


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# OFFICERS' CALL

VOLUME 3  
NUMBER 8

Public Relations—  
Your Other MOS





# OFFICERS' CALL

- Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

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# PUBLIC RELATIONS— YOUR OTHER MOS

***We're not all PIO's, but all of us share their duties because our behavior on or off-duty, and our leadership of troops, determine the Army's reputation.***

Captain White, commanding Company A, had his work cut out for him. That morning his commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, had called him in to give him the orders. When he arrived, Major McVey, the S3, and Captain Powers, the Public Information Officer, were seated in Colonel Brown's office.

"White, your company has been detailed to provide guides and instructors for Fort Blank's open house celebration two weeks from today," Colonel Brown told him. "Your men will guide groups of civilians around the post, explain the workings of the various installations to them, and answer their questions.

"I have the general plan of the celebration written," he continued, "but not later than 1200 hours next Wednesday, I want you to submit a detailed plan for the tours. You'll be in command of the escort staff. It will be your responsibility to see that it is well rehearsed. Major McVey and Captain Powers will of course assist you in any way they can.

"Frankly, White," the Colonel added, "I picked you for this job because you're one of my best company commanders.

"Remember, many civilians will be here to see how the Army operates. You and your company will be our public relations men on this project."

There it was: two weeks to acquaint his men—and himself—with the intricate workings of the entire post; two weeks to make sure that they knew the answers to the hundreds of questions that the visitors probably would ask. It was quite an order.

Captain White pondered the Colonel's words as he walked back to his orderly room. "Public relations man?" he asked silently. "What do I know about public relations? I'm an infantry company commander." Then he grinned. "Looks like I just got a new MOS."

## **Not Solely for Professionals**

Captain White was half right. He did have a public relations MOS, but it was not new. He had it all the

time, even though it never had appeared on his Form 66-1.

In a sense, all of us in the Army are like Captain White. We all carry that second, invisible MOS, no matter what our main duty may be, because all of us have a part in Army public relations.

That may seem to be an arbitrary statement; we usually think of public relations as a job for information specialists. The public relations field has its own operating techniques, its own "trade talk."

But we're not talking about that kind of public relations. We're talking about public relations as an everyday reality for all of us—our contacts, as individuals, with people in and out of the Army, and the good or bad effect those contacts have on the Army's reputation.

General Eisenhower once put it this way:

"A well qualified public relations officer can do much to lessen and counteract adverse criticism. However, it should be borne in mind that the impression gained by the public of the Army is largely formed as the result of daily contacts of civilians with officers and enlisted men."

In the Army, just as in any other organization, we will have some kind of public relations. Each of us shares the responsibility of making those relations with our public good. What do we mean by "good" and "bad" public relations? Admittedly, this question isn't easy to answer because public relations is an intangible. Perhaps the best way to examine our public relations is to consider some typical examples of what officers have done in the past. Many of us probably will be surprised to learn that we have done similar things without thinking of them as "public relations."

But before we talk about examples, there is another consideration: Who are the people that we will be dealing with? Who is our "public"?



## Our Two Audiences

There is first our *military* audience, or "internal public" whom we reach through leadership including troop information; the second is the *civilian* audience, or "external public" whom we reach through public information.

Additionally, there is a third element that overlaps these two main groups. It includes people who have been in the Army at some time and who retain an active interest in Army affairs. They may be retired officers and soldiers, war veterans—especially those who are active in veterans' organizations, or Reservists and National Guardsmen not on active duty. That this third element can exercise influence on other civilians is obvious.

What the American people think of the Army will be the total product of our individual actions with members of these groups, so let's examine our relationships with them.

## Separate Yet Similar

These two audiences are separate, yet similar, because our Army is made up of citizens. Unlike the military caste system that was a part of the culture of some European countries, such as the Prussian "Junkers" group, our Army always has been a "grass roots" product. There never has been a class system that divided the military from the civilian in our Nation.

Because soldiers and civilians share a common American background, there cannot be different sets of "facts" for these two audiences. Former Secretary of War Robert Patterson once said:

"The American soldier and the American public are the same people. They are imbued with the same patriotism, share the same heritage of freedom, speak the same language—and I mean that figuratively as well as literally. Both have the typical American desire to learn 'what it's all about'. Both have the typical dislike of the cheap buncombe artist, the weasel-worded prevaricator. It would be a great mistake to assume that the public can be told one thing and the soldier another. Both want the same thing—the facts."

Mr. Patterson underlined a basic truth. The main reason why our military public relations is important is that it directly affects our civilian relations. Here's why: the individual soldier is the most potent Army spokesman we have. When Private Jones is home on leave, he talks about the Army to his parents, his girl friend, the neighbors, and the kid on the corner. To them, he's an expert giving the "inside dope." They

believe him because they know him personally.

In the last analysis, the public will believe what soldiers say about the Army. Our civilian relations can only be as good as our military relations.

## Our Military Audience (or Internal Public)

The Army today is a full-time job. Many of us while in the Service will have little occasion to know civilians except in casual and informal ways. Most of our time, therefore, will be spent with our men and fellow officers—our military community. And as we've noted, our military public relations will have a direct effect on our civilian public relations.

How do we establish good public relations in our military community? Again, there are no stock answers, no rigid rules. But maybe some past experiences of other officers will help guide our future action.

Consider the case of the commanding officer of an Army hospital in a western city. Early in 1947, a public relations storm struck this officer when the local newspaper printed several letters from patients at the hospital and civilians in the city, protesting his alleged mistreatment of patients.

The trouble began when the hospital commander banned all private radio sets from the hospital wards. He did so at the request of many ward patients and their relatives because the noise was interfering with the recovery of seriously ill patients.

The other ward patients did not know why the radios were banned until the commanding officer explained it to the local newspaper. The furor then died down, because the patients agreed that the commander's action had been in their best interest.

This officer realized that he should have told the patients *in advance* why the radios were being forbidden. A few words of explanation *before* the radios were banned would have been worth a hundred words of justification after they had been removed.

## Your Men as Individuals

Many officers say that the core of good military relations is *knowing our men as individuals*. Of course, there are many methods we can use in getting to know our men.

Some company commanders, for example, keep a public information card file on every man in the unit. These card files do double duty—they help the public information officer in preparing hometown news releases and they help the commander in getting to know his men. Here's how they work.



**People tend to judge the  
Army in terms of the soldier ...  
he is the most potent spokesman  
the Army has.**

The average soldier has  
strong ties to the  
civilian public.



His report to the public  
may be ...

**GOOD**



**or**

**BAD**



**.... depending on his military relations!**



As new men come into the unit, the commander meets and talks with them. Then a card is prepared for each man, listing such vital facts as where he was born, his home town, his age, marital status, his civilian job, his hobbies, when he entered the Army, where he served, his promotions, decorations, and awards.

This system has several merits. It gives the soldier a sense of worth when he realizes his commander wants to learn something about him. It assists the commander in learning the background of newly arrived men, and furnishes a handy reference system, helpful in selecting men for promotions, new jobs, and schools. It also provides data to give the public information officer for hometown news releases.

Other officers, of course, find that the card system isn't necessary even at first; they are good at remembering names and personal facts. Furthermore, they point out, the same information can be obtained from the man's Form 20.

Regardless of the system used, officers agree that there is no substitute for personal contact. A platoon leader in an armored company puts it this way:

"I suppose a card system is all right, but I don't use anything so methodical. And I know every man in my outfit by name. I'd consider myself a poor officer if I didn't. That goes for the whole company, not just my platoon.

"I think the non-military things are important, too. Things like remembering to congratulate a man when his wife has had a baby, or writing a letter of sympathy when there is a death in the family."

#### ***Understanding Their Problems***

Every soldier in the Army has personal problems, large or small. On some of his problems, he'll turn to his officers for advice. Depending on our attitude and the way we handle his problem, he will decide whether we are genuinely interested in his welfare or are simply going through the motions.

If we listen to his problem, give him the best advice we can, and sincerely try to assist him, he will have reason to respect our judgment and will seek our help. If he decides, however, that we are trying to "brush him off", he will not turn to us in the future. What is worse, he may believe that "officers just don't care about their men."

Here's a typical soldier's problem and two ways of handling it:

Private Woods, who has been in the Army 6 months, applies for an emergency furlough to visit his sick wife. Captain Smith, his company commander, turns the problem over to the 1st sergeant, saying he is "too

busy" to give it his personal attention. The 1st sergeant, with problems of his own, gives Woods some general instructions but very little active help. The result? Private Woods, with much difficulty, finally gets the order cut and is on his way home—3 days later.

Captain Burgess handles a similar case a little differently. When Private Dunstan applies for an emergency leave, Captain Burgess calls Red Cross authorities, has them check the case, and starts the wheels moving to get the leave approved. The Red Cross verification comes through that evening, and Private Dunstan is soon on his way home.

It is not difficult to understand which of these two soldiers will give his family a favorable report of the Army when he arrives home.

None of us, of course, is expected to be a psychiatrist. Sometimes a soldier's problem will involve mental or spiritual difficulties in which we can offer little direct help. In such cases, our best advice may be that the man see the medical officer or the chaplain.

If we recall our early days in the Army, we'll realize that some of our new soldiers may be going through a difficult adjustment period. Some will be lonely and worried about the future. Whether they come through this period with a better impression of the Army, or are permanently "soured" on the Service, depends largely on us, their officers.

#### ***Keep the PIO Informed***

Soldiers, as everyone else, like to be recognized when they have done a good job. It's good for their morale, and it's good for the Army.

One of the best ways to show a soldier that the Army is interested in him is to notify his hometown paper when he has been promoted or when he has earned some other special commendation or recognition. Normally, this is the public information officer's job. He has a system set up to speed such news to hometown newspapers, but he needs help in collecting this information.

Many officers, therefore, regularly notify the public information officer concerning promotions and awards in their commands, so that news releases can be sent promptly to the men's hometown papers.

It pleases the soldiers to know that their friends at home will be reading about their progress and accomplishments.

Of course, not every soldier activity is news. Some officers have badgered their public information officer with the fancied accomplishments of their men. One newspaper editor wrote recently to a public information officer complaining that he was being swamped



with hometown releases that were insignificant as far as news value was concerned. Samples of such "news" told of men "winning the coveted marksman's badge."

As the editor pointed out, that is hardly news. He knew that most soldiers qualified as marksmen before they completed basic training, even though they are required only to fire the course. In other words, these soldiers were being credited for doing something that they were expected to do in the normal line of duty.

#### ***Help Them With Company Projects***

Soldiers, when they have that indefinable something called morale or esprit, often band together as a platoon, company, or battalion to form a baseball team, have a party, or stage a show. Officers have found that they can help in these projects by arranging baseball schedules, coaching the teams, helping the men complete the details of a party, or getting the costumes for a stage show.

Whenever possible, they try to encourage the men in their units by using the soldiers' talents. The company commander of a quartermaster depot company at a southern post encouraged an artist in his company to make training posters and charts. This same man volunteered to paint murals for the company day room.

At a basic training center in the midwest, a sergeant who had been a cabinet maker as a civilian did an outstanding job making training aids for his company.

Organized sport is one of the best ways for an officer to get to know his men and to develop the team spirit so essential to the Army. Besides helping our men organize schedules with other Service teams, we can very often arrange games with civilian teams, thereby accomplishing a double public relations job. We teach our men teamwork as an essential in battle. We might start by teaching them teamwork in sports.

#### **The Civilian Public**

We know that today, many officers have little time to be on close terms with the civilian public. The demands of military duty make it impossible. There are many others, however, who are in direct contact with civilians every day in connection with their official duties.

Such officers include those on Civilian Component or recruiting duty, the staffs of American embassies and legations, officers in the technical services who deal constantly with civilian manufacturers, and purchasing and contracting officers.

Those of us who are assigned such duty have an unparalleled opportunity for building good external public relations. These are some of the things officers have done.

#### ***Enter Into the Civilian Life of the Community***

In the States, if local conditions permitted, they have joined in the civilian life of the community wherever they have been stationed. Some have joined the local chapters of community service clubs, such as Rotary, Kiwanis, or Lions. They have found that such activities offer excellent opportunities for meeting community leaders on an informal, congenial basis.

Others have joined chapters of the well-known fraternal and veterans organizations, such as the Elks, Moose, Odd Fellows, American Legion, and Veterans of Foreign Wars, or have been active in local church affairs. They have found that another way to meet civilians is to join one of the various athletic clubs in the community. Most of us have some athletic hobby. If golf is our game, we'll find, probably, that we can join the local country club. If we normally golf at an Army course, then we might arrange matches with teams from the civilian club.

Many married officers with children take part in the Parent-Teacher's Association activities in their communities. Probably these officers seldom think of their PTA membership as "public relations." They're interested in the education of their sons and daughters. Yet these same officers are taking part in the community life and that in itself can be good public relations.

We shouldn't overlook the possibility of neighborhood clubs and organizations. Many neighborhoods have their own clubs that are conducted on an informal social level. Besides providing a social outlet, such membership allows our neighbors to know us better and, indirectly, to know the Army.

Suppose we are stationed in a city or town on Civilian Component duty. Chances are that we will be one of the few Army officers in the area. We probably will be asked to speak at various civic functions as an Army representative. Here we have an opportunity to make the Army look good, or an occasion to make it look bad, depending on the way we handle the situation.

A well-prepared, forcefully presented speech can do much to influence civilian thinking. But a rambling, incoherent address can create an impression that Army officers are poorly educated, inefficient, and ineffective.

Army wives can help their husbands build good-will for the Army. In many communities, they join women's clubs, help in the Red Cross and other charitable work, and generally take an active part in the community life.

In short, Army people and civilians are more alike than they are different. There is less feeling of



separation between "service people" and the rest of the community than there once was.

### ***Getting Along Overseas***

We've been talking about civilian public relations from the viewpoint of officers in the States. But what about those of us stationed overseas? Here, even more than at home, our personal public relations are vitally important because our actions reflect not only on our Army but on our Nation.

Many of our allies and the people in occupied countries, who never have been to the United States, judge our Nation by the American soldiers they see. It's obvious that our personal public relations overseas will have a direct bearing on our relations as a Nation with these people.

Officers have a responsibility, therefore, both for their own conduct in a foreign country and for the conduct of their men. If the people in these countries see that American troops perform their duties efficiently, dress neatly, and conduct themselves as soldiers should on and off duty, they will have reason to respect both our Army and the American people.

### ***New Horizons***

There was a newspaper story not long ago about a couple seeking a divorce. They told the judge that both were sound engineers for a recording company and had been in the business together for more than 20 years. The wife testified that they wanted the divorce because they had learned all there was to know about sound recording and now they didn't have anything to talk about.

This somewhat curious explanation has a point: talking shop all the time can be terribly boring, and a narrowing experience as well.

That's why the Army doesn't want its officers to live in a social vacuum, discussing technical matters 24 hours a day. To know and appreciate the Army's over-all role in the life of the Nation, we need to meet people in all walks of life and exchange ideas with them. It's part of the education we owe ourselves. And it's good public relations.

### **Good Press Relations**

Although press relations are primarily the job of the public information officer, there are a number of ways that we can help him promote the over-all objective of better public relations.

There will be times, for example, when we will deal directly with newspapermen. There will not always be a public information officer around to give news to the press. When this happens, there can be no hard and fast rules. We'll have to be guided by the situation and our own good judgment.

Suppose that you are in charge of a truck convoy carrying troops from one post to another. As the convoy approaches the city of Midville, there is an accident. A civilian motorist rams one of your trucks.

The truck tips over and four men are injured badly. The civilian driver is dazed, but not seriously hurt. When an ambulance arrives, the interne orders three of the men and the civilian driver placed in the ambulance. But he shakes his head when he examines the fourth man. He's dead.

At that moment, a reporter and a photographer from the *Midville Times* roar up in their car. The photographer begins popping pictures and the reporter starts popping questions. Your first impulse is to tell them to get along about their business, that this is an Army matter. You're in a spot. What should you do?

If you follow the advice of other officers who have been in similar predicaments, you'll stifle that impulse to sound off. You'll tell the reporter as much as you truthfully know about the accident. He'll want to know the names of the injured, naturally, and the name of the dead man, especially.

You should then explain that you're not allowed to give that information until the next of kin of the dead and injured men have been notified, but that you'll try to get an official release on it as soon as possible.

The reporter should accept this explanation because of the harm that can be done if the relatives read about the accident in the newspaper before they are notified by the Army.

We should always remember this: it will do us *no good* to "get tough" with newsmen in cases of this kind. We would have to give all the information, including names, to the local police anyway and it would then be a simple matter for the reporter to pick up the details from the police blotter.

If we hold out on him, we'll do nothing but make his job a little harder—probably when he's trying to meet a deadline—and he may include in the story the fact that we refused the information.

Here are some other tips on dealing with newsmen when there is no public information officer around:

If we have time, it's good practice to *write out* any statement intended for publication and give it to the reporter as a press release. Then there will be no



question as to what was said or how it was said. Of course, a good reporter probably won't be content with a "handout", and will have other questions, but at least the main facts will be on paper where they can't be misunderstood.

If there are competing newspapers in the community, try to give them an even break on stories. Don't give a story to one paper and nothing to another. It creates bad feeling and leads to charges of favoritism.

And here's a word of advice from a European correspondent for one of our largest newspapers: "As many officers as possible," he says, "should make a real effort to be on simple terms of friendship with as many correspondents as possible." Obviously, it is much easier to work with a friend than a stranger.

### **Create Mutual Respect**

Many of us have heard the story of the American who went to England for a two-month vacation and came back talking with an Oxford accent. That was public relations with a vengeance.

Fortunately, the Army doesn't expect us to go that far in building good will among our civilian neighbors. It does make sense, however, for us to try to understand and get along with our neighbors, no matter where we are.

Americans, regardless of where they live, are pretty much the same people. We have differences, but they are mostly minor. The point is, we tend to agree on the really big, fundamental issues; even when we disagree, we don't ordinarily resort to violence to win a point. It makes little sense, therefore, for us to criticize our neighbors just because their customs are slightly different from ours.

For this reason, common sense will tell us that we shouldn't criticize a town or its people. Neither should we get involved in local political arguments, or compare civilian and Army ways.

One example of how the Army can get a "black eye" is for Army people to compare PX and commissary prices with the prices in local civilian stores. Not long ago, a vendor was going from door to door in a housing project where many Army families live. Many of the Army wives turned him away, explaining that his prices were "too high" and that they could get the same things "much cheaper at the commissary." How do you suppose this vendor felt about the Army?

Commissaries and PX's are not established to compete with civilian merchants. We are therefore doing a disservice to the Army when we compare prices because civilians certainly do not like the implication

that the Army is competing economically against them.

Part of this feeling, of course, stems from our historic belief that the military always should be controlled by the civilian. Our forefathers set up a system of government that would insure that the military always would be answerable to the people, and that a "military clique" never would be able to take over the government.

The answer, in brief, is to create mutual respect. Americans will support their Army only as long as they are convinced that the Army is working for their best interests. We can strengthen this conviction if we let the civilians know that we are handling our jobs in an efficient manner, but at the same time, that we will not interfere with civilian affairs.

### **Public Relations—The Big Picture**

We have considered the public relations problem at the individual level—that is, in the light of what each of us can do to improve our own and the Army's public relations.

There is a considerable field of public relations within the Army, however, that can be exploited fully only by the *collective* action of many officers, working from top command levels.

This public relations might be called "command level" or "higher level". It includes projects that no one officer alone could hope to accomplish. Yet these projects present an ideal public relations opportunity to the Army because many officers, as individuals, will be meeting and working with the public.

One of the surest ways of getting the Army's story across to the public is to take advantage of and support various community projects.

The larger cities usually have science and industrial exhibits annually and the smaller towns have their counterparts in the state and county fairs. These exhibitions and fairs provide excellent opportunities for nearby Army installations to "display their wares".

At an industrial exhibition, local civilian industries set up attractive displays and working models of their machines. Within the bounds of military security, the Army does the same.

