

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG 2 February 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

• JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Majed Hamad Al Frih

Aliases and Current/True Name: <u>Majid Hamad Abd Al</u>

Rahman Al Frayh, Jarrah

• Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)

• Date of Birth: 1980

• Citizenship: Saudi Arabia

• Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000336DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has a history of appendectomy and tonsillectomy prior to detention. He has history of human bite wound to his left forearm in June 2005 and was treated with antibiotics. He is on no chronic medications. He has no known drug allergies.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on 20 August 2004.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 20310202

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an Al-Qaida recruit and an official of the Al-Qaida affiliated Al Wafa non-governmental organization (NGO). Detainee reportedly traveled to Afghanistan along with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) associate Sheikh Al Harbi in order to participate in jihad against US forces. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN A SCI SUPPLEMENT.]

4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

- **a.** (S//NF) Prior History: After high school, detainee held no occupation and lived with his parents. He then attended two years of a four-year course in general studies at the University of Teacher's College in Mecca, SA. He received a monthly government stipend of 800 USD for attending school.²
- b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee expressed an interest in volunteering with the Jama Al Tablik organization for many years. (Analyst Note: Jama Al Tablik is assessed to be a variant spelling for the Jama'at Tablighi (JT)). A conversation with Fahad Al Qla'wi (variant Fahad Al Qiyawi), detainee's friend from Mecca, reinforced this interest. At the time, Fahad served as an Imam at the Al Khaladia Mosque in Mecca. Al Qla'wi arranged the detainee's travel to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), for a three day JT conference. Al Qla'wi arranged for detainee to stay at the Hotel Mahar (variant: Mahran). Detainee's father purchased detainee's plane ticket and gave him an additional 1,500 USD. Detainee and Al Qla'wi flew from Jeddah, SA, to Karachi, PK, in mid-to-late September 2001. Akhtar Khann, the main assistant for the deputy of Jama'at Tablighi, contacted detainee the following day and offered to take detainee to Quetta, PK, for sightseeing since the conference would not be starting until the following day.⁴

¹ (FOUO) Al Wafa is an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) Tier 2 non-governmental organization (NGO) counterterrorism Target. NGO Tier 2 targets have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.

² 000336 FBI 302 28-May-2002

³ IIR 6 034 0505 02, (Analyst Note: There is no further information to identify Al Qla'wi. Jama Al Tablik will be noted throughout as the Jama'at Tabligh. JT is also an IICT Tier 2 terrorist NGO target.)

⁴ 000336 FBI 302 28-May-2002

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee and Al Qla'wi flew to Quetta, and stayed for three weeks at a large well-known mosque named either Tabligh or Sadiq. While there, they provided Islamic instructions to those in the community. Detainee reported that he did not socialize with anyone other than Al Qla'wi; ate all his meals in the mosque; and when he was not working, he was cleaning the mosque or reading the Koran. Detainee decided to travel to Chaman, PK, because he was not busy enough in Quetta. He stayed at the Qoban Mosque for three to four weeks performing the same tasks he did in Quetta. In a Friday sermon, the Qoban Mosque imam spoke of a refugee camp located in the town of Boldak, Afghanistan (AF). Detainee traveled to the refugee camp the same day, arriving after sundown. Upon arrival, detainee spoke to a refugee in the camp and gave him 2,000 rupees. Detainee explained that he gave the money as part of the generosity encouraged by the celebration of Ramadan. He added that the act of giving money satisfied his religious obligations at the camp, so he left the same day he arrived.

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

- a. (S/NF) According to detainee, Pakistani police arrested him at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border checkpoint when he returned to Pakistan the night he left the refugee camp. Detainee claimed the taxi in which he rode drove off with his documentation, clothes, and passport. Detainee reported that he had 1,200 dollars worth of Rupees in his pocket and \$200 USD in a bag. Detainee's capture story is assessed as false. Al Wafa Kabul office manager Adel Za Al Zamel, ISN US9KU-000568DP (KU-568), reported detainee traveled with him in mid-November 2001 from Kabul to the Al Wafa storage facility in Lowgar, AF, and then onto Ghazni outside of Khowst where they separated. At the time, detainee continued his travels with Al Wafa director Abdullah Alamatrafi, ISN US9SA-000005DP (SA-005), and Al Wafa employees Muhammad Agha and Muhammad Ajmal. Analysis of detainee's timeline indicates his date of capture would have occurred mid-December 2001. Detainee reportedly transferred to Kandahar Detention Facility on 10 January 2002.
- b. (S) Property Held: N/A
- c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 11 February 2002
- d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on recruiting networks between Saudi Arabia to Pakistan mosques.

6 000336 DA 4237 10-Jan-2002, IIR 6 034 0186 05

⁵ 000336 FBI 302 28-May-2002, (Analyst Note: Boldak probably refers to Spin Boldak, AF.)

