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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 7, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 18

(3)

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

MARSHALL, General George C.

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WARD & MAIL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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S. Con. Res. 27

Friday, December 7, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(resumed)

- - -

Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, yesterday in connection with exhibit 13, which is the Martin report on air defense, you mentioned that you had instituted an inquiry that resulted in that report and you were going to produce the memorandum. Have you the memorandum here with you this morning?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I have it here. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. Mitchell: If you will, please.

General Marshall: This is dated July 17, 1941.

(Reading):

"CORRECTED MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
U. S. AIR FORCES:

"The Chief of Staff desires that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii to include:

"a. Provision for the increase of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength (personnel and planes) of the Hawaiian Department up to one group.

"b. Any further increases to be limited to pursuit, light and medium bombardment and observation types,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

in order to reduce the concentration of air power in Hawaii by holding any additional heavy bombardment aviation required from Hawaiian defense in readiness on the mainland for rapid reinforcement of the Hawaiian garrison as required.

"c. Outlying fields to be organized at operating strength by rotation of personnel and organizations from parent airdromes.

"This study will be made in collaboration with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, who is being furnished a copy of this directive.

(Signed) ORLANDO WARD

Colonel, General Staff,

Secretary, General Staff."

Mr. Mitchell: This memorandum, General, speaks of one group of heavy bombers. What does a group mean in the Air Corps?

General Marshall: I think at that time a group consisted of about three squadrons of either nine or twelve planes each. The organization changed quite frequently. I am sorry I cannot give you an accurate count on that but the Air Corps officers who will follow me can.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, I want to refer to some testimony you gave --

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

The Vice Chairman: Does counsel intend to offer this as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, it was read into the transcript and I did not think I would waste another number on it.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Mr. Mitchell: I want to inquire about a matter you testified to yesterday in connection with the so-called "winds" implementing message.

In reading over the transcript I am not sure that it is as clear as it should be and I want to be sure it is clear. In the first place, I want to call your attention again to the message in Japanese code that we intercepted and translated appearing on page 154 of exhibit 1, which is the intercepted diplomatic messages.

At the left hand bottom of the page it is dated November 19, 1941, translated November 28, 1941 and it reads this way:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

"(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME", which translated, the record shows, means "East wind - rain."

"(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI", which translated, according to the record, means "North wind - cloudy."

"(3) JAPAN-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE", which translated means "West wind - clear."

The dispatch continues:

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

Now, I spoke of that as the message which set up the code system. You understood that, did you? And on the next page, at the top of page 155, there is a second message from Tokyo to Washington intercepted on November 19, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, the Jap number on which is just the succeeding number to the previous message. That sets up a slightly different system of giving out this news. It says:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan-U.S. Relations, "HIGASHI"; that is the first word, you will notice, in the number 1 in the previous message and I understand that means "East", just the word "East"; no "East wind-rain"; no "wind" about it.

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA." That is the first word or part of the first word in the second paragraph in the preceding message. That means "North".

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.): "NISHI". That is the first word in the third item in the previous message and means "West".

Now, those are what we call the initial messages which were received on the dates shown and in my questions I used the word "implementing" message which I intended to describe as any subsequent messages in which the Japs were using this code, in which the Japs using this code had sent out these warnings.

Now, I notice when I was inquiring on page 2912 of the transcript yesterday my assistants have called my attention to the fact that one of my questions was not clear.

I called your attention to the first message this way:

"Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

November 19th, translated November 28th, which appears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts?

"General Marshall: I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe."

Did you understand I was referring to the one at the bottom of page 154?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: (Reading)

"Mr. Mitchell: That is the message that established the code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

"General Marshall: Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar with the specific winds message which would utilize this code, would it not?

"Mr. Mitchell: Well, there are two. This is the message which came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to their Washington diplomatic representatives:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency."

And then without my having completed my question and

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

shown what the other one was you said: "I think I can say now specifically I did see it."

Now, when I said "two" in that question I was referring to the one on the bottom of page 154 and the second one on the top of page 155.

General Marshall: Are you asking me now specifically did I see both of these messages?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, having that statement I would like to know if you remember knowing about these two messages of November 19th which set up these code systems? The first one had the "winds" word in it and the second one did not.

General Marshall: I have no distinct recollection of the breakdown between the two messages.

Mr. Mitchell: I see.

General Marshall: But I am quite certain I saw them both.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, I think maybe we have been clear on this on the next page, page 2914, but I will ask you again:

Prior to December 7, 1941 did you ever see or hear of any later message in which the Japs in using this winds code sent out word that there was "East wind - rain", which meant trouble with the United States?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of either see-

Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

ing or hearing of such a message.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked you a question. I will repeat it now:

"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the fourteen part message and the one P.M. message?"

Your answer was, "Yes, sir."

"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and under what circumstances?"

And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message when I reached the" -- and then we adjourned.

Will you give us now the answer?

General Marshall: When I reached the office on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between

1810

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

eight o'clock and the time I went to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride.

Now, as to the probable duration of such a ride I can only say that there were very limited places to which one might ride unless you crossed from the Arlington side of the river up over Memorial bridge and the park system on the Washington side, which I did not do but once, I think, in the previous six years. My rides took me almost invariably down to the site of the present Pentagon Building, which is the government experimental farm.

On a few occasions I crossed the approaches to the Memorial bridge, not the bridge itself, and rode along the Potomac about two-thirds of the way down to where the present National Airport is, but no further. The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides is about fifty minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or certainly not longer.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton

Witness Marshall

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

had something important and wished to come out to Fort Lyer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about ten minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

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2927

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the one o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell: That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:00 p.m. Sunday to the American Government?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the West Coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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3 and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was
4 that he called me back. I am told now that the White House
5 telephone records show that I called him back. I had no
6 recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on
7 the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message,
8 saving the last sentence.

9
10 However, one way or the other, there was a call or
11 conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which
12 was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show
13 this to your Naval officers", which I did in longhand.

14
15 I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately
16 to the message center and start it. There was a proposal
17 then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no
18 time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

19
20 On his return I questioned him as to the length of
21 time involved and I could not make out whether or not he
22 was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time
23 of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back
24 accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the
25 immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

26
27 They came back and gave me the estimates of the time
28 of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My
29 recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back
30 again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two -- my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

(2)

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

General Marshall: The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that time, the Acting Secretary at that time, General Dean, that I had returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand by my Orderly that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was.

Anyway, shortly thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the War Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday there was no traffic. It was a matter of about seven minutes from my house to the Munitions building.

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happening.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

My questioning, as I recall, was with relation to a report that had come from somewhere, - and there were many reports of course at that time, rumors and authentic, confusion, that a Japanese landing was being attempted, as I recall, below Barber Point, and my recollection is my inquiry of Colonel Phillips was to the facts in regard to that.

I talked to Colonel Phillips because, as I recall, at that time General Short had gone to his command post and therefore was not able to talk to me directly.

The procedure on the dispatch of the messages did not come to my attention in detail until I was before the Roberts Board. The fact that the one message had been sent by the Western Union to San Francisco on a direct line, relayed by the RCA and presumably teletyped, which was not done in Hawaii, I did not know about that.

Admiral Stark tells me, and I am quite certain he is right, I do not recall it but he is undoubtedly right, that he asked me at the time of our second conversation that morning, or he said that they had rapid means of communication and if I wished to use it, and I told him no. That must be a fact -- I do not recall -- that must be a fact.

That, I think, covers the main details.

Mr. Mitchell: Now do you remember your movements on the evening of December 6, as to where you were?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

General Marshall: I can only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence. The only definite thing I have is that I had no dinner engagement. I found our engagement book, or Mrs. Marshall's engagement book, and between the 1st of November and 7th of December I had one dinner engagement, that was the 2nd of December.

Also they checked on the Post movie. It was about our only recourse for relaxation, and I had never seen the picture, so I was not there.

We were not calling. We were leading a rather monastic life. There was also in that record the affairs of the day for her, which involved, I think, an old-clothes sale, I think, all day long, to raise money for one of these industries they had down there, so the probability is she was tired and we were home.

Hook
Follows.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

General Marshall: No, sir, not at all.

Mr. Mitchell: There is a statement in the Army Board report that the warning message that you got out on the morning of the 7th you telephoned to the Philippines. Is that your recollection?

General Marshall: No, sir, I talked to Colonel Phillips, as I explained here, after the attack was going on, because we could hear the explosions at the time.

Mr. Mitchell: You did not telephone any such message yourself?

General Marshall: I did not telephone anywhere.