Weapons, along with charts, diagrams, and pictures, are set up for the public to see. Post motor officers sometimes show working models of truck, jeep, and tank engines. Army fire fighting equipment is shown. Army instructors are on hand to explain the workings to the visitors.

These displays may be part of a community exhibit; they may be an Army "show" held on the post.

A display of this kind sometimes is tied in with the local recruiting drive, thus accomplishing two missions



# **PUBLIC RELATIONS AUDIENCES**

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
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
**Military**

**2 external**



**3 Ex military**

*of both...*





at once. Naturally, projects like these are approved and directed at higher levels, but the opportunities for individual officer participation are many.

Many post commanders take advantage of the "open house" idea and bring the public to the Army. This, of course, is a public relations promotion that will involve almost every officer and man on the post.

We have seen how successful these open house invitations have been in the last two years on Armed Forces Day when thousands have flocked to Army posts, Navy installations, and Air Force bases to see the exhibits staged by the Services.

Local parades in observance of state and national holidays are another means for the Army—and the individual officer—to promote good public relations at the local level.

Most Americans love a parade. A well turned-out, snappy Army unit gives them a subconscious surge of pride. It is one of the best means of showing civilians that the Army has a real interest in their local civic ventures and, at the same time, it shows them that this is *their* Army—part of the American public, paid for by taxes from all of us.

### **It's Everyone's Job**

As individual officers, we may sometimes feel that we have little to do with Army public relations. But that's not true. Even though public relations policies are set at the top, the policies will only be as good as the people putting them into practice.

We can attain our public relations goal only by teamwork. That means that all of us "get into the act." The Army isn't just a few persons at the top who make policy. It's all of us. Army public rela-

tions cannot be maintained by a few people either. We all share the responsibility.

We've outlined what public relations is. Perhaps now it would be well to reemphasize this idea: we are *not* trying to be public relations *specialists*. That is not our goal.

Because the people created the Army for their protection, they are entitled to the facts about their Army. Our information facilities—one side of public relations—operate to give the people these facts.

Yet even our regular information facilities cannot do the job alone. People tend to judge the Army in terms of the soldier. That's why each of us is the Army's best (or worst) advertisement. That's why each of us, from general officer down to newly commissioned 2d lieutenant, from the oldest sergeant down to the newest private, has a part in public relations.

Public opinion is a double-edged sword that can cut for or against the Army. We are therefore directly concerned with whether we have public support. If we do not have it, our job of safeguarding the security of the Nation becomes much more difficult.

General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up the situation when he said:

"I am thoroughly convinced of the desirability of good public relations in achieving the maximum effectiveness of the Army. No organization so directly concerned with the public interest can hope to escape the effects of popular opinion, nor can personnel of that organization do their best work without adequate knowledge of where they fit in the scheme. My experience has been that the public will tend to support and cooperate with a worthwhile agency on which it has been fully and capably informed. . . ."



**General Eisenhower . . . press relations**

"In World War II the great body of the American and British press representatives comprised an intelligent, patriotic, and energetic group of individuals. They could, with complete safety and mutual advantage, be taken into the confidence of the commander. When this was done the press body itself became the best possible instrument for the disciplining of an individual who violated any confidence or code under which the group was operating. Throughout the campaigns in the Mediterranean and Europe, I found that correspondents habitually responded to candor, frankness and understanding.

"In the handling of the press, the American practice was to provide every facility that would permit an individual to go wherever he wanted, whenever he wanted. While this imposed upon us some additional administrative burdens, it paid off in big dividends because of the conviction in the minds of all that there was no attempt to conceal error and stupidity. These, when discovered, could be promptly aired and therefore did not grow into the festering sores that would have resulted from any attempt at concealment."\*

**General Collins . . . public relations**


"It is the public's business to know what we are doing in the Armed Services because we belong to the public. It is not our Army or our Navy or our Air Force; it is the Armed Services of the American people; it is their Army, their Navy and their Air Force. They are interested in knowing what we are doing . . . they are entitled to know . . .

"We are not going to let them know what we are doing if we simply stay at our stations, if we do not mix with them, if we do not let them understand what we are like, what we are thinking about, that we are human beings just as they are, and that we are only citizens wearing uniforms. Therefore, I feel strongly that at all of our posts our officers and men must join in the community life of the towns or cities nearby. They must get out and mix and talk and associate with the leaders of the communities, and make clear to them that they are responsible as well as we are for our national security . . ."\*\*

\* *Crusade in Europe*. New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948.

\*\* *Public Opinion and the Armed Forces*. Publication Number L48-145, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C., 1948.





## Books

### **A SOLDIER'S STORY\***

By General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

On 7 May 1940, a lieutenant colonel clad in civilian clothes rode a bus down Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D. C., bound for his desk in the Munitions Building.

Five years later the same man, then a four-star general, wrote *finis* to World War II in Europe. As he looked over the situation map in his command post near the Elbe River in Germany, General Omar N. Bradley saw that the 43 United States divisions making up his 12th Army Group were spread over a 640-mile front; he had under his command in the field more Americans than any other general in our history.

How he made this remarkable journey—a journey from the deserts of North Africa to the banks of the Elbe—is told in *A Soldier's Story*,\* a lively and candid account of the war as he saw it. By the author's definition, the book is an explanation of "how war is waged on the field from the field command post."

It is that, certainly, and many other things as well. Three main impressions emerge from this book. There is first the vivid, conversational style relating the grand strategy of war in terms of the men who fought it; second, the sharply etched portraits of Bradley's subordinate commanders; third, the character of General Bradley himself, who—more by suggestion than direct assertion—is seen as both a strategist and tactician in the scientific sense, and as a compassionate human being in relationships with his men.

It would be a disservice both to General Bradley and to future historians to say that his volume of recollections is a definitive analysis of the war in North Africa, Sicily and Europe.

In his own words, "my assertions are statements of opinion, they can be challenged, and they undoubtedly will be challenged. . . . This is the story of a war fought six years ago, unleavened with the passing of time, unseasoned by hindsight judgments. I have tried to tell the story as we lived it, with the prejudices, the obstinacy, the pride, the vanity, and

the sensitivity that afflicted us at that time. To avoid falling into the trap of self-justification, I have deliberately refrained from reading any of the books that have been published so far on World War II."

He would have "vastly preferred to have published this book while on inactive duty," General Bradley says. But the Korean war postponed his retirement plans and he could not "conscientiously expurgate" a story that had to be written "honestly and candidly."

In that writing, General Bradley culled some million words from personal recollections, diaries and documents, helped by his wartime aide and collaborator, Lt Col Chester B. Hansen. From this raw material a first draft of 600,000 words was prepared and this was pruned to the present 200,000 word volume.

Many of his observations on the conduct of the war may be debated in some quarters, the General admits, both in our own Army and in those of our Allies. He cautions us to remember, however, that these are his personal opinions and as such may be believed or disputed in the light of historical evidence.

He says further that "it would be foolhardy for me to assert that every tactical maneuver in the war in Europe was brilliantly conceived and executed. Generals are human; I know of none immune to error. We may have erred in discretion and in judgment, but because we were more often right than wrong in Europe, we can take pride in that campaign and in those colleagues whose judgments we sometimes disputed but whose achievements vastly outweighed their mistakes."

It is in the incisive word-portraits of these "colleagues" that General Bradley reveals himself as an astute judge both of battlefield tactics and of men. Character analyses of such generals as Patton, Allen, Ryder, Harmon, Eddy, and Hodges show that he always was keenly aware that "military command is as much a practice of human relations as it is a science of tactics. . . ."

General Bradley directs some criticism at General

\*New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1951. \$5.00



Montgomery indicating that in the European campaign, at least, Montgomery often was too ready to "tidy up" his front lines rather than press the attack.

After the Battle of the Bulge particularly, he says, he was quite perturbed by Montgomery's report which indicated that the British, not the Americans, had done the bulk of the fighting and had been responsible for stemming the German breakthrough. Regarding this criticism, he adds that he was warned he might strain Anglo-American relations by voicing it now. This General Bradley disputes. General Montgomery, he says, is too good to be harmed by "my few dissenting opinions. Those who would have us uphold the myth of the infallible military commander are those who do Montgomery the greatest disservice."

Professional military men will decide for themselves if they agree or disagree with his character sketches. More important, perhaps, are the hard kernels of common sense soldiering to be gleaned from this book.

General Bradley quickly knocks down the idea that soldiers of one nation are necessarily any better than those of another. He points out that wars are won by the side with the best trained men using the best weapons, by the armies with the best supplies, and by generals who draft and execute the best over-all tactical and strategic plans. In short, there is no easy way to victory.

He has refrained from getting involved in a mass of statistics and details yet he has given the broad picture of what was involved in each of his campaigns from North Africa on through Sicily, France, and Germany in terms of the men and machines needed to do the job. But always, he has stressed the man, not the machine.

His own rise through the various levels of command was rapid, General Bradley points out. He arrived in North Africa in February, 1943, and was assigned as General Eisenhower's "troubleshooter" in the desert campaign. After General Patton took command of II Corps in March, General Bradley became his deputy and in April, took command of the corps when Patton moved up to head the new Seventh Army.

In September of 1943, after taking the II Corps successfully through the Sicilian campaign, he was assigned as commander of the First Army in England. Later, he moved up to head the 1st Army Group also and, in his own words, "wore two hats" for a time. Finally in August, 1944, he took command of the 12th Army Group, which ultimately included the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies.

Enlightening are the General's comments on his period as General Eisenhower's "legman" in North Africa. The word is apt because, like a good reporter,

he went directly to his main source—the soldier—to find out why American troops did not fare better in the early phases of the desert war.

He interviewed hundreds of infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen to learn what was right or wrong about their training and weapons. He found, for example, the half-track an "over-rated vehicle," even though he recalls wryly that one soldier said the enemy machine gun fire didn't *pierce* the light armor—"bullets generally only come in on one side and rattle around a bit."

This and other similar observations make General Bradley's book a kind of battlefield commentary for field commanders. While much of what he recalls unavoidably repeats what is now well-known historical fact, he nevertheless has added an impressive volume to the growing library of World War II literature. It is a book that military men especially will find valuable.

\* \* \*

Because this *Officers' Call* is devoted to public relations, some of General Bradley's remarks on the subject are particularly appropriate. These excerpts are from *A Soldier's Story*:

*On Newsmen and the Public Interest—*

"Two days before the jump-off in this final offensive of the Tunisian campaign, I carted my map-board off to the press camp nearby to brief the correspondents there on our corps plan. This was my first press briefing and it marked the start of a long friendship with many of those hard-working newsmen. Two years later several of that original band accompanied me to the Elbe to celebrate our juncture with the Russians and the end of the war . . .

"Together, they represented the public interest, and they would have been poorly equipped to evaluate our current operations had they not been adequately informed on what was to come. But though they were privy to many of our secrets, not once during the war did a newsman accredited to my command willfully violate a confidence of mine." . . . p. 83.

\* \* \*

*On His Responsibility to the Public—*

"II Corps had moved its CP into a scanty olive grove on the side of a hill northeast of Nicosia [Sicily] when [Lt Col Chester B.] Hansen came into my trailer one evening.

"'I've been talking to Ernie Pyle,' he said. 'He'd like to trail around with you for a couple of days and do a column or two on you.'



"At the time I was still wary of newsmen. Thirty-two years in the peace time Army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and keep my name out of the papers.

"Why don't we get out of it if we can without getting Pyle mad? I'd feel much better off without all that publicity."

"But General, try looking at it this way," Hansen said earnestly, "how many men do you have in the corps?"

"Oh—about 80,000."

"Well—now for those 80,000 troops you've got better than a quarter-million fathers, mothers, wives, and what-have-you in the United States, all of them worrying about these men. A good many of them are probably asking themselves: What sort of guy is this Omar Bradley? Is he good enough to take care of my man? They're the American people, General, and they've got a right to the answer. And believe me, Pyle is just the bird to give them a good one."

"I threw up my hands and laughed. 'Put it that

way and I can't turn you down. When does he want to begin?"

"For the next three days, Ernie Pyle and I were inseparable. . ."

\* \* \*

*On His Relations With His Men—*

"There are those who contend that the best strategist is the commander most distantly removed from his troops. For where units exist merely as symbols on a map the strategist can perform in a vacuum and his judgment cannot be infected by compassion for his troops . . . But because war is as much a conflict of passion as it is of force, no commander can become a strategist until he first knows his men.

". . . Eisenhower found as I did that the well springs of humility lie in the field. For however arduous the task of a commander, he cannot face the men who shall live or die by his orders without sensing how much easier is his task than the one he has set them to perform."



# Talking points

## Notes for the Discussion Leader

### Presentation

We talked about "getting everybody into the act" as a part of good public relations in the Army. So you might try to put that idea into practice during your discussion. You'll find probably that almost everyone in your audience has had some interesting experiences in this field of personal public relations. It would be a good time to let them tell the rest of the group about it. After you start discussing this idea, examining all the various facets of the problem, you may find also that many of the officers will realize that some of the things that they have been doing every day, more or less as routine, have been public relations.

One of the main ideas that you should stress is that you are talking about public relations on the *personal*, not the professional, level. That means simply our relationships day by day, with the people we meet. You should also point out that the kind of public relations you are discussing is not a magic formula or a cure-all for the Army's problems.

### The Personal Problem Approach

We suggest that one way—but not the only way—to present this talk is to start with about a 20 minute explanation of what is involved in the public relations problem. You might use some of the examples from the article of both military and civilian public relations. The shorter you can keep the formal part of the presentation—and still get all the ideas in—the better.

Then you can put your audience to work. Ask each of them to jot down one or two public relations problems that have confronted them during their Army careers. Allow them a few minutes to write their ideas

and then have them read back to the audience their problems. There may be a good deal of duplication, but you'll probably be surprised at the number of different ideas.

As the problems are read, you can ask for discussion among the audience. There may be several comments and questions on what constitutes good public relations; the more the better. Your problem will be to act as moderator and to guide the talk so it doesn't wander from the subject.

If you know an officer in the group who has had either civilian or Army experience as an information specialist, you might ask him to speak for a few minutes to explain the "professional" side of public relations. This would be valuable by way of contrast to the kind of personal public relations that we are stressing.

### Suggested Questions

1. What do you think the goal of our public relations should be, both as individuals and as an Army?
2. Do you think the Army's public relations is generally good, bad, or indifferent? Do you think the American people generally understand and accept our Army? Are they indifferent to it, do they resent certain things about the Army?
3. What do you think of the Army's public relations in your own civilian community? Can you suggest ways that these relations might be improved?
4. Do you think the Army's present methods of informing its public—public information and troop information—are adequate, or would you suggest other methods?
5. What are some things that officers, as individuals, can do to improve public relations besides the things mentioned in the presentation?



## DISCUSSION LEADER'S OUTLINE

### 1. Introduction.

a. Captain White is assigned as escort officer for Fort Blank's open house celebration.

b. His mission will involve meeting many civilians. He therefore will be a "public relations man".

c. An infantry officer, he realizes that public relations is an additional duty for him—his "other MOS".

### 2. All of us in the Army are involved in public relations. It's our "invisible" MOS.

a. Normally our public relations role is in our day-by-day relationships with people we meet. It may be a special occasion such as Captain White's experience.

b. Either way, the kind of public relations we're discussing is the kind we run into all the time. It's what we do in addition to our normal job—not the information specialist's work.

### 3. It's up to us to make these relations good.

a. Public relations is an intangible thing. We can't make rigid rules.

b. But we can profit by an understanding of the problem and how others have met the problem.

### 4. Our two audiences.

a. The military, or "internal public"—the men in uniform.

b. The civilian, or "external public"—others not in the Service.

c. A third element overlaps both main audiences. It includes retired officers and soldiers, war veterans, Reservists, National Guardsmen.

d. Military relations have a direct effect on civilian relations. The soldier is a potent spokesman in his own home town.

### 5. Our military audience is our major audience because the Army is a full-time job.

a. The commanding officer of the Army hospital did not approach his military audience correctly. He should have explained his actions in advance.

b. We should know our men as individuals. The card file system sometimes helps.

c. There is no substitute for personal contact. Non-military things are important too.

d. Understand our soldiers' problems. They depend on us for advice. The cases of Privates Woods and Dunstan are examples.

e. Keep the PIO informed. Send him hometown news about your men, but don't bother him with items that aren't newsworthy.

f. Help the men with company projects—athletics, parties, shows, hobbies. Give the talented men a chance.

### 6. Many officers meet the civilian public every day in connection with official duties. They—

a. Enter community life. (Join clubs, speak at civic functions, athletics, PTA, community clubs.)

b. Act as "ambassadors." Our public relations in foreign countries reflect both on the Army and our Nation.

c. Build good press relations. The PIO isn't always present. (Example of the truck convoy accident.) Write out press releases. Give competing newspapers even breaks on stories.

d. Create mutual respect. Americans are much the same people. It doesn't make sense to criticize customs.

### 7. "Command level" public relations includes those projects that take many officers to accomplish.

a. Exhibits, displays, demonstrations; open house celebrations; parades.

b. But our actions as individuals have a lot of bearing on the public's reaction.


### 8. Conclusion.

a. We are not trying to be public relations specialists. Our goal is to give the American people the facts about their Army.

b. People judge the Army by the soldier. Each of us is therefore a good (or bad) Army advertisement.

c. Good public relations is therefore an individual responsibility. It's everybody's job.



**OFFICERS' CALL SALUTES:****THE 7th INFANTRY  
DIVISION****(North to the Yalu)**

When the 7th Infantry Division stormed ashore at Inchon on 15 September 1950, it returned to a country it had left in peace only a few months before. Elements of this battle-wise World War II division were among the last troops to leave South Korea in December 1949, when defenses were turned over to the Republic of Korea.

Under command of Major General David G. Barr, the "Hourglass Division" swung one combat team south to capture Suwon Air Base and link up with UN forces racing north. The rest of the division pressed on into Seoul.

From Seoul, the 7th battled guerrillas and by-passed Reds south to Pusan. Here they loaded on ships for another amphibious assault high up the Korean east coast. The division landed on 29 October at Iwon in one continuous operation.

After intervention of the Chinese communists in early November, the 7th pushed north to the Manchurian border and prepared to drive west along the Yalu River. A unit of the 7th reached Hyesanjin on the border, 21 November, and contacted the enemy in strength six miles west. After a week of bitter fighting, the division withdrew south.

To help other UN units trapped at the Changjin Reservoir, elements of the 7th then assembled on Hungnam to the southwest. On 7 December, 7th Division soldiers linked up with these forces and began the gruelling escape drive for Hamhung and the sea.

The hills on both sides of the road were alive with communist soldiers, and every inch of the way was contested fiercely. On the 13th, the withdrawal—orderly all the way despite overwhelming enemy strength and sub-zero weather—came under supporting naval gunfire. The worst was over.

Aided by their shortened lines and by Navy guns, the 7th with other UN units held an airtight perimeter around Hungnam so that every X Corps soldier, tons of supplies, and thousands of civilians were evacuated.

From the second week in January to the end of February, the 7th was again in the line, fighting savage battles daily to protect the Eighth Army's right flank and to maintain contact with the ROK forces to the east. By 5 March the division was holding Soksa-ri, and from there was breaking through the rugged mountains to the northwest. By mid-April the division was again across the 38th parallel in force, battling to secure the eastern edges of the huge Hwachan Reservoir. Here, the Reds were stopped cold in their first spring offensive and the 7th pressed north and west along the top of the reservoir to harass a communist build-up further west. Like the first, the second communist spring offensive was stopped and the hill-climbing 7th again drove north.

At this writing the men of the Hourglass Division are still in the line, determined to give the enemy no respite until he learns that aggression does not pay.

