



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331031

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

31 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000680DP (S)

### JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

#### 1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Imad Abdallah
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Emad Abdallah Hassan, Abd Rahman Ba Lahaith, Zabadani, Sayf al-Jamry, Abdallah Emad Abdallah, Aimad, Emad Abdallah Hassan al-Qoraiech
- Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 26 June 1979
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000680DP



2. (U//FOUO) **Health:** Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective but is in overall fair health. Detainee has chronic but stable medical problems. He is a repeated hunger striker with subsequent complications and has a history of chronic pancreatitis for which he is receiving medication.

#### 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

- a. (S) **Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 4 October 2007.
- b. (S//NF) **Executive Summary:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would likely reengage in extremist activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has threatened to kill the guard staff, has expressed support for suicides and hunger*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES  
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
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*strikes, and has been mostly uncooperative during custodial interviews.* Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida, a facilitator, and recruiter of extremists who reportedly swore *bayat* (oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and was selected to be a body guard for the al-Qaida leader. Detainee is associated with an al-Qaida cell in Pakistan (PK) previously controlled by senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016). This cell was reportedly preparing to conduct a terror campaign using improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan (AF). Detainee traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of engaging in combat and trained at al-Qaida's al-Faruq Camp. While in Afghanistan, detainee traveled to Tora Bora, where he probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces before fleeing to an al-Qaida safe house in Faisalabad, PK. Detainee and other suspected al-Qaida members were later captured in this safe house by Pakistani security forces. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

**c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Updated detainee's transfer to US custody information
- Included reporting indicating detainee may have offered training to an extremist
- Included reporting that further proves detainee probably participated in hostilities
- Included reporting on detainee's behavior and actions since transfer to JTF-GTMO
- Added new detainee alias: Emad Abdallah Hassan al-Qoraeich<sup>1</sup>

#### **4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** In 1999, detainee graduated from high school in Aden, YM. From 1999 to 2001, he harvested and sold khat.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ➤CIR 316-09038-08

<sup>2</sup> 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: The narcotic leaf khat (also kat or qat), is an evergreen shrub (*Catha edulis*) native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Khat is classified by the Drug Enforcement Agency

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**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** On 8 August 2001, detainee traveled from Sanaa, YM, to Karachi, PK, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He then proceeded to Faisalabad, where he enrolled in the Jamea Salafia University.<sup>3</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee stayed in the university dormitory for four or five months. While there, he had seven roommates, five Pakistani and two Asian (possibly Filipino). Detainee then moved to an off-campus house with approximately 15 other students. All of whom were Yemeni, with the exception of a Saudi, a Palestinian, a Libyan, and a Russian. Detainee identified the person who ran the house as a Pakistani named Issa.<sup>4</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two al-Qaida safe houses in Faisalabad, PK, on 28 March 2002, arresting more than 30 suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016, and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa safe house, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested detainee and at least 15 other suspected al-Qaida members. At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members, and seized manuals, tools, and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators. The safe houses were operated by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)<sup>5</sup> and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF, to help Arab al-Qaida fighters escape Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup> Detainee and other suspects were first held by Pakistani authorities in a prison near Lahore, PK, and then later at a prison in Islamabad, PK.<sup>7</sup> Detainee was transferred to US custody no later than 23 May 2002.<sup>8</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

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as a Schedule 1 (controlled) narcotic. However, Khat is legal and commonly used in Yemen, detainee's country of origin.

<sup>3</sup> 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002

<sup>4</sup> 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002

<sup>5</sup> Analyst Note: LT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HCS Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests.

<sup>6</sup> TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b), 000680 SIR 26-DEC-2007, Analyst Note: The Issa safe house was also called the Yemeni house and the Crescent Textile Mill house.

