

Doc. 4037 Evid.

Folder 8

(209)

Berlin, den 3. Februar 1941

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Ha

Diplogerme

T o k i o

Nr 123

Telegramm in Ziff.

(Geh. Ch.Verf.)

Cito

Geheimvermerk für Geheimsachen.

I. Auf Nr. 140 und 154 vom 30.1. und 3.2.

Deutschland ist ursprünglich an Frankreich herantreten mit Forderung auf Lieferung von 40 000 t Kautschuk aus Indochina. Von dieser Menge sollten Japaner als Gegenleistung für Transporthilfe 5 bis 10 000 t erhalten. Bei Verhandlungen mit Franzosen stellte sich dann heraus, dass die in Indochina im Herbst vorhandenen Lagerbestände inzwischen an USA und Japan verkauft worden waren; Franzosen sahen sich daher nicht mehr in der Lage, deutsche Forderung zu erfüllen. Deutscherseits wurden daraufhin Verhandlungen über die von Frankreich mit 68 000 t veranschlagte Kautschukproduktion Indochinas im Jahre 1941 aufgenommen. Hierbei zeigte sich, dass von dieser Gesamtmenge aus Austauschgründen, d.h. für die Sicherstellung weiterer Zufuhren nach Indochina eine Menge von 25 000 t zum Verkauf an Amerika freigegeben werden mußte. Auf Restmenge erhoben Franzosen im Hinblick auf Kautschukbedarf ihrer eigenen Industrie eine Mindestforderung von 18 000 t, die deutscherseits als berechtigt anerkannt werden mußte. Die übriggebliebene Menge von 25 000 t mußte Deutschland nunmehr für sich allein

Durchdr. erh.

Büro RAM

St.S.

U.St.S.Pol

Ges. Schnurre

Ha Pol VIII

6 H/2. 21³⁰

Einloch

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beanspruchen, weil Kautschukbedarf der Wehrmacht sich erhöht hatte und weil Japan inzwischen bereits im letzten Vierteljahr 1940 erhebliche Kautschukmengen - nach unserer Information 12 000 t - aus Indochina bezogen hat und ihm außerdem Bezugsmöglichkeiten aus Niederländisch-Indien und Thailand zur Verfügung stehen. Aus Gründen der Tarnung wurde allerdings auch in Verhandlungen über Kautschukproduktion Indochinas im Jahre 1941 den Franzosen gegenüber der Standpunkt vertreten, dass die von uns beanspruchten 25 000 t für Japan und den europäischen Raum, d. h. für Japan und Deutschland bestimmt seien. Wir haben jedoch über die von uns beanspruchte Menge mit den Franzosen folgende feste Vereinbarungen getroffen:

1) L'Union des Planteurs de caoutchouc en Indochine, Paris, ist verpflichtet, durch das Groupement des exportateurs de caoutchouc, Saigon, der Fa. L'Union commerciale Indochinoise et Africaine, Saigon (Lucia), die 25 000 t in folgenden monatlichen Lieferungen mit Ausfuhrerlaubnis zur Verfügung zu stellen:

Januar	2 500 t
Februar	1 875 t
März	1 875 t
April	2 500 t
Mai	1 875 t
Juni	1 875 t
Juli	2 500 t
August	1 875 t
September	1 875 t
Oktober	2 500 t
November	1 875 t
Dezember	1 875 t

Außerdem haben die Franzosen uns aus eigenen Vorabkäufen 1 500 t abgetreten, deren Auslieferung allen übrigen Lieferungen voran geht, so dass in den beiden ersten Monaten

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insgesamt

insgesamt 5 875 t zu liefern sind.

2) Zwischen dem Pariser Stammhaus der Lucia und den Hamburger Importeuren Klentze und Co. und Sontinentale Produktengesellschaft n.b.H. ist ein Kontrakt geschlossen worden, wonach die Lucia die obengenannten Mengen durch ihre Niederlassung in Saigon im eigenen Namen aufzunehmen, einzulagern und nach unserer Instruktion zu befördern, bzw. an japanische Firmen abzugeben hat. Die Zahlung für den Kautschuk erfolgt für die Lieferungen in den ersten vier Monaten durch uns derart, dass der Lucia, Saigon, durch die Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, Paris, bei der Banque franco-chinoise pour le commerce et l'industrie ein Akkreditiv in freien Devisen eröffnet wird, aus dem das Groupement sofort bei Andienung des Kautschuks gegen Übergabe des Lagerscheins bezahlt wird. Das Akkreditiv wird geschaffen durch Zahlung in Gold in Paris, welches mittels eines komplizierten Transfer-Mechanismus in Indochina in Dollars bzw. in andere freie Devisen umgewandelt wird.

Auf Grund dieser Sachlage und um weitere Verzögerungen in Lieferung zu vermeiden, müssen die ersten Partien entweder von Lucia nach Kobe befördert und dort von japanischen Firmen übernommen werden oder, wenn Beförderung nur als Militär- oder Regierungsgut gesichert ist, müssen Partien durch japanische Firmen in Saigon von Lucia ohne Zahlung übernommen werden. Hierzu ist erforderlich, dass wir sofort erfahren, welche japanische Firmen den Kautschuk in Kobe oder Saigon übernehmen werden, damit von uns die Lucia dahin instruiert werden kann, dass Konnossement oder Lagerscheine durch Banque franco-chinoise an diese Firmen ausgeliefert werden.

Bei

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Bei späteren Lieferungen könnte Zahlung über Japan geleitet werden, sofern in Japan Gold in Dollar konvertiert und von dort aus ein Akkreditiv für Lucia eröffnet oder ein anderer glatt laufender Zahlungsweg geschaffen werden kann.

Falls Japaner ^{für} Mitwirkung beim Abtransport eine besondere, über Abgeltung der reinen Transportkosten hinausgehende Entschädigung beanspruchen, bitte ich, Vorschläge zu unterbreiten. In Betracht kommt gegebenenfalls eine Kommission von höchstens 10 v.H., möglichst in Yen zahlbar.

Die von Direktor Wirtschaftsabteilung geäußerte Befürchtung, dass bei dem von uns gewählten Verfahren die Weiterleitung des Kautschuks durch Japan an Deutschland ersichtlich würde und damit eine Gefährdung der sonstigen Kautschukbezüge Japans eintreten könnte, dürfte nicht gerechtfertigt sein, da in Indochina nicht bekannt ist, für wen Lucia, die seit jeher Kautschukgeschäfte gemacht hat, Kautschuk kauft und da von vornherein vorgesehen ist, dass der Kautschuk in Kobe oder Saigon von japanischen Firmen übernommen wird.

Eine japanische Mitwirkung beim Abtransport von Kautschuk für Frankreich ist zunächst noch nicht erforderlich.

Vichy ist über Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission gebeten worden, französisch-indochinesischer Delegation Instruktionen im Sinne des deutsch-französischen Kautschukvertrags zu geben und Haradâ entsprechend zu unterrichten.

Mit durch Japanische Botschaft übermittelten Vorschlag, die von Deutschland in Frankreich gekauften Kautschukmengen aus Indochina formell

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an

an Japan zu verkaufen mit der Massgabe, dass Japan diese Mengen an Deutschland zurückverkauft, grundsätzlich einverstanden. Eine Anrechnung der aus laufenden Einfuhrgeschäften herrührenden 4 000 t, die Japan für Deutschland aus Niederländisch Indien besorgt, darf unter keinen Umständen stattfinden, da 25 000 t Indochina-Kautschuk neben den laufenden Einfuhrgeschäften hereingebracht werden müssen; andernfalls wären 25 000 t für deutsche Bedarfsdeckung nicht ausreichend. Entgegen japanischer Annahme wird Januar/Februar abzutransportierende Menge nicht 10 000 t betragen, sondern höchstens 6 000 t erreichen. Infolgedessen entfällt auch unter diesem Gesichtspunkt Voraussetzung für Anrechnung.

II. Auf Nr. 154.

Französischer Bedarf war im letzten Friedensjahr 60 000 t. Anteil von 18 000 t daher nicht übermäßig. Er ist zur Inangehaltung der französischen Wirtschaft unbedingt erforderlich. Von den 18 000 t sollten ursprünglich 9 000 t über Sibirien befördert werden; inzwischen hat aber Frankreich Möglichkeit zu Seetransport gefunden.

Wir hatten Frankreich Verkauf von 25 000 t an dritte Länder zugestanden, um indochinesischen Devisenbedarf zu decken und Indochina nicht in de Gaulle-Lager zu treiben. Haben keine Bedenken, wenn Japan von sich aus Ausfuhr von Kautschuk nach Amerika unterbinden will (vergl. Tel. Nr. 74 vom 22.1.)

III. Bitte hiernach die Fragen des Direktors Wirtschaftsabteilung Außenministeriums beantworten.

Drahtbericht.

136548

Zur

Zur dortigen Information: Riesige
Japanische Botschaft hat gleiche Fragen gestellt
und hinzugefügt:

"Es ist dringend erwünscht, dass deutsche
seits mit der französischen Seite darüber ver-
handelt wird werde, dass außer dem an Deutsch-
land zu liefernden Quantum von 25.000 t die
übrigen in Frage stehenden Quanten aus Fran-
zösisch-Indochina sämtlich an Japan gelie-
fert werden oder dass über die Verfügung
über diese übrigen Quanten durch unmittel-
bare Verhandlung zwischen Japan und Frank-
reich entschieden werde."

Schluß Mitteilung Botschaft.

Unsere Stellungnahme hierzu ergibt
sich aus obiger Antwort.

W i e h l

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4037

15 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat: File of Telegrams between (State Soc'y Japan, vol. 2.h) German Foreign Office and Embassy in Tokyo, Rome and Washington

Date: 1 Feb-28 Original () Copy (x) Language: German
Feb 1941

Was it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Was it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; KURUSU, Saburo; NOMURA, Kichisaburo

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Item 1. Note from ZAPP to WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 1 February 1941, re KURUSU's audience with the FUHRER 3 February, before his departure. /136542/

Item 2. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 3 February 1941.

The director of the Economy Division of the Foreign Ministry told OTT that the Japanese charge d'affairs had telegraphed that he could not confirm the fact that Germany had already bought 25,000 tons of caoutchouc from France. According to the decision of the armistice commission (14 Jan) it was decided /to assign/ 25,000 tons of caoutchouc to Europe and Asia, 18,000 tons to France, and 25,000 tons for third countries, especially the United States. Japan and Germany must negotiate over the division of the 25,000 for Europe and Asia. /136543/

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Item 3. Telegram in cipher from WIEHL, Berlin, 3 February, 1941, to German Embassy, Tokyo, in reply to Item 2.

Set of instructions regarding amount and source of caoutchouc to be purchased from Indo-China, etc.
/136544-49/

Item 4. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 4 February 1941.

Japanese Press attacks sharply the announced Dutch protest against the inclusion of the NEI into the economic sphere of East Asia in the MATSUOKA talks. England and America seek to sabotage Japan's strivings for the New Order. Economic cooperation with the Netherlands Indies is for Japan a question of life or death. Japan must unconditionally go against those in control behind the scenes in the Netherlands Indies. The Yomiuri advises breaking off negotiations and taking up matters with the controlling powers in the Netherlands Indies. /136550/

Item 5. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 4 February 1941.

In today's press conference the spokesman said that the Dutch Minister had lodged a protest in behalf of the Dutch Government in London with the Vice Foreign Minister against the inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in the Japanese idea of an East Asia sphere. It was not taken seriously. To the question, whether this disposition indicated non-recognition of all pseudo-governments in London, the spokesman answered that this question had hardly any practical significance to Japan, but only a formal, diplomatic one. /136551/

Item 6. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 6 February 1941.

In the negotiations beginning 7 February concerning the boundary disputes between France and Thailand, the Vice Foreign Minister instructed OTT that the Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement to make no military or political arrangements with a third power. The Vice Foreign Minister added that in regard to France this engagement would apply only to Indo-China. He believes that Germany

will welcome this action since it is, in accordance with the Tri-Partite Pact, directed towards removing English and American influence from an important area of the GREATER EAST ASIAN sphere. The Vice Minister requested notification of the German government of this fact since the French Government might counter by reference to the German-French Armistice agreements. /136552/

Item 7. Telegram in cipher from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 17 February 1941, to Tokyo. (German Embassy) (In reply to preceding item)

Germany welcomes the Japanese intentions that Thailand and France will not make any arrangements with a third power. Please add that the armistice convention will of course be concerned with all France's possessions, colonies, and protectorates, so that Germany will remain interested in the further development of relations in Indo-China, and therefore await continuous instructions concerning matters in Indo-China. /136553/

Item 8. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 February 1941.

The Vice Foreign Minister handed OTT a memorandum stating that

Japan is prepared to support Germany in regard to rubber and other raw materials from the SOUTH EAST ASIATIC sphere and that

The Japanese Government is preparing to export of this the rubber already purchased by Germany from Indo-China to Dairen, etc.

SHOWA TSUSUKU will undertake execution of the commercial side of the business. As representative of the Hamburg importers, NIGGEMAN, Dairen, is to undertake the internal arrangements with SHOWA. /136554-55/

Item 9. Telegram from OTT to Foreign Minister, Tokyo, 10 February 1941.

MATSUOKA told me joyfully that upon the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations, he will depart with the approval of the Emperor about 25 February and arrive in

Berlin between 12 and 15 March. He plans conferences in Berlin, supplemented by visits to Rome and Moscow lasting about 12 days, and expects to be back in Tokyo 10 April. At the latest he must be back in Tokyo 15 April.

The foreign minister gave me the following notes concerning what he would discuss in Berlin:

I. Relations of the partners in the Tri-Partite Pact against America.

1. Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

To prevent America's entry into war, he has instructed Ambassador NOJIMA to emphasize the unconditional faithfulness of Japan to the pact and Japan's military and economic might to President ROOSEVELT, to point out that American entry into war could not prevent the defeat of England, that Germany and Japan alone are capable of constructing in Europe and East Asia the necessary order, which, in the long run, is necessary for America, too.

2. Preventive attack against Singapore.

"Nevertheless, should America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese Government considers a preventive attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the REICH. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war." /136557/

II. End of the China Conflict.

The Foreign Minister gives a short report about his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. The Foreign Minister expects from his Berlin conferences a favorable progress in his secret negotiations with CHIANG.

III. Relation to Russia.

As the result of a surprising agreement with CHIANG KAI-SHEK the foreign minister expects important strengthening of the position in relations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared that he had informed Ambassador CSHINA, but had taken the carrying on of the negotiations upon himself.

OTT suggests that he be called to Berlin at the same time "in view of the importance of the decisions which are to be made there". /136556-58/

Item 10. Memo about KURUSU's final visit 13 Feb 1941. /136559/

Item 11. Telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP Foreign Minister personally, Tokyo, 14 February 1941, reporting that MATSUOKA's travel plans have leaked out. /136560/

Item 12. Irrelevant.

Item 13. Memo to Under State Secretary from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 15 February 1941.

"The Japanese Foreign Minister has recently expressed himself concerning the meaning of Article Five of the Tri-Partite Pact, which seems to me to signify that Japan, according to Article Five, is not sufficiently covered in case of a RUSSO-JAPANESE conflict. Inversely, one might also conclude that, according to Article Five, Japan would feel no unequivocal obligation to lend aid in case of a RUSSO-GERMAN conflict. I should appreciate a record of MATSUOKA's statements and their significance. /136562/

Item 14. Note from KURUSU to RIBBENTROP, Berlin, thanking him and wishing splendid successes to Germany. /136563/

Item 15. Telegram to OTT from RIBBENTROP, Berlin, 15 February 1941 (reply to Item 9), instructing OTT, that RIBBENTROP took note of the proposed topics of conversation with interest. He agrees to the proposal that OTT should come at the same time. /136564/

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Item 16. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 15 February 1941.

MATSUOKA's explanation yesterday in the diet on Russo-Japanese relations: Japan, in concordance with the basic ideas of the Tri-Partite Pact is trying to improve the relations basically. Russia is conciliatory, as witness the negotiations concerning the fishing and commerce problems.

"When asked what assurance Article V of the Tri-Partite Pact gave Japan against Russia, the Foreign Minister explained that no secret agreements exist between partners to the Tri-Partite Agreement."

The Foreign Minister further explained the Anti-Comintern Pact would not be cancelled by members of the Tri-Partite Agreement, since neither the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact nor the Tri-Partite Agreement influenced its ideological objective. /136565/

Item 17. Telegram to RIBBENTROP from OTT, Tokyo, 17 February 1941.

MATSUOKA said that his trip depended upon the conclusion of the THAILAND-INDO-CHINA negotiations, but would in any event take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulty on account of the excessive demands of THAILAND. The Japanese Government is working on a compromise which will be placed at the disposition of the REICHS MINISTER in the next few days with the request that the mediation of the German government /be used/ to influence VICHY's acceptance of the proposal. /136566/

Item 18. Telegram to REICH Foreign Minister from WEISSACHER, Berlin, 15 February 1941, about an inquiry by the Italian charge d'affaires re German attitude to MATSUOKA's travel plans. /136566 A/

Item 19. Telegram from WEISSACHER to German Foreign Minister, Berlin, 17 February 1941.

Ambassador OSHIDA thanks us for his reception in Berlin. /136566 B/

Item 20. Memo to German Foreign Minister from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 17 February 1941, (see Item 18) informing him that Germany agrees to MATSUOKA's travel plans. /136566 C/

Item 21. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, 18 February 1941.

The Director of the Europe Bureau informed OTT about an inquiry by the British Ambassador to MATSUOKA regarding the objectives of Japanese policy in the great Asiatic sphere. The Ambassador explained that the numerous recent press reports of alleged Japanese expansion plans had worried his government. Eden shortly before had directed similar questions to the Japanese Ambassador in London.

MATSUOKA instructed the Japanese ambassador in London to express to EDEN the surprise of the Japanese Government at the completely unfounded inquiry. He said the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded to check the further spread of war and aimed at the establishment of world peace. On the other hand, he said that Japan could rightfully demand information from the British and American governments as to what objectives the British and American measures had in arming themselves in the Pacific and in the South Sea. This armament had called forth great unrest when made public in Japan, and there was an increase in the demands that the Japanese Government take immediate counter-measures.

The Foreign Minister asked to emphasize what harm the world would suffer from the continuation or the expansion of the war. He declared that Japan was not pursuing imperialistic objectives and had no intentions of conquering and oppressing foreign countries. /136566 D-136566 E/

Item 22. Pages 88 and 89 (No. 49) of the German Information Service (DNB), Tokyo, 18 February 1941.

At the foreign press conference on Tuesday the spokesman for the Information Bureau, ISBII, made a statement, which was to be considered as an explanation of the Japanese Government, concerning the strained situation in the Far East created by English and American actions and propaganda. "We wish to repeat that the aim

of the Tri-Partite Pact is a peaceful one." In connection with British-American activities, the press stresses that Japan should lose no time, etc. Japan offered to mediate, whenever asked to do so e.g. in the Thai-F.I.C. border dispute. British actions, such as laying of mines around Singapore are cited and the other countries are worried not to provoke Japan. /136566 F-136566 G/

Item 23. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 19 February re a conference with MATSUOKA, in which he referred to the above statement of the Press chief.

The Foreign Minister explained that Eden in his recent reply to the Japanese Ambassador in London had stated in a blunt manner that Japan, in mediating between Thailand and Indo-China, had in mind merely the coercion of the little nations in the Greater East Asiatic sphere. He, MATSUOKA, refused to engage in a discussion with Eden concerning Japan's local mediatory action and preferred to clarify Japan's unselfishness by explaining her readiness to mediate in general for the re-establishment of world peace.

The Foreign Minister informed OTT "that in the secret session of the Upper House he declared at the occasion of the discussion on the Three Power Pact that he was firmly convinced of the victory of the Axis powers, as he trusted the FUJERER unconditionally. The effect of those words was strong, and even opponents of the Government were visibly impressed". /136567/

Item 24. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 21 February 1941, re Press reaction to the alleged Japanese offer of peace mediation.

In connection with this, the spokesman repeated the following as the contents of MATSUOKA's denial in the press yesterday: "As Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government I have never made an offer to any nation in the world to intervene for the re-establishment of world peace. I answered Eden's inquiry concerning Japanese mediatory activity between Thailand and Indo-China. Although I expressed in this reply my view respecting the re-establishment of world peace, I at no time forwarded

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to any nation whatsoever a message which had as its object Japanese mediation for world peace, as rumor has it." /136569/

Item 25. Telegram to charge d'affaires, German Embassy in Rome, from RIBBENTROP, 21 February 1941, Fuschl, informing him of the contents of Item 21 and 23 and citing world reaction as unfavorable to Germany, since a mediation offer would be considered as a sign of weakness in the Axis camp. /136570-72/

Item 26. Telegram in English to German Foreign Minister from Thomsen, Washington, 21 February 1941, re. statements by NOJURA re economic Southward expansion, Jap-U.S. relations, etc., also re Japan's treaty obligation to go to war against U.S. if U.S. goes to war against Germany. /136572-74/

Item 27. Press communique, from German Foreign Minister, Berlin, 23 February 1941.

RIBBENTROP today received the initial visit of the newly appointed Imperial Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi OSHIMA. /136575/

Item 28. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 22 February 1941. (to be delivered before OSHIMA's arrival)

"The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He developed his view-points on the future Japanese foreign policy. OSHIMA arranged the three East Asiatic problems of Japan in order of urgency from north to south.

1. Russia.

OSHIMA emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The public would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices were involved in it. Perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia, not involving sacrifice, would be within reach and even sufficient to ease Japan in the north. Speed is important.

2. China.

OSHIMA complains that Japan has not long ago settled matters with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. A settlement should now be found. There are two schools /of thought/ in Tokyo today, one which would agree directly with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on CHIANG KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING WEI.

OSHIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

3. British Possessions in East Asia.

Hereupon OSHIMA spoke of military matters concerning which it may be sufficient to mention that OSHIMA considers it necessary to take HONGKONG first, which should not be very difficult. /He said that/ SINGAPORE must be seized in a bold style from the sea and from the land. /136577/

I expressed my doubts to OSHIMA whether the order he gave the problems fitted the demands of the historic hour which would never return. OSHIMA replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries. . . ."
/136576-77/

Item 29. Telegram to German Minister from Bismarck, Rome, 23 February 1941.

ANFUSO told Bismarck that DUCE took cognizance of telegram 388 of 22 February (Item 25) and instructed the Italian Ambassador in TOKYO to undertake with MATSUOKA a step similar to OTT's. /136578-79/

Item 30. Telegram from WIEHL, dated 22 February 1941, Berlin, to the German Foreign Minister for his instruction in the impending interview with Ambassador OSHIMA, dealing with:

I. Economic Negotiations

At Japanese request a German delegation under WOHLTHAT is going to Tokyo in a few weeks for economic negotiations. . . . In connection with this the Japanese expressed the desire for the cession of patents, designs

and other technical support, chiefly in the sphere of war economy in payment for which they requested first credit of 100,000,000 yen, although the value of the patents, etc., would represent at least several hundred million yen. These requests for patents, etc., according to the German Foreign Minister's decision, are to be handled not through WOHLTHAT's delegation in TOKYO, but through the commission of the Three Power Pact in Berlin, namely by the Economic Commission. It is recommended that you mention to OSHIMA in connection with the Japanese return service something about the ceding of Japanese patents and, above all, Japanese aid in regard to important raw materials.