\* \* \*

*Activated:* Fort Ord, California, 1 July 1940

*World War II:* Aleutian Islands, Eastern Mandates, Ryukyus, Southern Philippines

*Present Commander:* Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh

*Shoulder Patch:* Red circle with black hourglass superimposed

*Nickname:* "Hourglass Division"




# OFFICERS' CALL

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VOLUME 3  
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7

*Using Our Supplies*





# OFFICERS' CALL

- Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

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## USING OUR SUPPLIES

### Our "Secret Weapon"

In two world wars we've overwhelmed the enemy to a large extent by force of matériel. Our ability to make and transport matériel of war to the battlefield has been a major factor in our winning these two wars. Today, courageous and battle-wise American troops in Korea, with a superiority in weapons, equipment, and other supplies, are defeating an enemy greatly outnumbering them.

Emphasizing the role of logistics in no way detracts from the combat soldier's importance. Rather it points up the only reason for logistic functions: to support and serve the combat soldier. For without his bravery and skill, what we produce and deliver to him is worthless.

In Korea, as in all our campaigns, it is the man with the gun—the combat soldier—who wins the battles. Our logistic know-how has enabled us to give the soldier what he needs to win battles, at the same time maintaining him in combat at the lowest risk to his own life.

They [Russian military leaders] suggested that of all the spectacular feats of the war, even including their own, the Allied success in the supply of the pursuit across France would go down in history as the most astonishing . . .

Regardless, however, of the extraordinary efforts of the supply system, this remained our most acute difficulty.

General of the Army  
Dwight D. Eisenhower  
*Crusade in Europe,\** pp. 309-310

\* New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948 . . .

Pride in our great capacity to supply, however, has created a false belief that in time of war our supply barrel has no bottom. Sufficiency of raw materials and American genius for mass production partly have been the cause for this feeling. Additionally, the troops usually got what they could use—often more than they could use—because the Army has always been quick to add to its own competence in the logistic field by adapting civilian techniques and skills in moving and distributing supplies. Rarely, except sometimes in the early stages of war, have American soldiers had to "do without" for any length of time.

### World War II "In Dollars and Tons"

An idea of the logistics requirements of World War II can be gathered by looking at some of the statistics of that war. From the beginning of the war until 31 May 1946, our Army Service Forces purchased some 69 billion dollars\* worth of war materials, with about half of this amount expended by the Ordnance Corps alone. We produced, for example, 7 million M-1 rifles, 6 million carbines, 2 million trucks, 39 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition, 98,000 railway cars, and 4½ billion atabrine tablets. We shipped 127 million tons of supplies overseas. We backed up every American soldier in the European theater with 17 tons of supplies. In addition, our fighting men in Europe were furnished an additional 6 tons each from the resources of the United Kingdom. Our troops in the Pacific theater got a total of 18 tons each from all sources.

The average American soldier in World War II—and there were about 8 million of them under arms with 90 percent of them overseas at one time or another—consumed an average of 8 blankets, 4 pairs of combat boots, 20 pairs of socks, and 4½ first aid packets.

Each day during World War II we issued to our troops an average of 12 ounces of meat products, 10 ounces of dairy foods, 5 ounces of citrus fruits, 11 ounces of potatoes, and 36 ounces of miscellaneous foods. German troops, the best fed of our enemies, were issued only 7.5 ounces of meat, 6 ounces of dairy foods, 28 ounces of miscellaneous foods, no citrus fruits, and 28 ounces of potatoes.

Today, planning figures envisage the use of some 65 pounds of supplies daily for every soldier in a combat theater. Statistics such as these provide us with a small idea of the type of logistics involved in total war. They also indicate that although the United States is often required to move its supplies half-way around the world, we issue the American soldier more than any other nation can give its fighting men.

At the height of World War II, nearly half of the Nation's production was being used to support our Armed Forces, and those of our allies. Although the Nation's living standard generally was high, there were shortages in the civilian economy. Just how much tighter the American civilian could have drawn his belt and still maintained our impressive rates of pro-

\* *Logistics in World War II*, Final Report of the Army Service Forces, July 1947.



duction, we don't know. We should remember that we fought World War II with an undamaged industrial machine, and that if in a future war we suffer damage within the continental United States from enemy action, some of our critical "war" production will have to be diverted to repair and rebuild our industries.

#### **Supply Discipline**

At any rate, there's a limit to supply. To produce war matériel for us and our allies, we must use large quantities of nearly all our raw materials; we must work production facilities to the limit. And we must cut our standard of living. We'll do this. But we can go only so far in cutting. The rest is up to us in the Service—we must get more out of what we have. It adds up to something we call *supply economy* or, if you prefer, *supply discipline*—the care, preservation, and conservation of supplies and equipment.

Supply economy (supply discipline) is the practice of conservation of matériel by every individual in the Armed Forces, and is developed through training and practice until it becomes habit. It includes conservation, maintenance, safeguarding, recovery, repair, and salvage of food, fuel, clothing, weapons, transport, expendable supplies, and all other supplies and equipment.

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Supply economy affects each member of the Army. It affects us all along the supply chain. It affects procurement, storage, transportation. But it affects us as individuals in the Army *most* vitally after we get the supplies in our hands. That's why we feel it important to emphasize the necessity for rigid enforcement of supply economy during and after issuance of supplies to the troops.

#### **From Rogers' Rangers to Korea**

Logistics have been a part of war since the first tribal leader brought up food and weapons for the next day's battle. As our means of fighting have become more complex, so have our methods of supplying the fighting man. Whether the "fighting side" or the "logistics side" of warfare has grown more complicated is a moot point.

Clausewitz spoke of a "maintenance of the military force" as a necessary condition of warfare. Maintaining the military force—the ability to support a campaign logistically—often has been the decisive

factor in war. Conversely, inability to support the campaign logistically has been the deterring factor shelving many a commander's tactical or strategical plans.

Support of the battle plan has become more and more of a technical feat. Compare, for instance, the logistics situation in the expedition of Rogers' Rangers against the hostile Indian village at St. Francis, Canada, some two hundred years ago, with logistics today. Rogers' force was on an independent mission, operating in hostile, unknown territory. Winter was approaching; it was cold. Plans called for the Rangers to travel about 300 miles and make their way back unaided after the fight.

Operationally, these conditions were similar to those confronting some of our units in Korea last winter.

Each man in Rogers' column carried his own rations—"a whole bologna sausage, bag of meal, two cakes of chocolate, and a canteen of rum." Sixty rounds of "powder and ball" in pouches, made each man his own ammunition train. Medical services consisted of a packet of drugs in the commander's blanket roll and the crude first aid the Rangers could give each other. Any casualty unable to walk was propped up against a tree with his rifle and rations and abandoned.

#### **It Takes More Now**

Using FM 101-10 \* as a guide, our supply planners say troops in Korea now require an average of one ton of supplies per man per month. This indicates our present daily requirements for each man are more than one of Rogers' men carried for a two-month campaign. In addition, essential supplies are often dropped by air to columns advancing faster than their ground supply trains, or to troops otherwise removed from their supply base. As for *services*, contrast helicopter evacuation of wounded and latest battlefield medical techniques with the fate of a disabled Ranger.

In Rogers' day, supply was not much of a problem—if you had the supplies in the first place. Logistics were not overlooked then. But warfare demanded far fewer materials. Transportation was one's own feet for all but the lucky few with horses. Services were few and primitive. The emphasis—like the burden—was on the man.

The emphasis in our Army today is still on the

\* Staff Officers Field Manual, Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data, Department of the Army, August 1949. (Provides planning data for General Staff officers of all echelons.)





*The last lap. Food and ammunition moving "on foot" to forward positions.*

man. And our logistic improvements are designed to make him a better fighter in today's war. The wise leader today—like wise commanders before him—keeps the man's individual logistical burden down to his immediate needs.

### **ABC's of Supply**

Our supply doctrine is based on principles or fundamentals proved in combat. In brief, these are—

1. Supply, like about everything else in the Army, is a command responsibility.
2. Strategy, tactics, and supply are inseparable.
3. The impetus of supply is from the rear—supplies move toward the point of consumption. (Each commander is responsible for making his requirements known to his commander.)
4. Supplies are adequate but not excessive.
5. Supplies and transport are conserved.
6. The supply plan is simple and continuous. Good planners look ahead.
7. To meet the changing conditions of combat, the supply plan is flexible and provides for mobility.
8. Combat elements are relieved of administrative details that can be handled by administrative troops.

Based on these principles, supply operations revolve around these major activities—*requirements, procurement, storage, movement, issue, redistribution, main-*

*tenance, and salvage.* Added to each of these is the function of planning.

### **Plans**

Supply planning concerns each echelon from the infantry squad through Department of the Army. Technical and staff agencies which handle planning at high levels no more free junior officers or noncommissioned officers from their supply planning responsibility than receipt of the battalion order permits the company commander to commit his unit without making a plan.

Higher echelon supply planning guides lower units; imposes limits within which lower units devise methods; but does not cover all details vital to a small unit's success. For example, battalion may distribute ammunition to companies, but companies then devise methods of passing it on to the using troops.

Unlike determining the tactical mission, the higher unit can seldom spell out fully the supply requirements of the lower unit. At best a maximum of critical items is announced and other factors furnished for the lower commander's plans. In the final analysis, it is the immediate commander's job to determine, under existing directives, what his unit will need.

Our supply system, moreover, usually works so well that we expect items as a matter of course. But back of having what we need most of the time is a lot of detailed, long-distance planning. In our long-distance



planning our present mobilization of industry to supply a greater Armed Forces is matching, if not preceding, manpower mobilization. It takes longer to equip a modern military force than to train one. As Secretary of Defense Marshall says, first priority is arms, not men.

The small-unit commander has his own supply planning responsibilities. His requisition procedure is much simpler, but the function still exists. Take, as an example, a platoon leader's request for more ammunition. The platoon leader doesn't wait until his ammunition is gone before he sends back for more. He anticipates in advance when, and where, how much, and what kind of ammunition he'll need and makes his plans accordingly.

In determining our needs accurately and sufficiently far in advance, we can contribute handsomely to over-all supply economy. But we can more than match this contribution by seeing that our supplies are properly handled and properly used, and—when we find we have more supplies on hand than we can use—by returning them to our source of supply. By so doing, we make them available for reissue to others.

#### ***Knowing What We Have***

There were cases in the last war (and probably in every other modern war) where supply depots were crammed with boxes and crates of all descriptions in all states of condition, yet relatively few supplies were moving because no one seemed to know exactly *how much of what* was in each pile. In some places operations were limited for lack of supplies which actually were on hand. At other times, items were shipped from the States on emergency requisitions although they were in ample supply in the overseas depots and dumps, if they could only have been located.

Cognizance of this need for better control of distribution was reflected in the critique at LOGEX 50, the logistic map maneuver at Fort Belvoir last year:

"Better unload 50,000 tons of well-packaged, properly documented supplies, efficiently stockpiled on a beach than bring in 100,000 tons helter-skelter, no matter how badly the troops need the tonnage. In the former case the troops will promptly receive 50,000 tons. In the latter they will receive far less and the effort wasted in handling the greater, but less useful tonnage, may be disastrous."

Knowing what supplies are on hand—how much and where, including those in transit—is a vital element in the supply business.

Because we ship supplies great distances and then

store them in all kinds of weather, the way articles are packaged has a lot to do with determining their condition at final issue. We preserve, wrap, and water-proof various items so that they'll be usable (or edible) when we need them—often long after they have been packaged. We identify the package so that we'll know what we have.

How we handle supplies in transit and storage also has much to do with their condition when the troops finally get them. Efficiency in supply handling and use must start in depots and ports in the zone of interior, and it must continue to the forward area. Broken containers, lost packing lists, and careless stacking can occur all along the supply line—in rear areas just as well as in forward areas.

#### ***Stop the Leaks***

Occasionally along our extended lines of supply are a few men who ignore their responsibilities for protecting military supplies. Sometimes these unsoldierly individuals sell goods themselves; at other times they turn their backs and permit others to steal. Whatever the method, these men are the king-pins of the black market. There could be no illegal traffic in military supplies without the means. Others may steal because they are hungry, but black marketeers in uniform already have everything they need. Army criminal authorities use every trick in the book of criminology to stamp out black markets. But these officials can only make black market operations more difficult. By themselves they can hardly stop black market activities entirely.

Although the responsibility for protecting supplies falls on the man who has charge of them, all of us have an obligation and responsibility for their proper use. "Moonlight requisitioning" for extra supplies or some particular item, or trading a few blankets or cartons of cigarettes for some fancied requirement of the moment can well be the wedge that opens up in the minds of our troops the possibilities for later black market traffic. Anyone with ideas of taking supplies not intended for him needs to recast his views in the light of his responsibilities to his country and to his fellow soldiers.

General Ridgway, in a statement to his Eighth Army, very clearly pointed out the real loser in this grim business of selling the other fellow's supplies. He said: "Any soldier who, simply because equipment and supplies have been provided for him, draws or buys items which he does not need or use for himself, or who *sells*, or *trades*, or *gives* what he does not need or use to any person outside the Armed Forces,



*is cheating everyone who worked to get it to him and —what is worse—cheating another soldier. YOU WOULDN'T SELL YOUR BUDDY'S LIFE—DON'T SELL HIS STUFF."*

In addition to the mechanical side of supply handling, there's a lot in the "golden rule" aspect of it.

#### **Organizational Maintenance**


A private business firm expects its equipment to last a certain time and to be used for specific purposes. It is the same way in the Army. And only by using it properly and by maintaining it properly can we hope to get full "life" out of our equipment. Neglect of maintenance not only costs dollars, but more important in war, it costs men, materials, and services that otherwise could go into making a greater contribution toward victory. It's not the rifle sear which has to be replaced because of careless and unauthorized filing alone that measures the real cost; it's the extra jobs of bringing up another rifle to the

front, repairing the old one, transporting the replacement part from the States, as well as the material and labor to manufacture the replacement part.

Needless replacement uses manpower which should be producing more weapons of war and transporting them to the battlefield. Proper maintenance adds life to our equipment, which is another way of saying we'll need less if we take care of what we've got. The concept of "dollar economy" is abhorrent when men's lives are at stake. No one suggests that troops be handicapped either in battle or in rear areas with damaged or worn out equipment. But it is only common sense to make our equipment last as long as possible. Preventive maintenance is the core of our maintenance system. We, as officers, must practice it with the same fervor we preach it.

It's every soldier's job to maintain his own equipment with every means available to him. Usually this means keeping his equipment clean, properly lubricated, and in good operating condition. It also means

*Supplying our forces half-way around the world. Cases of rations being unloaded at Pusan, Korea.*





turning it in to a qualified technical service maintenance man for repair when the soldier has neither the tools nor the know-how for the job.

Commanders are responsible for seeing that all their men practice this preventive maintenance. Most good soldiers practice the rudiments of good preventive maintenance by what we might call instincts of the profession. The few who don't, can be taught its value by retraining and frequent inspections.

#### *Savings Through Salvage*

Prompt collection of equipment which has been abandoned on the battlefield and in bivouac areas and the use of waste materials are important measures in supply economy. These salvage operations make available substantial quantities of arms, equipment, and other supplies, conserve labor and materials, and consequently cut down on transport.

While we think of salvage as a service function, the responsibility for collection rests on every soldier. It is up to unit commanders to see that salvage is collected and turned in promptly to salvage agencies.

Captured enemy equipment, except new items which must be turned over immediately to technical intelligence, must likewise be collected by the troops and turned in.

#### **Waste**

Next to stupidity, the greatest enemy of an efficient supply system is waste. And waste and stupidity usually go hand-in-hand. We're not a stupid Army. Nor are we deliberately a wasteful one. But our Army is a collection of Americans. And Americans are not noted for their thrift. In maintaining supply economy, the Army then must be more thrifty than its members habitually are.

One of our big planning considerations is to give the soldier only what he needs. For, almost without exception, when he gets on his own two feet, he will dispose of, in one way or another, every unnecessary pound of supplies or equipment he is burdened with. No combat veteran will endanger his survival by lugging more ammunition or equipment than he expects to use. It is most important that combat leaders recognize this situation and make certain that their soldiers carry only what they can use into each engagement. Items likely to be dropped along a rugged mountain path, should be left in the assembly area.

Supply planners realize that when the front-line fighter ditches superfluous items he is merely climaxing a long series of wastages: waste of factory-tool life and industrial labor; waste of transport bringing the

item to the combat area; and, probably most important of all, the wasted opportunity to bring something else to the front line. Here is the "logistics snowball" at its greatest girth. The longer it takes to catch the item and tab it "unnecessary" or "too much," the greater will be the waste.

#### *Moral Stigma of Waste*

Those rare incidents when combat troops have thrown away their weapons are rightly viewed with an "it can't happen here" attitude in all good outfits. The moral stigma should be equally great in service units which lose their equipment during frequent moves, or depot details that damage equipment entrusted to their care; to transportation units which pilfer supplies, or guards who "look the other way," and rear echelon units which supply themselves first, and allow front-line soldiers to go without if supplies are short.

The opportunity to waste is ever present. Take, for instance, one of the most important factors in a soldier's well-being and morale—his food. The Army's food is good; soldiers like to eat. So there should be little wasted food. In an outfit where the food is prepared properly, there is little waste. A good commander constantly checks his mess to see that his men are being fed as well as the situation will permit; he also explains to them the necessity for taking only what they can eat. Men often waste through carelessness. If they know the "why" behind conservation, they'll usually practice it. A good commander not only can *spot* waste, he *stops* it.

By misusing vehicles and other equipment (including cannibalization), by "hogging" supplies, by "shorting" the man up the line, we're adding to the logistics snowball. Worse yet, we're taking something away from the soldier who really needs it.

An important part of the World War II Food Service Program was the reduction of food wastage. Troops were cautioned to take only what they could eat, and garbage was carefully inspected for indications of careless food handling. Kitchen waste was also cut down. For example, a 50 percent savings in the consumption of fat was brought about in July 1943. The savings from this program in 1944 were sufficient to feed 3 infantry divisions for 12 months.

In the United States, after the war, the Quartermaster Corps' master menus reduced the bread ration from 15 to 12 pounds per 100 men. This represented a saving of over 10 million pounds of wheat in 1946. By increasing the extraction of flour to 80 percent in April of that year, another 9 million pounds of



wheat were saved. Savings in various other food items included 76,000 pounds of sugar each month, 50,000 gallons of syrup, 84,000 pounds of flour, and 1,000,000 pounds of bread. All these conservation measures were accomplished without any sacrifice in the adequacy of Army messing.

### **Improving Supply Efficiency**

Work continues daily in bettering our supply techniques. These improvements are mainly "technical"—mechanical means designed to get more out of day-by-day operations. But the supply system is made up of men. And one of the biggest improvements that can be made in the system is improving our soldiers' supply discipline, making them more supply conscious. Saying it another way, it's part of command responsibility to see that supplies are used properly. In supply, as in all other military functions, officer responsibility leads the way.

Ours is a dual responsibility. Because we use supplies it is up to us to set the example. Additionally, we must demand supply responsibility on the part of our men. We must see to it that every ounce of value is obtained from our supplies. This makes it very simple. Individually, we do what we'd have our men do—get the most out of what we have. Men reflect their officers' good supply discipline; they also reflect sloppy discipline. It is especially important that we explain supply economy to our troops. Early, and often, tell men what supply economy is, what it means, why it is necessary, and how troops can practice it in their daily duties.\*

Supply command responsibility, as we know, includes supervision. Not only teach your men how to save, but see that they do it. Each time you straighten out a supply economy violator, each instance of noting and praising conservation will have its effect on all your men.

### **Supply Economy "Battlefield Style"**

The termination of the supply system is the battlefield. This applies particularly to the most important of all our supplies—our weapons. Of course, there's a lot more involved than supply economy in getting the most out of the weapons in your unit. Besides its tactical implications, however, a wasted round means that all the logistical effort in getting the round to your men has been wasted.

\* When his First Army was training to invade France, General Bradley sent a personal explanation of supply discipline to officers of his command, setting an example for all his officers. This message follows the main article in this issue. We recommend it for your study.