<sup>7</sup> IIR 6 034 0144 03

<sup>8</sup> >000680 Initial Screening 23-MAY-2002

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- 600 Pakistani rupees<sup>9</sup>
- 110 Saudi riyals<sup>10</sup>
- \$1 US

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 19 June 2002

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- The recruitment of Yemeni males who travel to Pakistan to study at the Jamea Salafia University
- The curriculum and make-up of the student body at the Jamea Salafia University
- A safe house in Faisalabad that was used to house foreign students attending the Jamea Salafia University

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Based on similar stories by various other individuals captured at the safe houses in Faisalabad, PK, detainee's version of accounts is assessed to be a cover story. Detainee claims that he has never been in Afghanistan and that he only traveled to Faisalabad, PK to study at the Jamea Salafia University. However, reporting from other sources indicate detainee was also present in Afghanistan, trained at the al-Faruq Camp, traveled to Tora Bora, and resided in al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would likely reengage in extremist activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has threatened to kill the guard staff, has expressed support for suicides and hunger strikes, and has been mostly uncooperative during custodial interviews.*

Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida, a recruiter, and facilitator of extremist who reportedly swore *bayat* to UBL and was selected to be a bodyguard for the al-Qaida leader. Detainee is associated with an al-Qaida cell that was preparing to conduct a terror campaign against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan by using IED attacks. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with the intention of engaging in combat, was trained at al-Qaida's al-Faruq

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<sup>9</sup> Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$10.50 US.

<sup>10</sup> Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to \$29 US.

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Camp, stayed at al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses, and probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora, AF.

- (S//NF) Detainee reportedly swore *bayat* to UBL and is assessed to be an al-Qaida member, recruiter and facilitator named Sayf al-Jamry.
  - (S//NF) Abd al-Hakim Abd al-Karim Amin Bukhari, US9SA-000493DP (SA-493, transferred), stated detainee is a member of al-Qaida, who was in Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. SA-493 also stated detainee swore *bayat* to UBL and was selected to be a UBL bodyguard.<sup>11</sup> (Analyst Note: Although detainee was selected to be a UBL bodyguard, there is no reporting indicating he actually served in that position.)
  - (S//NF) Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina, ISN US9YM-000254DP (YM-254), stated he met an individual named Sayf al-Jamry in Yemen. According to YM-254, al-Jamry, a guest speaker at the Sadaa mosque, offered to facilitate YM-254's travel to Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> Shortly afterward, al-Jamry said he could help YM-254 with his travel into Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup> Al-Jamry then helped fund YM-254's trip and the two of them subsequently traveled from Yemen to Pakistan together.<sup>14</sup> YM-254 also stated al-Jamry may or may not have offered him training in Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee and YM-254 held consecutively numbered plane tickets purchased from the same travel agency on the same day for the same flight to Pakistan, indicating the two tickets were purchased at the same time by the same person.<sup>16</sup> Though YM-254 identified the individual he was traveling with as Sayf al-Jamry, the names on the tickets used by YM-254 (listed as Muhammad Ali Hussain) and detainee (listed as Abdallah Emad Abdallah), indicate detainee and Sayf al-Jamry are the same individual.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee may have served as a facilitator in Faisalabad, PK, prior to his capture with other al-Qaida operatives in March 2002. Detainee invited Muhammad Muhammad Hasan al-Odaini, ISN US9YM-000681DP (YM-681), to the Issa safe house in Faisalabad where detainee and numerous other suspects were later captured by Pakistani security forces in a raid.<sup>17</sup> (Analyst note: Detainee's invitation to YM-681 to stay at the Faisalabad house indicates detainee may have facilitated an al-Qaida member's attempts to evade Pakistani authorities following his escape from Afghanistan.)