Mr. Mitchell: After you drafted this warning message to the outposts that you were prepared to send as the result of having seen this 1 p.m. message, is it your recollection that you called Admiral Stark first before he called you? Originally, I mean.

General Marshall: I am quite certain of that. I called him first.

Mr. Mitchell: What did you say to him?

General Marshall: As nearly as I can recall, I asked him if he had seen the message. He stated that he had, and I proposed that we send a message apropos of this to the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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various commanders concerned, and he replied as I have outlined, he feared that that would tend to confuse them, that we had given them an alert and now we were putting something else into the picture.

I then went ahead and wrote the message, and I don't think I said to him in concluding that first conversation whether or not I was going to do it, but I did write it out immediately in longhand.

Mr. Mitchell: Then your recollection is he called you?

General Marshall: My recollection is he called me, but the records of the White House telephone exchange show I called him.

Mr. Mitchell: And what was the subject of the second conversation?

General Marshall: I had thought that he called me to say he wanted this shown to the Naval officer. It would seem from the record at the White House that I called him and maybe read the message. In any event he did ask me, and I am specific about that, he did ask me to put into the message that it be shown to the Naval officer.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you Exhibit 58 before you?

General Marshall: No.

Mr. Mitchell: I will have to show it to you, General.

This is a record of telephone calls on December 7 by

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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outside parties through using the White House exchange.

It says, and I will show it to you -- the record says "11:40 A" which means "A.M.," I suppose.

"General Marshall cld Ad'm Stark. - O.K.

"11:30 a - Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark - O.K."

In that particular instance, according to the White House records, these hours are reversed. The 11:40 A is ahead of 11:30, which does not seem to be the practice, and we are not sure just what it means.

Will you look at it and see if it means anything to you? That is exactly what the record shows there, that the time 11:40 precedes the entry of the 11:30 message.

General Marshall: I would not know what the significance of that is.

Mr. Mitchell: You would not know anything about it?

General Marshall: No, sir. It does this, though. It gives the time one way or another of the completion of the message following the reading of the 14-point thing and the preparation of this other message.

Mr. Mitchell: Then at least you did read the message and were in the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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except the last sentence.

Mr. Mitchell: I will offer now as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows:

"December 7, 1941."

It is typed.

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary,
General Staff)

"Subject: Far East Situation

"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;"

And the message is this:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

Marshall."

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:

"Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDAC."

General Marshall: War Department Message Center.

Mr. Mitchell: And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila; another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

The Vice Chairman: That is Exhibit 61?

Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 61.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: Did you give any instructions to the Communications Center as to the means of transmitting this message to Hawaii?

General Marshall: No, sir. Their business was to dispatch it in the most efficient and rapid manner possible. This photostat of this document of General Gerow's should be read in the light that it was written, after the event. The message was sent from a longhand pencil copy on an ordinary ruled sheet of paper. Which, incidentally, was before the Roberts Board.

Mr. Mitchell: The original message was in your handwriting and you gave directions that it should not be typed?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. It was carried by hand by Colonel Bratton and checked on the second trip by Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy, and then I thought there also should be a third trip by Colonel Bundy, but there was a difference of opinion on that.

Mr. Mitchell: In the message center it was necessary to take your handwritten draft and encode it?

General Marshall: Yes, sir; encode it first.

Mr. Mitchell: And then put it on the way?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Was there any report made to you at that time that there was any difficulty in reaching Hawaii on

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 the telephone?

2 General Marshall: No, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I mean before the attack?

4 General Marshall: No, sir. I did not ask the question.

5
6 Mr. Mitchell: You didn't ask the question as to means
7 of transportation?

8 General Marshall: I didn't ask the question about the
9 telephone.

10 Mr. Mitchell: What did they estimate to you would be
11 the required time for delivery to Fort Shafter of the Hawaiian
12 message?

13 General Marshall: I don't recollect, sir. I have a
14 faint recollection of being told that it would take eight
15 minutes to get it through, but I think you will have positive
16 testimony on that.

17 Mr. Mitchell: You sent the message to all the commands
18 without any special selection of Pearl Harbor?

19 General Marshall: Exactly. I sent each Commander in-
20 volved in the Pacific situation. The Western Defense Command,
21 which is the 4th Army, the Caribbean Command, the Philippine
22 Command, and the Hawaiian Command.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Did you make any inquiry of the communica-
24 tions people or your subordinates as to the prospective time
25 of delivery of that message to Hawaii?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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General Marshall: That was the reason I sent Colonel Bratton back with Colonel Bundy, to give me a clear picture of what the time involved was, because when I first questioned Colonel Bundy I couldn't tell whether he was including the time necessary to encipher the message, and so I sent him back to determine that for me.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, what report did he make to you, do you remember, about that?

General Marshall: I do not recall the minutes. I think it is shown in one of the documents. I couldn't tell you offhand. I think they are prepared to give you that, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Did anybody in your office, when you were reading the 14-part message and the 1:00 p.m. supplement, on the morning of the 7th, make any mention of the fact that 1:00 p.m. in Washington would be about 7:30 a.m. in Honolulu?

General Marshall: There was no mention of the 1:00 p.m. message until I came across it at the end of the pile. I am quite clear about that, because I was very much taken back by the time I had spent on the preceding lengthy message in trying to understand its significance, and then arriving at this, to me, very critical one of 1:00 p.m.

Mr. Mitchell: You thought you ought to have been shown the 1:00 p.m. part first?

General Marshall: I don't know about that. I am just

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 talking about my own reaction.

2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, was any discussion had when you
3 saw the 1:00 p.m. message? Any discussion about the corres-
4 ponding time of day in Honolulu or the Philippines?

5 General Marshall: I don't recall that. I don't recall
6 that at all. The whole thing was, it was a significant
7 message, and what would we tell these Commanders, and I went
8 ahead and wrote it out myself.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Did you talk to the President on the
10 morning of the 7th before the attack?

11 General Marshall: Not to my recollection. I think I
12 had an appointment, I think the records show it, and that is
13 my only source for speaking now, that I had had a previous
14 appointment for 3:00 o'clock that afternoon. I had no
15 recollection of that until I was shown the record. I know
16 I went to the White House that afternoon.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have your staff organized at
18 that time so that if an especially significant or important
19 intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on
20 duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to
21 send a warning message out?

22 General Marshall: No, sir, I don't think there was a
23 set-up for that special purpose. We had always had an arrange-
24 ment there whereby the officer on the receiving end, at the
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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central point in the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and for about a year thereafter, I always maintained an Orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where to reach me. These various sections of the War Department Staff, notably the G-2 Section, were all working pretty much overtime. General Gerow's section I know was working at that rate practically all the time. Too much so, as a matter of fact.

(2)

Mr. Mitchell: If they had not been able to reach you on the morning of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning message to the outlying post?

General Marshall: Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, in the Deputy Chief of Staff. Or even the head of War Plans Division. There is no dispute about that, I do not think, because the actions always had been on a very decentralized basis. We selected the men and we trusted them. That does not go down the line, of course.

I was asked on one of the investigations if Colonel Bratton would have had authority to send such a message. I would think that would be asking a great deal of him, to do that. I don't think that would apply in his case. He would

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

certainly not be responsible for sending such a message.

Mr. Mitchell: Was General Miles high enough up in the list to have authority to send out a warning message to G-2?

General Marshall: General Miles had responsibility for dispensing information. He could not issue a command message. This goes as a command message.

The same information, of course, might have been sent as just information of what was happening.

Mr. Mitchell: The thing that made this a command message --

General Marshall: Was the positive direction.

Mr. Mitchell: A direction to be on the alert accordingly?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. He would only have authority to send the facts. As to any deductions he might make, he couldn't tell them what to do.

Mr. Mitchell: But the War Plans Division would have operational authority to send a message that involved action?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one that had authority to send a message without reaching you?

General Marshall: I think that would be the accurate way of stating it, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I have, of course, then speaking of the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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military officers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would have directed an order.

Secretary Stimson, if this thing had come to him, and he had felt a warning ought to be sent out, he would have had authority to send it out?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in?

General Marshall: I don't recall it. He was at the State Department I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you know at the time that a meeting was being held at the State Department?

General Marshall: I think I did, but I am not certain. You see, my time, when I reached the Department, was completely taken up in reading this lengthy message and trying to digest it, and nobody could talk to me while I was reading it.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you have any meeting with the President, or an appointment with him, on the 6th of December? The White House records say: 10:00 a.m., Justice William O. Douglas; 11:15, Director Harold Smith. Those are under the head of President appointments. Nobody else for the 6th.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

General Marshall: I have no recollection of any contact with him.