Studies of troop performance in battle during World War II indicate that we're not getting the firepower we should out of our individual weapons. A significant number of riflemen just don't use their weapons in combat. In a survey of hundreds of rifle companies, it was determined that only about 25 percent of the riflemen used their weapons against the enemy.

The ultimate in tactics is little more than bringing your firepower to bear on the enemy. Logistically we have the means. It's up to us—the officers and our noncommissioned officers—to see that these means are used. More than wanting "better and quicker-firing rifles"—ours are the best in the world now—we want our riflemen to shoot more often, more accurately, and faster than ever before. There's not much use in having superior production if the results of our production aren't used, and used properly. As is true in just about any job, if we demand and get efficiency from our men, we're helping to put over the basic ideas of supply economy.

### **Extend the "Rifle Complex"**


A front-line soldier seldom neglects his rifle. For generations soldiers have built up an almost fanatical devotion to their individual weapons. It's their passport home. This is a wonderful tradition. But many a fine soldier has unthinkingly expended more care on and held in higher regard a \$70 rifle than a \$5,000 truck delivered to his keeping. Certainly the comparative dollar value means little under shell fire. But the basic cost in men, materials, and services which go into a truck (or any other similar equipment) exceeds the cost of a rifle by about the same proportion. Expand the "rifle complex" in your men and you'll help supply economy immensely.

### **Logistical Commands**

Since World War II, our logistic organizations have been streamlined and improved. One of the most important innovations has been the activation of logistical commands—a balanced grouping of combined services organized for logistical support of combat forces. The logistical command brings the "team" idea to rear-area units. It is based on the fundamental principle that for most efficient operation service troops must be directed by a regular headquarters and staff which have had the opportunity to work together previously.

The logistical command is an important step towards eliminating the situation in which "homeless" service units of all sizes wonder what the score is






**The Army Supply Line**

A portrayal of what's behind movement of supplies to the battle area overseas. Men and matériel move from training centers and factories in the zone of interior to embarkation ports. Arriving at base areas overseas, they pass through other communications zone sections to army areas where the actual fighting is taking place. Although the division zones are probably the smallest in area, they are the most important: Here is the end of the supply chain—the reason the rest of the chain exists.







until an over-worked base section headquarters, trying to organize, plan, and operate, all at the same time, gets around to looking after them, or making use of their services.

Normally most discussions in supply use wind up expressing a desire for a "common" standard of living for all troops. Of course it is physically impossible for front-line soldiers to live as well as those in the rear area. But they should have the food, cigarettes, clothing, and other things to which they are entitled. In fact, because they have it tougher every other way, the front-line troops should have priority on these items. It's up to service troop commanders to get these items up front, even though it may mean shorting some of their own men on items in short supply.

Probably one of the biggest sources of friction between front-line and rear-area soldiers is in the matter of facilities. Certain technical activities in the rear cannot be carried out efficiently under the same primitive conditions which are the usual lot of front-line soldiers. The combat soldier doesn't expect them to be. All he wants is a reasonable, fair share of what he *can* use and what has been *ordered for him*.

#### ***Are Safety Margins Too Safe?***

Efforts at supply economy sooner or later turn to the question of how much of a safety factor, or safety level, we actually need. Playing one hundred percent safe leads inevitably to overstocking and oversupplying. The wartime chief of transportation in the European theater said that on VE Day there were more tons of ammunition piled up in Europe than had been expended from Normandy to the Elbe crossing. Of course, successes on the battlefield—greater than expected—make normally anticipated requirements look like oversupply. In Europe, for instance, if things had been a little tougher—if we had had to fight longer and harder—some of the goods we called "excess" at the end of the war would not have been surplus at all.

Estimating insurance against unforeseen events is every bit as difficult as determining, in advance, tactical strengths needed for various operations. And it is, of course, a much newer science. By judiciously cutting these safety margins, however, we can take a sizeable chunk out of the "logistics snowball." Excess supplies mean excess manpower to produce and care for them, and consequently, fewer men for combat jobs. When our Nation's productive capacity is strained, excess supplies at one spot inevitably mean a shortage somewhere else, or in some other item.

Cutting safety margins is not a problem for supply personnel alone. Combat commanders must be prepared to take the logistical risks involved with the same fortitude they would, if necessary, accept an over-extended frontage. For it is almost certain that the quickening pace of war will, in the future, force us to take far greater logistical risks, if we are to make best use of tactical and strategical advantages. However supply economy, practiced in the fullest measure possible, will aid us to minimize these logistical risks.

#### ***Stock Control***

Closely involved in any efforts to improve our practice of supply economy are our methods for stock control and the proper exercise of our supply responsibilities in connection with it. Stock control requires us to make proper distribution and use of all supplies and equipment charged to us. This doesn't include explaining every rifle bullet expended in combat or a head count at mess, but it does make us keep track of such expensive items as wrist watches, field glasses, and trucks. Even in combat areas, though accounting regulations are relaxed, unit commanders are still responsible for the proper use of equipment.

A common fallacy in the Army is the idea that responsibility "goes only to the water's edge"—that supplies anywhere overseas are to be had for the asking, in any amount deemed necessary, and can be asked for as often as desired. This is not so. Most combat theaters institute formal supply accounting as soon as possible after activation, and handle the issue and replacement of supplies, except in the combat areas during actual fighting, exactly as they would in the States.

By our maintaining accurate stock control, it is possible for supply planners from front to rear to keep stocks above a safe minimum without the indiscriminate dumping that overloads installations and wastes time in rehandling. Additionally, it helps to maintain uniform levels of supplies. It isn't very realistic to build up a 60-day reserve stock of small-arms ammunition and have only, say, 5 days' 105-mm howitzer ammunition.

Lack of adequate stock control was one of the problems in our oversea supply system in World War II. Of the reasons for our stock control difficulties, two stand out. One was the general failure to understand its importance; the other was the shortage of experienced personnel to set up and operate this activity. It takes good men to keep good records, just as it takes good men to keep supplies moving to the front. Record keeping is always tedious—particu-



larly in the combat zone. But if by managing our supplies a little better, we get more Army-wide efficiency, the time is worth it.

### **A Glance at the Future**

The expected fury and intensity of total war may bring radical changes in some of our supply procedures. For one thing, it may mean we'll have to alter the way we establish and maintain supply installations. Dispersion of installations, lack of major ports, and other elaborate facilities are possibilities of future war, particularly in the war's early stages. If the enemy can reach them, huge dumps and installations may be such lucrative targets that we would be risking their destruction if we concentrated them as we've done in the past. Dispersion, however, creates transport problems. It also makes defense of individual installations more difficult.

Weapons of mass destruction, partisan warfare, "fluid fronts," airborne strikes, and other possible characteristics of future war may require all units to become more self-sustaining. Our training is wisely reflecting the concept of "every man a rifleman." Additionally, under continuous study is the organization, weapons, and training of service units so that they can carry on their service jobs properly and still fight off sudden attacks and protect their installations against enemy action. Carrying this program of strengthening service units to the extremes of self preservation, however, would result in a reduction of service to combat troops, also an increase in the troops needed to support the front-line fighter. In carrying out their normal functions as economically and efficiently as possible, service troops may find themselves having to accept greater combat risks just as combat commanders may be asked to go along with greater logistical risks.

We've indicated that supplies in the future may be limited; that we'll have to cut here and there. We've hinted, too, that we may have to reduce various safety factors as the need arises. In so doing, however, we must also try to do everything we can to offset this pinch through effective use of indigenous material and manpower, and above all through the diligent practice of supply economy.

#### ***Faster Transport***

In a previous issue of *Officers' Call*\* we discussed advantages and limitations of air transport. "Can we afford to fly?" loomed as one of our big questions.

\* Volume III, No. 2.

At present the answer must be, only if we can't use ground or sea transport, can't get there fast enough, or can't get there at all by surface means. However, these limitations may be conditions of future war which will make air transport imperative—at least in the war's early stages. And make no mistake about it, building and maintaining sufficient aircraft and aircraft facilities to fill our needs will consume a staggering amount of war matériel.

After we get supplies to a theater, can their delivery time be shortened? One of the items we are working on now is a conveyor-belt arrangement that offers great possibilities for reducing time, manpower, and facilities in moving supplies to the front. The mining industry is having good results with such a system. The conveyor-belt method is similar to pipelines that move petroleum forward to using units.

#### ***Cross and Common Service Support***

No discussion of supply economy would be complete without at least some mention of the possibilities for reducing supply and manpower requirements through the use of common and cross service support whenever feasible. More inter-Service jealousies can be traced to real or fancied logistics inequalities than to any other source. When troops of one Service enjoy fresh meat while those of another Service eat cold cuts; when units of one Service live in shelter-tents while those of another Service nearby have Quonset huts, morale suffers. So does efficiency in the use of materials, as everyone scrambles to get the best for himself.

In Korea today the Army's logistical commands have been made responsible for resupplying all ground and air forces actually stationed on the Korean peninsula. These supplies include food, gasoline, ammunition, and all other types of supplies not peculiar to another Service. Tomorrow, or in another war, it may be the Navy's turn to act as principal supplier. Later it may be the Air Force which will be called upon to furnish all the supplies needed by Army, Navy, and Air Force units. On still other occasions in the future, it may be more economical, logistics-wise, for the Navy to support one element of a joint force, while the Army supports another element, and the Air Force supports still a third element of the same single force. Unified supply support, whether the method be cross or common, is actually less formidable an obstacle than the unification of tactics already achieved. And the rewards for our continued efforts in this direction will be equally great.



But beyond any "changes in the system," supply economy down on the using level—where most of us come into the picture and where the real day by day savings are made—will always revolve around leadership and training. As long as there are armies, they will still have to be supplied. To fight successfully, they will need more and more complicated equipment. Yet armies will have to be more mobile despite this additional matériel which Caesar called "impedimenta." To make the best use of this impedimenta,

both men and methods must keep pace with these technical advancements.

We can expect a total war of the future to tax the production facilities of our Nation and our allies to the utmost. We can also expect to have our efforts toward getting more and more use from our supplies and equipment to be challenged with equal severity. Meeting this challenge effectively means a progressively greater exercise of our responsibility to teach, demonstrate, and enforce supply economy on every occasion.

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## SUPPLY ECONOMY

When his First Army was training to invade the European continent, General Bradley sent the following

message on supply economy to officers of his command:

**HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY**

To:.....

**"A UNIT CAN GO ONLY AS FAR  
AS ITS SUPPLIES WILL ALLOW"**

I desire that you study and remember these

**NOTES ON  
SUPPLY DISCIPLINE**

and use your influence and example to instill  
in every man the habit of

<b>CONSERVING</b>	<b>SAFEGUARDING</b>
<b>MAINTAINING</b>	<b>SALVAGING</b>

food, clothing, weapons, fuel, motor transportation, materiel and supplies of all kinds.

*D. N. Bradley*

**Lieut.-General, U.S.A.  
Commanding.**

sg. 909.—13-12-43/15m/12001(23-5 39006)

### General

1. No plan of operation, however good, will succeed unless administration has been emphasized from the start. Supply discipline goes hand in hand with military discipline.

2. The production of our equipment involves enormous efforts on the part of workers in our homes in the United States and United Kingdom, and it all has to be transported across seas at great risk to our seamen and ships.

3. In any operation, transportation, whether by sea, rail, motor vehicle, or air will *never* be adequate to meet all our requirements.

**TO REQUEST MORE THAN YOU NEED IS  
INEFFICIENT.**

**TO WASTE WHAT YOU HAVE IS SABOTAGE.**

### Training

1. The training of the individual in supply discipline is as important as any other form of training.

Your training program will set aside regular periods for this. Prepare what you have to say, your demonstrations, your practical work, as you would for any other training. The support of the men must be won. Ingenuity will be required. Emphasize protecting property in guard duty. Remind each man that he is a taxpayer, quoting prices.

2. *a. Food.* It is a standing order of the ETO that no one should help himself to more food than he needs nor leave any on his plate. Greases and bones are used in manufacturing explosives; teach your men the various uses for which garbage is saved.

*b. Clothing.* Impress your men that a "stitch in time saves nine," and that laundering of socks, fatigues, etc., increases the life as well as the cleanliness of clothing. In battle it is more important to use transportation for ammunition than clothing.

*c. Weapons.* Teach your men that "for want of a nail a horse can be lost," and that in combat a



missing rifle part means not loss of pay or KP but immobilization of a weapon.

*d. Fuel.* Train all handlers of gasoline and oil to avoid spilling a drop when making transfers.

*e. Motor vehicles.* Have your drivers do 1st echelon maintenance at stops and periods of waiting instead of only at "motor stables." As long as 1st and 2d echelon maintenance is kept up, our vehicles will keep rolling.

*f. Hygiene and sanitation.* Get your men to observe the principles instinctively. The best fighter is no good if he gets sick; unnecessary sickness must be avoided.

3. Administrative directives are not the sole concern of the supply services. Learn about their contents yourself.

**IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HAVE A GOOD S-4 OR SUPPLY SERGEANT—EVERY MAN MUST BE SOMETHING OF AN S-4 OR SUPPLY SERGEANT HIMSELF.**

#### ***In Combat***

1. The hoarding of supplies and equipment by individuals results in overloading of vehicles and undue wear and eventual breakdown of transportation.

2. The throwing away of prescribed equipment by individuals to lighten personal loads involves re-supply at a later date and unnecessary demands on transportation. To prevent this, give thought to confining personal loads to what is necessary for the mission.

3. The formation of unauthorized reserves and dumps at battery and other positions will result in shortages of supplies where most needed.

4. To abandon a supply of ammunition however small may be equivalent to disarming yourself or your fellow-soldiers at a later date.

5. Vehicles, tools, and spare parts are always short of demand. Units which retain more than they are entitled to prevent the speedy re-equipment of other units.

6. Cannibalization of tanks and vehicles prevents these tanks and vehicles from becoming quickly available as replacements and disorganizes repair and replacement services.

7. There must be no unnecessary use of transportation.

8. Gasoline and oil represent a very large percentage of tonnage to be moved. Trucks and vehicles cannot advance a yard without it. Uneconomical use and spilling is sabotage.


9. It is of the utmost importance that damaged valuable equipment such as radio sets, weapons, and spare parts be salvaged for repair and reissue. New stocks cannot be provided in sufficient quantities without the assistance of efficient salvage.

10. It is important that captured enemy material and supplies of all sorts be reported and brought under centralized control, intact, without pilfering or cannibalization. Such supplies may prove the greatest value in assisting planning and speeding an advance.

11. Administration must win the confidence of troops by its efficiency. Organizations and units, on their side, must show confidence in their administrative service. Then there can be no excuse for the forming of unauthorized reserves and dumps, holding of excess equipment and hoarding, and overloading of vehicles.

**NO MATTER HOW HARD THE FIGHTING,  
OUR BATTLES WILL NOT BE WON WITHOUT GOOD SUPPLY DISCIPLINE.**





## Books

*Logistics in World War II. Final Report of the Army Service Forces.* During World War II the Army faced logistic tasks and problems of unprecedented volume and complexity. This report of the Army Service Forces, which with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces, made up the three main subdivisions of the War Department during most of World War II, summarizes the organization, functions, and methods by which we accomplished this gigantic logistic feat. Although copies are no longer available through normal supply channels or from the Government Printing Office, it was given special distribution within the Army and should be on hand in most military libraries. Additionally, it was sent to "depository" libraries—libraries designated by Congress to receive government publications. These libraries are found in most large cities and state colleges and universities.

*Logistics in World War II* traces our logistic picture from our preparation for national defense before Pearl Harbor through the close of World War II. It covers difficulties encountered in each major supply field; influence of logistics on strategy; supply and service operations in the various active theaters; logistic accomplishments during the war; problems of demobilization; and logistic lessons of World War II. Briefly, the report lists these logistic lessons—

Wars cannot be won without logistic superiority . . . Skill, courage, and guts are not enough.

The outcome of the next war may be decided by what we have, at the moment war strikes.

The logistic organization with which we will fight must be in being and capable of immediate expansion.

Military effectiveness must govern, but logistic supportability is the first prerequisite.

We must be able to strike with full force and to maintain that force until victory is won.

Industrial and Governmental mobilization planning must be complete, precise, and capable of instant execution.

Our research and development must secure and maintain, and our intelligence must confirm, unquestionable superiority in weapons and military equipment.

*For Want of a Nail. The Influence of Logistics on War.* By Hawthorne Daniel. This is a short but enlightening study of logistics in past wars. Two campaigns of the American Revolution open the book, followed by the Peninsular and Russian campaigns of Napoleon, the American Civil War, the "River War" of the Sudan Campaign (1896-98), and the invasion of Europe (1944-45). (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948. \$5.00)

*A Soldier's Story.* By General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. This important World War II memoir will be reviewed in greater detail in a future *Officers' Call*. As 12th Army Group commander, General Bradley led the largest body of combat forces in history. His book begins with the late stages of the North African campaign and continues through the operations that brought the surrender of Germany in May 1945. (New York, Henry Holt, 1951. \$5.00)

*Peace Can Be Won.* By Paul G. Hoffman. Until recently, Mr. Hoffman was the "field commander" of the Marshall Plan aid forces. This book, however, is not a report on ECA accomplishments. It is rather the author's analysis and conclusions about those accomplishments in terms of their influence on the chances for achieving peace in the world. As the title indicates, Mr. Hoffman is on the optimistic side of this most vital question; his optimism is particularly convincing because he does not minimize the dangers and obstacles that lie ahead. The hard common sense of the experienced businessman pervades his analysis of the political, economic, and social tasks that must be achieved if peace is to be won. (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1951. Cloth, \$2.50. Paper, \$1.00)

*U. S. A. The Permanent Revolution.* By the editors of *Fortune* in collaboration with Russell W. Davenport. The February 1951 issue of *Fortune* was devoted entirely to a study of the philosophical, political, economic, social, and cultural origins and forces that have developed into the "American way of life." This book is a reprinting of the *Fortune* material; it is an excellent and inspiring short summary of the "permanent revolution" that is the United States. (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951. \$3.75)



# Talking points

## Notes for the Discussion Leader

### Presentation

Getting more use out of our supplies—making them go further—is a subject on which all officers can contribute helpful ideas. We all use supplies. We all are affected detrimentally by their misuse. It is important in conducting a discussion on the use of supplies, however, that both the “combat man’s” and “supply man’s” part be presented adequately. The various elements of supply should be presented in balance, showing how they fit into the logistic mission—to support and maintain the fighting man.

In presenting this subject, do not overlook supply experiences coming out of Korea. There’s many an interesting supply incident there, ranging from the Army’s efforts to supply all ground troops there and operations of the logistical commands, to bringing in supplies by hand to isolated units. One battalion commander in Korea writes that “for 26 days the nearest a vehicle could get to my front lines was two-and-a-half miles . . . all supply by A-frame, etc.” But the supply picture is far from completely primitive; supply by air has become almost commonplace in Korea.

You may be able to enliven your discussions, too, by getting officers from different theaters in World War II to compare their supply experiences. Those who were with the Army Service Forces during the war may be able to add something on the “big” picture. If officers of your group have had first-hand knowledge of how our sister Services handle supplies, maybe they can tell you about the supply system of the Air Force and the Navy, particularly how these Services teach and stress supply discipline. Signal Corps libraries can furnish you with several interesting films which complement our main article. These include—

MISC 1152, *The Late Company B*, 44 minutes; shows how the fate of men in battle often depends on an individual’s sense of supply responsibility and attention to small details.

MISC 1112, *Stock Control at War*, 20 minutes; illustrates the role of stock control in creating a smooth, balanced flow of supplies to the battlefield.

TF 10-2086, *Store It Right*, 20 minutes; compares the problems of storing Army supplies in the zone of interior with those of the communications and combat zones.

### Suggested Questions

1. What methods can you suggest to make troops more aware of the necessity for getting every last ounce of use out of their supplies and equipment?

2. It has been said that the combat soldier and the “rear-area” soldier do not understand each other’s vital role in the combat zone. How can a greater understanding and appreciation for the other soldier be gained?