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detainee claim to have traveled for religious purposes to Pakistan is assessed to be a cover story. Additional information provided by other detainees significantly detracts from detainee's claimed timeline, locations, associate and activities. KU-568's account of detainee's activities prior to his capture is assessed to be more accurate than detainee's account.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

- **a.** (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an Al-Qaida recruit who traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. He received assistance from Al-Qaida affiliated Al Wafa NGO. Due to his familial relationship to the Al Wafa director, detainee held a position of authority in the organization.
 - (S//NF) SA-005, the former Al Wafa director, reported detainee belonged to a group of jihadists led by Abu Sulayman Al Harbi. The group came to Afghanistan to participate in jihad against US forces and received training in the Kabul Al Wafa office. (Analyst Note: Although there were disagreements between Al Wafa officials and UBL, UBL regarded Al Wafa as a support organization for Al-Qaida.⁷)
 - (S//NF) SA-005 stated that the Al Wafa NGO smuggled detainee, Al Harbi and his group into Afghanistan after the 11 September attacks, and provided them with a cover story. The group entered Afghanistan in preparation for jihad against US/coalition forces. (Analyst Note: Al Harbi is Sheikh Khaled Ouda Al Harbi, the paraplegic sheikh who appeared with UBL, Sulayman Abu Ghaith, and Ayman Al Zawahiri on videotapes recovered from Afghanistan.)⁸
 - o (S/NF) SA-005 stated Al Wafa arranged for individuals to enter Afghanistan through Iran, including detainee's group, with the help of Jamal Al Din (alias Jamaluddin Nasrallah), an Al Wafa employee in Herat. SA-005 reported Al Wafa provided Al Harbi's group of 13 with the Al Wafa cover story.
 - o (S//NF) SA-005 reported many of Al Harbi's group participated in weapons training at the Al Wafa office in Kabul. The training included the AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). (Analyst Note: While the detainee is not specifically mentioned as receiving this training, it is probable that he participated as well.)¹⁰

⁷ TD-314/35332-02, Para #M2

⁸ HR 6 034 0336 02, HR 6 034 0333 02, HR 2 340 6286 02, HR 2 340 6325 02, TD-314/27545-02

⁹ IIR 6 034 0333 02, TD-314/09020-02, IIR 6 034 0336 02

¹⁰ IIR 6 034 0336 02, IIR 6 034 0334 02

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

• (S//NF) Multiple JTF GTMO detainees identified detainee as the brother-in-law of SA-005 and as an Al Wafa associate.

- o (S//NF) The following detainees corroborated SA-005's reporting that detainee was his brother-in-law: KU-568, Abd Al Aziz Abd Al Rahman, ISN US9SA-000264DP (SA-264), and Mohammad Basardah, ISN US9YM-00252DP (YM-252).¹¹
 - (C//REL USA AND GCTF) SA-264 also reported Iran-based Al Wafa employee Farial was in charge of guiding Al Wafa personnel from Iran to Afghanistan. (Analyst Note: Farial is assessed as Aminullah Baryalai Tukhiak aka Feryalai, ISN US9AF-001012DP (AF-1012). AF-1012 confirmed that he smuggled men into Afghanistan for SA-005 and Al Wafa. (Analyst Note: AF-1012 probably provided travel assistance to detainee and his group.)
 - (S//NF) SA-264 reported that he saw detainee after the events of 11 September in the Al Wafa office in Kabul, AF. The detainee constantly accompanied SA-005. Although other Al Wafa officials were present, detainee was placed in a position of trust due to his familial relationship with SA-005. Detainee lived in the same house as SA-005. (Analyst Note: This contradicts detainee's claim to have been in Pakistan during this timeframe.)
 - (S//NF) YM-252 reported that detainee was a supporter of UBL and an Al Wafa official.¹⁵
- (S//NF) The Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) designated detainee as a high priority and placed him on their watch list for a previous trip to Chechnya. This report noted detainee departed Saudi Arabia on 12 October 2001 and traveled to Syria. (Analyst Note: The Mabahith reporting contradicts detainee's claimed travel route.)
- (S/NF) In July 2002, a delegation from Saudi Arabia visited JTF GTMO and interviewed detainee. He was identified as of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests. Further, the Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the US determined it no longer wanted to hold him.¹⁷

¹¹ IIR 6 034 0334 02, TD-314/37246-02, 000264 SIR 27-Nov-2004, 000568 SIR 15-May-2003, IIR 4 201 1927 05, IIR 6 034 1173 03

¹² IIR 6 034 0087 05

^{13 001012} SIR 25-Oct-2004, 001012 MFR 8-Jul-2003, IIR 6 034 0087 05, 000264 SIR 27-Nov-2004

^{14 000264} SIR 04-Dec-2004

¹⁵ IIR 6 034 1173 03

¹⁶ TD-314/27545-02

¹⁷ TD 314 30789 02

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been aggressive and non-compliant with the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 50 Reports of Disciplinary Infractions with the last occurring on 29 May 2005 when he assaulted another detainee (SA-493). Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to comply, possession of contraband (food, etc.) assault (major and minor), cross block talking, making threats, and damage to government property. Other behavior notes show that the detainee has threatened the lives of guards and their families on several occasions. In 2005 he has on record 1 disciplinary infraction. The detainee regularly conducts normal PT in his cell (as recently as 17 December 2005) and will often conduct martial arts PT in his cell as well (as recently as 30 August 2005). The detainee's last assault on a member of Camp Delta staff was on 7 August 2005 when he threw water on a platoon leader and block guard, an assault for which he was not disciplined.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- **a. (S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.
- **b.** (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was identified by multiple detainees as being closely associated with the former director of the Al-Wafa NGO, SA-005. Detainee traveled with a group of twelve individuals, including UBL associate Sheikh Al Harbi.
- c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's close association with SA-005 and the other personalities he traveled to Afghanistan with under the cover of Al-Wafa means that he should be able to provide information on smuggling routes, personnel and procedures. Detainee has failed to provide information on his true activities in Afghanistan. Detainee may be able to provide information regarding gaps in intelligence on Al Wafa personalities and activities after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee's travel with a large group indicates a concerted recruitment effort that may also be exploitable.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida and Al Wafa cooperation
- Bios on personalities he traveled with from Saudi Arabia and personalities he came into contact with in Afghanistan and Pakistan to include his 12 traveling companions

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000336DP (S)

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 2 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

JAY W. HOOD

Major General, USA

Commanding