a body of troops thrown in their way. Finding they were surrounded, they laid down their

arms. The number which submitted was 20 officers, and 886 men. The detachment in Trenton consisted of three Hessian regiments, amounting to 1500 men, and a troop of British light-horse. All these were killed or captured, except about 600, who escaped by the road leading to Bordentown.

Immediately after the surprize of the Hessians, General Washington, with his prisoners, re-crossed the Delaware, which at this place is about three quarters of a mile over, and reassumed his post on the Pennsylvania side. Trenton remained unoccupied, and the enemy were posted at Princetown, twelve miles distant, on the road towards New-York.

The effects of this successful enterprize were speedily felt in recruiting the American army. About 1400 regular foldiers, whose time of service was on the point of expiring, agreed to serve six weeks longer, and reinforcements came in from several quarters to General Washington. The weather was now growing very severe, and as there were very few houses near the shore where General Washington had taken his station, the greatest part of his army remained out in the woods and fields. These, with some other circumstances, induced the general once more to pass the Delaware, and to take possession of Trenton. This was undoubtedly a bold adventure, and carried with it the appearance of defiance.

Trenton is situated on a rising ground, about half a mile distant from the Delaware, and is cut into two divisions by a small creek, sufficient to turn a mill which is on it, after which it empties itself at nearly right angles into the Delaware,

Scarcely had General Washington taken post here, and before the several parties of militia, out on detachments, or on their way, could be collected, than the British, leaving behind them a strong garrison at Princeton, marched suddenly, and entered Trenton at the upper or north east quarter. A party of the Americans skirmished with the advanced party of the British, to afford time for removing the stores and baggage, and withdrawing over the bridge.

In a little time the British had possession of one half of the town; General Washington of the other; and the creek only separated the two armies. Nothing could be a more critical situation than this; and if ever the fate of America depended on the event of a day it was now. The Delaware was filling fast with large sheets of driving ice, and was impassable; so that no retreat into Pennsylvania could be effected, neither is it possible, in the

face of an enemy, to pass a river of such extent. The roads were broken and rugged with the frost, and the main road was occupied by the enemy.

About four o'clock a party of the British approached the bridge with a design to gain it, but were repulsed. They made no more attempts, though the creek itself is passable any where between the bridge and the Delaware. Evening was now coming on, and the British believing they had all the advantages they could wish for, and that they could use them when they pleased, discontinued all further operations, and held themselves prepared to make the attack next morning.

But the next morning produced a scene as elegant as it was unexpected.—The British were under arms and ready to march to action, when one of their light horse from Princeton came furiously down the street with an account that General Washington had that morning attacked and carried the British post at that place, and was proceeding on to seize the magazine at Brunswick; on which the British, who were then on the point of making an assault on the evacuated camp of the Americans, wheeled about, and marched for Princeton.

General Washington, the better to cover and disguise his retreat from Trenton, had ordered a line of fires to be lighted up in front of his camp. These not only served to give an appearance of going to rest, and continuing that deception, but they effectually concealed from the British whatever was acting behind them; After this, by a circuitous march of about eighteen miles, the Americans arrived near Princetown early in the morning, and were descried by a party of British troops, consisting of about three regiments who were on their march to Trenton. They briskly attacked the center of the Americans, who gave way in disorder. The moment was critical; general Washington pushed forward, and placed himself between his own men and the British, fronting the latter. The Americans encouraged by his example, made a stand and returned the British fire. They killed 60, wounded many, and took between 3 and 400 prisoners of the British; obliging the rest of them to make a precipitate escape; some towards Trenton, and others to Brunswick. The loss of the Americans who immediately set off with their prisoners, was inconsiderable in point of numbers; but the fall of general Mercer rendered it important.

The British army that had abandoned Trenton, for the safety of their magazines at Brunswick eighteen miles distant, marched for that place where they arrived late in the evening; and from

which they made no attempts to move, for near five months. The triumphant Americans retired to Morristown. General Washington divided his army into small parties, so as to be able to re-unite them on a few hours warning, and thereby covered the country, and re-possessed himself of all the important places.

The campaign of 1776 did not end till it had been protracted into the first month of the year 1777, the British had counted on the complete and speedy reduction of their late colonies, but they found the work more difficult of execution than they supposed. They wholly failed in their designs on the Southern States. In Canada they recovered what in the preceding year they had lost—drove the Americans out of their borders, and destroyed their fleet on the Lakes, but they failed in making their intended impression on the north western frontier of the States. While their main army was successful in the Jerseys, a party undertook an expedition against Rhode-Island. The Americans abandoned the island, and the English took possession of it; but the acquisition was of little service, perhaps was of detriment. For three years several thousand men stationed thereon for its security, were lost to every active co-operation with the royal forces in the field, and the possession of it secured no equivalent advantages. The British succeeded against the city of New-York and the adjacent country, but when they pursued their victories into New-Jersey, and subdivided their army, the recoiling Americans soon recovered the greatest part of what they had lost.

The war, on the part of the Americans, was but barely begun. Hitherto they had engaged with temporary forces for a redress of grievances, but towards the close of this year they made arrangements for raising a permanent army to contend with Great Britain for the sovereignty of the country. To have thus far stood their ground with their new levies was a matter of great importance, because to them delay was victory, and not to be conquered was to conquer.

The third Campaign, 1777.

THREE months which followed the actions of Trenton and Princeton, passed away without any important military enterprise on either side. It was matter of astonishment, that the British suffered the dangerous interval between the disbanding of one army and the raising of another, to pass away without attempting

something of consequence against the remaining shadow of an armed force.

Hitherto there had been a deficiency of arms and amunition, as well as of men; but at the beginning of this campaign a vessel of 24 guns arrived from France at Portsmouth in New-Hampshire, with upwards of 11,000 stand of arms, and 1000 barrels of powder. Ten thousand stand of arms arrived about the same time in another part of the United States.

Before the British army took the field, two enterprizes for the destruction of American stores were undertaken. Col. Bird landed with about 500 men at Peek's-Kill, March 23, fifty miles from New-York. The few Americans who were stationed as a guard at this place on the approach of the British, fired the principal store houses, and retired. The loss of the provisions was considerable. On the 26th of April, major gen. Tryon, with a detachment of 2000 men, embarked at New-York, and passing through the Sound, landed between Fairfield and Norwalk. They advanced through the country without interruption, and arrived in about twenty hours at Danbury. The few Americans who were in the town withdrew from it, and the British burnt and destroyed 18 houses, 500 barrels of pork and beef, 800 barrels of flour, 2000 bushels of grain, 1700 tents, &c. In returning from this expedition, however, the British were greatly harrassed by the Americans under generals Arnold, Wooster, and Sullivan; but they made good their retreat, with the loss of 170 killed and wounded. On the American side, the loss was likewise considerable; general Wooster was killed and Arnold in the most eminent danger. Soon after the Americans destroyed the enemies stores at Sagg Harbour, on Long-Island, and made prisoners of all who defended the place.

As the season advanced the American army in New-Jersey was reinforced by the successive arrival of recruits; but nevertheless at the opening of the campaign, it amounted only to 7,272 men.

Towards the latter end of May, general Washington, quitted his winter encampment at Morristown, and took a strong position at Middlebrook. General Howe endeavoured to provoke him to an engagement and left no manœuvre untried that could induce him to quit his position, but without success. General Washington knew the full value of his situation, and was well apprised that it was not the interest of his country to commit its fortune to a single action. General Howe, thought it to be too hazardous to attempt passing the Delaware, while the country was in arms, and

the main American army in his rear; he therefore passed over to Staten Island, resolving to prosecute the objects of the campaign by another route.

About this time, the Americans found means to make amends for the capture of general Lee, by that of general Prescott, who was seized in his quarters with his aid de camp, in much the same manner as general Lee had been. This was very mortifying to the general himself, as he had not long before set a price upon general Arnold, by offering a sum of money to any one that apprehended him, which the latter answered by setting a lower price upon general Prescott.

The designs of general Howe were involved in great obscurity. Though the season for military operations was advanced as far as the month of July, yet his real object could not be ascertained. General Washington received intelligence, that Burgoyne was coming in great force towards New-York from Canada, which favored the idea that a junction of the two royal armies, near Albany was intended. General Washington therefore detached a brigade to re-inforce the northern division of his army. Some movements were likewise made towards Peek's Kill, and on the other side towards Trenton, while the main army was encamped near the Clove, in readiness to march either north or south, as the movements of general Howe might require. At length the main body of the British army, consisting of 36 battalions with a regiment of light horse, and a body of loyalists, raised at New-York, and a powerful artillery, amounting in the whole to about 16,000 men, departed from Sandy-Hook. After a week's sailing they arrived at the mouth of the Delaware; but, for reasons that do not obviously occur, general Howe gave up the idea of approaching Philadelphia by ascending the Delaware, and resolved on a circuitous route by the way of the Chesapeake.

The navigation from the Delaware to the Chesapeake took up the best part of the month of August. At last they ascended the bay and landed at Turkey Point: intelligence thereof in a few days reached the American army, and dispelled that cloud of uncertainty in which general Howe's movements had been enveloped. The American troops were put in motion to meet the British army. The real effective force of the former did not exceed 8000 men. They were posted near Newport. The royal army advanced till they were within two miles of the American army. General Washington then changed his position, and took post on the high ground near Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine Creek,

with an intention of disputing the passage. It was the wish, but by no means the interest of the Americans to try their strength by an engagement. The opinion of the inhabitants however, imposed a species of necessity on the American general to keep his army in front of the enemy, and to risk an action for the security of Philadelphia. This took place the 11th of September at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, a small stream which empties itself into Christmas Creek, near its conflux with the river Delaware.

The British army advanced at day break, in two columns; commanded by general Knyphausen, and lord Cornwallis. The first took the direct road to Chad's Ford and made a shew of passing it in front of the main body of the Americans; at the same time the other column moved up on the west side of the Brandywine to its fork, and crossed both its branches about two o'clock in the afternoon; and then marched down on the east side thereof, with a view of turning the right wing of their adversaries. This they effected, and compelled them to retreat with great loss. General Knyphausen amused the Americans with the appearance of crossing the ford, but did not attempt it, until lord Cornwallis having crossed above, and moved down on the opposite side, had commenced his attack. Knyphausen then crossed the ford, and attacked the troops posted for its defence. These, after a severe conflict, were compelled to give way. The retreat of the Americans soon became general, and was continued to Chester, under cover of general Weeden's brigade, which came off in good order. General Washington was by a small circumstance, prevented from executing a bold design; to effect which, his troops were actually in motion. This was to have crossed the Brandywine, and attacked Knyphausen, while generals Sullivan and Stirling should keep Earl Cornwallis in check. In the most critical moment general Washington received intelligence which he was obliged to credit, that the column of lord Cornwallis had been only making a feint, and was returning to join Knyphausen. This prevented the execution of a plan, which, if carried into effect, would probably have given a different turn to the events of the day. The killed and wounded of the British army were 600; the loss of the Americans was above 1000. In the list of their wounded, were two of their general officers, the marquis de la Fayette, and general Woodford; the former was a French nobleman, who, animated with the love of liberty, had left his native country, and offered his service to congress.

The bulk of the British army being left in German-Town, general Howe with a small part, made his entry into Philadelphia. Congress, which after a short residence at Baltimore had returned to Philadelphia, were obliged a second time to consult their safety by flight. They retired to York-Town.

The first care of the British general was to cut off, by means of strong batteries, the communication between the upper and lower parts of the river. The American frigate Delaware, of 32 guns, seconded by some smaller vessels, commenced a heavy cannonade upon the batteries; but upon the falling of the tide she ran aground, and was then soon compelled to surrender, and the other American vessels retired. The next undertaking of the British commander was to open a communication by sea. A vast number of batteries and forts had been erected, and machines formed like *chevaux de frize*, sunk in the river to prevent its navigation. As the fleet was sent round to the mouth of the river in order to co-operate with the army, this work, after surmounting great difficulties, was at last accomplished.

General Washington having been reinforced by 2,500 men from Peek's-Kill and Virginia; and having been informed that general Howe had detached a considerable part of his force for reducing the forts on the Delaware, conceived the design of attacking the British post at Germantown. It was resolved that the attack should be sudden and vigorous. On the 4th of October, the Americans began their attack about sun-rise, on the 40th regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, which were posted on the Chestnut Hill road, three quarters of a mile advance. These two corps were obliged to retreat; but the morning being extremely foggy, it concealed the true situation of the parties, and made so much caution necessary as to give the British time to recover from the effects of their first surprize. From these causes the early promising appearances on the part of the assailants were speedily reversed, the Americans were forced to leave the field, and all efforts to rally them were ineffectual. The loss of the British army, dead, wounded and prisoners, was about 500. Among their slain were brigadier general Agnew, and lieutenant col. Bird. The loss of the Americans, including 400 prisoners was about 1000. Among their slain were general Nash and his aid de-camp, Major Witherspoon.

Soon after this action the British left German-Town, and as there still remained two strong forts on the Delaware to be reduced,

they turned their principal attention towards them. These were Mud-Island and Red-Bank. The various obstructions which the Americans had thrown in the way, rendered it necessary to bring up the *Augusta*, a ship of the line, and the *Merlin* frigate, to the attack of Mud-Island; but, during the action, both the *Augusta* and *Merlin* took fire and were burnt to ashes. At last the British general found means to convey a number of cannon, and to erect batteries within a gunshot of the fort by land, and bringing up three ships of the line. The garrison, after making a vigorous defence, from the latter end of September to the 4th of November, perceiving that preparations were making for a general assault abandoned the place in the night. Three days after Mud-Island was evacuated, the garrison was also withdrawn from Red-Bank, on the approach of lord Cornwallis who at the head of a large force prepared to assault it. Some of the American galleys and armed vessels escaped by keeping close in with the Jersey shore, to places of security above Philadelphia, but 17 of them were abandoned by their crews and fired.

Thus the campaign of 1777, in the middle states, concluded, upon the whole, successively on the part of the British. In the North, however, matters wore a different aspect.

(To be continued.)

REMARKS ON THE ANCIENT AND MODERN METHOD OF
FORTIFYING.


From the "*FORTIFICATION PERPENDICULAIRE*" of the Marquis de
Montalembert.

[WITH A PLATE.]

IN every period of the world it has been the practice of all nations to contrive suitable means for defending themselves against the tyranny of power. But it seems that men have greater abilities for destroying than for preserving; as no sufficient means have been hitherto found out, whereby we might confine in proper limits the spirit of conquest which animates the ambitious princes, of the earth, whose existence is too often a misfortune to mankind.


By well erected forts we might probably best attain this object and impede the progress of an enemy; but in the present day they are a weak obstacle, and seem to exist only to heighten the enemy's triumph. If the issue of a battle has been once fortunate

Scale of 250 Toises



Book of ...

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for the one or the other party; the conqueror pursues his advantages with avidity, and strong towns surrounded with walls and ditches, leave to him hardly so much time as he wants, to doubt of its submission. They cannot send deputies soon enough to solicit the favour of their new master. Towns with bulwarks and half-moons, besides all other outworks, hardly wait till the *Saps* of the besiegers have reached the *Glacis*, and their batteries are erected upon the *Crete* of it, to open their gates to the conqueror. A siege of two or three weeks is in our day a very long and obstinate one. Only capital forts, which are surrounded by a double and triple line of works, the fortifying and keeping of which have cost enormous sums, and to the garrisoning of which a small army is requisite—such forts only may hold out a regular siege: and, if they are well defended; the siege lasts about six weeks or two months after the opening of the trenches. * But this is all that we can expect of them. Nevertheless it is certain that they lay great obstacles in the enemy's way. If they were better fortified; they would be capable of interrupting the conquests of the most formidable and powerful enemy. Men of experience know how great is the trouble, and, how enormous are the expences requisite to get to the places, all the utensils belonging to a siege, if the fort is of importance. Perhaps we have attained the highest degree of perfection, and of force in the attack of forts. In a siege a still greater number of arms and a still longer time, are necessary by which an enemy might at last find himself compelled to leave the most part of his arms behind, when an advanced season does not permit him to continue the siege.

Forts, built on true principles, would therefore protect whole provinces against devastations, which are but too often the consequences of war. A state, whose frontiers are secured by forts, the besieging of which would cause great difficulties to an enemy, would be but seldom drawn into a war; for it frequently happens that the facility of the conquest first prompts the ambitious neighbour to become a conqueror. But no art deserves our attention more, than that on the perfection of which depend the quietness, and the domestic felicity of the nation of which we are members. As the annals of all centuries teach us, that force can only be resisted by force, that a greater power only is able to put limits to the injustice of men; let us search after means of defence which will compel the rapacious neighbour to be at least equitable

* *The siege of Gibraltar is a great exception to this rule.*

Those reasons have disposed me to make some examinations on the means of making the defence of our forts perfect. The importance of the object alone can outbalance the disagreeableness which is connected with considerations of that kind. What I learned in my youth of the fortifying of towns according to the principles of the most renowned engineers, had given me a sincere aversion against that science. The knowledge which we gain thereon discovers to us the principal faults of all the methods of fortifying, without pointing out a remedy to us. The more we get acquainted with the universally-adopted theory of fortification, the more we see the impossibility of meliorating the fortifying of our towns, if we adhere to that theory and to the stale prejudices which it produces. If we consider the small difference which exists between the (so named) different manners of fortifying, we should think that the inventors of these systems have but given different names to one and the same method. Hence it follows: that the impossibility lies within the narrow circle in which they have so long time acted, and in the thing itself; as so many great men have in vain made essays in that branch. All the methods of fortifying consist of Faces (*a*), Flanks (*b*), and Curtains (*c*), which connect the flanks; Some have given the commanded angle (*f*) (angle flanqué,) a greater or smaller number of degrees, according as they have adopted the perpendicular (*d*) smaller or greater. Others have combined the length of faces, flanks, and curtains in all manners possible, lengthened some of these lines, and shortened others. Particularly the flanks were the object of the most ample enquiries, and the cause of the most violent and the bitterest literary disputes. One of the first system-forgers, Errard, put his flank perpendicular on the face (as *gb*), that the flank might be denied to the fire of the besiegers, without considering, that, if it is not seen by the enemy, it cannot see the enemy neither, and fire at it very little. That consequently the flank, must become by this quite useless. In order to mend that fault, chevalier de Ville put his flank (*gi*) perpendicular on the curtains, and thereby ameliorated its position. However count de Pagan rightly discovered that chevalier de Ville had not done enough; and that the flank on the lengthened Face, the Fosse of which it is to defend, must be perpendicular. This disposed him to draw this flank (*gk*) on the line of defence (*fk*) perpendicular. In reality his was the best situation which he could give to the flank, as the perpendicular defence is incontestibly the most advantageous. The outworks which lay before the bastions and curtains are then only of use

when they defend themselves perpendicular : and we have hitherto been contented with an oblique defence for that reason only as we did not know any means to give to the said works a perpendicular defence. The situation of the flank proposed by count de Pagan should therefore have ended the contest ; but they asserted, that, as he wanted to approach the appointed aim too near ; he had stepped over it ; that the *whole* flank at the lengthened face of the opposite bulwark should not be perpendicular ; that this could be said of the point (*k*) of the flank ; and that all the other points of the flank, had towards the face an inward bended situation. Finally they made against the position of the flank, proposed by Pagan, the following singular objection : As the commanded angle (*f*) is the most important point, which is to be taken into consideration ; so the flank must be drawn so, that it can best defend this point ; just as if the fosse (*lm*,) where the enemy undertakes the passing over, did not deserve a far greater attention ! Therefore marshal Vauban drew his flank (*gu*) so, that it made a pointed angle with the defence line. However this angle is not more pointed than the angle, which the flank (*gi*) of chevalier de Ville makes with the defence line.

It is not a little astonishing that so great a man as Vauban, has occupied himself with so trifling a thing, as the difference of the position of his flank with that proposed by Pagan. In order to defend the commanded angle still more, he made his flank (*p q*) concave, by which likewise the design was attained that it could less be hurt by ricochets. At last he adopted the Orillon (*r*), what was known before him, and sacrificed the third part of his flank that both the other parts of it might be better secured against the batteries of the besiegers, and that he might have a place for a cannon, which from the side of the field could not be seen, as the cannon itself only sees the face of the opposite bulwark.* The concave flanks provided with Orillions were therefore applied at several places and approved of by many of the newer engineers. However here likewise they have made some alterations, in the length and inclination of the flank towards the curtain. For in order to have a pretension to the honour of being the inventors of a new system, it was at least necessary to shorten or lengthen the faces, flanks and curtains of some toises.

* *This as well as all other cannon which stand along the flank, may be caught at their wheel-work by the enemy's Ricochets and may be dismounted.*

But if the different situation of the flanks have for a long time divided the opinions of the most able engineers; they have had no less violent disputes on the advantages and disadvantages of the second flanks. Second flank is called that part of the curtain which can defend the face of the opposite bulwark, if the defence line reaches to one point of the curtain, but not to the end of it. If therefore the defence line (*fc*) cuts off the part of (*nc*) of the curtain; so this part of the curtain is called the second flank, as, though in a very oblique direction, it commands the face (*a*) of the opposite bastion. Against second flanks they have made the following two objections. First, they say, they command the face, (*a*) only in a very oblique direction; and the true greatness, of the second flank cannot be judged of by the greatness of the line (*nc*), but, on the contrary by the greatness of the line (*no*.) But even from that it is clear that this is no well founded objection against the second flank; for the face (*a*) can indisputably be better defended by the flank (*go*), than by the flank (*gn*) as the first is longer than the second. The second objection is: In order to get second flanks we should adopt the commanded angle (*f*), sharper pointed. But as all the authors on the subject, have agreed that this angle may be augmented from 60 to 110 or 120 degrees, without causing the least disadvantage; and as we can have second flanks in all polygons, the pentagon excepted, without being obliged to adopt the commanded angle less than of 60 degrees; so it follows from hence, that this second objection against the second flank, is as little founded as the first; and that there is no ground, why this method, like the once adopted system, has not been followed more generally.

This is a short account of the most important disputes on those matters. It would be renewing them, were we to say more on the subject; and it may suffice to have briefly signified their nullity.

I trust it will not be concluded from hence, that I do not do justice to the talents of those who have written on these matters. Some authors have done all that could ever have been done by the once adopted system; and have given, in divers works, particular proofs of Genius. But as they contented themselves with only mending the very faulty methods of their predecessors, the end of their endeavours was only, that their methods were less defective. Had Cohorn never seen the works of count de Pagan, he would not have adopted his system, and would not have confined him-

self merely improving that system.* He would, and we could, have expected as much of so great a man as Cohorn, have invented something eminently good, if Vauban had not been so much prepossessed in favour of the art of fortifying with bulwarks, he would not have contented himself to invent only the (so named) Tours bastionnées, and contre gardes with flanks, of which the latter are nothing but separated bulwarks. Those counter gardes were made with a design to have a second line of works, by which the fort would be enclosed. But it does not seem that this intention was crowned with success. People, who understand it, have observed, that the bulwarks are not sufficiently secured by the contre gardes, and that the enemy may build batteries on the crete (summit or top) of the glacis, with which he may lay breaches into the chief wall. If therefore a breach can be made into the chief wall at the same time that it can be done into the contre gardes, it is not necessary to raise new batteries and to fire a breach into the contre gardes. Then we have nothing to do but to extend the lodgement to the right and the left as far as the flanks, and to undertake from thence the storm on the chief ramparts, and this, the so named Tours bastionnées, are, as we easily see, not able to prevent. Many able authors have shewn the faults of that system; among others, the Chevalier de St. Julien, in his military architecture.

Marshal de Vauban, who possessed so much skill in the attack of strong places, has therefore not thrown a great light on the art of defending forts. Perhaps he would have been more successful had he ventured to go out of the common road. All those who set out from the same principles, must necessarily come to the same results. Therefore, though much pains were taken to perfect the art of fortifying cities, yet it is certain, that it remained far beneath the degree of perfection on which it was before the invention of gunpowder. With the opinions that reign at present, this assertion will excite surprize; but, I hope, the following will evince that it is well founded; and if the essays I have made, to open a new road, may produce some advantageous alterations, the design of this work would be, in some measure, already attained; particularly, if men of knowledge should thereby be animated to make examinations into an art which has the peace and security of all nations for its object.

* Cohorn's first system is entirely like that of Pagan. The former has only applied at every Orillion a tower with casemats, in order to defend the high faces of the bulwark.

OF THE STRONG PLACES, AND THEIR DEFENCE BEFORE THE
INVENTION OF GUNPOWDER.

IF society owes its origin to a desire of promoting the general interest; so the desire of self preservation, has given rise to the art of fortifying our abodes, and of securing ourselves against any sudden attack. At first this art was very simple indeed: all fortifications consisted, perhaps of a ditch, provided with pallisadoes. But as soon as the habitations of men became more considerable they were obliged to have recourse to invention for something less vulnerable. The care so natural to every one, for the preservation of wives, children and property, must soon lead to the means, how this great aim might best be attained. They therefore erected high walls, to the foot of which they gave a side defence by towers, which were erected from distance to distance; and before those wall they made a large deep ditch. Though this manner of fortifying was simple yet it did not merit contempt; if we consider the times in which they were used, and the attacks then in use which they were to resist. At that time they had nothing to fear for the foot of the wall, as long as the ditch was not filled up. In comparing this manner of fortifying with the modern one, we must particularly take this circumstance into consideration. The great height of the walls and towers was therefore advantageous to the besieged. The towers, particularly the round ones, which were strongly built, forced the besiegers to attach themselves to that part of the wall which in course of time received the name of the curtain. But from this cause it was that the battering rams were at the front as well as at the flanks exposed to the arrows of the besieged. It therefore often happened that those enormous machines were ruined by the besieged, before they could effect a breach

This forced the besiegers to erect new machines, and their building was connected with so much loss of time, and with so many difficulties, that many places had to be thankful to those wooden towers for not having been ruined. Not to reckon the difficulties to which the building of those machines were subjected, it required infinite labour and pains to get them at the foot of the wall.

Ancient history has handed down to us many examples of towns which have withstood the most impetuous attacks, and the greatest perseverance to subdue them. That renowned Carthagenean, the brave Hymilcan, who defended Lilibaea with so much valour and

art, and converted all the besieging machines of the Romans into a heap of cinders, forced them at last to raise the siege, and to blockade the town merely. The sieges of Jerusalem, of Tyrus, Carthage, Numantia, Rhodus, and Marseilles will remain for ever memorable in the annals of the history of war on account of the obstinacy with which they were defended. Not to mention the sieges of Troy, that of Veya deserves our whole attention, which town was not conquered till after a siege of ten years: and had not Camillus conceived the lucky thought of making a subterraneous passage from the Roman camp into the town as far as under the Temple of Juno, the Romans would not have made themselves masters of the place. When the Roman Consul saw at the siege of Ambracia that he could effect nothing with a visible force; he took to the like scheme of a subterraneous passage. But as the besieged guessed what was going forward; they made a large fosse behind the wall opposite the place where the besiegers were at work; and made from that ditch a gallery directly towards the gallery of the besiegers. Here one of the bloodiest combats ensued; at last the Romans were forced to retire, as the besieged had set fire to the wood of which the Roman mine was composed.

If therefore we read the history of that era with attention, we shall be perfectly convinced of the goodness of the ancient manner of fortifying; for a thing is good or bad so far as it promotes more or less the design which we seek to attain; and if those methods of fortifying often enabled the besieged, to delude every endeavour of the besieger's (though the latter may have been far superior in number to the former) we must do them justice, and give them our entire approbation.

We can on the contrary by no means oppose, that the forts of the ancients had held out so long sieges on account of the ignorance of the besiegers, and that they conducted their attacks without courage. We have had in our times no sieges, where under the walls of the forts had happened more lively and more repeated combats, than at the sieges which the ancients undertook; and, besides we can by no means compare the labours of the sieges of the ancients with the works which our trenches and batteries require. Those works are subject to a few rules only which can be understood by every one; where, on the contrary, the buildings of those machines, and every thing requisite to put them in motion presupposed great knowledge in him who ordered the work and great abilities in the workmen. The grand effect of the Ballista

and Catapultae must also be merely attributed to the manner of making them, as we have not been able to give that power (elasticity) to those machines, which in our days have been made as an imitation of the Ballists and Catapultae. We therefore must allow that the ancients have carried on their sieges with as much art and science, as courage and resolution, and as they showed great perseverance in their undertakings, it evinces, that walls, which could resist all those powerful means, were a manner of fortifying which did not leave much to be wished for. How well would it be if we could say the same of our modern art! but it is too true, that it has lost that ascendancy over the art of attack.

Before the invention of gun powder, there was a sort of equilibrium between the attack and defence of forts; and we may even assert that the defence often had an ascendancy over the attack, if we take into consideration the want of victuals, which often forced the forts to surrender. But since this epoch, or rather since the time of Marshal de Vauban, the attack has gained such an ascendancy and the defence is so much neglected, that forts, can no more be considered as forts;* for the longest sieges, which happened since the before mentioned epoch, did not last longer than 40, 50, or 60 days, after the opening of the trenches. Ryffel one of the best forts in France, was defended in the year 1708 by a numerous garrison which performed prodigies of valour, yet this place, after a siege of two months, was obliged to open its gates to the conquerors. At four places there were breaches in the chief rampart; and how many places are there which have held out a much shorter time? *Ath* is one of those forts which Marshall de Vauban has fortified with the greatest attention. The engineer, who has kept a journal of that siege assures us, that Vauban had taken the greatest care to give every line its most advantageous length. From the plan, we have of that fort, we see, that according to the system he had laid down, he could do nothing better. In spite of all that, the fort held out but 13 days, when Vauban himself besieged it in the year 1667. It is true that this general made at this siege the first use of his newly invented ricochet-batteries, and that, by this means, he fired at all the faces and flanks of the attacked polygon in the length, by which the garrison was forced to quit the walls, and could therefore not sufficiently oppose the

* *The war burns more fiercely than ever; and they write me from Flanders, "that the towns fall like tiles in a storm."*

Vol. I. of XI lettre of Pope Clements, XIV. (Ganganelli.)

rapid advancing of the works of the besiegers. But it is true, that the great effect of these ricochet-batteries shows the weakness of that manner of fortification.

At this siege the epocha happened, where the art to attack forts attained the highest degree of perfection. As at this siege, the place for the batteries of the besiegers was appointed on the lengthening of the faces and flanks of the works; so the besieged, could no more secure their heavy arms against the enemy's fire. But if the guns of a besieged place are once silenced, the most valiant garrison can defer a capitulation but a few days.

This we have seen in the war in Flanders in the year 1741, where the strongest places held out but 15 to 20 days, after the opening of the trenches. The siege of Namur lasted 7, and the siege of the castles round it 6 days. Only the city of Bergen-op-Zoom held out a siege of 62 day. But he who knows the situation of that place, must naturally be astonished that it could be conquered. If we examine closely the plans of the attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, which were publicly known afterwards, we do not find two batteries which were made according to Vauban's principles. The fire of the fort could therefore not be silenced. How did it happen then that the garrison who was supported by a whole army, to which victuals could be carried by land and by water, suffered itself to be conquered? This is one of those extraordinary occurrences, which we must not take as a pattern in like enterprizes; particularly if we should operate with the same degree of art and precaution as were exercised at this siege.

The defence of Landau conducted by M. de Melac in the year 1702, is one of the finest we can alledge. It deserves the greatest praise, as this valiant commander held out in that small place a siege of 82 days from the opening of the trenches. Within the compass of a hundred years, this was the longest siege. The defence of Garve in the year 1689, which did so much honour to the marquis of Usselles, lasted 40 days; the defence of Duai by M. d'Albergoti, as well as the defence of Aire by M. de Goubriant in the year 1710, only 52 days. It would be useless to enter into a more ample narration of similar examples.* It is well known that we dare not expect a longer resistance of the best forts; and shall by no means be astonished, if we consider the great advantages which the modern methods of fortifying afford to the besiegers, whereas, on the contrary they leave but few means to the besieged. But as this important truth has never been looked upon in an exact point of view, and as even those who endeavoured to improve

* *The short sieges of the present war confirm this.*

military architecture fell into the same errors as their predecessors, so it is necessary to place the advantages of those methods of fortifying, which were made use of directly after the invention of gunpowder, in a clear light; that we may convince ourselves that we have not improved it, and that we cannot come to a better manner of fortifying' if in future we do not proceed on other principles.

REMARK OF THE EDITOR.

IF we, among other gallant defences, consider the siege of Colberg in the year 1761, where that brave Prussian commander, Hayden, with a small garrison, resisted a numerous Russian army by land, and a Russian and Swedish fleet of seven and twenty ships of the line, with a proportioned number of smaller ones, by sea, and deluded by his activity and prudence every attempt of the enemy, till after four months he was compelled by hunger to surrender; if we likewise take the gallant defence of Gibraltar from July 1779 to September 1782 in consideration, we shall find, that the assertions of Montalembert, of Virgin, and of others who pretend that the art of defence did not keep equal pace with the art of attack, will suffer some refutation. How many strong places would never have been taken, if the commander had either possessed sufficient skill and activity, to delude the enemy's endeavours, or faithfulness enough not to listen to secret proposals?

If we allow even that few forts can at present resist the art of a regular siege, the query will be, whether the art of attack has gained particular ascendancy over that of defence; for in ancient times, when hardly any strong place could be taken; the art of attack was behind that of defence; and it is therefore conspicuous, that both these arts came then upon an equal scale, as soon as the attacks have been rendered so that forts could be taken. Should new methods of fortifying be invented, of such magnitude as to defy any of the present artful attacks, then the latter is again behind the former; so that truth will ever remain indisputable, that with every invention it will depend on the skill, activity and faithfulness of the commander, to exercise with success those advantages which art or nature has given for his defence.