3. The great part our logistic system played in our winning World War II is recognized. Sometimes, though, when we are talking about how to improve supplying the fighting man, the remark is made, “Well, we won the war, didn’t we? So our logistic set-up must have been pretty good, too.” It was good. But that doesn’t mean we should not be looking for improvements. What do you think are needed improvements in the supply system?

4. Why is so much stress being laid today on a greater use of indigenous manpower and facilities in foreign areas? Is it a matter of saving transportation alone? What was done in the way of fabricating matériel overseas during the last war? What is being done now?

5. Logistical commands are an important step in the development of better service area coordination. What do you think can be done to make them still more effective?

With this issue, we’ve enlarged our “Talking Points,” particularly expanding the former “Points to be Emphasized” into a discussion leader’s outline. We’d appreciate your comments as to the usefulness of this material in your actual presentation.



## DISCUSSION LEADER'S OUTLINE

### 1. Introduction.

- a.* Our dominance in matériel has helped us immensely in winning two World Wars.
- b.* American soldiers are the best equipped in the world.
- c.* Supplies, however, are no longer limitless.

### 2. Tight supply economy is necessary all along the supply line, particularly after the troops get supplies.

- a.* Effective supply planning at all levels saves supplies.
- b.* Knowing what's on hand, and where it is, is vital to effective supply use.
- c.* Proper maintenance, especially preventive maintenance, plays a big part in supply economy.
- d.* Don't overlook savings through salvage.

### 3. Waste must be eliminated from the supply chain.

- a.* Issue soldiers only what they need.
- b.* Teach troops to take pride in protecting equipment they use and supplies they guard.
- c.* Supervise messes. Look for chances to save.

### 4. Improvements in supply economy must keep pace with improvements in supply techniques.

- a.* Officers set the example; but must see that soldiers follow their lead.
- b.* Supply economy should be explained to soldiers frequently and in terms they can understand.
- c.* Battle use of supplies is most important—it is the end of the supply line.

### 5. Logistical commands have been designed to save supplies through better supervision and direction of service units.

### 6. Forward troops deserve their share of supplies.

- a.* Supplies are ordered for specific purposes; diverting them indiscriminately or to non-essential uses may result in desperate shortages elsewhere.
- b.* Priority on items in short supply should go to front-line troops.

### 7. Close support of control measures enables all of us to make important contributions to supply economy.

- a.* Supply responsibility, moral and otherwise, is a part of every military assignment.
- b.* Effective stock control cuts cost inherent in overstocking and rehandling.
- c.* An efficient supply system needs competent men.

### 8. Future war may bring some radical changes in supply handling.

- a.* More dispersion may be required, especially in the early stages.
- b.* Service troops may have to undertake still more of their own defense.
- c.* Greater use will have to be made of indigenous manpower and supplies in oversea areas.
- d.* Air transport will probably be used to a greater extent to speed the flow of supplies, but its high cost in terms of material must be recognized.
- e.* Cross and common service support may bring sizable savings.

### 9. Conclusion.

- a.* Men and methods must keep pace with technical improvements in supply handling.
- b.* Commanders and troops can meet the supply challenge of tomorrow's war by practicing supply economy to the limit—from factory to firing line.



**OFFICERS' CALL SALUTES:**

**THE**  
**25th INFANTRY**  
**DIVISION**  
**(TROPIC LIGHTNING)**



From the desperate days before Pusan to the present, the 25th Division has shown the Chinese and Korean enemy that "Tropic Lightning" packs a terrific wallop. At Chinju, Masan, and Taegu, on the road to Kunsan, north of Kunuri, in the recapture of Seoul, over and over again he has felt its paralyzing, devastating power.

The Red invader first felt it near Sangju and Kumchon, in the stifling days of early August when part of the 25th Division (Task Force Kean) slammed into him at Chinju. He felt it again before Taegu when he tried repeatedly to ram his way down the "bowling alley" corridor to Pusan. Here, in barring his way, elements of the 25th Division won acclaim for a brilliant defense.

The 25th Division, like its sister division the 24th, entered the Korean struggle piecemeal. Under Major General William B. Kean, its first elements landed at Pusan, 10 July, and immediately rushed into action northeast of Yongdong.

Following the landing of the X Corps at Inchon, 15 September, the 25th was ordered to smash out of the perimeter and drive for Kunsan on the west coast. After Kunsan fell on 1 October, the men of the Tropic Lightning Division then took on part of the gruelling, unglamorous task of routing out and destroying some 50,000 or more North Koreans trapped in small groups south and west of the Pusan-Seoul highway.

With the sudden attack of the Red Chinese in early November, the 25th moved to positions southeast of Pyongyang to protect the rear of the I Corps. It made contact with the Communists at Ichon, 10 November, and the next day at Sibyonni and Yongchon. As our attack continued on 23 November, the 25th was assigned a sector in the Sanggudong and Chongchon River area. Here the attack went well until Yongdong was reached on the 26th. Then the Chinese struck with overwhelming force in their all-out effort to drive the UN Forces out of Korea.

With other units of the Eighth Army, the 25th was forced to fall back first to the Chongchon River, then to the high ground south of Pyongyang. It was heartbreak highway all over again, this time with a new and even more desperate foe. Seoul was abandoned early in January in favor of a new, shortened line below the Han River; here the UN held. Like the North Korean Communists before, the Chinese advance was stopped. The terrific price in men and equipment the Chinese army was forced to pay down the bloody road from the Yalu began to tell. The Reds began to give ground.

By early February the 25th, operating on the left flank of the I Corps, was again moving north. Yongdong-Po, Inchon, and the Kimpo airfield were retaken by the 25th on 9 February. By early March the 25th was again driving up the Han River toward the 38th parallel. As of this writing they were back once more in North Korea, inching their way northward towards a build-up of Red forces. Though their pace now was slower and more cautious, their determination to see the fight through to victory was as fixed as ever.

\* \* \*

*Activated:* In Hawaii, October 1941, from elements of the historic Hawaiian Division, which was split to form the 25th and 24th Infantry Divisions.

*World War II:* Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, Central Pacific, and the Luzon campaign in the Philippines.


*Present Commander:* Major General Joseph Sladen Bradley.

*Shoulder Patch:* A red taro leaf with a golden lightning bolt.

*Nickname:* "Tropic Lightning."



# Officers' <sup>CHS</sup> CALL



VOLUME III

*Air Transport*

NUMBER TWO



**CORRECTION**

THIS DOCUMENT  
HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED  
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY



CHS - GHQ - SCAP

ROUTING SLIP

Date 1951  
 M/C Log No. 22

To	Initial For	Action
Chief	/	Action
Special Assistant	WPA	Comment/Concur
Exec. Off.	2	Note-Return
Admin.		Dispatch
Personnel		Info
Library Div.		File 2
Spec. Proj. Br.		Initials
Pol-Soc. Aff. Div.		Signature
Economic Div.		Suspense Slip
		To Library


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# Officers' *Call History* CALL



VOLUME II

*The Air-Ground Team*

NUMBER NINE



# Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

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VOLUME II



NUMBER NINE

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Books .....	15
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Talking Points .....	Inside back cover

**Cover:** Elements of the air-ground team in action and the results—a blazing enemy tank. Shown are part of a tactical air control center, a forward air observer, and F-80's. The tank is a Russian T-34 captured in Korea. It has been set afire by napalm bombs to test the destructive effects of this type of aerial bombing on enemy armor.

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## **THE AIR-GROUND TEAM**

*In its never-ending quest for weapons of greater mobility, range, and firepower, our Army is placing increased emphasis on the airplane to support ground troops.*

*The airman and the soldier have made great strides in learning to work together. But both agree on the need for continued improvement of doctrine and techniques to exploit fully the combat potentialities of the air-ground team.*

*We suggest you keep this in mind while reading this issue of OFFICERS' CALL. In our main article we have described basic principles and current doctrine in air-ground operations.*

*We emphasize the word "current." Studies now in progress can be expected to produce further improvements in the doctrine and techniques here presented.*

\* \* \* \*

During World War II, the air-ground team came of age.

As the war progressed, tactical air support played an increasingly important role in the success of ground troops. To be sure, not all air-ground operations were perfect. But there is no denying that support from the air gave the ground forces an added powerful punch that speeded our victory.

Members of the air-ground team knew how to work with each other and what to expect from each other. Ground commanders were accustomed to count on prompt, efficient air support when they needed it. This support was often as smooth-working as artillery—which is saying a lot.

A priceless ingredient of air-ground operations in World War II was teamwork based on know-how built up during months of hard campaigning. This practical knowledge was the sum of many skills, distributed widely among the agencies that made up the air-ground team.

After the war, a combination of factors permitted only limited training in air-ground operations. Army combat units and tactical air support units had little opportunity to work with each other.

When the Korean fighting began, practical skill in applying air-ground techniques had all but diminished to a lost art in comparison with late World War II standards. Moreover, initial shortages of critical equipment, key men, and other deficiencies tended to hinder smooth air-ground operations in the early days of the Korean campaign.

Fortunately, we were able to overcome these disadvantages—often through hurried improvisation. Despite handicaps, the air-ground team developed in Korea has taken a heavy toll of the communist enemy.

### **Air-Ground Action in Korea**

In Korea, air power has supported ground troops in virtually every way possible. Because of our immediate air supremacy, the Air Force assumed a close support role almost from the start. Air support was especially welcomed by those ground units whose normal artillery had not yet arrived.

Weather permitting, ground troops received almost continuous bombing and strafing support. As fighting progressed, our amphibious and airborne landings were screened with fighter and bomber protection. Troop carriers flew soldiers to and from Korea (the first ground units arrived there by air), transported paratroopers, and brought in cargo rivaling the amount of the Berlin airlift.

Most of the infantrymen and tankers who have fought up and down the rugged peninsula of Korea are now combat veterans. They know that their own skill and courage plus that of their artillerymen and other ground units played the biggest part in stopping the Korean communists and then striking back. But they also know they could not have succeeded without real air support.

Many of our doughboys fighting in Korea have never met a pilot—unless one was shot down and landed in their lines. They do not know the airmen as they do the artillerymen and the tankers. But they have gained a real appreciation for what our fliers have done and are doing. Day and night—sometimes actually around the clock—Allied air power has blasted the communist army. Korea is today dotted with the wreckage of Red trucks, tanks, and guns. Against heavy odds, many allied ground attacks have succeeded largely because of air support.

Soldiers fighting in Korea appreciate what the term "air support" means. Along with their own fire support, they have learned to count on it when they size up a job. They have learned, too, their own responsibility for the success of air-ground operations.

### **Some Air-Ground Difficulties in Korea**

Our top military leaders share the front-line soldiers' enthusiasm about what the airmen have done in Korea. General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of



Staff, summed it up early in September after a visit to the combat area:

"Like the Army, the Air Force had to switch from peace to wartime operation overnight. General Walton Walker testifies that, but for what the fliers did those first few days, we would have lost Korea."

This is typical of what other observers have said about air support in Korea. They praise air units operating there. This does not mean, however, that air operations have been perfect, any more than the Army's have been. General Collins went on to explain:

"At the beginning, there was confusion over air support. But with the inevitable early creaking, the situation has steadily improved. Special Air Force teams rushed from the States to coordinate close support of ground troops; we now have one with each American division and have assigned others to Republic of Korea units. Now the system works."


#### Early Deficiencies

Many of the "kinks" in the early Korean air operations stemmed from the same sort of difficulties the Army faced on the ground. Far East air groups were there to support the occupation. Initial shortages of trained men and communications equipment to work with infantry units existed partly because of the occupation mission, and partly because of budgetary ceilings which had limited the programs of all the Services. At any rate, recently authorized budgetary increases for our Armed Forces should correct deficiencies of this kind.

Other difficulties grew out of the peculiar nature of the Korean fighting. For example, the first several weeks involved a delaying action on our part. Although not new in our thinking, this difficult operation has been relatively rare in our experience.

This is one of the problems that developed: the bomb line\* set for our own troops' safety actually proved a disadvantage in a fluid situation where the enemy, always probing for weak spots, could get between it and our own positions. Here the enemy was relatively immune until the bomb line could be lifted or special permission to bomb inside it could be obtained. While points of contact see-sawed along a line marked by deep salients, the conventional bomb line became a somewhat unrealistic safety measure. This and similar difficulties have emphasized points which will need consideration in improving our air-ground techniques.

\* A "bomb line" is a precautionary line designated by ground troops beyond which air attacks may be made without clearance from ground forces.



*Examples of effective air interdiction.*

#### We Need Practice

One big lesson Korea holds for Army officers is that we generally require a fuller understanding of how to use tactical aviation. Specifically, every combat troop leader must know what targets are appropriate for tactical aircraft and how to get air support. We need to understand also the limitations of tactical aviation and under what circumstances we cannot expect air support at all.

An obvious corollary is that we need actual practice—as much as we can get—in working with the air control system used in obtaining and insuring the accuracy of air strikes.

#### Korea May Not Be A Prototype

We should be careful against extending the lessons of Korea too far. The fighting there has been a special type of warfare. The Korean communists have used an odd combination of old and new weapons, old and new tactics. We have used many weapons of World War II, and the tactics our combat veterans knew have had to be modified at times. Future fighting in which we may be involved will not necessarily be like that in Korea.

Another thing to remember is that in Korea we have been almost unopposed in the air. This has permitted an unusually large part of our air strength to be used in close support of ground units. Further, in the limited geographical area involved, even the bombing of targets farthest removed from the battle area has been largely "tactical." Certainly strategic bombing, to the limits of its present capabilities, has not been involved.



Korea has given us a good test of our air doctrine and techniques but not a complete or conclusive test.

### Strategic Air Power

In this issue we are concerned primarily with tactical aviation and what it does to assist ground troops. But we cannot understand its role without having some knowledge of what strategic aviation can accomplish. The two overlap in a number of ways.

For this reason we need not become involved in complicated attempts to define each category. The distinction is sufficiently clear for our present discussion if we think of these differences: strategic aviation includes aircraft and other facilities intended primarily for long-range bombardment with the most destructive types of weapons; tactical aviation operates at shorter ranges, generally using smaller aircraft and less powerful weapons against a wider variety of targets. Strategic air strikes at sources of enemy strength; tactical air denies effective application of his strength in a given battle area.

Besides the functional relationship between strategic and tactical air power, there are two additional aspects of strategic aviation which touch on our discussion. First, we are today devoting a very material part of our war potential to the building of a strategic air force second to none. This obviously affects the size of our tactical air forces. Second, a successful strategic air campaign, though it may not quickly bring about a decision, can contribute greatly to the ultimate success of our land and naval forces by weakening enemy means of resistance.

### Tactical Air in Europe, World War II

When we think of "air support of ground troops," many of us may visualize fighter-bombers screaming down on an enemy strongpoint, blasting it to rubble, and thus clearing the way for the tactical success of infantry and armor. This type of *close support* is quite naturally the first concern of the embattled doughboy or tanker. But it is by no means the only kind of support tactical air gives to ground troops. This becomes evident when we review the air offensive in Europe during World War II.

We know the story of the German Luftwaffe. From the high point of its might in 1940, it was turned away over England by the Royal Air Force, and then gradually beaten back and reduced in strength by the growing Allied air offensive. By early 1944 the turning point was passed. German aircraft production was no longer able to keep up with losses. Hitler largely wasted the rest of his air strength on tasks

of secondary importance and thus helped reduce the Luftwaffe's effectiveness.


In the last few months before the Normandy invasion, more and more of our fighters and shorter-range bombers concentrated on German-occupied airfields in France. The Luftwaffe's remaining power was rapidly destroyed. By D-Day it was impotent against the Allied landings. One of the primary objectives of our air campaign had been achieved; at the time of the invasion and afterwards, we enjoyed almost total air superiority in Europe. Most of our tactical air forces in that theater were able to operate thereafter in support of ground troops.

During the last few weeks before D-Day, our tactical air forces also systematically knocked out rail and highway bridges along the Seine River from the English Channel to the outskirts of Paris. As the invasion began, more bridges were cut to the south and east of Paris.

### Supporting The Beachhead

A large part of the German armies were thus cut off in Western France and separated from their sources of supply and reinforcement. Trapped in this area, they were subjected to a terrific pounding from fighter-bombers. Rail lines, trains, and convoys within the area were blasted so that movement by day was virtually impossible, and night movement was difficult. This series of air operations, designed to *isolate the battlefield*, made possible an Allied buildup in the beachhead much faster than the German commanders could assemble forces to counter it.

When our buildup reached sufficient strength to permit a breakout, the air forces again played a major



Napalm or "fire" bombs, as dropped here by F-80's, have been particularly effective in the Korean fighting.



role. All available aircraft blasted an area along the St. Lo-Periers road about 6,000 yards wide by 2,500 yards deep. The blow fell on 25 July 1944. More than 1,500 heavy bombers dropped about 4,800 tons of bombs on the target area; approximately 400 medium bombers and 350 fighter-bombers worked it over with napalm and fragmentation bombs and strafing.

This unusually heavy air effort on a target immediately in front of friendly ground troops is hardly a typical mission. Yet it is illustrative of many hundreds of strikes—most of them on a smaller scale—delivered in *close support* of Allied army units in World War II.

### Three Main Tasks

The events we have just summarized demonstrate the three main objectives of our tactical air forces: *gain and maintain air superiority— isolate the battle-*

"Within the high command a clear appreciation of the relationship between the strategic bombing effort in the German homeland and the needs of the land forces was essential if we were to work in common purpose and achieve the greatest possible result. As this appreciation developed among air as well as ground commanders, the early reluctance of such [air] specialists . . . to employ their formations against so-called tactical targets completely disappeared. By the time the breakout [St. Lo sector] was achieved, the emergency intervention of the entire bomber force in the land battle had come to be accepted almost as a matter of course."

General of the Army  
Dwight D. Eisenhower,  
*Crusade in Europe* \* pp. 270-271

*field (also called interdiction)— and give close support to ground troops.*

\* New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948, \$5.00.

## 3 TASKS OF TACTICAL AIR




*Gain and maintain air superiority*



*Isolate the battlefield*



*Close support of ground troops*





These three types of activity, sometimes given numerical designations and referred to as "phases" of an air campaign, have been the subject of occasional misinterpretation. Let's see if we can clarify them.

In the first place, all three "phases" may be going on at the same time. At least initially, a large part of our tactical air strength in a theater probably will be engaged in countering the attacks of enemy planes. This "air defense" complements the more aggressive missions aimed at seeking out and destroying enemy aircraft and air facilities. These tasks contribute directly toward *gaining air superiority*, and their ultimate objective is not reached until enemy air power is destroyed.


Our air superiority is by no means a concern of air forces alone. If the enemy controls the sky, our ground forces also must operate under great handicaps.

This does not mean that our aircraft concentrate solely on gaining air superiority while enemy planes contest us for control of the skies. The decision as

to how much air effort will be allotted in a given period to "air superiority" missions and how much to "isolating the battlefield" or "close support" activities is made after weighing the facts. "Phases" overlap; we do not wait for one phase to end before we start another. Even during the fight for air superiority, for example, conditions may be such that aircraft also may be used in "close support" fighting.


Additionally, the term "air superiority" is a relative one. The degree of air superiority necessary for success varies with different operations and different conditions. It may mean control of the air for only short periods in specific areas. It may mean control over only a part of a combat area.

For example, consider the critical phase of an amphibious attack. When troops are disembarking and coming ashore, we need a much greater measure of air control over the segment of hostile shore involved than would be necessary after the troops have secured the beachhead. Another difficult operation demanding



*The C-119 has proved its worth in combat operations in Korea.*





The tactical air control center is the focal point for aircraft control and warning activities of a tactical air force. Part of the job is knowing the positions of all aircraft—both friendly and enemy—airborne in the area. Here, these positions are being continuously plotted.

a high order of *local* air superiority is the capture and buildup of an airhead.