Mr. Mitchell: When one of these Jap intercepts was translated there was a system of delivering copies of the translation to you, was there not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Was that done at your office?

General Marshall: My office desk.

Mr. Mitchell: Was it the practice to send copies of those intercepts out to your quarters, your home?

General Marshall: I do not recall that we ever did that. That would have been strongly opposed by the G-2 people. I don't recall ever having received any at my home.

Mr. Mitchell: You stated that the first time you saw this 14-part message and the 1:00 p.m. message was when you arrived at your office on the morning of December 7; is that correct?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Had you learned prior to that time of it, prior to the time you actually saw a copy, did you learn that any such dispatch had been received, had it been told or telephoned you?

General Marshall: No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember whether you had been told

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

or telephoned or informed in any way on the evening of the 6th, late in the evening, that any arrangement had been made for a meeting between Secretary Stimson and Mr. Hull on the next morning?

General Marshall: No, sir, I have no such recollection.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: General, I want to go back a little
3 bit over the question of the estimates as to the possibili-
4 ties of the success of a Japanese air attack on Pearl
5 Harbor, and the estimates as to the possibility of whether
6 an attack might be made by the Japs.

7 The record here shows that the question of a possible
8 air attack on Pearl Harbor had been carefully considered.
9 There is the Martin-Bellinger report, and the Martin re-
10 port, and others.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 Those reports show that an assured, complete defense
12 that would practically guarantee the safety of the Fleet in
13 Pearl Harbor could only be accomplished if you had a long
14 range reconnaissance which caught the enemy carriers at
15 sea at a distance of 800 or a thousand miles the evening
16 before, followed up by a bombing attack on them to destroy
17 the carriers before the planes had left.

18 The conclusion in all those reports was that the pro-
19 bable selection by the enemy of the hour would be to reach
20 a distance at a point some thousand miles or so, or 600
21 miles, the night before and then run in the dark, and dis-
22 charge their planes early the next morning.

23 I think the reports make it clear that the quantity of
24 patrol planes needed to make a daily reconnaissance out
25 that distance in all directions was something more than

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 double the number of patrol planes they actually had, and
3 bombers available for a striking force were quite few.

4 Now, on the basis of those reports and the available
5 materiel on December 7, isn't it fair to say, first, that
6 the best that could be done with the available patrol
7 forces was what you might call a sector long-distance re-
8 connaissance each afternoon, choosing one sector one day
9 and another sector another.

10 Isn't that the conclusion you draw?

11 General Marshall: That is, I would say, roughly the
12 case. They had to, certainly, modify the procedure according
13 to the means available, which, however, is a common situation
14 with any commander.

15 Mr. Mitchell: That necessarily involved some element
16 of luck. If you selected one sector for a long-distance
17 reconnaissance one day and another for another day, you
18 took some chance of missing the Japs.

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir. You have to accept that.

20 Mr. Mitchell: So, with the available materiel, there
21 would necessarily be considerable risk of their not being
22 able to run such a reconnaissance as would locate the Jap
23 carriers; is that the way you judge these reports?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Now, that meant that there was no definite

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 assurance that they could strike the carriers and destroy
2 the attack before it got launched?
3

4 General Marshall: That is correct..

5 Mr. Mitchell: The alternative to that, if they
6 couldn't reach them, was to hit the Japs in the morning,
7 put our fighters out with radar detection, or some other
8 reconnaissance, spot the Jap attack coming in, or just
9 leaving the carrier, and trying to destroy their planes
10 and break up their attack; that is the alternative, is it
11 not?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir. It would be the alter-
13 native in one sense, but also your dispositions might be
14 changed to meet that situation. Your degree of alert
15 arrangements might be altered accordingly. The disposi-
16 tions, Naval, as well as Army, might have been modified
17 to meet that.

18 Of course, what the modifications would be, I don't
19 know, but certainly you make various adjustments to meet a
20 critical weakness in order to lessen the possibility of
21 damage.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, all of my questions are based on
23 the assumption that there was a complete alert, that every-
24 thing was ready that could be ready. Of course, if you are
25 not, that presents a different problem, but I am assuming in

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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my questions that they are completely on the alert in the light of everything they had to face.

Now, the Japs had six carriers in this attacking force and their records show around 360 planes. The record isn't quite clear as to whether they sent all of them in, or whether they may have kept some as a screen. But the number of planes that we had available in service to resist their attack seems to be less than a third of the Japs'.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, assuming on the Japanese side that they knew where our carriers were which also had some planes, and which also necessitated their holding certain planes on their Japanese carrier force.

Mr. Mitchell: I naturally assumed that because the daily ship reports which were intercepted kept reporting whether the carriers were in and out.

General Marshall: And, as I recall, the carriers were out.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Now, with the available materiel at Hawaii, there wasn't sufficient in the way of air forces, bombers, and so forth to insure that the Japanese air force could not get in to the Fleet, was there? Wasn't there a risk that some of the planes would get through and that damage would be done?

General Marshall: There was always that hazard.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: It was a question then, under the con-
3 ditions, of whether if they had been completely on the
4 alert, the air forces we had would have been able to break
5 up the Japanese attack in such a way as to minimize or
6 mitigate the damage?

7 General Marshall: It was a question of the deployment,
8 the status, alertness, the various arrangements made with
9 the means available.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, would it seem that under
11 the circumstances, if it had been definitely expected that
12 an air attack would be made, would you have felt, considering
13 what I have just said, knowing or believing that an attack
14 was going to be made, that the risk ought to be taken of
15 keeping the Fleet in the port. Have you any estimate of
16 that?

17 General Marshall: You are getting, Mr. Mitchell, into
18 a very technical naval question, which I do not think I am
19 competent to answer, because how you might otherwise have
20 disposed those vessels is distinctly a naval problem involv-
21 ing considerations of which, as a land man, I do not have
22 the information to speak, and therefore I am not prepared
23 to answer that. I will merely say that we created what
24 we thought was a fair defensive set-up for our Islands
25 which was quite unusual for our degree of unpreparedness at

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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that time and that everybody there was aware, as indicated by the communications of the hazard of an air attack or a submarine attack.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, then I think it comes down probably to what you said yesterday, that considering what was to be done, the question of the hazards of an air attack and the lack of complete assurance that it could be wholly defeated, was tempered with a question of judgment as to whether or not an attack ought to be expected at all in sizing up the situation; the two things blend, do they not?

General Marshall: I don't know as I quite understand your question, but I would say this as to the problem of the attack not being expected at all, the question of whether or not there is an attack depends on what you do yourself, to a great extent, on which the enemy makes his estimate, and you always have to suppose that he will do the thing that is most embarrassing to you.

Perfection of defense is seldom ever achieved. Even in our most carefully laid out operation, in which we took about two and a half years to prepare for the landing in Normandy, we were short of LST's, and there was a bitter battle over getting them from the Pacific and the Mediterranean.

I presume had that failed, there would have been an investigation as to why we went into Normandy until we had

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 the full number of LST's necessary for the operation.

3 Mr. Mitchell: You stated in your testimony before
4 the Army Board, I think you used this phrase, I think "we"
5 did not expect the attack at Pearl Harbor. When you
6 said "we," were you speaking generally of the high officers
7 in the War Department?

8 General Marshall: That was a rather careless expres-
9 sion. I will make that "I."

10 Mr. Mitchell: And when you say the enemy would judge
11 whether he would attack on whether he knew you were going
12 to be ready, did you, in that conclusion take into account
13 the fact that the Japs knew we weren't alert?

14 General Marshall: I didn't take that into consideration
15 because I thought we were on the alert.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Your estimate that you didn't expect
17 it was based on the theory that what you had was ready
18 and if ready, the Japs probably knew it was ready?

19 General Marshall: It is a little bit like, in my mind,
20 the present discussion as to the postwar organization of
21 our Army. If we are ready, the other man will not involve
22 us.

23 Mr. Keefe: I would like to have that last answer
24 read. I didn't quite get the purport of it.

25 (The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, it appears here from the record that commencing with Admiral Stark's letter to Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, directing him when he got back to Hawaii to start in motion facilities for air defense against an air attack, from that time, the Bloch report, the Knox and Stimson letter, and all those plans, and the Martin-Bellinger report, and right up to the end of August, at least everybody that had anything to do with the subject, both in the War Department and the officers at Hawaii, seemed to be worried over the possibility of an air attack; people out there were reporting that they were vulnerable and were demanding new materiel and you were doing your level best to shoot materiel out there to help them prepare, and the thing was battered back and forth right up to that time, everybody seemed to be on his toes about an air attack, and the possibility of it.