II. Caoutchouc (Giving a report about the negotiation in this matter) /136580-81/

Item 31. Telegram to Ambassador in Tokyo from RIBBENTROP, Fuschl, 24 February 1941. (re Item 26)

"In a report from the Ambassador in Washington, NOMURA, when asked if Japan was obligated to go to war against USA, if USA went to war against Germany, replied, 'That is a question of treaty interpretation. I will refrain from going into it'.

"Please speak to the Foreign Minister about the correctness of this statement, since it obviously does not fit the circumstances, since the question of Japan's entry into war, in case of an American declaration of war, is unequivocally clarified by the wording of the Tri-Partite Pact. . . ."

OTT is also to suggest that it is better to use clear language toward U.S. rather than evasive explanations. /136582/

Item 32. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 25 February 1941, re interview of MATSUOKA by WIEGANDS and TOLISCHUS. /136583-84/

Item 33. Telegram from OTT, dated Tokyo, 27 February 1941.

Instructions in Item 31 were carried out. The

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Foreign Minister dictated in OTT's presence telegraphic instructions to NOMURA in which he was asked to report the exact words of his remarks at the press conference in question. Also reminded NOMURA of his instructions to express with unconditional clarity in America Japan's faithfulness to the Tri-Partite Pact since America's entry into war was to be prevented only by firm speech. /136585/

Item 34. Telegram to Tokyo Embassy from RIBBENTROP, Fuschl, 27 February 1941.

"For the Ambassador personally.

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan take possession of SINGAPORE as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything further from the informative telegram dispatched today. RIBBENTROP." /136586/

Item 35. /136587-93/ Identical with Item 4 in IPS Doc. 4038. (RIBBENTROP suggests to OSHIMA to attack SINGAPORE without declaration of war. OSHIMA declares preparations for this will be furnished in May. Germany intervenes with France re Thai-F.I.C. dispute.)

Item 36. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 28 February 1941, re Japanese mediation offer. (see Items 21, 23, 25) /136594-5/

Analyst: Lt Leo Traynor

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NOTE

26 August 1946

The following have been extracted from this file
for presentation in court as evidence (Mr. Hyde).

Items: 4037-A ; 4037-B ; 4037-C ;
4037-D ; 4037-E ; 4037-G

Frames: 136552 ; 136556 - 136558
136566 ; 136576 - 136577 ; 136587 - ~~588~~⁵⁹³ ;
136586

W H Wagner

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28 Sep

Item 7 and 8

(4037-F)

Frames ¹³⁶⁵⁵³
~~136533~~ - 555

have been withdrawn for

presentation by DNETO in

court.

WVAW

EXHIBIT NO. 564

Doc. No. 4037 A

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in
locked file

Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9.40 S
Arrival: 6 February 1941, 21.55

No.175 of Feb. 6

Cito!

Secret.

Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning here on February 7 concerning settlement of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no political or military agreement with a third power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obligation, as far as it concerns France, would, of course, apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Government of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because, in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed towards eliminating the British-American influence in an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for the reason that the French Government might possibly raise objections by referring to the German-French Armistice Agreements.

The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same information to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

/136552/

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EXHIBIT NO. 564

秘密事項トシテノミ取扱ノコト

電報 (秘密暗號法)

東京 一九四一年二月六日 九時四十分S
着 六日 二十一時五十五分

4037A

二月六日附第一七五號

至急

秘。 只今外務次官ハ本官ニ報告シテ曰ク、
日本政府ハ泰。印度支那間ノ國境紛争解決ニ關シ
テ二月七日當地ニ開始セル交渉ニ於テ、佛蘭西及
泰國ニ秘密協定ニヨリ第三國ト何等ノ政治的或ハ
軍事的協定ヲ締結セザル義務ヲ與ヘル意向ナリト。
外務次官ハコノ義務ハ佛蘭西ニ關スル限り勿論々
ダ印度支那ニノミ適用アルモノトスト附言シタ。
同次官ハ獨逸政府ハ日本ノ行動ハ歡迎スル、何ト
ナレバソレハ三國同盟ノ精神ニ則リ、大東亞地域
ノ重要ナル地域ニ於テ出來ル限り英米勢力排除ニ
向ケラレテ居ルカラダト推測スルト。

外務次官ハ獨逸政府ヘノ通告ヲ依頼シタ。殊ニ
佛蘭西政府ハ專ニヨルト獨逸政府ニ言及シテ
疑惑ヲ表明スルカモ知レヌカラテアル。361
外務次官ハ伊太利本使ニ同様通告ラスルテアラウ
TO オット

REF ID: A65111 / 136552 / 4

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國山西省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ就リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部經營ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、白獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ贈本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真贈本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真贈本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W.P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

Ct. H. Gardle

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

6x569

locked file

Tokyo, 10 February 1941 01.10
Arrival, 10 February 1941 2400

No. 196 of 10.2.41 Most Urgent

For the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

x) at the Reichs Foreign Minister's office.

xx) at the Reichs Foreign Minister's office.

To Telegram No. 77 of 19th x) and with reference to /Tokyo/ Tel. No. 146 from here xx)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has just told me with obvious joy that the Emperor, on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission to accept the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to /visit/ Berlin. He intends presuming an agreement to this from the other side to depart after the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about 25 February and to reach Berlin between 12 and 15 March. He has set aside 12 days in all for the conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the European Division, Ministerial Director, SALEMOTO, Director NAKANISHI, of the South Manchurian Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by the Legation Secretaries KASE and HOGEN, Attache SAIONJI, grandchild of the last GENRO who died recently, one younger officer from the army and the navy each, as well as two cipher operators.

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details re the most important questions which he would like to discuss in Berlin:

I. Attitude of the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact towards America.

1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

The Foreign Minister is endeavoring to prevent America's entry into the war in the spirit of the pact. To this end he has instructed Ambassador NOMURA to dwell most emphatically on Japan's unconditional loyalty to the pact and her military and economic might /in talks/ with President ROOSEVELT, and point out the senselessness of an American entry into the war. America could not stop the defeat of England by entering

the war. On the contrary, by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone are able to create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary even for our own survival, she would act against her own interest.

a.) Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

Should, in spite of this, America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese Government considers a preventative attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.

II. Termination of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The latter was showing signs of greater readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister expects favorable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang-Kai-Shek from the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to decide to recognize WANG-CHING-WEI.

III. Relations to Russia.

As the result of a surprise agreement with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, the Foreign Minister expects an important strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador OSHIMA of the questions, but had taken it upon himself to carry on the negotiations

the Foreign Minister requests that his intended journey be treated very confidentially. He proposes to publish simultaneous communiques in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, shortly before his departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from there.

In view of the importance of the decisions to be made I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign Minister to be able to report about the situation here from my side and to receive personal instructions for the execution of the decisions reached there.

OTT

/136556-8/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

54 569

秘密事項トシテノミ取扱ノコト

電報 (秘密暗號法)

東京、一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月一〇日 一時一〇分

一〇日 二四時

一九四一年二月一〇日付第一九六號 大至急

獨逸國外務大臣宛

十九日付第七十七號電報 (RAMRAM 綴込)ニ關聯シテ且
第四百十六號當地發電報 (RAMRAM 綴込)ニ關シ

4037B-1

松岡外務大臣ハ只今明ラカナル喜ビテ以テ本官ニ
報告シテ曰ク、天皇ハ總理大臣ノ上奏ニヨリ獨逸
國外務大臣ノ招待ニ應ズルコトノ許可ヲ與ヘラレ
タト。外務大臣ハ先方ノ同意ヲ前提トシテ、泰國
交渉ノ終結后二月二十五日頃出發シ三月十二日ヨ
リ十五日ノ間ニベルリン到着ノ意向デアアル。
ベルリン會談及ピローマ及モスコウヘノ追加的訪
問ノタメニ大凡合計十二日ヲ豫定セリト。ソレニ
依レバ彼ハ四月十日頃東京ニ又歸着スルデアラウ。
必要ガアラバ歐洲滞在ハ數日延長出來ヨウ。併シ外
務大臣ハオソクトモ四月十五日ニハ東京ニ居ナ
ケレバナラヌト。
彼ハオソラク歐羅巴局坂本局長個人的ニ彼ニ親シ
イ關係ニアル中西南滿洲鐵道會社總裁更ニ加瀬及

法眼兩公使館書記官、最近物故セシ最後ノ元老ノ孫西園寺官補、陸海軍若手將校各一名、及暗號手二名ヲ隨伴スルデアラウ。

外務大臣ハ、彼ガベルリンデ會談セント欲スル最重要問題ニツイテ左ノ説明ヲ本官ニテシタ

I 三國條約當事國ノ米國ニ對スル態度

(1) 歐戰セシメヌ爲ノ外交的影響

外務大臣ハ條約ノ精神ニ則シ米國ノ參戰ヲ防止スベク努力シテキル。コノ目的ノタメニ彼ハ、ルゼン大統領ニ向ヒ日本ノ條約ニノ絕對忠實ト日本ノ軍事的及經濟的戦力ヲ最モ力強ク強調シ彼ニ米國ノ參戰ノ無意味ナルコトヲ指摘スル様野村大使ニ訓令ヲ與ヘタ。米國ハソノ參戰ニヨリテ英國ノ敗北ヲ防グコトハ出來ナイト。結局米國ニモ必要ナル秩序ヲ歐洲及東亞ニ於テ確立スルコトガ兩國ダケガ出來ルヲ及日本ト米國ガ戰ツタラ米國ハムシロ自身ノ利益ニ反シテ行動スルコトトナラウト。

(2) シンガポールヘノ豫防的攻撃

ソレニモ不拘米國ノ參戰ガ不可避ト思ハレルナラバ、日本政府ハ、太平洋ニ於テアメリカカラ軍事的戰爭遂行ノ可能性ヲ排除シ又ハ、困難ニスルタメ、シンガポールニ豫防的攻撃ヲ考量シテ居ル。

4037B-3

カ、ル行動ノ波及スルトコロ多キ政治的軍事的结果ニ鑑ミ外務大臣ハ日本ハコノ決意ヲ獨逸國政府ト完全ニ一致シテノミナシウルト宣明シタ。ソノ間軍陸ハ戰爭用意ニ必要ナル處置ヲ取リツ、アリ。

III 支那事變ノ終局

外務大臣ハ蔣介石ト極秘密ニ彼ノ接觸ヲツマケテ來タ。蔣ハ支那共産黨軍備ノ増大シツ、アル急激ヲ避ケルタメ日本トノ諒解ヘノ一層ノ用意ヲ示セリト。外務大臣ハ日本ハ汪精衛ノ承認ヲ決定セネバナラナカツタガベルリン會談リ蔣介石トノ秘密交渉ノ有私ナ進展ヲ期待シテ居ル。

III ロシアトノ關係

蔣介石トノ不意ノ諒解ヨリ外務大臣ハロシアトノ交渉ニ於テ立場ノ相當ナル強化ヲ期待シテ居ル。外務大臣ハ、自分ハ大島大使ニコレラノ問題ニ關シシ報告シタガ併シ交渉ノ遂行ハ自ラ行クト言明シタ。外務大臣ハ企圖サレタル旅行ヲ嚴重秘密ニ取扱フコトヲ求メタルソノ出發ノ少シ前ニ東京、ロイマ、ベルリンニテ向文ノコムニニケテ公表スルコトヲ提案シテキル。旅行ノ計畫ニ對スル先方ノ同意が到着次第、ソノ文案ハアトヨリ送ラレルデアラウ。

403713-4

ナサルベキ諸決定ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ、本官ハ本官側
カラモ當地ノ狀勢ニツキ報告シ得且ソチラノ決定
ノ執行ノタメニ個人的指示ヲ受ケルタメ本官ヲ外
務大臣ト同時ニベルリンヘ呼ブコトヲ願ヒマス。

供 述 書

余、W. P. Jo Cumming
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國山岳省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ就リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸信林所在、信林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

ニ 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ直接取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル／伯林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管理ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、白装セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユト・ピー・カミング
(W. P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面直ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官等務取扱
St. Colonel AGD
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Doc. No. 4037 C

EX 565

page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file

Tokyo, 17 February 1941 1.30 S
Arrival: 17 February 1941 10.00

No. 229 of February 17.

Citissima

For the Reichs Minister personally

To telegram No. 59 of 15th yellow

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, to whom I forwarded approval from there to his planned trip, asked me to express to the Reichs Foreign Minister his sincerest thanks for the report which had pleased him very much. He repeated that the time of the departure would depend on the progress of the Thailand-Indo-China negotiations, but would in any case take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulties on account of the excessive demands of Thailand. The Japanese Government is at present working on a proposal of a compromise which through me will be placed at the disposal of the Reichsminister in the next few days with the request to influence the Vichy regime in the direction of acceptance of the proposal through mediation of the Reich Government.

Draft of the press communique about MATSUOKA's trip will follow separately.

OTT

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
136566/

44565
4037e

秘密事項トシテノミ取扱ノコト

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四一年二月十七日 一時三〇分

着 〃 十七日 一〇時〇〇分

二月十七日附第二二九號 大至急

河大巨 親展

黄三九號十五日付電報ニ送シ

松岡外相ニハ計書シタ旅行ニ送シソテラノ同意ヲ
傳達シタルニ、獨外相ニ送シ、彼ニ非常ニ喜バシイ
報告ニ送シ心カラナル謝意ヲ表明スベク私ニ依頼ア
リマシタ。出發期日ハ泰ト印度支那交渉ノ経過ニ依
存スルモ、トモカク本月末ニナランコトヲ繰返シタ
交渉ノ進展ハ泰ノ過大ナル要求ノタメ困難ナキニア
ラズ。日本政府ハ目下妥協案作成中デアリ、ソレヲ
獨外相ニ渡スベク近日中ニ本官手許自由ニ供シ同時
ニヴィンノ政府ニ送シ提案受理ノ意味ヲ獨政府ノ仲
介ニヨリ影響ヲ及ボス事ヲ依頼セント。
松岡外相ニ關スル紙上コムニケノ要略ハ後ヨリ
別報セン。
オツト

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
P. P. Cumming
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル函獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ函獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該函獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング

(W. P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

Ct. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, A.G.D.

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Doc. No. 4037 D

EXHIBIT NO. 520

Teletype to Reich's Foreign Minister

Today

Berlin, 22 February 1941 Secret

(To be presented before OSFIMA's arrival)

The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He briefly developed his viewpoints regarding the future Japanese foreign policy. OSFIMA arranged the three tasks of Japan in East Asia according to their urgency from north to south.

1.)
Russia

OSFIMA emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The latter would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices were to be brought for this. But perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia could be reached without sacrifices and would also be sufficient to relieve Japan in the north.

Speed is required.

2.)
China

OSFIMA deplored that Japan had not settled matters with CHIANG KAI-SHEK long ago. A settlement should now be found. There were two schools at present in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on CHIANG KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING-WEI. OSFIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

3.)
British Possessions in East Asia.

In this connection OSFIMA made military statements concerning which it may be sufficient to mention that OSFIMA considers it necessary to take Hongkong first, which should not be very difficult. Singapore has to be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land.

I expressed doubts to OSFIMA whether the order of the problems, which he had mentioned, fits the demand of the historic hour which would probably never return. OSFIMA replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries.

I suppose that OSFIMA's trend of thought when he visits Fuschl will be within the framework depicted above.

FILE COPIES
RETURN TO ROOM WEISSACKER

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Ex. 570

ベルリン一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月二十二日

今日

獨逸國外務大臣宛電信 秘

(大島到着前ニ提示ノコト)

40372-1

日本大使ハ今日午前本官ヲ訪問シタリシニ、
彼ハ將來ノ日本ノ外交政策ニ關シソノ懸念ヲ短ク開
陳シタリ。大島ハ日本ノ東亞ノ三課題ヲ緊急性ニ從ヒ
北ヨリ南ヘ順次説イタリ。

(1) ロシア

大島ハ日本民衆ニ於ケル本問題ノ感情的側面ヲ強
調シタリ。後者ハロシアトノ協定(不可侵條約)ヲ、
モシソノタメニ眞ノ犠牲ガモタラサレルナラバ、容
認スマイ。併シオソラク犠牲ナシニロシアトノ假條
約ハ達成可能デアリ。又北方ニ日本ノ負擔ヲ除クニ
モ亦充分ナラント。

急速ナルコトガ必要デアルト。

(2) 支那

日本ハ蔣介石ト既ニ久シク解決シナイコトヲ大島
ハ痛嘆シタリ。解決ハ今發見セラルベキデアルト。
今日東京ニ二派アリ、一方ハ直接蔣介石ト和解セン
ト欲シ、他方ハ汪兆銘ヲ優先セシメテ蔣介石ヲ壓迫
セントシ居リト。

大島ハ自ラハムシロ後者ノ處置ニ傾イテ居ル。

Ex 570

4037D-2

(3) 東亞ニ於ケル英國領土

コレニ關シテ大島ハ軍事の詳論ヲ行ツタ。ソノコトニ就イテハ大島ガ先ヅソウ困難デハナイ香港ノ占領ガ必要デアルト考ヘル程多ク言及シナケレバナラナイ。シंगाポールハ大規模ニ海陸両面ヨリ襲撃セネバナラヌト。

本官ハ大島ニ對シ、彼ニ依ツテ述べラレタル問題ノ順序ガ、オソラク再ビ還ラヌ歴史的時間ノ要求ニ適合スルカニツキ疑問ヲ表明シタ。大島ハ答ヘタ。自分ハ東京ニ於テ、幾世紀ニ亘リ日本ノ運命ヲ決定スルデアラウトコロノ機會ハ逸スベカラズトノ觀點ヲ精力的ニ主張シタト。

本官ハ、フツシユル訪問ノ際ノ大島ノ恩惟ノ徑路ハホボ茲ニ敘述セル枠内ヲ達ムデアラウト思フ。

ワイスゼツカー

一三六五七七

電 報 (平 文)

一九四一年 (昭和十六年) 二月二十八日午前一時四十五分特別列車

二月二十八日ノ第一二〇號

暗號 (秘密暗號法)

RAM I 五一 / R

「フシル」昭和十六年二月二十七日

DIPLOMATERMA 東京

部長宛秘密信

全ク個人的ナ御参考ノ爲ニ

大島日本大使ハ二月二十三日余ヲ「フシル」ニ來訪
シタ。討議ハ常ノ如ク特ニ友好的且親密ニ進ンダ。
詳細ハ次ノ通りデアアル。

先ヅ最初ニ私ハ一般政治情勢ヲ回顧シタ。英國トノ
戰爭ガ避ケラレナクナツテカラハ、總統ハ二正面戰
線ノ戰爭ヲ避ケル爲露西亞ト協定ヲ結ブコトニ決シ
タ。結局協定ハ獨逸ノ速カナ勝利ニ關心ヲ有スル日
本ノ利益ニモナルデアアル。日獨同盟ノ成立後ハ更
ニ此ノ協定ヲ發展サセナケレバナラナイ。獨逸ニ取
ツテハ大陸ニ於テハモウ何等ノ軍事問題モナイノデ
アル。獨逸ハ英國ガ大陸ト地中海、ギリシヤ其他如
何ナル地點ニモ一ニ足場ヲ獲得スルコトヲ許サナイ
デアラウ。封鎖、飢饉、不穩ニ對スル英國ノ期待ハ

Ex 571

4037E-1

豊餅ニ歸シタノデアアル。英國ヲシテ勝利ノ見込ナク
 和ヲ請ハネバナラヌコトヲ悟ラネバナラナイ。
 獨逸ハ佛蘭西全土ヲ占領スル氣持ハナイガ、佛領「
 アフリカ」ガ「ドゴール」ノ手中ニ落チナイ様佛蘭
 西國內情勢ノ進展ヲ嚴ニ注視シテ居ルノデアアル。
 佛蘭西ノ力ハ永久ニ破ラレタノデアアル。占領國駐屯
 ハ單ニ警察的機能ヲ果ス爲デアアル。何處モ平穩デア
 ヲツテ、食糧ノ缺乏ハナイ。獨逸ハ自國ニ充分ノ食糧
 ヲ持ツテ居リ、時折原料ノ供給ガ不足シテモ實際的
 ニハ大シタコトハナイ。春ニハ百八十六個ノ第一級
 攻撃師團ヲ含メ二百四十個師團ガ用意サレルデアラ
 ウ。「ルトマニア」「ハンガリー」及ビ「スロバキ
 ア」ハ既ニ三國協定ニ參加シテ居リ、又「ブルガリ
 ア」ノ參加モ間近デアアル。土、勃宣言ハ土耳其ガ「
 パルカン」ニ於ケル軍事的發展及ビ英國ヨリ決定的
 ニ手ヲ引イタコトヲ示シタモノデアアル。獨逸ガ「ギ
 リシャ」ニ干渉スル場合土耳其モ露西亞モ何等ノ行
 動ヲ取ラナイデアテウ。
 「ユーゴーステビア」ノ政治家ハ最近獨逸ヲ訪問シ
 テ平和ノ希望ヲ表明シタノデアアル。「ユーゴースラ
 ビア」ハ早晚我々ノ味方ニ加ハテネバナラナイノデ
 アアル。從ツテ「パルカン」ハ我々ノ手中ニ歸スルノ
 デアル。英國ハ「ギリシャ」ヨリ微退シナケレバナ

ラナクナルデアラウ。伊太利ハ敗北ヲ喫シタ。我々ニ無断デ又貧弱ナ軍備デ「ギリシヤ」ヲ攻撃シタノデアアル。然シ「ギリシヤ」ニ於ケル伊太利ノ戦線ハ現在安定シテモル。北「アフリカ」ニ於ケル「ウエーベル」將軍ノ進出ハタンクニ對スル戦闘ニ充分訓練サレテ居ナイ伊太利軍ノタンクニ對スル恐怖ニ依ルモノト説明出來ル。我々ハ出來レバ事態ノ變化ヲ齎ス爲「リビヤ」ニ部隊ヲ派遣シタ。伊太利國民ハ「ムツソリニ」ノ統卒ノ下ニ團結シテ居リ、我々ハ原料ヲ供給シテ之ニ援助ヲ與ヘテ居ル。我々ハスベイントモ良好ニシテ親密ナ關係ヲ維持シテ居ル。

早晚我々ノ味方ニ公然ト加ハルデアラウガ、今ハ食糧供給ノ困難ノ故ニ躊躇シテ居ルノデアアル。露西亞トノ關係モ良好デアアル。而シテ我國ノ軍備力ニ鑑ミテ我國ニ對シテ何等カノ行動ニ出ルコトニ就テハ用心スルデアラウ。「スターリン」ハ冷静ニシテ賢明ナ政治家デアアル。獨逸ハ東歐ノ事態ハ最大ノ安堵ヲ以テ眺メテ居ルノデアアル。我々ハ望マナイガ、若シ獨蘇ガ敗フコトアレバ獨逸ノ大勝トナリ「ソビエツト」政權ノ終焉ヲ意味スルデアラウ。