### Reconnaissance and Air Transport Roles

Besides the actual combat operations of its fighters and bombers, tactical aviation has other important functions.

One of these, reconnaissance, is a continuing, day-and-night job. Modern fast reconnaissance planes cover areas far beyond the range of the ground soldier's patrols and observation posts, or even his liaison planes. Besides actually reporting what they have seen on their flights, reconnaissance pilots take photographs of several kinds, day or night. Also, through the use of special electronic equipment, limited reconnaissance can be carried out in bad weather. Both air and ground commanders benefit from the information


these missions obtain. It has been said that up to 80 percent of an army's tactical information of the enemy is gathered by reconnaissance aircraft.

Although troop-carrier units usually are not a part of a tactical air command, air transport support may be vital in directly furthering land operations. Normally, troop-carrier units are theater forces and are not assigned to tactical air forces except in some cases for administrative purposes. This assignment under theater command permits their exploitation for strategic as well as tactical missions.

### Airborne Needs

Airborne warfare demands large numbers of passenger-cargo type planes. An army today must always be ready to exploit opportunities or react to emergencies requiring use of airborne troops. Once these





Decisions to fly close support missions are made at the joint operations center. A control system guides aircraft to targets.

JOC—Joint operations center.  
 COS—Combat operations section.  
 AGOS—Air-ground operations section.  
 TACC—Tactical air control center.

TADC—Tactical air direction center.  
 D/F—Direction finding station.  
 TACP—Tactical air control party.  
 TADP—Tactical air direction post.  
 L/W—Light weight radar.

troops are committed, they must be supported by air until relieved or reinforced overland.

We also are relying more on air transport in carrying out other ground operations. This is one of the ways we hope to make up in mobility what we may lack in total manpower and other resources. Troops and equipment as well as urgently needed supplies often can reach their destination in time only if moved by air. The vital role of air transport in the Korean campaign offers the most recent example.

Then there is the great morale importance, as well as the practical military value, in evacuating wounded men by air, taking them quickly to areas where the best medical care can be provided. Time saved means lives saved.


These jobs and many more are carried out by the troop carrier units assigned to the theater.\*

### Tactical Air Organization

To exploit the speed, range, and versatility of aircraft, Air Force organization stresses the principle of flexibility. In general, units are standardized but may vary greatly in strength and composition. An air commander enjoys considerable latitude in organizing his forces for a mission. Moreover, as operations progress, he usually modifies this organization to meet changing requirements.

\*The Army is now organizing its own special light air-transport forces. Army helicopter companies are being formed for the speedy movement of men, equipment, and supplies.





A Typical Request for Immediate Air


Situation (see sketch above): A front-line infantry battalion wants fire on an enemy strong point, heavy in tanks, which is holding up the battalion's advance.

Here is how it gets the fire.

1. In this case, an artillery forward observer calls a fire message to his fire support coordination center (FSCC). The request

(An air strike request is further explained on





*A Typical Request for Immediate Air Support*

in tanks, which is

is relayed to the joint operations center (JOC) as an air-strike request. (There are no planes on air alert and no intermediate headquarters cancels the request.)

2. The JOC approves an air strike and issues an air attack order.

3. The planes are dispatched. A control and direction system guides the aircraft in flight and brings them onto the target.

CC). The request

(An air strike request is further explained on pages 10 and 11.)



In our typical theater setup for combat operations, a single headquarters—that of the theater commander—directs all Army, Navy, and Air Forces assigned to the theater.

Each *army group* in the theater is usually supported by a *tactical air command*. The latter's headquarters is located with that of the army group and controls all its tactical air units according to the dictates of the common mission of the army group and the tactical air command.

Each *field army* is supported by a *tactical air force*. Again, the two headquarters are together, and close coordination between air and ground action is effected. Incidentally, this is normally the lowest level at which air commanders are physically present and working directly with ground commanders. All missions of the tactical air force are controlled from this point in much the same way that fire missions of artillery batteries are controlled from their battalion fire direction center.

At levels below the army, there are air control agencies to help coordinate requests from subordinate units and to guide planes to their targets. There are also officers to insure air-ground coordination.

#### Tactical Air Force

A tactical air force normally has these major components:

A headquarters which controls all operations and integrates them with those of the supported army.

An air control group for control of planes in flight.

A reconnaissance wing, including about 18 high-speed aircraft specially equipped for day and night photography and electronic (radar) reconnaissance.

Fighter aviation, which may include one or more all-weather groups (usually 36 planes each) and 2 to 8 fighter-bomber groups (equipped with jet or conventional fighters—total planes may vary from 250 to 800).

In addition, there are communication, engineer, transportation, and other units.

Detailed discussion of our newest aircraft's technical characteristics is not appropriate here. However, for our present purposes, we may think in terms of fighter planes with speeds ranging from a minimum of 185 to a maximum of 700 miles per hour, armed with 6 or more .50 caliber machine guns and carrying two 1,000 pound bombs or about twenty 5-inch rockets, or various combinations of rockets and smaller bombs. These aircraft may be used for air combat or strafing and tactical bombardment missions within a combat

radius varying from 300 to 500 miles, depending on the type of plane and how it is loaded.

These data, purposely given in very general form, are useful only as reflecting in a general way the capabilities of our tactical air forces.

#### Close Support Missions

We are familiar with the artillery plan that usually accompanies a division or corps operation order. In this plan, provision is made for using every gun according to its range and effectiveness against targets in priority of their importance to the overall commander's plan.

In the same way, the field army commander and the tactical air force commander work out a plan each day for the most effective use of air support during the next 24 hours. This close air support is integrated with the fire and movement of ground troops. Requests of lower units for air strikes in support of their contemplated operations are incorporated into the overall air plan.

These lower-unit requests, plus necessary reconnaissance missions, often take most of the aircraft allocated for close support missions. The rest are retained for close support *on request*. They are designated to operate on call of the *joint operations center (JOC)*—staffed by officers of the field army and tactical air force headquarters jointly—at the field army-tactical air force headquarters.

#### An Air Strike Request

(A typical request for an immediate air support mission is shown schematically on pages 8 and 9.)

The front lines ask for an immediate air strike like any other fire support request. Probably the front-line commander or an artillery forward observer initiates the call.


If the weapons under the control of the fire support coordination center (FSCC) at the direct support artillery battalion cannot fire the mission, the request is sent to the division FSCC. Determining that an air strike is necessary and not having planes on air alert under its control, the division FSCC asks for an air mission by sending a request over a special net to the joint operations center (JOC).\*

Corps monitors this net and could cancel the request if it is so desired. Corps silence means corps approval.


Decision to fly the mission is then up to the JOC. The air-ground operations section receives the

\* If planes are overhead on an air alert status, the procedure may be shortened. Division FSCC would probably be able to give these planes the mission by working through the G-3 Air.






*A familiar sight in Korean skies are our F-80 B "Shooting Stars."*



*Still highly effective in the Korean fighting—the F-51.*



*One of our newest night and all-weather fighters is the XF-89.*



request. If approved—normally depending on priority of effort—the request is given to the combat operations section as urgent. After accepting the request, the combat operations section issues an attack order to a tactical air unit.

Word is sent back to the front line that the mission will be flown, the estimated time of the attack, and the type and number of planes.

The aircraft are guided to the target by a control and direction system. The tactical air control center (TACC) gets the flight underway. It is the operational headquarters for control units which will guide the flight to the target.

After the planes are airborne and moving to the target, a tactical air direction center (TADC) takes over and directs them to a tactical air control party (TACP) near the front lines. The TACP brings the planes onto the target. If the TACP is unable to direct the planes visually, a tactical air direction post (TADP) takes control, brings the planes to the target, and “fires” the mission by electronic rather than visual means.

Working with front-line units are experienced combat pilots. These *forward air controllers* usually are assigned so that at least one forward air control party is with each forward infantry regiment. They may operate from vehicles, or they may be aloft in light planes. In either case, their job is similar to that of forward observers in controlling artillery fire.

### Artillery and Tactical Aviation

We have already found the analogy with artillery convenient in describing some features of tactical aviation. This is worth pursuing further. There are important differences as well as similarities between the two forms of support.

For example, tactical aviation uses a wider variety of weapons than does artillery. These normally range from multiple .50 caliber machine guns to 1,000-pound bombs, and they are available in many combinations for different types of mission.

Tactical aircraft have ranges up to hundreds of miles. The effective range of our largest field artillery pieces is about 20 miles. But this difference may be reduced greatly by the advent of guided missiles, which will extend the striking range of ground weapons considerably beyond that of our present artillery.

#### The Time Element

An air strike requested on targets of opportunity (as distinguished from preplanned missions) normally requires more time than would an artillery fire mission on the same target. There are exceptions, of

course, as in the case of planes immediately overhead on an “air alert” status. A forward air controller can direct such planes onto a target in a matter of seconds.

As a rule, however, a ground commander requiring air assistance must allow time for transmitting his request, processing it at the joint operations center, issuing orders to the air squadron, and briefing pilots. This briefing is very important. An error of 500 yards is easy enough for a pilot to make at upwards of 500 miles per hour; yet this distance may place his bomb-load on friendly troops instead of on the enemy target.

In addition, the planes may have to be “run up” and readied. And unless someone has foreseen the mission with uncanny accuracy, bomb-loads already on the planes may have to be modified or changed completely for the specific mission requested.

The time factor involved in “immediate” support means that, generally speaking, artillery fire offers a much quicker means of attacking emergency targets.

#### Availability


Artillery is available for targets within its range 24 hours a day, in all types of weather. Tactical aircraft, on the other hand, are seriously curtailed by bad weather.

In general, air support is more powerful but also more expensive and is seldom available as generously as artillery support. As much as the front-line dough-boy would like air support constantly over the battlefield, there will be times when he will have to get along without it.


Air force tactical aircraft must be based on prepared airfields which include relatively large fixed or semi-fixed installations. Artillery requires positions protected from enemy small-arms fire. But these positions require no preparation, and they may be located in most any type of terrain over which the other ground arms can move.

There are times—particularly in “special operations”—when close support aircraft may be the only means or the most effective means of destroying or neutralizing a target. In the early, critical stages of an airhead, for example, fighters and bombers will be the commander’s major “artillery” support. Supporting planes are especially valuable in combatting enemy tanks, the major threat to airborne soldiers. Likewise, during the initial part of an amphibious landing before artillery is ashore and emplaced, aircraft may be the only effective means of silencing enemy howitzers hidden in defilade from flat-trajectory naval guns. And both in pursuits and in retrograde movements, the role of aircraft support as column






*A light bomber, the B-26, is used extensively in tactical air force missions.*



*One of the major functions of the F-84 F is close support of ground troops.*



*One of our new fighters—the F-86 D.*



cover and long-range fire power becomes increasingly important.

#### **"Rules" of Employment**

Two simple "rules" governing employment of artillery as well as other ground weapons have a logical application to the use of tactical air support.

The first has to do with where we place a weapon and who controls it. The greater the range and versatility of a weapon the farther back we place it, and the higher up in the command system is its control retained.

The second concerns selection of weapons. We always use the most economical means to do the job. If mortars can handle a target, we spare the artillery; if only light artillery is needed, we hold back the medium artillery; and so on. We try not to waste our resources by using a sledge hammer to break eggs.

Applying these rules to tactical aviation, we see the logic in placing our air units and air control agencies where they can best be employed in furtherance of the common air-ground mission. We can also see why controls are set up to see that air strikes are not used against targets the artillery can handle.

#### **Teamwork Is Essential**

One more analogy with artillery may prove helpful to us in understanding tactical aviation. The teamwork between artillery and its supported arms, which we take for granted today, did not always exist. Many years ago, there was a period in our Army's development when artillery-infantry cooperation was inadequate. There was lack of mutual confidence founded largely on ignorance of each other's problems and capabilities. It was not until the forward observer system was established that a common sympathetic approach to fire support problems was achieved. When members of the two arms lived together and fought side-by-side, these problems quickly disappeared.

Despite difficulties, air and ground units usually worked well together during World War II. They have done the same thing in Korea. In both cases, cooperation grew in an environment where the common goal was urgently clear and when airmen and soldiers lived and fought together.

Our air-ground doctrine and techniques have advanced rapidly in the few short years since air power came of age. Future common problems which airmen and ground soldiers may encounter will find ready solution in the same spirit of mutual respect that brought our infantry-armor-artillery team to its present level of effectiveness.

#### **Today's Opportunities**

We are today on the threshold of opportunities in the field of air-ground development such as we have never before encountered.

Our first postwar statement of air-ground doctrine was published in Field Manual 31-35, *Air-Ground Operations* (War Department, 1946). Since then, analysis of World War II lessons, and study of postwar technical developments have continued. The Tactical Air Command and the Army Field Forces, which have worked together on these studies, have just published jointly a *Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations* (1 September 1950). This directive amplifies FM 31-35 and will be used for training within the Army and the Tactical Air Command. After the doctrine and techniques set forth in this directive have been tested in field operations, a final version is expected to be published jointly by the Departments of Army and Air Force.

Even before Korea, the Army and the Air Force had initiated a joint training program calling for every combat battalion in the United States to participate in a type field exercise involving close air support with live bombs. Although the Korean situation disrupted this program—partly because of the emergency movement of units—we may look for renewed emphasis on this type of training in the near future.

The Army has established at Fort Bragg an agency known as The Army Air Support Center. This Center will help the Chief, Army Field Forces in conducting air-ground training, in determining Army requirements for tactical air support, and in promoting joint consideration of doctrine, procedure, tactics, and other matters affecting air support of ground troops.

These developments, together with the buildup of our Armed Forces, offer us a chance to recover much important ground lost since the end of World War II, when our combat-trained air crews and air-ground staffs, with the know-how they shared, were dissipated.

Our goal should be to develop throughout our combat echelons the practiced skill best exemplified recently by the air, infantry, armor, and artillery elements in Korea, who earned their places on the air-ground team.

Teamwork and mutual understanding are of the essence.

#### **References**

##### **OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS**

- Field Manual 31-35, *Air-Ground Operations*, August 1946.  
*Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations*, September 1950. (Prepared jointly by Office, Chief



of Army Field Forces and Headquarters, Tactical Air Command.)

*Conduct of Air-Ground Operations*, June 1950. (Prepared jointly by Office, Chief of Army Field Forces and Headquarters, Tactical Air Command.)

*Air Force Manual*, September 1950. Command and General Staff College.

#### TRAINING FILMS

*Control of Tactical Air Operations*, Air Force film TF 1-4659, part I: Organization; part II: Training. Running time 40 minutes.

#### PAMPHLETS AND PERIODICAL MATERIAL

United States Army Combat Forces Journal, November 1950. Most of this issue is devoted to tactical air support, airborne warfare, and air transportation.

*Tactical Air Support*, Army-Navy-Air Force Register, 2 September 1950.

*Tactical Air and Armor*, *Armor*, July-August 1950.

#### ARMY AIR SUPPORT CENTER


The Army Air Support Center has been established at Ft. Bragg to help Army Field Forces conduct training in air-ground operations.

Resident instruction will be held for unit commanders, air-ground operations staffs, and cadres. Additionally, the Center will send instruction teams to tactical units to conduct conferences, demonstrations, and exercises.

The Center will study the Army's present air support doctrine and tactics; Army requirements for tactical support; and long-range plans for new techniques.

Evaluation and requirements for Army equipment in the air-ground operations system will be another of the Center's responsibilities.

The Center will work closely with tactical commanders and Army schools in exchanging instruction methods, developing doctrine, and testing material.



#### Some Outstanding Books of 1950

Many more worthwhile books appeared during 1950 than could be reviewed in *Officers' Call*. In our last issue of this year we present two lists in place of our regular book review. The first list, given primarily for the convenience of officers who have recently entered on active duty, consists of books that have been reviewed in issues of Volume II of *Officers' Call*. The second list includes some of the many additional books of 1950 we would have reviewed if space had permitted.

##### Books Reviewed in Volume II

(Numbers in parentheses indicate respective issue of Volume II in which each book was reviewed).

- (No. 1) *Modern Arms and Free Men*, by Vannevar Bush.  
 (No. 2) *Global Mission*, by General of the Air Force H. H. Arnold.  
*The Art of War on Land*, by Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne.

- (No. 3) *The Red Army Today*, by Colonel Louis B. Ely.  
 (No. 4) *Decision in Germany*, by General Lucius D. Clay.  
*My Three Years in Moscow*, by Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.  
 (No. 5) *Psychological Warfare*, by Paul M. A. Linebarger.  
*Sykewar*, by Daniel Lerner.  
*West Point: A History of the United States Military Academy*, by Sidney Forman.  
 (No. 6) *The Grand Alliance*, by Winston S. Churchill.  
*The Effects of Atomic Weapons*, prepared under direction of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.  
 (No. 7) *I Was There*, by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.  
*Overture to Overlord*, by Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan.  
 (No. 8) *The Price of Survival*, by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Sweet.



**Other Worthwhile Books of 1950****American History and Biography**

- The Reluctant Rebels*, by Lynn Montross. A history of the Continental Congress.
- Captain Sam Grant*, by Lloyd Lewis. The early career of Ulysses S. Grant.
- John Adams and the American Revolution*, by Catherine Drinker Bowen. A new study of the second President and his contribution to American independence.
- Two Captains West*, by Albert and Jane Salisbury. The famed expedition of Captain Lewis and Lieutenant Clark, which substantiated our claims to the unknown lands west of the Mississippi to the Pacific.
- The Emergence of Lincoln*, by Allan Nevins. A two-volume study of the four critical years preceding the outbreak of war between North and South.
- Lincoln Finds a General*, by Kenneth P. Williams. Perhaps the finest study yet made of the Civil War, covering the action through the battle of Gettysburg. The general of the title is, of course, Grant.

**World War II**


- The Lorraine Campaign*, by Hugh M. Cole. Latest volume of the series US Army in World War II. Third Army action against German forces in the Saar Basin in the autumn of 1944.
- Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. The story of ground fighting in the Pacific from the Buna campaign to Japan, told by a man who played a leading part.
- The Road to Pearl Harbor*, by Herbert Fels. A study based on official records that trace the events and attitudes leading to war between the United States and Japan.
- Invasion*, by Lt. Gen. Hans Speidel. The Allied invasion of Europe as it looked to the Nazi command. General Speidel was Field Marshal Rommel's chief of staff.
- Ten Days to Die*, by Michael A. Musmanno. Hitler's last days in the Berlin bunker. The author interviewed many eyewitnesses for this unusual account. Not an important book but fascinating reading.
- Escape to Adventure*, by Fitzroy MacLean. Exciting first-person adventure in Soviet Central Asia, the Sahara Desert, and with Tito's forces in World War II. By a British intelligence officer.
- Calculated Risk*, by General Mark W. Clark. Frank and lively reminiscences of wartime by the present Chief of Army Field Forces.

*The Hinge of Fate*, by Winston S. Churchill. Fourth volume of the British Prime Minister's memoirs.

**Military and Political Affairs**

- Strategic Air Power*, by Stefan T. Possony. The principles, possibilities, and limitations of strategic bombing, and the relation of air power to land and sea power.
- The Coming Defeat of Communism*, by James Burnham. A plausible but not entirely realistic plan of action for defeating communism.
- Communism: Its Plans and Tactics*. A thorough study of world communism, based on a report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- War or Peace*, by John Foster Dulles. A plan for the free people of the world to unite into a bulwark for peace.
- International Relations*, by Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan T. Possony. A lengthy and detailed analysis of the struggle between democracy and dictatorship.
- The Economics of Freedom*, by Howard S. Ellis. What the Marshall Plan has accomplished in the economic field.
- The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, by Richard P. Stebbins. A review of American foreign relations around the world. Latest volume of an annual series sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
- The American Impact on Russia*, by Max M. Laserson. Historical study of United States-Russian relations.
- Tito and Goliath*, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Interpretation of the Tito-Stalin rift.
- Why War Came in Korea*, by Robert T. Oliver. Background of Korean events leading to the Communist invasion in June 1950.
- The Uniform Code of Military Justice*, by Colonel Frederick B. Wiener. An explanation of the new code of military law which will govern the Army, Navy, and Air Force, effective 31 May 1951.
- Germany and the Fight for Freedom*, by General Lucius D. Clay. An account of efforts to administer Germany as part of a free Europe and a member of the world community.
- Military Management for National Defense*, by Colonel John R. Beishline. A treatise on military management combining the best principles of industrial organization and management with the best principles of traditional military organization.