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<sup>11</sup> 000493 SIR 05-APR-2007, RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0117-07 ISN 493

<sup>12</sup> 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0600 04, GTMO INTSUM 09-JUN-2002

<sup>13</sup> 000254 302 09-JUN-2002

<sup>14</sup> 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002

<sup>15</sup> >000254 302 30-SEP-2002

<sup>16</sup> HARMONY PAK1-2002-805325 30-JUL-2003 (Page 27 and 45), 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002

<sup>17</sup> 000681 FM40 10-SEP-2003

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- (S//NF) Detainee is associated with an al-Qaida cell that was preparing to conduct a terror campaign against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2002 using IED attacks.
  - (S//NF) On 28 March 2002, detainee was captured during raids conducted on two LT operated safe houses in Faisalabad that were sheltering GZ-10016 and more than 30 other al-Qaida fighters. The house where detainee lived was known as Issa's safe house, which housed detainee and 15 other suspected al-Qaida members. These safe houses are assessed to have been used by GZ-10016 to conduct training and produce explosive devices in preparation for a campaign of IED attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.<sup>18</sup>
    - (S//NF) At least two individuals captured with detainee at the Issa safe house had expertise in explosives.
      - ◆ (S//NF) Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), an admitted explosives trainer, stated he observed detainee teaching the Koran at the Issa safe house.<sup>19</sup>
      - ◆ (S//NF) Ravil Mingazov, ISN US9RS-000702DP (RS-702), received bomb training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Camp from mid-August through mid-September 2001.<sup>20</sup>
    - (S//NF) The Issa safe house was operated by LT as part of a network of safe houses used to help evacuate al-Qaida fighters from Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> (Analyst Note: The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz ud-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI). During the US-led campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, the LT provided assistance such as transportation and safe houses to fleeing al-Qaida and other extremists. The LT is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India (IN) and has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets. The Indian Government implicated the LT along with Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM)<sup>22</sup> for the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building. Most recently the LT

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<sup>18</sup> 000691 KB-22-JUN-2002, 000688 SIR 07-SEP-2004, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, 000707 302 11-SEP-2002

<sup>19</sup> IIR 6 034 0196 05, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003

<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 034 1483 03, 000702 KB SUP 20-FEB-2006

<sup>21</sup> TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b), 000114 Lashkar-E-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan-2001

<sup>22</sup> Analyst Note: JEM is a NIPF Priority 2 CT target. Priority 2 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interest.

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- has been linked to the 11 July 2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, IN, in which at least 207 people were killed and over 800 injured.)
- (S//NF) According to open source and other reporting, the residents of Issa's safe house were part of a network poised to launch attacks against American installations and embassies in various countries. The plan had been finalized but was broken up by the Faisalabad, PK, safe house raids that led to the arrest of numerous suspects including its chief, GZ-10016, a key al-Qaida facilitator.<sup>23</sup>
    - (S//NF) Sufyian Barhoumi, ISN US9AG-000694DP (AG-694), stated he recognized detainee from Faisalabad but provided no other information.<sup>24</sup> AG-694 lived at the other safe house raided at the same time as detainee's. (Analyst Note: AG-694's identification indicates some level of association between the two safe houses. Considering the links between the two safe houses and that several of the residents at Issa's safe house had explosives training, it is possible GZ-10016 intended to have the Issa safe house group make the explosives for the detonators assembled at GZ-10016's safe house.<sup>25</sup>
    - (S//NF) Abdul Muhammad Ahmad Nassir al-Muhajari, ISN US9YM-000728DP (YM-728), photo-identified detainee as being in the guesthouse (safe house) in Faisalabad.<sup>26</sup>
    - (S//NF) This house was one of two safe houses controlled by GZ-10016, who was captured in a raid on the same day.<sup>27</sup> GZ-10016 acknowledged knowing detainee.<sup>28</sup> GZ-10016 established remote-controlled detonator training at his safe house, intending to send the trainees back into Afghanistan to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces.<sup>29</sup>
    - (S//NF) Jabran Said Wazir al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA-00696DP (SA-696), reported that detonator training took place at GZ-10016's house under the direction of GZ-10016, probably in support of operational plans ordered by Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026).<sup>30</sup> SA-696 stated that he (SA-696) intended to make circuit boards to be used with explosives for operations against US forces in Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup> GZ-10016 confirmed that AG-694 conducted remote-control

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<sup>23</sup> SAP20020404000045 04-APR-2002, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02