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Have you anything you could say that would help this committee by way of explanation that after all that stir, when it came to the last critical days, the people at Hawaii, certainly the people in the War Department had gotten into a frame of mind where at least some of them, I don't say all, where they feared, or dreaded, -- thought the danger of an air attack had faded away? To a layman that is the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 thing that is interesting, and if there is anything you
3 want to say on that, we would like to have it.

4 General Marshall: Possibly I can explain it in this
5 way:

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7 In the first place, taking the latter part of your
8 question -- your statement -- the fear of an air attack,
9 as far as the War Department was concerned, had not faded
10 away. The point was this. A new commander for the Fleet
11 had been appointed. A new commander for the Air Forces
12 in Hawaii had been appointed. They had brought up various
13 things they wished to have done in order to insure capability
14 of carrying out their missions. We were then in a state
15 of woeful inadequacy of all such materiel. Also, combined
16 with that fact, what little we had, a materiel proportion
17 had to be used or we couldn't develop an Army or air force.
18 We couldn't prepare the crews for the new planes which
19 were soon to appear.

20 Therefore, through the late winter, at least beginning
21 in February, and running up into the summer, we did our
22 utmost one way or another to provide the things that they
23 Navy thought were needed and the Army Commander in Hawaii
24 thought were needed. We did our utmost to provide the
25 materiel that was needed. We had gone to the point where
we thought they were reasonably prepared in meeting the

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requirements they had stated.

The last one, of course, was this Martin-Bellinger report, which we never did come up to, up until the end of the war.

We then, as quantity production came in, turned for the first time to try to send something to General MacArthur. The indications, the positive indications, by observation, by reconnaissance, by magic, were definitely a Japanese evil intention south of the China Sea. We had that, as I say, by reconnaissance. We had it by many sources. By magic.

General MacArthur had little or nothing. If we could make the Philippines then reasonably defensible, particularly with heavy bombers in which the air corps at that time had great faith, in their action against hostile shipping, we felt that we could block that Japanese advance and block their entry into the war by their fear of what would happen.

If they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers on that island. So from the latter part of August, having given Hawaii all we could afford to give them up to that time, and there having been elaborate arrangements made, modifications, readjustments one way or another, we turned and tried to do something for General MacArthur, and most of that went through the Hawaiian Islands, incidentally, by Navy or by air. So our struggle from that

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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time on was to give the Phiippines an adequate defensive
• set-up. Theretofore they had little or nothing.

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Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

I might put in the record here now the fact that on at least two occasions and possibly three the President a long time back, in 1940, and Admiral Stark in the presence of the President and to me personally had expressed the hope that we could do something for the Philippines and in each case I had given them the reply that we could not; that it would be the seed corn.

We first had the defense of the continental United States. Hawaii was a vital factor in the defense of the United States, the Panama Canal was a vital factor, a great bottleneck in connection with the defense of the United States. To create the necessary forces we had to have experienced people, we had to have materiel, we had to create those forces not so much to arm them as to permit them to prepare themselves.

Therefore, anything we sent to the Philippines that could have had any possible effect on the situation out there would practically deny us the ability to create an Army, to create a defense out there that was in any degree effectual.

Now, as I have said, quantity production was making its first appearance really in about August 1941 and, as I have said, we turned from the meeting of the demands in Hawaii and not fulfilling the Martin-Bellinger request for 180 B-ly's, of which in all we possessed all over the world 148

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

at that particular time. We turned to our endeavor to set up a sufficient force in the Philippine Islands to guard the islands to be a threat to any Japanese movement through the China Sea and to possibly avert a war in the Pacific.

We had equipped, so far as we thought it possible to equip and instructed, so far as we thought it was necessary to instruct, the garrison in the Hawaiian Islands. We were now engaged in trying to do for General MacArthur that what he so urgently required.

I think that is a reasonable explanation of why from August on we were working in the Far East rather than a continuation of discussions of one kind and another and of material items to the Hawaiian garrison.

Have I made that fairly plain, sir?

Mr. Mitchell: It appears that some B-17's were flown from the Pacific Coast to Hawaii leaving December 6th and that arrived at Pearl Harbor during the Jap attack. What do you know about that?

General Marshall: We had succeeded in getting 35 Flying Fortresses to the Philippines, incidentally, sending them via Wake Island and then Port Moresby or Rabaul or Port Darwin or Balikpapan in Borneo, north of the Philippines.

Those had been made available by reason of the additional funds that were appropriated by Congress to expedite produc-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

tion, which always costs a great deal more money.

The result of that was that the following deliveries, which we had assumed would immediately come after those 35 from the plants, were delayed several weeks, I think about three weeks. There was a gap, in other words, in the delivery of the B-17's.

Not only that, but after we got the crews into the delivered ships we then found that the adverse winds at an unexpected period between Hawaii and California prevented the flight.

I might add that the flight of the 35 was the first time that a B-17, in other words, a land based plane, had attempted a crossing from 24 to 27 hundred miles. It became a common thing later on with wider cruising radius.

So these ships were held on the West Coast, the B-17's. General Arnold can give you practical testimony regarding this. From my point of view and memory, I sent him out personally to the West Coast to see if they were doing everything possible, first to get these planes completed with the extra tanks and the things that it required, and next to take off for the flight.

Naturally, the young men, the squadron leaders, could not be told all the various factors in the case except that we wanted them to leave as quickly as possible.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 So General Arnold made the trip personally. My recollec-
2 tion is he called me up on the "phone shortly after he had
3 arrived out there and he said, "These damn fellows don't
4 realize how serious this thing is," and I told him, "Well,"
5 I said, "you are there and they are your people. You start
6 them out." And he drove the harder to make an early depar-
7 ture.
8

9 His criticism, of course, must be moderated to the
10 point that they were doing their best and it was a very
11 dangerous flight. The limitation on the quantity of gasoline
12 you could carry was very decided and it gave them a small
13 factor of safety, so it was not one to be stepped into light-
14 ly unless a great emergency was in existence. The question
15 was how thoroughly the great emergency was realized by the
16 senior officers directing the men.
17

18 Actually, under his urging and presumably under a moder-
19 ation of the winds, the adverse winds, the flight of the
20 first squadron took off and arrived in the middle of the
21 Japanese attack.
22

23 Mr. Mitchell: Did you say the first flight was the one
24 that got there during the Jap attack?
25

26 General Marshall: My understanding is that they ar-
27 rived in the air over Hawaii while the Japanese were bombing
28 Pearl Harbor.
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: The record shows that those planes were unarmed; that is, they were not provided with ammunition.

General Marshall: I think they did not have any ammunition. That was explained, I think, by the fact these pilots were trying to get every gallon of gas they could in the plane and they did not anticipate fighting this plane on that long hop from California to Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell: Do you know anything about their actual equipment at the time they left the West Coast with regard to arms or anything like that?

General Marshall: I do not know that. General Arnold can probably tell you that specifically. My recollection is that they had their arms but they were covered with cosmoline to protect them against the salt air and that they did not carry ammunition.

Mr. Mitchell: I will ask you to consider the suggestion about unity of command in Haway. There has been a memorandum introduced here, General Gerow's, dated November 17, 1941, reporting to you about the efforts of the Army and Navy in joint conference to reach some agreement in respect to unified command at various posts, including Hawaii.

Will you tell us what you know about that? There was also offered in evidence with that a letter you wrote on the 20th. Is that attached to that file?

Witness Marshall

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1 General Marshall: Yes, sir. There is missing from this
2 my endorsement on General Gerow's paper, though. My recol-
3 lection is that I wrote a specific endorsement to General
4 Gerow on his paper, on his proposal. If you haven't got it
5 here I will obtain it for the committee.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I wish you could get it from the War
7 Department.

8 Will you please tell us what you know about the situa-
9 tion dealt with in that report and your letter of the 20th?

10 General Marshall: We had been endeavoring for a long
11 time to reach a more efficient command basis where the Army
12 and the Navy were both in the same area. It presented, of
13 course, certain very definite complications along the coast
14 because you had the close-in defense, the coast defense guns,
15 you had, we will say, the fighter planes which operated fair-
16 ly close in and you had naval reconnaiss_{ance} planes which go
17 tremendous distances out to sea and may become involved with
18 the fleet or naval task forces in a sense remote from the
19 coastal defense itself, so it presented a compltation in
20 working out a system which would enable control without pro-
21 ducing confusion.