對英戰ニ於テハ獨逸ノ爆撃ハ悪天候ニモ拘ラズ甚大ナ損害ヲ與ヘ、英國ノ軍需生産力其他ヲ大イニ減退セシメテ居ルノデアアル。我々ハ米國ガ補給スルヨリ

モ造ニ多クノ爆撃ヲ以テ破壊ヲ繼續シタイト思ツテ
后ル。三月初メヨリ後ハ潜水艦ノ使用ハ數倍ニ増加
スルデアラウ。其ノ曉ニハ我々ハ航空機ト潜水艦ノ
併用ニ依リ英國ニ對シ悉ルベキ打撃ヲ與ヘ得ルデア
ラウ。英國ノ輸入ハ船舶ノ擊沈ニヨツテソノ生活維
持線以下ノ最低限度ニ引下ゲラレ、事態ヲ破滅的ナ
ラシメネバナラナイ。英本土侵入ハ準備サレテ居ル
ガ之ニハ色々ノ要件ガアルノデアアル。「ルーズベル
ト」ハ獨逸ト日本ニ取ツテ最モ恨重ナル敵デアアル。
然シ乍ラ米國ヲ參戰セシメナイコトガ我々ノ爲デア
ル。ソレデモ若シ米國ガ戰爭ニ參加スル様ニナツタ
ラ、米國ハ軍事のニハ戰ヘナイデアラウ。米國ト我
々ノ國トノ間ノ廣大ナ太平洋ガ之ヲ不可能ナラシメル
ノデアアル。實際上ハ唯英國ニ米國ノ航空基地ヲ設ケ
ルダケデアラウ。然シ乍ラ航空戰ニ於テハ我國ハ英
國ニ對シテ戰略的ニ有利ナ地位ヲ占メテ居ルノデア
ル。我國ノ空軍ハ英米聯合ノ航空兵力ニ同等デア
ル。我々ハ常ニ優勢デアアル。操縦士ノ數ハ無限デア
リ、航空機ノ生産可能力モ同様ニ無限デアアル。
莫大ナ資材ハ貯藏サレテ居リ軍需品モ同様デアアル。
生産ハ潜水艦隊、航空艦隊及ビ高射砲ニ集中サレル
デアラウ。

今日我々ハ軍事的ニ、經濟的ニ又政治的ニ勝利ヲ收メテ居ル

ガ我々ハ速カニ戦争ヲ終結シ英國ヲシテ早ク和ヲ請ハシメタイト希望シテ居ルノデアアル。之ニ關聯シテ日本トノ協力ガ重要トナルノデアアル。日本ハ日本自身ノ爲ニモ出來得ル限り早ク攻撃ヲ開始スベキデアアル。英國ノ東亞ニ於ケル中心基地ヲ除去シ、戦争ノミニヨツテ獲得出來ル東亞ニ於ケル地位ヲ日本ガ確保スル爲ニ必要ナル決定的打撃ハ新嘉坡ニ對スル攻撃デアラウ。新嘉坡ノ占領ハ戦争ヲ急速ニ終結シ米國ヲ參戰セシメナイ爲ニ出來得レバ實現スルコトナク、又平和ノ眞只中デ電光的速度デ行ハレナケレバナラナイ。大島大使ハ新嘉坡占領ノ準備ハ五月初メ迄ニ完了スルデアラウト答ヘタ。完全ヲ期スル爲唯ニ對英戰ノミナラズ對米戰ニモ備ヘナケレバナラナイ。日本ノ原料特ニ鐵鋼ノ供給ハ困難デアアル。四萬五千噸ノ艦船建造ハ中止サレ、ソノ代リニ潜水艦、魚雷艇及快速艇ヲ國土防衛ノ爲建造シテ居ルノデアアル。新嘉坡占領ノ時期ハ歐洲ニ於ケル作戰ト調節サレネバナラナイ。攻撃ハ海上ヨリハ餘リニ困難デアアルカラ陸上ヨリ行ハネバナラナイ。香港ト「ヒリッピン」ノ占領モ必要ノ場合ノ爲準備サレテ居ルノデアアル。余ハ「ヒリッピン」ニ對スル計畫ハ後廻シニシテ新嘉坡ノミノ不意打的占領ニ進ム方ガ良イデアラウト

ノ意見ヲ述べタ。占領ニ對スル相應ノ説明ト動機ガ
與ヘラレル場合ニハ米國ハ參戰シナイデアラウ。

急速ナ行動ヲ要スル左ノ三ツノ理由ハ重要デアル。

(一) 新嘉坡ノ占領ハ英帝國ノ核心ニ對スル決定的打撃
ヲ意味スルデアラウ。

(二) 米國ハ末ダ軍備ヲ整ヘ居ラズ、ハワイ以西ニ於テ
其ノ艦隊ニ危險ヲ冒サシメルコトヲ欲シナイデア
ラウ。カラ參戰シナイデアラウ。若シ米國ノ權益ガ
尊重サレルナラバ、參戰ノ威信ニ關スル「ルーズ
ベルト」ノ議論モ排除サレルデアラウ。

若シ參戰スレバ、米國ハ日本ガ「ヒリツピン」ヲ
奪取スルノヲ如何トモ爲シ得ズ眺メテ居ナケレバ
ナラヌデアラウ。

(三) 日本ハ日本自身ノ爲來ルベキ世界新秩序ニ於テ和
平締結ノ際獲得セント希望スル所ノ地位ヲ確保シ
ナケレバナラナイノデアアル。英皇ハ外交々渉ニ依
ツテハ決シテ新嘉坡ヲ手離サズ、寧ロ最後迄戰ヒ
續ケルデアラウ。

大島大使ハ此ノ考ヘ方ニ完全ニ同意シタ。

大使ハ此ノ政策ヲ實現スル爲ニ凡ユル手段ヲ講ズル
コトヲ厭ハナイト言明シタ。

大使ハ日本外務大臣ニ最モ具体的且可能ナ提案ヲ持

ツテ伯林ヲ訪問スル様要請シタト述ベタ。
余ハ大島大使ニ對シ若シ日本外務大臣ガ我々ガ此處
デ凡テノ細目ニ就イテ討議シ得ル様速ニ新嘉坡ヲ攻
撃スル最後の決定ヲ持ツテ來ラレルナラバ結構デア
ルト話シタ。更ニ余ハ凡ユル分身ニ於ケル密接ナル
協力、特ニ通信並ニ新聞ニ關シテ、既ニ伊太利「ハ
ンガリー」「スロバキア」及ビ「ブルガリヤ」トノ
間ニ模範的方法ヲ取極メラレタ如キモノガ戰爭ノ共
同遂行ノ爲必要デアルト説明シタ。大使ハ日本ノ宣
傳強化ノ爲我ガ代表者トプログラムヲ作成シタイ意
向デアアル。米國ニ關シテハ余ハ彼等ニ對シテハ卒直
ナ話方ヲ適當ニ使用スベキデアルト云ツタ。米國民
ハ國家社會主義ヲ好マナイガ、他面其ノ子弟ヲ犠牲
ニシタクナイノデ戰爭ニハ反對デアアル。米國民ハ「
ルーズベルト」ト猶太人ノ黒幕ガ理由ナシニ彼等ヲ
戰爭ニ引張り込マウトシテ居ルト本能的ニ感ジテ居
ルノデアアル。夫レ故ニ米國ニ對シテハ明瞭ニシテ強
力ナ、但シ攻勢的ナラザル政策ヲ執ラネバナラナイ
ノデアアル。米國民ハ若シ彼等ガ侵略的野望ヲ抱クナ
ラバ、殆下全世界ヲ包含スル諸國民ノ鐵ノ如キ固キ
結束ガ彼等ニ反抗スルコトヲ知ラナケレバナラナイ。
我々ハ密接ニ協力シテ英國ノ虛聲ノ宣傳ニ對抗シナ

ケレバナラナイ。此ノ爲ニハ主義ニ關スル講演、及
ビ發言ニヨル意見ノ繼續的交換ガ必要デアル。之ニ
關聯シ、余ハ日本ハ和平斡旋ノ用意アルト松岡大臣
ノ最近ノ聲明及ビ米國參戰ノ場合ニ於ケル日本ノ態
度ニ關スルワシントン駐劄野村日本大使ノ聲明ニ言
及シタ。獨逸ハ既ニ大陸ニ於ケル勝利ニ依リ聯合國
ノ運命形成ニ大ナル寄與ヲ爲シタ旨、又將來地理的
要素ノ故ニ日本ハ唯英帝國ノ外面ニ對シ戰フ丈ケデ
アルガ、獨逸ハ戰爭ノ鋒先ヲ支ヘネバナラヌ旨、日
本ハ提供サレタ大ナル機會ヲ擲ミ、究極ノ結果ヲ回
避シテハナラヌ旨余ガ述べタノニ對シ大島大使ハ日
本ハ帝國的地位ヲ維持スル決心ガツイテ居ルト答ヘ
タ。大使ガ余ニ内密話ス所ニ依レバ近衛及ビ松岡モ
彼ト同意見デアリ、新嘉坡ニ對スル早期攻撃ニ贊成
シテ居ル。

次ニ余ハ戰後ニ於テ三國協定諸國ノ直面スル歐洲及
ビ東亞ニ於ケル復興事業ヲ論ジタ。過度ノ中央集權
ハ避ケルベキデアツテ經濟的分野ニ於テハ平等ノ基
礎ニ立ツテ問題ヲ解決シナケレバナラナイ。

獨逸ト伊太利ノ指導下ノ歐洲「アフリカ」勢力圏
 ト日本領導下ノ東亞權益圏ト云フニツノ大キナ權
 益圏ノ間ニ大規模ナ自由通商ノ交換ガ行ハレナケ
 レバナラナイ。日本ハ從前通り西半球ノ獨立諸國
 ト直接貿易ヲ行ヒ貿易協定ヲ結ブコトガ出來、獨
 逸伊太利モ同様ニ中國、タイ、印度支那等日本勢
 力圏内ノ諸國ト之ヲ行フコトガ出來ルノデアラウ。
 双方ノ經濟圏内ニ於テハ第三國ニ先ダツテ特惠ヲ
 與ヘラルベキデアル。「ウォールタート」局長ノ
 仕事ハ貿易協定ノ締結ニ限ラレテキル。新貿易政
 策ノ概要ハ三國協定ノ經濟委員會ニ依ツテ伯林ニ
 於テ協定ニ從ツテ決定セラレルデアラウ。續イテ
 余ハ米國ノ新タナ厚益振ノ理由ニ依リ時局ニ對ス
 ル米國民ノ眼ヲ開カセ出來レバ孤立ニ傾ク様與論
 ニ變化ヲ齎ス爲ノ共同活動ノ必要アルベキコトヲ
 指摘シタ。余ハ此ノ問題ハ明カニ理論的ノモノデ
 アリ、現在ノ處決シテ重大ナモノデハナイト云ツ
 タ。三國協定諸國ニ依ル米國トノ外交關係共同
 絶ハ時局ノ成行ヲ見テ若シ必要ガ起レバ其ノ時考
 慮セララルデアラウ。

× × ×

× × ×

リツベントロツプ

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cunningham ハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國山西省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ叙リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸伯林所在、伯林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ直接取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル伯林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管理ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ陸在官時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

曰余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢圖覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證防ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐

ジー・エツチ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 21 February 1941
Arrived 21 February 1941

10:05 o'clock
20:45 o'clock

No. 250 of 21 February

MOST URGENT

In connection with Telegram No. 241 of 19th with Pol. VIII.

Today the press further occupied itself with the alleged Japanese proposal for peace mediation. Judgment is generally reserved, emphasizing that it was in no way definite that the press reports from London are correctly repeating Butler's declaration in the Lower House. "HOCHI" warns against the danger that Japan's peace gesture would be propagandistically misused by opposing powers to Japan's disadvantage.

The Japanese Government spokesman declared in today's press conference that he could not make more detailed statements regarding the substance of MATSUOKA's answer to EDEN, but that he had the impression that Butler's Lower House declaration had been incorrectly repeated by the press. MATSUOKA's answer to Eden had not contained a concrete proposal for mediation, but had merely, in general phrases, touched upon the fundamental attitude of Japan toward the question of world peace.

Continuing, the spokesman repeated yesterday's MATSUOKA's press-dementi having the following content: "As Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government I have never offered to any nation of the world mediation for the reestablishment of world peace. I answered an inquiry from Eden regarding Japanese mediation activity between Thailand and Indo-China. Although I expressed my opinion regarding the reestablishment of world peace in their answer, I have never sent to any nation a message, the subject of which was Japanese mediation for world peace, as is rumored."

I also refer to the detailed statement of D.N.B., Tokyo No. 602, 603, 604. For obvious reasons I have advised the D.N.B. representative here against detailed reporting for the present.

OTT

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 9 February 1941
Arrived: 9 February 1941

7:50 o'clock
18:00 o'clock

No. 192 of 9 February 1941

MOST URGENT!

SECRET!

Ha. Pol. 538 g

In answer to telegram No. 123 of the 3rd.

The Vice Foreign Minister personally handed to me a memorandum in the following content:

1. Japan is honestly willing to support Germany in the procurement of rubber and other raw materials from the South-East Asian Sphere.
2. The Japanese Government has taken notice of the fact that Germany has concluded a contract for the purchase of over 25,000 tons of raw rubber from Indo-China and prepares the transport of this amount from Indo-China to Dairen.
3. Instruction requested as to what the total amount of raw rubber is, which Germany (aside from Indo-China rubber) still wants from South East Asia this year.
4. As it is to be expected that the export of raw rubber from the Malayan States and the Netherlands Indies to Japan will be made difficult, Japan will only be able to cover its own most necessary requirements with difficulty there. In consideration of this circumstance it will be necessary to reach a compromise between the amount of raw rubber desired by Germany and the amount actually able to be delivered. The negotiations concerning this /are to be made/ exclusively through diplomatic channels, not, however, as has happened several times until now, through military authorities.
5. The Japanese Government requests information as soon as possible as to what raw materials (kind and amount) besides rubber, Germany wishes to obtain from the South East Asian areas still in this year.

The commercial execution of the business will be taken over by Showa TSUSHU (compare Report No. 220 of 2 August 1939 and following /ones/). As representatives of the Hamburg exporters in question, NIGGEMANN, Dairen, shall for the Germans, together with SHOWA undertake the internal winding up. For this purpose I have requested NIGGEMANN by telegram to come here at once. I request that he be given the necessary instructions via the Embassy.

OTT

Berlin, 17 February 1941

to Pol. VIII 560 g

Diplogerma TOKYO

No. 179

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

(Secret Cipher Process)

(Secret Appendix to Secret Matters b)

URGENT!

To telegram No. 175 of 6 February.

I request that you inform the Japanese Government that the German Government welcomes the Japanese intention that Thailand and France reach no political or military agreements whatsoever with a third power, whereby this obligation, as far as it concerns France, was to apply only to Indo-China. I request that you add that the armistice treaty, of course, applies to France with all her possessions, colonies, protectorates, so that we remain interested, if only for this reason, in the further development of affairs in Indo-China and therefore were awaiting current information on affairs in Indo-China.

WEIZSAECKER

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 19 February 1941
Arrived, 19 February 1941

10:30 o'clock
20:15 o'clock

No. 241 of 19 February

MOST URGENT

In addition to telegram No. 235 (with Pol. VIII) of 18.

1. During my visit today, the Foreign Minister at once approached me on /the subject of/ his instruction to the Japanese Ambassador to London, reported yesterday by a preceding telegram, and regarding yesterday's statements by the press chief of the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister declared that Eden, in his recent answer to the Japanese Ambassador to London, had bluntly imputed that Japan, in her mediation action between Thailand and Indo-China, merely aims at the oppression of small nations in the Great East Asia Sphere. He had refused to enter into a discussion with Eden regarding this local Japanese act of mediation, and had preferred to make clear Japan's altruism by the declaration of a general mediation /and/ the willingness to reestablish world peace. Of course, he had left no doubt at this that these applications had sprung solely from his own initiative.

2. The Foreign Minister further reported that he had declared in a secret --- session of the Upper House on the occasion of a discussion on the Tripartite Pact that he was firmly convinced of the victory of the Axis Powers, since he had absolute confidence in the Fuehrer. The effect of these words had been very strong and had even visibly impressed opponents of the Governments.

OTT

EXHIBIT NO. 572

Doc. No. 4037 G

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file.

Fuschl, 27 February 1941
Arrival, 27 February 1941 23.30

R.A.M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

1. Diplogerma Tokyo
2. For Cipher Bureau.

No. 119 of 27.2

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 III)

For the Ambassador personally

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan takes possession of Singapore as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything else from the information telegram dispatched today, at the same time.

RIBBENTROP

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Notes: Transmitted to Tokyo at 23.50 27.2.1941 with No. 232

Cipher Bureau

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EXHIBIT NO. 572

40374

電報 (秘密暗號法)

秘密事項トシテノミ取扱ノコト

フツシユル 一九四一年 (昭和十六年) 二月二十七日

着 一九四一年 (昭和十六年) 二月二十七日

二十三時三十分

R A M 49/R 外務省ベルリン

1、東京獨大使館

2、暗號局宛

第一一九號 二月二十七日

當局長官ニ對シ秘ノ記號 (M B D 36 II)

大使閣下 親展

日本が出來ル限り早クシンガポールヲ奇襲、占領スル様貴下ノ及ブ限りノ手段ヲ以テ努力サレシコトヲ懇願ス。爾余ノコトハ、本日同時ニ發信ノ報告電報ヨリ承知可能ナリ。リベントロツプ

註 東京宛 一九四一年二月二十七日

二十三時五十分 第二三二號ト共ニ回送

暗號局

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ就リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

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三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、由發セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ贈本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真贈本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢同覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ諸原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真贈本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官兼書記長

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Item 9037

1

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9.40 S

Arrival: " " " , 21.55

175
NB. ~~175~~ of Febr. 6

Cito!

Secret. ~~The~~ Vice-Foreign Minister ^{informed} ~~instructed~~ me just now that

~~The~~ Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thai-land by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning ^{settlement} here on Febr. 7 concerning settling of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no military or political agreement with a third power. ~~The~~ Vice-Foreign Minister added that ~~in regard to~~ ~~France~~ ^{obligation} this engagement, as far as it concerns ^{of course,} France, would only apply to Indo-China. He ^{supposes} ~~believes~~ that the Government of the Reich ~~would~~ welcomes the Japanese acti-

on, because it is, in the spirit of the Tri-partite Pact,
^{it is} directed towards ^{eliminating} ~~crippling~~ ^{every} ~~where possible~~ the British-American
 influence in an important area of the Greater East
 Asia Sphere, ^{as much as possible.} The Vice-Foreign Minister requested notification
 of the German Government, ^{Reichs} and ^{also particularly for the reason} specially because
^{that} the French Government might ^{possibly raise objections} by referring to the German-French
 Armistice Agreements. ~~raise objections.~~

The Vice-Foreign Minister will ^{give the same information} ~~make the same report~~
 to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

| 136552 |

4037

ITEM 9

~~Secret~~ cipher Telegram (Secret ~~cipher~~ cipher process) To be kept in locked file

Tokyo, 10 February 1941 01.10
Amval 10 " " 2400

No. 196 of 10.2.41

Most urgent.

For Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

+) at the Reich Foreign Minister's office

++) " " " Appended to Telegram No. 77 of 19th Feb⁺ and with reference to

Tokyo/ Tel. no 146 from here ++)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has just told me with obvious

my delight, that ^{the Emperor,} on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission ~~commented to~~ to accept

~~by MATSUOKA's~~ acceptance of the Reich Foreign Minister's

invitation to (visit) Berlin. He intends, taking ~~the~~ ^{from the other side} agreement to ~~it~~ ^{this} for

granted, to depart after the conclusion of the THAILAND

negotiations about 25 February ^{and} to reach Berlin between 12 &

15 March. He has set aside 12 days in all for the conversations in

Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and Moscow. Consequently

he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in

Europe could be prolonged a few days. The Foreign minister would have to

be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15.

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the

European Division, Ministerial director SAKAMOTO, Director

NAKANISHI, of the South Manchurian Railway Co., ^{to} whom ^{he} knows

him intimately, further, by the Legation Secretaries KASE and

HOKEN, A ~~l~~attache SAIONJI, grandchild of the last

GENRO who died recently, ^{one} a younger officer from the

Army and ^{the} Navy, ~~each~~, as well as two Cipher-operators

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details re:

the most important questions which he would like to discuss in

at Berlin.

1. Attitude of the partners of the Tri. Pact towards America.

1) Diplomatic influence against entry into war

The Foreign Minister is ~~not struggling~~ ^{endeavouring} to prevent America's

entry into the war in the spirit of the pact. To this end he has

instructed Ambassador NOMURA ^{to} dwell most emphatically on

Japan's unconditional loyalty to the pact and her military and

economic might, ^{in talks} with President ROOSEVELT, and point out

the senselessness of an American entry into the war. America

could not ~~delay~~ ^{stop} the defeat of England by entering the war. Rather,

~~It would (rather) be against her own interests~~ ^{by fighting} to fight Germany &

Japan, who alone are able to create an order in Europe and East

Asia necessary even for America in the long run, she would act against her own interest.

2). Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

~~Nevertheless~~, ^{in spite of this,} should America's entry into war appear unavoidable,

the Japanese Government considers a preventative attack against Singapore

to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a

Military

war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political

and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained

that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement

with the REICH. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking

the measures necessary ^{to be ready} ~~for preparation~~ for war.

II

^{Termination}
~~Bringing to an end~~ of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential

sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The latter ^{showed signs of} ~~hinted at~~ greater

readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger

from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister

expects favourable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang

Kai-Shek from the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to
decide to recognize
~~determine to~~ ~~on recognizing~~ WANG-CHING-WEI.

III Relations to Russia.

As the result of a ^{surprise} ~~sudden~~ agreement with ~~R G~~

Chang-Kai-Shek, the Foreign Minister expects an important
strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador

OSHIMA of ~~the~~ questions, but had taken ^{it upon himself to carry} ~~the~~ ~~charge~~ ^{on} of the
negotiations.

The Foreign Minister requested me to treat his
intended journey very confidentially. He proposed to publish

simultaneous communique's in Tokyo, Berlin & Rome, shortly before his
departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as ~~Berlin's~~
approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from the other side.

In view of the ^{importance} ~~significance~~ of the decisions to be made
I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign
Minister to be able to report about the situation here ~~discuss the position~~ from my side too and
to receive personal instructions for the execution ^{of} the ~~decisions~~ decisions
reached there

OTT

/ 136 556-8 /

Item 17, Doc 4037

1

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret cipher process)
Tokyo, 14 Febr. 1941 1.30 S
Arrival: " " 10.00

No. 229 of Febr. 14

Citissime

For the Reich ~~Foreign~~ Minister personally
In regard ~~to~~ telegram No. 59 of Febr. 15th yellow

Foreign Minister MAZUOKA, ^{to} whom I forwarded ~~to~~

^{from there} approval to his planned trip, asked me to express ^{to} the Reich

Foreign Minister his ^{at} sincerest thanks for the report which had

pleased him very much. He repeated that the time of the

departure would depend on the progress of the Thailand -

Indo-China negotiations, but would in any case take

place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded

not without difficulty on account of the excessive demands of Iceland. The Japanese Government is at present working on a proposal of a compromise which ^{through me} will be placed ^{through me} at the ^{at} disposition of the Reichminister in the next few days with the request to influence the Vichy-regime in the ^{direction} spirit of acceptance of the proposal through mediation of the Reichgovernment.

Draft of the press communique about MATSUOKA's trip will follow ~~apart~~ ^{separately}.

OTT

| 186566 |

Item 28 4037

1

Berlin, 22 Feb^{ruary} 1941

today

Teletype

~~Telegram~~ to Reichs Foreign Minister

Secret

(To be presented before OSHIMA's arrival)

The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He briefly developed his viewpoints regarding the future ja-
panese foreign policy. OSHIMA ^{arranged} ~~dealt with~~ the three
tasks of Japan in East Asia according to their urgency
from North to South.

1.)

Russia

OSHIMA ^{emphasized} ~~underlined~~ the emotional side of this question
with the Japanese public. The latter would not admit an
agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacri-

ties were to be brought for this. But perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia without sacrifices would be within reach and ~~even~~ ^{also} sufficient to ~~ease~~ ^{relieve} Japan in the North.