A Plan to instruct as well the officer of horse, as the private, in the field-service, and to give him, in time of peace, distinct notions of every thing necessary to be known in time of war; by a distinguished officer in the Prussian service.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is necessary, and indeed among divers armies, it is usual, in time of peace to instruct the troops, and exercise them in every thing belonging to their duty in the field: but having often found that the cavalry has been either too little, or not sufficiently instructed; after I have arranged and opened my ideas on the subject, I will proceed to give such instructions, particularly to light-horsemen, from the common man to the officer, that they may have occasion to know, in every thing necessary for them in the field, point out to them the advantages of ground, teach them how to make the best use of it, and enable them to act against their enemy, either in the day or night, as well offensive as defensive.

Patience is the principal and first thing I recommend to every one, whose duty it is to instruct his subordinates. The generality of young men become timid by harsh treatment; when they commit faults they lose their zeal in the service, and, to avoid punishment, work as machines; not indulging their own good ideas, because they have not sufficient courage to address their impatient, surly, or proud commander on the subject. I shall have an opportunity to say more hereafter upon this head: at present I will begin with shewing what I expect of a troop or squadron, before the men are instructed in field manœuvres; this shall be, independent of instructions for the private, the first part of my plan.

The second shall contain instructions for the subaltern officer; the third for the officer of higher rank. I write not as an author, but as a soldier; my words are directed to military men, and I wish only to make myself intelligible to those I address.

FIRST PART.—*Instructions for the Private.*

EVERY building must have its foundation; each labourer must know his utensils before he begins to work; more necessary it is in the business of a soldier, that he should first acquire a knowledge of his arms, and how to use them in his own defence; and that he should know how to unite and apply them to his advantage, before we can expect him to act properly in the field.

The private must, consequently, if he would be of service in time of war, be drilled and gradually instructed. To this purpose, as I have already observed, he should be well acquainted with his arms, and know how to make use of them. He should first learn to ride well, to manage his horse, and use his sword and pistol with effect. The light-horse-man, particularly, where opportunity offers, should practise swimming. He should next know perfectly the evolutions, and manœuvres in the exercise of the squadron. This is to be learned by the officer, as well as the private, for unless they know this, and its use perfectly, they never can be very serviceable in the field. We must not therefore spend years merely in instructing them to make a good attack, and in forming the squadron well, teaching them merely *to wheel and to break*. We must give the men notions of real service in the field. This depends much on the management of the time, and in the manner of exercising.

The greatest objection against frequent exercise of the cavalry is the necessity of sparing their horses. But it is the objection of those only who attend too much to trifles, talk much, but who know not how to make the best use of time or ground, and who never exercise with the necessary strictness and accuracy. I have seen them travel fast for some miles to the place of exercise, and back again in the same manner, without any attention either to time or ground; then pity their horses, and say, they have been exercised three hours! But how? Has not time been wasted? Can we not in the march of two a breast at least, take care that the men ride in order, and close, and that they do not avoid every puddle; that they do not at one time trot, at another walk; but continue one pace, in order to use them to a good column march? Can we not, where ground permits, march with a large front, form squadrons, trot and break all together, according to circumstances? By this mode we should not be obliged to stay so long upon the place of exercise, and should return an hour sooner to quarters, and the horses would be in the stable. But if this is not done on the place of exercise, it is considered as no exercise at all. Besides, we do not accustom the men sufficiently to have their eyes and ears on their commander; but merely preach to them, tell them what they have to do, as they exercise one day after another, teaching them by rote, as children are taught the alphabet. It is this that makes the men not attentive to their employ; they never acquire a thorough knowledge of their duty, but act like a piece of mechanism, or like a clock when wound up, their

exercise being always the same, and ever explained to them before; whereas they should be taught to act according to the expediency of time and place.

The recruit should certainly first be instructed in the manual exercise, and properly disciplined, but, this done, such instructions should cease as soon as he is ranged in the squadron. And though some repetitions are necessary to those who in the spring join their regiments after some time of absence, yet it is likewise necessary, that he who is not attentive should feel it, and when the men are once used to this way of instruction, there will be fewer to punish.

Why do we not on the march also, and from the place of exercise, wherever ground permits march with van and rear-guard, and with side-patrols? Why do we not search the villages, hedges, &c. which lie in the way? Should a time be fixed for being with the squadron on the place, this may be done on returning. In one word, we may do a great deal without fatiguing men or horses unnecessarily, if we know only how to make the best use of the time.

In order to have, at every exercise the field service in view, to give the men more adroitness, what the Prussian's call *appel*, to use them to quick motions, and a prompt execution of their commands; I think it should be done as follows:

Sec. I. Exercise should never be performed after one and the same way, whereby we only lose time and fatigue the horses; the squadron should receive instruction only in that point where it is most deficient. If they know not how to make a proper attack, we should begin by this: why should they first pass by in lines, form and break? If they cannot quickly *deployer*, or extend their lines, which I should principally attend to, we may commence with that, even if nothing else should that day be done on the place. In this manner we should have sufficient time, and the horses sufficient strength to instruct the officers, as well as privates, in other things belonging to the field-service.

To make the officer, as well as the private, attentive, and to use them to every quick and unforeseen motion; the commander should sometimes, whilst the squadron is making a commanded motion, ride to another platoon, and direct another motion. For instance, if he has given the words of command, *Form the squadron*, so that all are in motion, he may ride to the first platoon, give the word of command, *the first platoon with four to the right*; go on, trot with them to the right, command, *Halt front*; and give the officer, who leads the troop, orders what further he is to do. The

other three platoons take no notice of this, but form the Squadron, and wait for further orders. Or, during the attack, the commander may order one platoon to halt, or to turn out of the line. In this manner, the Squadron, attentive and ready, will be more expert, and will, in occurrences before the enemy, know how to direct themselves. Besides, in such motions, the commander should always ride near the platoon, and command distinctly; the officer who leads the platoon, should take the command from him, and go on repeating it. On the contrary, if the words of command are given for the whole Squadron, no one should, but the commander, open his mouth. If the Squadron is once used to this, it will become easy, and be of great use in real action. All motions must be done backwards and forwards, that is, if the Squadron, with four is wheeled to the right, they must be able to wheel as well in platoons, to form and break, and do every thing that is desired of them: with one word, the first line, whether in front or in rear, should know readily how to execute every thing.

Sec. II. To make every thing to the men as easy as possible, they should not be harassed with many divisions. The simple peasant has so little thought and judgment, that it is difficult to make him understand the most necessary things; yet he shall have sometimes four or five different divisions to keep in his head, and make use of it at a proper time, without consideration, directly after the word of command. For example, 1st. He is in the fourth platoon. 2d. By extending, he is No. 4. 3d. In out-flanking before the attack, when they are to trot to the *point de vue*, he is No. 5. 4th. In dismounting, he is the second man. 5th. If they are to wheel with four to the right, he is perhaps the first, or otherwise. Now I ask, is this poor man not to be pitied, and does he deserve to be punished when he fails? It is to be considered, whether the following two divisions are not sufficient for all the abovementioned motions; that is to say, when the Squadron is divided into two, *viz.* in half, and into quarter platoons?

For example: First, if they are to make or extend a small front in order to pass a redoubt, a bridge, or other obstacle, I file off with two. (N. B. as usual out of each line) consequently, have four men in front, not being able to get with a larger front through such a passage. If there is no obstacle, I file off always with half, or quarter platoons. Secondly, if we have to trot to the *point de vue*, in order to out-flank: why cannot that be done with half, or quarter platoons, as well as with a fifth or a third? If the platoon be not too great, it is done with half platoons. Here

then we wheel always with half platoons, so that the second line is continually behind the first; but not so, if done as in the second *deploiement*, where, *with four to the right*, the four men of the second rank come always to the right of those of the first line, consequently, they are eight in front. Thirdly, for dismounting I want no other division than by two; because I can say to the men, which will answer the purpose: in dismounting *one advance and two retreat*, instead of saying advance the first and third, and retreat the second and fourth. Fourthly, if we are to wheel by four to the right, it can always be done by half and quarter platoons. (N. B. If the platoon is less than twelve files, we wheel to the right by half platoons: in case it is above twelve, by quarter platoons, because three men wheel as well, and indeed quicker than four.) If ever I would allow another division in the squadron, it would be that of wheeling by three; that, in case a part of the squadron is to dismount, to cover the passage of a defile or a bridge, the first and third men dismount, and give their horses to the second; and in this the men must be instructed. The subaltern of the wing of the platoon remains, if possible, on his horse, and he who closes the platoon dismounts.

Scct. III. In garrison the men must be exercised in saddling and marching out, and must learn to make all kinds of forage-bundles. To this end we may order the men sometimes to prepare their saddles, and all belonging to them at a fixed hour, as it is done in camps. The officers then go into their stables, and command the men to saddle their horses in their presence as quick as possible. No one should put on his saddle, till the officer is present, at which time, the whole stable saddles together. In order to make the men more attentive to the signals, a general order should be given and never varied. If the alarm is given, by trumpet and beat of drum, the squadron marches out with bag and baggage, and each brings his comrade's horse, if his comrade is absent, to the place of alarm: but in case the sound of alarm is given only for exercise, the squadron armed and saddled, with their arms quit the stable, but leave their comrade's horses behind. I make this distinction, that the men may know directly, whether there is an alarm in reality, or whether it be merely for exercise.

Of great utility it would be, if we could use the men more to signals, that they may know from the sound of the trumpet, whether they are to advance, retreat, or draw to the right or

left; at least the officers ought to know it. This is attended to among many Prussian regiments, particularly the Hussars.

If, in garrison, food is received, a party should come to the magazine in their undress, and make saddle, and baggage bundles of their hay, and straw in order to teach those men, who were never in a campaign. The little fodder perhaps that is lost by it, cannot be so much injury to the horses, as the advantage arising from the use of it will be in time of war.

This is the general preparation. We will proceed now to a mock engagement; for this it is necessary that the private should learn well to flank.

Sec̄t. IV. The flanker must know how to use his arms well particularly his pistol; to apply his shot, and to manage his horse properly. All this he must learn whilst a recruit. It remains then to show him how he must draw the fire from his adversary, how to save his own fire, and second his friend. To this end we must use the men, so as that in flanking two are always together; to second each other. If whole files are advanced in order to flank, two men from each file remain together, as follows: the flanker from the first line rides up within a pistol shot of his enemy; manages his horse well, and wheeling himself so that his enemy shall be on his right, takes his mark, careful to secure his own fire till his adversary has fired, or till he thinks himself sure of his aim. If his adversary fires first, he should advance a few paces more towards him, and then fire. As soon as the flanker from the second line, who should always be eight or ten paces behind the former, sees that the one before him has fired, he should advance hastily and do the same: but the first retreats immediately behind him, and re-charges his pistol; he never, however, should stand still, but be continually wheeling with his horse, or ride up and down. If those of the second line remark that any one of his enemy's flankers stand still, and is not attentive, they should endeavour to shoot him with their carbine; so, if they can reach the enemy, the flankers of the second line, should fire at them with their carbines, but never forget that they are to second their foreman. Of course, we should particularly shew the men how to take aim with their carbines without quitting the bridle. When they fire with carbines, they must be always on the right of the enemy, in order to be able to present with the left hand. If the enemy's troop retreats, they should endeavour to come up with it, as close as possible, to be able to fire with effect, and must keep to

the flanks, so as not to be in the way of their own troop, in case that should mean to attack.

If the enemy retreats, some of the flankers should join and rush upon the rear of the enemy, shouting with sword in hand, or seem as if they intended to cut into the troop, in order to interrupt or force it to make front, and give their own troop an opportunity to attack it with effect.

If it is necessary to retreat, the flankers should always follow their troop at a proper distance, and never lose sight of it, in case two lines of battle are formed. In this case, they always draw behind their troop through the second line, and not make front again till their troop makes front. If the enemy should attack us during the retreat, they should briskly fall on its flank, in order to give their troop an opportunity of gaining time to get into proper positions. For all this, the men should, during their manœuvres, be well instructed. Of course, we should always, when they make these manœuvres, leave a subaltern officer with them who understands the business well, and who can teach them how to take the right point of time. If they fail, they should be punished on the place of exercise. We cannot conceive what great utility good flankers are of, in the field; particularly in a retreat. §

Sec. V. This having been made intelligible to them, they are to learn their business at the head of the van and rear-guard, and that of the side patrols. He who is at the head of the van guard should be very attentive to every thing; as soon as he discovers any thing of the enemy, he is directly to report it, each by communication to the man behind him, to the subaltern, who leads the troop, but he is himself, by no means to lose sight of the enemy. He should beforehand be instructed, whether the intention is to attack or retreat. This consequently must be determined at every manœuvre. In the latter case, he directly draws back slowly, but observing always the enemy's motion. Are they to attack, he must not run directly up to the enemy, but wait the approach of the subaltern's troop, then get up to the enemy as close as possible, and attack briskly. If it is not determined which troop is to retreat (as we shall see in the continuation), and as in war, an attack is often changed into a retreat, the foremost man retreats slowly, and waits for further orders, or conducts himself according to the motions of his troop. The last of the rear must have his eyes always backwards, to see whether the enemy approaches him in the rear, in which case, he directly, if the enemy be at a distance, must give information. But should the enemy be within

500 paces of him, he should fire, that his troop may put itself in a proper position.

The side patrols should learn properly to search mountains, hedges, plains, villages, and give information of every thing they discover; but there is a difference to be made between seeking the enemy to attack, or wishing to get slyly by; consequently they should be instructed in both.

If we seek the enemy in order to act offensively, the flankers should ride quietly up a hill, and look round on all sides. If we act on the defensive only, they should ascend the hill slowly and slyly, and move slow when upon it, that from a distance, they may not easily be discovered. The side-patrols also, should never stray so as to be cut off from their squadron; for instance, if a river, ditch, redoubt, or morass is before them, they should never go round it, so as that such river, &c. should at any time be between them and their squadron, because this river, &c. would cover their squadron from any unexpected attack, they should at such a passage draw towards their squadron and pass the place with it. I have, to my great mortification, seen a number of subalterns and officers of higher rank thoughtlessly following one another, and leaving morasses, great ditches, and such like places, between them and their column—and why? because they were not properly instructed in these matters; so have I seen a quantity of gun powder fired away, during the exercise of a regiment, to no use, owing to the ignorance of the officers.

If any thing unexpectedly occurs to the side-patrols, they should instantly fire, in order to inform the squadron as quick as possible, of the presence of the enemy. One principle thing is, to instruct the men to be always on the look out after their squadron, and direct themselves according to its march; for it is impossible that the commander, (particularly in war) should be able to call to his detached men, and that if he finds it necessary to alter his march, they should, on seeing it, know how to act. In their manœuvres they should be accustomed to this. In night-marches they are to act differently, here they are not to go so far from their troop, but that, if it is out of sight, they may be within hearing; in short the ear should in this case supply the use of the eye. They should ride cautiously, often stop and listen, whether they hear the noise either of men or horses; if they do, endeavour to draw up to the noise as silent as possible, examine it nearly, and give intelligence of the same; should any thing approach them before the intelligence be given, they should instantly fire and call out.

They should early be taught together, in such cases, to retreat to their squadron, or direct their course another way, in order to mislead the enemy.

If they are first discovered by the enemy, it is their business not to retreat, but ride off another way, firing frequently, so as to draw the enemy after them; and thus give their squadron an opportunity to take its own measures, and either fall on the flank or rear of the enemy.

They should be instructed in certain signals that should govern them in the dark, such as for example their leader's whistling, or striking against a tree, either of which may be heard at some distance, and which, by previous explanation, may direct them how to act.

The men, in time of peace, should be well instructed, or in war we never shall have a good side-patrol, and shall unnecessarily lose many a man. If it is not requisite to instruct the men in night-manceuvres, in the dark; we, at least, should do it in the day, and explain to them every thing distinctly. They should learn to patrol the villages, both in day and night, be taught how to separate themselves among villages, hedges, and hollow ways, &c. and how to assist each other, so that no place remains unsearched.

Sec. VI. Should a troop be detached, in order to reconnoitre, the vanguard and side-patrol should know how artfully to examine the passengers and country people they meet, and gain from them all the intelligence they can without discovering their design, and if they find it necessary, to take them before the commanding officer; how to seize an inhabitant, and frighten him out of information; how they are to assist each other in making discoveries; that one should give his horse to another to hold, whilst he climbs a tree, a precipice, or hill, or whilst he goes to the top of a house or steeple, in order to make a good look out; how to creep up to the fire of an enemy at night, or get near a house where any of the party are, to observe what sort of troops they are. If this is not practised in time of peace, so as to give the men a thorough notion of it, and convince them that they are practicable things; it will be impossible, in time of war, to get it done. When advancing to the enemy, the obstacles the men at such a time will naturally anticipate, will prevent its being effectually done. If these things are practised in time of peace, and a small reward given to such as are more expert than others, they will take a pleasure in doing it, and in time of war, will do the same, (even without orders,) and venture courageously into the midst of danger, in

hopes of meeting their commander's approbation. At least, by such a practice, an army will have men expert at this business, at the commencement of a campaign.

They should be given to understand, that this is more practicable in real service, than at exercise; as in the first case, the enemy will not be apprized of what they are going to do: whereas in the last, those against whom their designs are aimed, are aware of it.

Sec. VII. The men should also be instructed in every thing respecting a field-guard, how to examine all who come to the chain, and suffer none either to pass or repass, more particularly at night, whom they do not know, or who have not a passport; how to give signals to each other, and pass the watch-word; how to stop a trumpeter with dispatches, blindfold him, and conduct him to the guard; how to conduct themselves in case they see, at a distance, a great fire, a cloud of dust, a glittering of arms, or a body marching, or in case they hear a voice at night, how to draw up to it undiscovered, and make themselves acquainted with what is passing, before they give the alarm, and finally, how to conduct themselves in an enemy's approach.

These are the things in which the privates should be principally instructed, and which we should make to them very clear and intelligible. We will now proceed to the subaltern.

Of instructions for the Non-commissioned Officers.

Sec. I. It should be the chief view of the commanding officer of a squadron, particularly of light horse, to have able, active, and well informed non-commissioned officers; as in war they are often left to themselves, and employed in expedients which, though they may seem trifling, may, in fact, be of the utmost importance; we should endeavour, therefore, to form them in time of peace, and improve their understanding as much as possible. For example, they should be accustomed in private affairs to act on commission, in the discharge of which, they should be exact and adroit; by this their abilities will be better known.

Sec. II. They should be able to read and write, that, in case of necessity, they may make their reports in writing. As soon as they can give some account of what they have done, *viva voce*, they should be accustomed to do the same in writing; and if they cannot do it properly, they should be taught; examples should be laid before them to copy and study. Men that teach them should do it with patience, and point out where they err, with temper.

Care should be taken that non-commissioned, and even officers of higher rank, should express themselves in their reports with precision, and not use themselves to vague and indefinite terms; for instance, they should not use the expressions, *on this part*, or, *the other part*; or, if speaking of rivers, *the right or the left shore*. I have known great mistakes arise from such undetermined expressions.

They should learn to make reports of the patrols, in writing; and in teaching them this, we should use great patience, and go on with them gradually. At first they should merely relate the way they have taken. Here they should learn to determine what sort of ground they passed; whether sandy, stony, hilly, or boggy; how and where it changed; whether they passed bridges or defiles, and where and with how large bodies they could be passed. Whether the river could be forded or not; whether the bridge is of stone or wood. By this they will know the way, and be certain of making true reports.

If, for example, a manoeuvre is made to reconnoitre the enemy, we should use them to describe its position; that is to say, where they found the enemy; how strong they are; what sort of troops they consist of; and how and from what side they approached. Here again they must be very explicit, and not say, "I marched by on the other side of the village, and the field-guard was at the lower part of it;" but "I had the village on my left, and the field-guard being at the end of the village, the village was on its right flank." We should, if possible, teach them to write down their own movements, and those also of the enemy; viz. in what manner and with how many troops, the enemy made the attack or retreated; how they conducted themselves in the business; how they followed the enemy, in what position, and why they did not pursue them further.

Few non-commissioned officers will have occasion to put this in practice; but if some of them only are equal to the task, should there be occasion so to employ them, the commanding officer has it in his power. How often does it happen in war, that an officer is sent out on a dangerous patrol, to reconnoitre; or on a business which requires chosen men; and how glad would such officer be to have such serjeants and privates with him, on whose prudence and experience he can rely? I will here mention a circumstance which happened to me in the campaign of 1758. I went out on a command, and was cut off from my corps, and had neither money or victuals for man or horse. Not being able to learn any thing

of the corps I belonged to, which had taken another route, on account of the enemy's approach; I drew up to one of our forts, in order to procure intelligence of the enemy's position and ours, and, at the same time, to get money, and provisions; but the commanding officer refused both, and would scarce allow me to take quarters in a village under his cannons, and could give me no further intelligence, than that he supposed Lieutenant General——, was with his corps about four miles off. I wrote therefore to this general, sent a serjeant, with two well mounted men, whom I directed which way to take, and instructed him in the manner in which he might get through to the place I sent him. He succeeded, and the general, who, indeed, was no friend to the cavalry was astonished at it. He desired the serjeant to point out to him on the map, the way he had taken, and how he had crept by unnoticed. The serjeant having given such an account, and such a description of the environs, as highly pleased him, he made him a present, and gave him instructions which way to return. I received a suitable answer, and every thing I wanted; was quartered in the suburbs of the fort, and joined our corps six days after.

This is a proof that a clever serjeant or corporal with four or six men, may make his way every where; whilst an officer, with 30 or 40 horses, perhaps dare not venture.

An officer would be very badly off, who with a troop of 30 or 40 horses, is appointed to a command, and in which he has something to risk, and in case of necessity, must add force to craft, if he had not at least one non-commissioned officer with him, on whom he could rely, and to whom in a case of urgency he could tell his secret, and who might share with him in the danger. How frequently does it occur, that on such expeditions, we are obliged to open our way back with sword in hand. Should the officer be killed or taken prisoner, who is to make the report to the general? Or suppose I was gone with a party to the rear of the enemy, and had detached several troops commanded by serjeants and officers, of higher rank, further into the country; with orders to shew themselves every where, to deceive and alarm the people, in order to make them believe that we were as strong again as we were; that they might carry such a false report to their army, and thus disquiet them, and make them take another position; or perhaps induce them to detach a force ten times stronger than mine against me, from which our army might draw good advantages: if this was to happen, and I had only such non-

commissioned officers under me as knew nothing of the service, and were not able to make a report, how could I rely on them, and how could they give me a proper account of what they did, or of what they knew of the enemy? I know no greater misfortune can befall an officer on a command, than that of having none but blockheads as subalterns with him. It is a principal thing then in the cavalry, that non-commissioned officers should be instructed in time of peace, so as to acquire knowledge and consideration.

Sec. III. How to instruct Non-commissioned Officers in a Campaign.

It will seldom occur, that a non-commissioned officer will be left to place his field-guard according to his own plan; for such field-guards are commonly detached from a larger body, or are at least placed by an officer of higher rank; in which case they receive their orders, and their posts are fixed; yet there is still a good deal left to their own consideration. A non-commissioned officer, therefore, should know how to inspect his *videttes* properly, that they may give him good intelligence of all they hear and see. He should be able to tell them how they are to detain every one that comes towards them; how they are at night alternately to ride backwards and forwards for some hundred paces; and listen whether they hear a noise or any thing approaching them; how they are to call to the patrol, and how dispatch them. To this end he must give them the patrol or watch-word distinctly, and so as that they shall understand it; and to make them ready at this, he should himself ride forwards so as to be spoke to, and that the watch-word may be demanded of him.

In the campaign of 1761, I was very nearly being killed by one of my own men: the non-commissioned officer having given him a wrong watch-word. As the circumstance applies so closely to this subject, I will relate it.

The regiment was posted in three villages; it was not half complete, having only seven non-commissioned officers fit for service, who were chiefly on command and patrols; of course these only had the field-guards, and as I was in the village near the field-guard, I had the charge of visiting them, and instructing and dispatching the patrols. Having once reached the *vidette* of a corporal, and let him purposely call out twice, he demanded the watch-word; and on my giving it in his opinion wrong, he advanced and fired. I then called to him, and, he knowing me by my voice,

came up to me. I examined him and took him with me to the troop. He had received the watch-word in writing, and shewed me the paper, but the misfortune was, he could not read; and had given out the word *Cassimir* as the watch-word, instead of *Girrigini*. I give this as a proof of the necessity of serjeants and corporals being better informed.

THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN GERMANY.

(Continued from page 131.)

THE immediate result of that loss was the raising of the siege of Olmutz. This was executed by field-marshal Keith with the utmost prudence and precaution, so that he brought away unmolested all the ammunition, all the waggons with provisions, and even the sick, only 30 of the weakest were left to the generosity of the enemy.

Frederic again revealed his fatal situation to his generals in a speech, wherein he declared great confidence in the bravery of his troops, hoping they would conquer the enemy, though they should be posted on the highest mountains or buried within batteries. Daun wanted to block up the king's retreat into Silesia, occupying all the passes that led thither from Moravia, thinking already to have taken the king prisoner. But Frederic turned suddenly, taking his march not to Silesia but to Bohemia, dividing his army into separate corps; and thus he arrived, after having surmounted the greatest difficulties, in those pathless mountains and at last in Silesia by the way of Glatz, after many hot skirmishes. Keith covered the artillery of the siege, and about 4000 waggons. This immense train also passed safely the high mountains and a chain of defiles, though the enemy pursued them. The offensive war against the Austrians was for the present at an end, for the Russians having penetrated to the center of his dominions, called for the most speedy measures to repel them.

They had already at the beginning of the year returned to Prussia under the command of general Fermor, and finding the kingdom void of troops they took possession of it without a shot. Fermor made a triumphal entry into Konigsburg, trumpets and kettle-drums were heard all day long from off the church steeples.

The inhabitants, bearing in mind the former cruelties of the Russians, supplicated the protection of the empress. The general's answer is remarkable. He said: "It is fortunate for you, gentlemen, that my most gracious monarch has taken possession of this kingdom, you will be happy under her mild sceptre and I will take care to support in their former course all regulations, which I find perfectly good, and admitting of no amendment." He immediately dispatched a courier to Petersberg with the keys of the city, and gave audience to the nobility; after that, pompous entertainments followed. From that period the Russians considered the kingdom of Prussia as their property, which they would peaceably keep; and it must be confessed, that they treated it with exemplary forbearance during the remainder of the war.

The members of all the royal colleges were obliged to swear allegiance in the church, to do nothing contrary to the interest of the empress of Russia, either public or private. The sick members took their oaths at their dwelling-houses. The consistory received orders to pray in the churches for the empress, and a form of prayer was added. At last the nobility as well as the citizens were forced to swear allegiance in the churches appointed for that purpose. Russian officers conducted them thither, and presided at the ceremony. The Russian court feast-days were published to be celebrated with devotion and cessation of labour, and every measure taken to preserve, uninterrupted, the commerce, the posts, and other regulations of public utility.

The Russians obtained at Königsberg and Pillau 88 iron cannon, with a considerable quantity of balls and bombs, likewise several hundred barrels of powder. Never was a kingdom easier conquered than Prussia, and never barbarous soldiers conducted themselves with more moderation. The court of Vienna, to reward this uncontested conquest, created Fermor a count of the empire, and the Russian monarch confirmed all his regulations.

The inhabitants of Prussia, by this unexpected moderation, seemed to forget their king, and submitted quietly to the yoke of his enemies. At Königsberg, especially, more was done than required. On the 21st of February (the birth-day of the prince of the crown) they illuminated the city, displayed fireworks, and the university asked leave to read a public oration on that occasion. Such illuminations, at the expence of the people of Königsberg, and other pompous shews, were usual at the Russian court-feasts; and though policy had a greater share than choice in those doings, yet Frederic could not forget that behaviour, and he never after-

wards set his foot in his kingdom of Prussia. Every thing went on quietly. The administration of all the branches of government was continued without alteration. The revenues fell to the conquerors. However, the chiefs of the departments, as in Saxony, found means to give to their monarch effectual proofs of their loyalty and zeal. This remained a secret to the Russians. Fermor at last quitted Prussia with his army, which was supplied with provision on 20,000 sledges, taking his march towards Pomerania and the Mark. But the conquerors, were not, as in Prussia, restrained by superior orders, and therefore pursued their last year's practice, by marking their footsteps in these unfortunate provinces with fire and blood.

The army of Dohna before the arrival of the Russians had driven the Swedes into a narrow compass, and kept even Stralsund blockaded. But these advantages were soon frustrated at the approach of this enemy. The operations of that army were much retarded by the transports of provision and the establishing of magazines. It was not sufficient for the Russians to be masters of the Weichsel; they aspired to be masters of the Warthe also. They took possession of Posen, the capital of Great Poland, of Elbing, and Thorn. Even Danzig they wanted to occupy and to establish there the magazines, but they failed. The inhabitants of that place, being then very much concerned for Prussia, declared themselves formally against this design, to deliver up their outworks to the Russians; and they made preparations to repel them by force in case of necessity. However, it did not come to that. The Russians had no time to lose. Their view was directed to the interior part of the Prussian states, whither Fermor directed his march. He entered Pomerania and the New Mark with 80,000 men, and besieged Custrin, which Dohna could not prevent with his small army. The system of these troops was fire and destruction, after the manner of barbarous hords. The unfortunate town was the very first day reduced to a heap of ashes, and a large magazine destroyed. The inhabitants, bereft of every thing, had scarcely time to save their miserable lives. They fled across the Oder, and beheld with grief the smoke ascending to the clouds from the fire which consumed their all. Many inhabitants of the adjacent country, and some from a greater distance, had brought their most valuable effects into that fort, to save them from the rapacity of the Cossacks; so that an astonishing quantity, of great value, was consumed by the flames. The enemy's design was that the inha-

bitants should preserve nothing; for they continued throwing red hot grenades, when the fire had already raged in every corner of the place. Towards evening they ceased the fruitless bombardment. Fermor himself gave orders to throw the remainder of the grenades into the city, saying, "they would not be wanted any more this campaign, but the cannon balls should be reserved for the battle." After five days the commandant was, for the first time, summoned to surrender, because it now and then came into the head of the Russian general to act in the stile of civilized nations: and even that summons denotes the savage. He threatened with a storm, and to put the whole garrison to the sword, if the fort was not immediately surrendered. The commandant answered, "the city, it is true, is no more than a heap of stones; the magazines are burned; but the fort is still in the best state, and the garrison has suffered nothing: I shall therefore defend myself to the last man." He defended himself upon the heap of rubbish, but without shewing much skill. The king, to whom he afterwards made an excuse, answered: "It is my fault; why did I make you a commander?!"

The threatened storm of Custrin, however, did not take place; for the approach of the king engaged all the attention of the Russians. Dohna came to the assistance of this narrowly enclosed fortification before the king's arrival, and opened thereby a communication, so that the garrison could constantly be relieved.

The king had left the greatest part of his army in Silesia: he took but 14,000 men, and began with them a very forced march. This small army burned with a desire to be revenged of an enemy whom they had never seen; but whose cruelties and devastations, well known by report, called for streams of blood. Their courage increased when they set foot on provinces where they saw nothing but ruins and ashes still smoking. So great was the devastation, that they could hardly distinguish their native country. All fatigues were despised. They drank, in this sultry time of the year, the water out of standing pools. In twenty four days Frederic ended a march of 60 German miles (300 English), arrived the 21st of August near Custrin, and joined the army of Dohna. He passed the Oder at a place where it was not expected. Fermor's designs were now totally frustrated. The siege of Custrin was raised. Both armies approached each other, and prepared for battle. Perhaps there never was an army that wished more for a battle than did that of the Prussians this time. The dæmon of war seemed to have inspired them. Frederic himself, moved to compassion by the numberless heaps of ruins, and the

fugitives wandering about deprived of every thing, forgot every passion but that of revenge. He gave orders that no quarters should be given to the Russians. Every preparation was made to cut off the retreat of the enemy, and to drive them into the morass along the Oder. Even the bridges, which might have favoured their flight, were burnt down. This the Russians learned just as the battle commenced: "The Prussians give no quarters." "Neither will we," was the echo of the Russians.

Frederic's situation was again desperate, and every thing depended on the event of a battle. The enemy were on the point to unite and to cut him off from the Elbe and the Oder. The French and the troops of the empire were on their march to Saxony, ~~where~~ Daun had likewise marched with the main army of the ~~Austrians~~. The Swedes, having now no enemy before them, proceeded towards Berlin, which is not fortified; and, above all, the Russians, who had "DESTRUCTION" for their motto, were in the heart of his states.