22 Admiral Stark and I, - I am certain for myself and I am
23 quite certain from his point of view, were endeavoring all
24 the time to find a basis of unity in control of these matters.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

As has always been the case, you could do more at the top than you could down through the line because there a hundred complications would come up and differences of view, very decided.

I had considered a long time before this of a proposal to the Navy that they take unity of command in Alaska and the Aleutians because I thought that if there was an actual landing attempt up there by an enemy that the matter was predominantly naval. For various reasons it was not accepted. I do not know, I do not recall at the moment, I do not know that I knew at the time exactly why. I thought possibly -- I may be utterly wrong -- that they had felt that that would be taken as the basis for carrying the thing further on.

We thought it was very important that we have unity of command in the Panama Canal on the part of the Army, where its interests are so predominant we felt, though the Canal was for the service of the Navy.

There was no question in my mind but what Hawaii was a predominant naval factor. The question was how you worked this out.

I have said this before; I will repeat it again. It is a very simple thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man but that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among ourselves and always will

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

continue to be so.

So we made every effort to bring this to a head and as I think I stated in my letter to General Emmons when it was finally determined, I covered a good many of the reasons. I will read the particular paragraph. This is the letter of December 20th to General Emmons, then in Army command in Hawaii, an air officer who had been the commander of the GHQ air force and for that reason I had sent him out there.

Unity of command had just been ordered and it was to be a naval command in that region. The same occurred in Panama. It was to be an Army command in that region.

(Reading)

"For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to -- that is Hawaii and Panama -- "have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

"I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

"Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency."

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Now I will add this further item in connect' on with that. After Pearl Harbor and preceding this letter I brought General Eisenhower in and he worked on the details, as I recall, and drew up what I might designate a bill of particulars or exceptions in Panama to meet various Naval objections, things that we would guarantee on the Army side we would not do, we would not do this, we would not do that, with these reservations in favor of a Naval situation. It was quite a long list. I know he worked most of the night on it, and I worked with him part of the time.

When we turned to the Hawaiian side we put in no Army proviso, and bringing them in that way the net result was, as I recall, there were no provisos on either side, and we accomplished unity on that basis.

It might be interesting to the committee, although it is not pertinent to this hearing, that we ran into exactly the same situation in determining unity of command in the Western Pacific with Wavel. We had to write a great many provisos and restrictions in the document in order to get a general acceptance of the proposition. Later on those were almost forgotten. The minute we had unity the solutions became evident and resolved themselves right within the command. But the start was always the same, and in that case also General Eisenhower helped me with the details of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

provisos in order to get the acceptance by the other party to the proposition.

Mr. Mitchell: Has unity of command at Hawaii been maintained up to the present time?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. I say the present time -- I do not know what has happened in the last ten days.

Mr. Mitchell: Without asking you any questions about the unity of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?

General Marshall: I think it is an imperative necessity.

Mr. Mitchell: During this period, from what you learned about the operations of the Intelligence branches of the Navy and Army, and what not, and the question of uncertainty or difficulty in exchanges and assurance of having all branches informed of all information, have you any views to express about unity of consolidation or centralization of the Military and Naval Intelligence?

General Marshall: I think it is very necessary.

Mr. Mitchell: I may have some more questions of the General but not until after lunch anyway, and if the committee want to inquire they can start in.

Witness Marshall

It is ten minutes of twelve.

The Chairman: It is ten minutes to twelve, and while some members of the committee might properly inquire of General Marshall in that ten minutes, suppose we hold ten minutes later this afternoon and make up for that lost time?

Therefore we will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a.m., the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(resumed)

- - -

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, before proceeding further with General Marshall there is one point on which I would like the instructions of the committee.

In September 1944 General Marshall wrote some letters to Mr. Dewey during the presidential campaign. Without going into details I will say that I think that these letters are material to this inquiry and the incident ought to be gone into and the letters put in evidence but, unfortunately, in those letters there is a sentence or two, a few words, which disclose technical crypto-analytical methods which we had adopted to break the Japanese code and the question arises whether those words should be deleted or whether the whole letter should go in.

I have here copies of the letters that are complete. I also have here copies of the letters in which those statements of our technical methods of cracking the Japanese codes are deleted.

The deletion, in my judgment, does not change the tenor of the letters or their continuity and for the purposes of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

this case I should think that the deletions have nothing to do with what you are interested in.

My own feeling is that in the interests of national security the deletions should be made but I do not think all the members of the committee have yet seen these letters.

I am bringing that question up now so that I can have the instructions of the committee as to whether we should offer in evidence the complete letters or those copies which have that crypto-analytic information deleted. I can supply the committee with copies if anyone has not seen them.

The Chairman: The chair wishes to make a statement in that connection which he thinks ought to be made on behalf of the committee and in justice to General Marshall and to the counsel for the committee.

In September 1944, during the Presidential campaign, it is the understanding of the chair that General Marshall received information that the question of cracking the Japanese codes might become involved in the campaign; whereupon he wrote a letter or two letters to Governor Dewey who was a candidate for President.

In the letter or letters General Marshall referred to the cracking of certain codes which was then current. That is, they were in progress then in September 1944.

General Marshall felt that in view of the fact that this

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

information was confidential and was not related necessarily to the Pearl Harbor situation but dealt with a situation that was current in 1944 and may be even current now in 1945, that there was a sentence and a phrase or two in that letter to Governor Dewey that might well be deleted so far as this record is concerned.

The committee met this morning in executive session to discuss that question and it transpired that there was a division within the ranks of the committee as to whether these parts that General Marshall felt that so far as he was personally concerned, due to relations existing between our government and one of our allies, might well be omitted from the transcript.

I think the committee recognized the fact that unless they could unanimously agree to the deletion and even though they unanimously agreed to the deletion, that it would be difficult to maintain that situation in view of the avenues by which information is obtained, that notwithstanding General Marshall's feeling about it that so far as he was personally concerned that this information was given in confidence and notwithstanding the view of the counsel that it should be maintained in confidence, the committee was unable to agree that it should be and in effect decided that the letter should be made a part of the record and that it should be made a

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

part of the record without deletion and that the committee accepts the responsibility of whatever consequences may ensue in regard to our relations with any other country among our allies for the publication of the full letter and its inclusion here in the record.

I think that it is fair to General Marshall and to counsel and to the committee to make that statement and, therefore, it is the viewpoint of the committee as a whole that the whole letter should be placed in the record at this time and made public.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson, the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson: I think the record should also show that I was unable to bring my thought to the conclusion that I should attend the executive session where there was a witness who wanted to give statements or testimony to the committee as a committee in executive session. Therefore, I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

I felt that because of the statements of the Chairman previously on the floor and my own stand that all meetings should be public meetings and that all evidence should be produced in the public and for that reason I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

The Chairman: The chair might also state --

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois.

The chair will also state that the Senator from Illinois also took the same position and excused himself from the executive session. The object of the executive session was to discuss the very question involved here because it was thought it could be more freely discussed in executive session than here in an open session, as to whether the entire letter should go into the record or as to whether there should be eliminated the sentence or two to which I have referred and to which General Marshall called our attention.

Now, the Senator from Illinois may amplify that statement in any way that he may see fit.

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, the position taken by the Senator from Michigan is not the same position that the Senator from Illinois takes. The Senator from Michigan absented himself from the committee meeting and refused to participate in executive session, and hear General Marshall's statement upon this question.

The Senator from Illinois also absented himself from the executive session. I know nothing about the contents of the letter. The Senator from Illinois was not willing, as one member of the committee, to absent himself from this meeting without going out with the General.

Mr. Murpny: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Congressman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion it was a question whether or not the rules of this committee, or the feelings of any individual on this committee should come before the security of the nation.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster: I think in order to complete the record, it ought to appear that the members of the committee who remained excused General Marshall at the same time that we excused the Senator from Michigan, or the Senator from Illinois, so no information of any character was received

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from General Marshall aside from that given in the letter, with the underlining of the passages which he previously stated he thought perhaps might be left out.

The Chairman: That statement is correct. The committee excused General Marshall simultaneously with the excusing of the two Senators, who had excused themselves. The Chairman might suggest if we had excused anybody else we might not have had a quorum present.

The upshot of the whole thing is the entire letter will be read into the record and made public. I might say that the committee accepts responsibility for that procedure.