<sup>24</sup> 000694 SIR 18-Jul-2002

<sup>25</sup> IIR 6 034 1483 03, TD-314/44769-04, TD-314/20711-02, IIR 2 103 0142 02

<sup>26</sup> IIR 6 034 0872 02

<sup>27</sup> 000707 302 11-SEP-2002, TD-314/04491-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02

<sup>28</sup> TD-314/20711-02

<sup>29</sup> TD-314/24217-04

<sup>30</sup> TD-314/39716-03, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/30299-03, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/35879-02

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detonator training at Issa's safe house for SA-696 and Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-Sharbi, ISN US9SA-000682DP (SA-682).<sup>32</sup>

- (S//NF) The group detainee was captured with include the following individuals: Abd Hakim Ghalib Ahmad, ISN US9YM-000686DP (YM-686), Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi, ISN US9YM-000688DP (YM-688), and Muhammad Ahmad Salam, ISN US9YM-000689DP (YM-689).<sup>33</sup>
  - ◆ (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operative Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-10014DP (YM-10014), reported he saw YM-686, YM-688, and YM-689 at al-Qaida training camps and guesthouses in Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee, YM-686, YM-688, YM-689 and at least three others detained in the Faisalabad raids told a similar story of traveling to teach and study Islam to explain their presence in Pakistan. None of them have admitted traveling to Afghanistan. Despite their claims, detainee, YM-686, YM-688, and YM-689's presence at al-Qaida associated facilities in Afghanistan, has been reported and corroborated by separate sources.)
- (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of engaging in combat.
  - (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), stated detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight.<sup>35</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee claimed he traveled to Pakistan to attend the Jamea Salafia University in Faisalabad, PK.<sup>36</sup> (Analyst Note: Although the Jamea Salafia University curriculum is a multi-year program, detainee only had a 45-day visa. Detainee's account of traveling to Pakistan to study is assessed to be a cover story to hide his extremist activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
  - (S//NF) Travel documents as well as information provided by YM-254, confirm detainee's claimed August 2001 travels to Pakistan. However, according to YM-254, they then proceeded together to Afghanistan where YM-254 claimed they previously traveled to before their August 2001 trip.<sup>37</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee received training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Camp, stayed at al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses, and probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora.

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<sup>32</sup> TD-314/20711-02

<sup>33</sup> IIR 6 034 0911 04, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002

<sup>34</sup> TD-314/39255-03

<sup>35</sup> 000252 SIR 16-JAN-2003

<sup>36</sup> 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002

<sup>37</sup> 000254 KB 10-JUN-2002, HARMONY PAK1-2002-805325 30-JUL-2003, 000254 302 09-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: YM-254 stated detainee told him he had spent time in Afghanistan before and that he could help him with his travel. In that regard, detainee knew the route well enough to know which hotel in Pakistan to stay in and how to proceed to Afghanistan. Once there, detainee looked up his friend in Kabul, Abu Yahya al-Sharqui, aka Abu Omar, whom they stayed with for a week before detainee proceeded to Kandahar.