Speed is important

2)

China

OSHIMA regretted that Japan has not long ago settled matters with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. A settlement should now be found. ^{There are} ~~two~~ schools ~~exist~~ at present in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on CHIANG-KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG-CHING-WEI.

OSHIMA himself inclines toward the latter ~~one~~ procedure.

3.) British Possessions in East Asia
 In this connection ~~Herbyson~~ OSHIMA ^{made some} ~~spoke of~~ military ^{statements} ~~issues~~ concerning,

which it may be sufficient to mention that OSHIMA con-
 sidered it necessary to take Hongkong first, which should
 not be very difficult. Singapore must be seized in a ^{grand} ~~bold~~
 style from the sea ~~and~~ from the land.

I expressed doubts to OSHIMA whether the order ^{of} ~~the~~
^{which he had mentioned,}
~~gave~~ the problems, fitted the demands of the historic hour
 which would never return. OSHIMA replied that he had
 energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo
 that one should not let slip by opportunities that would
 determine the fate of Japan for centuries.

When he visits Tuschl

I ^{suppose} believe that OSHIMA's ~~statements~~ ^{train of thought} will ~~follow the~~ ^{be within the} framework, depicted above ~~when he visits~~ ^{course suggested here.}

WEIZÄCKER

| 13 6 5 76 - 77 |

Doc 4037

ITEM 35

Telegram (~~Enclosed~~)
(In the clear)

To be kept in ~~the~~
~~locked~~ file

Special train 28 February 1941 01.45 hours
Arrival 28 " " 03.00 "

No 120 of 28.2

R.A.M - 51/R

ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)

FUSCHL 27 February 1941

+ Marginal note:

Transmitted under No 233 to
Tokyo. Tel. Ktr. 28.2

Diplomata Tokyo +)

9.30. 9.15. 10.20

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information!

The Japanese Ambassador OSHIMA visited me at FUSCHL

on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded ~~openly~~

particularly friendly and intimately. ^{as regards details} In detail, it took the following

course:

To start with, I ~~got~~

first of all made a review of the general political situation:

After war with England had become inevitable, the Führer

decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts.

The agreement also lay in ^{the} ~~Japan's~~ interests (in the long run) which ~~looked~~ ^{is interested in} of Japan,

so the ~~of~~ ^{the} ~~fastest~~ ^{speediest} possible victory for Germany. After the

the conclusion of the German-Japanese ~~letter~~ alliance, the

further development of this / agreement / must follow. For Germany,

there ~~would be~~ ^{are} no more military problems of any kind on the continent.

Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold

anywhere on the continent — in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere.

England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain.

England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of

victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching

developments in France, ~~and~~ was not interested in occupying the whole country, also least

~~so that~~ French Africa should ~~not~~ fall to De GAULLE. France's

might was broken for all time. The occupation of ^{the} garrisoning

the Occupied Countries ^{is} ~~was~~ merely a police ^{function} ~~measure~~. Peace

reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany

herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials

had no practical significance. ^{In spring} ~~At the beginning of the year~~ 240

divisions, including 186 first-class ^{offensive} ~~combat~~ divisions were ready for use.

RUMANIA, HUNGARY and SLOVAKIA had already entered the

Tri-Partite Pact. BULGARIA'S entry was very close at hand.

The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration indicates demonstrates a

definite ~~to~~ Turkish withdrawal from military developments in the BALKANS

and from England. Neither TURKEY nor RUSSIA would take any action in the

event of a German ^{intervention} ~~attack~~ in Greece. Jugo-Slavian statesmen had recently

expressed their desire for peace by their visit to Germany. Jugo-Slavia

must come over to our camp sooner or later. Consequently the Balkans were in

our hands. The English would have to evacuate Greece. ~~The~~

Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without our

knowledge and with ^{poor} ~~limited~~ military preparation. However the

Italian front in Greece was now stable. General WAVELL's advance

in North Africa was to be explained by the Italian fear of tanks among

the Italians, who had not been sufficiently schooled for ^{fight} ~~action~~ against

tanks. We had ^{had} ~~had~~ now sent an ^{organization} ~~commission~~ / Verband / to LIBYA, to

bring about a change ~~which~~ as soon as possible. The Italian people stood

firmly behind the ~~the~~ Duce; we were helping by supplying raw

materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain SPAIN.

Sooner or later she would come over to us openly; ~~although~~ she

still ~~hesitated~~ ^{hesitated} at present because of ^{the} difficulties of her food supply.

Our Russia relations were good. Moreover, ~~it~~ in view

of our military strength, she would beware of taking any action

against us! Germany was winning matters in the East with supreme ease. STALIN ~~was~~ was a cool and clever politician. A

RUSSO-GERMAN conflict, ^{wished} not ~~sought~~ by us - would mean a

gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime

In the war against England our bombs had created

serious ~~great~~ ~~to~~ ~~some~~ destruction, despite bad weather, which was having

a strongly retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to

continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the beginning of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many ~~times~~ times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the LUFTWAFFE and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to ^{a definite} ~~definitely~~ ~~below~~ ~~the~~ ~~minimum~~, ^{below} English subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the situation catastrophic.

~~has~~ Invasion of ~~landings~~ in England was prepared, but depended on various factors. ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany & Japan. However it was in our interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come in to the war despite this, she could not assist militarily. The vast extent of the Oceans lying between us and

America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air-bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategically favourable position vis-a-vis England. We were not only equal to a combination of the British and American air forces but superior every time. The number of pilots was unlimited, likewise of the aircraft production potential. ^{reserves of} giant material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on U-boat fleets, air-fleets and Flak. The war was won to-day, militarily, economically, and politically; we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and force England to ask for peace soon. In this connection co-operation with Japan was important. ~~She~~ In her most personal interests she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be

an attack on SINGAPORE, to eliminate England's key-position

in East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East Asia

which it could only win in war. Occupation
The ~~taking~~ of SINGAPORE must

take place with lightning speed, ^{if at all} ~~as far as possible~~ without a declaration

of war and in the middle of peace, - to contribute to a speedy termination

of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador OSHIMA replied, that preparations for

the ^{occupation} ~~taking~~ of SINGAPORE would be complete ^{by} at the end of May

For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against

England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials,

^{especially} ~~mainly~~ steel & iron, was difficult. Construction of 45,000

ton ships had been suspended & ^{they were building} instead submarines, torpedoes - boats &

speed-boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the
occupation of
~~the~~ Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe.

The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the

sea. The ^{occupation} ~~capture~~ of HONG KONG & the PHILIPPINES ~~is~~

had been provided for in case of need.

I remarked that it would be better to delay the Philippines

project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone.

In case of ~~statement~~ and motivation
For a corresponding explanation ~~and~~ of ~~the~~ ~~reasons~~

occupation; America would stay out the war. ~~There are~~ Three reasons

for ~~dictating~~ speedy action were of importance:

(1) Occupation of Singapore would mean a decisive blow

against the ^{core} ~~base~~ of the British Empire

(2) America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of HAWAII

If American interests were respected, even ROOSEVELT'S agreement re: prestige for entering the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the

war, America would have ~~to~~ ~~to~~ ~~lose~~ ~~helplessly~~, ^{look on powerlessly} how

Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

(3). Japan must secure for herself the position for the coming

New Order in the World that position which she hoped to have at the

conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore

through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last, ~~man~~

Ambassador OSHIMA agreed ^{completely} ~~thoroughly~~ with these sentiments ^{line} ~~this line~~ of

thought.

~~argument~~ He declared himself willing to do everything to ~~put~~

realize this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told ŌSHIMA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister ^{with him} brought ^{of} a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest co-operation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Slovakia + Bulgaria. The Ambassador intends to set up a program with ~~the Germans~~ ^{our representatives} for the intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U. S. A, I ~~should be employed appropriately~~ ^{should be employed appropriately} ~~was a wise~~ ^{them} remarked that blunt speaking ~~was required~~ ^{was required} The U. S. people did

not like National Socialism, but, on the other hand, were against

entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U.S. people felt

instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire-pullers wanted

to ~~bring~~ ^{push pull} them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and

strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued ~~as toward the~~

U.S.A. The U.S. people must know that if they had

aggressive desires, on the front of determined peoples, which

practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must

~~have~~ ^{meet} the English (of misrepresentation) propaganda with the

closest co-operation. For this a continuous exchange of

ideas in systematic speeches and utterances ^{about principles} was necessary. In this

connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's

readiness for peace mediation for peace and the

declaration of the Jap. ambassador in Washington, NOMURA's ~~statement~~

on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To,

my own reference that ~~Germany~~ ^{we} had already ^{made a great} contribution to the

shaping of the fate of the ~~the~~ allied Nations through the

victory on the Continent, ~~and~~ also that in the future, on account of

geographical factors, ~~Germany~~ ^{we} would have to bear the brunt of the

war, while Japan would only have to fight on the periphery of the

British Empire, and that Japan must ~~now~~ seize the

great opportunity being offered her, & must ~~not~~ evade the

fatal consequence — OSHIMA replied that Japan ^{was determined} ~~had decided~~

to maintain her Imperial position. As he confidentially told me,

KONOYE & MATSUOKA thought as he did and were for
an early attack on SINGAPORE.

I then discussed the ^{tasks} ~~responsibilities~~ ^{of} reconstruction
in Europe & East Asia ^{after the war for facing} _{for} (the power of the Tri-Polite Pact).

Over-centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic
sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found

A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take
place between the two great spheres of interest, the European-African
sphere ^{of power under the leadership of} ~~led by~~ Germany & Italy and the East Asia sphere of
interest ^{under the leadership of} ~~led by~~ Japan. Japan could conduct ^{free direct} trade and

conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the

Western Hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany ^{and} Italy

with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power,
such as China, Thailand, Indo-China etc. In both ^{economic} spheres

preference should be given ^{over} against ~~British~~ third powers. Ministerial

Director WOHLTAT'S task was confined to ~~it~~ can be limited to

concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new

trade policy would be determined ^{in Berlin} ~~in~~ according to agreement,

by the the Economic Commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following this up,

I pointed out the ^{possible} ~~essential~~ necessity ^{on the grounds of U.S. impudence} for common action to

open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation and possibly

bring about a change in public opinion in favour of isolation.

^{expressly} I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no

way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with

the U.S. by the partners of the Tri-Partite pact was to be

considered should the occasion arise in the course of ~~the proceedings~~ ^{this action}.

From other individual problems touched upon

↳ special attention is to be paid to ~~individual problems~~

(1) OSHIMA promised to get into contact immediately

with Tokyo about to get things speeded up re: supply of rubber

from Indo-China to Germany. ^{are trying at present} We ~~could~~ try to ^{meet} ~~comply~~ with his ^{available arrangement} ~~request~~.

wish to modify the decision of the Amstercam Commission - whereby

25,000 tons of rubber ^{are to} will be ~~also~~ released ^{to} by the French for supply to

third powers, — so that the rubber will ^{be} placed at the disposal of Japan.

2. On the question of the transfer of patents in the economic
commission, I requested that Japanese patents be put at our disposal

as in return

(3) On ŌSHIMA'S asking, whether we had spoken with the
Russians
RUSSIA about joining the Tri-Partite Pact, I answered in the affirmative.

Russia had expressed her willingness in principle ^{under} with certain
^{preliminary} conditions, among them were
~~relations~~; ~~including~~ Russian interests in FINLAND, creation of

close relations with BULGARIA and the Straits Problem. / MEERESSENCE

PROBLEM / ~~D. D. D. ANELLES~~ Conversations were still pending.

^{So} if there were further developments in the Balkans, they could be

continued as the occasion arose. The Axis guarantee for

RUMANIA was not very sympathetic to ^{do} Russians, however they had

reneged themselves ^{to}
~~to~~ in view of our strong economic interests in the Balkans

particularly for Rumanian petroleum. On his side, ŌSHIMA declared ^{Russia} he was

ready to conclude a pact with Japan, on condition that the North

SAKHA SAKHALIN concessions be returned. Relations were in general good, the Russians were supplying CHIANG KAI SHEK with relatively little and only on payment.

4) With regard to China, OSHIMA declared that there were two courses: ^{the one was} ~~either~~ to strengthen WANG CHING WEI, ^{the other} ~~or to attempt~~ to come to an understanding with CHIANG KAI SHEK. I advised waiting until the German army was again in action before attempting a new understanding with CHIANG KAI SHEK, so that ^{with} ~~under~~ the influence of ^{this} military success, the most comprehensive ^{with Chiang Kai Shek} ~~most~~ consolidation of relations might be achieved. I and I also declared myself ready to strengthen Wang Ching Wei's position, if desired.

5) The Ambassador requested support ~~for the~~ ~~advancing the~~
VICHY govt. to acceptance ^{of the} ~~the~~ Japanese mediation proposals in the
THAILAND - INDO-CHINA conflict. ^{vis à vis the Vichy-Government.}
This wish was fulfilled.

6) Handing over of ŌSHIMA's credentials to the FÜHRER ~~took~~

will take place ^{on} at 28.2. ~~at~~ at the BERGHOF

RIBBENTROP

/ 136587-93

4037 E

Telegram

(In the Clear)

Special train, 28 February 1941	01.45 hours
Arrival	03.00 "

No. 120 of 28.2	R A M - 51/R
Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)	Fuschl 27 February 1941
	Diplogerma Tokyo*)

*)Marginal note:
Transmitted under
No. 233 to Tokyo.
Tel. Ktr. 28.2
9.30. 9.45. 10.20

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information!

The Japanese Ambassador OEHIMA visited me at Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As regards details, it took the following course:

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation. After war with England had become inevitable, the Fuhrer decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run, the agreement also lay in the interests of Japan, which is interested in the speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, the further development of this /agreement/ must follow. For Germany, there are no more military problems of any kind on the continent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching developments in France, was not interested in occupying the whole country, also lest French Africa should fall to De Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time. Garrisoning the Occupied Countries is merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance. In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions, were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Partite Pact. Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand. The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish withdrawal from military developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would take any action in the event of a German intervention in Greece. Jugo-Slavian statesmen had recently expressed their desire for peace by their visit to Germany. Jugoslavia must come over to our camp sooner or later. Consequently the Balkans were in our hands. The English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without our knowledge and with poor military preparation. However the Italian front in Greece was now stable. General WAVEILL's advance in North Africa was to be explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians, who had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against tanks. We had now sent an organization /Verband/ to Libya, to bring about a change there as soon as possible. The Italian people stood firmly behind the DUCE; we were helping by supplying raw materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner or later she would come over to us openly; she hesitated still at present because of the difficulties of her food supply. With Russia relations were good. Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would beware of taking any action against us! STALIN was a cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing matters in the East with supreme ease. A Russo-German conflict - not wished by us - would mean a gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

In the war against England our bombs had created serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was having a strongly retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the beginning of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to a definite minimum, below English subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was prepared, but depended on various factors. ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan. However it was in our interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come in to the war despite this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast extent of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategically ^{very} favourable position vis a vis England. We were not only equal to a combination ~~of~~ ^{at any} the British and American air forces but superior ~~every~~ ^{at any} time. The number of pilots was unlimited, likewise ~~the~~ ^{aircraft} production potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on U-boat fleets, air fleets and flak. The war was won to-day, militarily, economically, and politically; we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and force England to ask for peace soon. In this connection co-operation with Japan was important. In her most personal interests she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be an attack on Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation of Singapore must take place with lightning speed, if at all possible without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace, - to contribute to a speedy termination of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador OSHIMA replied, that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials, especially re: steel and iron, was difficult. Construction of 45,000 ton ships had been suspended and instead they were building submarines, torpedo boats and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the sea. The occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need.

I remarked that it would be better to delay the Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone. In case of ^a corresponding explanation and motivation of the occupation, America would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy action were of importance:

(1) Occupation of Singapore would mean a decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.

(2) America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected, even ROOSEVELT's ^{agreement} ~~agreement~~ re: prestige for entering the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the war, America would have to look on powerlessly, how Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

(3) Japan must secure for herself for the coming New Order in the world that position which she hoped to have at the conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador OSHIMA agreed completely with this line of thought. He declared himself willing to do everything to realize this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told OSHIMA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then

discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest co-operation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already ^{in an ex-} been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria. ^{play} The Ambassador intends to set up a program with our representatives for the ^{manner} intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U. S. A., I remarked that blunt speaking should be employed appropriately vis a vis them. The U. S. people did not like National Socialism, but on the other hand, were against entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U. S. people felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued toward the U. S. A. The U. S. people must know that if they had aggressive desires, an iron front of determined peoples, which practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with the closest co-operation. For this a continuous exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about principles was necessary. In this connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration of the Jap. ambassador in Washington, NOMURA, on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To my reference that we had already made a great contribution to the shaping of the fate of the Allied Nations through the victory on the continent, also that in the future, on account of geographical factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war, while Japan would only have to ~~fight on the~~ ^{fight} periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her, and should not evade the final consequence - OSHIMA replied that Japan was determined to maintain her Imperial position. As he confidentially told me, KONOYE and MATSUOKA thought as he did and were for an early attack on Singapore.

^{facing} I then discussed the tasks of reconstruction in Europe and East Asia after the war (~~at~~ ^{renewed} ~~the~~ ^{the} powers of the Tri-Partite Pact). Over centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the two great spheres of interest, the European-African sphere of power under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the East Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the western hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China etc. In both economic spheres preference should be given over third powers. Ministerial Director WOELTAT's task was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined in Berlin according to agreement, by the Economic commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the grounds of U. S. impudence for common action to open the eyes of the U. S. people to the situation and possibly bring about a change in public opinion in favour of isolation. I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with the U. S. by the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of this action. ■ . . .

* * *

RIBBENTROP

Item 2: Telegram from OTT

TOKYO, 3 Feb. 1941

The director of the Economy Division of the Foreign Ministry told OTT that the Japanese charge d'affaires had telegraphed that ~~Germany~~ ^{he could not confirm the fact that} had already bought 25,000 tons of caoutchouc ~~in Indochina~~ ^{from France}. According to the decision of the armistice commission (14 Jan.) it was decided / to ~~assign~~ ^{assign} / 25,000 tons of caoutchouc ~~to~~ to Europe and Asia, 18,000 tons to France, and 25,000 tons for ~~third~~ ^{third} countries, especially the United States. Japan and Germany must negotiate over the division of the 25,000 for Europe and Asia. ~~Japan also wants to know if France really needs 18,000 tons. Japan cannot understand why 25,000 tons should be sold to these countries, especially the United States.~~

The director requested clarification and speedy information concerning German ~~sales~~ decision upon the purchase of the 25,000 tons of caoutchouc, so that preparations may be made for export from Indochina.

(136543)

Item 3: Telegram in cipher from WIEHL, Berlin,
3 February, 1941, to German Embassy,
Tokyo. in reply to Item 2.

Set of instructions regarding amount and source of
caoutchouc to be purchased from Indo-China, ^{etc.} and
~~regarding means to be taken to export it through~~
~~Japan~~ (136544 - 136549)

Item 4: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 4 Feb, 1941

Japanese Press attacks sharply the announced
Dutch protest against the inclusion ^{of the NEI into} of the economic
sphere of the ^{East Asia} ~~Netherlands East Indies~~ in the MATSUOKA
talks. ~~The Asahi's leading article called the~~
~~High so-called Dutch Government, after the flight to~~
~~England, a mere tool of English politics. England~~
~~and America seek to sabotage Japan's strivings~~
~~for the New Order. Economic co-operation with the~~
~~Netherlands Indies is for Japan a question of~~
~~life or death. Japan must unconditionally go against~~
~~those in control behind the scenes in the Netherlands Indies.~~
The Yomiuri advises breaking off negotiations and taking up matters
with the controlling powers in the Netherlands Indies.

since it is questionable whether the Dutch Minister is authorized /to receive/ the protest. [136550]

Item 5: Telegram from OTT

TOKYO, 4 Feb., 1941

In today's press conference the spokesman said that the Dutch Minister had lodged a protest in behalf of the Dutch Government in London with the Vice Foreign Minister against the inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in the Japanese idea of an East Asia sphere. It was not taken seriously. To the question, whether this disposition indicated non-recognition of all pseudo-governments in London, the spokesman answered that this question had hardly any practical significance to Japan, but only a formal, diplomatic one. ~~The Dutch Minister was merely considered here as a representative of the Netherlands Indies.~~

~~136550~~ 136551

Item 6: Telegram from OTT

Tokyo, 6 Feb., 1941

The Vice Foreign Minister instructed OTT that the Japanese Government ^{intends to obligate} ~~would make~~ ^{to it that no} ~~France and Thailand~~ ^{or made} by a secret agreement to make no military or political arrangements ~~with~~ with a third power [in the negotiations beginning 7 February concerning the boundary disputes between France and Thailand.] The Vice Foreign Minister added that in regard to France this ~~the~~ engagement would apply only to Indochina. He believes that Germany will welcome this action since it is ^{in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, directed towards} ~~towards~~ the direction of a ~~Tri-Partite Pact to removing~~ English and American influence from an important area of the GREATER EAST ASIA sphere. The Vice Minister requested ^{notification of the German government of this fact} ~~Germany's understanding~~ since the French Government, ^{might be able by reference to German-French} ~~on the occasion of the~~ ^{armistice} ~~convocation~~ might be able to make these ~~deliberations~~ sound.

The Vice Minister will communicate ~~immediately~~ ^{with} ~~to~~ the Italian Embassy.

(136552)

6

Item 7: Telegram in cipher from Weizsäcker, Berlin,
17 February, 1941 to Tokyo (German Embassy).

(In reply to preceding item.)

~~Tell Japanese Government~~ Germany welcomes
the Japanese intentions that Thailand and France
will not make any arrangements with a
third power, ~~in connection with which~~ ~~the~~
~~obligation, in relation to France,~~ will be
valid only for Indochina. Please add
that ~~at~~ the armistice convention will of course
be concerned with all France's possessions,
colonies, and protectorates, so that ~~we shall~~ Germany will
"remain interested in the further development
of relations in Indochina," and therefore
await ~~a~~ continuous instructions concerning
matters in Indo-China.

[136553]

Item 8: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 Feb., 1941

The Vice Foreign Minister handed ~~to me~~ ^{OTT} ~~the~~ ^a following memorandum stating that

1. Japan is prepared to support Germany in regard to rubber and other raw materials from the SOUTH EAST ASIATIC sphere and that

2. The Japanese Government ~~knows that Germany~~ ^{has concluded purchase of 25,000 tons of raw rubber from Indochina and is preparing to export of this} ^{the rubber already pur-} ^{chased by Germany} ~~is~~ ^{from} Indochina to Dairen etc

3. ~~Requests a statement how large a total quantity of caoutchouc (aside from Indochina rubber) Germany still desires this year from South-East Asia.~~

4. ~~Since the exportation of caoutchouc from the Malay States and Netherland Indies to Japan is difficult, Japan will be able to take care of only her ^{own} most necessary needs. Therefore, there must be a settlement between the amount desired by Germany and the amount actually deliverable. Negotiations will be carried on exclusively through diplomatic channels, and not, as repeatedly happened before, through the military.~~

8

5. The Japanese Government requests as soon as possible information regarding what raw materials (kind and quantity) besides rubber Germany wishes still to obtain this year from the SOUTHEAST ASIATIC areas.

SHOWA TSUSHU will undertake execution of the commercial side of the business. As representative of the Hamburg importers, NIGGEMAN, Dairen, is to undertake the internal arrangements with SHOWA. I have wired NIGGEMAN to come here immediately. Please provide him with the necessary instruction for the mission.