I might also say it was the viewpoint of the Chairman that notwithstanding any possible embarrassment that might accrue between our Government and an allied nation over the publication of confidential information contained in General Marshall's letter, that in the long run, it would be less embarrassing to publish the whole letter than to be required later to explain why we left any of it out, and for that reason the Chair felt, and now feels that the entire letter should be made part of the record, and made public.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark: I, of course, accept my part of the responsibility to which the Chairman has just referred, but I

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regret exceedingly that some sensible and perfectly simple plan could not have been adopted, as I think it could, to the satisfaction of everybody who is reasonable about it, rather than to put us up against exposing a matter here that is wholly irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, that may have consequences that we cannot foresee.

Under the circumstances, while I accept my part of the responsibility, I regret the circumstances that make it necessary.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I might add one more sentence.

While I feel it is the responsibility of this committee at the present time, the occasion with which we were confronted this morning, was occasioned by two people other than people who are in this room, and one of whom will be before this committee later, at which time I wish to question him about the circumstances that brought about this morning's meeting.

The Chairman: We will cross that bridge when we reach it.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson: I want to make it clear that my only reason this morning, as I stated, was not that General Marshall was a witness -- I have the highest respect for

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2 General Marshall -- but it is the fact that I was unwilling
3 to take any testimony in executive session, no matter what
4 it was about, or who was the witness.

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6 I sat on the sofa outside with General Marshall. We
7 were very friendly, and we discussed a portion of Pearl
8 Harbor, and things relating to it. It was not the question
9 that General Marshall was the witness, it was merely that
10 all meetings, in my opinion, should be open meetings, no
11 matter what is to be discussed with the witness. They should
12 be here and be sworn as witnesses. We should get our
13 testimony from the witnesses in sworn statements, in an
14 open hearing.

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16 The Chairman: Of course, it is obvious that probably
17 from time to time there will have to be executive sessions of
18 the committee to determine with respect to testimony brought
19 out in the open hearing.

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21 The Chair might volunteer this suggestion. In view of
22 this situation, it is his opinion that the result would have
23 been the same in this particular instance if the entire
24 committee had remained present and if General Marshall had
25 been permitted to remain in it too, that the result would
26 have been the same as we now face, and therefore the Chair
27 is ready to suggest to the counsel that he proceed along
28 the line of the committee's suggestion to inquire about

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1 this correspondence that he mentioned.

2 Mr. Mitchell: The only thing I have left to say is
3 there are two members of the committee now in the position
4 of never having seen the letter or the proposed deletions,
5 and their judgment has not been asked as to whether the dele-
6 tions should be made or not.
7

8 The Chairman: I think, gentlemen, it is the consensus
9 of opinion, and the Chair is going to take that responsi-
10 bility -- if the committee decides otherwise, why we will
11 abide by the decision, but in view of the discussion, it
12 is the view of the Chair that the committee decided these
13 letters should be made a part of the record without dele-
14 tion.

15 Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, did you have some cor-
16 respondence with the Honorable Thomas E. Dewey in September,
17 1944?

18 General Marshall: I did, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I understand you wrote him two letters.

20 General Marshall: I did, sir, and I have the letters
21 here.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Will you read the two letters, first the
23 one of the 25th of September, and then the one of the 27th
24 of September?

25 These are complete copies, are they?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

On the 25th of September I addressed the following letter to Governor Dewey, who at that time was travelling in Oklahoma.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Senator Lucas: Will you read to top two words, General Marshall?

General Marshall: "Top Secret. For Mr. Dewey's Eyes Only."

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, in order that we may understand this letter at the beginning, and before General Marshall starts reading, he is referring to the fact that he addressed the letter to Governor Dewey on the 25th of September, and another on the 27th.

I would like to have the record show, Mr. Mitchell, at the start as to whether or not this letter was sent through the mail or by courier, or delivered in some other way?

Mr. Mitchell: I will cover all that, Mr. Congressman, as to just how the letters were delivered and all the rest. I just want to get the letters in first.

Mr. Keefe: All right, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: We will go right to that.

Please read, General, the first letter of September 25th, every word on it.

General Marshall: The heading at the top of the paper is "Top Secret". To the left in capitals "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY". It is dated the 25 September 1944.

"My dear Governor,

"I am writing you without the knowledge of any

Witness Marshall

other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

"What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

"I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

"In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this:

"The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our

Witness Marshall

cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department - rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information - but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

"Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

"To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the

Witness Marshall

battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

"Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

"The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

Witness Marshall

"You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

"The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

"As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

"A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such

Witness Marshall

conclusion.

"The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

"I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

"Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

"Faithfully yours,

"(Sgd) G. C. Marshall"

Witness Marshall

The second letter is dated the 27th of September, 1944, and is headed "Top Secret", and "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY".

" My dear Governor,

"Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding 'not communicating its contents to any other person' in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word 'cryptograph', and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

"As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a

Witness Marshall

communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

"I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

Mr. Chairman, the remainder of the letter is a repetition of what I read in the first letter. Do you want me to read it?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman
Mr. Mitchell

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2 The Chairman: No. I suppose it will be published in
3 full as it is without the necessity of reading it. It is
4 exactly the same?

5 General Marshall: It is exactly the same.

6 Mr. Mitchell: We will have it copied straight through
7 in the transcript.

8 The Chairman: These two letters will be printed in full
9 as they appear in the transcript at this point.

10 Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, what means did you take
11 in presenting your first letter of September 25 to Governor
12 Dewey?

13 General Marshall: It was sent by the hand of Colonel
14 Clarke who flew out to some point in Oklahoma and he boarded
15 Governor Dewey's train at some point in Oklahoma and saw
16 Governor Dewey personally.

17 Mr. Mitchell: When Colonel Clarke came back did he
18 bring back with him your letter of September 25?

19 General Marshall: He brought back the letter with
20 the statement that Governor Dewey felt he could not accept
21 the proviso of the first paragraph, which I will read again
22 in order to make it clear:

23 "What I have to tell you below is of such a
24 highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you
25 either to accept it on the basis of your not communi-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

ating its contents to any other person and returning
this letter or not reading any further and returning
the letter to the bearer."

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell: Did Colonel Clark report that Mr. Dewey had stopped there and read no other part of the letter?

General Marshall: He read no further, according to Colonel Clarke.

Senator Brewster: I wonder if you are clear that the letter of the 27th, the remainder, is the same. It seems to me there is a paragraph missing between the reference to Mr. Donovan, and the reference to Mr. Harness on the third page. That paragraph is left out.

Mr. Murphy: It is shifted over on the other page. It is in a different place in the second letter.

The Vice Chairman: I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that General Marshall read the rest of the letter.

The Chairman: If there is any question about it, suppose you begin where you left off in the second letter, and read the rest of it.

Mr. Keefe: It is all in there, only it is on the third page.

The Chairman: The Chair thinks it is in there, but it is in a different place in the second letter.

General Marshall: I will continue reading.

Senator Brewster: I think it is important in connection with any copies that have been given out that we be clear

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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for the information of everybody as to whether or not the paragraph which appears in the second letter appears in the first. I don't see where it is in the first.

Mr. Mitchell: What paragraph do you refer to, Senator?

Senator Brewster: With reference to the British -- "a further most serious embarrassment."

Senator Lucas: The second paragraph on page 3 of the September 27 letter.

Mr. Mitchell: Go ahead, General, and read the letter of the 27th completely so there won't be any mistake about it.

General Marshall: Shall I go back to the beginning?

Mr. Mitchell: How far did you read?

General Marshall: I read to the words "in brief," the military dilemma is this:"

Mr. Mitchell: Continue then with the letter of the 27th, commencing with the words "In brief, the military dilemma is this."

General Marshall: (Reading)

"The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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3 were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based
4 on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deci-
5 phers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of
6 information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in
7 turn was furnished the State Department - rather than as
8 is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us
9 with the information - but which unfortunately made no
10 reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the
11 last message before December 7th, which did not reach our
12 hands until the following day, December 8th.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
13 "Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have
14 gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes
15 until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese,
16 but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's in-
17 tentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages
18 from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other
19 officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in
20 the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

21 "To explain further the critical nature of this set-up
22 which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least
23 suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral
24 Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few
25 ships were in the right place at the right time. Further,
26 we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

"Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

"The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

"You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 "The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have with-
3 drawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter,
4 therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete.
5 The same reason which dictated that course is even more im-
6 portant today because our sources have been greatly elab-
7 orated.

8 "As another example of the delicacy of the situation,
9 some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us,
10 instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices
11 in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache
12 Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though
13 this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to
14 break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source
15 of information, particularly regarding the European situa-
16 tion.