The well-meditated disposition of Frederic's army was not only directed to a victory, but to the total annihilation of the enemy's army: reserving to himself, however, a retreat towards Custrin in case of a misfortune. This great battle was fought the 25th of August, near Zorndorf. The Russians were 50,000 and the Prussians 30,000 strong; the latter began the attack with a lively cannon fire. The position of the Russians was a bulky square, used in the wars against the Turks, in the midst whereof was their cavalry, their baggage, and the reserve corps. The cannon-balls had a terrible effect on the Russian mass of men so badly posted. By one cannon-ball 42 men of a grenadier regiment were thrown down; they created besides a horrid confusion among the baggage, the horses ran away with their waggons, and broke through the ranks so that they were obliged to clear the square from that incumbrance. Meanwhile the Prussian left wing advanced so fiercely that they exposed a flank. This circumstance the Russian cavalry made use of to penetrate into the Prussian infantry, and to beat several battalions out of the field. Fermor who thought already the victory was sure, ordered the square to be opened on all sides, in order to pursue the enemy. This happened with loud shouts of victory, but the Russians were not advanced far, when they became involved in great confusion. General Seidlitz at that time came forward with the Prussian cavalry and overturned that of the Russians, driving them back on their own infantry. Ano-

ther body of Prussian horse attacked the Russian infantry furiously; they cut down without mercy whatever their swords could reach. Some regiments of Prussian dragoons, not restrained by the fire that raged in the village of Zorndorf, rode through the midst of the flames towards the Russians; and Seidlitz, who by that time had quite done with the enemy's cavalry, followed this new road to victory. The Russian infantry was now attacked on all sides in the flank in the front and rear, and dreadful was the carnage. These warriors presented to the Prussians scenes of battle, they never saw before. After having spent all their shot, they stood in their ranks like statues. However here it was not valour, worthy of admiration, arising from ambition or patriotism, maintain their post to the last moment; for they did not desert themselves at all. It was a kind of stubborn insensibility to suffer themselves to be killed where they stood. If whole lines were stretched to the ground, new ones appeared, seemingly wishing to be dispatched in the same manner. It was easier to kill them than to put them to flight. Even a shot through the body was not sufficient to bring them to the ground. The Prussians had therefore nothing to do but slaughter all that would not give way. The whole right wing of the Russians was partly cut to pieces, partly driven into the morass. A number of the fugitives came amongst the baggage; the waggons of the sutlers were plundered, and the brandy swallowed with brutality. In vain did the Russian officers break the casks, the soldiers threw themselves in full length on the ground to sip their favourite liquor out of the dust. Many vomited out their souls, others massacred their own officers, whole crowds ran raving about the field, without any attention to the calls of their commanders.

Such was the state of things on the right wing of the Russians. It was noon. On the left wing little was done hitherto; but now the Prussians attacked it likewise: however, the regiments that might have put the seal on the already gained victory, did not shew their usual valour. They forgot the fame of the Prussian name; they lost their strength in the most decisive moment; and fell back, in the presence of their king, before the weakened and already half-beaten enemy. The disorder was great, and all the valiant actions of the Prussian left wing seemed to be lost, when Seydlitz came flying with his cavalry from the victorious wing, advanced into the opening that was made by the retreating infantry; held out a very heavy musket and grape-shot fire; and then broke in, not only upon the Russian cavalry, but also upon that

part of the infantry which had kept ground, and drove the advanced enemy, who had already gained some batteries, into the morafs. This grand manœuvre of the cavalry was excellently supported by the flower of the Pruffian infantry, confifting of the regiments, Prince of Pruffia, Forcado, Kalkstein, Affeburg, and feveral grenadier battallions, all troops which the king had brought with him. Thofe veterans had, without regard to the battallions that were retreating near them, constantly been advancing, and with the cavalry fell on the Ruffian infantry with fixed bayonets. The firing ceafed every where; ammunition began to fail; bud-ends of guns, bayonets, and fwords, were now the weapons wherewith they were beating and pushing about each other. The animofity was on both fides beyond expreffion. The Pruffians, grievoufly wounded, forgot their own prefervation, and were thinking only on the murder of their enemies. The Ruffians did the fame. One was found mortally wounded lying upon a dying Pruffian, gnawing him with his teeth: The Pruffian, fruggling with death, and unable to move, was forced to fuffer that gnawing, till one of his comrades came and perforated the cannibal.

The regiments of Forcade and Prince of Pruffia fell upon the Ruffian baggage and the military chefts, of which they took the greateft part. The total weaknefs of both parties, and night breaking in, put at laft an end to the flaughter: only the Coffacks were fwarming about the field of battle, killing the defencelefs wounded. Both armies remained during the night under arms. The Ruffians were in the moft dreadful confufion; all their troops were like a confused chaos. They would have willingly yielded to the Pruffians the honour of the victory, had not their retreat been blocked up, the bridges over the rivers having all been deftroyed. In this diforder general Fermor demanded, on the very evening of the battle, a truce of two or three days. His pretext was the burial of the dead. To this extraordinary demand general Dohna replied, "Since the king my mafter has gained the battle, by his command the dead will be buried, and the wounded taken care of;" giving him thereby to underftand, that a ceffation of hoftilities was a very uncommon thing after a battle. The following day nothing happened but cannonading. The king thought to renew the battle formally: but want of ammunition among the infantry, and the great fatigue of the cavalry, who had fought with the utmoft exertion of their ftrength, made neceffarily an end of the battle, and afforded the Ruffians an opportunity of

extricating themselves from the labyrinth in which they were involved. They retired by the way of Landsberg upon the Warthe. This defeat cost them 19,000 killed and wounded, besides 3000 prisoners, 103 cannons, many colours, their military chest, and a quantity of baggage. The Prussians had 10,000 killed and wounded, and 1400 prisoners or missing; they likewise had lost 26 cannons by the giving way of their right wing.

This small number of cannon, the few prisoners, and the circumstance that part of the Russian army in scattered crouds had remained on the field of battle, induced the Russians to ascribe to themselves the victory. The Russian general Panin, was however honest enough to say, "we have, it is true maintained the field of battle, but it has been by those that were slaughtered, wounded, and intoxicated. Notwithstanding it was Fermor himself, who solicited permission to bury the dead, he sent couriers with the news of the victory to all the courts and armies of the allies. Never was more use made of martial bravados than in the seven years war; but the Prussians despised such tricks. If they were really beaten they owned it freely, with the sure confidence to repair the losses by future exploits. That was the sentiment of Frederic, and of all the leaders of his armies. They left it to the conquered, to amuse themselves with imaginations and false accounts; and made good use of the victory. The king, master of the field of battle near Zorndorf, pursued his flying enemies to Ludberg. He was so convinced of their present impotence that he ordered them to be observed only by a part of his army under the command of general Dohna: he detached again a corps against the Swedes, and with the remainder of his army he marched to Saxony, where his presence was highly necessary.

The king was generous enough to acknowledge the extraordinary merit of general Seidlitz; he declared publicly, that the battle was won by that general. He however, was not sparing of his own person, having entered so far among the Russian fire that all his adjutants and pages around him were either killed or wounded.

The enormities committed by the Russians being still in the memory of the Prussian soldiers and peasants, suppressed in them for a short time every feeling of humanity, so that many lying wounded and helpless on the field, were, together with the dead bodies, thrown into one hole and buried alive. These unfortunate wretches endeavoured in vain to crawl from under the dead; other

corps were thrown upon them, which soon prevented their feeble motions.

In the mean time the Austrians did all in their power to make good use of the king's absence. They now were able to act offensively, and from the superiority of their numbers they had to expect the most brilliant success. Every thing depended on a quick execution. In Silesia there were, an account of the number of fortresses and occupied posts, many obstacles in their way, the removal of which required time. In Saxony they expected, to gather laurels easier. The whole army of Daun was there, and the duke of Deux-Ponts had also arrived in Saxony with the army of the Empire. The loss of that country, so useful to the Prussians, seemed to be inevitable. Prince Henry of Prussia, who covered the country with a small army, was compelled to yield to superiority of numbers, and to retire to Dresden. Daun's plan was to take this royal residence, and to annihilate the Prussians or at least to drive them out of Saxony, and to cut off the king from the river Elbe. The execution of all this depended on detaining that formidable general long enough in his own dominions. Daun therefore, in a letter warned general Fermor, not to enter into an engagement with the king, a cunning enemy, whom he did not know, yet, advising him at the same time to act rather on the defensive till Saxony was freed from the Prussians. The courier with that letter fell into the king's hands; who after the battle of Zorndorf, sent in Fermor's name to Daun the following answer: "You have reason to warn general Fermor to take care of a cunning enemy, whom you know better than him; for he stood his ground and was beaten."

Prince Henry, relying on Frederic's activity, endeavoured to maintain, by divers operations his post against the numerous enemies, and, he succeeded. The troops of the Empire besieged the fort of Sonnenstein. The Prussian commandant lost courage, and surrendered the place with 1400 men. Daun made a trial of taking Dresden. He approached that residence, which was weakly garrisoned, and not strongly fortified. But the prudence and resolution of the commandant count Smettau, made up those deficiencies. He made arrangements for burning the magnificent suburbs, where the houses are six and seven stories high, and project over the ramparts. This design put the count and the whole city in the greatest consternation: An universal lamentation took place, when the Prussians began filling the houses with combustibles. Smettau alledged necessity and his

duty to defend himself. He declared that the Saxons could not expect of him as the enemies of his king, any consideration for their royal residence, whilst their allies designedly did the same. Daun, threatened to avenge in the most barbarous manner the burning of the suburbs; and after taking the place, never to give quarter to any Prussian. Smettau in his turn declared to defend himself from street to street, to make the royal palace his last castle, and to bury himself under its ruins. He resolved to carry a quantity of gunpowder into the palace, to assemble there by force the nobility and the first men of the court, and then in the apartment of the Electoral prince, in the midst of the dejected royal family, to expect the final enterprises of the enemy. Such a menace, uncertain as its execution might have been, was too well meditated, and so congenial to the circumstances, that the effect could not fail. Daun relinquished his intention upon Dresden, and Smettau left the suburbs undisturbed. The combustibles were taken out of the houses, and the inhabitants became quieted.

The enormous superiority of the Austrians and troops of the Empire, however, disposed the allies to new and important plans. They intended to surround prince Henry, attack him at once in front and in rear, and to annihilate his army. The generals of the different armies, already had conference on the project, and measures for its execution were taken, when the *thundering word*: Frederic is drawing near! defeated all at once the whole plan. He arrived and formed a junction with prince Henry. His desire was immediately to come to a battle, in order to drive the Austrians into Bohemia, and then to march to the assistance of Silesia, which being but weakly provided with troops was in great danger. The enemies levied contributions in that province and besieged at once the forts of Neisse and Cosel. General Fouquet stood intrenched with a body of four thousand Prussians near Landshut. He could throw difficulties in the way of the enemy, but could not prevent their operations. Daun carefully avoided a battle endeavouring to protract Frederic's march to Silesia by well posted corps. His camp near Stolpen was one of the strongest in Saxony. It was upon steep hills, covered by ditches, morasses, forests and ravines. The general as well as his troops were courageous, in good spirits and devout. On account of the imagined victory of their allies near Zorndorf they sang the *Te Deum* accompanied by martial music, and the firing of cannon and small arms. Those among them, however, that were not void of reason, doubted that victory, which was sufficiently refuted by the arrival of the

king and the alteration in all their great plans. Several Austrian corps were driven from their posts, and skirmishes became frequent. The way to Silesia became open, but Daun remained unmoveable in his camp. Nevertheless the king did not lose the hopes of driving him back to Bohemia by cutting of his provisions and destroying his magazines. About the troops of the Empire he was quite unconcerned, whose departure he was certain of, they already suffering by want of provision and forage. He, therefore, encamped near Bautzen. His troops who for eight weeks were daily in motion, wanted some rest. The season had already commenced to be rough; he ordered therefore his infantry to build huts, and his cavalry stables of branches of trees. Of the then situation of the king and his army we may judge from a letter which he wrote at the beginning of October to lord Marshal. He there says: "Until the fall of snow, I shall be obliged to dance upon the rope. How often would I give the half of that glory of which you write, for a little rest."

Both armies, at last, altered their positions. Daun took again a strong camp at a little distance from his former, and the Prussians encamped near Hochkirch. A fault, committed by the Prussian general, Retzow, in leaving a mountain unoccupied, was here the cause of a great event, which brought the king to the very brink of destruction, shewed his heroic genius in its brightest light, and belongs to the most extraordinary scenes of this war.—The neglected hills were immediately occupied and fortified by the Austrians. The advantages they gained thereby were so great, that they excited in Daun, cautious as he was, the idea of surprising the king in his camp. Every thing favoured this design: The armies were so near each other, that the right wing of the Prussians was but a cannon-shot from the enemy's camp. The vast number of light troops in the Austrian army was particularly favourable to a surprise, and, skirmishes continuing day and night, they were able to cover more important plans. The Prussians, accustomed, under Frederic's lead, always to attack first, did not dream even of a possibility of an attack from the cautious Daun, whose camps hardly ever could be made strong enough when he knew Frederic to be in his vicinity.

The king, however, was sensible of his position being disadvantageous; yet he thought it to be dishonourable, and not absolutely necessary to retreat. Field-marshal Keith observed to the King, "if the Austrians leave us tranquil in our present camp, they deserve to be hanged." Frederic replied, "we must hope,

that they are more afraid of us than of the gallows." Nevertheless he resolved to alter his position as soon as the army could be afresh supplied with provisions. The night from the 14th to the 15th of October was selected for the removal of the camp.

But the Austrian columns had already, in the night of the 13th quitted their camp, in order to surprize the Prussians. General Odonel led the van, consisting of four battallions and thirty-six squadrons; they were followed by thirty-four battallions, under the command of generals Sincere and Fortgath. The corps of general Laudon, which was posted almost in the rear of the Prussian camp, was reinforced by four battallions and fifteen squadrons, which afterwards were joined by the whole Austrian cavalry of the left wing. The infantry of that wing was led by field-marshal Daun himself. All those troops, and some smaller corps were destined to attack the Prussian right wing, their front and rear; the duke of Aremberg, with twenty-three battallions and thirty-two squadrons, was to observe the Prussian left wing, and to attack, then only, when the defeat of the enemy was completed every where else. In their van they had volunteer grenadiers, who mounted behind the dragoons, but dismounted before the Prussian camp, formed and pushed forwards.

The tents remained in the Austrian camps, and the usual fires were carefully continued. A number of labourers were employed the whole night in felling trees, constantly calling out to each other; whereby they intended to prevent the Prussian out posts from observing the march of the troops. But the vigilant Prussian hussars discovered the enemy's movements, and informed the king of it. At first he doubted the movements; but they being confirmed by repeated reports, he guessed at every other cause but that of a formal attack. Generals Seidlitz and Zieten were with the king, endeavouring to remove his doubts in this critical moment; they succeeded at last so far, that orders were sent to several brigades to rise. But this order was countermanded towards morning, and the soldiers now yielded to a profound sleep.

But day light had not yet appeared, and the clock struck five in the village of Hochkirch, when the enemy appeared before the camp. Whole crouds of Austrian soldiers arrived at the Prussian out posts, announcing themselves as deserters. Their number encreased so rapidly that they were soon able to overturn out posts and field guards. The Austrian army, divided into several corps, followed their van closely, and now entered, in columns, the Prussian camp. Many royal regiments were first waked from

their sleep by their own cannon; for the enemy, who had left most of their great guns behind, found at the surpris'd field-guards and batteries, cannon and ammunition, with which they fired into the Prussian camp.

Never an army of brave troops was in a more terrible situation than those Prussians, carelessly sleeping under the ægis of Frederic, who now at once were attacked in the interior of their camp, and wakened by fire and sword to the sleep of death. It was yet night, and the confusion beyond expression. What a sight for those warriors, resembling a nocturnal vision! the Austrians, as if risen from out of the earth, in the midst of their camp. Many hundreds were slain in their tents before they could open their eyes; others ran half naked to their arms: few could get their own: each laid hold on what first fell into his hands, and flew with it into line and rank. Here the advantages of an excellent discipline appeared in a striking light. In this terrible situation, where resistance seem'd almost to be madness, and where flight and salvation must be the thought of every soldier, a total destruction would have been the fate of the army of any other nation whatever; courage availed here little, *discipline did all*.

The war cry spread like a torrent through the Prussian camp; all ran from out of their tents, and in a few moments, notwithstanding the great confusion, the most part of the infantry and cavalry stood in line of battle. The manner of attack oblig'd the regiments to act singly. They oppos'd the enemy every where, and repell'd them in some places, but in most they were forced to yield to superior numbers. The break of day did not serve to lessen the confusion, for a thick fog was hovering over the surface. The Prussian cavalry, led by Seidlitz, flew about in search of the enemy: Wherever, in the dark, their swords could reach them, they cut down every thing before them. The dragoon regiment of Schoneich, alone, overturned a whole line of Austrian infantry, and took 500 prisoners.

The village of Hochkirch was in flames, yet the Prussians defend'd it bravely. Victory seem'd to depend on its possession, wherefore Daun renew'd the attack continually with fresh troops. Only 600 Prussians remained here to be conquer'd, who, after having spent their ammunition, endeavour'd to cut their way through their numerous foes. A small party of them effected it, the others were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Whole Prussian regiments advanced and drove the enemy again out of the village. The bloodiest combat took place here. A cannon-ball

took away the head of prince France of Brunswick; field-marshal Keith was shot through the breast; prince Moritz of Dessau was mortally wounded. The Prussians, attacked in front and rear, were forced to yield. The king in person now advanced with fresh troops, and forced the Austrians again to retreat, but the Austrian cavalry regained lost advantages.

The fog now dispersing both parties beheld the field of battle covered with dead bodies. Both parties formed new lines of battle. Daun, his advantages notwithstanding, did not think of having conquered an army, that had deluded all human expectations; which, though surpris'd in the night in the midst of sleep, had combated so many hours with bravery in darkness, which had lost many of its leaders, and yet stood ready to renew the attack. This was Frederic's intention, when the duke of Arémburg under cover of the fog approached with his strong corps the king's left wing and attacked it. Several thousand men were here overturned and a Prussian battery taken. But here the victory ended. The king who had now enemies in front and rear, assembled his troops in the midst of this murderous tumult, and made after a desperate combat of five hours a retreat which ever will be memorable in the annals of wars. The Austrians were in too great a confusion to interrupt this retreat.

Frederic's march was but short. Two miles distant from the field of battle he encamped with his troops, who had lost most part of their artillery and baggage, had their short coats for a cover, and the skies for a tent. They even were in want of powder and balls. A new battle would have been renewing the ancient method of fighting, where every one depended on his fist. However the king's position was so advantageous, his means to defy dangers so various, and his troops even after their defeat still so formidable, that Daun would not venture a new attack. The Prussian army lost on this unfortunate day besides their baggage, above 100 cannon and 9000 men. The Austrians lost 8000.

The king had ventured into the hottest fire; a horse was killed under him, and two pages were shot on his side. He was in the greatest danger of being taken prisoner. The enemy had already surrounded him but he escaped by the valour of the hussars that accompanied him. He was present wherever the combat was the most bloody. His great talents never appeared in so glaring a light as on that night, which, instead of diminishing his fame, heightened it in the extreme. Not the king, who in the midst of warlike tumult governs his dominions the same as in time of

peace by his own regulations; who in hours of dangers plays on the flute, and soon after gives the wisest orders; who on the day of a decisive battle, makes French verses, gives laws and inspects accounts; not the victor at Lissa, who on Silesian fields performs Grecian tactics, and annihilates a whole army of warlike nations; not this extraordinary man is so venerable to the philosopher, the historian and the thinking man, as the king who is surprised near Hochkirch, beaten, but not conquered, who calls his sleeping warriors together, opposes them to a valiant and more numerous enemy, which is already in the midst of their camp, killing Prussians with Prussian balls; who in those terrible moments loses his bosom friend, all his best generals, and now, left to himself, takes by the power of his genius the most salutary measures; converts the chaos of his army in the midst of death and destruction into harmony, combats five hours and retires with the greatest order; who in that desperate situation, without cannon, without ammunition and baggage, still inspires the enemy with fear, and soon after is able to dislodge besieging armies. Such a prince forces the admiration of all nations and of all centuries.

(To be continued)

POETRY.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER.

[A PICTURE FROM THE LIFE.]

DEEP in a vale, a stranger now to arms,
 Too poor to shine in court, too proud to beg,
 He who once war'd on Saratoga's plains
 Sits musing o'er his scars and wooden leg.
 Rememb'ring still the toil of former days,
 To others' hands he sees his earnings paid;
They share the due reward—*he* feeds on praise,
 Lost in the abyss of want, misfortune's shade.
 Far, far from domes where splendid tapers glare,
 'Tis his from dear-bought PEACE no wealth to win,
 Remov'd alike from country cringing 'squires,
 The great man's levee, and the proud man's grin.
 Sold are those arms that once on Briton's blaz'd,
 When flush'd with conquest to the charge they came.
 That power repell'd, and Freedom's fabric rais'd,
 She leaves her soldier—FAMINE and a NAME!

MILITARY MEMOIRS AND MAXIMS.

THE DISPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

YOU must chuse wide and open ground, if you are strong in cavalry; and close and narrow, if your strength be in your foot.

Reconnoitre well your ground, and know the space the movements you design to give your army will take up.

Each general officer should assist at the council of war, and be well informed of the General's designs, the means he intends to use, and the retreat he chuses; which should be always well secured, in case you should lose the battle.

He must make good use of his troops, according as time and place offers, and not suffer them to lie idle.

Wind, dust, rain, the sun, fogs, are things that may be serviceable to you; but you must not trust to them too much, they being liable to change.

Hollow ways and morasses in your front may be of great use. You send out troops advanced before them, who may hide themselves from the enemy; and when they approach, your troops retire by passages made on purpose, you employ them elsewhere, and the enemy's troops remain useless on that side.

Post your best troops on your wings.

Cover your flanks, at least front your wings, with an impenetrable situation, as a morass, a river, a mountain, or fortify it with your chevaux de frise, waggons, great trees cut down, and the like: and if one wing has morasses or very strong ground before it, you may send the greatest part of your cavalry to the other wing.

Let your infantry and cavalry be so disposed, as to be able to support and reinforce one other, according as you have more of one than the other: and observe to mix some foot by platoons with your horse.

Appoint general officers to be on the wings, in the centre, and every where if you can, even in the rear, to animate and rally those who give way.

Be sure to have a good reserve, to return to the charge, and support the broken troops. That army who keeps most troops together at the end of a battle is always victorious. The troops of reserve are posted in the rear of the infantry in the centre: they are of use to support the troops who give way, to possess the ground the others have lost, and to march to any place where the General thinks they may be wanted.

You divide your artillery, and post the cannon where you think they may do most execution; and avoid halting under the cannon of the enemy: or if you are obliged to it, it is no disgrace, but prudent, to order your men to lie on their arms, in rank and file; it may save the lives of many men, and they can get up in an instant when commanded.

When you command brave and faithful soldiers, you should not let the chance of war depend on a single battle. But if you suspect your troops, and you are obliged to fight, let them know they must conquer or die.

Begin by endeavouring to take some prisoners and examine them, severely, in order to get the best intelligence you can of the state and situation of the enemy; but take but few of them, lest they encumber you in time of battle.

When it is resolved to fight the enemy, your troops should be weakest where the ground is strongest; and strongest, especially in cavalry, where the ground is openest.

And therefore it is of the utmost importance for a commander to know well the ground between him and his enemy; such as morasses, rivers, rivulets, thick hedges, large ditches, &c. behind which the infantry only is of use; and to have near him those who can inform him whether they are passable for horse and foot, the better to take his advantages from them.

The General is not to act by constant rules and methods, but to vary as he sees occasion; remembering what the great *Turenne* often said, *viz. Q'un sot l'embarraffoit quelquefois plus qu'n habile homme*: That a blockhead had sometimes perplexed him more than an able General.

As soon as a General has an opportunity of giving the enemy battle to advantage, he should do it immediately if he has day-light for it. This gives spirit to his men, and fear to the enemy, and prevents their intrenching themselves.

In good success push the advantages as far as you possibly can: in bad, find all the remedies in your power.

A General is more to be esteemed for preserving a country after the loss of a battle, than he is who gains it, and does not know how to make use of the advantages of it.

Actions ought more to be prized for their consequences than for themselves. In field expeditions it is impossible exactly to prescribe to an army or separate body how to govern itself in each action, because every different motion of the enemy, and the various accounts a man has of them, ought to make him alter his measures; and there is no giving a commander other than general rules, the rest depending on his own conduct and behaviour of his troops.

When a man boasts of never having committed errors in war, it is a sign he has not been long a general officer.

If your army is superior to the enemy in goodness, spirit or number, it is best to attack them in the morning: you have the whole day to drive them before you, and make your advantage of the victory. But if there be a necessity of giving them battle in other circumstances, do it in the evening: if your army is victorious, it is well; if not, you have the night to favour your retreat.

Remember always to begin the attack, and keep your fire till the enemy have given theirs; then march briskly up with recovered arms, and you will find they will fly before you. When you have gained the battle, keep moving after the enemy, and send a good body of light horse to continue in sight of them. This keeps up their fear, not knowing but your whole army is at hand; and thus they may abandon a whole country to you, if no fortified town or river is in your way; and if the latter, you may drive many of the enemy into it, take their baggage, and, it may be, their cannon.

After the battle is gained, and the enemy fly before you, forget not to send bodies of horse immediately to summon the towns to surrender which the enemy leave behind them; and leave small detachments at the roads leading to them, to prevent your stragglers from mistaking their way, and being taken by their garrisons.

When a project of importance is to be executed, chuse the commander you think best qualified for it; and as duty is done by seniority and rotation, send those officers who are

before him on other commands, to prepare the way for the officer you have your eye on. Thus will your schemes prosper, and your officers jealousy of your partiality be prevented; for it is highly necessary that all Generals and officers should gain the esteem of their inferiors.

If it is necessary to intrench a post of great use to your army, see that it be done effectually, that your fossé be large and deep, that your works be steep and give a good flank fire, that you be well stockaded and palisaded; make advanced fossés and out-works if you have time; and, in a word, make it defensible against the whole force of the enemy, till your army can come to your relief; and have good communication with them by several bridges over the rivers between you.

If a river is between you and the enemy, in the field, or in winter-quarters, and they have the possession of the bridges over it, send a small guard of horse every twenty-four hours to watch them, and give you intelligence if any bodies of men are coming over, that you may not be surprized.

It is not always necessary to fight in two lines with a corps de reserve; for if the enemy be more numerous than you, and the ground open, so that they may out-flank you, care must be taken to extend your front (though you fight in one line) equal to the front of the enemy: but if your right and left wing be well covered with rivers, morasses, thick woods, or other strong ground, your front need only to extend to them; the rest of your troops should be disposed so as best to support the front line, or to force the enemy where the ground is openest.

When you attack, march up to the enemy with as quick a pace as good order will allow: it gives spirit to your troops, and fear to the enemy: a slow motion allows too much time for reflection, damps their courage,* and exposes them too much to the enemy's fire. But take care to march in even front.

When your troops are inferior in number and goodness, chuse to give your enemy battle in strong or close ground; if you are superior, in as open ground as possible.

* The French practise it, but the Germans and Hollanders march with a slow pace.

If you command a body of foot in a plain, and are like to be attacked by a superior number of horse, throw your foot into a square; let your officers and serjeants be in the front ranks on each side, with their pikes and halberts ready to present to the enemy; the soldiers with their bayonets fixed, closing their ranks and files, so as to make the whole body as compact as the use of their arms will allow. Thus march, and thus receive the enemy's charge, who will soon respect and grow weary of having to do with you.*

Chevaux de frise are of great use on the above and many other occasions. The *Russians* never march without them; though if the foot make a close compact body, and a good front every way, they need them not; for we have often seen large bodies of cavalry pay great respect to less bodies of foot, and let them march quietly off, without risking their lives, or (which is almost as dear to them) their horses.

Have your eye on the enemy's motions in time of battle; if they draw off troops from one wing to reinforce the other, do so too; or immediately attack the weakened wing, if the ground permits; if not, be always strongest where the ground is openest, and intermix bodies of foot with (or have them at hand to support) your cavalry on your wings.

There is nothing so weak as the flank or rear of cavalry: if they are thus attacked, they make no resistance; but bodies of foot can make a respectable front every way.

Cavalry should always attack sword in hand: there is little hope from those who begin with the fire of their carbines. Therefore their swords should have weight and length, be of the best metal, and a full yard in the blade. As this is the weapon most to be depended on, they cannot be too well chosen.

* Charles XII. the brave King of Sweden, with 8000 horse, himself at the head of them, attacked a body of between five and six thousand Saxon foot, commanded by General Schulenburg, in the plains of Poland, drawn up in one square body. He first gave a furious charge to one front only, and was gallantly repulsed: after that, the King attacked every front at once with the greatest vigour, but was again beaten off. This gave the King and his cavalry enough of it; and Schulenburg, by the favour of the night, passed a rivulet, and leaving some foot in a mill, the fire of which stopt the enemy, he made a safe retreat.

In open countries you must have large bodies of cavalry. In woody countries, as America, or hilly, as Switzerland, cavalry is of little use.

When your wings are in the air, that is, when they have no cover, and may be attacked in flank, the usual method has been to draw your wheel-carriages, cut down trees, and plant chevaux de frise on the wings. By these you make as good a cover as you can: but remember, where your wings are exposed, the best method is to strengthen your flanks with good bodies of foot,* which alone are capable of resisting the efforts of horse, or the torrent with which they drive your broken squadrons.

Your centre should likewise be well supported; for an army broken in the centre we may pronounce defeated, and the battle irrecoverably lost.

General officers should keep the posts assigned them, or which their rank gives them; and not leave them, to go where their curiosity or a distant fire invites them; and to have it said in print, *Such a one was every where*: when really they should remember, that he that is every where is no where; and that he is the best officer, who is found where the duty of his post requires his presence.

As every thing depends upon the strength and good resistance of the front line, it should be made much stronger than the second; and therefore care should be taken to have good bodies of foot in the rear of both wings of horse, and in the rear of the centre and both wings of foot.

Horse should never be sent against an enemy, without a proportionable body of foot for their support.

Never begin the attack with part of your army, if the rest are not at hand to sustain you.

Never give the command of a brisk and important attack to a slow officer.

When horse are sent to attack the rear of a retreating army which is near you, let them take foot behind them. They should not grumble at it, for they will find great use from them.

Take care in all strong or inclosed ground to make large openings in the hedges, on the flanks of each regiment, that

* The wings being thus secured, there is little to fear, though you should be out-flank'd by the enemy's squadrons.

the battalions may have a free and easy communication with each other from right to left of your army.

Avoid encamping in swampy bottoms, or where great torrents of water from hasty rains may sweep away the baggage, forage, and tents of the army.

Be sure let your camp have the advantage of water, for the health and convenience of your men and horse: a good river in front or flank will strengthen your camp, and refresh both.

Keep your camp clean, and order the malefactors of each regiment to bury all dead horses, dogs, &c. that are found in front or rear of their regiment.

When you are near the enemy, and resolve rather to fight than quit your camp, chuse the ground, and be ready in an instant to form in order of battle on it; and that, before the enemy can come up to you.

Try and reconnoitre well, and as soon as possible, the rivers, rivulets, morasses, ditches, &c. which are between you and the enemy; and prevent as much as you can their doing it.

Always endeavour to be master of the bridges between you and the enemy, and secure each head of them with good works well guarded; and encamp not too far from them.

If before a battle you judge it necessary to take possession of the villages in your front, let them not be much advanced or too far from you, but rather in a line with your front. Open their flanks largely, and make good communications within, that you may sustain them, and they within, one the other.

Leave nothing for chance to do, but what wisdom cannot effect.

Let no inferior officer officiously attack any post or part of the enemy's army without orders.

If you find it difficult to dislodge an enemy from an advantageous post, send some troops with trumpets and drums into the inclosed ground on their flank or rear: their sounding and beating a march will often make them believe they are to be attacked there, as well as in front, and so cause them to quit their post.

If the enemy lay siege to an important place, do not attempt the raising it, till by the length of the siege, fatigue, death, and desertion, which is frequent on these occasions, the enemy's army is lessened and dispirited.

And to approach their army, and be afterwards forced to retire, would be attended with very ill consequences both to your army and the town besieged.

If you resolve to besiege a place where the enemy's army may possibly cut off your provisions and communication with your magazines, take care before you open your trenches, to be well provided with all necessaries for the duration of the whole siege.

When you detach from one wing to strengthen and make a grant effort with the other, if possible do it so that the enemy may not perceive it, lest they attack immediately your weakened wing and defeat you.

When any part of the first line is broken, the nearest regiment of the second should instantly march up, repulse the enemy, and make good the line; and give time to the broken regiments or squadrons to form in their room.

Consider well before you come to an engagement with the enemy, the situation and circumstances of their army; and whether you may not gain more by temporising, cutting off their provisions, or otherwise distressing them, than by giving them battle, and the chance of a victory over you.

If their means of continuing the war be scanty, and yours otherwise, it is best to dally with them, and come to nothing decisive, though your army should be superior. Want of forage, bread, or other necessaries, will often oblige an enemy to quit their camp, when your whole force could not have done it.

If you chuse to give the enemy battle, let the circumstances of it be such, that if you lose it, it may not be decisive on your part, but may be so to the enemy if you gain it; and never give or engage in battle, but when there is much more to be gained by victory, than lost by being beaten.

Always encamp your army, if near the enemy, in the manner you intend they shall fight.

When an enemy would attack you, and you have rivers, rivulets, or morasses, &c. before you, draw up your army so near them, as that if they pass, they may not have room or time to form, but be overfet and driven into them as fast as they come over.

If your right wing beat the enemy's left, so as that they break and fly before you, and seem to be quite routed, yet pursue them not too far, but with your troops in good order

wheel to the left, and charge the remaining enemy in flank, whilst your left wing is buying them in front: so will you easily defeat them.*

A General should always endeavour to make his war become offensive. His troops will often be quiet in their camp, while the enemy are insecure and harrassed.

A commander in chief should never be prevailed on to drink to excess: that might give the enemy a terrible advantage over him.

