

Def. Doc. No. 1401-N-2

From Nomura to Tōgō  
14 November 1941  
No. 1090

I submit this telegram for your reference only.

With respect to the Japanese-American negotiations, I will, believing in success, do all that I can until the last moment. Beyond that, my state of mind is to do my best and leave the rest to Providence. However, I observe the present situation as follows:

1. As I have repeatedly made report to you, the Pacific policy of the United States is to stop further advance of Japan either to north or to south. This objective she desires to achieve through economic pressure, but preparations for war are steadily in progress.

2. In order to meet the southern or northern advance of Japan, operational and all other preparations are being made and the utmost cooperation is being carried on with the countries concerned. It is the determination of the United States rather to wage war than to concede anything from fundamental political principles she holds traditionally, or to compromise, and it seems that she has no intention whatever of repeating what happened in Munich, which is now branded as a failure. This is the more true by reason of encouragement at the observation that the peak of German power has now been passed, that the Soviet Union maintains its fighting spirit, and that the danger of a separate peace has decreased.

3. With respect to China, ties of alliance become stronger and stronger. The United States gives all possible assistance to China, and will accept nothing which will prejudice the sovereignty of China, even in favor of stabilization of the Pacific. It is, therefore, possible that the China problem may become the "stumbling-block" of the stabilization of the Pacific, thereby bringing the adjustment of Japanese-American relations to end in failure.

4. Our relations with the Axis are very flexible; they can be very close or otherwise depending on the policy of the Japanese Government. The United States, however, believes that Japan is in a position in which she can stab the United States in the back if the situation warrants. The press tends to report on the intimacy of Japan with the Axis, and some papers even go so far as to talk about their unity.

5. In case Japan dares to advance into the south for the sake of her life and self-existence, it is very likely that a war against Britain, the United States and the Netherlands will follow as a consequence, and that the Soviet Union, too, will join it. In such case, Central American countries, among the neutrals, are at the disposal of the United States, and the South American countries will, though reluctantly, maintain neutrality in favor of the United States, it being necessary economically for them to do so.

6. Such a war will necessarily be a long war, in which the winning or losing of local battles will not matter much. It is easy to see that the victor will be the one who holds out till the last.

Def. Doc. No. 1401-N-2

7. The United States is getting engangled in the Atlantic step by step, but up to now she has not gone beyond the convoy operations, so she can concentrate her main forces in the Pacific at any time. Britain, too can, in view of the present state of the German and Italian navies, spare a considerable part of her forces for the Indian Ocean. It has been my expectation that the United States would more or less compromise in the Pacific when she got very busy in the Atlantic, but no such signs have yet been observed. On the contrary, it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility that the United States will first join the war in the Pacific, because public opinion still holds against war with Germany, while there is less opposition to a Pacific war.

8. Although I am not very familiar with the present domestic situation in Japan, I learn through your instructions that the situation is pressing and that the endurance of the Japanese people is reaching its maximum. It may be presumptuous for me to suggest it in such circumstances, but I consider it advisable to be patient and wait for a month or two, if the domestic situation permits, until we get a clearer over-all prospect of the world war.

Please read my telegrams no. 894 and 901 of 3 and 4 October.

辯諭側書體第一四〇一九〇九ニ號

RE TURN  
一〇九〇號

野村、發東邦宛 一九四一年十一月十四日第

本電、蒙大臣限リ御含ミ迄申道ス  
日本交渉ニ付テハ必勝ヲ確信シ最後迄奮闘致スヘシ其ノ上ハ人寡ヲ盡シテ  
天命ヲ待ツノ心境ナ判然ルニ現下ノ情勢ニ付左ノ通り觀測ス