17 "A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that
18 the British government is involved concerning its most secret
19 sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minis-
20 ter, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other
21 officials have knowledge.

22 "A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness
23 would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been
24 reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American
25 public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

"I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

"Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

"Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL."

Mr. Mitchell: Now, I think I asked you if Colonel Clarke brought the earlier letter of September 25 back to you.

General Marshall: He did. I discussed the matter with him, Governor Dewey's comments, and also with General Bissell, head of the Army Intelligence. I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make it a matter of record, and I sent Colonel Clarke -- incidentally, in civilian clothes -- to Albany. He there secured

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 an audience with Governor Dewey, and he telephone me, as
3 I recall from Governor Dewey's office that the Governor was
4 unwilling to read the letter until he had at least one
5 adviser similarly aware of the circumstances I was bringing
6 to his, the Governor's, attention, and also that he felt he
7 must keep the letter in his file, because he did not know
8 what might happen to me, and he would have no record what-
9 soever of the occurrence.

10 Governor Dewey, as I recall, then came on the phone, I
11 having told Colonel Clarke that I was ready to make those
12 agreements. The Governor spoke to me personally about a
13 Mr. Bell, who was, I think, the State Bank Examiner --

14 Mr. Mitchell: Superintendent of Banks.

15 General Marshall: Something of that sort, who was
16 thoroughly to be trusted, and he, the Governor would see
17 that it was locked up in his most secret file case, what-
18 ever that might be.

19 He also said that he must keep the letters to have with
20 his records.

21 I then agreed to that, and on that basis the letter was
22 left in his hands. There was no discussion between us as
23 to what his decision might be. As a matter of fact, I do
24 not think he read the letter beyond the first paragraph at
25 the time of this conversation.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke, and I do not recall that he gave us any assurances. All I know is that there seemed to be no further reference to the matter in the campaign.

Do you wish me to go on?

Mr. Mitchell: Go ahead, General.

General Marshall: Do you wish me to go into any further conversations with Governor Dewey?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

General Marshall: After the election and the defeat of Governor Dewey, I thought it was due him that he should know more the basis of this letter, so I had General Bissell proceed to Albany, gain an audience with the Governor, and General Bissell took with him a number of copies of magic showing at that time the movements of the various Japanese convoys, and of the Japanese naval craft on which we were basing our operations, so that the Governor could gather some idea of just how important the matter was. As far as I know, he was greatly interested. It was more or less in appreciation of the action he had apparently taken.

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Witness Marshall

I saw Governor Dewey for the first time in connection with this incident at the funeral, I think, of Mr. Roosevelt. At the end of the funeral services we were thrown together there and I asked him to come to the War Department with me. He did and we showed him the situation out in the Pacific. Showed him also the current magic, giving the Japanese movements at that time, and made as plain as we could to him just what the importance of these matters were.

His attitude was very friendly and very gracious.

At a later time -- no, I am wrong.

When General Vissell returned from Albany, having gone up in effect to see Governor Dewey and to show him these copies of magic as to the current operations in the Pacific, the Governor told him and he, General Vissell, told me orally on his return that he, the Governor, understood there was going to be a further discussion in the near future in the Congress regarding Pearl Harbor and he, Governor Dewey, inquired of General Vissell to me as to whether I desired him to intervene to the extent that he might be able to suppress such debates.

General Vissell was telling me this on his return to Washington. He suggested that I telephone Governor Dewey but I thought it was better that General Vissell should have the conversation, and I told him what to say. He called up.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

This is all hearsay.

Mr. Mitchell: Tell us what you told him to say.

General Marshall: I told him to tell Governor Dewey that I had already embarrassed him with requests which had affected his personal actions and that I would not make any further request of him. I told General Vissell that Governor Dewey would probably say that didn't matter, that he would be interested in the conduct of the campaign, the successful conclusion of the war, and if he said that to again repeat that I had anticipated that response and that I still had no request to make of him.

That is exactly the way it took place. General Vissell told him what I had said. He replied that that was not the point, it wasn't a question of personal embarrassment, it was a question of the progress of the war.

General Vissell told him that I had anticipated some such reply and I still had no request to make.

And I will add that so far as I know, certainly not in the immediate future after that, there was no debate on the question in Congress.

Mr. Mitchell: I notice in these letters there is a reference to the fact that at some time prior to September 1944 as a result of the OSS getting into the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal, the military attache, Japanese codes

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

all over the world were changed. Was that just one of the Japanese codes?

General Marshall: That was one of their codes, which we had broken down.

Mr. Mitchell: You continued to decode up to the time this letter to Mr. Dewey was written, the diplomatic codes that we have had here in evidence?

General Marshall: We continued right through that time, and, I might add, it played a very important part, the decoding of these messages, deciphering of these messages, played a very important part after the termination of the Japanese struggle in connection with our movement of troops into Japan and particularly into Korea, because we had the communications of the Japanese officers and we knew whether we had to go in with a regiment or an Army corps.

We went into Korea with, that was General MacArthur's action but I think this is approximately correct, on September 3 with, I believe, only a regiment, when the original plan was September 23 with a whole Army corps, because we had the communications of the Japanese Commander in Korea appealing to his own Government to expedite the movement of the American troops into Korea, which meant to us we need not anticipate any violent reaction from the Japanese.

Mr. Mitchell: That was about what date in 1945?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

General Marshall: That was after V-J Day. That was some days in August and possibly early September.

Mr. Mitchell: With the exception of this change --

General Marshall: Also I might add that in the final phase of the war we obtained information regarding the campaign in Manchuria which was helpful to the occupation of the Allied troops.

Mr. Mitchell: With the exception of this military attache code which you lost the ability to decode, prior to 1944 had you, since Pearl Harbor, lost the ability to crack these other Japanese codes?

General Marshall: They lost some of them from time to time due to the regular changes. Then it would take a while to bring it down to date. But on that attache code the whole code went out. Almost all codes have frequent changes, some daily.

Mr. Mitchell: There is a sentence in your letter of the 27th of September, at the bottom of page 1, which reads:

"Therefore we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific which in turn was furnished the State Department rather than as popularly supposed the State Department providing us with the information, but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

the last message before December 7th which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th."

Now, I would like for you to look in the intercept book, Mr. Hannaford, and find the messages you marked, and --

General Marshall: I can tell you the character. The only message I had in mind was where they were talking about lights in the windows. That was the first one that came to my attention regarding the Pearl Harbor affair.

Mr. Mitchell: That pointed at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. Of course, at this time there had not been the exhaustive search of all of these various records.

(A document was handed to General Marshall by Mr. Hannaford.)

General Marshall: It is a lengthy message from Honolulu to Tokyo.

3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.

The Vice Chairman: What is the page in the book?

General Marshall: Page 22.

Mr. Mitchell: That message we are showing you, about the lights in the windows, appears not to have been translated until December 11, and your letter refers to a message that didn't come into your hands until the 8th.

General Marshall: Mr. Chairman, the point was, I didn't

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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go back and check on these dates and translations, but was speaking from memory three or four years afterwards in dictating this letter to Mr. Dewey. It may have been that it didn't get to me until the 11th. I was not looking at any record. I was talking three years later. But it was a message that came to my attention after the event and this was the one I was talking about.

Mr. Mitchell: At page 27 of the book you are looking at there is a message that was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, and was translated December 8. That is the message which says:

"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

General Marshall: The one I am referring to is this lengthy one.

Mr. Mitchell: You don't identify the one I have read?

General Marshall: I don't have a recollection of that. I have a definite recollection of this elaborate message here on page 22 though I didn't read it at the time, I didn't have it available, I have never seen it from that day until now.

Mr. Mitchell: In your letter of the 27th you refer to the last message before December 7 "which did not reach our

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

hands until the following day, December 8." As I understand it you were not referring to this 14-part and 1:00 p.m. message?

General Marshall: No, sir, I am referring to this message, as nearly as my recollection permits, and am quite clear this was the one, beginning at page 22, dated the 3rd of December, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo; and I repeat I have never seen the message from the time I looked at it until today and I was dictating a letter offhand in a very few minutes to Governor Dewey.

Mr. Mitchell: Will you tell the committee what occasioned your writing Mr. Dewey at all?