## TALKING POINTS



### Notes for the Discussion Leader

#### Preparation

The fighting in Korea has served to focus the attention of all Army officers on the air-ground team. You can therefore expect your group to approach this discussion period with particular interest.

We suggest, in conducting your discussion, that you capitalize on the timeliness of your subject. Describe and analyze recent air-ground operations in Korea. It's possible you may be able to obtain as guest speakers soldiers or airmen who have observed or participated in such operations. If not, you're likely to have available World War II veterans who can recount "case histories" of the air-ground team in action during that war.

Air force film TF 1-4659, *Control of Tactical Air Operations*, shows how a tactical air command is organized and how tactical air supports ground action. Organization and operation of the planning and control agencies in our air-ground system also are described.

This excellent film runs 40 minutes. You may feel it is too long to show in connection with an *Officers' Call* discussion period. But it would be particularly worthwhile for you to see it for background.

#### Points to be Emphasized

1. The Korean conflict provides at least a partial test of our air-ground doctrine and techniques.
2. Tactical air has three main tasks.
  - a. Gain and maintain air superiority. Like any fighting unit, tactical air forces must protect themselves as well as help others. By driving enemy planes from the skies, our planes also help ground forces.
  - b. Isolate the battlefield. This is to deny or seriously hinder the enemy's ability to reinforce and to supply units in the battle area.

- c. Close support to ground troops. In this phase, tactical air activity engages targets immediately opposing our ground troops.

3. Beneath the theater commander, air and ground commanders in equivalent positions are on an equal command basis. Thus air missions in support of ground operations became in effect a joint decision of air and ground commanders.

4. Various operation and control agencies, from a joint operations center through tactical air control parties, serve to expedite the completion of a front-line commander's request for an immediate air strike.

5. A "governing" rule for the use of any ground-support weapon, including tactical air, is that we try to use the most economical means possible to do the job.

6. The success of our air-ground operations depends on these factors:

- a. Availability of troops and equipment for the job.
- b. Mutual understanding between air and ground commanders, based primarily on a knowledge of the capabilities, limitations, and requirements of the "other man's" force.
- c. Joint practice and teamwork.


#### Suggested Questions

1. Describe what you consider mandatory military characteristics of a good ground-support plane.
2. Do you think an Army commander should have operational control over planes supporting his unit? Explain.
3. Discuss the influence of tactical aviation on the Korean fighting.
4. Discuss the effects of continued improvement of guided missiles on our current tactical air support doctrine.



# Officers' CALL

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VOLUME III

*Air Transport*

NUMBER TWO



# Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

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### *Military Management for National Defense*

A review of a book which analyzes and explains principles underlying successful military management.

Talking Points ..... Inside back cover  
Cover: Representative of Army needs in larger transport aircraft is the C-124 type plane. Capable of carrying a 50,000-pound payload more than 2,000 miles, the C-124A can transport 200 fully equipped troops and all but the heaviest and bulkiest items of equipment in the infantry division.

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For explanation of distribution formula, see SR 310-90-1.



## **AIR TRANSPORT**

### **A Bridge Is Blown**

The time is December 1950; the place is Changjin Reservoir in North Korea. Slugging their way from Changjin Reservoir to Hungnam's seaport are soldiers of the Army's 7th Infantry Division and marines of the 1st Marine Division. Ahead of them is a reservoir once crossed by a bridge. Now the bridge is destroyed. In the hills about them are thousands of communist soldiers awaiting an opportunity to destroy our troops.

There is one way to regain the road to Hungnam without crossing the reservoir. But this means making a detour of several miles over rugged mountain trails in the teeth of enemy fire. It means our men will have to abandon their tanks and vehicles, many of them filled with wounded. It means, at best, a delay of days for our weary and frostbitten fighting men. It could mean annihilation.

Fortunately, our troops do not have to make this detour. Even before the main body of the withdrawing column has reached the reservoir, C-119's of the United States Combat Cargo Command are over the bridge site. They parachute eight spans of a 16-ton bridge to engineer troops below. In a matter of hours, our men are escaping from what could have been a death trap. Eventually, they fight their way to Hungnam and safety.

### **Greater Mobility**

The performance of our transport planes at the Changjin Reservoir was one of the more dramatic highlights of the continuous service they have given ground troops during the Korean fighting. From the very start of Korean hostilities, these planes have helped carry troops and equipment.

In Korea we are building on air transport know-how gained in World War II. During that war we came to look upon the air as a military highway giving our ground forces a mobility never known before.

Mobility on the battlefield and to the battlefield is a "must" in our concept of fighting. It is largely because we can move men and equipment where they are needed at the decisive time and place that we feel confident we can defeat the probable greater mass of any future enemy's land forces.

As Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, puts it, "It is our hope that through increased air mobility, each of our divisions eventually can do the work of several present-day divisions."

Some military experts feel that air transport has

altered the maxim of Napoleon that "the strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity [of movement]" . . . to "multiplying the mass by the *square* of the rapidity."

In this *Officers' Call* we will discuss some of the aspects of air transport, particularly as they affect the soldier. A previous issue of *Officers' Call* was devoted to airborne operations.\* Some of this material naturally overlaps. However, of primary concern in this issue is the use of air transport as a means of travel and factors involved in air transportability.

Because they may seem to overlap, it is well to define some of the terms most used in this article. An *airborne operation* involves the movement and delivery by air into an objective area of combat forces and their logistical support. *Airborne units* are ground units organized, equipped, and trained primarily for making assault landings from the air.

*Air transport* refers to the moving of supplies, equipment, men, and vehicles by air, usually in transport airplanes or gliders. *Air transportable* means the state of being suitable for transport by air. And *air-transportable units* are ground units, other than airborne, which are trained and whose equipment has been modified, when necessary, for movement and delivery into an objective area by transport aircraft.

### **Why Air Movements**

With our scope limited to air transport, let's first consider the reasons for moving by air. When do we use air transport and why?

We find our answers in past and current military operations and considerations for the future.

Let's look first at our current test of air transportation—the Korean airlift. Actually, this is two airlifts. One is from the United States to Japan; the other from Japan to our troops in Korea.

Almost with the start of the Korean fighting, Military Air Transport Service (MATS) began flying vitally needed men and matériel from the West Coast to Japan. Some 100 MATS transports were augmented by about 60 commercial planes. Within a short time, these planes were carrying about 100 tons a day.


This airlift carried material needed now, not soon. An example of getting critical items to the far-off battlefield in a hurry was the case of the 3.5 inch

\* Volume II, No. 1.




## Why Air Movement


Moves critical items fast even over great distances



Used when other means can't do the job or do it fast enough



Normally augments other modes of transportation  
Does not replace them



bazookas. Seventeen days after United Nations Commander General Douglas MacArthur first called for them, these new antitank weapons, ammunition, and an instruction crew were in the Korean combat area. Delivery was from factory to battlefield—direct.

Other critical items have been speeded to Japan by

air. These include troops, ammunition, and fighter-plane engines—to name but a few essentials of combat.

### *Critical Items Fast*

Thus, we see air transport moves critical items in a hurry—even though great distances are involved.



Impressive as the tonnage carried has been, this airlift has not replaced sea transportation. It has augmented the more normal transportation by delivering many essentials to the fighting front when they are needed most.

The airlift has worked in reverse, too. Especially important has been the evacuation of war casualties to hospitals in the States.

With the first American troops entering Korea from Japan by air, the role of air transport grew as the fighting progressed.

To handle the huge traffic, a Combat Cargo Command was created. Its job was to fly materials from Japan to Korea, often to improvised landing strips near the fighting units which needed the supplies most. Most supplies were airlanded; others were dropped.

After our breakout of the Pusan beachhead, transport planes helped to supply our advancing forces. As we moved up the peninsula, we found some of the sea ports could not handle all the traffic that was planned for them. The harbors at Inchon and Pohang were inadequate. To keep supplies moving to the fighting troops, air transport continued to help normal sea delivery.

Advancing troops were supplied by air when they had overrun normal supply lines. Instead of stopping

for matériel to catch up, our troops kept driving, depending on transport aircraft to keep them supplied.

#### *Something New in Air-Transportable Items*

Items not generally considered air transportable were brought in by air. These included pontoon bridges, steam shovels, a complete asphalt paving unit, three-ton generators, and an equipped fire-crash truck.

The Air Force's new C-119's carried the larger items; the C-82's and C-47's the smaller.


The Combat Cargo Command dropped some 6,000 troops of the 11th Airborne Division (187th Regimental Combat Team). Many of the things learned in Operation *Swamer* and developed since then paid off on the "money" run in Korea. Supporting the paratroopers were artillery pieces as large as 105-mm howitzers, 90-mm antitank guns, vehicles, and other large items dropped by parachute.

Then, when the tide of battle in Korea turned against us and we were forced back by the Chinese communist hordes, air transport continued its vital role. Withdrawing units received supplies in regularly scheduled air drops and by planes which often set down on improvised strips. Cut-off units got emergency drops. Bombers and transports landed on small strips to bring out wounded men.



Marked "special delivery, airlift," vital supplies have been flown to the men fighting on the ground since our first days in Korea.





*Our largest transport aircraft, the XC-99, can carry 400 fully equipped troops or about 100,000 pounds of cargo. Like its "sister," the B-36, however, it needs a fairly long and sturdy runway to land and take off.*

This reverse part of the airlift to Korea was exploited to the utmost in salvaging matériel. Air strips were held to the last to bring out supplies—particularly ammunition. Pilots were often under small-arms fire as they took off with the loaded planes.

The importance of helicopters as a means of transportation has been demonstrated in Korea. Men wounded so critically that it was unsafe to move them by vehicles were brought out by helicopters. They rescued downed pilots. They carried critical supplies to isolated units. They did jobs that other planes, or any other transport, for that matter, couldn't touch.

Operations in Korea have shown that air transport is used where other means can't do the job or can't do it fast enough.

#### ***Early Air Transport***

Of course we found out the advantages of air transport long before Korea. Before World War II many nations, including Russia, experimented extensively in the use of airborne and air-transported troops.

In their conquest of Crete in the Spring of 1941, the Germans showed what air-transported troops could achieve. Some 1,200 German transports flew in 35,000

fully equipped troops. In this operation it became evident that if the attacker has air support and aerial supply, his forces may well overcome a strong defense lacking air superiority.

Most of us are familiar with our airborne operations during World War II. We will not go into them here. But it is well to point out that a good part of the success of most of them depended on efficient and timely resupply—both of men and matériel—by air.

Realizing that air transport was to play an important role in our operations in Europe, we established before the Normandy invasion a joint operations agency to handle air lift requests. This Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) continued through the war. It received requests for air transport and allocated them among the American and British units which could fly the missions.

Our ability to fly matériel to our troops was a turning point in many of our World War II battles.

For instance, our troops at Bastogne received more than 1,000 tons of equipment and supplies, about 300 artillery weapons, and about 8,000 gallons of gasoline by air transport. Much of it was by air drop with a 94 percent drop effectiveness. Most important, it came



when needed most. On Christmas Eve 1944, the troops were virtually out of ammunition. But by day-break the next morning the sky was clear for the first time in days. With the sun, came transport aircraft bringing in supplies to continue the fight.

General George Patton's march across Germany shows how that extra punch delivered by air transports can speed victory. The Third Army became so conscious of air supply that combat units put emphasis on taking airfields and clearing them for transport aircraft.

Although trucks carried most of the supplies in the Third Army's march, air transport played no small part in the drive. In 48 days, airplanes delivered more than 6,000,000 gallons of gasoline—about 22 percent of all that the Third Army used—and 11 percent of the Third Army's rations. On return trips, these airplanes, brought out 20,000 casualties and 134,600 prisoners of war.

In the closing days of the fighting in Europe, the evacuation by air of repatriated allied military personnel became a big job. From April through May 1945, American and British planes flew some 350,000 former prisoners of war out of Germany.


### *Major Supply By Air*

Thanks to several well-known comic strips, many Americans think of the "Hump" as the ultimate in flying war supplies. And the tonnage and type of cargo flown was impressive. By July 1945, the Air Transport Command was flying more than 71,000 tons per month in support of the China war effort.

Supply in the British reconquest of Burma in 1944 and 1945 was primarily by air. To overcome the obstacles of difficult terrain, miserable weather, tropical diseases, and lack of roads, 96 percent of the supplies went in by air. About 100,000 casualties were flown out. During the entire Burma campaign, more than 1,000,000 tons of supplies and equipment were moved by air.

That we can maintain large military forces by air transport is apparent from our operations in the past.

In fact, we supplied more than 2,000,000 people of Berlin almost entirely by air from June 1948 through September 1949. During this period some 225 American Air Force and Navy planes and 128 British planes delivered 2,325,509 tons of fuel and food to blockaded Berlin. On one day, 16 April 1949, almost 13,000



*This scale model of the XH-16 represents one of the largest helicopters currently being developed. Its all metal fuselage has the general shape and dimensions of the C-54 transport. It is expected the large detachable compartment and the main cabin space can carry about the same number of troops as the normal Army bus.*



tons of supplies were brought in. More than 200,000 passengers were flown in the Berlin airlift. This tremendous cargo was carried in all kinds of weather and in spite of the fact that loading and unloading largely was done by hand.

We know, *if we control the skies*, we can supply large groups strictly by air—be they military or civilian.

#### **No Other Means Possible**

If we fight in areas of large waste lands and other undeveloped spots in the world devoid of adequate land transport systems, we will rely largely on air transport. Such, for example, are our concepts if we fight in the arctic.

Although partisans largely "live off the land and the enemy," they also need other supplies. They may be supplied by air drops, particularly of critical items. During World War II, for example, French resistance groups received matériel in this manner. The very nature of guerrilla operations are such that stealth is mandatory. And if supplies from the outside must be brought in, air transport is one of the best means available.

Summing it up, we have used, are using, and will use air transport when other forms cannot do the job; cannot get a needed item some place quickly enough; or the item is so critical, so short in supply, or so expensive that we cannot afford to fill the normal supply pipeline. Additionally, with other transportation carrying the bulk, air transport will augment the normal system. There will always be times when something is needed in a hurry. And air transport is our fastest way to get it there.

#### **Limitations**

In pointing out what air transport can do and has done, we must remember its limitations.

First, we must have air superiority for the mass movement of air transports. We must be able to protect our transports from interception and destruction by enemy planes, missiles, and gunfire. And we must have air superiority over our airhead and departure bases.

Second, we need plenty of the right kind of planes. We don't have enough now—either in quantity or in variety—to support a major campaign solely by air transport.

If we have the planes and we can get them to and from the objective area, the other limitations are not too bad. Here are some obstacles hampering movement by air:

As much as the cargo-carrying capacity of aircraft has been improved, airplanes still can't match sea or land transports in tonnage moved. An airlift still must be regarded as expensive transportation.

We can't carry the items by air that we should. For example, an infantry division is still not completely air transportable. This means that an air-transported division goes to combat lacking some of its needed punch.

If the cargo is to be airlanded—and that is the most efficient method of delivery—we need strips and fields capable of handling the landing aircraft. We need planes that can land and take off in small areas. Once the planes are on the ground, we need faster methods of loading and unloading cargo.

Distances may be prohibitive for mass air travel. Adverse weather may be a serious handicap.

Fuel is a problem. Planes flying from the United States to Japan, for instance, are expected to fly back. Some other form of transportation carries fuel to Japan for the planes' return trip. If, however, planes are flying to a new airhead, the problem of bringing in sufficient fuel for the return trip is a large one. In other words, part of the tonnage carried would have to be fuel for the return trip of all the planes.\*

Most of these limitations are logistical rather than tactical or strategic. And the tactical and strategic considerations in an airborne or air-transported operation are many. Indeed, the preplanning, conferences, and coordination efforts within and between units and services that are part of such an operation seem endless.

But despite all limitations, we have come a long way in a short time in the use of air transport. Current developments—some of them discussed in this article—will further the importance of air transport.

#### **Plans and Problems**

Generally, what are our goals for air transport?

General Collins has indicated that the Army must use air transport to the greatest extent possible. He has said:

"Certainly transport of ground forces and their equipment by air would be a vital factor in the battles of any future war. Therefore, our ultimate goal is to have all Army combat elements (except armored divisions) and their supporting units capable of making airborne assaults. This means that the Army must maintain the nucleus of trained, equipped airborne divisions capable of employment in an airborne

\* We have flying tankers that can carry large quantities of fuel. These planes also can be converted to regular transports.





*Among the favorable characteristics of the C-119 transport are its facilities for rapid loading and unloading.*

assault, and that the remainder of the Army must, insofar as possible, be organized, trained, and equipped in such a manner as to be air transportable."

This is a big order. What are some of the problems it poses, some of the present limitations in air transportability that we must overcome to reach this goal? Factors to be considered include the airplanes themselves, our equipment, our present know-how, and our plans for the future, including our plans for training.

On the positive side, we have the know-how to move by air. World War II and our post-war operations, particularly Operation *Swarm* and the Berlin Airlift gave us extensive experience in air transport. We are now learning more in support of the fighting in Korea.

In our training, we are building on our know-how in air transportability. Combat units that can move by air will receive training in air transportability.

The Army has many qualified paratroopers. These

men know how to move by air. Additionally, for a time, The Infantry School conducted an excellent three-weeks' course in air transportability. This course acquainted officers with the problems of moving by air and instructed them in training for, planning, and conducting air movements. Much of the material in the course is now a part of the regular instruction of our Service Schools.

#### ***Number of Transports***

Moving any sizeable force by air requires a great number of transports. Here, the picture is not so good.

For example, to airlift the air-transportable part of an infantry division with 3-days' supply would take a combination of about 1,350 medium cargo aircraft (C-119 type) and about 160 heavy cargo aircraft (C-124 type). The follow-up echelon, mainly larger tanks and other heavy equipment, is presently not air transportable. Fewer planes could, of course, shuttle



the division. And it would take considerably fewer aircraft to move the actual assault elements of an infantry division.

Thus, we can see the need for more cargo-type planes if we are to contemplate the moving of large ground units by air.

Besides our regular cargo-type transports, we have many additional aircraft in our Air Force, Navy, the unified MATS, and commercial transportation. But if the time comes for emergency war use of air transportation, most of these planes will be needed also for purposes other than moving and supplying combat troops. Moreover, a civilian-type transport does not make the best airplane for combat transportation.

Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, has said that although a "very substantial deficit" exists in our present capacity for air transport, the long-range situation is more encouraging.

Mr. Finletter explains that under a projected Air Force expansion our airlift capacities would be greatly increased, particularly through the introduction of C-97 and C-124 transports. He cautions, however, that the proposed increase would meet the requirements for our Armed Forces in-being but not the needs of all-out mobilization.

President Truman has asked for a five-fold increase in the production of war planes to a rate of about 24,000 within a year. He has said that industry will be geared to turn out 50,000 planes a year if necessary.

This latter figure compares favorably with our yearly average during World War II. From 1940 through 1945, for example, we produced about 300,000 air-

craft of all types with an airframe weight of about one and one-fourth million tons.\* These included 100,000 fighters; 100,000 bombers of all types; 25,000 transports; and 75,000 trainers, reconnaissance planes, and aircraft for other uses.

It is significant to note that of all the airplanes built in World War II less than 10 percent were transports. And if we are to increase our air transport potentialities to the extent that large ground units are to move by air, we will need many more transports than we have ever had.

### *The Right Kind*

Granted that our expanding Armed Forces will have more air transports, will our problems then be over? Not by a long shot. Even if we had all the planes we wanted today, we couldn't with our present aircraft move by air all elements of an infantry division.