Prevent gaming among the troops as much as possible. Soldiers have often deserted when they have lost their pay, and are indebted to the company, which gaming is frequently the cause of.

Take care your army never wants bread; other necessaries of life will follow of course; for as all victuals in an army are paid for in ready money, butchers, bakers, wine merchants, &c. will flock to you. But you must make your communications with your magazines as secure as possible, and have them in more places than one, that if one should be cut off, others may supply you.

It is of the greatest importance that your soldiers be instructed in the best and most adroit method of loading and firing their firelocks. Without this their manual exercise is but ornament and shew. The French do not cut the neck from their ball, but tie their cartridge to it as it comes from the mould: the paper being thin, when the cartridge is uncapp'd and put into the barrel, the bullet at the end of it, by a stamp of the piece, and the weight of the ball, drives down the paper, so that the firelock is charged and wadded expeditiously, and without drawing the rammer. This seems worthy of imitation.

At the same time that you are obliged to punish your soldiers with severity, take care not to lose their affections.

Let none fear you but the enemy, and the evil doers: get that respect from the rest of your troops which is consistent with their love.

See that there be subordination in your army; for he that knows not how to obey, will not know how to command.

Carefully find out and imitate what the soldiery esteemed in your predecessor, and avoid what they disliked in him.

* There are many instances where battles have been lost by not observing this maxim.

Let not any pique or ill-will to your superior officer divert you from doing all the real service you can to your country.

Regulate all your actions by a strict regard to your duty.

Instead of wishing for a war that you may make a greater figure, endeavour nothing so much as the good and tranquillity of your country.

Be more anxious to gain the love of your troops, than to heap up riches ; and spare not one to gain the other.

In a word, do every thing for the good of the soldier, that is consistent with your service to your Country.

It is better to march up to the enemy, than to expect them ; and endeavour to move up to them in good order before they are ready to receive you : charge them briskly, and let your artillery keep a continual fire on them : attack their squadrons in flank by small detached bodies ; and never attack a squadron without breaking or putting it in disorder.

You must be ready at all times to succour and refresh your troops who seem to be most fatigued ; and take care that those who are repulled do not put your second line into disorder. For this end make large interval in the second line, by doubling the files of each battalion.

You must not march too far forward, nor separate your troops in the pursuit of the enemy, unless the victory is fully declared for you ; and even then it is best to keep your troops together, and in good order, as much as possible.

In the rear of the regiments you post your surgeons, and some officers, to take care of the wounded.

If you are beaten, assemble your troops where they may be in safety ; let your militia betake themselves to arms ; furnish your strong places well, and the posts and passes of your frontier ; break down your bridges ; stop up your ways, by cutting, or laying great trees cross them.

Put your army immediately in good order and reinforce it,

THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN GERMANY.

(Continued from page 224.)

DAUN never was more cautious than after a fortunate event. He now fortified himself in an almost impregnable situation, and neglected every measure to hurt the King. Frederic made good use of that precious time. He pro-

cured in haste from Dresden, as well as from the army of Prince Henry, ammunition and provisions, ordered new transports, and was joined by a reinforcement of 6000 men, which Prince Henry sent him, and made preparations to march to Silesia. He said; "Daun has let us escape; the game is not lost; let us take repose for some days, and then march to free Neisse." But there were yet many obstacles to surmount. The camp was full of sick and wounded, for whose safety they had to provide. Saxony was to be covered, the field bakery taken care of, and the enemy, who occupied the roads to Silesia, was, by countermarches, to be deluded. All this was executed, and on the 25th of October, eleven days after the battle, Frederic was again on his march to Silesia, with such advantages, that Daun himself gave up all hope to prevent it. He however detached a strong corps after the King, to throw at least some difficulties in his way. Laudon shewed in this expedition his skill. Sometimes he threw light troops into hollow ways, in order to obstruct the Prussians; sometimes he cannonaded them from advantageous situations; sometimes he burst like a stream from out of the forests, attacking the marching enemy. But nothing essential was thereby gained; a few Prussian pontoons and baggage waggons only were taken.

The Austrian General, Harsh, besieged Neisse, which, like all Prussian forts, was weakly garrisoned, on account of the troops being wanted in the field. The hope of conquering that important place was great, on account of the King's absence. By the battle of Hochkirk, the loss of Neisse seemed to be inevitable. To dislodge a besieging army is the natural consequence of a victory, or other fortunate events; but that Frederic, after being beaten, surrounded by large armies, at the distance of near 200 miles, could hasten to the assistance of Neisse, was an event that surpassed the expectations of all Europe. After a march of 13 days, he arrived on the 5th of November, three miles distant from that fort. More was not requisite, to gain the end; for on the same day Harsh raised the siege, left a large quantity of ammunition and provisions behind, and retired to Moravia. He had blockaded that place since the 4th of August, and bombarded it since the 5th of October; but all his attacks became nugatory by the gallant defence of the garrison.

The fortress of Cosel, which was hitherto blockaded by the Austrians, was also freed, and Silesia evacuated by the enemy. The campaign was at an end in this province, but in Saxony, where Daun remained with the main army, and which was but weakly covered, this General hoped to make important conquests before the winter. All Europe looked for the fruits of the victory of Hochkirk, of which no sign had yet appeared. They were however not backward in forming plans. Dresden, Leipzig, and Torgau, were to be taken by different corps at one time. Daun himself approached the capital. There was but a small corps of Prussians in Saxony, under the command of General Fink, but great activity reigned among them. They took the most effectual measures against the great superiority of the enemy, and reinforced the garrison of Dresden. The Commandant, General Smettau, was now under the sorrowful necessity of burning the suburbs, which were, from their manner of building, equal to the most magnificent cities of Europe.

Daun made preparations to besiege Dresden in the regular way; but the bad news from Silesia, the raising of the siege of Neisse, the retreat of the Austrians to Moravia, and Frederic's march towards Saxony, again made his plan nugatory. He retired. In the Austrian account of that event, it is said, that from a certain important reason the plan was altered. But that important reason was nothing else than Frederic's approach. The plans upon Torgau and Leipzig met with the same fate. Both these places were relieved by the Prussian Generals Dohna and Wedel. Nothing remained to the Austrians and the troops of the Empire, but to march to Bohemia; even the fort of Sonnenstein was given up. Daun endeavoured to divide his armies in their winter quarters in such a manner as to form an enormous chain of troops, such as never was heard of in Europe. It commenced on the frontiers of Silesia and Saxony, and ended on the confines of Switzerland.

The Russians, who after the battle of Zorndarf were somewhat relieved by Frederic's absence, resolved to besiege Colberg. The sea port of that place promised them on account of the transports great advantage, and from the weakness of the garrison, they expected an easy conquest. The fate of all Pomerania depended upon 700 men militia under the command of a major of invalids of which the garrison

son of Colberg was composed. But the commandant Hayden, was not of the common class of warriors. He took the best measures for defence and displayed great courage and resolution. General Palmbael besieged the fort with 10,000 Russians, and after five days the covered way was in his hands. The conquest now seemed to be certain, but the valour, of the commandant and his armed citizens, put a stop to all farther progress. The besiegers were daily reinforced from their main army, and renewed then their attacks with fresh troops. But they could not succeed and were after a 19 days siege compelled to retire. The Russians, after this miscarriage evacuated Pomerania and Brandenburg, taking their winter quarters in Poland and Prussia.

The operations of the Swedes were in this campaign as insignificant as in the preceding. In the month of october whilst Brandenburg was totally without troops, they marched towards Berlin, and were but 20 miles from it when General Wedel with a small corps advanced and made them retreat. The Prussians did not stop till they had driven the enemy under the cannon of Stralsund.

The campaign was now every where at an end. In the midst of December there were no more enemies in Silesia, Saxony, Brandenburg and Pomerania. Frederic, beaten in October, was now master of Saxony of the rivers Elbe and Oder. In the space of seven weeks he marched from Saxony to Silesia, thence back to Saxony and again to Silesia; during which time the forts of Neise, Cosel, Dresden, Leipzig, Torgau and Colberg were freed from their besiegers. If these operations astonished people ignorant in tactics, they surprised still more the warriors who knew the difficulties of such continued movements in their full extent. The Austrians in Moravia and Bohemia were now making new plans; the Russians in Poland and Prussia endeavoured to fill their Magazines; the troops of the Empire in their winter quarters in the heart of Germany enjoyed rest; and the Swedes, who now saw their own part of Pomerania in the hands of the Prussians did not think themselves secure under the cannon of Stralsund.

This year's campaign of the allies against the French, was also very remarkable; at the beginning of the year Richelieu was obliged to yield the chief command to the Count of Clermont. This commander was a clergyman,

who never had seen an army, even not at a review. This choice of a commander surprized all Europe, and Frederic said on receiving the news: "I hope the archbishop of Paris will soon relieve him."

Clermont found the troops, confided to him in the most deplorable situation; he made to his King the following singular report: "I have found your Majesty's army divided into three very different parties. The one is above ground, clothed in rags and composed of thieves and marauders; the second party is below ground, and the third in the hospitals;" he therefore begged for orders, whether to lead the first back to their own country, or whether to stay till they were united with the two latter parties.

The Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick gave him no time to mend his situation: he advanced towards Hanover. The French fled in every direction, leaving their cannon and baggage behind. At Hoya on the Weser, they made a stand, but the hereditary Prince now reigning Duke of Brunswick, after a lively engagement routed them and made 1500 prisoners. This was the first action of that young prince, who soon after was ranked among the first generals of the age. The French retired over the Rhine:

As soon as the troops, during the short winter quarters, had refreshed themselves, Duke Ferdinand opened the campaign with the design to carry the war into France, but as the French army was advantageously posted on the banks of the Rhine, the passing of that large river was connected with extraordinary difficulties. They however were by prudent measures surmounted, and the allied army effected in the night of the first of June a passage over the Rhine near Cleves. Clermont with his far superior army strongly intrenched himself near Rhinefelden. Nothing remained to Ferdinand but to manœuvre the enemy from out of their strong camp. In this he succeeded and a few days after he attacked the whole French army, in the plains of Crefeld. The battle was obstinate and bloody, but the French were forced to retreat with the loss of 7500 men. The allies counted 1500 wounded and dead.

The consequence of this victory, was the siege of Dusseldorf, where the French had their head quarters. On the 8th day the place was surrendered, and the conquerors obtained an enormous quantity of ammunition, cannon and pro-

visions. This new loss caused disquietude in France; the Bastille became filled and Clermont was recalled. The command on the Rhine was now given to the experienced Marshal of Contades, and Soubise received orders to penetrate at any hazard into Heflia. Ferdinand being distant, they counted upon an easy conquest of that province, which likewise would draw the army of the allies from the Rhine. Soubise advanced, and though his van was beaten by the Hessian Militia, he penetrated with 30,000 men into the heart of the province, which now again experienced all the hardships of war.

England was by the battle of Crefeld and Ferdinand's progress on the Rhine determined to combat the French by land as well as by sea. Parliament resolved to send 18,000 men to Germany. If this had been done sooner, Ferdinand would have been able to maintain himself on the other side of the Rhine. But now his situation was critical, he had an army of 80,000 men under the command of an experienced general against him; provisions began to fail and a long continued rain had ruined the roads and made the rivers overflow. Hanover which was threatened by Soubise, was in need of immediate assistance; and the English troops, which were to land in the north of Germany, and could easily be cut off, required protection. These considerations compelled Ferdinand to recross the Rhine; but the difficulties of effecting this were great, the enemy being in the vicinity with a powerful army. The allies erected a bridge near Rees, which general Imhof was to protect with 3000 men. A French corps of 10,000 men attacked him, and Ferdinand not being able to send any assistance, he was left to his own valour. His camp was covered by ditches and hedges. The enemy was unacquainted with the ground, and Imhof, not waiting their attack, advanced and in less than half an hour routed them. They left eleven cannon, their waggons, ammunition, and 300 prisoners behind. Such was the hurry of that French corps, so much superior in number, that on the way most of them threw away their arms. On the road to Wesel above 2000 muskets were found.

Insignificant as this event was in so bloody and active a war, yet it had the same effect as the most signal victory; for it decided the fate of the large magazine at Emmeric and the pontoon bridge, without which it would have been im-

possible for Ferdinand to cross the Rhine. On the 10th of July the whole allied army passed the river, and General Imhof was soon after detached with a corps to meet the English troops, who had landed at Emden. They formed a junction at Crefeld.

Ferdinand, in order to give some rest to his troops, took advantageous positions, on the river Lippe, whereby he covered Hanover. General Oberg was to cover Heflia with 20,000 men. He occupied a strong camp near Sandershausen, and did every thing to provoke Soubise, who with 30,000 men stood opposite him, to an attack. The latter avoided it, and endeavoured to gain Oberg's rear. This drew Oberg out of his camp, who was now attacked on all sides by the superior enemy near Lutternberg. The Hessians defended themselves bravely, and forced the enemy's infantry to retreat, but were in the moment of victory taken in flank and rear by the French cavalry. The want of horse in the Hessian army augmented this misfortune, and compelled them to retreat, with the loss of 1500 men dead and wounded, besides 28 cannon.

This victory procured Soubise the Marshall staff. He now began to make inroads into the neighbouring provinces, and to exact heavy contributions. Ferdinand's marches and positions, however, prevented their making farther progress. The French evacuating Heflia, both parties went into winter quarters. The French under Contades between the Meuse and the Rhine, and those under Soubise along the borders of the Rhine and the Mayne. The allies occupied Heflia and Westphalia.

(1759.) The belligerent powers made preparations for a new campaign. Frederic resolved to act on the defensive, without however neglecting an opportunity to make himself formidable. During this winter, the Polish Prince Sulkowsky took, without respect to the neutrality of the republic of Poland, an active part in the war. He raised troops, and erected magazines for the Russians. To Frederic's representations he gave haughty answers, continuing zealously his preparations to the advantage of the Russians. He resided in the town of Reisen, in Poland, at a considerable distance from the frontiers of Silesia. He had soldiers and cannon of his own, and besides thought himself protected by his republic. But Frederic, without any political considerations, detached

General Woberfnow with a corps to Poland. Reifen was surprized without a shot, the Prince taken prisoner, and his soldiers disarmed. The magazines were ruined, and all cannon, horses, waggons, and ammunition carried to Silesia. The soldiers were forced into the Prussian service, and the Prince was sent to the fort of Glogau, where he remained prisoner to the end of the war. Another ally of that kind was a newspaper writer at Erlangen, who relying on his sovereign, had in his papers declared war against the Prussians. His papers were filled with lies and scurrility. A Prussian officer took upon himself to chastise this newspaper hero. He took with him two corporals, and after having in a military manner applied to his back a good portion of strokes, he forced the patient to give a formal receipt in writing for the number of strokes received.

The Prussian troops never were more active than during this winter. They took Erfurt, destroyed a number of magazines, and beat a strong corps of the Austrians. Prince Henry, the severity of the season, and the sterility of the mountains notwithstanding, advanced into Bohemia, forced the passes, and dispersed the enemy. General Halseu defeated the Austrian General Reinhard, made 2000 prisoners, and took large magazines. Against the troops of the Empire also diversions were made from Saxony. Prince Henry detached into Franconia several corps, and the troops of the Empire fled. The Swedes also had no rest during this winter. Five places which they had occupied were taken from them, with 2700 prisoners, and a large quantity of provisions and warlike stores.

The Russians, during this time, had assembled in Poland, threatening the Prussian States with a new attack. Frederic detached towards them a strong corps under Dohna, in order, if not to prevent, at least to make difficult their march. Want of subsistence compelled the Prussians to draw towards the river Oder, and the Russians, from the same reason, followed them thither. Field Marshal Zoltikow was now in Fermor's place, who had resigned the command. Frederic, being discontented with Dohna, gave the command to General Wedel, who was totally unacquainted with the strength of his enemy, and with their manner of fighting. He however had strict orders to attack the Russians without delay, if he could not prevent their junction with the Austrians by other

means. Laudon was for that purpose on the march with 30,000 men. Wedel soon came to an engagement with the Russians, who were much superior, and with considerable loss forced him to retreat. Nothing now prevented the Austrian and Russian armies from joining. They fortified themselves, 80,000 strong, on the borders of the Oder. Wedel did all in his power to make their passage over this river difficult.

The King had contented himself with acting on the defensive in Saxony. He remained encamped for some time near Landshut, in order to wait a favourable opportunity. Daun, who with the main army was encamped opposite him, was also waiting a favourable opportunity to advance, or to engage. To delude this hope, and to drive the Austrians into Bohemia, the King did all he could to make their subsistence difficult. But the march of the Russians altered the plan entirely.

The unfortunate battle near Zullichau disposed the king to hasten to his States of Brandenburg. Henry detached a great part of his army from Saxony to reinforce that on the Oder, and went himself to Silesia, to take the command of the army that Frederic had left behind. Even the corps under General Fink received orders to march to the Oder.

Frederic's march was successful. Near Guben he met with an Austrian corps under General Haddick, which he attacked, made 2000 prisoners, and took 500 waggons with flour; after which he formed a junction with Wedel's army.

He resolved without delay to give battle. His army was 40,000 and that of the Russians and Austrians above 70,000 strong. The latter stood between Frankfort and Kunnerdorf upon heights in an intrenched camp, defended by an enormous artillery. Their right wing was covered by the Oder, and their left by swamps and hedges. Before the front there were ditches and broken ground. All those advantages notwithstanding the King resolved, to attack them on the 12th of August. He formed his army in a wood, whence his line attacked the enemy's left in columns, with great impetuosity. It was Frederic's plan to attack the enemy at once in the flanks and in front and rear. But he was not well enough acquainted with the ground. The march of his troops was interrupted by unexpected great ditches. They made great round about ways, whereby the troops became fatigued, and the precious time lost. At last the

Prussians approached the Russian entrenchments, and cannonaded them briskly from three batteries, which the Russians answered by an hundred cannon, from their left wing. The King ordered an assault on the batteries. The grenadiers worked themselves through barricadoes, advanced through broken ground, and at last gained the heights, whence the Russians made a murderous fire. They however did not lose courage, mounted the batteries and drove the enemy from their intrenchment. The whole left wing of the Russians fled, leaving all their artillery behind. Victory seemed to be decided, and couriers were already dispatched from the field of battle to Berlin and Silesia, when all at once the fate of war turned in the most extraordinary manner.

The Prussian infantry had done all, but the victory could not be pursued, as the Prussian cavalry was on the other wing, and the cannon could not follow so quick. At last they brought some cannon upon the heights, but too few in number to accomplish the defeat. Meanwhile the King advanced with the other wing towards the Russians. The same did the corps of Gen. Fink. But their march was every moment impeded by the badness of the ground. The troops had sometimes to pass over small bridges, sometimes to go round large ditches. The Russians made use of that delay, assembling and bringing their heavy artillery to bear. Laudon, who had not yet taken any part in the combat now put his troops in motion. The King ordered his cavalry to advance, which under the lead of Seidlitz passed between the ditches, formed under the Russian cannon fire, and advanced, but the stream of grape-shot was too incessant from the Russian line, that it stretched whole platoons of man and horse to the ground, put the courageous cavalry into confusion, and forced them to retreat.

However the Prussians had not lost any thing yet. The Russians, being pressed together 80 and 100 men deep, formed a chaos; but that chaos, was covered by fifty cannon. The Prussians were fatigued in the extreme by a march of almost 40 miles, by their great exertions and the intense heat of the day. The battle was gained and the loss of the Russians so great, that in all probability they would retreat during the night. But Frederic was of opinion, that the Russian army should not only be beaten, but totally annihilated, as they always returned to renew their devastations. The Prus-

sian generals, amongst whom was Seidlitz, represented to the King the extreme fatigue of the troops, and the King was on the point of desisting from any further operation, when an other general approached, whose opinion the King asked, and who, being a courtier, agreed with the King, to continue the battle. March! was now the order.

To complete the victory it was necessary to conquer a height called the Spizberg. This height was extremely steep and occupied by Laudon's best troops. The Prussians endeavoured to climb up the hill, but whoever reached the summit met with immediate death. All courage availed nothing. The incessant fire of the Russians and Austrians fell like a torrent upon the Prussians, and stretched every thing to the ground. Frederic exposed himself to the greatest danger, but all attempts to drive the enemy from the heights were fruitless. The troops came into disorder, and now Laudon, advanced from behind the right wing with fresh troops, and attacked the Prussians in flank and rear. The battle was soon after decided.

Frederic's fortitude was never more shaken, than on that unfortunate day. In a few hours, the fate of war precipitated him from the height of victory into a complete defeat. His lively imagination painted to him in the first moments, the consequences of this event, in a terrible light. From the same field of battle whence a few hours before he dispatched couriers with the news of victory, he now sent orders to Berlin, to remove the royal family, the archives, and every thing valuable. Nothing he thought could hinder the enemy from marching to his residence. His troops were dispersed in such a manner, that the day after the battle he had but about 5000 men together. Not only all the cannon taken from the Russians, but also an hundred of those of the Prussians were lost. General Wunsch, who commanded a small corps of Prussians on the other side of the Oder, had arrived towards the end of the battle, at Frankfort, and had taken the Russian garrison prisoners; but the battle being lost he was obliged to withdraw. The approaching night was favourable to the King. He retreated with his army, and gained some heights, which the enemy did not venture to attack.

This battle was the most murderous that had hitherto been fought. The Prussians had 8000 dead, and above 12,000

wounded, of which however a few only were taken prisoners. Almost all the Prussian Generals and officers of rank were wounded. The Russians had, according to their own account, 16,000 dead and wounded. General Soltikow, in giving to the Empress of Russia information of the battle, says, "Your Majesty will not be astonished at the great loss, knowing that the King of Prussia feels his defeats always very dear. If I gain another such victory, I shall be obliged to bring myself an account of it, with a stick in my hand, to Peterfburg."

The day after the battle, Frederic passed the Oder, assembled his scattered troops, formed a junction with Wunsh, called General Kleist with 5000 men from Pomerania, and procured in haste cannon from his arsenals. The Russians, who, his defeat notwithstanding, were afraid of him, entrenched themselves. The King, by a speech to his troops, again inspired them with courage; and in a few weeks Berlin was out of danger, his army provided with every thing, and reinforced in such a manner, that the Electorate of Hanover could be covered, and General Wunsh was able to march with his troops to Silesia.

(*To be continued.*)



ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF CUDALORE, IN THE EAST INDIES, IN THE YEAR. 1782.

(*Written by an Hanoverian Officer.*)

ON the morning of the 13th of June before day-break, the whole army formed into lines. The second was composed chiefly of battalions of seapoys, some of which were placed between the European regiments according to the custom in India. We, Hanoverians, took post with the 101st regiment in the centre, under the brigade of Colonel *Elphinston*. The 78th regiment, and three regiments of seapoys, were on our right, under the brigade of Colonel *Stewart*, the 73d, the Madras regiment, and three battalions of seapoys, were to our left, under Colonel *Gordon*; and to cover the whole left flank, Colonel *Kelly* was placed with three battalions of seapoys, from the Grenadier corps of Colonel *Cathcart*.

We were under arms the evening before, and mustered by

General *Bruce*, who was lately come from Europe, and had served in the American war. On both wings, were well occupied batteries of eighteen pounders, as well as in the centre, where the head quarters were.

The first attack was made, about five in the morning after the whole army had advanced in front: however, a small wood of cocoa trees separated us from the enemy. The canonade soon became general, with very brisk firing; after a few hours, several French batteries, on both the wings were taken.

We were forced to advance with the 101st regiment, and a battalion of seapoys, about ten in the morning, under the batteries of the head quarters, where we stood above two hours, exposed to a very heavy fire of the enemy's cannon, as well as musketry: we did not, however, suffer much on this occasion, as their batteries were pointed too high. At one o'clock, we received orders to storm the largest French redoubt, which was opposite to one of our batteries, that mounted 21 guns. The men had first some rum and biscuit distributed among them, and afterwards a signal from head-quarters was made to begin the storm.

We advanced in front with the usual march, until we came near the small wood, where we took our fuzees in the right hand, and held them *en balance*, hastening forward, with quick steps, through the wood, which was intersected with ditches and barricadoes. The heat on that day, as well as the fire from the musketry, and which we were in the reach of, was intolerable. Not only cannon balls, but twigs and branches, which were torn by them from the trees, were continually showering down upon us. Whole ranks dropped down at once, either dead or wounded.

One of the first who was killed, was our worthy friend, Major *Varenius*: and, at his side, fell lieutenant M——. However we got through the wood, behind which at about 40 paces distant, was the above mentioned battery called *Siegtum*, which kept up a very brisk firing upon us; but to the unspeakable astonishment of us all, we saw the 101st regiment had not advanced with us; and that we, Hanoverians, were left quite alone, exposed to the fire of the enemy.

Our men, however, were extremely resolute. When we came out of the wood we were obliged to form afresh. The French were entrenched up to their chin; we, however,

now kept up a regular and brisk firing, and then advanced, with fixed bayonets, until we came up to the parapet.

The great superiority in numbers of the enemy, prevented the success of our first attack; but, as we retreated in good order, to the wood, and formed again, we attempted a second, although we had been pursued by some hundreds of the French, who annoyed us very much as we fell back.

With the assistance of a battalion of sepoy, we renewed the attack, with an intrepidity that entirely deranged the enemy; who, on their commanding officer being shot, quitted the fort, and retreated, with the utmost precipitation, to Cudalore.

We took possession of it, with 17 pieces of cannon, and some artillerymen, who were wounded; we also found many killed. The troops in the fort consisted of 1,500 men, belonging to the regiments of *La Marc* and *Austrasia*.

Such was the end of that memorable hot day. We also got possession of that important redoubt at Bondsbridge. Our killed and wounded amounted to near 300; among the latter of which were ten Hanoverian officers.

A N E C D O T E S.

F I R M N E S S.

AT a skirmish near Saratoga, a Bat-man of General Frazer's rescued from the Indians an officer of the Americans, one Captain Van Swearingham, of Colonel Morgan's Virginia rifle-men; they were on the point of stripping him, which the man prevented, and recovered his pocket-book from them containing all his papers of consequence, and his commission.

The Bat-man brought him up to Gen. Frazer who interrogated him concerning the enemy, but could obtain no other answer, than that the American army was commanded by Generals Gates, and Arnold. General Frazer, exceedingly provoked that he could gain no intelligence, told him if he did not immediately inform him as to the exact situation of the enemy, he would hang him up directly;

the officer, with the most undaunted firmness, replied, "You may if you please." The general perceiving he could make nothing of him, rode off, leaving him in the custody of Lieutenant Dunbar of the artillery.

HEROISM.

IN the course of the action of Saratoga, Lieutenant Hervey, of the British, a youth of sixteen, and nephew to Gen. Hervey, received several wounds, and was repeatedly ordered off the field by Col. Anstruther; but his ardor would not allow him to quit the battle, while he could stand and see his brave lads fighting beside him. A ball striking one of his legs, his removal became absolutely necessary, and while they were conveying him away, another wounded him mortally. In this situation the surgeon recommended him to take a powerful dose of opium, to avoid a seven or eight hours life of most exquisite torture: this he immediately consented to, and when the Colonel entered the tent with major Harnage, who were both wounded, they asked whether he had any affairs they could settle for him? "His reply was, that being a minor, every thing was already adjusted;" but he had one request, which he had just life enough to utter "Tell my uncle I died like a Soldier!"

THE Prussian Field Marshal *Schwerin*, died, as is well known, the death of a hero, in the battle near Prague. His body after the battle, was carried to a neighbouring convent, where soon after, appeared Princes, Generals, and officers of all ranks of the Prussian army, to pay the last respect to this immortal General. They entered the room where the lifeless corps was lying—and, impelled by a profound respect, all, at once, pulled off their hats, as if this great man *still was present*, and alive; and seemed to wait, as if they were still expecting his orders. The monks of the convent, though, less moved at it, admired with a silent attention, the great impression, which true greatness and merit must make on noble minds, when even the view of a dead body could inspire so much veneration.

THE AMERICAN WAR.

(Continued from page 186.)

CAMPAIGN, OF 1777 IN THE NORTH.

TO effect a free communication, between New-York and Canada, and to maintain the navigation of the Lakes, was a principal object with the British, for the campaign of 1777. An expedition in that quarter had been projected, by the British ministry, as the most effectual method that could be taken, to crush the colonies at once. They considered the New-England people, to be the soul of the confederacy, and promised themselves much by severing them from all free communication with the neighbouring states. They hoped, when this was accomplished, to be able to surround them so effectually with fleets and armies, and Indian allies, as to compel their submission.

For this purpose an army of 4000 British and 3000 German troops, exclusive of the corps of artillery, were put under the command of General Burgoyne. Their train of artillery was perhaps the finest, that had ever been allotted to second the operations of an equal force. Gen. Burgoyne was furnished with picked and experienced officers. The most eminent of these were Gen. Philips, Frazer, Powal, and Hamilton; the German generals, Riedesel, and Specht. This large body of veteran troops, was to be kept together as much as possible. In order to produce this effect, the inhabitants of Canada, were commanded to furnish men sufficient to occupy the woods on the frontiers, to prevent desertion, to procure intelligence, and to intercept all communication between the Americans and the malcontents in the province. They were also required to provide men, for the completion of the fortifications, at Sorel, St. John's, Chamblee, and Isle Aux Noix, for the carriage of provisions, artillery, and stores, and for making roads. Gen. Carleton was ordered to use his interest with the Indians, to persuade them to join in this expedition.

The Americans had been early attentive to their security in that quarter. Ticonderoga is situated on the western shore, a few miles to the northward of that narrow inlet, which unites Lake George, with Lake Champlain. Crown Point lies more northward than Ticonderoga, and is situate on an

angle of land washed on two sides by water flowing over rocks. A deep morass covered the third side, except in a small part, where formerly the French had erected lines, and which still continued. These the Americans had strengthened by additional works. Opposite to Ticonderoga, on the eastern shore the Americans had with great industry fortified a high hill called Mount Independence. On the top of it, which is flat, a star-fort had been erected, containing extensive barracks well supplied with artillery. The mount ain stretched in a sloping direction into the water, strongly intrenched to its base, supplied with heavy artillery. Midway up the mountain, another battery was erected to cover the lower works. With infinite labour the Americans had united Ticonderoga and Mount Independence by a strong bridge of communications over the inlet. Twenty-two sunken piers supported the bridge, at equal distances. Between the piers, floats were placed, fastened together with chains and rivets, and bound to the sunken piers. On the Lake Champlain side of the bridge, a boom, composed of very large timber, was erected, fastened together by rivetted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and half square. They strengthened Fort Schuyler and erected other fortifications, near the Mohawk River, requisitions were made by the commanding officer, in the department for 13,600 men, as necessary for the security of this district. The adjacent states were urged to be in readiness for an active campaign.

Col. St. Leger, with a body of light troops and Indians amounting to between seven and eight hundred men, having been previously detached by the way of Lake Ontario, and the Mohawk river, in order to make a diversion in favour of the British army, General Burgoyne set out from St. John's on the sixteenth of June, 1777. The naval force, under the command of Commodore Lutwych, preceded the army, and opened the way for its advances, detachments of Indians having been previously made from the river Bouquet. Their fleet proceeded without any opposition, and under its protection the troops were landed about the middle of June, and encamped at a small distance from Crown Point, on the north side.

At this place General Burgoyne thought proper to give the Indians a war feast, and to make a speech to them. The

purport of it was, to induce them to refrain from cruelty, and to mitigate their natural ferocity.

Gen. Burgoyne, before he advanced to Ticonderoga, issued a manifesto, in which, with an ill judged policy, he threatened to punish, with the utmost severity, those who refused to attach themselves to the British cause, magnifying at the same time the ferocity of the savages. Having remained at Crown Point a few days, the whole army proceeded to Ticonderoga.

This place, notwithstanding its apparent strength, had one disadvantage to contend with. To the southward of the bridge of communications, which effectually prevented any attack by water from the northern side, was a hill called Sugar Hill, which overlooked and commanded both the works at Ticonderoga and on Mount Independence. This hill the Americans were unable to fortify, on account of the want of men; Gen. St. Clair, who commanded at Ticonderoga, not having above 3000 men.

The British army advanced with great circumspection and prudence on both sides of the lake, the fleet keeping in the centre till the army had enclosed the Americans on the land side. The royal army proceeded with great expedition in constructing works necessary for the investment of that place. By the 5th of July these works were completed, and a road made to the top of Sugar Hill for the construction of a battery there. In these circumstances Gen. St. Clair resolved to evacuate the post. The situation of this officer was embarrassing. Such was the confidence of the States in the fancied strength of this post, and of the supposed superiority of force for its defence, that the retreat without risking an action, could not fail of drawing on him the execration of the multitude. To stand still, and, by suffering himself to be surrounded, to risk his whole army for a single post, was contrary to the true interest of the States. In this trying situation, with the unanimous approbation of a council of war, he adopted the resolution of sacrificing personal reputation to save his army. In consequence of this determination, the retreating army embarked as much of their baggage and stores as they had any prospect of saving, on board batteaux, and dispatched them, under the convoy of five armed galleys, to Skenesborough. The army took the Castle-Town road, in order to reach Skenesborough by land. The dawn of day,

on the 6th of July, discovered this retreat. The British immediately began removing the immense work of framed timber sunk in the water, and, after having cleared their way, pursued the Americans with a brigade of gun-boats. They came up with them near the falls of Skenesborough, engaged and captured some of the largest gallies, obliging the Americans to set the others on fire, together with a considerable number of their batteaux. The grand division of the army under General Burgoyne, in gun-boats and two frigates, followed and landed at South Bay. The Americans, after setting fire to their works, left Skenesborough. Gen. Fraser, at the head of the advanced corps, pressed hard upon the rear of that division of the Americans which had taken the route of Hubberton, and which he overtook at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July. He attacked the Americans, who maintained their post with great resolution.