一、既ニ累次報告ノ通り米國政府ノ太平洋政策ハ日本ノ之ル以上ノ南進、北  
進ヲ阻止スルニ在リ而シテ經濟壓迫ヲ以テ其ノ目的ヲ達成セントスルモ  
戦争ニ對スル準備ハ著々進メ居レリ  
二、即チ日本力南進又ハ北進スル場合ニ對シ作戦其ノ他萬般ノ準備ヲ爲シ開  
保國トハ極力協力シ米國ノ信條タル政治的根本原則ヲ顧り妥協スル位ナ  
ラハ等戦争ヲ辟セサル覺悟ニシテ今ノ所失敗ナリシト刻印ヲ押ス數年前  
前ノ「ミュンヘン」會議ノ如キコトヲ繰返ス意思アリトハ思ハルス殊ニ  
最近ハ獨逸全盛ノ時モ況エタリト認メ蘇聯ノ戰意ハ今猶現存シ與潤講和ノ危  
セラル

三、支那ニ對シアハ逐日愈々與國關係トナリ事情許ス限り援助ヲ爲シツツアリ太平洋安定ノ爲ニ支那ノ主權ニ累ヲ及ホスカ如仲條件ヲ承認シ得サル立場ニ在リト認メラル故ニ支那同様カ太平洋安定ノ「スタンブリング」アロツク」トナリ其ノ爲ニハ日米國交訂節度亦不可謂トナリ得ル次第ナ

四、権輦關係ハ日本政府ノ當局次第ニ實リ或ヘ極メテ緊密一體トナリ或ヘ然ラサル如トモアリ極メテ敵遇性アリ然シ乍ラ要スルニ形勢如何仁義リアハ直ニ背後ヨリ米國ヲ刺スノ姿勢ニ在ルモソト認メ居リ斯圖ハ漸次権輦ハトメ緊密化基タシキハ一體化ヲ認ムル様シ充張ナリ  
吾我國力自存自活ノ爲甫造ヲ敢行スル場合ニハ當然ノ結論トシテ對英、米、本蘭ノ戰亞リ且蘇聯者蔵加スルニ至ル公算多キモトナリ居リ南米諸國モ嫌々乍ラ其ノ經濟的生存上居局米側ニ有利ナル中立ヲ保ツニ至ルヘン

六、此ノ戰爭ハ長期トナリトハ必然ノ勢ニシテ一部ノ成敗ハ左程大問題ニアラス最後迄踏張リ得タル者力勝者タルコトモ略々豫想スルニ難カラス

マ米國ハ一步、一步太西洋ニ深入シツツアルカ如キモ該方面ハ要スルニ  
「コンボイ」ニ開港スル作戦ニ止マリ今日ノ形勢ニテハ何日ニテモ主  
力ヲ太平洋ニ集中シ得ヘク英國モ亦獨伊海軍ノ現狀ニ照ラシ可成リノ  
勢力ヲ印度洋方面ニ差向ケ得レニ相違ナク本使ハ元來米國カ太西洋ニ  
忙殺セラルルニ至ラハ太平洋ニ於テ多少妥協氣分トナルヘシト豫期シ  
タリシカ其ノ氣分ハ今ノ所少シモ現レサル次第ナリ寧ロ米政府ハ國內  
問題ヨリシテ對獨戰爭ニ對シテハ今猶若干ノ異論アルニ計シ今日ニテ  
ハ太平洋戰ニ與論ノ反對少キニ觀テ此ノ方面ヨリ之戰スルコトモ充分  
アリ得ヘシト見込ミ置クワ要ス

八 我國現下ノ國情ヲ詳知セサルモ累次ノ貴電ニ依リ形勢ノ急迫ヲ知リ國  
民亦堪忍袋ヲ切リツツアル趣ヲ承知スルニ拘ラスカルコトヲ由上タルハ  
ルハ聯力亂暴ノ誹ヲ免レサルモ本使ハ國情許スナラハ一、二ヶ月ノ通達ヲ  
ヲ争フヨリモ今少シ世界戰ノ全局ニ於テ前途ノ見透シ判明スル時迄辛  
持スルコト得策ナリト國考ス

尙十月三日及四日ノ拙電第八九四號及第九〇一號御一讀ヲ請フ