[136554 - 136555]

Item 9: Telegram from OTT to Foreign Minister, Tokyo, 10 February, 1941.

MATSUOKA told me joyfully ^{with the approval of the Emperor} that upon the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations, he will depart about 25 February and arrive in Berlin between ~~the~~ 12 and 15 March. He plans conferences in Berlin, supplemented by visits to Rome and Moscow lasting about 12 days, and expects to be back in Tokyo

10 April. At the latest he must be back in Tokyo
15 April.

He will be accompanied by Ministerial Director
SAKAMOTO; Director NAKANISHI ^{of the} SOUTH
MANCHURIAN ~~Railway~~ Railway; and also by KASE
and HOGEN, legation secretaries; attaché SAIONJI;
and ~~two~~ two cryptographers.

The foreign minister gave me the following
notes concerning what he would discuss in Berlin:

I Relations of the partners in the Tri-Partite Pact
against America.

1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

To prevent America's entry into war, he has
instructed Ambassador NOMURA to emphasize the
unconditional ~~sincerity~~ ^{faithfulness} of Japan to ~~keep~~ the ~~treaty~~
~~pact~~ ~~alliance~~ and Japan's military and economic
might to Pres. ROOSEVELT, to point out that
American entry into war could not prevent the defeat
of England, that Germany and Japan alone are
capable of constructing in Europe and East Asia
the necessary order, which, in the long run, is
necessary for America, too.

2.) Preventive attack against Singapore

"Nevertheless, should America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese Government considers ~~the~~^a preventive attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the ~~Wehrmacht~~^{armed forces} ~~are taking~~^{should take} the necessary measures, to ~~be ready~~^{be ready prepared} for war." (136557.)

II End of the China Conflict.

The Foreign Minister ~~has continued~~^{gives a short report about} his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. He ~~shows greater readiness to come to an understanding with Japan~~^{in order to escape} ~~in the face of the growing danger from the Chinese communist army.~~ The Foreign Minister ~~promises~~^{expects from his Berlin conference} a favorable progress ~~as in his secret~~ from the Berlin viewpoint in his secret negotiations with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, although Japan had made up its mind for the recognition of WANG CHING WEI.

IV. Relation ^{to} ~~with~~ Russia

As the result of a surprising agreement with CHIANG KAI SHEK the foreign minister expects important strengthening of the position in relations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared that he had ~~instructed~~ ^{informed} Ambassador OSHIMA, ~~to~~ ^{last had} taken upon himself the ~~management~~ ^{carrying on} of the negotiations, ^{upon himself}

~~The Foreign Minister begs that the intended trip be treated confidentially. He proposes that shortly after his departure ~~simultaneously~~ consistent ~~communiqués~~ be published.~~

OTT ~~suggests that he be called to Berlin at the same time~~ ~~appears also to Berlin~~ ^{for} ~~personal instructions concerning the situation~~ ^{in view of the importance of} ~~the decisions which are to be made there~~ ^{in Japan and the decisions made so that he} ~~may be able to make proposals here.~~

[136556 - 136558]

~~[136559 Irrelevant.]~~

Item 10: ~~Memorandum from Weizsäcker to Reich Foreign Minister, Berlin,~~
~~13 February, 1941.~~

~~Ambassador KURUSU, before his departure, regrets that he will not see the Reich Foreign Minister.~~

Memo about KURUSU's final visit 13 Feb 1941

[136559]

Item 11: Telegram from OTT to REICH Foreign Minister personally,
Tokyo, 14 Feb., 1941 reporting that

~~In spite of official security measures MATSUOKA'S~~
~~travel plans have leaked out, so that there is~~
~~danger that a premature announcement of the~~
~~intended visit will appear in the Anglo Saxon~~
~~press.~~ [136560]

Item 12: 136561. Irrelevant.

Item 13: ~~136562~~ Memo to Under State Secretary from
Weizsäcker, Berlin, 15 Feb., 1941

"The Japanese Foreign Minister has ^{recently} expressed
himself ~~on~~ ^{concerning} the meaning of Article Five of the Tri-
Partite Pact, which seems to me to signify that
Japan, according to Article Five, is not sufficiently
covered in case of a RUSSO-JAPANESE conflict.
Inhouse, one might also conclude that, according
to Article Five, Japan would feel no ^{unequivocal} ~~explicit~~
~~obligation~~ to lend aid in case of a RUSSO-
GERMAN conflict. I should appreciate a record

of MATSUOKA'S ~~Observations~~ ^{Statements} and their significance." [136562]

Item 14: Note from KURUSU to RIBBENTROP, Berlin, Thanking him and wishing splendid successes to Germany. KURUSU, ~~before leaving Germany, thanks RIBBENTROP for his kindness and wishes further success to his country.~~ [136563]

Item 15: Telegram to ~~Government leaders~~ ^{OTT} from RIBBENTROP, Berlin, 15 February, 1941 (reply to Item 9), instructing OTT, that Ribbentrop took note of ~~Tell MATSUOKA I am glad he will come to Berlin. I am looking forward with interest to the proposed topics and conversation with interest. He agrees to the fact that OTT should come at the same time. I am agreed that you should~~ [136564]

Item 16: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 15 February, 1941. MATSUOKA'S explanation yesterday in the diet on Russo-Japanese relations: Japan, ^{in concordance} agrees with the basic ideas of the Tri-Partite Pact and ^{is} trying to ~~improve the relations basically~~ ^{clear up individual} questions still left up ~~is the air.~~ ^{in conciliatory} Russia appreciates the uprightness of the Japanese intentions, as witness the negotiations

concerning the fishing and commerce problems.

"When asked what assurance Article V of the Tripartite Pact gave Japan against Russia, the Foreign Minister explained that no secret ^{agreements exist} ~~settlements~~ ~~would take~~ place between partners to the Tri-Partite Agreement." Of course, Japan is to keep a sharp look out on the question of Russia's future behavior. He could not say ~~today~~ that day whether a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact were attainable.

The Foreign Minister further explained the Anti-Comintern Pact would not be cancelled by members of the Tri-Partite Agreement, since neither the Russo-German Non-Agression Pact nor the Tri-Partite Agreement influenced its ideological objective. [136565]

Item 17: Telegram to ^{Ribbentrop} ~~Reichsminister~~ from OTT, TOKYO, 17 Feb., 1941

MATSUOKA said that his trip depended upon the ^{conclusion} ~~expiration~~ of the THAILAND-INDOCHINA negotiations, but would in any event take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulty on account of the excessive demands of THAILAND. The Japanese Government is working on a compromise

which will be placed at the disposition of the REICHSMINISTER in the next few days with the request that the mediation of the German government /be used / to influence VICHY's acceptance of the proposal.

~~Draft of the press communiqué for MATSUOKA's trip follows separately.~~ [136566]

Item 18: Telegram ~~from~~ to REICH Foreign Minister from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin 15 February, 1941. about an

inquiry by

The Italian chargé d'affaires asked me today ~~what the German commitment on the travel plans of the Japanese Foreign Minister was.~~ ^{re:} ~~attitude to MATSUOKA's~~ ~~that we had not yet answered, but~~ that I would forward the question to the REICH Foreign Minister. [136566 A]

Item 19: Telegram from WEIZSÄCKER to German Foreign Minister, Berlin, 17 Feb., 1941.

Ambassador OSHIMA thanks us for his reception ^{in Berlin}. He has not yet expressed any wishes in regard to his first visit.

[136566 B]

Item 20: Memo to German Foreign Minister from Weizsäcker,
 Berlin, 17 Feb., 1941. (see Item 18) informing him
 that Germany agrees to MATSUOKA's travel plans.

~~I told the Italian chargé d'affaires
 today that his question concerning German commitments
 on the Japanese Foreign Minister's itinerary had crossed
 a telegram from the German Foreign Secretary to Tokyo,
 which entrusted Ambassador OTT with communicating
 to MATSUOKA the German ~~assent~~ assent to his itinerary.~~

[136566 C]

Item 21: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT,
 18 February, 1941.

The Director of the European ^{Bureau} ~~Division~~ informed OTT
~~to me~~ ~~asked~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~Ambassador~~ ~~asked~~ ~~Foreign~~
 Minister MATSUOKA ^{about an inquiry by} ~~to~~ ~~Foreign~~
~~Minister~~ MATSUOKA ^{regarding} ~~to~~ ~~an~~ ~~expression~~ of the objectives
 of Japanese policy in the great Asiatic sphere. The
 Ambassador explained that the numerous recent press reports
~~announcements~~ of alleged Japanese expansion plans had
 worried his ~~kept~~ government. ~~by~~ Eden shortly before had
 directed similar questions to the Japanese Ambassador
 in London.

MATSUOKA instructed, ~~to~~ ~~said~~, the Japanese

ambassador in London to express to EDEN the surprise of the Japanese Government at the completely unfounded ^{inquiry.} ~~question~~ that in the first place ~~probably~~ was attributable to the ~~delivery of false information on the part of the British Embassy here.~~ He said the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded to check the further spread of war and aimed at the establishment of world peace. On the other hand, he said that Japan could rightfully demand information ~~of~~ from the British and American governments as to what objectives the British and American measures had in ~~to~~ arming themselves in the Pacific and in the South Sea. This armament had ~~called~~ called forth great unrest ~~in the Japanese~~ when made public in Japan, and there was an increase in the demands that the Japanese Government take immediate countermeasures.

The Foreign Minister ^{called to emphasize} ~~but the strongest~~ ~~impressions~~ ~~be given~~ ^{assuming} a what harm the world would suffer from the continuation of the ^{expansion} ~~broadening~~ of the war. ~~A heavy responsibility~~ ~~rested upon~~ ~~all~~ ~~statesmen~~ ~~today.~~ ^{deceived} He said that ~~for~~ ~~as~~ Japan was concerned ~~he could assert that~~ ^{not} was pursuing ~~no~~ imperialistic objectives and had

no intentions of conquering and oppressing foreign ~~to~~ countries. Japan was ready, he said, at any time to serve as mediator to re-establish world peace.

[136566 D - 136566 E]

Item 22: Pages 88 and 89 (No. 49) of the German Information Service (DNB), Tokyo, 18 February, 1941

At the foreign press conference on Tuesday the spokesman for ~~speaker~~ of the Information ~~Service~~ Bureau, ISHII, made a statement, ~~that~~ which was to be considered as an explanation of the Japanese Government, concerning the strained situation in the Far East created by English and American actions and propaganda. The statement said that various alarming reports had reached Japan which gave the impression that the situation in East Asia had become extremely strained. We (are surprised) to see that some foreign countries with this so-called strained situation and wish to emphasize that, as far as we can see, there is no foundation for the alarming accounts concerning the situation in the Far East. "We wish to

In connection with British-American activities, the press stresses that¹⁹
Japan should lose no time etc.

repeat that the aim of the Tri-Partite Pact is a peaceful one." Therefore, we cannot help cherishing a certain concern, or even serious apprehensions in regard to the war-like preparations of the British and American governments in view of all unforeseen contingencies in the Pacific and in the South Seas. The press reports from English, American and other sources concerning the British and American activity. The fears arising [from this activity] are leading to conception in certain circles that Japan must lose no time in taking the necessary steps to prevent the worst eventualities [from occurring] in these areas. The situation would be materially improved if the American Government could ~~be~~ only be induced to limit her activity to the Western Hemisphere and thus avoid [arousing] unnecessary unrest among the Japanese people. We ~~can~~ absolutely cannot see that an extended war would serve a good purpose. Whatever the motive may be,

Japan offered to mediate, whenever asked to do so
e.g. in the Thai - F.I.C. border dispute.

The present situation demands a highly responsible statesmanship.

In conclusion we want to say clearly that Japan is ready to ready to serve as a mediator or to take other actions, which are suitable, to create normal relations again, not only in Greater Asia, but also elsewhere in the world. The leading powers have a great responsibility in regard to the re-establishment of world peace and civilization. Such responsibility, however, can attain its goal only by means of a wise and boldly conceived statesmanship which is ready to yield to the demands of others and to hear their opinions.

The spokesman, in conclusion, confirmed when questioned that Japan was at any time ready to take mediating action in case a third power should present itself to the Japanese Government. He pointed out the Japanese mediation in the boundary dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China and the

British activities, such as laying of mines around Singapore are cited and the other countries are warned not to provoke Japan.

^{peace} current negotiations in Tokyo. The statement demonstrated Japan's peaceful intentions. To the question of what was meant by "war-like preparations of the English and American governments", the spokesman indicated the fortification of SAMOA, GUAM, etc., and said that it was incomprehensible to the Japanese why the English were undertaking [such] preparations as, for example, the laying of mines around SINGAPORE. It would not be wise for the other countries to provoke Japan.

To another question [ISHII] replied that the Japanese Government of course also hoped for a quick end to the European war. The spokesman, on inquiry, confirmed in conclusion that the British Ambassador CRAIGIE had had an interview with MATSUOKA within the last few days in which the general situation had been discussed. CRAIGIE at that time made no request for peace mediation. [136566F - 136566G]

Item 23 Telegram to German Foreign Minister

from OTT, Tokyo, 19 February re a conference with MATSUOKA, in which he referred to the above statement of the Press Chief.

1. The Foreign Minister spoke to me today when I visited him concerning his previously telegraphed instructions to the Japanese ambassador in London and concerning yesterday's talk by the Press chief of the Japanese government. The foreign minister explained that Eden in his recent reply to the Japanese Ambassador in London had stated in a blunt manner that Japan, in mediating between Thailand and Indo-China, had in mind merely the coercion of the little nations in the Greater East Asiatic sphere. ^(MATSUOKA) He refused to engage in a discussion with Eden concerning Japan's local mediatory action and preferred to clarify Japan's unselfishness by explaining her readiness to mediate in general for the re-establishment of world peace. At the same time he, of course, made it clear that these ~~implications~~ were exclusively a matter of his own initiative.

2. The Foreign Minister ^{informed OTT} communicated further

" that in ^{the} secret session of the Upper House he ~~explained~~ ^{declared} at the occasion of the discussion on the Three Power Pact that he was firmly convinced of the victory of the Axis powers, since he trusted ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the FÜHRER unconditionally. The effect of these words was strong, and ~~viewing~~ ^{viewing} opponents of the Government were visibly ~~influenced~~ ^{impressed}. " [136567]

Item 24: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 21 February, 1941 re: press reaction to

~~The press is further concerned today with the alleged Japanese offer of peace mediation. Judgment is in general reserved in connection with which emphasis is placed on the fact that it has by no means been confirmed that the London press announcements of Butler's declarations were rendered correctly. The HOCHI press warns of the danger that the Japanese peace gesture may be propagandistically abused by the opposing powers to the detriment of Japan.~~

A spokesman for the Japanese government explained at today's press conference that he could make no more definite a statement concerning MATSUOKA's reply to Eden, but he had the impression Butler's declaration in the Lower House had been falsely rendered by the press. He said that MATSUOKA's answer ^{to Eden} contained no concrete offer to mediate, but merely mentioned in general terms Japan's basic interest in the question of world peace.

In connection with this, the spokesman repeated the following as the contents of MATSUOKA's denial in the press yesterday: "As Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government I have never made an offer to any nation in the world to intervene for the re-establishment of world peace. I answered Eden's inquiry concerning Japanese mediating activity between Thailand and Indo-China. Although I expressed in this reply my view respecting the re-establishment of world peace, I at no time forwarded ~~a message~~ to any nation whatsoever a message which

had as its object Japanese mediation for world peace, as rumor has it."

[136569]

Item 25 Telegram (to) chargé d'affaires, German Embassy in Rome, from RIBBENTROP,

21 February, 1941, FUSCHEL, informing him of the contents of Item 21 and 23 and citing world reaction as unfavorable to Germany, since a mediation offer would be considered as a sign of weakness in the Axis camp.

The Tokyo Embassy states the following concerning the Japanese declaration of Japan's readiness to mediate for peace:

1. From telegram (Tokyo, No. 235: [See Item 21]

2. From telegram Tokyo, No. 241 [See Item 23]

In this connection I directed today the following telegram to the Tokyo Embassy:

Diplorama Tokyo

For The Ambassador personally

Subject: Telegrams No. 235 and

No. 241 of 18 February and 22 February.

I took great interest in the statement the Japanese foreign minister made to you

in regard to the Japanese move in London. The readiness of Japan to act at any time as a mediator to re-establish world peace, which was expressed in this move, together with ISHII's statements at the press conference in Tokyo, 18 February, produced so strong a reverberation in the world that I request that you take up this subject at the next opportunity with MATSUOKA and pursue the following [with him] in a somewhat milder form:

As was to be expected, English propaganda immediately seized the Japanese utterances and made combinations and commentaries harmful to the Axis powers. The American press came through with announcements under a London date-line that the British Government had received a Japanese offer to mediate for peace. Other announcements declared that the Japanese proposal to mediate for peace had probably been instigated by Berlin. This reverberation indicates

clearly what danger is involved with
any declaration concerning a Japanese
readiness of the Japanese to mediate
for peace. Since Japan is looked upon as
a bona fide member of the Axis powers
since the conclusion of the Tri-Partite
Pact, such utterances on the part of the
Japanese naturally have a different
effect than if they had proceeded from
another power not interested in the war.
They could be all too easily be interpreted
as German or Italian wishes for peace or
utilized as signs of weakness in the
Axis camp. Please explain these to
MATSUOKA in a quite friendly manner,
but at the same time emphasizing that
we view the subject of peace-mediation
as completely impractical.

Wine concerning the course the
interview takes. End of instruction to Tokyo.

Please acquaint ANFUSO verbally with the
contents of the foregoing repeated telegrams and ask him to inform the Duce.

[136570 - 136572]

in English

Item 26: Telegram to German Foreign Minister
from Thomson, Washington, 21 Feb., 1941

re: statements by NOMURA re: economic expansion, Jap-US relations etc.
also re: Japan's obligation to go to war against U.S. if U.S. goes to war against Germany.

Ambassador described Japan's aims as peaceful and directed at economic ends. "Japan will expand to the south peacefully and economically under the present economic block system. Japan can no longer get goods from far places. Naturally she has to get them nearby." In this connection he mentioned oil particularly, but said that Japan had no intention of seizing territories, but when pressed, he added, "I cannot say with absolute definiteness whether Japan will have to resort to force to secure these necessities."

... Question: Can there be any commercial equality in Asia in view of Japan's ~~own~~ program? Answer: I believe that eventually when peace and normal conditions are restored in China, it will be quite possible to restore normal policies and guarantees to USA commerce. Of course at present there are military controls. Without these controls it would be impossible to carry out our operations. It is inevitable that there will be certain cases of impairing third power interests, but this is merely

temporary. Question: Do you think Japan will have to expand her territory some more in order to establish this new order? Answer: No.

Regarding current activities in Indo-China and Thailand, he said: "Indo-China and Thailand have special reference to China war. The main object of Japan there is economic and exchange of goods." He explained that his country is interested chiefly in making sure that no war supplies get into China, Indochina, or Thailand.

Question: Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against USA, if USA goes to war against Germany?

Answer: "That is a question of treaty interpretation. I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously.

[136573 - 136574]

Item 27: Press communiqué, from German Foreign Minister, Berlin, 23 Feb., 1941

RIBBENTROP today received the initial visit of the newly appointed Imperial Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi OSHIMA.

[136575]

Item 28: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from
Weizsäcker, Berlin, 22 February, 1941.

(to be delivered before OSHIMA's ~~visit~~ ^{arrival})

"The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He developed his view-points on the future Japanese foreign policy. OSHIMA arranged the three East Asiatic ~~tasks~~ problems of Japan ~~according to~~ in order of urgency from north to ~~the~~ south.

1. Russia.

OSHIMA emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The public would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices ~~had to be made~~ were involved in it. Perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia, not involving sacrifice, would be within reach and even sufficient to ease Japan in the north. *Speed is important*

2. China.

OSHIMA complains ^{that} because Japan has not long ago settled matters with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. A settlement should now be found.
~~[136576-136577]~~

There are two schools /of thought/ in Tokyo today, one which would agree directly with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, the other which would ~~exact~~ put pressure on CHIANG KAI SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING WEI.

OSHIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

3. British Possessions in East Asia

Hereupon OSHIMA spoke of military matters concerning which it may be sufficient to mention ^{that} OSHIMA considers it necessary to take HONGKONG first ~~and~~, which should not be very difficult. /He said that/ SINGAPORE must be seized in a bold style from the sea and from the land. ^{*} [136577]

I expressed my doubts to OSHIMA whether the order he gave the problems fitted the demands of the historic hour which would never return. OSHIMA replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip ^{by} opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries... ⁾⁾ [136576 + 136577]

Item 29: Telegram ~~from~~ to German Minister from
 Bismarck, Rome, 23 February 1941
 Relative to telegraphic ~~release~~ ^{release} 388 (22 Feb.)
 and telegraphic ~~information~~ report 400 (22 Feb.).

ANFUSO told Bismarck that DUCE
 took cognizance of telegram 388 of 22 February
 (Item 25) and instructed the Italian Ambassador
 in TOKYO to undertake with MATSUOKA
 a step similar to OTT's. Anfuso gave
 Bismarck the following brief of the instruction
 Duce imparted to the Italian ambassador
 in Tokyo.

Telegram directed to the Royal
 Ambassador in TOKYO, 23 Feb., 1941.

MATSUOKA himself saw fit to
 correct and deny his remarks to Eden
 concerning a readiness for peace mediations.

The German Foreign Ministry instructed
 its Ambassador in Tokyo to point out to
 MATSUOKA that that sort of statement on the
 part of Japan could easily be interpreted as
 a sign of weakness in the Axis camp.

To be in agreement with your German

colleague, you should also try to speak to MATSUOKA in the same vein without letting your conversation give the impression that the move was arranged beforehand between Germany and us.

You can also add that the readiness for mediation expressed by MATSUOKA has again aroused the North American intransigent reaction instead of curbing it. Proof of this is the statement SUMNER WELLES read to the press day before yesterday which was regarded by the Anglo-Saxon press as notice of the firm intention of the United States not to desist from their present anti-Japanese policy and not to withdraw from the Pacific Ocean.

Mussolini

End of the Italian instruction to Tokyo.

[136578 - 136579]

Item 30: Telegram from WIEHL, dated 22 February 1941, Berlin, to the German Foreign Minister for his instruction in the impending interview with Ambassador OSHIMA, dealing with:

I Economic Negotiations

At Japanese request a German delegation under ~~Privy Councillor~~ WOHLTHAT is going to Tokyo in a few weeks for economic negotiations... concerning a settlement for the exchange of goods. The Japanese have expressed a desire for reciprocal deliveries to the extent of 150,000,000 yen each. In connection with this ~~the Japanese~~ ^{The Japanese} expressed the desire for the cession of patents, designs and other technical support, chiefly in the ~~economic~~ ^{of war economy} defense sphere, in payment for which they requested ^{first} a credit of 100,000,000 yen, although the value of the patents, etc., would represent at least several hundred million yen. These requests for patents, etc., according to ~~the~~ German Foreign Minister's decision, are to be handled not through WOHLTHAT'S delegation in Tokyo, but through the commission of the Three Power Pact in Berlin,

namely ~~and~~ by the Economic Commission. It is recommended that you mention to OSHIMA in connection with the Japanese return service something about the ending of Japanese patents and, above all, Japanese aid in regard to important raw materials.

II Caoutchouc (Griping a report about the negotiations in this matter.)