Victory for a long time was doubtful, but the arrival of a reinforcement under the German General Riedesel decided the fate of the day. The Americans, after sustaining considerable loss, were obliged to give way.

The destruction of the gallies and batteaux of the Americans, and the defeat of their rear, obliged General St. Clair to turn off from Castleton to the left, fearful of being intercepted at Fort Anne. After a distressing march of seven days, he joined General Schuyler at Fort Edward. In the mean time a party of the Americans took the road by Wood Creek, in order to proceed beyond Fort Anne. The ninth regiment of the British having been detached to take post near that fort, overtook them. A warm engagement immediately commenced, which, with various success, lasted above two hours, but at last the Americans, after setting fire to Fort Anne, were obliged to retreat to Fort Edward. The combined strength of this place did not exceed four thousand four hundred men, including militia.

The artillery lost, by the evacuation of the northern posts, and taken or destroyed in the armed vessels at Skenesborough, amounted to 128 pieces. The loss of provisions was also very considerable.

Such was the rapid torrent of success, which in this period of the campaign swept away all opposition from before the Royal army. They were highly elated with their good

fortune; considered their toils to be nearly at an end; Albany to be within their grasp, and the conquest of the adjacent provinces reduced to a certainty. Before we proceed, it may not be improper to relate here a well contrived stratagem. General Schuyler took out of a canteen, with a false bottom, a letter from a person in the interest of the Americans to Gen. Sullivan, and prepared an answer to it, drawn up in such a strain as to perplex and distract Gen. Burgoyne, and leave him in doubt what course to follow. This letter, which fell, as was intended, into the British General's hands, had the desired effect; for he was completely duped and puzzled by it for several days, and at a loss whether to advance or retreat.

General Burgoyne, after remaining some days at Skeneborough, left that place with an intention of taking the road that leads to Hudson's river, and thence to Albany, in order to open a communication with Lake George, on which he had embarked the heavy artillery and baggage. In this undertaking the difficulties which the royal army had to encounter were infinite;* but all obstacles were surmounted so that after making every exertion possible, it reached Fort Edward, on Hudson's river, the 30th of July.

Gen. Schuyler, who at this time commanded the Northern American army, had posted himself, immediately after the affair of Hubbardton, as already observed, at Fort Edward. On the advance of the British army he retreated down Hudson's river to Saratoga, where he issued a proclamation calculated to counteract the effect intended to be produced by the manifesto published by Gen. Burgoyne.

While the British were retarded in their advance by the combined difficulties of nature and of art, events took place, which proved the wisdom and propriety of the retreat from Ticonderoga. The army saved by that means, was between the inhabitants and Gen. Burgoyne; this abated the panic of the people, and became a center of rendezvous for them to

* This general has, with much reason, been blamed for adopting this difficult and tardy mode of conduct; by returning to Ticonderoga, and embarking again on Lake George, he might have easily proceeded to Fort George, where there was a waggon road to the place of his destination, Fort Edward.

repair to : On the other hand, had they stood their ground at Ticonderoga, they must in the ordinary course of events, in a short time, either have been cut in pieces, or surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

While danger was remote, the pressing calls of Congress for the inhabitants to be in readiness to oppose a distant foe were unavailing; but no sooner had they recovered from the first impression of the general panic, than they turned out with an unexampled alacrity.

Where the Mohawk falls into the Hudson's river about 8 miles from Albany, is an Island in the shape of a half moon, called Stillwater. On this place General Schuyler, posted his army, in order to check the progress of Col. St. Leger, who, as already observed, had been detached by the way of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk river, to make a diversion in favour of the main army of the British. Gen. Burgoyne still remained in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward, where on account of the difficulty of bringing the stores from Fort Edward to Hudson's river, his army began to experience great hardships. At this juncture he received intelligence that Col. St. Leger had advanced up the St. Lawrence, and had commenced his operations against Stanwix, a Fort situate on a rising ground at the upper end of the Mohawk river. Gen. Burgoyne saw the necessity of co-operating with Col. St. Leger, and of making a rapid movement forward. The only difficulty was the want of provisions; and this it was proposed to remedy by reducing the American magazine at Bennington, a place about 20 miles from Hudson's river. On this expedition the German Col. Baum, was dispatched with about six hundred men, mostly Germans, including a detachment of Riedesel's dragoons. On the first day Baum, surprised a body of the Americans who had assembled for the purpose of opposing the progress of his detachment. On the second day's march he captured some cattle, and routed a small party of the Americans near a village called Cambridge. Here Baum was informed that the Americans were assembled from New-Hampshire, and the borders of Connecticut, for the defence of Bennington. He halted at Walloon Creek, and transmitted this intelligence to Gen. Burgoyne, who sent a detachment of five hundred Germans under the command of Col. Breyman to his assistance.

The American General Starke, with a body of one thousand men from New-Hampshire and Massachusetts, was at this period on his route to join Gen. Schuyler. Having received intelligence, however, of the approach of Colonel Baum, he altered his course and hastened towards Bennington, where joining the continental troops under Colonel Warner, he set out on the sixteenth of August, and by ten o'clock in the morning, surrounded Col. Baum, at St. Cojek's mill, on Walloon creek. The Americans commenced a furious attack on all sides, and forced their adversaries to retreat into the woods, leaving their commander mortally wounded on the field of battle. The savages who had accompanied Baum, retreated at the commencement of the engagement. Flushed with this victory, the Americans advanced against the detachment under Colonel Breyman, who ignorant of Baum's defeat, was advancing to his relief; but the obstacles which the roads presented, had retarded their progress. Breyman came up just in time to join the fugitives of Baum's detachment. The Americans began a vigorous attack on him and forced him to retreat. The loss of the British in these two actions, amounted to about 700 killed, wounded and taken prisoners. They also lost four brass field pieces, and four ammunition waggons. The loss of the Americans, inclusive of their wounded, was about 100 men.

Immediately after the defeat of Col. Baum, the royal army, which had advanced to Saratoga, drew back. In the mean time Col. St. Leger had commenced his attack upon Fort Stanwix, a small square log fort, with four bastions and a stockaded covered way, without any other out-works. It was defended by Colonels Gansevert and Willet, and 700 men. Col. St. Leger had received intelligence that one thousand Americans, under the command of General Harkimer, were advancing to the relief of the fort. He therefore dispatched a party of regulars, and a number of savages into the woods, to lay in ambush. The Americans advanced incautiously. An unexpected fire was poured upon them from behind trees and bushes, and the savages rushing from their concealment, made a dreadful slaughter. The Americans, though surprized, did not retreat precipitately, but recovered a rising ground, which enabled them, by a kind of running fight, to preserve part of their detachment. The besieged being informed of Harkimer's approach, made a sally

under Col. Willet, which was attended with some success. Having received, however, intelligence of the defeat of Harkimer, he and another officer undertook a very perilous expedition. They penetrated, during night, through the camp of the besiegers, and traversed a space of fifty miles, through deserts, woods and morasses, in order to bring relief to the fort. The besieged treated every proposal for a surrender with contempt. Col. St. Leger received information that General Arnold, with 2000 men, and ten pieces of cannon, was advancing rapidly to raise the siege. This produced an immediate effect on the savages. A large party of them departed, which made an immediate retreat necessary. The tents were left standing, and the artillery and stores fell into the possession of the garrison. General Arnold had advanced up the Mohawk river; but, in order to arrive more speedily at the place of his destination, he had left the main body, and moved rapidly forward with a body of about 900 men. He arrived at the fort two days after the siege had been raised. His assistance being now unnecessary, he returned with his army to reinforce General Gates, who had a short time before taken the command of the American army in the north.


The arrival of General Gates at the army had given fresh vigour to the exertions of the inhabitants. The militia, flushed with their recent victory at Bennington, collected in great numbers to his standard. A spirit of adventure burst forth in many different points of direction. While General Burgoyne was urging his preparations for advancing towards Albany, an enterprize was undertaken (Sept. 13) by Gen. Lincoln, to recover Ticonderoga and the other posts in the rear of the British army. He detached Col. Brown, with 500 men, to the landing at Lake George. The Colonel conducted his operations with so much address, that he surprized all the out-posts between the landing at the north end of Lake George, and the body of the Fort of Ticonderoga. He also took Mount Defiance and Mount Hope, the French lines, and a block-house, 200 batteaux, several gun-boats, and an armed sloop, together with 290 prisoners. However, Col. Brown and Col. Johnson, the latter of whom had been detached with 500 men to attempt Mount Independence, found that the reduction of either that post or of Ticonderoga, was beyond their ability.



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ACTION AT STILLWATER.

GENERAL Burgoyne having at last collected about thirty days provisions, and a bridge of boats being constructed in lieu of the bridge of rafts which had been carried away by incessant rains, his whole army crossed Hudson's river on the 13th and 14th of September, and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga, with a vast train of artillery. On the nineteenth of September, they advanced in front of the Americans at Stillwater. Their right wing was commanded by General Burgoyne, and covered by Gen. Frazer and Col. Breyman, with the grenadiers and light infantry, who were posted along some high grounds on the right. Their front and flanks were covered by Indians, Provincials, and Canadians. Their left wing and artillery were commanded by Generals Philips and Reidesel, who proceeded along the great road. The nature of the country preventing the Americans from beholding the different movements of the British army, they detached a body of five thousand men to attempt turning the right wing, and attacking Gen. Burgoyne in the rear. Being checked in their design by General Frazer, they made a rapid movement, which the peculiar situation of the country prevented from being discovered, and advanced to attack the British line on the right. The engagement began at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of September, and continued till after sun-set. The conflict was only partial for an hour and a half, but then it became general. A constant blaze of fire was kept up, and both armies seemed to be determined on death or victory.

The Americans were led to the battle by General Arnold, who distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner.

As day light closed, the Americans retired, leaving the British masters of the field of battle. The British lost upwards of 500 men, including their killed, wounded and prisoners. The Americans, inclusive of the missing, lost 319.

No solid advantages, however, resulted to the British troops from this encounter. The conduct of the Americans had fully convinced every one that they were able to sustain an attack in open plains with the intrepidity, the spirit and the coolness of veterans. For four hours they maintained a contest hand in hand, and when they retired, it was not be-

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cause they were conquered, but because the approach of night made a retreat to their camp, absolutely necessary.

This action though it decided nothing, was followed by important consequences. Of these one was the diminution of the zeal of the Indians in the British army. Fidelity and honour are but feeble motives in the minds of Savages. They had been disappointed in their hopes of plunder, and the check which the English had received at Bennington and Fort Stanwix, had chilled that ardour which they had at first manifested. They deserted Gen. Burgoyne in the season when their aid would have been most useful. Very little more perseverance was exhibited by the Canadians and other British provincials. They also abandoned the British standard, when they found, that instead of a flying and dispirited enemy, they had a numerous and resolute force opposed to them.

Both armies lay in sight of each other for some time, each fortifying their camp, in the strongest manner possible. This delay was extremely beneficial to the Americans, in as much as it enabled them to increase the number of men, and to obtain a powerful reinforcement of stores and provisions, from the Southern States.

From the commencement of the expedition, Gen. Burgoyne had promised himself a strong reinforcement from that part of the British army, which was stationed at New-York. He depended on its being able to force its way to Albany, and to join him there, or in the vicinity. With this expectation he had crossed Hudson's river and given up all communication with the lakes.

Such a diversion was indeed made about this time. Sir Henry Clinton conducted an expedition upon the Hudson's river. This consisted of about 3000 men, and was accompanied by a suitable naval force. They reduced the Forts, Clinton and Montgomery, in the lower parts of Hudson's river. The Americans destroyed Fort Constitution, and set fire to two new frigates, and some other vessels. Instead of pushing forward to Burgoyne's encampment or even to Albany, the British spent several days in laying waste the adjacent country. Gen. Tryon, destroyed a settlement called Continental Village, which contained barracks for 1500 men. Sir James Wallace, with a flying squadron of light frigates, and Gen. Vaughan, with a detachment

of land forces, continued on and near the river for several days, desolating the country near its margin; Gen. Vaughan so completely burned Esopus, a fine flourishing village, that a single house was not left standing, though on his approach the Americans had left the town, without making any resistance. While the British by these wanton devastations, were doing mischief to individuals without serving the cause of their royal master, they lost the precious time to bring Gen. Gates's army, by pushing forward, between two fires.

General Burgoyne's difficulties began to increase daily. The Americans had augmented their strength in such a manner as to render him diffident of the possibility of making good his retreat. His army was reduced to little more than 5000 men, who were limited to half the usual allowance of provisions. The stock of forage was entirely exhausted, and the horses were perishing in great numbers for the want of it. In addition to these circumstances, General Burgoyne had yet received no intelligence of the approach of General Clinton, or of the diversion which was to be made. Environed thus by difficulty and danger, he resolved to try the disposition of the Americans, to examine the possibility of advancing, and of dislodging them from their posts on the left, which would enable him to adopt the melancholy resource of retreating to the lakes. Pursuant to this determination, he detached a body of fifteen hundred men, which he headed himself, being attended by Generals Philips, Riedesel, and Fraser. The British camp was defended on the high grounds by Generals Hamilton and Specht; and the redoubts and parts adjacent to the river by brigadier Gell. This detachment had scarce formed, within less than half a mile of the American entrenchments, when the Americans made a furious attack on their left, where the grenadiers were posted. The Americans also made a movement round the right of the British, to prevent their retreat; but the British light infantry and the 24th regiment instantly formed, in order to frustrate the intentions of the Americans.

The British left wing in the mean time, was obliged to retreat, and would inevitably have been cut to pieces, but for the intervention of their light infantry, and the twenty-fourth regiment. The whole detachment was now under the necessity of retiring; with the loss of six pieces of artillery. Scarce had the British troops entered their

lines when they were again impetuously attacked by the Americans, who, notwithstanding a most heavy fire, began a furious assault upon their intrenchments. They were led by Gen. Arnold, who attacked Lord Balcarras's light infantry with great eagerness. The resistance was firm, and the engagement for a long while doubtful. A wound which Arnold received, at length gave the victory to the English, and the Americans were repulsed from this quarter. In another however, they were more successful. The intrenchments defended by the German troops under Colonel Breyman were carried sword in hand. The Colonel was killed, and his troops retreated, with the loss of all their baggage, artillery, &c. Night closed the dreadful scene. The British officers suffered this day more than their common proportion. Among their slain, were Gen. Frazer, Colonel Breyman; and several other officers of note, beside a considerable number of wounded. The Americans took upwards of two hundred officers and privates prisoners, besides nine pieces of brass artillery; and the encampment of the German brigade with all their equipage. But what was of the greatest consequence, they obtained from the spoils of the field, a large supply of ammunition, under a scarcity of which they had long laboured.

General Burgoyne was now most critically situated; he could not continue in his present position without a certainty of destruction; he therefore resolved to make a total and immediate change of position. With great secrecy and silence the whole army removed, with all their baggage and artillery to the heights above the hospital during the night. This movement reduced the Americans to the necessity of making a new disposition. On the succeeding day, the eighth of October, the British made several attempts to induce the Americans to hazard a battle. They were however ineffectual, and the whole day was occupied in continued skirmishes.

The Americans had refused to hazard a battle because they were preparing to carry measures into execution which would have immediately completed the ruin of the British army. These were to turn General Burgoyne's right, which if effected would have enclosed him on all sides. The British General, however discovered these intentions before they were carried into execution. An instant retreat there-

fore to Saratoga was now the only alternative left, which was effected without any obstruction on the part of the Americans, but it was impossible to carry off the sick and wounded from the hospital. General Gates, however, behaved with his wonted humanity, and the unfortunate tenants of the hospital were treated with all imaginable tenderness. When the British arrived at the fords of Fishkill Creek, which is somewhat towards the northward of Saratoga, they found the watchful Americans already occupying them, but on the approach of the retreating army, they retired over the river Hudson, to a larger force, which had been detached thither to obstruct the passage of the royal troops.

An attempt was now made to retreat to Fort George. Gen. Burgoyne detached a body of artificers under a strong escort before the army, in order to repair the bridges, and open the road to Fort Edward. The appearance of the Americans, however, prevented the artificers from effecting their purpose, and they were under the necessity of making a precipitate retreat, on account of the desertion of their escort. The Americans stretching along the farther shore of the river Hudson, annoyed the bateaux of the royal army in such a manner, that they were forced to land the provisions and convoy them to the camp up a steep hill; the Americans pouring, during the whole time, a most tremendous fire on the men employed in this service. Surrounded in this manner by destruction, Gen. Burgoyne resolved to attempt a retreat by night to Fort Edward, each soldier carrying his provisions on his back. Their artillery was to be left behind. But even this sad alternative was rendered impracticable. While the British army were preparing to march, they received information that their enemies had already possessed themselves of the road to Fort Edward, and that they were well provided with artillery.

The situation of the royal army had now attained the climax of difficulty and danger. Abandoned in the most critical moment, by their Indian allies, unsupported by their brethren in New-York, enervated by incessant toil, and greatly reduced in their numbers by repeated battles, they were invested by a numerous army, without a possibility of retreat, or of procuring provisions. A continual cannonade

pervaded their camp, and rifle and grape shot fell in many parts of their lines.

Every hope of relief being now at an end, on the 13th of October, 1777, General Burgoyne ordered an exact statement to be made of the stock of provisions, which was found not to exceed seven or eight days subsistence for the troops. The British General instantly called a council of war, at which not only field officers, but every Captain, was ordered to assist. Their unanimous opinion was, that their present situation justified a capitulation on honourable terms.

After various messages between General Burgoyne and General Gates, the subsequent articles of Convention were settled.

1. The troops under Lieut. General Burgoyne to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments to the verge of the river where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

2. A free passage to be granted to the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne to Great-Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North-America during the present contest; and the port of Boston to be assigned for the entry of transports, to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

3. Should any cartel take place, by which the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void, as far as such exchange shall be made.

4. The army under Lieut. General Burgoyne is to march to Massachusetts Bay, by the easiest and most expeditious and convenient route; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible to Boston, that the march of the troops may not be delayed when transports arrive to receive them.

5. The troops to be supplied on the march, and during their being in quarters, with provisions, by Major General Gates's orders, at the same rate of rations as the troops of his own army; and, if possible, the officers, horses, and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

6. All officers to retain their carriages, bat-horses, and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched; Lt. General Burgoyne giving his honor, that there are no pub-

lic stores contained therein. Major General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the due performance of this article: should any carriages be wanted during the march, for the transportation of officers baggage, they are, if possible, to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

7. Upon the march, and during the time the army shall remain in quarters, in the Massachusetts-Bay, the officers are not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to their rank, and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll-calls, and other necessary purposes of regularity.

8. All corps whatever of Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne's army, whether composed of sailors, batteaux-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

9. All Canadians, and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting of sailors, batteaux-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular description, are to be permitted to return there: they are to be conducted immediately, by the shortest route to the first British post on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as the other troops, and to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest in North-America.

10. Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of Captains, who shall be appointed by Lieut. General Burgoyne, to carry dispatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great-Britain by the way of New-York; and Major General Gates engages the public faith, that these dispatches shall not be opened. These officers are to set out immediately after receiving their dispatches, and are to travel by the shortest route, and in the most expeditious manner.

11. During the stay of the troops in the Massachusetts-Bay, the officers are to be admitted on parole, and are to be permitted to wear their side arms.

12. Should the army under Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne find it necessary to send for their clothing and other baggage from

Canada, they are to be permitted to do it in the most convenient manner, and necessary passports to be granted for that purpose.

13. These articles are to be mutually signed and exchanged to-morrow morning at nine o'clock; and the troops under Liéut. Gen. Burgoyne are to march out of their entrenchments at three o'clock in the afternoon.

HORATIO GATES, Major-General.

To prevent any doubts that might arise from Lt. Gen. Burgoyne's name not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major General Gates hereby declares, that he is understood to be comprehended in it, as fully as if his name had been specifically mentioned.

HORATIO GATES.

Camp at Saratoga,
October 16, 1777.

The number of men who surrendered, amounted, including Canadians and British Provincials, to near six thousand. The sick and wounded in the hospitals amounted to six hundred; and it was computed that their loss in killed, taken, and deserted, subsequent to the capture of Ticonderoga, was near three thousand men. The stores which the Americans acquired were considerable. The captured artillery consisted of 35 brass field-pieces. There were also 4647 muskets, and a variety of other useful and much wanted articles, which fell into their hands. The Continentals in Gen. Gates's army were 9093, the militia 4100; the number of militia, however, was constantly fluctuating.

Such was the melancholy event of a campaign from which the British expected the most important benefits. The capture of General Burgoyne was the hinge on which the revolution turned. While it encouraged the perseverance of the Americans by well grounded hopes of final success, it increased the embarrassments of that Ministry which had so ineffectually laboured to compel their submission.

In a short time after the Convention was signed, General Gates moved forward to stop the devastations of the British on the North river. But on hearing of the fate of Burgoyne, Vaughan and Wallace retired to New-York.

Immediately after the surrender of the troops, commanded by General Burgoyne, they were marched to the vicinity of

Boston. From the general unwillingness of the people to oblige them, it was impossible to provide immediately for so large a number of officers and soldiers, in such a manner as from the articles of the Convention they might reasonably expect. The officers remonstrated to General Burgoyne, that six or seven were crowded together in one room, without any regard to their respective ranks, in violation of the 7th article of the convention. Gen. Burgoyne forwarded this account to General Gates, and added, "the public faith is broken." This letter corroborated an apprehension, previously entertained, that the captured troops, on their embarkation, would make a junction with the British garrisons in America. The declaration of the General, that "the public faith was broken" while in the power of Congress, was considered by them as destroying the security which they before had in his personal honour: for in every event he might adduce his previous notice to justify his future conduct. They therefore resolved, "That the embarkation of General Burgoyne and the troops under his command, be postponed till a distinct and explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga be properly notified by the Court of Great-Britain to Congress.

EUROPEAN PROCEEDINGS CONNECTED WITH THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

THE consequences which the capture of Burgoyne's army produced in Europe were of great moment. In Great Britain the most sanguine expectations had been raised from the Canada expedition, the rapid success of which, in its first stages seeming to promise the most fortunate issue. A junction of the northern army with that of New-York was confidently expected; it was hoped that by this junction a decisive blow would be given to the rebellion, by cutting off the northern from the middle and southern states. The British nation, elevated with such hopes, and encouraged to cherish them by the first intelligence from Canada which brought an account of the almost instantaneous reduction of Ticonderoga, and the destruction or capture of the American naval force in the Lake Champlain, suffered proportionate disappointment upon hearing of the ultimate failure of the ex-

pedition, and the total loss of the army. But if the disappointment of the British nation was great, that of the ministry was still greater; and in a fit of despondency it would seem, they determined, for the sake of peace, and of getting rid of a troublesome and expensive war, to give up every thing for which they had originally contended. To the surprize of all and to the no small mortification of those who had hitherto zealously supported the measures of administration, the minister in the month of February 1778, introduced two bills into the House of Commons, which were passed through both houses of parliament with great dispatch, and received the royal assent on the 11th of March. By the first of these the duty payable on tea imported into America, which was the original cause of dispute, was repealed and a legislative declaration was made, that the King and parliament of Great Britain would not in future impose any tax or duty whatsoever payable in the colonies, except only such as should be necessary for the regulation of trade, and in such case that the nett produce of the duty so imposed should be applied to the particular use of that colony in which it should be collected in the same manner as other duties collected under the authority of the assemblies. By the other of these acts, authority was given to the King to appoint commissioners with full powers to treat, consult and agree, with any assemblies of men whatsoever in America and even with individuals, concerning any grievances existing in the government of any of the colonies; or in the laws of Great Britain extending to them, concerning any contribution to be furnished by the colonies, and concerning any other regulations which might be for the common good of both countries; with a proviso, however, that such agreement should not be binding until ratified by parliament. But in the following instances the commissioners were to be invested with absolute power, exerciseable however, according to their discretion, for proclaiming a cessation of hostilities by sea and land, for opening an intercourse with the mother country, for suspending the operations of all acts of parliament relating to the North American colonies, passed, since the tenth of February 1763, and for granting pardons to all descriptions of persons.

This moment of despondency, humiliation, and debasement was seized by the court of Versailles, to give a fatal blow to

the over grown power of her rival. Ever since the commencement of the revolution the Americans had been encouraged in their opposition to Great Britain, by secret assurances of assistance from the court of France, and by supplies of money, arms, and ammunition, clandestinely conveyed to them. The French were in the mean time making preparations; and their original design was, probably, to abstain from an open declaration, until Great Britain and the American States had mutually weakened each other in their civil contention. But the disaster which happened to Gen. Burgoyne's army, and the consequent conciliatory measures about to be adopted by the British cabinet, at last obliged them to throw off the masque. They knew that the Americans, notwithstanding their success at Saratoga, still laboured under very great difficulties; and that for want of internal resources, whilst their foreign trade was almost annihilated by the British cruisers, it was impossible for them, without assistance to keep a respectable army in the field, for any length of time; and they dreaded, lest under such unpromising circumstances, they should be induced to accept the terms which they knew were to be offered to them. To prevent this, and to defeat the effect of the conciliatory measures about to be adopted by the British cabinet, two treaties were now entered into between the French King and the Thirteen United States; one of commerce, and another of defensive alliance; which were finally signed at Paris, the 6th of February 1778, by the Chevalier Gerard, in behalf of the French King, and by Dr. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, in behalf of the American States. The first of these, as its title imports, was intended to regulate the commerce to be carried on between the countries of the contracting parties; and the principal object of the other was to secure the sovereignty and independence of the colonies; it being stipulated, that if a war in consequence of this treaty should break out between Great Britain and France the two contracting parties should mutually assist each other, according to their power and ability, and that peace should not be made without the consent of both, nor until the sovereignty and independence of the colonies, both in matters of government and commerce, should be expressly or tacitly acknowledged by the King of Great Britain.

Intelligence of the engagements between France and America was quickly transmitted by the British Ambassador at Paris, Lord Stormont, to the British ministry; and this was the cause why the conciliatory bills were passed with so much dispatch through the two houses of parliament. It was hoped that they might reach America, before the Congress had received intelligence of what had been done in France, and, that they might be apprised of what was intended, even before it was completed, rough drafts of the bills, as soon as they were introduced into parliament, were immediately dispatched to the British commander in chief in America, to be forwarded to Congress. On their arrival in America, they were sent to Congress then at York-Town. When they were received, on the 21st of April, Congress was uninformed of the treaty which their deputies had lately concluded at Paris. A committee was appointed to examine these bills and report on them. Their report was brought in the day following and adopted. The British plan for conciliation being wholly founded on the idea of the states returning to their allegiance, it was utterly rejected. The British commissioners for peace, who sometime after arrived in America, were not more successful. They received an answer of Congress, which shewed that all negotiation, except upon the ground of acknowledging their independence, would be unavailing, and that nothing but conquest could reunite the colonies to the British Empire.

On the 2d of May, Silas Deane arrived at York Town, with copies of the treaties already mentioned, entered into by the French King and the American Plenipotentiaries which were received with heartfelt joy.

Somewhat more than a month previous to the sailing of the British commissioners, the French ambassador, by order of his court formally notified to that of London, the nature of the engagements entered into between his sovereign and the United States of America, and some days after quitted London, and returned to France, about the same time that the British Ambassador quitted Paris. This notification was considered as amounting to a declaration of war, and although war was not actually declared both kingdoms rigorously prepared for open hostilities.

We now return to the two armies which we left towards the close of the present campaign in Pennsylvania.

General Washington, soon after the surrender of the British northern army, received a considerable reinforcement from the army under the command of General Gates. With this increased force he took a position near White Marsh, which in a military point of view was admirable. On the 4th of December, General Howe, who had new enterprizes in view, marched out of Philadelphia with almost his whole force, expecting to bring on a general engagement. He marched to the right of the Americans, and made every appearance of an intention to attack the American camp. Several days passed away, during which some skirmishes took place. A general action was hourly expected, but after various marches and counter-marches, the British filed off from their right, in full march for Philadelphia. Soon after these events, Gen. Smallwood, with a corps, was posted at Wilmington, on the banks of the Delaware, and General Washington, with the main army, retired to winter quarters at Valley Forge, sixteen miles distant from Philadelphia. This position was preferred to distant and more comfortable villages, as being calculated to give the most extensive security to the country adjacent to Philadelphia. Some hundreds of the Americans were without shoes, stockings, or blankets. Whilst the British enjoyed all the conveniences which an opulent city afforded, the former had to sit down in a wood, in the latter end of December, and to build huts for their accommodation. The cheerfulness with which the General and his army submitted to spend a severe winter in such circumstances rather than leave the country exposed by retiring farther, demonstrated as well their patriotism as their fixed resolution to suffer every inconvenience in preference to submission.

FOURTH CAMPAIGN, 1778.

THE winter and spring passed away without any more remarkable events in either army, than a few successful excursions of parties from Philadelphia to the neighbouring country, for the purpose of bringing in supplies, plundering or destroying property.

The first active measure of this campaign, on the side of the British, was the evacuation of Philadelphia, and the retreat

of their army to New-York. Through the interference of a hostile maritime power, the command of the sea was about to be disputed by the contending parties. Hence greater circumspection became necessary in the choice of ports for the British army. It was uncertain where the French might attempt to strike a blow; whether upon the continent of America, or in the West-Indies. It was therefore necessary that the British army should occupy a station from which reinforcements might be sent with ease and expedition wherever they should be required. Philadelphia being an hundred miles distant from the sea, and communicating with it only by a winding river, was not adapted to such a purpose. Orders were therefore sent from England for the evacuation of Philadelphia, which was effected at three in the morning, on the 18th of June, the British army retiring to the point of land below the town formed by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill, where the boats and vessels belonging to the British navy were ready to receive them. They passed the Delaware unmolested, and were encamped on the Jersey shore, by ten in the forenoon.

General Washington having penetrated into the design of the British commander to evacuate Philadelphia, had previously detached General Maxwell with a brigade into New-Jersey, with orders to assemble the militia, break down the bridges, and by every means in his power impede and harass the British troops in their retreat, until he, with the main army, should cross the Delaware; and fall upon their rear.

The route of the British army was along the eastern bank of the Delaware, as high as Trenton. General Washington therefore was obliged to make a considerable circuit to cross it higher up. A little to the left of the most northerly road leading from Trenton to New-York, the country of New-Jersey becomes high and mountainous. This country Gen. Washington entered when he passed the Delaware at Correll's Ferry. The slow movement of the British army indicated a design in Sir Henry Clinton, who now commanded the British army, to draw General Washington from his advantageous situation, and either force an engagement in the level country, or, by a rapid movement, gain the high grounds which the Americans had quitted. This, Gen. Washington guarded against, by keeping for some time a cautious distance, sending forward detachments of light troops to watch

the motions of the enemy, and hang on its flanks and rear. The course of the British army now pointed from the Delaware, and the farther it advanced in this new direction, the more General Washington strengthened his detachments.

BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.

WHEN Sir Henry Clinton had advanced to Allen-town, he determined, instead of keeping the direct course towards Staten-Island, to take the road which led to Sandy Hook, as that which presented the fewest impediments to obstruct his progress. Along this road, therefore, the British army was ordered to march; and having proceeded some miles, they encamped on the 27th of June, on some high grounds in the neighbourhood of Freehold court-house, in the county of Monmouth. General Washington had so powerfully reinforced his advanced detachments, that the Marquis de la Fayette first, and afterwards General Lee, were in succession sent to take the command of them. They had taken post at English Town, a few miles in the rear of the British army. General Washington, with the main body of the American army, encamped about three miles in the rear of his advanced corps.

Such was the disposition of the two armies, on the evening of the twenty-seventh of June. The American General resolved to make an attack the following morning, before the British troops should reach an advantageous position, about twelve miles in their front. Orders were accordingly sent to Gen. Lee, to begin the attack with the advanced corps as soon as the British army should be in motion, with an intimation that Gen. Washington with the main body of his army would advance and support him. Sir Henry Clinton sensible of the approach of the Americans made a new disposition in order more effectually to protect his baggage. The British army marched in two divisions; the van commanded by Gen. Knyphausen, and the rear by Lord Cornwallis; but the whole of the baggage was now put under the care of Gen. Knyphausen's division, that their rear division, under Lord Cornwallis, being disencumbered, might be ready to act with vigor, as circumstances should require.

This arrangement being made, Gen. Knyphausen's division, consisting of the German troops, the yagers excepted, the second battalion of light infantry, with the baggage, marched at break of day on the 28th of June, whilst the other division, headed by Sir Henry Clinton, did not move till near eight, that it might not press too close upon their baggage, which was so enormous as to occupy a line of march of near twelve miles in extent. The rear guard of the British army had scarcely descended from the heights of Freehold into a plain of three miles in length and one in breadth, when the advanced corps of the American army appeared, descending into the plain from the same heights which the British army had just before quitted. Sir Henry Clinton, about the same time, was informed that large columns of the Americans were seen marching on his flanks, which confirmed him in his first opinion, that the design of the enemy was upon his baggage; and as that was now engaged in defiles which would continue for a considerable distance, no other mode of affording relief to Gen. Knyphausen's division appeared to him so eligible, as that of making a vigorous attack upon the corps which appeared in his rear, which, if successful, would compel the American commander to recall the detachments sent forward on his flanks.