We couldn't move it; we couldn't load and unload supplies fast enough. Today, we just don't have all the types of planes and other equipment required for the task.

We're approaching these problems in air transportability from two sides. As we know, one way is to make and use lighter and less bulky equipment in ground warfare; the other is to make and fly and land planes more suitable for Army needs. Improvements are needed on both sides.


Let's consider some of the things we are doing about our equipment to make it more air transportable. Naturally we want to cut down on weight and size.

\* In March 1944 we made more than 9,000 aircraft.



*The C-124A can carry 94 percent of all military vehicles fully assembled and has facilities for rapid loading and unloading.*





*The assault transport, such as this XC-123, has great possibilities for Army combat operations.*

But we can't afford to sacrifice durability and dependability.

In some cases, we have been able to meet airborne requirements by modifying existing matériel. But we also have had to come up with entirely new models designed specifically for movement by air.

#### ***Miniaturization***

The concept of miniaturization has far-reaching implications. We have developed prototypes of superior new smaller equipment that point the way to more advances.

We are developing a family of airborne construction equipment designed to provide maximum utility and interchangeability of parts and components. One of the basic units is a tractor, available in both rubber-tired and track-laying versions, that provides almost the same work capacity as the standard model but at less than half the weight. With a series of lightweight attachments, it becomes successively a bulldozer, a front loading shovel, a grader, a prime mover for either a dump wagon or a scraper, and the power

source for a winch. This machine is rugged and dependable, but, naturally, is not expected to have the life of the larger and more durable models.

We have a new switchboard that outperforms its predecessors yet with a reduction in weight and size of about 70 percent. We have a new type of field wire that weighs 48 pounds per mile as compared to 132 pounds per mile for its World War II equivalents, requires no bulky reel, and minimizes the use of critical materials.

A new "walkie talkie" radio has only half the weight and size of its older version; yet, it provides four times as many frequency channels and double the power output of the earlier model.

In the field of weapons, we are concentrating on the problem of getting more and better firepower into an airhead in the early phases of an airborne operation. We have cut the weight of a 105-mm howitzer in half. In addition to our present recoilless rifles and bazookas, we have a new 105-mm recoilless rifle that has no counterpart among our recent weapons.



### *Aircraft Development*

Significant developments have also been made in the aircraft that the Army needs. Here, too, the problems are difficult. If, for example, we have a plane large enough to carry everything we want transported it probably can't land in the usual primitive landing strips of an airhead. Thus, we must experiment with new and modified types of planes, landing devices, improving landing strips, and so on.

We must consider the plane itself—what range, speed, and cargo capacities do we need?


Some of the factors in the cargo capacity of aircraft influencing air transportability are: the size and location of cargo doors; height of the door from the ground and the ability to load through this door; size of cargo compartment; strength of the floor; rapid delivery or "kick-out" system to drop large quantities into small drop zones; location and strength of cargo tie-down fittings; allowable cargo load; gross weight; maximum landing load; and limitation of the position of the center of gravity.

We have been making progress in the large cargo

transports. The C-119 has proved its value in Korea. Another plane, the C-124, not yet used operationally, can carry virtually anything in the infantry division except the heavier tanks and tank recovery vehicles. It can also carry 240 men or 50,000 pounds of cargo.

Included in our larger transports are the C-121, military version of the Constellation airliners; the C-97, patterned after the B-29 and capable of carrying a payload of 68,000 pounds; the C-74 with a payload of 50,000 pounds; and the XC-99, cargo version of the B-36, designed to carry 400 fully equipped troops or 100,000 pounds of cargo.

It should be remembered these payload figures are guides representing normally the maximum allowable cargo load. This allowable cargo load, or payload, varies with certain conditions. For instance, factors which reduce the plane's payload include flights of long distances; adverse meteorological conditions and the height at which the aircraft must fly; and condition of the landing strips or airfields where the cargo will be landed. As a result, allowable cargo loads are actually established for each operation.



*Detachable cargo compartments may be a characteristic of some of our future cargo aircraft. The C-120 is our first transport in which the cargo-compartment part of the fuselage may be uncoupled and hauled away.*



Additionally, some of these larger planes have characteristics that tend to reduce their suitability for all Army purposes.

Important in the types of aircraft the Army needs for combat operations is the assault transport. A sort of improved, powered glider, the assault transport is looked on as a rugged troop and equipment carrier that can land and take off in short distances. It has the very important advantage (over gliders) of being able to return under its own power for more loads. The XC-123, an assault transport, can carry 60 fully equipped troops or a cargo load of about 20,000 pounds.

**Detachable Cargo Transports**


Particularly in combat, one of the "musts" for air transport is loading and unloading quickly. There just isn't time in an airhead for hand unloading—as was largely the case in the Berlin airlift.

Developments in the cargo compartments of the


aircraft themselves can facilitate easier and faster unloading. But one of the most promising steps for quick unloading away from the air strip and, better yet, dispersal—which is also vital in an airhead—is the development of the detachable cargo type transport. The C-120, embodying the "prime mover and pod" or tractor trailer principle in an airplane, has operated successfully. Construction of more C-120's is under way.

The possibilities of the detachable cargo type transport are virtually limitless. With the present plane, the "mother ship" and the cargo pod land as one aircraft. The pod can be detached and the aerial prime mover (the aircraft less the cargo compartment) can return for another pod.

The pod will be hauled away from the landing strip for unloading at dumps. It may be possible that the pod can be towed on the ground as any other trailer might be. In this manner, we might be able to haul supplies close to the using units rather than store them.







*With organic helicopter companies now authorized for the Army, the soldier may look on the helicopter as his own "flying truck."  
The H-21 can carry about 2 tons.*

in dumps. The pod could also be used for small field hospital wards, mobile command posts, prepacked supply units, and many other purposes.

It may be possible to release the pod from the mother plane while both are still airborne and flying at low altitudes above the landing strips. The pod would then skid into a landing area. Particularly in the early stages of an airhead, this would be a way of getting a lot of supplies on the ground in a short time. It would also solve the problem of the heavier plane not being able to land on unimproved landing areas.

This would be similar to glider landings. A pod costs less than a glider—considered expendable during combat—and requires no man to guide it to a landing.

Perhaps the pod may be dropped by a parachute-rocket arrangement. After the pod is released from the mother ship, parachutes would keep the pod falling correctly at the same time breaking the fall. Rockets on the pod firing at certain altitudes above the ground would lessen the impact of landing.

A transportation possibility is that the pods also could be carried by a helicopter. If the pod were taken into spots that a conventional plane couldn't reach, a helicopter could hover over the pod and pick it up without landing.

### **Army Helicopters**

The Army has been authorized organic helicopter transport companies.\* It is contemplated that they will provide short-haul air transport for combat divisions on a basis similar to that of our present truck companies. In addition to helicopter transport companies, thought is being given to using helicopters in battalions and companies of combat units to complement and to replace partially the present vehicular transport of these units.

Our present utility helicopter can be used to transport men (especially important is evacuating casualties), take ammunition and hot food to troops in near-inaccessible spots, control fire, lay wire, reconnoiter, and a variety of other jobs involving getting some place where other means of transport can't reach or reach quickly enough.

With further improvements in helicopters, including increased lift capacities, it may be possible that they can carry all types of supplies and ammunition ground troops need, as well as move troop units themselves.

\* The first was activated at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1 November 1950. These companies are Transportation Corps units. They are authorized 21 cargo helicopters, as standard equipment, and 2 utility helicopters for command and control purposes.



In this regard, the Army has announced that it has requirements for helicopters from those capable of carrying one person to those capable of carrying extremely heavy loads. These larger helicopters, or "flying cranes," could transport the heavier weapons and other equipment of ground units.

#### *The "Convertiplane"*

Probably one of the most significant proposals of interest to the Army in the field of air transportation is the "convertiplane." This is a plane that combines the best features of the conventional plane and the helicopter. Some proposed models contain propellers that may be rotated so that on take-off and landing they operate vertically like helicopters. Then when the plane is in the air, the propellers are turned forward so that they operate like conventional aircraft. Of course, the big advantage of such an aircraft is its independence of prepared airstrips while still retaining a relatively high flying performance.

General Collins expressed the need for airplanes such as the convertiplane when he stated recently, "I feel we have only scratched the surface in airborne operations. I feel that we are still far from meeting our requirements and potential capabilities in the airborne field. Our airborne troops must have more firepower, an airborne tank that some day we may be able to drop by parachute, and air transports of radical design that can operate independently of airfields."

Along with improvements in aircraft, we also have been bettering our parachute techniques. With bigger and better parachutes we have been able to drop larger items. We now have safely dropped a 2½-ton truck.

#### *Best Use Of Supplies*

The troops being supplied by air must make the most efficient use of the matériel they receive, regardless of how they get it. Not to be overlooked in this regard is the human element. The practice of supply discipline and supply control is a "must"—probably even more so than in any other type of operation.

To conserve on transports and not to overburden the troops in an airhead, we send only the supplies that are needed. And we see that the supplies are properly documented, packaged, and tagged. It is much better to bring in only the essentials and for the troops on the ground to know what they have and where it is, than to bring in all the supplies that the available aircraft could carry, regardless of the needs of the troops on the ground. Documentation includes the proper keeping of records both on the delivery and

receiving end, as well as proper manifests for each flight.

#### *Logistical Advantages*

There are other advantages besides speed and versatility that air transport offers.

In the case of overseas warfare, air transport gives us the capability of delivery from factory to firing line (To a limited extent, we are doing this now in support of the fighting in Korea). This means that, within limitations, stockpiles for critical items are required only at the factory or nearby airfields and at the army supply points or their equivalents in the combat zone.

An ideal situation of having, at least in part, the productive capacity of the factory—rather than the manufactured goods on hand—as the reserve of supplies, would be almost completely realized. Our experience with some consumable items of large tonnage, such as ammunition, shows how we can overstock. The end of World War II found us with two-thirds of the tonnage of ammunition we had produced in stockpiles. More efficient use of matériel means more efficient use of manpower.

In the use of manpower, it seems that savings could be made through air transport. It has been suggested that the number of "pipeline" personnel—troops in transit to support an overseas force—could be reduced drastically if these troops were moved by air instead of surface means. And movement would be speeded.

It was estimated that the moving of one ton of supplies per day from St. Louis to Coblenz by land and sea transport required at least 100 men, but that transport by air could reduce this to approximately 75 men. As methods of air transport are improved, of course, this manpower saving would be even more pronounced.

#### *Air Transport Training*

Air transport is by no means the concern solely of our top planners and research and development specialists. Because we no longer look on air transport as a novelty in moving troops and their supplies, each combat unit that can be air transported will receive training in how to move by air.

The local situation, to include the urgency of air-transport training, certainly affects the time it takes to teach a unit to move by air. Regimental units normally would need about 2 to 3 weeks. Probably because of limited facilities such as aircraft, mock-ups, and other training necessities—including instructors—it would take a division longer to run through its



entire training cycle. Perhaps instruction would have to be given only one regiment at a time.

Air transport training for divisions with no previous instruction would usually begin with an orientation and indoctrination primarily for senior commanders and principal staff officers. An instructors' training course for unit staffs, company officers, and probably some noncommissioned officers also would be held. Both courses would be given by air transportability specialists. They may run concurrently. They would last about 5 days.

Instruction for the entire unit usually begins with a period of preflight training. Included is instruction in: characteristics of cargo aircraft and other types of planes; departure and arrival airfields; and flight safety to include how to use a parachute.

Next comes instruction in weight and balance computations; why aircraft must be loaded properly; and how we go about it.\* Men are taught how to prepare ropes to secure cargo; knots and lashing technique, to include work in tie-down devices.

Most of the time—perhaps a week—is devoted to practical work in loading and lashing. Troops load each item of equipment that will be moved. They practice until they have built up speed and accuracy in loading, lashing, unlash, and unloading. The ground work for the troops is completed with instruction in organization for an air movement.

The next step is air training. It is started with a short orientation flight, if possible in the same type of transport that will be used in the actual air movement.

Administrative procedures are then worked out for the forthcoming move. This gives the unit practice in preparing for a move and developing standing operating procedure. Various forms and manifests are completed. By staff and command work, it is possible to tell each soldier his specific duties, where his aircraft will be parked before loading; its number; what he will load; where he will ride; loading time; stations; and take off.

\* There is much more to loading an aircraft than simply filling one within the weight limitation. Allowable loads must be placed in certain positions and lashed properly so that the aircraft will have a safe balance during take-off, flight, and landing. The load must also be secured so that it will not break loose under any condition of flight. Fortunately we can compute these requirements as well as determine whether the aircraft is safe to fly as we plan to load it.

Then comes a flight with all equipment. It consists of a tactical exercise to include what has been taught in the course. Stress is on loading, lashing, flying, unloading, and perhaps dispersal and combat stations in the "airhead."

Of course, as in any other type of move, units can be air transported, when necessary, with little previous training in air transportability. Minimum training should cover about two days with one day devoted entirely to loading and lashing equipment.

For example, after VJ-day, the 27th Infantry Division was flown from Okinawa to Japan, with little formal training. Fully 20 percent of the men in the division had never been in an airplane before. But with the help of instructors from the 11th Airborne Division, who gave the 27th a week's training in basic air transportability, the 27th made the move to Japan without mishap.

It is well to remember, however, that regardless of how well units know how to move by air, few airborne or air-transported operations—particularly for combat purposes—are undertaken without much preplanning and all that it entails.

### How Air Transport Affects You

Because air transport will play an important role in our future operations, you can expect increasing Army emphasis on a more air-transportable Army. It follows then that Army officers—particularly those in combat units—can expect to be involved increasingly in air movements.

One of the decisive elements of modern war, air power means much more than the delivery of explosives on a target. Air power means also the transportation by air of all the means for waging war on the ground.

For, as General Collins explains:

"... the airborne operation is but a logical extension of the conventional use of aircraft in support of ground operations. The ultimate capabilities of ground forces, properly trained and equipped for air movement, are so tremendous that the outcome of any future war may well depend upon the degree to which we exploit this rapid means of transportation."



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**MILITARY MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE\***

*By Colonel John R. Beishline*

At first glance it might appear that this book would interest only those in the specialized field of management at the higher levels of our military establishment. And, as the title indicates, the subject matter deals largely with top level management.

But the book is more than that. It discusses principles applying to virtually all military units or situations that require administrative and operational management. (And what in the Army doesn't?) Covered are management principles which have bearing on the fundamental problems facing officers on all echelons, such as how, through efficient organization and direction of effort, to do the most with the men available to them.

\* New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., \$5.00.

Colonel Beishline, the author, is now Executive to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Department of the Army. *Military Management for National Defense* is based largely on his doctoral dissertation at Ohio State University where he received his Ph.D. in industrial management.

To "set the stage," Colonel Beishline has traced historically the relationship between industrial management and military management. Likewise, he has established and clarified definitions in the management field and has delineated principles of military management and their relationships with each other.

The author considers military management as "The vital spark that activates, directs, and controls the



military organization so that its objectives will be accomplished. Therefore, military management is the function of executive leadership."

This type of management applies both to top Army commanders and their staffs and to platoon leaders. The military leader is called on for both administrative management (forming and promulgating broad, over-all policies) and operational management (implementation in day-to-day operation). Thus, it follows that at the highest levels of military organization—Army headquarters in Washington, for example—management is chiefly administrative; at the lower levels—the company and platoon, for example—management is chiefly operational.

The book is divided principally into parts on planning, organization, command, and control. These, Colonel Beishline points out, correspond to the logical sequence of basic military management. All four of these broad activities are based on one thing—our objective; or what we are trying to accomplish through management.

With the objective established, planning is the first step in the management process. It boils down to selecting the best line of action for what we are trying to do. Colonel Beishline notes that a good plan is simple and clear; flexible yet stable; and balanced.

Once the plan has been adopted, we need the tools to carry it out. We must form an organization or perhaps alter an existing one. The organization develops and maintains proper relationships between functions, physical factors, and personnel needed for the job. Tests of a good organization are the economy and effectiveness evidenced in doing the job. In discussing organization, the author also covers the basic concepts in organizational and staff structures. He traces the history of the Army general staff and compares the present Army general staff with the staff organizations in the Air Force and Navy.

With the plan determined and the organization effected to carry it out, something is needed to spark

the plan into action and to guide the organization in accomplishing the mission. This Colonel Beishline sees as the function of commanding. Fundamental to commanding is an appreciation and understanding of human relationships. In this light, the author emphasizes the need for military leadership that instills and maintains high morale and *esprit*. The discussion on personnel management is worth the consideration of any troop leader or staff officer.

The author's fourth function of military management is controlling. He thinks of military controlling as determining the relationship between planned and actual results and taking the necessary and authorized steps to rectify any actual disparities with the plan of action. Particularly on the operational level of management, the commander and his staff can think of control as part of the command responsibility. Certainly effective control is mandatory in getting the most out of our unit. Managerial control consists of supervision, comparison (what is being done compared with what should be done), and correction.

Colonel Beishline stresses that effective and efficient use of manpower, money, and matériel in the Armed Forces is more than desirable—it is a necessity. And to get the most out of our resources we must tax our management capacity to the utmost. If a corporation lacks competent leadership, its worst fate is bankruptcy. But if the military leadership of the Nation fails, not only will untold lives be lost, but the Nation is likely to suffer disastrous defeat.

In effect, *Military Management for National Defense* is a book on the subject of management with stress on the military aspects. That there is need for such a book is evidenced by its use in various universities including the United States Military Academy (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership).

The fact it is also used as a text should not "scare" officers away from it. It is a book worthy of study and should stimulate considerable thinking on the part of its readers.



# TALKING POINTS



## Notes for the Discussion Leader

### Preparation

Here is another subject that has practical application for just about every Army officer. If you are in a combat unit that can be moved by air, you probably have either experienced some form of air transportability training or you will.

The speculative phase of air transport—what's next?—should interest all Army officers. There are problems in air transport that must be solved before we can move what we want to by air. You can view the material in the main article as a sort of "jumping off place" in your discussion—and your thinking—of the technological developments in store for a more air-transportable Army.

Combat reports from Korea are rich in the role of air transport there. Service journals, other magazines, and the daily press will give you a wealth of information to keep your subject up to date.

Most valuable of all, of course, are the reports of officers who have been working with air transport, both overseas and here in the States.

### Points to be Emphasized

1. Mobility to and on the battlefield is a "must" in our Army today. We look on air transport to give ground forces an increased mobility, resulting in the ability to have decisive forces at the decisive places.

2. Our Army's present goal in air transportability is for our regular infantry divisions to be able to move by air.

3. Although air transport is still expensive in comparison with surface means, it is no longer a novelty. Circumstances are often such that air transport is the only feasible method of moving troops and matériel of war.

4. We use air transport when—

*a.* It is the only method that can do the job (other means can't take us there).

*b.* Speed is essential.

*c.* An item is so critical that we can't afford to fill the normal supply pipeline.

*d.* To supplement normal transport.

5. At present we do not have the number nor the types of planes we need for major use of air transport in support of Army operations.

6. We are becoming a more air-transportable Army, however, by developing aircraft more suitable for Army needs and developing equipment that is more air transportable.

7. Although the technical side of learning to move by air should not be overlooked, training presents no unusual problems.

### Suggested Questions

1. Discuss the similarities and differences in an air-transported move as compared with an amphibious move.

2. Some advocates of "convertiplanes" and helicopters feel that we've come about as far as we can in the use of conventional air transports for Army combat purposes. Do you agree? Why?

3. Do you think the concept of using aircraft as the major method of transporting replacements to overseas forces is valid? What are the advantages? Disadvantages? Does the same hold true for transporting matériel?

4. If your company (or battalion) were to receive helicopters to replace, on an experimental basis, your present vehicular transport, do you think your unit could function better than it does now? Are there any of your normal functions you could not carry out?

5. If the Army had organic transport helicopters, how do you think we would use them in combat?