~~The most urgent need is caoutchouc from Indo-China. In October we requested the Japanese to help us transport from Indo-China caoutchouc bought from the French. The Japanese hesitated, partly to cause us to buy it through Japan to utilize the meeting for the impending economic negotiations. After the Führer ^{had} ordered the inside departments to force the importation of caoutchouc, DTT renewed the attempt for aid in transporting it at the end of January 1941. MATSUOKA promised emphatically to see to it. At the beginning of February the Japanese were asked concerning the Japanese agents, but no answer has yet come. The first shipment was supposed to have~~

already begun in the middle of February.
[136580-136581]

Item 31: Telegram to Ambassador in Tokyo from Ribbentrop, Fuschl, 24 February, 1941. (re. Item 26)

"In a report from the Ambassador in Washington, ~~Nomura~~ NOMURA, when asked if Japan was obligated to go to war against USA, if USA went ~~was~~ to war against Germany, replied, "That is a question of treaty interpretation. I will refrain from going into it."

"Please speak to the Foreign Minister about the correctness of this statement, since it obviously does not fit the circumstances, since the question of Japan's entry into war, in case of an American declaration of war, is expressly unequivocally clarified ^{by} the wording of the Tri-Partite Pact. . . .) OTT also to suggest that it is better to use clear language toward US. rather than evasive explanations."

~~Do this in an emphatical, friendly manner, but let it be ~~made~~ known that Nomura should ~~be~~ have properly referred simply to the clear wording of the Tri-Partite Pact.~~

/ Say that / We attribute no excessive significance

to the Ambassador's statement and therefore leave it up to the Japanese Government /to decide/ whether a correction is necessary or not. Fundamentally, however, we believe unconditionally that it is better to use clear speech toward America than an evasive explanation.

[136582]

Item 32: Telegram to German Foreign Minister

from OTT, Tokyo, 25 February, 1941, re:

Interview of MATSUOKA by WIEGAND and TOLISCHUS.

1. Spoke to Foreign Minister about alleged interview with TOLISCHUS and about the earlier promise of the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister explained that he had given no interview at all to TOLISCHUS. Rather, he had utilized the presence of KARL VON WIEGAND, on the occasion of a social meeting, to make clear to him and his colleague TOLISCHUS the unconditional faith Japan had to keep the Tri-Partite Alliance. This impressed Wiegand, and produced a corresponding news article in the Hearst press.

The Foreign Minister censored a draft telegram in which TOLISCHUS

called the conversation and interview and forbade him to wire it to his paper.

II. The Foreign Minister also promised to work to the end that TOLISCHUS leave Japan as soon as possible, before he knew that the "New York Times" had dispatched him to Japan not on a study trip, but as a permanent representative. Foreign Ministry believes they cannot protest against this use of TOLISCHUS, since in this case countermeasures against Japanese press representatives in the U.S.A. would be unavoidable.

But the Foreign Minister promised to do all possible to prevent TOLISCHUS from writing at the same time for the LONDON TIMES, after I had told him that rumor to that effect.

(136583 - 136584)

Item 33: Telegram from OTT, dated Tokyo, 27 Feb., 1941.

Instructions in Item 31 were carried out.

The Foreign Minister dictated in OTT's presence telegraphic instructions to NOMURA in which he was asked to report the exact words of his remarks at the press conference in question. Also reminded Nomura of his instructions to express with unconditional clarity in America Japan's faith in the faithfulness to the Tri-Partite Pact since ~~America's~~ America's entry into war was to be prevented only by firm speech. [136585]

Item 34: ~~Telegram~~ Telegram to Tokyo Embassy from Ribbentrop, Fuschl, 27 Feb., 1941.

"For the Ambassador personally.

I ask you (with all the means at your command) ~~command~~ to work to the end that Japan take possession of SINGAPORE as soon as possible by surprise. You will ~~provide yourself with~~ learn ~~anything~~ every thing further from the informative telegram ~~departing~~ dispatched today. Ribbentrop." [136586]

(Frames 136587-93)

Item 4 in IPS Doc. 4038.

Item 35: Identical with ~~Frame No. 136603-8~~

~~(OSHIMA on seizure of Singapore and Philippines)
(Rubbentrop suggests to OSHIMA to attack Singapore without declaration of war. Oshima declares preparations for this will be finished in May. Germany intervenes with France re: Thai-F.I.K. to dispute)~~

Item 36: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 28 February, 1941 re: Japanese mediation offer (see item 21, 23, 25)

1. Emphasized that the German Government regarded peace mediation as completely impractical.

Italian Ambassador did likewise.

2. The Foreign Minister acquainted me yesterday with a note ~~with~~ that Churchill had sent through the Ambassador in London. Note concerns the alleged peace mediation proposal of the Japanese. ~~Churchill~~ Churchill in it declares that England will accept no compromise.

The Foreign Minister instructed the Ambassador to explain that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA would like to explain that there had been no proposal of mediation, that Japan was loyal to the aims and ideals of the Tri-Partite Pact.

(136594-5)

Doc. No. 4037 - Page 12 - SUMMARY Cont'd

Foreign Minister dictated in OTT's presence telegraphic instructions to NOMURA in which he was asked to report the exact words of his remarks at the press conference in question. Also reminded NOMURA of his instructions to express with unconditional clarity in America Japan's faithfulness to the Tri-Partite Pact since America's entry into war was to be prevented only by firm speech. /136585/

Item 34. Telegram to Tokyo Embassy from RIBBENTROP, Fuschl, 27 February 1941.

"For the Ambassador personally.

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan take possession of SINGAPORE as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything further from the informative telegram dispatched today. RIBBENTROP." /136586/

Item 35. /136587-93/ Identical with Item 4 in IPS Doc. 4038. (RIBBENTROP suggests to OSHIMA to attack SINGAPORE without declaration of war. OSHIMA declares preparations for this will be furnished in May. Germany intervenes with France re Thai-F.I.C. dispute.)

Item 36. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 28 February 1941, re Japanese mediation offer. (see Items 21, 23, 25) /136594-5/

Analyst: Lt Leo Traynor

Doc. No. 4037
Page 12

4037

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

Date ~~30 May~~ - 5 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT Photostat

Title and Nature: ~~File~~ File of telegrams between German Foreign Office and Embassy in Tokyo, Rome, and Washington ^{State Sec Japan}

Date: 1 Feb. - 28 Feb. 1941 Original () Copy (v) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (v) Has it been photostated? Yes (v) No () (Item 76 - English)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; KURUSU, Saburo; NOMURA, Kichisaburo.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Item 1: Note from ZAPP to ^{Weisszaeckel} ~~Prot. A.~~, Berlin, 1 February 1941
re: KVRVSU ^{State Minister} MEISSNER ^{audience with} telephoned that the Führer will receive KURUSU on 3 February, before ^{his departure} the ~~ambassador~~ departs. STAMMER will call for the Foreign Minister. Zapp will call for KURUSU. Minister SCHMIDT will be present ~~as interpreter.~~ [136542]

< Insert from following pages >

Analyst: H Leo Traynor

Doc. No.

State Sec'y Japan
Vol 2 h

A u f z e i c h n u n g .

Staatsminister Meissner teilte fernmündlich um 19 Uhr mit, daß der Führer den Japanischen Botschafter K u r u s u am Montag, dem 3. Febr., um 12 Uhr in Abschiedsaudiens empfangen werde. Botschafter Kurusu sei unterrichtet.

Ich habe umgehend Herrn Botschafter Stahmer hiervon verständigt, der es übernommen hat, den Reichsminister des Auswärtigen zu unterrichten. Außerdem habe ich Herrn Botschafter Kurusu davon verständigt, daß ich ihn um 11,45 Uhr zum Empfang abholen werde. Gesandter Schmidt wird als Dolmetscher zugegen sein.

Berlin, den 1. Februar 1941.

gez.: Zapp.

Doppel für
Büro St.S.
J.St.S. Pol.
Dirigent Pol.
Pol.VIII (Japan)
GK. Schubert
LR. Strack
Att. Kempf.

136542

Telegramm
(offen)

Tokio, den 4. Februar 1941 7.30 Uhr
Ankunft: " 4. " " 19.15 "

Nr. 162 vom 4.2.

Japanische Presse angreift schärfstens angekündigten holländischen Protest gegen Einbeziehung Niederländisch-Indiens Ostasien Wirtschaftsraum in Matsuokarede. Asahi ausführt Leitartikel, sogenannte holländische Regierung nach Flucht London lediglich Werkzeug englischer Politik, England Amerika versuchen Japans Bestreben Neuordnung zu sabotieren. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit Niederländisch-Indien für Japan Frage Leben oder Tod. Japan müsse bedingungslos Drahtziehern Niederländisch-Indiens entgegentreten. Überdies fraglich, ob holländischer Minister zum Protest legitimiert. Yomiuri rät Verhandlungen abubrechen und Angelegenheit mit Niederländisch-Indien beherrschenden Mächten aufzunehmen.

Ott

+) durch Holland

- Platznahme in 10 Klassen
Davon sind gegengesen:
- Nr. 1 an (Arch. St.)
 - 2 - R.A.M.
 - 3 - S.S.
 - 4 - (bei A.O.)
 - 5 - B.K.A.M.
 - 6 - Leiter - Am. Pol.
 - 7 - " " Reich
 - 8 - " " Pers.
 - 9 - " " W.
 - 10 - " " Kult.
 - 11 - " " Presse
 - 12 - " " Prot.
 - 13 - " " Inzhl.
 - 14 - Dg. Pol.
 - 15 - Dg. W.
 - 16 - Dg. R.
 - 17 - Dg. Kult.
 - 18 - per. (ab. 11.00.00)
 - 19 - Land. Rat.

Wie ist Nr.

136550

Handwritten signature

Telegramm
(Geh.Ch.V.)

+

Tokio, den 4. Februar 1941 - 7.20 S.
Ankunft: 4. " " - 19.15 Uhr

Nr. 163 vom 4.2.

Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 4.
Nr. 162.

In heutiger Pressekonferenz teilte Sprecher auf Anfrage mit, dass hiesiger holländischer Gesandter bei Vize-aussenminister im Auftrage der holländischen Regierung London gegen Einbeziehung Niederländisch Indiens in ostasiatische Grossraumkonzeption Japans protestiert habe. Vize-aussenminister habe Protest nicht weiter ernst genommen. Auf weitere Fragen, ob diese Haltung Nichtanerkennung holländischer und auch anderer Schein-Regierungen London bedeute, antwortete Sprecher, diese Fragen hätten für Japan nur noch formal-diplomatische, aber kaum noch praktische Bedeutung. Der holländische Gesandte werde hier lediglich als Vertreter Niederländisch Indiens betrachtet.

Ott

- Hauptamt 10 Sach
Davon sind gegang:
- Nr. 1 im Press (Arch. 2)
 - 2 - R A M
 - 3 - M N
 - 4 - 1. Abt. AG
 - 5 - B K A M
 - 6 - Leiter Abt. Pol
 - 7 - " " Reich
 - 8 - " " Pers.
 - 9 - " " W.
 - 10 - " " Kult.
 - 11 - " " Press
 - 12 - " " Prot.
 - 13 - " " D. Arch.
 - 14 - " " Dir. Pol.
 - 15 - " " W.
 - 16 - " " R.
 - 17 - " " Kult.
 - 18 - " " ab. H. Arch.
 - 19 - " " Land. Ref.

136551

St -S. Nr. 112

Berlin, den 13. Februar 1941.

Botschafter K u r u s u hat mir heute seinen Abschiedsbesuch gemacht und mich gebeten, dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister zu übermitteln, wie sehr er bedauert habe, den Herrn Reichsaußenminister nicht mehr anzutreffen.

(gez.) Weizsäcker

Herrn R.A.M.
Protokoll

B

136559

FRANCE - THAILAND
INDOCHINA
BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Doc. No. 4037 A

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in
locked file

Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9.40 S
Arrival: 6 February 1941, 21.55

No.175 of Feb. 6

Cito!

Secret.

Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning here on February 7 concerning settlement of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no political or military agreement with a third power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obligation, as far as it concerns France, would, of course, apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Government of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because, in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed towards eliminating the British-American influence in an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for the reason that the French Government might possibly raise objections by referring to the German-French Armistice Agreements.

The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same information to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

/136552/

(Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in
locked file

Tokyo, 10 February 1941
Arrival, 10 February 1941

01.10
2400

No. 196 of 10.2.41

Most Urgent

For the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

x) at the Reich Foreign Minister's office.

xx) at the Reich Foreign Minister's office.

To Telegram No. 77 of 19th x) and with reference to /Tokyo/ Tel.
No. 146 from here xx)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has just told me with obvious joy that the Emperor, on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission to accept the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to /visit/ Berlin. He intends presuming an agreement to this from the other side to depart after the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about 25 February and to reach Berlin between 12 and 15 March. He has set aside 12 days in all for the conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15.

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the European Division, Ministerial Director, SAKAMOTO, Director NAKANISHI, of the South Manchurian Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by the Legation Secretaries KASE and HOGEN, Attache SAIONJI, grandchild of the last GENRO who died recently, one younger officer from the army and the navy each, as well as two cipher operators.

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details re the most important questions which he would like to discuss in Berlin:

I. Attitude of the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact towards America.

1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

The Foreign Minister is endeavoring to prevent America's entry into the war in the spirit of the pact. To this end he has instructed Ambassador NOMURA to dwell most emphatically on Japan's unconditional loyalty to the pact and her military and economic might /in talks/ with President ROOSEVELT, and point out the senselessness of an American entry into the war. America could not stop the defeat of England by entering

the contrary, by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone
could create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary even
for America in the long run, she would act against her own interest.

2.) Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

Should, in spite of this, America's entry into war appear unavoidable the Japanese Government considers a preventative attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.

II. Termination of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The latter was showing signs of greater readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister expects favorable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang-Kai-Shek from the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to decide to recognize WANG-CHING-WEI.

III. Relations to Russia.

As the result of a surprise agreement with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, the Foreign Minister expects an important strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador OSHIMA of the questions, but had taken it upon himself to carry on the negotiations

the Foreign Minister requests that his intended journey be treated very confidentially. He proposes to publish simultaneous communiques in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, shortly before his departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from there.

In view of the importance of the decisions to be made I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign Minister to be able to report about the situation here from my side and to receive personal instructions for the execution of the decisions reached there.

OTT

/136556-8/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Nur als
Verschlusssache
zu behandeln

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 14. Februar 1941
Ankunft den " " "

10.30 S Uhr
18.45 Uhr

Nr. 214 vom 14.2.

Citissime

+) i RAM

Für Herrn Reichsaussenminister persönlich.
Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 10.Nr.196 +)

Bei aller Geheimhaltung durch amtliche Stellen sind Reisepläne des Aussenministers Matsuoka durchgesickert. Insbesondere beginnen ausländische Pressevertreter sich mit Thema zu beschäftigen, sodass Gefahr verfrühter Ankündigung des beabsichtigten Besuchs in angelsächsischer Presse besteht.

Ott

Handwritten: Material destroyed
für D.H.M.
~~U.S. ...
Botan ...
Lad ...~~
D.H.M.

Handwritten: G. Y.

136560

Handwritten: Zap

Berlin, den 15. Februar 1941.

St.S. No. 122.

Admiral a.D. F ö r s t e r , der Präsident der
Deutsch-Japanischen Gesellschaft, hat mir gesagt, die
Japanische Botschaft werde demnächst auf Mißhelligkeiten
mit dem Professor Scharschmidt (?) zu sprechen kommen.
Sollte dies eintreten, so bitte ich, mich zu unterrichten.

Hiermit

Abteilung Kult.

gez: Weizsäcker.

Durchschlag an/

Herrn U.St.S.Pol.

Herrn Dg. Pol.

136561

Fap

Berlin, den 15. Februar 1941.

St.S. No. 125.

Der J a p a n i s c h e Außenminister hat in diesen Tagen Aeüßerungen über die Bedeutung des Artikels 5 des Dreimächtepakts gemacht, die mir darauf hinauszulaufen scheinen, daß Japan im Falle eines japanisch-russischen Konflikts sich infolge dieses Artikels 5 nicht hinreichend gedeckt vorkommen. Umgekehrt könnte man darauf schließen, daß Japan infolge des Artikels 5 keine unzweideutige Verpflichtung fühle, im Falle eines russisch-deutschen Zusammenstoßes Hilfe zu leisten.

Ich wäre dankbar für eine Aufzeichnung über die Aeüßerungen Matsuoka's und deren Tragweite.

Hiermit

Herrn U.St.S.Pol.

gez: Weizsäcker.

136562

Jan

A b s c h r i f t

Seiner Exzellenz

Herrn Reichsaussenminister v. Ribbentrop

B e r l i n

Bevor ich die deutsche Grenze überschreite, spreche ich Ihnen auf diesem Weg nochmals meinen herzlichsten Dank für alle Freundlichkeiten aus, die Sie mir während meines Aufenthaltes in Deutschland so gütigst erwiesen haben. Ich denke dabei auch des wunderschönen Abschiedsgeschenks, das mir stets ein wertvolles Andenken an Ihre Liebenswürdigkeit bleiben wird. Ich verlasse Deutschland mit den innigsten Wünschen für Ihre und Ihrer verehrten Angehörigen fernere Gesundheit Glück und Wohlergehen, sowie für weitere glänzende Erfolge Ihres grossen Vaterlandes.

K o r u s u

Japanischer Botschafter

Original RAM (Fuschl)

Vert. / St.S.
U.St.S. Pol.

Prot.

[Handwritten signature]

136563

[Handwritten mark]

Telegramm
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Nur als
Verschlusssache
zu behandeln.

Fuschl, den 15. Februar 1941 22.10 Uhr
Ankunft: " 15. " " 22.40 "

Nr.77 v.15.2. (für Tokyo Nr.173 v.15.2.41)

Geheimvermerk für Behördenleiter (M.B.D.36 II).

x) RAM.

Auf Telegramm vom 10. Nr.196. x)

Bitte japanischem Außenminister Matsuoka mitzuteilen, ich freute mich besonders, daß er meiner Einladung nach Berlin Folge leisten werde. Sei mit vorgeschlagenem Reiseplan einverstanden. Von aufgeworfenem Gesprächsthema *folgt in ...* mit Interesse Kenntnis genommen.

xx) Gruppe fehlt.

Ich vorbehalte mir zu diesem, sowie zu Telegramm Nr.146 vom 31. Januar, ausführliche Stellungnahme für nächsten Tage.

Mit Ihrer Mitreise einverstanden.

Ribbentrop

*Vorbereitung
für P.A. 16*

- ~~Chef A O~~
- ~~U.S.S. Pol.~~
- ~~U.S.S. R.~~
- ~~Polish. Leiter~~
- ~~Leiter Bot. Post.~~
- ~~" " W.~~
- ~~" " Kult.~~
- ~~" " Presse~~
- ~~" " Dischid.~~

P.A. 16

136564

Tsch

*Letzte Form
Antrag
19.1.41*

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file

Tokyo, 17 February 1941 1.30 S
Arrival: 17 February 1941 10.00

No. 229 of February 17.

Citissime

For the Reichs Minister personally

To telegram No. 59 of 15th yellow

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, to whom I forwarded approval from there to his planned trip, asked me to express to the Reichs Foreign Minister his sincerest thanks for the report which had pleased him very much. He repeated that the time of the departure would depend on the progress of the Thailand-Indo-China negotiations, but would in any case take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulties on account of the excessive demands of Thailand. The Japanese Government is at present working on a proposal of a compromise which through me will be placed at the disposal of the Reichsminister in the next few days with the request to influence the Vichy regime in the direction of acceptance of the proposal through mediation of the Reich Government.

Draft of the press communique about MATSUOKA's trip will follow separately.

OTT

/136566/

Berlin, den 15. Februar 1941.

St.S. No. 121.

Geheim-Fernschreiben an den Herrn Reichsaußenminister.

Der I t a l i e n i s c h e Geschäftsträger fragte mich heute nach der deutschen Stellungnahme zu dem Reiseplan des japanischen Außenministers.

Ich habe Cosmelli erwidert, wir hätten auf den Vorschlag noch nicht geantwortet. Ich wolle jedoch die Anfrage aus Rom dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister vortragen.

gez: Weizsäcker.

W.v. 17.2.41.

136566A

Zap.

Berlin, den 17. Februar 1941.

Fernschreiben an Reichsaußenminister.

Botschafter Oshima war für den ihm heute am Bahnhof gebrachten Empfang dankbar und läßt dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister seine besten Grüße sagen. Wegen seines Antrittsbesuches hat er bis jetzt noch keine Wünsche ausgesprochen.

Weizsäcker

Durchschlag an:

Protokoll

Botschafter Stahmer

Nr 192 Tr.

136566B

Gas

St.S.Nr. 127.

Berlin, den 17. Februar 1941.

Ich habe dem I t a l i e n i s c h e n
Geschäftsträger heute gesagt, seine Anfrage vom
15.d.M., betreffend die deutsche Stellungnahme
zu dem Reiseplan des japanischen Außenministers
habe sich mit einem Telegramm des Herrn Reichs-
außenministers nach Tokyo gekreuzt. In letzterem
sei Botschafter Ott beauftragt worden, dem Mini-
ster Matsuoka das deutsche Einverständnis mit
seinem Reiseplan mitzuteilen.

Hiermit

den Herrn Reichsaußenminister .

gez. v. Weizsäcker

13 6566C

Japs

Telegramm
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokyo, den 18. Februar 1941 9,50 S Uhr
Ankunft: den 18. Februar 1941 19,40 Uhr

Nr. 235 vom 18.2.

Citissime !
=====

Direktor Europaabteilung mitteilte, daß der britische Botschafter den Außenminister Matsuoka um Äußerung über Ziele japanischer Politik im großasiatischen Raum gebeten habe. Botschafter habe erklärt, daß die zahlreichen Preßmeldungen der jüngsten Zeit über angebliche japanische Expansionspläne seine Regierung ernstlich beschäftigen. Gleiche Anfrage habe Eden kurz vorher an japanischen Botschafter in London gerichtet.

Der Außenminister Matsuoka habe dem japanischen Botschafter in London angewiesen, Eden Befremden der japanischen Regierung über völlig unbegründete Anfrage, die wohl in erster Linie auf falsche Berichterstattung hiesiger britischer Botschaft beruhe, auszusprechen. Dreimächtepakt sei zur Verhinderung Kriegsausweitung geschlossen und habe Ziel Wiederherstellung Weltfriedens. Demgegenüber könne Japan mit größerem Recht von der britischen und amerikanischen Regierung Auskunft verlangen, welche Ziele die britischen und amerikanischen Rüstungsmaßnahmen im Pacific und der Südsee verfolgen. Diese Rüstungen hätten in der japanischen Öffentlichkeit große Beunruhigung hervorgerufen und es mehrten sich die Stimmen, die von der japanischen Regierung sofortige Gegenmaßnahmen verlangten. Der Außenminister habe Eden eindringlichst darauf

Hergestellt in 14 Stück

Davon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1	an	Pol VIII (Arb.St.)
" 2	"	R.A.M.
" 3	"	St.S.
" 4	"	Chef A.O.
" 5	"	B.R.A.M.
" 6	"	Leiter Abt. Pol.
" 7	"	" " Recht
" 8	"	" " Pers.
" 9	"	" " W.
" 10	"	" " Kult.
" 11	"	" " Presse
" 12	"	" " Prot.
" 13	"	" " Dtschl.
" 14	"	Dg. Pol.

Dies ist Nr.