The British made a disposition for commencing the attack in the plain; but before it could be carried into execution the Americans retired and took post on the high ground, from which they had before descended.* The British troops, ascended the heights and attacked the Americans with so much spirit, that they were obliged to give way. In this critical moment Gen. Washington came up with the main body of his army, and took possession of some strong ground

* The conduct of General Lee, on this day, which was so severely arraigned by the Americans, was worthy of applause. He had been betrayed across some narrow passes of a marsh, by the persuasion, that he had to deal with a rear-guard of only two or three battalions. When he suddenly perceived six thousand men, forming to receive him he retired with such quickness and decision, though not attacked, that he repassed the marsh before the British line was in readiness to move. Had he, in expectation of support, maintained his ground on the plain, until the enemy had attacked him, he must have been overpowered, and would not have had any retreat.

behind a defile, over which the British troops must necessarily pass in pursuit of the retreating corps, by this judicious position, he probably saved his advanced corps from total ruin. The check the British received afforded time to make a disposition of the left wing, and second line of the American army in the wood, and on an eminence to which Lee was retreating. On this, some cannon were placed by Lord Sterling, who commanded the left wing. Gen. Green, took an advantageous position, on the right of Lord Sterling. The British now attempted to turn the left flank of the Americans, but were repulsed. They also made a movement to the right, but Gen. Green with artillery disappointed their design. Gen. Wayne, now advanced with a body of troops, and kept up a severe and well directed fire. The enemy retired and took the position which Lee had before occupied. Here their flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could be approached only through a narrow pass. Night put a stop to any further operations. Gen. Washington, intended to renew the action the next day, but the British commander being confident that the end was gained, for which the attack had been made, marched his troops silently away in the night, leaving behind him four officers and about forty privates, all so badly wounded, that they could not be removed.

In the different engagements of this day, the loss of the British army in killed, wounded and missing, and those who died of fatigue, amounted to three hundred fifty eight men, including twenty officers. Such was the extreme heat of the day, that three sergeants, and fifty six men, dropped dead without a wound. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded was about two hundred and fifty, including thirty officers. The missing amounted to one hundred thirty, but many of them, having only dropped through heat and fatigue soon joined the army.

The British army proceeded on its march, until, the baggage having reached Sandy-Hook, there was no farther apprehension for its security. The British fleet from the Delaware was there ready to receive it; and whilst preparations were making, by a bridge of boats for transporting the British troops across an inlet of the sea, which separates Sandy Hook from the continent, Sir Henry Clinton, with the army

under his command, lay for two days encamped at the distance of some miles in the country, expecting an attack from Gen. Washington. But the American army, after the action of Monmouth, marched to the North River. The British General proceeded from his camp to Sandy Hook, where his army was embarked on the fifth day of July, and the same day landed at New York.

Gen. Washington, with his army, encamped at the White Plains, a few miles beyond Kingsbridge, where the British, though only a few miles distant, did not molest them. They remained in this position from an early day in July, till a late one in the autumn, and then the Americans retired to Middle-Brook in Jersey, where they built themselves huts in the same manner as they had done at Valley Forge.

The British having departed from Philadelphia, Congress, after an absence of nine months, returned to the former seat of their deliberations, and soon after gave a public audience to M. Gerard, the Minister Plenipotentiary from the Court of France. It afforded ample materials for philosophic contemplation, that the same spot, which, in less than a century, had been the residence of savages, should become the theatre on which the representatives of a new, free, and civilized nation, gave a public audience to a Minister Plenipotentiary, from one of the oldest and most powerful kingdoms of Europe.

The French, as soon as they had determined to take an open and active part in behalf of the Americans, began immediately to arm by sea. At Toulon they equipped a Fleet of twelve ships of the line and six frigates; which, with a considerable number of troops on board, sailed from thence on the thirteenth of April, under the command of the Count d'Estaing; but from adverse winds, did not pass the Straits of Gibraltar till the fifteenth of May, and arrived on the coast of Virginia on the 5th of July, the same day on which the British army had embarked at Sandy Hook. Had he found the British fleet in the Delaware, and their army in Philadelphia, it is not easy to determine what might have been the consequence of a joint operation between him and General Washington.

The British Ministry, who were not unapprized of the equipment of the French fleet under the command of Count D'Estaing, got ready a fleet of an equal number of ships, the

command of which was given to Vice Admiral Byron. This fleet sailed from Plymouth on the ninth of June.

The Count D'Estaing, disappointed in his first scheme by the evacuation of Philadelphia, of which he received intelligence whilst he lay off the mouth of the Chesapeake, coasted along the American shore to the northward, and on the eleventh of July appeared off Sandy-Hook.

The British fleet then in the harbour of New-York, altho' much inferior to the fleet under D'Estaing, was nevertheless respectable; the ships being well manned, and ably officered. It consisted of six ships of the line, and four of fifty guns, with a number of frigates and smaller vessels. The sight of the French fleet raised all the active passions of their adversaries. Irritated against the French, for interfering in what they called a domestic quarrel, the British displayed a spirit of zeal and bravery which could not be exceeded. A British fleet blocked up in one of its own ports was such a phenomenon as filled them with indignation.

The French fleet continued without the Hook for eleven days, during which time the British had the mortification of seeing the blockade of their fleet, and the capture of about twenty vessels under English colours. On the twenty-second, the French fleet appeared under weigh. The long meditated attack, it was now supposed, was instantly to be made; and so confident were all, that it would prove abortive, in consequence of the preparations made for defence, that the critical moment which was to decide, not only the fate of the British fleet, but of the army, was waited for with impatience. But the count D'Estaing, as soon as the ships had weighed anchor, instead of attempting to enter the harbour made sail to the Southward, and was soon out of sight. Whether he ever seriously intended to make an attempt upon the harbour of New-York, but after reconnoitering its situation, with the dispositions made for defence, relinquished the design as impracticable, or whether his appearing before that harbour was only a feint to draw the attention of the British commanders from the place where his attack was really intended, is uncertain. After quitting New-York, and standing to the southward as far as the mouth of the Delaware, he changed his course, and steered for Rhode-Island, before which he arrived on the twenty-ninth of July.

By his departure, the British had a second escape, for had he remained at the Hook but a few days longer, part of the fleet of Vice Admiral Byron must have fallen into his hands. That officer, as already observed, sailed from England on the ninth of June, to counteract the design of Count D'Estaing. This squadron, on the third of July, was dispersed and separated by a storm. It now arrived scattered, broken, sickly, dismasted, or otherwise damaged. Within eight days after the departure of D'Estaing, four sail of the line arrived singly at Sandy Hook.

The expulsion of the British troops from Rhode-Island, of which they had been in possession since December, 1776, had been in the contemplation of the Americans for several months past. In the spring of this year, General Sullivan was sent to take the command in its neighbourhood, and made preparations for invading it. Such was the eagerness of the people to co-operate with their new allies, that some thousands of volunteers engaged in the service. The royal troops on the island, having been lately reinforced, were about 6000, and General Sullivan's force was about 10,000.

The British commander at Rhode-Island, General Pigot, perceiving the object of his adversaries, projected about the end of May two different enterprizes into Providence Plantation, in order to retard the operations of the Americans. In the first, under Col. Campbell, several houses at Bristol and Warren, filled with military and naval stores, some galleys and armed sloops, and one hundred and twenty-five boats, which were built on the Hickamuck river, for the purpose of the invasion, were burnt and destroyed; and eighteen pieces of ordnance, were rendered unserviceable. And in the last expedition under Major Eyre, a large quantity of boards, plank, and other materials for ship-building, were burnt. These losses retarded the preparations of the Americans so much, that when D'Estaing arrived off Rhode-Island, they were not in readiness for co-operation.

The French Admiral stationed two of his frigates in the Seaconnet Passage on the east, and two of his line of battle ships in the Narraganset Passage, on the west side of the island, to interrupt the communications of the garrison, whilst, with the remainder of his fleet, he anchored off Brenton's Ledge, at the south east side of the island, in a situation open to the sea. On the eighth of August, every thing being in readi-

ness on the part of the Americans, he entered the harbour of Newport with his fleet.

The British fleet was now increased to eight line of battle ships, five ships of fifty guns, two of forty four guns, four frigates, three fire-ships, two bombs, and a number of smaller vessels. With this force Lord Howe followed the French fleet, and appeared in sight of Rhode-Island on the ninth of August. He came to an anchor the same evening, off Point Judith, which forms the entrance on the south-west side into the great bay that encompasses Rhode-Island, and the other smaller islands adjacent. On the following morning, the wind having changed to the north east, the French Admiral sailed out of the harbour with all his ships, and forming them in order of battle as they came out, bore down upon the British fleet. The British Admiral, for the present, thought it prudent to decline an engagement, and stood to the southward, in the hope that a shift of wind might enable him to gain the weather-gage.

While the two commanders were exerting their naval skill to gain respectively the advantages of position, the wind freshening into a tremendous storm, not only parted the two fleets from each other, but separated and dispersed the individual ships of each squadron. In this conflict of the elements, two French ships of the line were dismasted. The dispersion of the two fleets gave occasion to the accidental meeting of single ships, and produced engagements between them. The *Renown*, of fifty guns, fell in with the French Admiral's ship, the *Languedoc*, of eighty-four guns, dismasted; and resolutely assailed her with apparent advantage, until darkness put an end to the engagement. The same evening, a similar engagement happened between the *Preston*, of fifty guns, and the *Tonant*, a French ship of eighty guns, with her main-mast only standing. Night put an end to the conflict. Six sail of the French squadron coming up in the night, saved the disabled ships from any farther attack. The British suffered less in the storm than their adversaries, yet enough to make it necessary for them to return to New-York, for the purpose of refitting. The French fleet came to an anchor on the 20th, near to Rhode-Island, but sailed on the 22d to Boston.

As soon as the British fleet, which was now further augmented by the arrival of the *Monmouth*, one of Admiral By-

ron's fleet, was sufficiently refitted, Lord Howe put to sea with it again, hoping to reach the Bay of Boston before the French fleet; but in this hope he was disappointed. Upon his entering the bay, on the 13th of August, he found the French fleet already in the harbour, and so well secured by lying within certain points of land, on which batteries had been erected to cover and command the anchorage ground, that all attempts against them, in this situation, appeared impracticable. He again set sail, proceeding to the relief of Rhode-Island; but his assistance in that quarter no longer being necessary, he returned with his fleet to New-York, towards the middle of September. After the arrival of the remainder of Admiral Byron's squadron, Lord Howe resigned the command of the British fleet to Admiral Gambier, and took his departure for England.

Before the French fleet sailed for Boston, the Marquis de la Fayette and Gen. Greene went on board the *Languedoc*, to consult on measures proper to be pursued. They urged the French Admiral to return with his fleet into the harbour, but his principal officers were opposed to the measure. He had orders to go to Boston, if his fleet met with any misfortune. But whatever were the real reasons which induced him to sail for Boston, the Americans were greatly dissatisfied. They complained that they had incurred great expence and danger, under the prospect of the most effective co-operation; that they were abandoned at a time, when by persevering in the original plan, they had well grounded hopes of speedy success.

We will briefly relate the progress and issue of the invasion of Rhode-Island, which would not have been undertaken but in the prospect of a co-operation of the French fleet.

Previously to the arrival of the French fleet, Rhode-Island was sufficiently protected against an invasion from the Americans, by the garrison which the British had placed in it, and by the frigate and other smaller vessels of war, which were stationed round it for its security. Soon after the arrival of the French fleet upon the American coast, the British garrison was reinforced with five battalions, under General Prescott. As soon as the Count D'Estaing had detached two of his line of battle ships into the Narraganset passage, and as many frigates into the Seaconnet passage, the retreat

of such of the British ships as were advanced beyond them, was cut off: They could neither put to sea nor return to the harbor of Newport; and in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the French, they were dismantled and burnt. Sir Robert Pigot, being threatened with a descent in several quarters at the same time, was obliged to withdraw his outposts, and concentrate his force in an intrenched camp in the neighborhood of Newport. Thus all the north part of the Island was left unguarded by the British, and there General Sullivan effected a landing on the ninth of August, the day after the French fleet had entered the harbour of Newport. On the fourteenth, the Americans took possession of Honeyman's-Hill, and began to construct batteries, form lines of communication, and make regular approaches, which were continued without intermission until the morning of the twenty-sixth. But the departure of the French fleet for the harbor of Boston, threw a fatal damp upon the spirits of the men who composed Gen. Sullivan's army. They returned home in such numbers (three thousand of them having gone off in the course of one day) that the force which at last remained, did not exceed that of the British garrison. In these embarrassing circumstances, Gen. Sullivan extricated himself with judgment and ability. He saw the impossibility of succeeding, and took measures for effecting a retreat. Orders were dispatched to repair and strengthen the works in his rear, upon the north part of the island, and also at Bristol and Tiverton, upon the continent. His heavy artillery and baggage were sent off; and every preparation that was necessary being made, he began his retreat in the night of the twenty-eighth of August. Gen. Sullivan gained a march of several hours, unperceived by the British army, and by posting his light troops on various eminences in his line of march, and leaving them behind him with orders to skirmish with the British troops as they advanced, and then retire, he was enabled to make good his retreat with the main body of his army, to a commanding situation at the north end of the island; which, as we have seen, he had previously strengthened with some additional works, for the purpose of covering his retreat. Gen. Pigot discovered the retreat of the Americans at day light, on the morning of the twenty-ninth; and a pursuit being instantly ordered, the whole day was

spent in skirmishes ; in which, the covering parties of the Americans were driven from the different posts occupied by them, until they fell back upon the main body of their army, by this time encamped on the ground already mentioned. These skirmishes were terminated by a sharp action, in front of the American encampment, obstinately maintained for half an hour, at the end of which, the Americans being reinforced, repulsed their pursuers. The loss on each side, in killed, wounded, and missing, was between two and three hundred.

Gen. Sullivan, the next morning, received advice, that Lord Howe's fleet, with Sir Henry Clinton and 4000 troops on board, had again sailed from New-York, and that a fleet was off Block-Island. He therefore concluded immediately to evacuate Rhode-Island. In the evening of that day, after having purposely exhibited every appearance of an intention to maintain his ground, he silently struck his tents as soon as it was dark, and withdrew his troops unperceived ; which, with the help of the numerous boats that attended upon him, were in a few hours transported across the channel to the continent.

Sir Henry Clinton, having been disappointed in cutting off the retreat of the Americans from Rhode-Island, returned with his fleet to New-York, but directed General Grey to proceed to Bedford and the neighbourhood, where several American privateers resorted. The fleet of transports landed the British troops on the banks of the Acushnet river, on the fifth of September ; and such was the rapidity of the execution, that by noon of the next day they were all re-embarked, having in the mean time burnt and destroyed all the ships in the whole extent of the river, amounting to above 70 sail. They also burnt at Bedford and Fairhaven a number of store-houses filled with provisions and warlike stores. On the east side of the river they dismantled and burnt an inclosed fort mounting eleven pieces of heavy cannon. The royal troops, being re-embarked, proceeded to the island called Martha's Vineyard, where they destroyed a few vessels, and obliged the inhabitants to deliver up the militia arms, the public money, 300 oxen, and 2000 sheep. A similar expedition, under Capt. Ferguson, was about the same time undertaken against Little Egg-harbour, on the east coast of

New-Jersey, at which place the Americans had a number of privateers and prizes. Several of the vessels got off, but all that were found were destroyed. Before the embarkation of the British from Egg Harbour took place, Capt. Ferguson, with 250 men, in the night, surprized and put to death about fifty of Pulaski's corps, which was posted in the vicinity. But one of the most disastrous events which occurred during this campaign, was the surprize and massacre of an American regiment of light dragoons under the command of Col. Baylor. They were employed in a detached situation, to intercept a British foraging party, and had taken up their lodgings in a barn, near the village of Old Taapan. Major General Grey commanded the party which surprized them. His men proceeded with such silence and address, that they cut off a serjeant's patrol without noise, and surrounded old Taapan so completely, that very few of the regiment quartered in it were able to make their escape. They rushed in upon Baylor's regiment, while they were in a profound sleep. Incapable of defence, the surprized dragoons sued for quarters. Unmoved by their supplications, the British applied the bayonet, and continued its repeated thrusts while objects could be found in which any signs of life appeared. Baylor himself was wounded. He lost 67 killed and wounded, and 40 were made prisoners. These were indebted for their lives to one of Grey's Captains, who gave quarters to the whole fourth troop, contrary to the orders of his superiors.

Humanity would induce us to throw a veil over fights so hideous and deformed, did not a sense of duty, with a view to prevent their repetition, instigate us to narrate such enormities.

The season for active operations drawing near to a close, and no other force being necessary to be kept at New-York, during the winter, than would be sufficient for the defence of the different posts occupied by the British troops, a detachment of five thousand troops was embarked to proceed to the West-Indies, under the command of Gen. Grant. This force, which sailed from Sandy Hook on the third of November, was escorted by a squadron of six ships of war, under the command of Commodore Hotham.

In the summer of this year, General Robert Howe, an officer in the American service, undertook an expedition against East Florida. This was resolved upon, with the dou-

ble view of protecting the State of Georgia from incursions of the loyalists, who were obliged to fly from the Carolinas and Georgia, and of causing a diversion. Howe, with two thousand men, mostly militia, proceeded as far as St. Mary's river. On his approach, the British destroyed a fort they had erected there, called Tonym, and retreated towards St. Augustine. However, sickness raged among the Americans to such a degree that an immediate retreat became necessary.

Hitherto the conquest of the United States had been attempted from North to South: But in the close of this year that order was inverted, and the Southern States became the principal theatre of British war operations. Georgia being one of the weakest States in the Union, was marked out as the first object of warfare.

The British troops sent on this service (consisting of two thousand men) were commanded by Col. Campbell, and the naval force by Commodore Hyde Parker.

Gen. Howe had just returned from his unsuccessful expedition, and lay with his army encamped in the neighbourhood of Savannah at the time of the arrival of the British squadron from New-York.

This fleet accomplished, the twenty-ninth of December, a landing about 12 miles up the river Savannah. From the landing place, a narrow causeway, with a ditch on each side, led through a rice swamp, to a high plantation ground, at the distance of six hundred yards. Capt. Cameron, of the 71st regiment, having first reached the shore with his company of light-infantry, immediately formed them, and advanced along the causeway, at the end of which was posted a party of the Americans under Capt. Smith. These received him with a general discharge of musketry, by which this officer and several of his company were killed. But the British, rushing on with impetuosity, made their way good, and compelled Capt. Smith to retreat. Whilst the rest of the troops were landing, Col. Campbell reconnoitered the position of the Americans, and determined to attack them before the evening. The British troops having advanced within half a mile of the enemy, were formed in order of battle. Gen. Howe, the American officer to whom the defence of Georgia was committed, had drawn up his forces, consisting of about 600 continentals, and a few hundred militia, across the main road leading to Savannah, and about half a mile from

it. His right was covered by a thick woody swamp, and the houses of a plantation filled with riflemen; his left reached to the rice swamps upon the river, and the town and fort of Savannah covered his rear. In this position the American General waited the approach of the British troops; and had the attack been made only in front, probably the ground would have been obstinately disputed. But the British commander having received information of a private path leading through the swamp, which covered the right flank of the Americans, detached the light infantry, under Sir James Baird, supported by the New-York volunteers, to proceed by that path, and gain Howe's rear. This detachment, having safely gained their station, suddenly issued from the swamp, and attacked a body of militia, which was posted to secure the great road leading from Ogeeche. Hitherto the British troops in front had remained quiet upon their ground; but as soon as it was perceptible that the light infantry had turned the flank of the Americans, the whole British line received orders to advance and move on briskly; and the artillery, which had been previously formed behind a swell in the ground, to conceal it from view, was instantly run forward to the eminence, and began to play upon the Americans. Howe, thus attacked in front and rear, ordered an immediate retreat. The British pursued with great execution. Before night, thirty-eight commissioned officers, and four hundred and fifteen men, 48 pieces of cannon, 23 mortars, the town and fort of Savannah, with its ammunition and stores, the shipping in the river, and a great quantity of provisions, were in the possession of the conquerors, whose loss, during the whole of this day, amounted only to seven killed, and nineteen wounded.

General Prevost, who commanded the British forces in East Florida, had received orders to advance with them into the southern extremity of Georgia. He accordingly began his march from East-Florida, about the same time that the embarkation took place from New-York. After encountering many difficulties, he arrived at Savannah, and took the command of the combined forces from New-York and East-Florida. Previous to his arrival, a proclamation had been issued to encourage the inhabitants to come in and submit to the conquerors. Campbell discovered abilities no less adapted to govern than to conquer. He did more in a few days, and

with a small number of men, towards restoring the British government, than all the General officers who had preceded him in the projected conquest. He at once extirpated military opposition, and subverted, for some time, every trace of a republican government. Georgia was the only State in the Union, in which, after the declaration of Independence, a legislative body was convened under the sanction of Britain.

Such were the principal events on the American sea-coast during this campaign. On the western frontiers a delultory war was carried on between the States and the Indians, in the mode peculiar to those savages. Mutual incursions were made, and ruin and devastation followed on the steps of the invaders. Whole families were butchered, their houses burnt, the growing corn cut up, and entire plantations laid waste. In this barbarous warfare the flourishing new settlement of Wyoming, on the banks of the Susquehannah, fell a sacrifice to an incursion of the Indians: And the Indian settlements of Unadilla and Anaquago, upon the upper parts of the same river, which were also inhabited by white people attached to the royal cause, were in their turn ravaged and destroyed by the Americans.

FIFTH CAMPAIGN, 1779.

THE rigour of winter suspended all military operations between the two great armies in the State of New-York, until the return of spring; but even after that time the war, during the whole campaign, was, as shall be hereafter related, carried on for little more than distress and depredation. In the more Southern States, Carolina and Georgia, however, the re-establishment of British government was effectually attempted. After the reduction of Savannah, a great part of the State of Georgia was restored to the King's peace. The royal army in that quarter, now under the command of Gen. Prevost, was strengthened by numerous reinforcements. At that time there were but few continental troops in those States, as during the late tranquillity in that quarter, they had been detached to serve in the main army under Gen. Washington. A body of militia was raised, and sent forward by North-Carolina to aid her neighbours, but did not join the

continental troops till they had retreated out of Georgia, and taken post in South-Carolina.

General Lincoln was, in September of the last year, appointed by Congress to the command of their southern army. That officer was the second in command in the army which captured Burgoyne, a circumstance which of itself was sufficient to give him eclat. But his judicious, brave, and spirited conduct on the occasion, gave him still better pretensions to fame, and entitled him, in the opinion of the Americans, to no small share in the glory of the achievement. He arrived at Charleston in South-Carolina about the beginning of December.

The royal army at Savannah began to extend their posts, and made preparations to take possession of Port-Royal, in South-Carolina. Major Gardiner, with 200 men, being detached with this view, landed on the island, but General Moultrie, at the head of an equal number of Americans, attacked and drove him off it. This repulse restrained the British from attempting any immediate enterprize to the northward of Savannah, but they fixed posts at Ebenezer and Augusta, extending themselves over a great part of Georgia; they also endeavoured to strengthen themselves by reinforcements from the Tories in the western settlements of Georgia and Carolina. In this attempt they were successful. Several hundreds of them rendezvoused, and set off to join the royal forces at Augusta. Among those loyalists, there were many of the most infamous characters. They had no sooner began their march, than they commenced such a scene of plundering of the defenceless settlements through which they passed, as induced the orderly inhabitants to turn out to oppose them. Col. Pickens, with about three hundred men, pursued and came up with them near Kettle Creek. An action took place, in which the Tories were totally routed. About 40 of them, with their leader, were killed, and the rest dispersed.

The British had extended their posts on the Georgia side of Savannah river. This induced Gen. Lincoln to fix encampments at Black Swamp, and nearly opposite to Augusta, on the Carolina side. From these posts he formed a plan of crossing into Georgia, with the view of limiting the British to the low country, near the ocean. In the execution of this design, Gen. Ash with 1500 North-Carolina militia, and a

few regular troops, after crossing the river Savannah, took a position on Briar-Creek ; but in a few days he was surprised by Col. Prevost, brother of Gen. Prevost, who having made a circuitous march of fifty miles, came unexpectedly on his rear with about 900 men. The militia were thrown into confusion, and fled at the first fire. They had 150 men killed, and 162 were taken prisoners. Of those who got off safe, a great part returned home, so that the number which rejoined the American camp, did not exceed 450 men. This event opened a communication between the British, the Indians, and the Tories of North and South-Carolina.

The Americans soon after resumed their original plan of penetrating into Georgia ; part of their force was stationed on the North side of the Savannah, while Gen. Lincoln and the main army, which was reinforced by this time, crossed near Augusta into Georgia. Gen. Prevost availing himself of Lincoln's absence, crossed into Carolina over the same river, with about 2400 men, among which there were a large party of Indians. Gen. Moultrie, who was charged with the defence of South Carolina was forced to retire. When Lincoln found that Gen. Prevost was seriously pushing for Charleston, he re-crossed the Savannah, and pursued him. The absence of the main army, Moultrie's retreat, the plunderings of the invaders, and above all the dread of the Indian Savages, diffused a general panic among the inhabitants : Many were induced to apply for British protection. In the mean time, the South Carolinians' made every preparation for the defence of their capital, the suburbs were burnt down ; lines were carried across the Peninsula, between Ashley and Cooper rivers ; and cannon were mounted at proper intervals, in its whole extent. In a few days a force of 3300 men assembled in Charleston for its defence.

An advanced detachment of the British of 900 men, appeared before the town, the eleventh of May. The town was summoned to surrender. Commissioners from the garrison were sent to propose a neutrality during the war between Great Britain and America. But as these terms were refused, the garrison expecting an immediate assault, prepared accordingly. The British however, did not think proper to attempt a storm.

The approach of Gen. Lincoln induced the British commander to retreat from Charleston, filing off with his whole

forte from the main, to the islands near the sea, to prevent being between two fires. Both armies encamped in the vicinity of Charleston, watching each others' motions. John's Island, of which the British had taken possession, is separated from the main land by an inlet, to which has been given the name of Stono River; and the communication between the one and the other is preserved by a ferry. Upon the main land, at this ferry, the British had established a post, as well for the security of the island, as for the protection of their foraging parties. For the defence of it they had thrown up three redoubts, joined by lines of communication. The rear was covered by Stono inlet.

The weak state of the garrison, which did not much exceed 500 men, fit for duty, tempted Gen. Lincoln to attack it with a view of cutting it off. On the twentieth of June, he advanced against it with a superior force. The attack lasted for above an hour, but at last the Americans were forced to retreat, which they did in good order, carrying with them some of their killed and all their wounded. The British counted 129 killed and wounded; and the loss of the Americans was above two hundred killed, wounded and missing.

The militia under Gen. Lincoln were disheartened by this unsuccessful attack, and the greatest part of them soon after returned to their plantations. The British troops were no farther molested. They evacuated Stono Ferry, and retiring along the sea coast, passed from island to island, until they reached Beaufort, in the island of Port Royal. At Beaufort Gen. Prevost established a post, the garrison of which he left under the command of Col. Maitland, and returned with the rest of the British army to Georgia.

The profligate conduct of the officers and soldiers of the British army, in plundering the houses of individuals, during this incursion is incredible. Negroes were seduced or forced from their masters, furniture and plate were seized without decency or authority, and the most infamous violations of every law of honor and honesty, were openly perpetrated. Individuals thus accumulated wealth, but the royal cause suffered, and the British arms incurred an everlasting stigma.

The American army under Gen. Lincoln, soon after the action of Stono Ferry, retired to Sheldon, and nothing of any consequence was attempted by either army, till the arrival of

a French fleet on the coast, roused the whole country to immediate activity.

As soon as Admiral D'Estaing, in the month of November last, had re-fitted the French fleet at Boston, he sailed for the West Indies. About the same time, as before related, Commodore Hotham with the British fleet, set out from New-York, to the same theatre of operations. The British took St. Lucia, and the French took St. Vincent's and Grenada. After the reduction of the latter, D'Estaing retired to Cape Francois. Here he received letters from Gen. Lincoln and Mr. Plombard, the French Consul at Charleston, in which they represented to him the state of affairs in the southern provinces, and pointed out the advantages which might be expected, should he, during the hurricane months in the West Indies, visit the American coast with his fleet, and cooperate with Lincoln in the recovery of Georgia. The French Admiral, having discretionary orders from his Court for such a co-operation, sailed forthwith for the American continent, and arrived on the coast of Georgia on the first of September, with twenty sail of the line, two fifty gun ships, and eleven frigates. He arrived so unexpectedly, that the Experiment of fifty guns, commanded by Sir James Wallace, the Ariel of twenty-four guns, and two store ships, fell into his hands.

General Lincoln, as soon as intelligence of the arrival of the French fleet reached South-Carolina, marched with the force he had with him, towards Savannah, and the militia of Georgia and South-Carolina received orders to rendezvous near the same place. Vessels of a proper draught of water were dispatched from Charleston, to assist in landing the French troops.

The British, on their side, took measures for increasing the fortifications at Savannah, and putting the town in a proper posture of defence. The garrison at Sunbury was withdrawn, and orders were dispatched to Beaufort to the commanders of the British troops and armed vessels, to repair in all haste to Savannah.

On the ninth of October the French fleet came to an anchor off the bar; and as the line of battle ships could not pass it, nor come near the shore, the small coasting vessels sent from Charleston were employed in receiving the troops from the French ships, and landing them at Beaulieu, in

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Count D'Estaing, as soon as the debarkation of his troops was completed, marched against Savannah, and without waiting for a junction with the American army, summoned Gen. Prevost to surrender the town to the arms of the King of France. General Prevost, to whom it was of the utmost importance to gain time, desired twenty-four hours to consider of an answer. This was inconsiderately granted, D'Estaing expecting nothing less than a surrender of the town at the expiration of the time fixed for an answer: But Gen. Prevost hoped that the troops who had been stationed at Beaufort, under Col. Maitland, might arrive during the interval; and in this hope he was not disappointed. That officer arrived at Savannah before the expiration of the truce, with the best part of his detachment, amounting to about eight hundred men. The arrival of so considerable a reinforcement inspired the garrison of Savannah with new animation. An answer was returned to the French commander that the town would be defended to the last extremity.

The French and Americans formed a junction on the following day, but some time being required for landing and bringing up the heavy artillery from the ships, the combined armies did not begin to break ground for the purpose of carrying on their approaches until the twenty-third of September, nor were their batteries ready to open until the fourth of October. The batteries of the besiegers having on that



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day opened with a discharge from fifty three pieces of heavy cannon and fourteen mortars, a request was made by Gen. Prevost that the women and children might be permitted to leave the town, and embark on board vessels in the river, which should be placed under the protection of the Count D'Estaing: But this proposal was rejected, the combined armies suspecting that a desire of secreting the plunder, lately taken from the South-Carolinians, was covered under the veil of humanity.

From the fourth to the ninth of October an incessant cannonade was continued; but, fortunately for the inhabitants, less injury was done to the houses in the town than might have been expected; few lives were lost, and the defences were in no respect materially damaged. The French troops amounted to about five thousand men, and the militia joined General Lincoln in such numbers, that the combined armies, it is said, amounted to about ten thousand men. The garrison in Savannah did not exceed two thousand five hundred of all sorts, regulars, seamen, militia, and volunteers. But the disparity in numbers was in some degree compensated by the extraordinary zeal and ardour which animated the besieged. At the time the French landed, not more than twelve pieces of artillery appeared upon the fortifications at Savannah: But so incessantly did the garrison labour in enlarging the old works, and in erecting new redoubts and batteries, that before the conclusion of the siege, near one hundred pieces of cannon were mounted.

The town of Savannah being situated upon the Southern bank of the river of that name, had two of its sides secured by natural boundaries, one by the river behind it, and the other by a thick swamp and woody morass communicating with the river above the town. The other two sides were originally open towards the country, which in front of them for several miles was level, and entirely cleared of wood: But they were by this time covered with artificial works, the right and left being defended by redoubts, and the centre by seamen's batteries in front, with impalements and traverses thrown up behind to protect the troops from the fire of the besiegers; and the whole extent of the works was surrounded with an abatis. The redoubts on the right towards the swamp were three in number: That in the centre was garrisoned by two companies of militia, with the North-Caroli-

na regiment to support them, under the command of Colonel Hamilton. The provincial corps of King's Rangers were posted in the redoubt on the right, and the corps of Provincial dragoons in that on the left, called the Spring-Hill redoubt, supported by the South-Carolina regiment. To the right of the whole was a sailor's battery of nine pounders, covered by a company of the British Legion; and between the centre and Spring-Hill redoubt was another of these batteries, behind which were posted the grenadiers of the 60th regiment, with the marines which had been landed from the ships of war. The whole of this force on the right of the lines was under the orders of Col. Maitland. On the left of the lines were two redoubts, strongly constructed, with a maffy frame-work of green spongy wood, filled up with sand, and mounted with heavy cannon, one of them commanded by Col. Cruger, and the other by Major Wright, having under him the Georgia loyalists. Behind the impalements and traverses, in the centre of the works, were posted the two battalions of the 71st. regiment, two regiments of Hessians, the New-York volunteers, 1 battalion of Skinner's brigade, one of Delancey's, and the light infantry of the army under the command of Major Graham.

Such was the state of the works at Savannah, and such the position of the troops for its defence, at the time when the Count D'Estaing resolved to discontinue his regular approaches, and storm the British entrenchments. To this resolution he was forced by his marine officers, who had remonstrated against his continuing to risk so valuable a fleet on a dangerous coast, in the hurricane season, and at so great a distance from the shore, that it might be surprized by a British fleet, completely repaired and manned.