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- (S//NF) According to YM-252, detainee trained at al-Qaida's al-Faruq Camp near Kandahar, AF in April 2001. YM-252 reported detainee was in Tora Bora for two months prior to YM-252's arrival in November 2001. Detainee was a "common foot soldier" at the Qatal fighting position, training to be a medic, and left Tora Bora about two weeks after YM-252 arrived.<sup>38</sup> (Analyst Note: The Qatal camp was commanded by al-Qaida facilitator Abu Muhjin al-Taifi (subsequently killed). This camp was part of the first evacuation from Tora Bora which fell under attack by coalition forces.)<sup>39</sup>
- (S//NF) SA-493 stated detainee was at the Arab guesthouses in Kabul and Kandahar, AF with Muhammad Hamid al-Qarani, ISN US9CD-000269DP (CD-269) and UBL bodyguard, Muhammad Naji Subhi al-Mahayawi al-Juhani, ISN US9SA-000062 (SA-062, transferred).<sup>40</sup>
  - (C//REL TO USA AND GCTF) Abd al-Hadi Omar Mahmoud Faraj, ISN US9SY-000329DP (SY-329) reported all Arabs were issued weapons when they entered Tora Bora.<sup>41</sup> Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252) reported individuals could have continued to Pakistan but chose to travel to Tora Bora to fight. YM-252 further stated, "If you were in Tora Bora, you were not innocent. You were there to fight."<sup>42</sup> (Analyst Note: These statements support the assessment that detainee was armed in Tora Bora and participated in hostilities.)
- (S//NF) Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has threatened to kill the guard staff, and expressed support for suicides and hunger strikes within the camp.
  - (S//NF) SA-493 stated detainee has given speeches justifying the actions of detainees that have committed suicides.<sup>43</sup> In a separate occasion, while leading prayer call, detainee encouraged other detainees to continue engaging in hunger strikes.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> 000252 FM40 12-SEP-2003, 000252 SIR 16-JAN-2003, 000252 SIR 04-FEB-2003, 000252 302 17-MAY-2003, Analyst Note: Training at the al-Faruq Camp was conducted in four phases: small arms firing, physical conditioning, map reading/topography, and explosive devices. Generally, trainees completed all phases as a requirement for basic training. Following completion of their basic training, trainees had an opportunity to sign up for specialized courses. The courses available at al-Faruq or other locations included sniper, forgery, mountain or urban tactics, heavy weapons (such as mortars), medical, and assassination/ambush (see NGIC-1139-7046-04 15-Oct-2003).

<sup>39</sup> IIR 6 034 0619 02, IIR 4 201 0845 06, IIR 6 034 0537 03, IIR 6 034 1303 03, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis, Analyst Note: Variants of Qatal include Qataal and Katal.

<sup>40</sup> RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0117-07 ISN 493

<sup>41</sup> >IIR 6 034 0055 05

<sup>42</sup> >000252 SIR 31-DEC-2004

<sup>43</sup> >000493 SIR 05-APR-2007

<sup>44</sup> >JIG INCIDENT 07-MAR-2006 12:50:00

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- (S//NF) Detainee has threatened to kill the guard staff in more than one occasion.<sup>45</sup> Additionally, detainee participated in a riot while chanting the name Zarqawi.<sup>46</sup> (Analyst Note: Zarqawi is probably a reference to Abu Musab al-Zarawi, the deceased former leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.)

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 132 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 11 June 2008, when he was reported refusing to eat. He has 23 reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 17 April 2008, when he was reported throwing feces at the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, attempted assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of 27 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and has 13 so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 21 October 2008.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee's role in facilitating the travel of a prospective extremist reflects knowledge of al-Qaida facilitation and support networks. Detainee's training at al-Faruq and tenure at al-Qaida associated guesthouses in Afghanistan, provided detainee with knowledge of the training curriculum and information on key al-Qaida facilitators and members. Detainee's presence at Tora Bora provided detainee with egress routes from Afghanistan. Detainee's presence in an al-Qaida safe house provided detainee with knowledge of al-Qaida plans, security procedures, and facilitators.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida who facilitated the travel of extremist, to Afghanistan from Yemen. Detainee trained at al-Qaida associated camps and stayed at al-Qaida associated guesthouses. Detainee was at Tora Bora and escaped from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where he resided in an al-Qaida safe house in Faisalabad with other al-Qaida members until his capture by Pakistani authorities. Detainee has knowledge of other al-Qaida members captured with him in the safe house raids and who are current detainees.

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<sup>45</sup> >JIG INCIDENT 18-AUG-2005 09:23:00, JIG INCIDENT 22-JUL-2005 04:44:00, JIG INCIDENT 21 JAN-2003 00:00:00

<sup>46</sup> >JIG INCIDENT 05-MAR-2006 08:25:00

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000680DP (S)

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Al-Qaida facilitators and other members
- Detainee's timeline and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Al-Qaida operational planning, tactics, methodologies
- Terrorist biographical and psychological information
- Detainee's intentions after release from US custody

**9. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 September 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.