1365660

hinweisen lassen, welche Schäden ganze Welt bei Fortsetzung oder gar Ausweitung Krieges erleidet. Auf allen Staatsmännern laste heute eine schwere Verantwortung. Er habe jedoch noch immer die Hoffnung, daß es ihnen gelingen werde, Krieg auf Basis gerechter Neuordnung bald zu beenden. Was Japan angeht, so könne er versichern, daß es keine imperialistischen Ziele verfolge und nicht daran denke, fremde Länder zu erobern und zu unterdrücken. Im übrigen sei Japan bereit, jederzeit als Vermittler zu wirken, um den Weltfrieden wiederherzustellen.

Zu Ausführungen Pressechefs der japanischen Regierung, die sich in gleichem Gedankengang bewegen, hinweise auf Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro Tokio Nr.26 bis 30.

Da Außenminister heute wegen Reichstagssitzung nicht erreichbar war, werde ich ihn morgen auf Angelegenheit ansprechen und weiteres drahten.

O t t

136566E

Eigentum des Deutschen Nachrichtenbüros (DNB)

Rohtextmaterial - Nur zur streng persönlichen Kenntnisnahme des Empfängers

Unzensuriertes Material

(Ohne redaktionelle Verantwortung)

Nicht zur Veröffentlichung

Nr. 49

18. Februar 1941

Mittags

E i g e n d i e n s t

Blatt - 88 -

T o k i o , 18. Februar (DNB-Vertr. 26-30) - Auf der Auslandspresse-
konferenz am Dienstag gab der Sprecher des Informationsbüros, Gesandter
Ischii, ein Statement, das sich mit der durch englisch-amerikanische
Aktionen und Propaganda geschaffenen gespannten Lage im Fernen Osten
befasst, und das, wie der Sprecher auf Anfrage ausdrücklich betonte,
als eine Erklärung der japanischen Regierung anzusehen ist. Verschiedene
alarmierende Berichte, so heisst es im Statement, haben Japan erreicht,
die den Eindruck erwecken, als ob die Situation in Ostasien äusserst
gespannt geworden sei. Wir sind überrascht zu sehen, dass sich einige
fremde Länder mit dieser angeblichen Spannung in der Fernostlage be-
fassen und wünschen daher nachdrücklichst zu betonen, dass, soweit wir
sehen können, kein Grund für alarmierende Nachrichten über die Lage im
Fernen Osten besteht. Wir wünschen zu wiederholen, dass der Zweck des
Dreierpaktes ein friedlicher ist. Daher können wir nicht umhin, eine
gewisse Besorgnis, wenn nicht schwere Befürchtungen gegenüber den kriegs-
ähnlichen Vorbereitungen der britischen und amerikanischen Regierung zu
hegen, um allen unvorhergesehenen Möglichkeiten im Pazifik und in der
Südsee zu begegnen.

Die Presse berichtet aus englischen, amerikanischen und
anderen Quellen über britische und amerikanischen Aktionen. Die hier-
durch entstandenen schweren Befürchtungen führten in gewissen Kreisen Ja-
pans zu der weiter fortgeschrittenen Auffassung, dass Japan keine Zeit
verlieren dürfe, die notwendigen Schritte zu ergreifen, um den schlimm-
sten Eventualitäten in den Gebieten zu begegnen. Wenn die amerikanische
Regierung nur dazu veranlasst werden könnte, ihre Aktivität auf die west-
liche Hemisphäre zu beschränken und dadurch unnötige Unruhe unter dem
japanischen Volk vermeide, würde die Lage wesentlich gebessert. Wir
können absolut nicht einsehen, dass ein verlängerter Krieg einem guten
Zwecke dient. Was auch immer die Motive sein....ff. auf Blatt 89

136566F

Eigentum des Deutschen Nachrichtenbüros (DNB)

Rehmateriel - Nur zur streng persönlichen Kenntnisnahme des Empfängers

Unzensuriertes Material

(Ohne redaktionelle Verantwortung)

Nicht zur Veröffentlichung

Nr. 49

18. Februar 1941

mittags

E i g e n d i e n s t

Blatt - 89 -

(Fortsetzung von Blatt 88).....sein mögen, die gegenwärtige Situation verlangt eine höchst verantwortliche Staatsführung. Wir vertrauen darauf, dass eine solche Staatsführung weder bei dem britischen Empire noch sonstwo fehlt.

Zum Schluss wollen wir klar herausstellen, dass Japan bereit ist, als Vermittler zu wirken oder sonstige Aktionen zu ergreifen, die geeignet sind, wider normale Verhältnisse zu schaffen, und zwar nicht nur in Grossasien sondern auch sonstwo in der Welt. Die führenden Mächte haben eine grosse Verantwortung hinsichtlich der Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens und der Zivilisation. Solche Verantwortung kann aber nur durch kluge und grosszügige Staatsführung erzielt werden, die bereit ist, auch auf die Forderungen anderer einzugehen und ihre Ansichten zu hören.

Der Sprecher stellte schliesslich auf Anfrage fest, dass die Vermittlung so aufzufassen sei, dass Japan jederzeit zur Vermittlungsbereitschaft bereit sei, falls eine dritte Macht an die japanische Regierung herantreten sollte. Er verwies dabei auf die japanische Vermittlungsbereitschaft im Grenzstreit zwischen Thailand und Französisch-Indochina und auf die gegenwärtigen Tokioter Friedensverhandlungen. Das Statement demonstrierte Japans friedliche Absichten. Auf die Frage, was unter "kriegsähnlichen Vorbereitungen englischer und amerikanischer Regierung" zu verstehen sei, verwies der Sprecher auf die Befestigungen Samoas, Guams usw. und meinte, dass japanischerseits es unverständlich sei, warum die Engländer Vorbereitungen treffen wie z.B. Minenlegung um Singapur. Es sei nicht klug von den anderen Ländern, Japan zu provozieren.

Auf eine weitere Frage wies Ischii daraufhin, dass die japanische Regierung selbstverständlich auch eine baldige Beendigung des Europakrieges wünsche. Der Sprecher bestätigte schliesslich noch auf Anfrage, dass der britische Botschafter Craigie in den letzten Tagen eine Unterredung mit Matsuoka hatte, wobei die allgemein Lage berührt wurde. Die Bitte um eine Friedensvermittlung sei dabei von Seiten Craigies nicht ausgesprochen worden.

136566 G

トクシロ通信社(DONB)一所有

材料一学級者個人に送るに限り

検閲ヲ行ハズ材料 公用用ニ非ズ

(編輯者トモ限ナシ)

昭和十一年(昭和十一年)二月十日付

第四十九号

独白一サーヴァイス

東京 二月十日 (DONB社) (01110)

火曜日一外国新聞会是ニ於テ情報局ノポーラニシテ在リ

ハ聲明ヲ行フコトガ此ノハ英米一行政ト同傳ニシテ在リ

極東ニ於テニ野張シテ情報ヲ取リ扱フニ在リ

カ所何トシテハキリト強海ニ在リ日本政府一聲明一

サレ可キモ一ステートメントニ由ル。東亞ニ於テニ情報カ非常

ニ野張シタモ一タリト呼ビ送スルニ在リ

情報ガ日本ニ在リ。我々ハニニ一外国ガ極東ノ情報ニ

ニ一野張ナルモ一田邊ノ一外ニ在リ

ニカ目入ニ出ル限リ。極東ニ於テニ情報ニ在リ

情報ニ在リ。我々ハニニ一野張ナルモ一田邊ノ一外ニ在リ

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リ在リ。我々ハニニ一野張ナルモ一田邊ノ一外ニ在リ

おのちポロニアンデーの目的が達成せられたら、

スポーラスマンの目的が達成せられたら、仲介したるハ、若しモカモ

国が日本政府に依頼した場合には、日本は何時モ仲介行動一

用をたかこつと云ふ特理解解サレテモ、モータービークル、

ソ、際、泰国ト佛印ト、同一国境紛争デナシ、日本、仲介行

為、並に現在、東京ニ於て平和交渉ヲ指摘シ、

メ、ト、日本、平和的、甚、因、チ、ホ、ス、モ、ア、リ、ト、何、カ、

府、執、行、ニ、似、テ、進、行、ス、ト、解、サ、レ、テ、モ、ア、リ、ト、何、カ、

対、シ、ス、ポ、ラ、ス、マ、ン、ハ、サ、モ、ア、リ、ト、ア、ム、シ、テ、

故、英、国、が、例、シ、テ、ハ、カ、ポ、ル、に、対、シ、テ、水、電、ヲ、

進、行、サ、シ、テ、キ、リ、カ、日、本、側、ニ、ハ、解、ナ、シ、ト、

日本ニ挑発シ、テ、ハ、カ、一、国、ト、シ、テ、一、國、ト、シ、テ、

更、ニ、他、一、國、ト、シ、テ、ハ、カ、日、本、政、府、ハ、カ、

内、モ、ナ、シ、テ、ハ、カ、一、國、ト、シ、テ、ハ、カ、

ソ、ス、ト、ハ、カ、一、國、ト、シ、テ、ハ、カ、

一、般、情、況、ニ、対、シ、テ、ハ、カ、一、國、ト、シ、テ、ハ、カ、

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 19. Februar 1941 10.30 S Uhr
Ankunft den " " " 20.15 Uhr

Nr. 241 vom 19.2.

Citissime

+) bei Pol VIII

~~X~~ Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 18.Nr.235 +)

1.) Aussenminister ansprach mich bei meinem heutigen Besuch sofort auf seine mit Vortelegramm gemeldete Weisung an japanischen Botschafter London und gestrige Ausführungen Pressechefs der japanischen Regierung. Aussenminister erklärte, Eden habe in seiner kürzlichen Rückantwort an japanischen Botschafter London in plumper Weise unterstellt, dass Japan bei seiner Vermittlungsaktion zwischen Thailand und Indochina lediglich auf Vergewaltigung kleiner Nationen des grossasiatischen Raumes ausgeht. Er habe es abgelehnt, sich mit Eden auf eine Auseinandersetzung über diese örtliche japanische Vermittlungsaktion einzulassen und vorgezogen, die Selbstlosigkeit Japans durch die Erklärung einer allgemeinen Vermittlung die Bereitschaft für Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens klarzustellen. Dabei habe er selbstverständlich keinen Zweifel gelassen, dass diese Erweiterungen ausschliesslich seiner eigenen Initiative entspringen.

2.) Aussenminister teilte weiterhin mit, er habe in Geheimsitzung Oberhauses bei Aussprache über Dreimächtepakt erklärt, dass er vom Sieg der Achsenmächte fest überzeugt sei, da er unbedingt auf den Führer vertraue. Wirkung dieser Worte sei sehr stark gewesen und habe selbst Gegner der Regierung sichtlich beeindruckt.

Ott

- Manuskript in 16 Stück
Davon sind gegangenen:
- Nr. 1 an Pol VIII (Arch. St.)
 - 2 . R.A.M.
 - 3 . S.S.
 - 4 . Chef A.G.
 - 5 . R.R. & M.
 - 6 . Leiter Abt. Pol.
 - 7 . " " Recht
 - 8 . " " Pers.
 - 9 . " " W.
 - 10 . " " Kult.
 - 11 . " " Press.
 - 12 . " " Prot.
 - 13 . " " Dir. Abt.
 - 14 . Dg. Pol.
 - 15 . pers. Stab (Hofrat)
 - 16 . Land. Ref.

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 21. Februar 1941 10.05 Uhr s

Ankunft: 21. " " 20.45 "

Nr. 250 vom 21.2.

Citissime !

Im Anschluß an Telegramm vom 19. Nr. 241 +)

+) bei Pol.VIII

Presse beschäftigt sich heute weiter mit angeblichem japanischen Angebot Friedensvermittlung. Beurteilung im allgemeinen zurückhaltend, wobei betont wird, es feststehe keineswegs, daß Londoner Pressemeldungen Erklärungen Butlers im Unterhaus richtig wiedergeben. "Hochi" warnt vor Gefahr, daß japanische Friedensgeste von gegnerischen Mächten zum Schaden Japans propagandistisch mißbraucht werde.

Sprecher japanischer Regierung erklärte in heutiger Pressekonferenz, er könne zu Inhalt Antwort Matsuokas an Eden keine näheren Angaben machen, habe jedoch Eindruck, daß Unterhauserklärung Butlers von Presse falsch wiedergegeben. Matsuokas Antwort an Eden habe kein konkretes Vermittlungsangebot enthalten, sondern lediglich in allgemeinen Wendungen grundsätzliche Einstellung Japans zur Frage des Weltfriedens berührt.

Anschließend wiedergab Sprecher gestriges Presse-dementi Matsuokas folgenden Inhalts: "Als Außenminister japanischer Regierung habe ich niemals irgendeiner Nation der Welt Vermittlung Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens angeboten. Ich antwortete auf eine Anfrage Edens betreffend japanische Vermittlungstätigkeit zwischen Thailand und Indochina. Obgleich ich in dieser Antwort meine Ansicht bezüglich Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens zum Ausdruck brachte, habe ich niemals irgendeiner Nation eine Botschaft übersandt, die eine japanische Vermittlung des Weltfriedens zum Gegenstand hatte, wie gerüchtweise verlautet."

Hinweise auch auf ausführliche Darstellung D.N.B.-Tokio Nr. 602, 603, 604. Hatte hiesigen D.N.B.-Vertreter aus naheliegenden Gründen zunächst von ausführlicher Berichterstattung abgeraten.

Beregestellt in 13 St.
Davon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1	an	Pol.VIII (Arb.St.)
2	"	R.A.M.
3	"	St.S.
4	"	B.R.A.M.
5	"	LeiterApt. Pol.
6	"	Recht
7	"	Pers.
8	"	W.
9	"	Kult.
10	"	Presse
11	"	Prot.
12	"	Dtschl.
13	"	Dg. Pol.

Dies ist Nr.

Ott

136569

Telegramm

(Offen)

Verechluessen

zu behandeln

Sonderzug, den 21. Februar 1941 23.00 Uhr
Ankunft, den 21. Februar 1941 23.40 Uhr

Fuschl, den 21. Februar 1941 Nr. 83 (RAM Nr. 14 Ang. 2)
Diplogerma Rom F Nr. 388 G-Schreiber

Randvermerk:

Unter Nr. 388 nach
Rom weitergeleitet.

Tel.Ktr. 22.2.41

Für Geschäftsträger persönlich.

Auf Drahtbericht Nr. 363 vom 20. Februar.

Zur Angelegenheit der japanischen Erklärung
über eine Bereitschaft Japans zur Friedensvermittlung
hat die Botschaft Tokio die beiden nachstehenden
Drahtberichte erstattet:

1.) , , aus Telegramm Tokio Nr. 235:

Direktor Europaabteilung mitteilte, dass der
britische Botschafter den Aussenminister Matsuoka
um Äusserung über Ziele japanischer Politik im
Grossasiatischen Raum gebeten habe. Botschafter
habe erklärt, dass die zahlreichen Pressemeldungen
der jüngsten Zeit über angebliche japanische Expansionspläne
seine Regierung ernstlich beschäftigen. Gleiche
Anfrage habe Eden kurz vorher an japanischen
Botschafter in London gerichtet.

Der Aussenminister Matsuoka habe den japanischen
Botschafter in London angewiesen, Eden Befremden
der japanischen Regierung über völlig unbegründete
Anfrage, die wohl in erster Linie auf falscher
Berichterstattung hiesiger britischer Botschaft
beruhe, auszusprechen. Dreimächtepakt sei zur
Verhinderung Kriegsausweitung geschlossen und
habe Ziel Wiederherstellung Weltfriedens. Demgegenüber
könne Japan mit grösserem Recht von der britischen
und amerikanischen Regierung Auskunft verlangen,
welche Ziele die britischen und amerikanischen
Rüstungsmassnahmen im Pazific und der Südsee
verfolgen. Diese Rüstungen hätten in der japanischen
Öffentlichkeit grosse Beunruhigung hervorgerufen
und es mehr an sich die Stimmen, die von der
japanischen Regierung sofortige Gegenmassnahmen
verlangten. Der Aussenminister habe Eden eindringlich
darauf hinweisen lassen, welche Schäden ganze

136570

Welt bei Fortsetzung oder gar Ausweitung Krieges erleidet. Auf allen Staatsmännern laste heute eine schwere Verantwortung. Er habe jedoch noch immer die Hoffnung, dass es ihnen gelingen werde, Krieg auf Basis gerechter Neuordnung bald zu beenden. Was Japan anbelangt, so könne er versichern, dass es keine imperialistischen Ziele verfolge und nicht daran denke, fremde Länder zu erobern und zu unterdrücken. Im Übrigen sei Japan bereit, jederzeit als Vermittler zu wirken, um den Weltfrieden wieder herzustellen.

Zu Ausführungen Pressechefs der japanischen Regierung, die sich in gleichem Gedankengang bewegen, hinweise auf Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro Tokio.

2.) Aus Telegramm Tokio Nr. 241:

Aussenminister ansprach mich bei meinem heutigen Besuch sofort auf seine mit Vortelegramm gemeldete Weisung an japanischen Botschafter in London und gestrige Ausführungen Pressechefs der japanischen Regierung. Aussenminister erklärte, Eden habe in seiner kürzlichen Rückantwort an japanischen Botschafter London in plumper Weise unterstellt, dass Japan bei seiner Vermittlungsaktion zwischen Thailand und Indochina lediglich auf Vergewaltigung kleiner Nationen des Grossasiatischen Raumes ausgeht. Er habe es abgelehnt, sich mit Eden auf eine Auseinandersetzung über diese örtliche japanische Vermittlungsaktion einzulassen und vorgezogen, die Selbstlosigkeit Japans durch die Erklärung einer allgemeinen Vermittlung die Bereitschaft für Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens klarzustellen. Dabei habe er selbstverständlich keinen Zweifel gelassen, dass diese Erweiterungen ausschliesslich seiner eigenen Initiative entspringen.

Schluss der Telegramme aus Tokio.

Daraufhin habe ich an die Botschaft Tokio heute folgenden Drahterlass gerichtet:

Diplogerma Tokio.

Für Herrn Botschafter persönlich.

Auf Telegramme Nr. 235 und Nr. 241 vom 18. Februar und vom 22. Februar.

Von der Erklärung, die der japanische Aussenminister Ihnen zu dem japanischen Schritt in London gemacht hat, habe ich mit Interesse Kenntnis genommen. Die bei diesem Schritt zum Ausdruck gebrachte Bereitwilligkeit Japans,

jederzeit als Vermittler zu wirken, um den Weltfrieden wiederherzustellen, hat allerdings zusammen mit den Erklärungen Ishiis auf der Pressekonferenz in Tokio am 18. Februar ein so starkes Echo in der Weltöffentlichkeit gefunden, dass ich Sie bitte, bei nächster Gelegenheit Herrn Matsuoka gegenüber auf dieses Thema nochmals zurückzukommen und in der leichteren Form etwa folgendes auszuführen:

Wie nicht anders zu erwarten gewesen wäre, habe die englische Propaganda die japanischen Äusserungen sofort aufgegriffen, um daran für die Achsenmächte abträgliche Kombinationen und Kommentare zu knüpfen. Die amerikanische Presse habe unter Schlagzeile Londoner Meldungen gebracht, wonach die britische Regierung ein japanisches Angebot zur Friedensvermittlung erhalten habe. Andere Meldungen hätten behauptet, der japanische Friedensvermittlungsvorschlag sei wohl von Berlin angeregt worden. Dieses Echo zeige deutlich, welche Gefahr mit jeder Erklärung über eine japanische Bereitschaft zur Friedensvermittlung verbunden sei. Da Japan seit dem Abschluss des Dreimächtepakts überall als sehr guter Partner der Achsenmächte angesehen werde, wirkten derartige Äusserungen von japanischer Seite natürlich anders, als wenn sie von einer sonstigen, am Kriege nicht beteiligten Macht ausgehen würden. Sie würden vielmehr nur allzu leicht auf deutsche oder italienische Friedenswünsche zurückgeführt und als Zeichen einer Schwäche im Lager der Achsenmächte ausgenutzt. Ich bitte, diese Ausführungen Herrn Matsuoka gegenüber in sehr freundschaftlicher Form zu machen, dabei jedoch zu unterstreichen, dass wir Thema einer Friedensvermittlung als völlig inaktuell ansehen.

Erbitte Drahtbericht über den Verlauf der Unterredung. Schluss der Weisung nach Tokio.

Ich bitte Sie, Anfuso in Beantwortung seiner Anfrage vom 20. Februar von dem Inhalt der vorstehend wiedergegebenen Telegramme mündlich Kenntnis zu geben und ihn zu bitten, den Duce darüber zu informieren.

Ribbentrop

電報 (公送)

特別列車

一九四一年(昭和三十六年)二月二十一日 二三時〇分

到着

一九四一年 二月二十一日 二三時〇分

一九四一年二月二十一日 二三時

AMR (外電) 4月10日 5月

ティンポラリシニ、ローニ、H. カニハルゴ、G. ニーガ、

縁註 カニハルゴ、ローニニ傳ハル。

電報 昭和三十六年二月二十一日

代理大使個人宛。

二月二十一日、電報情報カニハルゴニ送ルコトナリ。

平和仲介ニ対シテ日本が用意スルモノニ付テ、日本ノ声明ニ対シ

東京ノ大使館ハ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。

(一) 東京電報 カニハルゴニ送ル。

改組局長ハ、英大使が松岡外相ニ、大東亞圏ニ於テハ日本ノ

政策ノ目的ニ付テハ、述ビテ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。大使ハ、日本

ノ擴張計画ト稱スルモノニ付テ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。新聞情報ヲ英

政府ハ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。同ニ付テ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。

少シ前ニロンドン駐在ノ日本大使ニ送ルコトナリ。松岡外相ハ、ハルニツ、電報ニ送ルコトナリ。

基すニ違フナク金々根拠ナク其内ニツクテ日本政府が仕^②

誅^①ニシテノロイデーニ対シテ其ノロビトニ日本大使と訓令シタ

ト、三國條約ハ戦争拡大ヲ妨グル爲メ結ビ、ソノ目的ハ世々

平和ノ再建ヲアルトシテ、其ノ日本ハ、其ノ太平洋及ヒ南洋

ヲ行ツテ其ノ軍備処置ガ何ノ目的ヲ追テスルモ、カニソノ情

報ヲ、英米政府カ、ソノ大イ權利ヲ以テオケルニトガ出来シト、

一軍備ハ日本ノ社会ニ大イ不字ヲ呼ビ起シ、日本政府ガ直チ

ニ之ニ対抗スル処置ヲ採ル事ヲ要求スル声ガ、イニク上ルナリ

ナリト、外相ハ、此ノ戦争ノ繼續ハ、更ニソノ拡大ニ際シテ全世界ガ

如何ナリニシテ其ノ事ヲ其ノカトシテ、ソノイデーニ、其ノ事ヲ指摘シタ

ト、総テ一政治家ノ今日ノ責任ガ、ソノ事ナリ、其ノ併シ今ナ

ク、戦争ヲ正シク新秩序ノ基礎トシ、ソノカガテ終ラセシメ、ソノ

政治ガ成メスルニテ、希望シテ、日本ニ對シテハ、其ノ日本

ガ、其ノ帝國主義ノ目的ヲ達スルモ、テ、外國ノ領土ヲ獲

得シ、其ノ所ノ事ヲ、ソノ事ヲ、ソノ事ヲ、ソノ事ヲ、ソノ事ヲ、

日本ハ、何カモセ、世界平和ヲ、再建スル爲メ、件介者トシテ、用

スルニ用キガ、ソノ事。

(二) 東京電報カニ、四一、五、三、リ。

本日、余ノ訪内ニ際シテ、外相ハ直チニ、ソノ事ニ對シテ電報ヲ、報セ、

夕毎一ロンドンを駐在日大使之宛テハ訓令ト日本政府情

報長官ノ取ル一聲明ニツキテ余之話ニカケタ。外相ハイデーが

ロンドンに日本大使之宛テハ返答ヲ日本ハ泰国内印

度支那ト同ノノ仲介行動之際ニテ早之大東亞圏ニ於テハ

民ニ異行ヲ加ヘルニ由リテト執野ナ方法ヲ罪ヲナスリフ

タト。外相ハ「日本」地域ノ仲介行動ニツイテイデーニ討論

スルニテ拒否ス。ムシロ日本一自ニテ即チ一般の仲介ノ聲明

ヲシテ。世界平和ノ再建ニ用事スルニテハ明解スルニテハ

ノヲアルト。ソノ際ハ今論ニ對シテ徹頭徹尾ハ一ニシテ

チャーヴンヲ發スルモテアルニテハハセナカッタ。

東京ヨリ電報終ハリ

「ここ」於テ余ハ東京ノ大使館ニ宛テ。本日ハ一訓令ヲ打電

ス。ロンドンニ東京

大使個人宛。

二月十八日及び「ロンドン」ニ電報ヲニシセラル。及「ロンドン」ニ答フニテ。

日本外相がロンドンに於テ日本ノ処置ニツイテ果シテ如何ニ

聲明シ余ハ興味ヲ以テテ流ニシ。一々別ニ發行スルシム

日本ノ世界平和ノ再建ノメカニ對シテ仲介行動ノ再行ノ

ニ日本ハ善キニテシキヤシクハ「ロンドン」ニ「二月十八日」ニ答フ

新聞會見席上「ロンドン」ニ「二月十八日」ニ答フ。聲明ト共ニ「世界」

強く反響を呼喚起す。この際余は、此一機会に松岡氏に対し
この一語の戻り、特に論子に大体次の通り述べらるるに、
依りて

他一トが期待出来、かかる松岡氏。其の英日通傳に日本一語明く、直
々に取上げ、其の松岡氏に、不利益に、
ルヤシ、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
和伸介、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
告、大なる揚、其の情報、日本一平和伸介、松岡氏が、
この、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
本が平和伸介の用意、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
ト、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
国保約締結、以来、松岡氏に、不利益に、
手、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
戦争の参加、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
有、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
例、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
表、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
非、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
平、この松岡氏に、不利益に、
年、この松岡氏に、不利益に、

会谈ノ又ト過ニシイニ、電報タヒ、

東京宛テ訓令ヲ終ヘリ。

余ハ貴官ノアニフーズニ於テ二月二十日一紙ノ實内ヘリ答ハトシテ、
上ニ再録シタ電報ノ内容ヲ口頭ニ知ラセム。ソリニ一書
相ニソレコワイテ情報ヲ与ヘル事ニ於テ頼ムトテ依頼スル。

リフズニトローゾ

Telegramm (offener Text)

Washington, den 21. Februar 1941

7.45 PM

Ankunft: " 22. " "

9.50 Uhr

Nr. 446 vom 21.2.