In order to facilitate the success of the enterprize, an officer with five men, on the eighth of October, advanced under a heavy fire from the garrison, and kindled the abbatis; but the dampness of the air, and the moisture of the green wood of which the abbatis was composed, soon extinguished the flames. The morning of the ninth of October, was fixed upon for making the assault; and two feigned attacks by the militia, were to draw the attention of the besieged to their centre and left, whilst a strong body of chosen troops, from the combined armies, should advance on the right of the British lines, and in two columns make the real attack.

The principal of these columns was commanded by Count D'Estaing, assisted by Gen. Lincoln, and was destined to attack the Spring-Hill redoubt in front, whilst the other column, commanded by Count Dillon, should silently move along the edge of the swamp, pass the redoubts and batteries, and get into the rear of the British lines. The troops which composed these two columns consisted of 3500 French, 600 regulars of the Americans, and 350 of the Charleston militia. They were in motion long before day-light. The column commanded by Dillon mistook its way, from the darkness of the morning, and was entangled in the swamp, from which it was unable to extricate itself until broad day-light appeared, and exposed it to the view of the garrison and the fire from the British batteries. This was so well directed, that it was never able even to form. In the mean time, the column led by D'Estaing advanced against the Spring-Hill redoubt, just as day-light appeared. As soon as it was discovered, it became exposed to a continual blaze of musquetry from the redoubt, and to a destructive cross fire from the adjoining batteries, which mowed down whole ranks of the allies as they advanced. They, with great bravery, moved on until they reached the redoubt, where the contest became more fierce. A French and American standard were for a short time planted upon the parapet. The contest for the possession of the redoubt nevertheless continued to be obstinately maintained on both sides, and the event remained in suspense; when Col. Maitland, seizing the critical moment, ordered the grenadiers of the 60th regiment, with the marines, to move forward, and charge the American column. This movement decided the fate of the attack. The assailants were repulsed, driven out of the ditch of the redoubt, and routed with great loss, leaving behind them, in killed and wounded, 637 of the French troops, and 264 of the Americans. The loss of the garrison, during the siege and assault, did not exceed 120. Count Pulaski, who commanded an American corps, received a mortal wound, and D'Estaing was wounded in two places, but in neither of them dangerously.

This unsuccessful assault determined the issue of the siege. The Americans and French kept possession of their lines only till the artillery and heavy baggage were withdrawn, and re-embarked on board the fleet. As soon as this was accom-

plished, the siege was raised, and the allies separated, the Americans retreating into South-Carolina, and the French returning to their ships. The Count D'Estaing, with part of the ships, returned to France, and the rest proceeded to the West-Indies.

With the raising of the siege of Savannah ended the campaign to the Southward, without any thing decisive on either side. During this year, the British had overrun the State of Georgia for 150 miles from the sea coast, and had penetrated as far as the lines of Charleston, but at the end of the campaign they were reduced to their original limits in Savannah.

The campaign in the States to the northward of Carolina was spent in desultory operations and partial expeditions, the object of which seems to have been to distract the attention of the Americans by their multiplicity, and to weaken them by cutting off their resources, and destroying their magazines of naval and military stores.

Admiral Gambier, who succeeded Lord Howe in the command of the British fleet on the American coast, was recalled in the spring of the present year, and in the month of April resigned the command to Sir George Collier. Not long after his arrival, an expedition to the Chesapeake, in Virginia, was concerted between him and Sir Henry Clinton, the commander in chief of the British army. A detachment, consisting of the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards, the 42d regiment, a regiment of Hessians, and the royal volunteers of Ireland, with a detachment of artillery, amounting in the whole to one thousand eight hundred men, under the command of General Mathew, was assigned for this purpose, and embarked on board transports. Sir George Collier, in the *Raisonable* of 64 guns, and some other vessels, conveyed them. The fleet entered between the Capes of Virginia on the eighth of May, and on the thirteenth entered the mouth of Elizabeth river. The British troops effected a landing about three miles below the fort of Portsmouth. The American garrison, fearful of being surrounded, and having their retreat cut off, hastily evacuated the fort, leaving behind all the artillery, ammunition, baggage, and stores. Gen. Mathew, after having taken possession of the fort, took a strong position with his army between Portsmouth and the country, his right wing reaching to the fort, the left to the South branch of Elizabeth river, and the centre covered in front

by an impenetrable swamp. The British commander sent detachments to Norfolk and Gosport; and all the vessels in Elizabeth river, with an immense quantity of naval and military stores, merchandize, and provisions, were either taken or destroyed by the British troops. At Kemp's Landing, in Princess Ann county, and at the town of Suffolk, in Nansemond county, an immense quantity of provisions and stores of all sorts, with some vessels richly laden, were either taken or destroyed by other detachments.

These services being performed, the British troops were re-embarked, and the whole fleet, with the prizes, having quitted Virginia, arrived at New-York before the end of the month, having been absent only twenty-four days. The damage done to the Americans has been estimated at half a million sterling, but it did no service to the royal cause.

Soon after, a similar expedition was projected against Connecticut. Governor Tryon was appointed to the command of about 2600 land forces, employed on this business, and he was supported by Gen. Garth. The transports which conveyed these troops, were covered by a suitable number of armed vessels, commanded by Sir George Collier. They landed at East-Haven, and reduced the town to ashes; after which they marched to New-Haven. The town was delivered up to promiscuous plunder, and the inhabitants were stripped of every thing. An aged citizen, who laboured under a natural inability of speech, had his tongue cut out by one of the royal army. After perpetrating every species of enormity, the invaders re-embarked, and proceeded by water to Fairfield. On their approach, the town was evacuated by most of the inhabitants. A few women remained, with a view of saving their property. Parties of the British entered the deserted houses, where they took every thing of value that came in their way, abusing the women with the foulest language, threatening their lives, and presenting the bayonets to their breasts. A sucking infant was plundered of its cloathing, while the bayonet was presented to the breast of its mother. Towards evening they set the houses on fire, which they had previously plundered. The town of Norfolk, and a part of Green's farms were likewise burnt, and two houses of public worship were demolished.

During this short expedition, which had lasted only nine days, the injury sustained by the inhabitants of Connecticut in the

loss of property, was very considerable : But notwithstanding the conflagration of so many towns on the sea-coast, Gen. Washington could not be prevailed upon to abandon his strong situation in the neighborhood of New-York. He apprehended, that one design of the British in these movements was to draw off a part of his army from West-Point, to favour an intended attack on that important post. It was his uniform practice, to risque no more by way of covering the country, than was consistent with the general safety. His apparent apathy, with respect to Connecticut, produced murmurs among the inhabitants, and the British commanders were devising measures for improving the disposition, which had manifested itself in Connecticut : But Gen. Washington had already achieved an enterprize, which disconcerted all their designs against that State, and called their attention to a different quarter. This was the surprize of the fort of Stony-Point, which was taken by assault in the night of the fifteenth of July. It was an enterprize of difficulty and danger ; and the American Gen. Wayne who conducted it, deserved great praise for his gallantry and good conduct, as did the troops which he commanded, for their bravery.

With a strong detachment, Gen. Wayne set out at noon, and completed a march of fourteen miles, over bad roads, by eight o'clock in the evening. After having reconnoitered the works, he divided his troops into two columns, entered the works in opposite quarters, and met in the centre of them about one in the morning of the sixteenth of July. Neither the morass, the double row of abatis, nor the strength of the works, damped the ardour of the assailants. In the face of the most tremendous fire of musketry, and of cannon loaded with grape shot, they forced their way at the point of the bayonet, through every obstacle. Col. Johnson, of the 17th regiment, commanded the British garrison, which consisted of the 17th regiment, the grenadier company of the 71st, a company of the regiment of Loyal Americans, and a detachment of artillery, amounting in the whole to about six hundred men ; of these one hundred and fifty two were either killed or wounded, and the rest, with their commander, were made prisoners. Two flags, two standards, 15 pieces of ordnance, and a considerable quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The conduct of the Americans upon this occasion was

highly meritorious; for they would have been fully justified in putting the garrison to the sword; not one man of which was put to death but in fair combat.

As soon as the news of that event reached New-York, preparations were made to recover the fort. The British commander expected that Gen. Washington might be tempted to quit his fastnesses, and risque an engagement for the possession of Stoney-Point. But this was not Gen. Washington's intention. Orders were given for evacuating Stoney-Point, which was done after as many of the works had been destroyed as the time would permit. On the third day after the capture of that fort, the British regained possession of it, repaired the works, and placed in it a larger garrison.

This successful enterprize was speedily followed by another, which equalled it in boldness of design. This was the surprize of the British garrison at Powles's Hook, opposite to New-York, on the Jersey shore, which was effected by Major Lee, with about 350 men. About 30 of the British were killed, and 169 taken prisoners. Major Lee, according to the orders he had received, made an immediate retreat, without waiting to destroy either the barracks or the artillery.

But these advantages were counterbalanced by an unsuccessful attempt, made by the State of Massachusetts, on a British post at Penobscot.

Gen. Francis Maclean, who commanded the British troops in Nova-Scotia, with a detachment of 650 men, in the month of June embarked in transports, and, escorted by three sloops of war, arrived in the bay of Penobscot, in order to form a settlement, and establish a post which might not only serve to check the incursions of the Americans, into Nova-Scotia, but be the means of obtaining a constant supply of ship timber, with which the neighbouring country abounded, for the use of the King's yards at Halifax and other places. The bay of Penobscot is about seven leagues in breadth at the mouth, and seventeen leagues in length, terminating where the river Penobscot empties itself into the head of it; and the lands all round were then covered with wood, scarcely any settlements having been made upon them. About nine miles below the mouth of Penobscot river; on the eastern side of the bay, is a small but convenient harbour, which still retains its ancient Indian name of Majabagaduce; and a point of land, forming one side of that harbour, was the spot fixed

upon by Gen. Maclean for erecting a fort to protect the settlement.

This occasioned alarm at Boston, and it was resolved to counteract the establishment of the post. A Squadron was soon got in readiness, which consisted of nineteen armed ships and brigantines, the largest carrying thirty-two, and the smallest ten guns. To these were added twenty-seven transports, having on board three thousand troops; the fleet being under the direction of Commodore Saltonstall, and the troops under the command of General Lovel.

Gen. Maclean received intelligence of the sailing of this armament only four days before its arrival at Penobscot. At that time, two of the bastions of the intended fort were not begun, and the other two, with the curtains, were in no part above five feet in height, and twelve in thickness. There was no platform laid, nor any artillery mounted, and the ditch in most parts was not more than three feet deep. Upon the arrival of this intelligence, Gen. Maclean employed his troops day and night on such works as were immediately necessary to secure them against an assault.

The Americans effected a landing before day in the morning of the twenty-eighth of July, at a place which had been thought inaccessible, and on the thirtieth opened a battery against the works, at the distance of seven hundred and fifty yards. From the incessant labour of the garrison, the gorge of one of the unfinished bastions was filled up with logs of timber, and the other was surrounded with a work of fascines and earth, ten feet thick; platforms were laid, and artillery mounted; so that by the time the Americans had opened their battery, the British thought themselves tolerably prepared to resist an assault. The Americans made frequent attempts to enter the harbour, but were constantly repulsed by the fire from the British ships of war, and a battery erected to support them on shore. The American land forces, nevertheless, continued to make approaches, and erect new batteries; and a brisk cannonade was kept up between them and the garrison for near a fortnight. Frequent skirmishes happened without the fort, the garrison being under the necessity of preserving a communication with the shipping and the battery which covered it. Gen. Maclean received, on the twelfth of August, intelligence by a deserter, that on the following day an assault was to be made on the fort, and an

attack upon the ships of war about the same time. But the approach of the British squadron under Sir George Collier, which had sailed from New-York to the relief of the garrison, prevented the Americans from executing their intention. During the night of the thirteenth to the fourteenth of August the besiegers evacuated the works, and re-embarked with the greatest part of their cannon on board the ships. A flight of the American fleet took place, not daring to wait the shock of the British squadron. Two of the American armed ships endeavoured to get to sea by passing round Long-Island, which lies in the middle of the bay; but they were soon intercepted, the first being taken, and the other run ashore and blown up by the crew. The rest of their fleet, with the transports, fled to the head of the bay, and entered the mouth of Penobscot river, where they landed, and thereby became exposed to a danger almost as great as that which they had escaped. They had, without provisions or any other necessaries, to explore their way for more than an hundred miles through this pathless desert, before they could reach a place from which supplies might be obtained. All the American armed vessels were either taken or destroyed. The garrison lost 70 men, killed, wounded and missing.

Sir George Collier, on his return to New-York, found himself superseded by the arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot from England, with some ships of war, and a fleet of transports, bringing a reinforcement of troops. To the Admiral he resigned the command, and embarked for England.

When this reinforcement arrived, the season for action was not entirely over; but the appearance of the formidable French fleet on the coast of Georgia, and the expected attack against New-York, from the French by sea, and the Americans by land, obliged Sir Henry Clinton to give up all thoughts of offensive operations during the remainder of the campaign, and in order to concentrate the British forces, Rhode-Island was evacuated, and the garrison withdrawn to New-York. This visit of the French fleet to the American coast, though unsuccessful as to its main object, may be said to have been serviceable to the American cause, as it obliged the British commander to change his system, and act upon the defensive during the remainder of the campaign.

While the war thus was languishing with respect to great objects in the country, where it originated, it was raging on a new element. Hostilities between the fleets of France and

England were carrying on in both the Indies, and in the European seas, as well as on the coast of America. Distressing was at this time the situation of Great-Britain. She was weakened and distracted in a domestic contest, was involved in a new and much more dangerous war with one of the greatest powers of Europe, and before the end of this year, she had the mortification to see the King of Spain also take a decided part against her. This union of Spain with France had for some time been foreseen by Great-Britain, and the most vigorous preparations were made by her to resist the impending storm. Gibraltar, where an attack was expected, was, in the spring of the year, reinforced with troops, and plentifully supplied with provision, and store.

The declaration of war against Great-Britain, on the part of the Spanish nation, though long expected, was not made till the month of June, after every thing had been prepared by them for acting with effect. The grand Spanish fleet was ready to sail; troops were in motion to occupy the works at St. Roque, and invest Gibraltar by land, whilst a naval force was proceeding to block it up by sea. Whilst Gr. Britain was embarrassed with the complicated operations of so extensive a war, it was hoped that Spain might with ease recover back some of the possessions that had been wrested from her in less auspicious times.

The province of West-Florida, in the month of August, was invaded by two thousand Spaniards, under the command of Don Bernardo de Galvez, and the reduction of Gibraltar being thought impracticable any other way than by blockade, it was invested both by sea and land.

By this time, the difficulties under which the new formed States of America were labouring, had been greatly increased by the depreciation of their paper currency. The contest originating on the subject of taxation, the laying on of taxes adequate to the exigencies of war, would have been impolitic. The only plausible expedient in the power of Congress was therefore to adopt the emission of bills of credit, representing specie, under a public engagement to be ultimately sunk by equal taxes, or exchanged for gold or silver. The United States derived from this paper creation, for a considerable time, much benefit. But the encreasing expences of the war, the want of other resources, and the readiness of the people to receive these bills, prompted Congress to multiply

them beyond the limits of prudence. A diminution of their value was the unavoidable consequence. The depreciation continued by a kind of gradual progression from the year 1777 to 1780: so that at last the Continental dollars were passed in most parts of America from 50 or 60 for one, and afterwards 150 for one. The requisition made by Congress to the several States for supplies, were also far from being always regularly complied with, and their troops were often in want of the most common necessaries. Hitherto the cause of the United States appears also to have suffered by their depending too much on temporary enlistments. But, during this year, the Congress endeavoured to put their army upon a more permanent footing, and to give all the satisfaction to their officers and soldiers which their circumstances would permit. They appointed a committee for arranging their finances, and made some new regulations respecting the war-office and treasury board, and other public offices.

From these events, which caused but temporary embarrassments, I reassume the thread of the history of the war.

SIXTH CAMPAIGN, 1780.

THE departure of Count D'Estaing, after his unsuccessful attack upon Savannah, which has already been related, was no sooner known, than Sir Henry Clinton set on foot an expedition, the object of which was the taking of Charleston, and the reduction of the province of South-Carolina. The troops designed for this expedition, were immediately embarked on board the transports; and these, escorted by admiral Arbuthnot, with an adequate naval force, sailed from Sandy-Hook on the 26th of December, 1779. Sir Henry Clinton accompanied the expedition, committing the command of the royal army in New-York, to Gen. Knyphausen. Such was the severity of the season, that this fleet was soon separated, and driven out of its course by tempestuous weather; and scarcely any of the ships, arrived at Tybee, their place of rendezvous, before the end of January. Some of their vessels were taken; some others were lost, and all received damage. Amongst the ships that were lost, was one which contained the heavy ordnance, and almost all the horses belonging to the artillery or cavalry, perished



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during the passage. After having repaired the damages, the fleet proceeded from Tybee to North Edenton Sound; and on the 11th of February, the British troops were disembarked on John's Island, about thirty miles from Charleston. They advanced slowly through the country, passing from John's to James' Island; and from thence over Wappoo-Cut, to the main land, until they reached the banks of Ashley river, opposite to Charleston. At the same time, part of the fleet was sent round to block up the harbour of Charleston by sea.

The losses which the British army had sustained in the late tempestuous weather, induced Sir Henry Clinton, to dispatch an order to New-York for reinforcements of men and stores. He at the same time directed Gen. Prevost, to send on to him twelve hundred men from the garrison of Savannah. Gen. Patterson at the head of this detachment, made his way good over the river Savannah, and through the intermediate country, and soon after joined Sir Henry Clinton near the banks of Ashley river.

It was not until the 29th of March, that the advance of the royal army crossed that river at the ferry, and landed on Charleston Neck, some miles above. On the following day the British troops encamped in front of the American lines; and on the 1st of April, began to break ground before Charleston, at the distance of about one thousand yards from the American works.

The tedious passage from New-York to Tybee, and the slow advance of the royal army, after they had landed, gave the Americans time not only to strengthen, but greatly to enlarge the defences of Charleston. A chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries, was thrown up extending from Ashley, to Cooper river, upon which were mounted upwards of eighty pieces of cannon and mortars. In front of the whole, was a strong abatis, and a wet ditch made by passing a canal from the heads of swamps, which run in opposite directions. Between the lines and the abatis, deep holes were dug at short intervals. The works on the right and left, were not only of great strength, but advanced so far beyond the range of the intermediate line, as to enfilade the canal, almost from one end to the other: and in the centre was a hornwork of masonry, which being closed during the siege, formed a kind of citadel. Works were also thrown up



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during the passage. After having repaired the damages, the fleet proceeded from Tybee to North Edenton Sound; and on the 11th of February, the British troops were disembarked on John's Island, about thirty miles from Charleston. They advanced slowly through the country, passing from John's to James' Island; and from thence over Wappoo-Cut, to the main land, until they reached the banks of Ashley river, opposite to Charleston. At the same time, part of the fleet was sent round to block up the harbour of Charleston by sea.

The losses which the British army had sustained in the late tempestuous weather, induced Sir Henry Clinton, to dispatch an order to New-York for reinforcements of men and stores. He at the same time directed Gen. Prevost, to send on to him twelve hundred men from the garrison of Savannah. Gen. Patterson at the head of this detachment, made his way good over the river Savannah, and through the intermediate country, and soon after joined Sir Henry Clinton near the banks of Ashley river.

It was not until the 29th of March, that the advance of the royal army crossed that river at the ferry, and landed on Charleston Neck, some miles above. On the following day the British troops encamped in front of the American lines; and on the 1st of April, began to break ground before Charleston, at the distance of about one thousand yards from the American works.

The tedious passage from New-York to Tybee, and the slow advance of the royal army, after they had landed, gave the Americans time not only to strengthen, but greatly to enlarge the defences of Charleston. A chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries, was thrown up extending from Ashley, to Cooper river, upon which were mounted upwards of eighty pieces of cannon and mortars. In front of the whole, was a strong abbatiss, and a wet ditch made by passing a canal from the heads of swamps, which run in opposite directions. Between the lines and the abbatiss, deep holes were dug at short intervals. The works on the right and left, were not only of great strength, but advanced so far beyond the range of the intermediate line, as to enfilade the canal, almost from one end to the other: and in the centre was a hornwork of masonry, which being closed during the siege, formed a kind of citadel. Works were also thrown up

on all sides of the town, were a landing was practicable. But, besides those numerous batteries, Charleston was still more effectually protected by the bar, or sand bank, at the mouth of the inlet that led from the sea. This bar could not be passed by large ships of war, and the entry of others was rendered difficult and dangerous. The American commodore, Whipple, occupied the station which commanded the bar, with a squadron of of nine sail; the largest carrying forty-four, and the smallest sixteen guns.

Great expectations were at first entertained, of the successful defence of the bar, from the advantageous position of the American squadron; but, on further examination, this was found to be impracticable. Commodore Whipple, therefore fell back to fort Moultrie, and afterwards to Charleston, and the crew and guns of all his vessels, except one, were put on shore to reinforce the batteries. To prevent the British armed vessels from running into Cooper river, eleven vessels were sunk across the mouth of it. This was a most important precaution; for had the British fleet been permitted to gain possession of Cooper river, their largest ships might have been so stationed as to rake the American lines, and to interrupt the only communication, that remained between the town and country.

Commodore Whipple having quitted his station, admiral Arbuthnot entered the bar. On the the 9th of April he weighed anchor, at five fathom hole, and with the advantage of a strong southerly wind, and flowing tide, passed with his ships the fire of fort Moultrie, with very little loss, and their entry into Cooper river being precluded, they anchored near the remains of fort Johnson. This squadron consisted of the Renown of fifty, the Romulus, and Roebuck, each of forty-four guns; the Richmond, Blonde, Raleigh and Virginia, frigates, and the Sandwich armed ship. The same day on which this fleet passed fort Moultrie, the first parallel of the besiegers was finished; and the town being now almost completely invested, both by sea and land, the British commanders summoned Gen. Lincoln to surrender. His answer was short, but firm, declaring that he would defend the town to the last extremity.

The batteries of the first parallel were opened upon the town, which did some execution; but still the communication between the country and the garrison was kept open

across Cooper river. The American General, Woodford, passed this river with seven hundred men, and entered the town on the very day on which the summons was sent to Gen. Lincoln. Nevertheless, the regular force in the garrison was much inferior to that of the besiegers, and but few of the militia could be persuaded to leave their plantations, and reinforce their brethren in the capital. In order to keep up the communication between the town and country, Gen. Lincoln had left his cavalry without the lines, with orders to traverse and keep open the country to the eastward of Cooper river; and the militia without the lines were requested to rendezvous there; but Sir Henry Clinton, after having secured his own communications with the sea, detached Colonel Webster, with one thousand, four hundred men, to cut off those of the Americans. The advanced guard of this detachment, composed of Tarleton's legion and Ferguson's corps, in the night of the fourteenth of April, surprised the American cavalry, with the militia attached to them, at Biggin's Bridge, near Monk's corner, thirty-two miles from Charleston, and completely routed and dispersed them.

After this defeat, the British extended themselves to the eastward of Cooper river, and the arrival of a reinforcement of 3000 men from New-York, enabled Sir Henry Clinton to send more considerable detachments to the Eastward of Cooper river, so as to cut off from the garrison all reasonable hopes of effecting a retreat. By the advice of a council of war, offers of capitulation were made to Sir Henry Clinton, which he instantly rejected, but the garrison adhered to them, in hopes that succours would arrive from the neighbouring states. In the mean time the besiegers were daily advancing their works: the second parallel was completed on the twentieth of April, and the third on the 6th of May. On the same day, the garrison of Fort Moultrie surrendered to Capt. Hudson of the navy, who had landed on Sullivan's island, with 200 seamen and marines, to attack the Fort by land, whilst the ships prepared to batter it from the water; and, on the same day also, the remains of the American cavalry, which escaped from the surprise at Monk's corner, were again surprised by Col. Tarleton on the banks of the Santee, and the whole either captured, killed, or dispersed.

While thus every thing prospered with the British, Gen. Clinton, with a view of saving the effusion of blood, once more opened a correspondence with Gen. Lincoln for the surrender of the town. But the American commander, wishing to gain better terms for the citizens, demanded a conference; which Clinton refused. The garrison then recommenced hostilities, and the besiegers immediately followed. The batteries of the third parallel opened upon the town, and did great execution. During this fire, which continued for two days without intermission, the besiegers gained the counter-scarp of the outwork, that flanked the canal; the canal itself was passed: and the works were advanced almost to the verge of the ditch. All expectation of succours was at an end; and an immediate assault was to be expected. Under the pressure of these circumstances, a number of the citizens addressed Gen. Lincoln in a petition, expressing their acquiescence in the terms which Gen. Clinton had offered, and requesting his acceptance of them. A flag of truce was accordingly sent out with a proposition to that effect; and the British commander, unwilling to press to unconditional submission a reduced enemy, whom indulgence might yet reconcile, accepted the proposition, and agreed to grant the same terms which had been before rejected. On the 12th of May a capitulation was signed; and the same day the garrison laid down their arms, and Gen. Leslie took possession of the town.

By articles of capitulation, the garrison was to march out of town, and to deposit their arms in front of the works, but the drums were not to beat a British march, nor the colours to be uncased. The troops and seaman were to keep their baggage, and remain prisoners of war till exchanged. The militia were permitted to return to their respective homes, as prisoners on parole; and while they adhered to their parole, were not to be molested by the British troops, in person or property. The inhabitants of all conditions to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their property on the same terms with the militia. The officers of the army and navy, to retain their servants, swords, pistols, and baggage unsearched. They were also permitted to sell their horses, but not to remove them. A vessel was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia with Gen. Lincoln's dispatches unopened.

(To be continued.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF
HORSE.*(Continued from page 210.)*

A NON-COMMISSIONED Officer should be acquainted also with the name of every village within view of his post, and to be able to tell their distance; that when his officer or the commander of the corps visits him, he may give them proper answers.

If the enemy attacks, he should endeavor to draw it from that troop, commanded by an officer, higher in rank than a non-commissioned officer; and should the enemy advance against that troop notwithstanding, he should know how to get into its rear.

Though as I have said, a non-commissioned officer is seldom left to himself, he may be under a necessity of placing *videttes*; of course he should be instructed in this in time of peace, and this is the duty of the officer; from whose field-guard he is detached, as we shall see in the continuation.

Seçt. IV. To instruct non-commissioned officers in making guard-patrols, is a thing principally to be attended to. They should learn how to patrol a village, a wood, a hill, or pass cut grounds unnoticed through occupied places: to secure a safe retreat, or return by a round-about way, and even to divide the troops under their command, and re-unite them at a fixed place. We should teach them how to march in nightly patrols, and not suffer them to stray too far from them; how they are to act in winter-patrols, where they can only follow the common road. All this they should be properly and distinctly shewn at the manœuvres, as such things frequently occur in skirmishes.

Seçt. V. If they can patrol well, they will be able to reconnoitre well, and to get good intelligence of the enemy. Here we should shew them how they are to try any ground; to get slyly up to the enemy, in order to discover its position; to steal up to their field-guards, in order to discover their strength; to creep by night into a village, to learn whether it is occupied; to lie down in a trench or ditch, to listen and observe the enemy at a distance, and suffer them

to march by, in order to give intelligence of their strength, or the way they have taken.

We should, therefore, at the manœuvres act as follows. Sometimes in hilly, sometimes in sandy environs, we should post a strong and sometimes a non-commissioned officer's guard, and make it take different positions on different days, and cover themselves, by field-guards properly. At one time we should command a non-commissioned officer with from 6 to 12 men, according to the situation of the ground, to steal by with his men, or at least with a couple of them, either at a distance or near; teach him how to quit his concealed troop; dismounting himself, giving his horse to another to hold, so as to get forward himself unperceived, in order to observe every thing more particularly. He should have two pistols continually in his hand, that in case he meets a peasant or any other person, he may stop him, by clapping the pistol to his breast, and threatening to kill him, if he does not instantly tell him what he knows of the enemy, or its position; or if he makes the least noise. He may then ask the person he meets, how he shall be able to get up close to the enemy, and unperceived; but should not, on any account, suffer such person to go from him.

We should also instruct the non-commissioned officers, in case they are taken prisoners, to say they are deserters, and this, in order to prevent their troops being searched for and discovered; and as soon as their troops have any reason to suppose, that their officer, or officers, are taken prisoners, by a too long absence, they should retreat and give intelligence of it. They should be practised, therefore in this, that they may be ready and expert at it.

We have occasion sometimes at night, to post field-guards, and make a fire near them; we should therefore shew the non-commissioned officers and privates how to conduct themselves in this. This may be done in day time; and they should be taught how to act, in case they are discovered or attacked by a *vidette* or patrol.

They should learn to reconnoitre an enemy from a distance; to this end, we should send from 30 to 50, or more horsemen from one village to another, and give the officers orders to alter their march often. At this time, the non-commissioned officer, who is in command, being told where the enemy will pass, is to endeavor, to get slyly by them,

without being discovered by the side-patrol, in order to observe their march. Here he should be taught occasionally to creep into a hedge, and let the enemy pass by him, in order to observe their strength; next to draw back, and get forward again, sideways of them; or get up a hill, a tree, or a post, to make fresh observation of their march.

When an *appel* is sounded, they should minutely report what they have seen; how strong they suppose the enemy to be, or how strong the troop is they have observed, to which quarter they have marched, what place they observed them from, and where they changed their route; whether they marched two by two, in platoons, or in whole fronts, and where they halted. And those officers who have the command of the troops, so called the enemy's, should also notice and remember their own motions, that it may be known whether the non-commissioned officers on the lookout, make a true and exact report or not.

The manœuvre ended, the non-commissioned officers should give their report in writing, which should be as plain, concise, and simple, as possible. On the receipt of this report, we should talk to them on the subject with temper, correct them if wrong, and order them to copy it.

Seçt. VI. They should learn to levy contributions in a neighborhood, where an enemy is, to demand hostages, or secure suspected persons. In short, we cannot be too particular in our instructions to non-commissioned officers; and we shall be amply rewarded, if we can, by this labour and attention, make one in every squadron, so clever, as to be able to entrust him safely with a command, and to rely on his reports.

There are many things in which no instructions can be given in time of peace: but to those who are desirous of information and knowledge, we should frequently discourse of and talk such matters over; and should, as far as possible explain things to them, and point out all the ways and means and every advantage to be taken in case of necessity. For instance, we should represent to them, that patrols in an enemy's country, should get the best intelligence possible of their intention, by enquiries among the country-people; for which purpose they are to appear sometimes as friends, sometimes as an enemy: sometimes to use good words, and sometimes threats. Such things cannot be learned at manœuvres or exercise.

I have further to observe, that in the instructions, to non-commissioned officers, we should advance with them gradually, give them time to make their patrols, and to reconnoitre; and should not interrupt them, that they may get a liking for what they are to do; and every thing, as before an enemy, should be made difficult, that they may know how to conduct themselves in time of action.

(To be continued.)

JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH EXPEDITION AGAINST ALGIERS,
IN 1775.

THE Count Alexander O'Reilly, is an Irishman, who began by a sub-lieutenancy in the regiment of Hibernia: he was major of that corps, when he obtained leave to serve a campaign in the French army in Germany. At his return he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and afterwards the post of adjutant, or aide-major-general of exercise was created for him, in consideration of his having introduced the German exercise into the British army. In the Portuguese war, the command of a body of light troops, was given to O'Reilly, who was made a brigadier, before the end of the campaign; and soon after sent out as mariscal de campo, to superintend the rebuilding of the fortifications of the Havannah, which had been lately restored to Spain, by the treaty of Fontainebleau.

His commission being ended, he returned from Cuba; and, being named inspector general of the Spanish infantry, formed a camp, where the king assisted at the manœuvres in person. The monarch was so well pleased with the performance, that he raised the inspector, to the rank of lieutenant-general, and dispatched him to settle the disputes in New-Orleans, where the French planters, refused to submit to the Spanish government. He is the projector of the present scheme, and came to Carthage, to put it in execution; being appointed commander in chief of all the troops assembled in this port. If he is successful, no doubt he will be immediately named captain-general. An order is issued out, prohibiting all discourse on the subject of this expedition, the destination of which remains a profound secret. Count O'Reilly has under his command nineteen thousand eight.

hundred and twenty foot, and thirteen hundred and sixty-eight horse. Costejon brings him forty-seven king's ships, of different rates and three hundred and forty-six transports.

June 15.

The procession of *Corpus Christi* passed along the mole of Carthage, and the fleet received the benediction. The ships, drest out with flags and streamers of various colours, saluted the *Host* with a triple discharge of all their artillery. Our generals, O'Reilly and Sir Philip Richardos, came on board at five in the afternoon. We remained till the

23d,

expecting every day to sail, except that very one we actually did sail. We had seen the wind so often favorable, without our making the least motion, that I began to have my doubts about our departure; which however took place in the night between the 22d and 23d. We kept beating about before Carthage, in the utmost disorder, till the

27th,

when we bore away from that harbor; and, after two days of the strangest manœuvres ever known, by which the fleet was separated into an hundred divisions, all steering different ways, we began to suspect we were bound for Algiers.

30th.

At ten this morning, found ourselves off Cape Cercely, fifteen leagues west of Algiers. All our scattered fleet got together in the night, and made for the land, between Cape Tenez, and Cape Cercely, where we lay to the remainder of the night. We saw fires on all the hills, and along the shore; signals, no doubt, to alarm the country.