General Marshall: It was reported to me by the Chief of Army Intelligence that these various comments were being made on the floor of Congress referring to Pearl Harbor, and the comments being made at frequent intervals in the campaign speeches of the various members of the parties were leading inevitably to the conclusion, the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Vissell thought, that other Governments would decide that we had a method of breaking their code, and the matter was growing more pointed as the campaign was becoming more violent, and some action ought to be taken in a hurry or we were going to lose our tremendous source of information in the Far East.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

The recommendation made to me by General Vissell -- and you can call him as a witness -- was to go to the President for some assistance in the matter. I didn't think that would do. I thought it over overnight. The next morning I dictated this letter of September 25 and sent for General Vissell, read the letter to him, and asked him his view on this procedure. He thought that was all right.

I then sent him, as I recall, with the letter personally to Admiral King to let Admiral King see it and get his reaction. His reaction was to concur. Then the discussion was how to get the letter into Governor Dewey's hands without attracting attention to procedure. I have described the method we took.

In explanation of that procedure of addressing the letter to Governor Dewey, I felt, and Admiral King concurred, that it was absolutely necessary that Governor Dewey feel that no one other than ourselves, that is, that the President, the Secretary of War, and other officials of the War Department or the Navy Department, had no knowledge whatever of this action, and its success would depend entirely on Governor Dewey feeling that that was the case.

Therefore, we followed a purely non-political procedure entirely in the interest of the conduct of the operation. That is the way, I understand, Governor Dewey accepted the approach. I never told the President, I think he died with-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

out knowing anything about this, I am quite certain he did, and I have no recollection after the event of ever telling the Secretary of War.

Mr. Mitchell: I think I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: General Marshall, I have two or three questions I would like to ask.

Going back into the spring and summer of 1941, I think you stated on yesterday that not only you but other officers of the War Department and also officers of the Navy Department, insofar as you felt it proper to do so, were urging that everything be done to postpone any clash that might result in armed hostilities between the United States and Japan?

General Marshall: That is the case.

The Chairman: Were you present during any of the discussions in the latter part of 1940 or any part of 1941 with reference to the location of the Fleet in the Hawaiian region?

General Marshall: I was present at some discussions with reference to the Fleet changing its base from Long Beach and San Diego to Hawaii and with regard to portions of the Fleet being drawn into the Atlantic.

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follows

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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1 The Chairman: What was the general understanding,
2 what was your understanding of the general opinion of those
3 responsible in the various branches of the Government, that
4 is, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary
5 of Navy, with respect to the maintenance of that Fleet,
6 Pacific Fleet, as it finally came to be called, in the region
7 of Hawaii?
8

9 General Marshall: I don't recall, as I said before
10 in my testimony, the pros and cons of the argument regard-
11 ing the Fleet at Hawaii. I heard it -- I am sorry to tell
12 you that I don't remember. I think I had a very definite
13 view in the matter. I know I had a very definite view in
14 relation to the reinforcement of the naval forces in the
15 Atlantic, and I am rather foggy about that.
16

17 So much happened after that, and it was a naval issue,
18 that I have lost the thread of the discussions. I know that
19 I was intensely interested in the development of the fleet
20 train, as it was then called, and I recall specifically
21 taking it up in a liaison meeting in an effort to assist
22 Admiral Stark in getting the necessary craft which would
23 have to be drawn from commercial use, particularly Latin
24 America, at that time.
25

26 I am sorry I can't give you any definite reactions
27 regarding the movement of the Fleet from the West Coast out

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D. T. HOLLOWAY, JR., 4010 14th St. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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to Hawaii, or regarding the reinforcement of the Atlantic portion of our Navy from ships in the Pacific, though I sat in on a good many of the discussions.

The Chairman: Do you recall what your own view was during the progress of the Japanese encroachments from Japan down to the south in the direction of Indochina, Thailand, and the Kra Peninsula, as to whether that encroachment endangered the security of our interests in the Philippine Islands, and other regions of the Southwest Pacific?

General Marshall: My view was that it clearly did endanger our interests, endanger the security of the Philippines, if the Japanese moved in force into the south of the Philippines, southern Indochina, Borneo, Thailand.

The Chairman: And your view was, as I understand it that while attempting to postpone any actual clash, while attempting to play for time, as we might say, in the relationship between Japan and the United States, such efforts might be, would be taken, or should be taken as would in some measure convince Japan that it was hazardous for her to proceed further south?

General Marshall: That was the effort that we were making in connection with the reinforcement of the Philippines, which began in a material way in August 1941 for the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 purpose of so strengthening the Philippines that the
3 Japanese would think it unsafe to proceed further south.

4 The Chairman: Did I understand you to say that,
5 taking the Panama Canal, the Caribbean area, into considera-
6 tion, and the Pacific Coast of the United States into con-
7 sideration, and the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine
8 Islands into consideration, in view of the limited material
9 we had for distribution to all of those points, that Hawaii
10 was better taken care of in the way of materiel than any of
11 these other points that I have mentioned?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir. At that time, I think, to
13 which you referred, virtually nothing had been done about
14 the Philippines, and Panama had been about halfway developed
15 up to the standard we thought necessary.

16 The Chairman: So that you began to make some intensi-
17 fication of effort to give General MacArthur in the Philip-
18 pines something of the materiel and supplies which he had
19 been for quite a time requesting?

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir. There were two factors.

21 One is, we had reached in the delivery of materiel or
22 troops, or both, to Panama and to Hawaii to the degree where
23 we thought they were reasonably safe, and, quantity produc-
24 tion just coming in, we started to build up the Philippine
25 Island defenses.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: Was it in pursuance of that policy that
3 these unarmed airplanes had left the West Coast on the 6th
4 of December for the Philippines? Were dispatched?

5 General Marshall: That is correct. That was the
6 first quadron reinforcement of 45 Flying Fortresses, to
7 be added to the 35 which had already reached the Philippines
8 in early September.

9 The Chairman: They left from some point in California?

10 General Marshall: They left Hamilton Field, right
11 near San Francisco.

12 The Chairman: Destined for the Philippines, but with
13 a view of stopping in Hawaii to refuel.

14 General Marshall: Refuel and have the engines gone
15 over and give the pilots a rest.

16 The Chairman: I presume it is safe to say that it was
17 obvious to those planes, inasmuch as they were unarmed, they
18 did not expect to run into a war in Hawaii on their way
19 to the Philippines.

20 General Marshall: No, sir. That was a natural reaction
21 on their part.

22 The Chairman: Now, this morning, I believe you said,
23 or yesterday, that when General MacArthur's dispatch to
24 you of November 28, which was in reply to yours to him of
25 the 27, and General Short's dispatch of the same date were
handed to you, you did not recall whether they were attached

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 together by a clip or not, as they now appear.

3 General Marshall: I don't think I said I did not know
4 whether they were attached together, or not. I do not know.
5 All I do know is that I initialed the first upper copy,
6 and apparently they came in in that form.

7 The Chairman: Did I understand you to say you did or
8 did not remember whether you saw General Short's reply?

9 General Marshall: I do not remember whether or not
10 I saw General Short's reply, but the presumption must be
11 that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to inter-
12 vene which I did not do.

13 The Chairman: Now, you sent on the 27th almost identi-
14 cal messages to Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and the
15 Pacific Coast of the United States.

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: There was apparently one difference, I
18 think, in your message to General MacArthur in the Philip-
19 pines; you did not caution him with reference to alarming
20 the civil population, which you did include in your message
21 to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you recall that?

22 General Marshall: There is that difference between
23 the two messages. The reason, quite evidently, is that
24 Hawaii had quite a mixed population, including 130,000
25 Japanese, which is quite a different situation from that in

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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1
2 the Philippines, and the position of vital installations
3 which related to the city proper presented a condition in
4 Hawaii considerably different from that in the Philippines.

5 Clark Field is to the north of Manila, and Corregidor
6 at the entrance of the Bay, 35 miles from Manila. And,
7 may I add, a very definite reason in connection with that
8 was to try not to upset the procedure that Mr. Hull was
9 following in an effort to stall action in the Pacific.

10 The Chairman: In your conversations with the War Depart-
11 ment and the Navy Department, and the President, with refer-
12 ence to obtaining time, as much time as was possible in
13 order to prepare better before there might possibly be any
14 clash of arms between Japan and the United States, do you
15 recall what the President's attitude was toward that approach
16 to the subject in conversations you had?

17 General Marshall: As far as I can recall, it was
18 identical with ours, and Mr. Hulls. "Ours" meaning
19 Admiral Stark and myself, the Secretary of War; Colonel
20 Knox.

21 The Chairman: In your message to these various areas on
22 the 27th of November, after calling attention to the fact
23 that the negotiations with Japan appeared to be on the
24 verge of termination, to all practical purposes, and so
25 forth, you gave them what apparently amounted to instructions