July 1st.

At three in the morning, the admiral fired a gun, for us to keep on our course, and at nine we were about six leagues from Bocmeo. At eleven, we doubled Cape Pescado and a little before twelve, the Bay of Algiers opened upon us, where we saw our men of war and missing ships lying at anchor. At one, we could distinguish the town with a spying-glass. Soon after, the Algerines fired some shot from the town and castles, and hoisted several red flags. Came to an anchor in twenty five fathom water. The rest of the fleet came up soon, and formed a most beautiful and formidable show; but I must confess, that the fortifications of Al-

giers, and the dangerous appearance of the coast, were to the full as tremendous. We were in the belief, that we had seen a considerable camp on the east of the river Inrac; and about nine at night, we were confirmed in our opinion, by the lighting of many fires; which in less than a quarter of an hour ran along and set the whole ridge of hills in a blaze. The dead calm which then reigned, and the sweet harmony of two clarinets, that were playing on board a neighboring ship, made me pass a most delicious hour, and forget that all those charms were soon to be changed into horrors. Till midnight we heard a continual firing of muskets, which we were told was the Moorish method of passing the parole. I now learned that the men of war, had come up the preceding evening; that our generals, disguised in sailors jackets, had reconnoitred the coast, and on their return had held a council of war.

At seven, the general sent for the captains of the transports, to withdraw a sealed paper they had received at Carthage, which they were not to open, unless driven off by stress of weather. At five in the evening, he gave out the order for landing the next morning; but the sea running rather high about eight, the expedition was put off. Our commanding officers had orders not to send for cartridges till next day. They are to be delivered out at the rate of sixty for each soldier; which, with twenty-two he received at Barcelona, a pick-axe, a knapsack for provisions, and a tin-box for vinegar and water, besides his arms, will prove an intolerable burthen at this hot season of the year.

3d.

All this day it blew a fresh gale from the E. N. E. which ruffled the sea so much, as to prevent our landing the following night, as the general had proposed. We discovered some new camps of Moors; one in particular, to the eastward of Algiers, which could neither annoy us, nor succor those we intended to attack; but we inferred from it, they were in no want of troops, since they had posts on every side.

4th.

At noon, we had notice given us, that our four companies were to pass on board another vessel; but which it was to be, we were not informed till three; when we were told that five galliots were to take in fifty men each, and the surplus to be passed on board other ships; the captains of

which, were ordered to send their boats for them immediately. The cartridges, not being delivered, occasioned a delay of two hours, spent in great confusion. This affair being at length settled, we went on board the galliots, where we soon had a lively sense of the misery that awaited us. The orders of the day were, that the officers and soldiers should carry four days provision; and at eight at night, they should put off, in order to be able to land next morning on the beach of the gulf of the Badwoman, which is five leagues west of Algiers. Our generals had so often boasted of the plenty that was to follow us ashore, that we longed with the utmost impatience for the order for landing, as we looked upon it as the only thing that could put an end to our sufferings, which hourly increased on board the galliots, whither we had carried nothing but a little bad biscuit, some cheele and wine; most wretched food! besides the horrid inconvenience of not having room to lie down, or even to get up from the bench, we first sat down upon. A dead calm all night. The breeze failed and our landing was once more deferred, by which means both officers and men passed a cruel night.

5th.

Received orders to comply with those given out on the 2d, for the mode of disembarking, now no longer to be attempted at the gulf of the Badwoman; where we should indeed have been in the greatest danger of perishing. The very name denotes the danger we should have had to encounter. All day a smart gale from the east, and another demur; and a second most fatiguing night for the soldiers.

6th.

The plan being now changed, we were ordered at eight, to pass into the galliot that was to be placed on the left wing, with an hundred men of the Walloon guards on board. By some strange arrangement or other, our hundred was made up of two half companies, instead of one whole one. At ten, saw some men of war working out of the line of battle, to get near the shore. The slowness of their motion was no doubt, regulated by the desire they had of attacking three forts on the west, which it was deemed necessary to silence, before we could approach the land; but for what reason had this been deferred for so many days?

We had received orders to land so long ago as the 2d which would have been put in execution, but for the wea-

ther that proved unfavorable, although no such precaution had been taken, nor even any floats prepared for the artillery. Indeed, since that time, they had been at work patching up some rafts.

At noon, the lesser of the two Tuscan frigates bore down within half a cannon shot of a fort that fired upon her. After having examined it, she tacked about, and came along side of her commodore. At half past three, the *Saint Joseph* steered towards the land, and drove within reach of three batteries that began to cannonade her; she returned the fire, but theirs growing very brisk, the *Oriente* was sent to take off the shot of a fort, that annoyed her very much on her starboard quarter. This engagement lasted till eight, without much harm done to either side. The *Saint Joseph* had four men killed and some wounded, among whom was the captain slightly bruised by a splinter: Some of the cannon of the fort were dismounted. The galliots rowed away the two ships which were becalmed. During this action, the Tuscan frigate sailed in again, close under the shore to cannonade some straggling parties of Moors, and a fort at some distance on the left. A Spanish man of war, and a frigate had already attacked this fort, but had prudently placed themselves out of the reach of all mischief; their caution was exemplary and his catholic majesty may safely entrust such dauntless captains with the command of his ships being well assured they will bring them back to his ports whole and untouched. At seven, we descried three Algerine barques, and about twelve shallops with heavy cannon, bearing down upon the *Saint Joseph*. The half galley of D. Ant. Barcelo got under sail in an instant to give them chase, and was followed by five of our galliots. The chase lasted till half after eight, when the enemy retired under the cannon of Algiers. The galliot I was in, was one of those sent out to tow a bombketch up to the Admiral's ship; but the breeze was so strong that we would not row against it, and were obliged to give up the point, and come along side of the admiral, to wait for our orders.

7th.

At four, saw several shallops full of troops going and coming under the stern of the admiral. The major of the Walloon guards, whom I saw upon deck, called out to me, that the affair was put off to the next day, and that he would

take care to have boats for our hundred men. The poor soldiers, were quite cast down with the wretchedness of their situation; and it must be acknowledged, that to leave them four days, and as many nights, on a beach exposed to the violent heats and unwholesome damps of the coast of Africa, and to give them nothing to eat but bad bread and cheese, was but a sorry preparation for an enterprize that required strength of body and vigor of mind. Their officers were not much better off. The master of our barque did every thing in his power to alleviate our distresses; but this kind of vessel is so exceedingly inconvenient, that we were obliged to lie on the floor; and its cookery so nauseous, that, even in our miserable condition, we never could get any thing down but a little soup.

At nine, I went on board the ship where Gen. O'Reilly was, and learned that the attack had been deferred, because many detachments had not been punctual to their hour. On this account, he ordered all the barques with the grenadiers and battalions destined for the first embarkation, to be along side of the admiral precisely at eight in the evening, in order to set off at day-break, when the signal was to be given. The bomb-ketches were put in readiness, and the galliots had orders to range themselves behind them exactly at ten. Our commanders seemed to intend bombarding Algiers, but the design was not put in execution, nor have I learnt the reason. Till ten, the boats kept rowing up to the rendezvous, whilst the rest of the fleet drew near the batteries they were to cannonade, to cover our landing. Our inaction this whole day had given the Moors time to repair the damage done the foregoing one, and to put their forts in proper order. The boats our major promised us, did not yet appear; so our master told us we should have his, which, however, could only land part of us at a time.

8th.

At half past three, the men of war began the attack, with sufficient prudence, not to be under any apprehensions of the enemy's balls reaching them. The two Tuscan frigates, and the Chebec commanded by Barcelo, by drawing too near the land, destroyed the beautiful uniformity of the line, formed afar by our men of war and frigates, whose fire was perfectly well kept up; but unfortunately of no manner of service, on account of their vast distance from the enemy. At half after

four, the admiral hung out the signal for going ashore. Seven galliots advanced to clear the beach; they were followed by seven divisions of boats; each division carrying a brigade of soldiers, which was to form itself into a line of battle six deep, as soon as landed; but the boats were thrown into confusion, as they had not been properly separated and disposed, before they left the place of rendezvous. This disorder, which might have occasioned our total overthrow, would have been prevented, had we been provided with boats proper for such an operation. Luckily for us, we met with no obstacles, the least of which would have been fatal to us; and we landed about eight thousand men on the shore, east of Algiers; the boats left us immediately, and went back to fetch the second division, which did not arrive till an hour after; and then only part of the troops could get on shore.

The grenadiers of the army drew up in front, and advanced; but they had not marched an hundred yards, before many of their men and almost all their officers were killed or wounded. Those next them, moved forward to support them, without having time to form their ranks, a necessary consequence of the manner in which they had been put into the boats and disembarked; some companies never could get together, having landed in different places, and by parcels. The light infantry was by this time cut to pieces. The unevenness of the ground we occupied, rendered every sand-heap, a small breast-work, from behind which the Africans fired upon us by platoons, as they kept retiring towards the foot of the hills, about six hundred paces from the sea, where they hid themselves among the woods and gardens.

The General now ordered the left wing to advance. It was just six o'clock, and his scheme was to march the left wing to the brow of the hill, (the right resting on the sea-shore) and then to form a column, and advance about a league further, to the attack of the castle of Charles V. which commands the whole town. The storming of this fort would have ensured the conquest of Algiers. Whilst our left wing marched on with an intrepidity scarce to be expected in so dangerous a position; some battalions of the centre being rather before the rest, drew up in battle array, and with the Spanish guards faced to the right, that they might defend us from the cavalry of the Bey of Mascara. This body of horse

was soon dispersed by their fire, and that of the chebec of Ant. Barcelo. But the Bey of Constantina, who commanded a large detachment of cavalry on our left, seized this opportunity to drive a herd of camels against the head of the Walloon guards. By this unexpected assault, he was in hopes of drawing off their attention, whilst he dispatched a body of fifteen thousand horse, to cut off their communication with the sea, from which we were now pretty far distant. Our corps de reserve wheeling off to the left, drew up to fill the space between the sea and the column of Walloons, who were forming their lines to repel the enemies that attacked them from behind the camels; but the greatest steadiness would have availed us little, nor could we have avoided being broken and slaughtered to a man, as our formation was too weak to resist the impetuosity of such a body of horse, had not Mr. Acton, the Tuscan commander, cut his cables, and let his ships drive into shore, just as the enemy was coming on us full gallop. The incessant fire of his great guns, loaded with grape shot, not only stopped them in their career, but obliged them to retire with great loss.

Being delivered from this danger, we made our retreat towards the sea-side, in such disorder as must ensue from a want of proper commanders, abandoning to the fury of the barbarians our unhappy fellow soldiers, that were unable to keep up with us.

Our general had been busy for the last two hours, throwing up an intrenchment with fascines, earth bags, and chevaux de frize. We continued the work, and, to cover our front and flanks, placed a few eight and twelve pounders that had been of great service to us all the morning, in our different operations. We remained thus the best part of the day, pretty secure from all attacks of the Moorish cavalry, but by no means sheltered from the balls of their carabines; which, carrying at least one third further than our firelocks, killed upwards of four hundred of our men, in this kind of camp. Here I saw our general on horse-back, going about to encourage the soldiers; who stretched out on the burning sands, seemed heedless of the dangers around, and only anxious to procure a little rest to their weary limbs.

By one o'clock, the Moors had finished a battery on the right of our camp; and we were so pinched for room, and huddled together, that every shot took place. General

O'Reilly having called for a return of the killed and wounded, assembled a council of war, in which it was decided, that at four we should re-embark, as the enemy was raising an other battery in front, which we must pass under if we persisted in the undertaking. The Algerines, for want of experience in these matters, suffered us to accomplish our ends undisturbed; And about three in the morning, the last division of the army re-embarked, leaving behind them fourteen field-pieces, two howitzers, some chests of ammunition, and the materials of our encampment, which the enemy broke into, the moment the grenadiers of the rear-guards pushed off from the shore. We left on the field of battle, one thousand three hundred men, and brought off three thousand desparately wounded.

There being unfortunately hospitals only for four hundred men, the boats that had landed the Walloons, were taken up for the reception of the wounded; this occasioned the greatest disorder imaginable in our battalions, who came off as well as they could, in the first boats or tartans they could meet with. They remained in this confusion above four and twenty hours employed, as well as any other regiments, in getting together their disjointed companies.

The Moors, as soon as they had burst into our camp, cut off the heads of all our slain, and carried them off in bags, to demand the premium offered by the dey, for every christian head; they afterwards heaped up the carcases upon the facines of the entrenchment, and set fire to the pile, which we saw burning for two days and two nights.

10th. and 11th.

All hurry; no water to be had, though there were ship-loads of it in the fleet. 12th.

At six, A. M. signal for weighing anchor. Soon after most of the fleet sailed out of the bay.

15th.

At seven A. M. came to an anchor in Alicant road.

31st.

The Walloon guards were ordered ashore, and quartered at Sanjuan. August 10th.

We re-embarked, and 20th.

Landed at Barcelona.

*Taken from Travels through
Spain, in the years 1775, and
6, by Henry Swinburne, Esq.* }

EXTRAORDINARY VALOUR OF THE BRITISH GARRISON,
OF ALICANT IN 1709.*

ALICANT is a city and port, commanded by a strong castle, standing on a rock, at a small distance from the sea, and about sixty-eight miles south from the capital city of Valentia. There was in it a pretty good garrison, under the command of Major-General Richards, which made an obstinate defence against a very numerous army of the French and Spaniards, with a very large train of heavy artillery, and excellently supplied with ammunition. At last the city being absolutely untenable, the garrison resolved to retire into the castle, which had hitherto been esteemed impregnable. They sunk three cisterns in the solid rock, and then, with incredible labor, filled them with water. The troops that retired into it, were Sir Charles Hotham's regiment, and that of Colonel Sibourg, generally called the French regiment, because it was composed of refugees. After some progress made in this second siege, the French saw that it was impossible to do any great matter in the usual way, and therefore contrary to all expectation, resolved upon a work excessively laborious, and in all outward appearance impracticable; which was that of mining through the solid rock, in order to blow up the castle and its garrison into the air together. At first Major-General Richards, and all the officers in the place, looked upon the enemy's scheme as a thing utterly impossible to be accomplished, and were secretly well pleased with their undertaking, in hopes it would give time for the British fleet to come to their relief; yet this did not hinder them from doing all that lay in their power to incommode the workmen, and at least to countermine them.

The besiegers however, wrought so incessantly, and brought such numbers of peasants to assist them in their labours, that they, having in about twelve weeks time finished the works thought proper for this service, by very experienced engineers, and charged them with 1500 barrels of powder, several

* This place was taken by the British in 1706.

large beams, iron bars and crows, and other utensils of destruction, summoned the castle to surrender, March 20th. most solemnly assuring, a safe and honorable convoy to Barcelona, with bag and baggage for every person in it, if they submitted within three days, and prevented the ruin of the castle ; but threatened otherwise, no mercy should be shewn, if any might accidentally escape the blow : and, to demonstrate the reality of their design, they desired the garrison might depute three or more engineers, with other gentlemen of competent skill, to view their works, and make a faithful report of what they saw. Accordingly, two field-officers went to the mine, and were allowed the liberty of making what scrutiny they pleased ; upon which they told the governor, that, if their judgment failed them not, the explosion would carry up the whole castle to the easternmost battery, unless it took vent in their own countermine, or vein ; but at least, they conceived it would carry away the sea-battery, the lodging rooms in the castle close, some of the chambers cut for soldiers barracks, and they very much feared, might affect the great cistern.

A grand council of war was called upon this ; the French message delivered, and the engineers made their report ; the besieged acknowledged their want of water, but believing the British fleet might be sensible of their distress, and consequently under some concern for their relief, their unanimous resolution was, to commit themselves to the providence of God, and, whatever fate attended them, to stand the springing of the mine. The French General, and Spanish Officers, expressed the utmost concern at this answer ; and the second night of the three allowed, sent to divert them, from what they called, inexcusable obstinacy : offering the same honorable articles as before, even upon that late compliance ; but these still were rejected by the besieged. The fatal third night approaching, and no fleet seen, the French sent their last summons, and withal an assurance, that their mine was primed, and should be sprung by six o'clock the next morning ; and though, as they saw, all hope and prospect of relief was vain, yet there was room for safety still, and the terms already proposed, were in their power to accept. The besieged persisted in their adherence to the result of their first council, and the French met their usual answer again ; therefore, as a prologue to their intended tragedy,

they ordered all the inhabitants of that quarter to withdraw from their houses before five o'clock the ensuing morning. The besieged, in the mean time, kept a general guard, devoting themselves to their meditations. The Major-General, Col. Sibourg, and Lieut. Col. Thornicroft, of Sir Charles Hotham's regiment, sat together in the Governor's usual lodging room; other officers cantoned themselves as their tempers inclined them, to pass the melancholy night.

At length, day appearing, the Governor was informed, that the inhabitants were flying in crowds to the westernmost part of the town. The Governor, attended by the above mentioned gentlemen, and about five or six other officers, went to the west battery, to inform himself better. After he had remained there about a quarter of an hour, Lieut. Col. Thornicroft desired him to remove, as being unable to do any service there; he and Col. Sibourg both answered, that no danger was to be apprehended there, more than in any other place; and that there they would wait the event. The Lieut. Colonel remained, because his superiors did, and other officers imitated the same example; but the hour of five being now considerably past, the corporal's guard cried out, that the train was fired, observing some smoke from the lighted matches, and other combustible matter near it, from whence the same ascended to the centinels above. The Governor and field-officers were then urged to retreat, but refused.

The mine at last blew up; the rock opened and shut; the whole mountain felt the convulsion; the Governor and field-officers, with their company, ten guns, and two mortars, were buried in the abyss; the walls of the castle shook, part of the great cistern fell, another cistern almost closed, and the rock shut a man to his neck in its cliff, who lived many hours in that afflicting posture. About thirty-six centinels and women were swallowed in different quarters, whose dying groans were heard, some of them, after the fourth mournful day. Many houses of the town were overwhelmed in their ruins, and the castle suffered much; but that it wears any form at all, was owing to the vent which the explosion forced through the veins of the rock, and the countermine. After the loss of the chief-officers, the government fell of course to Lieut. Col. Dalbeume, who drew out a detachment from the whole garrison, and with it made a

desperate sally, to shew how little he was moved at their thunder. The bombs from the castle played on the town more violently; and the shot rilled every corner of their streets; which marks of their resentment they continued till the arrival of the British fleet, which they had expected so long.

MILITARY MEMOIRS AND MAXIMS.

R E T R E A T.

A FINE retreat is look'd on by many experienced officers as the master-piece of a good General; for which reason nothing should be neglected to make it safe and honorable.

Remember never to halt and surrender your troops to the enemy, if there is a possibility of retreating or defending yourself with success.

You must give to all your troops a rendezvous remote from the field of battle.

After having computed the time necessary for your retreat, with that which the enemy will require to come up with you, gather your troops together, and your prisoners, and march to some strong ground without stopping.

If you have many prisoners, separate them in three or four bodies, and let them march between the squadrons, without arms or spurs; and mount the chief officers, or those who cannot walk, on the worst horses that can be got for them.

If you are obliged to fight again, send your prisoners and booty to some strong place, with a sufficient guard; or send them before, with a party in proportion to their number, whilst you are engaged with the enemy.

Let your retreat be made by ways where you do not expect the enemy; and in your march, put good detachments in the woods, vallies, narrow passes, or other places, which may obstruct the enemy in their pursuit.

Leave three or four troopers and a trumpet, well mounted, at the entrance of a wood, close country, or road at the top of a high ground. The enemy appearing, the troopers shew themselves, sound their trumpet, and oblige the enemy

to march slowly and with precaution ; and then at a certain distance they gallop as fast as they can, and join your army.

If the enemy get before you, and attack your advanced guard, you must sacrifice some of your troops, who are to charge the enemy, whilst the rest of your army marches off with the greatest diligence.

If you can be well informed, that the enemy's advanced guard has marched with so much haste, as not to be soon joined by the rest of their troops, halt behind some eminence, hedge, or other covered place, have your troops drawn up in good order, and suddenly fall on them as soon as they appear : they will be weaker than you, perhaps in disorder too, and you will easily rout them.

Do this always, when you have too little time for your retreat, and the enemy cannot come up to assist their advanced guard ; and attack them always with vigor.

When you are weak, and would not risk a battle, you succeed by temporizing ; by keeping the enemy within their own country, and eating up their own forage ; and if they want the means of supporting a long war, have few or no fortified places, and the country they possess is too small to subsist their army, it is then their interest to give you battle, and it is yours to avoid it.

You likewise may get the advantage of the enemy by starving them, by burning their forage and magazines, by laying waste the country from whence they draw their subsistence, seizing their passes, breaking their bridges, and sending out great parties to surprize their foragers and convoys, and at the same time putting your army in order of battle, to prevent their weakening theirs by sending parties to their relief.

Block them up in their camp by redoubts, small forts, and possessing their passes, if the situation of the country will permit you ; or burn their camp by open force, or by people appointed for that purpose.

To prevent the enemy's starving you, attack their ambushes, possess as much country as you can : make your camp sure by good intrenchments and redoubts, which defend your avenues and communications ; change your camp ; endeavor to be near the sea, or a navigable river ; in a word be master of your rear, and have wherewith to subsist your army.

You put the country under military execution, which refuses to pay contribution ; and you oblige them to it by burning their country, plundering, and taking some of the inhabitants prisoners for hostages.

When a country is suspected, the General must keep some of the principal inhabitants near him, under the pretence of civility.

You seem sometimes to shew fear, to give a greater confidence to the enemy in their own strength, and to make them more negligent and less distrustful of you.

You make a feint retreat, in order to induce them to make some false movement, which may put them in a disadvantageous situation, and give you an easy opportunity of correcting them.

To throw a terror and consternation into the enemy's country, separate your troops into several bodies, as secretly as you can, to execute several enterprizes at the same time. Let it be reported abroad, that your troops are more numerous than they are ; and to confirm that opinion, let bodies of them appear in several places at the same time.

PARTICULAR BATTLES AND AMBUSCADES.

You lie in ambush in woods, gardens, houses, villages, ruins, ditches, hollow ways, and coppices.

Post yourself so, as that you may retire by several ways, in case the enemy should come with a superior force ; and contrive it so that you may quit your ambush without disorder.

Reconnoitre well the place you would chuse for your ambush, lest you yourself fall into one.

Post your sentinels so, that they may see without being seen ; and be very alert, lest you should be surprized. Make two or three ambuscades at the same time.

Put all your troops in ambush, if the enemy can come at you only with a part of their army ; but if they can come towards you with the whole, then make only small ambuscades.

You let single people or small parties pass without shewing yourselves, when you expect some more considerable stroke shall offer : but if they discover you, they must be stopped, and taken into your ambush, till the expected affair is over.

Those who are commanded to attack an enemy in ambush, should march to them by unknown and by-ways ; and the commanding officer should be the only person who knows what he is going about.

SKIRMISHES.

You skirmish to reconnoitre the situation of the ground or place ; to animate your soldiers ; to try their courage, and that of the enemy ; to get prisoners, and intelligence ; to seize or secure a post ; or stop the march of an enemy.

If your army be small, you must give it more front and less depth ; and let the same troops pass several times in the fight of the enemy ; widen your intervals ; let your drums beat, and your trumpets sound, out of sight of the enemy, and where you have no troops.

On the contrary, if you are strong, hide part of your troops behind some cover, and let your front appear narrow, by giving depth to your regiments, or drawing one or more in the rear of the other.

In your skirmishing, you must take care not to be drawn into an ambuscade ; succour your troops often ; and if you think of retiring, let your skirmish grow hotter.

TO SURPRIZE A POST OR QUARTER.

To succeed in this, you must get a perfect knowledge of the place ; entertain good spies among the enemy, in order that if they should get notice of your design, they may make no movement without your knowledge ; and agree on a place with them, where they may bring you their intelligence.

Have three or four light carts, drawn each with one horse, to carry what is necessary for your purpose. In one you may have three or four petards ; in another a little folding-bridge, which may serve as a mantelet or shelter when you pass the fossé ; in another two chevres, or machines to mount your guns with, some large pincers, strong saws, hatchets, hammers, nails, bolts, files, and other instruments of force, such as cricks or jacks, handspikes, and the like. These carts may serve for cover. Add to these, two small pieces of artillery, light and short, mounted on very light carriages, and drawn by one horse each ; and a small mortar, with some cohorns, bombs, and grenades.

When you would surprize the enemy by a sudden and unexpected attack, seize on such passages as may secure your retreat ; be at the place at the hour appointed for execution ; and do not halt too near the place you design to attack, lest you should be discovered by the foragers, scouts, or small parties of the enemy : and whilst you are in action, have a body of troops abroad, to hinder the place from being relieved.

Endeavour to attack the post in flank or rear, and come as near as you can to it without being discovered : cut off their patrols, vedets, and advanced guards.

These sort of attacks are always best made in the night, or at the break of day, or close of the evening ; before the enemy have posted their guards or sentinels, or given any order for the security of the place.

You must not give them time to assemble their troops, but as soon as you are discovered, charge briskly, and enter pell-mell with the enemy. Separate your troops into several bodies, and let them all attack, at the same time in different places.

Force your way immediately to their main guard, seize their place of arms, and push forward to hinder the enemy from deliberating, assembling, or putting themselves in order of battle.

Let your horse gallop instantly to the parade ; where finding no resistance, detach small parties from them to scour the streets, and seize the commanding and other officers ; and whilst this is doing, let another body of horse be ordered to march round the out-skirts of the post, to seize all who would make their escape.

In the mean while the rest of your infantry must march into the place, take post in the market-place, and draw up in order of battle, to be ready to march where there may be occasion.

SURPRISES.

You fall on the enemy by surprize when they march through narrow and difficult passes, when one part has passed, so as not easily to come to the succour of the other ; as in the passage of rivers, or woods, in which you lay an ambush of foot, posting likewise a body of horse near the place they

come out at ; and when part of the enemy are come out of the wood, you charge them in front, flank, and rear ; and you have them at a cheap rate.

ATTACK OF LINES OR INTRENCHMENTS.

When you attack lines, always make a false attack with a small body of men, in order to favor the true ones ; and let your attacks begin precisely at the same time.

Let your attacks be made in the night : the enemy, not seeing your disposition, will not know where the storm will fall, and consequently must keep every place guarded.*

Take care for the above purpose, to carry good store of fascines and hurdles with you ; let your cavalry, as well as the infantry, be well loaded with them, in order to fill up all advanced or other fosses : and direct your men, as soon as they have entered the lines, to open the barriers, and level the line for the cavalry to enter.

Reconnoitre well the enemy's lines, that you may know their situation, and the approaches to them, before you attack.

March briskly up to them with your infantry in two lines ; keep your fire, and to each battalion of the front line, appoint four or five squadrons to carry the fascines and hurdles.

Seem to resolve to attack the intrenchment in the part you last design : let fascines be cut, and other glaring preparations be made : and whilst the enemy is intent on the defence of that part, you march in the night, and slip into their line where they least suspected you.

It almost always happens, that an army which attacks intrenchments or troops in the field with vigour, and is well sustained, finds great advantages over those who defend.

If you apprehend the enemy will attack your lines, keep constantly out small parties, especially in the night, to give you the earliest intelligence of their motions, that you may be ready to receive them.

* See *Ramsley's Turenne*, Vol. II. p. 130, where there is a remarkable attack of lines.

ON THE FITTING OUT OF SOLDIERS.

UNDER the term of fitting out of a soldier, we understand not only his arms and cloaths, but also the manner of his dress and ornaments. Utility is the first thing to which we must look : cleanliness and comfort the second, and neatness the third. Where all three can be united, they certainly should ; but where it is not possible, there neatness must yield to comfortableness, and that to utility.

For the sake of neatness, comfort and utility are often sacrificed. The following remarks and propositions, at least, merit some attention.

OF THE CLOATHING.

- The narrow and short coat is neither good for the cold nor for wet. A cloak, which would reach over the knees, in which the soldier might wrap himself up, but which he might lay aside on the march, and at exercise, would be preferable. It certainly would cost somewhat more, but it would last longer, and then tent-covers and guard-cloaks might be dispensed with.

- Were coats to be abolished, waistcoats must have sleeves, and we might ornament these with cuffs, lappels and collars.

- The breeches are commonly so narrow and short, that with pain and art only, they are kept on the body, tearing away at a little violent motion. They ought to be spacious and reach to the navel.

- The most uncomfortable of all clothing are the gaters. They are so narrow, and have such a quantity of buttons, that a long time is requisite to put them on properly. They are good for nothing but to make the soldier stiff and unhealthy. Those of white linen are eternally to be washed ; those of black linen, which, with wax, are to be kept shining put the soldier to trouble and expence ; those of black cloth are the best, if ever any should be given ; but still better it would be to give them half boots, instead of those uncomfortable shoes and gaters. These are very quickly put on, or pulled off, and are, in dirty weather, very comfortable.

Small cocked hats do not cover the head, and require fastening, some way, to prevent their falling off the soldier's heads at the least motion. Still more uncomfortable are grenadier's and fusilier's caps. These require fastening as well as the hats, and are not of the least use against rain, or a *coup de soleil*. They are insupportable when the sun shines on the tin, and makes it hot; or should the rain run down straight into the eyes of the soldier, he must not alter his position to wipe his face. Another uncomfortable thing is that the soldier never puts this cap on, but when on service, and is obliged to provide a hat, at his own expence, which, on the march, he carries on his back, where it cuts a ridiculous figure, with the cartouch-pouch, his knapsack, and field-kettle, and increases the soldier's burthen, who has a full load without it. What utility or comfort is there in this? Even the ornament, of carrying a shining steeple upon the head, is nothing of moment. At the time when granades were thrown, round and pointed caps must have been of use, in order to throw the sling readier over the head, but of what use are they now, as throwing of granades is no longer in practice? It is to be considered, whether round hats (as most of the Prussian regiments now have) ornamented with a card and feather, would not look as well, or better, and would not remove the uncomfortableness of the common hats and caps.

So far for the form and clothing of the soldier. Now for the colour of it, which is not unworthy of notice. Colours which are soon soiled, and want cleaning, colouring, or washing, are not good for a soldier. He has not time always to clean them; it puts him to expence, and he is obliged to carry with him, besides his other load, brushes and chalk; and the cloth, by continual brushing and colouring, is sooner worn out, than by any other use. Consequently we should avoid, as much as possible, white, yellow, and red. Blue and green are the fittest colours.

In order to ease the soldier in the dress of his head, and promote cleanliness, it would be wise to cut the hair round the head, by this the round hats might be fastened, if it ever requires it, with a ribband under the chin.

By this mode of dress it will scarcely be necessary to keep the soldier in his cloaths in time of danger; because he may be dressed in a minute. What an advantage at a surprise!

The issue of the whole affair may depend upon it. Besides, this dress will give him a more warlike appearance than the present.

OF THE ARMS.

The arms are the only things in which we have been making improvements from time to time ; but there are, perhaps, some more applicable.

The manner in which the bayonet is fixed on the fusil is very unhandy. If it is fastened too tight, it causes difficulty in reversing the firelock ; if too loose, it falls down in presenting the firelock. Before the exercise every thing may be in order, but during the exercise it loses time, and gives trouble to the best disciplined men. How easy would it be to remedy this by an invention, which would keep the bayonet fast till a spring was touched. It is needless to describe that which every one must conceive.

Every one knows that arms, on the march, as well as in camp, are not secure against wet. This might be remedied by a leather cover, from the butt to reach over the lock. On the march the firelock might be carried reversed, and might in camp, on the side of the tent, be stuck by the bayonet into the ground. The falling out of the shot might easily be prevented by fixing the rammer, or any other stick into the barrel. Another advantage from it would be, that at a surprize, every soldier would in a moment, find his own fusil. We know what disorder it causes, if a whole company has to fetch its arms at two *manteaux d'armes* ; and that it is impossible that each soldier, could without loss of time, at night lay hold of his own fusil, which is of some moment to him.

The bayonet-sheaths, which are as long as swords, are superfluous, in war-time at least ; and would be so in time of peace, if reversing of arms was abolished. But still more useless are those little machines for the cartridges, called pouches, or cartridge-boxes ; they are neither handy, useful, nor ornamental. No soldier can trust his cartridges to this machine, if he would not see them spoiled in a few days. Even in the action it serves no purpose ; for, if we fill up more than one row of the holes, the soldier, in haste, often takes hold of two at once. It would be better to save this considerable expence, or apply it to something else. If that

machine was put aside, the cartridge-pouch might be made smaller. A new saving to Government, and more ease to the soldier. Further, the cartridge-pouch has an uncomfortable position on the soldier's back. The cartridge cannot so handily be taken out, and it hinders the soldier's motions. Would it not be better to carry them before the body, as the grenadier non-commissioned officers do? Thirty cartridges, without that box, take a very little space. The other thirty might be carried in the knapsack, or in any thing, applied to it for that purpose.

Those long sticks, called pikes, what a burthen are they to the officers! And how are they serviceable? Would not short fusils look as well, or rather better; and they are useful at the same time?

Perhaps, it may be possible to introduce, among the infantry, small cuirasses, if they were eased of other things in the proposed manner. At least, they would be more useful to them than to the heavy horsemen, who seldom are exposed to the fire of small arms.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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THE FOLLOWING GENTLEMEN HAVE ALREADY HONOURED
THIS WORK WITH THEIR SUBSCRIPTION.
SUCCEEDING SUBSCRIBERS WILL BE PRINTED AT THE
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G. Arnold.
Samuel Allen.
P. Avery.
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B

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