Ambassador described Japans aims as peaceful and directed at economic ends " Japan will expand to the south peacefully and economically under the present economic blocksystem. Japan can no longer get goods from far places. Naturally she has to get them nearby" In this connection he mentioned oil particularly, but said, that Japan had no intention of seizing territories, but when pressed, he added I cannot say with absolute definiteness whether Japan will have to resort to force to secure these necessities questioned on japanese american relations he found the " Atmosphere in Washington not quite so good as I expected when I was in Japan. I thought it would not be so bad" Frage: Do you believe there is a danger of war between the U S A and Japan Antwort: Personally I believe, that there should not be war and there will not be war, but of course that is my personal opinion. Frage: Can there be any commercial equality in Asia in view of Japans program. Antwort: I believe that eventually when peace and normal conditions are restored in China, it will be quite possible to restore normal policies and guarantees to USA commerce of course at present there are military controls. Without these controls it would be impossible to carry out our operations. It is inevitable that there will be certain cases of impairing third power interests, but this is merely temporary. Asked if Japan objected to strengthening by USA of Guam and Somoa Nomura replied of course from the japanese side, we dont like to see an air or naval base so near our territory, especially a base of a great power like the USA, but we cannot interfere" Asked if he had any objection to british reinforcements arriving at Singapore he replied, Singapore doesnt concern us it is a british base.

Whether

136573

Tap

- Telegramm in 10 Abschn.
 Davon sind gegangen:
 Nr. 1 an Press (Arch. 22)
 2 - R A M
 3 - S S
 4 - Libel AG
 5 - B R A M
 6 - Lotta Am Pol
 7 - " " Recht
 8 - " " Pers
 9 - " " W.
 10 - " " Kult.
 11 - " " Presse
 12 - " " Prot
 13 - " " Intern.
 14 - De Pol
 15 - " V
 16 - " R
 17 - " Kult
 18 - " " (Hawaii)
 19 - Land Ref

File in Nr. _____

Whether he had brought with him any concrete suggestions for improving relations Nomura replied that " I cannot answer that" Frage: Do you think Japan will have to expand her territory some more in order to establish this new order. Antwort: Ne. Regarding current activities in Indochina and Thailand he said " Indochina and Thailand have special reference to China war the main object of Japan there is economic and exchange of goods" He explained that his country is interested chiefly in making sure, that no war supplies get into China, Indochina or Thailand. Nomura was asked " Will Japan extend her relations with the Axis? Answer: There is a treaty and Japan will stick to it. Frage: If the USA goes to war against Germany would Japan declare war on USA. Antwort: I dont think USA will declare war against Germany so the situation you refer to will not arise . Frage: Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against USA, if USA goes to war against Germany. Antwort: That is a question of treaty interpretation I will refrain from going into it he said cautiously then he volunteered the following " When Japan entered upon the Axis treaty it was her intention to preserve peace her motives were entirely peaceful we wanted to avoid war with USA" Asked for comment on a statement by Undersecretary of State Welles Tuesday that Japan would express her intentions in deeds not words Ambassador said " That remark by Mr. Welles may mean some criticism against Japan or some other country Japan sincerely tries to carry out her words"

Thomsen

Presse-Communiqué

betr.: Empfang des neuen Kaiserlich Japanischen Botschafters

Berlin, den 23. Februar 1941

Der Reichsminister des Auswärtigen von Ribbentrop empfing heute den neuernannten Kaiserlich Japanischen Botschafter, Hiroshi Oshima, zum Antrittsbesuch.

Communiqué vom Reichsaußenminister noch nicht genehmigt.

Verteiler:

**St.S.
U.St.S. Vol
Pol VIII
Frl. Pappritz**

136575

zu Protokoll-Nr. *A 226*

Doc. No. 4037 D

Teletype to Reich's Foreign Minister

Today

Berlin, 22 February 1941 Secret

(To be presented before OSFIMA's arrival)

The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He briefly developed his viewpoints regarding the future Japanese foreign policy. OSFIMA arranged the three tasks of Japan in East Asia according to their urgency from north to south.

1.)

Russia

OSFIMA emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The latter would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices were to be brought for this. But perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia could be reached without sacrifices and would also be sufficient to relieve Japan in the north.

Speed is required.

2.)

China

OSFIMA deplored that Japan had not settled matters with CHIANG KAI-SHEK long ago. A settlement should now be found. There were two schools at present in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on CHIANG KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING-WEI. OSFIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

3.)

British Possessions in East Asia.

In this connection OSFIMA made military statements concerning which it may be sufficient to mention that OSFIMA considers it necessary to take Hongkong first, which should not be very difficult. Singapore has to be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land.

I expressed doubts to OSFIMA whether the order of the problems, which he had mentioned, fits the demand of the historic hour which would probably never return. OSFIMA replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries.

I suppose that OSFIMA's trend of thought when he visits Fuschl will be within the framework depicted above.

WEIZSACKER

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm (Geh, Ch. V.)

Rom, den 23.2.41 16.40 Uhr

Ankunft den 23.2.41 17.15 Uhr

Nr. 403 vom 23.2.41

Cito.

Für Herrn Reichsminister persönlich.

Mit Bezug auf Drahterlass 388 vom 22. Februar
ar und Drahtbericht 400 vom 22. Februar.

Anfuso bat Bismarck heute zu sich, um ihm mitzuteilen, dass der Duce mit grösstem Interesse von dem Inhalt des Drahterlasses 388 vom 22. Februar Kenntnis genommen habe und bäte, dem Herrn Reichsaussenminister seinen Dank für die erschöpfende Information auszusprechen. Der Duce habe daraufhin den italienischen Botschafter in Tokio angewiesen, einen gleichen Schritt wie Botschafter Ott bei Matsuoka zu unternehmen. Anfuso übergab Bismarck nachfolgende Zusammenfassung der dem italienischen Botschafter in Tokio vom Duce erteilten Weisung:

Telegramm gerichtet an den königlichen Botschafter in Tokio unterm 23. Februar 1941.

Die englische und amerikanische Presse haben die von dem dortigen Aussenminister Eden gegenüber geäußerte Bereitschaft zu einer Welt-Friedensvermittlung und der diesbezüglichen Erklärungen Ishi's in einer Weise kommentiert, dass Matsuoka selbst sich zu Richtigstellungen und Dementis in dem von der " Domei " gestern veröffentlichten Interview veranlasst sah.

Das deutsche Aussenministerium hat seinem Botschafter in Tokio Weisung gegeben, bei Matsuoka auf die Angelegenheit zurückzukommen und darauf hinzuweisen, dass derartige Erklärungen seitens Japans, das durch den Dreierpakt mit den Achsenmächten eng verbunden ist, leicht, mit selbstverständlich nachteiligen Folgen, ausgelegt werden können als Ausdruck angeblicher italienischer

italienischer oder deutscher Friedenswünsche oder doch als Anzeichen einer Schwäche der Lage der Achse. Tatsächlich ist es so gekommen.

Im Einklang mit Ihrem deutschen Kollegen suchen auch Sie im gleichen Sinne mit Matsuoka zu reden, in freundschaftlicher Form und Ton und ohne Ihrer Unterhaltung den Charakter eines vorher zwischen Deutschland und uns vereinbarten Schrittes zu geben.

Übrigens können Sie anfügen, dass die von Matsuoka geäußerte Vermittlungsbereitschaft die nordamerikanische intransigente Reaktion wieder angefacht hat anstatt sie niederzuhalten, eben weil sie als ein Zeichen unsicherer Haltung ausgelegt worden ist. Beweis hierfür sind die Erklärungen, die Sumner Welles vorgestern den Journalisten verlesen hat und die von der gesamten angelsächsischen Presse kommentiert worden sind als eine Kundgebung der festen Absicht der Vereinigten Staaten, von der jetzigen antijapanischen Politik nicht Abstand zu nehmen und sich aus dem Pazifischen Ozean nicht zurückzuziehen.

Mussolini.

Schluss der italienischen Weisung

nach Tokio.

Bismarck.

Vermerk: Mit Nr. 637 an Fuschl am
23.2.41 17.40 weitergegeben.

Tel.Ktr.

Verschlußsache
zu behandeln

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Fuschl, den 24. Februar 1941

17.30 Uhr

Ankunft: " 24. " "

18.10 "

R A M Nr. 26/R

Nr. 95 vom 24.2.

An Auswärtig Amt
1.) Diplogerma Tokio
2.) für Chiffrierbüro.

Für Botschafter.

Nach einem Bericht der Botschaft aus Washington, hat auf einer Pressekonferenz Botschafter Nomura auf die Frage, ob Japan verpflichtet sei, den Vereinigten Staaten den Krieg zu erklären, wenn diese Deutschland den Krieg erklären, geantwortet: " das ist eine Frage der Vertragsauslegung, auf die ich nicht eingehen möchte."

Ich bitte Sie, den Aussenminister auf Richtigkeit dieser Äusserung anzusprechen und dabei zum Ausdruck zu bringen, dass die Äusserung offensichtlich nicht dem Sachverhalt entspreche, da die Frage des Kriegseintritts Japans, im Falle einer amerikanischen Kriegserklärung eindeutig durch den Wortlaut des Dreimächtepakts geklärt ist.

Ich bitte Sie, die Unterhaltung in betonter freundschaftlicher Form zu führen, dabei aber durchblicken zu lassen, dass unserer Ansicht nach, Nomura zweckmässigerweise einfach auf den klaren Wortlaut des Dreimächtepakts hätte verweisen sollen.

Wir legten im übrigen der Äusserung des Botschafters keine übertriebene Bedeutung bei, und überliessen es daher der japanischen Regierung ob sie eine Richtigstellung für notwendig hielt oder nicht. Grundsätzlich wären wir aber unbedingt der Auffassung, dass Amerika gegenüber eine klare Sprache besser am Platze ist, als eine ausweichende Erklärung.

Ribbentrop

Randvermerk:
Unter Nr. 209
nach Tokio weiter-
gegeben.

Tel.Ktr. 24.2.41.

136582

Zur

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 25. Februar 1941

9.40 S

Ankunft: 25. " "

20.10 Uhr

Nr. 273 vom 25.2.

+) P 2134

Auf Telegramm vom 22.Nr. 205 +)

I.) Habe Aussenminister persönlich auf angebliches Interview an Tolischus angesprochen und auf frühere Zusage Aussenministeriums hingewiesen. Aussenminister erklärte, er habe keinerlei Interview an Tolischus gegeben. Vielmehr habe er die Anwesenheit Karl von Wiegands benutzt, um diesem und seinem langjährigen Mitarbeiter Tolischus gelegentlich eines gesellschaftlichen Zusammentreffens die unbedingte Bündnistreue Japans zum Dreimächtepakt in eindringlichen Worten klarzulegen. Wie mir Wiegand, der mich gestern aufsuchte, mitteilte, haben ihn diese Ausführungen des Aussenministers stark beeindruckt und zu entsprechender Berichterstattung an Hearstpresse veranlasst.

Bezüglich Tolischus erklärte mir Aussenminister, er habe einen ihm von diesem vorgelegten Telegrammentwurf, in dem das Gespräch als Interview aufgemacht war, zessiert und ihm untersagt, über das Gespräch an seine Zeitung zu drahten. Zu diesem Verbot sah Aussenminister sich durch die von deutscher Seite geäußerten Bedenken gegen die Person Tolischus veranlasst.

II. Aussenministerium hat seinerzeit zugesagt, darauf hinwirken zu wollen, dass Tolischus Japan bald möglichst wieder verlässt, ehe es wusste, dass die "New York Times" ihn nicht nur zu einer Studienreise, sondern als ständigen Vertreter nach Japan entsandt hatte. Aussenministerium glaubt, gegen diese Verwendung von Tolischus keinen Einspruch erheben zu können,

- Manuskript in 16 Stück
 davon sind gegangen:
- Nr. 1 an (Arb. St.)
 - 2 .. R.A.M.
 - 3 .. St.N.
 - 4 .. Chef A.O.
 - 5 .. R.K.A.M.
 - 6 .. Leiter Abt. Pol.
 - 7 .. " " Recht
 - 8 .. " " Pres.
 - 9 .. " " W.
 - 10 .. " " Kult.
 - 11 .. " " Presse
 - 12 .. " " Prot.
 - 13 .. " " Dtschld
 - 14 .. Dir. Pol.
 - 15 .. pers. Stab (Haupt)
 - 16 .. Jurist. Ref.

136583

gab

da in diesen Falle Gegenmassnahmen gegen japanische Pressevertreter in U.S.A. unvermeidlich wären.

Dagegen hat Aussehminister zugesagt, nach Möglichkeit zu verhindern, dass Tolischus zugleich auch für "London Times" schreibe, nachdem ich ihn auf ein derartiges Gerücht hingewiesen hatte.

Ott

136584

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 21 February 1941
Arrived 21 February 1941

10:05 o'clock
20:45 o'clock

No. 250 of 21 February

MOST URGENT

In connection with Telegram No. 241 of 19th with Pol. VIII.

Today the press further occupied itself with the alleged Japanese proposal for peace mediation. Judgment is generally reserved, emphasizing that it was in no way definite that the press reports from London are correctly repeating Butler's declaration in the Lower House. "HOCHI" warns against the danger that Japan's peace gesture would be propagandistically misused by opposing powers to Japan's disadvantage.

The Japanese Government spokesman declared in today's press conference that he could not make more detailed statements regarding the substance of MATSUOKA's answer to EDEN, but that he had the impression that Butler's Lower House declaration had been incorrectly repeated by the press. MATSUOKA's answer to Eden had not contained a concrete proposal for mediation, but had merely, in general phrases, touched upon the fundamental attitude of Japan toward the question of world peace.

Continuing, the spokesman repeated yesterday's MATSUOKA's press-dementi having the following content: "As Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government I have never offered to any nation of the world mediation for the reestablishment of world peace. I answered an inquiry from Eden regarding Japanese mediation activity between Thailand and Indo-China. Although I expressed my opinion regarding the reestablishment of world peace in their answer, I have never sent to any nation a message, the subject of which was Japanese mediation for world peace, as is rumored."

I also refer to the detailed statement of D.N.B., Tokyo No. 602, 603, 604. For obvious reasons I have advised the D.N.B. representative here against detailed reporting for the present.

OTT

730/

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 9 February 1941
Arrived: 9 February 1941

7:50 o'clock
18:00 o'clock

No. 192 of 9 February 1941.

MOST URGENT!

SECRET!

Ha. Pol. 538 g

In answer to telegram No. 123 of the 3rd.

The Vice Foreign Minister personally handed to me a memorandum in the following content:

1. Japan is honestly willing to support Germany in the procurement of rubber and other raw materials from the South-East Asian Sphere.
2. The Japanese Government has taken notice of the fact that Germany has concluded a contract for the purchase of over 25,000 tons of raw rubber from Indo-China and prepares the transport of this amount from Indo-China to Dairen.
3. Instruction requested as to what the total amount of raw rubber is, which Germany (aside from Indo-China rubber) still wants from South East Asia this year.
4. As it is to be expected that the export of raw rubber from the Malayan States and the Netherlands Indies to Japan will be made difficult, Japan will only be able to cover its own most necessary requirements with difficulty there. In consideration of this circumstance it will be necessary to reach a compromise between the amount of raw rubber desired by Germany and the amount actually able to be delivered. The negotiations concerning this /are to be made/ exclusively through diplomatic channels, not, however, as has happened several times until now, through military authorities.
5. The Japanese Government requests information as soon as possible as to what raw materials (kind and amount) besides rubber, Germany wishes to obtain from the South East Asian areas still in this year.

The commercial execution of the business will be taken over by Showa TSUSHU (compare Report No. 220 of 2 August 1939 and following /ones/). As representatives of the Hamburg exporters in question, NIGGEMANN, Dairen, shall for the Germans, together with SHOWA undertake the internal winding up. For this purpose I have requested NIGGEMANN by telegram to come here at once. I request that he be given the necessary instructions via the Embassy.

OTT

Berlin, 17 February 1941

to Pol. VIII 560 g

Diplogerma TOKYO
No. 179

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

(Secret Ciphor Process)

(Secret Appendix to Secret Matters b)

URGENT!

To telegram No. 175 of 6 February.

I request that you inform the Japanese Government that the German Government welcomes the Japanese intention that Thailand and France reach no political or military agreements whatsoever with a third power, whereby this obligation, as far as it concerns France, was to apply only to Indo-China. I request that you add that the armistice treaty, of course, applies to France with all her possessions, colonies, protectorates, so that we remain interested, if only for this reason, in the further development of affairs in Indo-China and therefore were awaiting current information on affairs in Indo-China.

WEIZSAECKER

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 19 February 1941
Arrived, 19 February 1941

10:30 o'clock
20:15 o'clock

No. 241 of 19 February

MOST URGENT

In addition to telegram No. 235 (with Pol. VIII) of 18.

1. During my visit today, the Foreign Minister at once approached me on /the subject of/ his instruction to the Japanese Ambassador to London, reported yesterday by a preceding telegram, and regarding yesterday's statements by the press chief of the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister declared that Eden, in his recent answer to the Japanese Ambassador to London, had bluntly imputed that Japan, in her mediation action between Thailand and Indo-China, merely aims at the oppression of small nations in the Great East Asia Sphere. He had refused to enter into a discussion with Eden regarding this local Japanese act of mediation, and had preferred to make clear Japan's altruism by the declaration of a general mediation /and/ the willingness to reestablish world peace. Of course, he had left no doubt at this that these applications had sprung solely from his own initiative.

2. The Foreign Minister further reported that he had declared in a secret --- session of the Upper House on the occasion of a discussion on the Tripartite Pact that he was firmly convinced of the victory of the Axis Powers, since he had absolute confidence in the Fuehrer. The effect of these words had been very strong and had even visibly impressed opponents of the Governments.

OTT

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 8/28/66

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 4037

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 564 ~~4565~~

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Ch. Col. Jarameno
rl

ROOM NO. _____

- Doc. 4037A-564
4037B-569
4037C-565
4037D-570
4037E-571
4037F-631
4037G-572

Doc. 4037
Item 34

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file.

Fuschl, 27 February 1941
Arrival, 27 February 1941 23.30

ReA.M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

1. Diplogerma Tokyo
2. For Cipher Bureau.

No. 119 of 27.2.

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 III)

(For the Ambassador personally)

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan takes possession of Singapore as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything else from the information telegram despatched today.

RIBBENTROP

/p.To/

Note: Transmitted to Tokyo at 23.50 27.2.1941 with No. 232.

Cipher Bureau

/136586/

4037
ITEM 34.

To be kept in locked file.

Telegram (Secret Cipher ^{Process} ~~Service~~)

FUSCHL 27 February 1941
Arrival 27 " " 23.30

R. A. M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

1. Duplicates Tokyo

2. For Cipher Bureau.

No 119 of 27.2.

(For the Ambassador personally)

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 III)

I ask you to work with all the means at your command ~~to get~~ to the end that Japan

~~Japan~~ ^{- necessary} to take SINGAPORE (by surprise as soon as possible). You will

learn everything ^{else} further from the ~~the~~ information-telegram despatched to-day

RIBBENTROP / P.T. 1

88
Note. Transmitted
To Tokyo at 23.50 27.2.1941 incl No 232.

Cypher Bureau.

/ 136586 |

Tokio, den 27. Februar 1941 5.15 Uhr
 Ankunft: " 27. " " 12.42 "

Nr. 285 vom 27.2. C i t i s s i m e !

+) RAM

Auf Telegr. vom 24.Nr. 209 +)

Habe Aussenminister auf angebliche
 Äusserungen Botschafters Nomura weisungsgemäss
 in betont freundschaftlicher Form angesprochen und
 die unbedingte deutsche Auffassung zum Ausdruck ge-
 bracht, dass Amerika gegenüber eine klare Sprache
 besser am Platze ist, als eine ausweichende Erklärung.
 Aussenminister zustimmte dieser Auffassung uneinge-
 schränkt und diktierte sofort in meiner Gegenwart
 eine Drahtweisung an Botschafter Nomura, in der
 dieser zur Berichterstattung über genauen Wortlaut
 seiner Ausführungen auf fraglicher Pressekonferenz
 aufgefordert wird. Gleichzeitig erinnerte Aussen-
 minister den Botschafter an ihm vor seiner Ausreise
 erteilte Instruktion (vergl. Drahtbericht Nr. 196
 vom 10. Februar), in Amerika die Bündnis-Treue Japans
 gegenüber Dreimächtepakt und seiner eindeutigen Ver-
 pflichtungen mit unbedingter Klarheit zum Ausdruck zu
 bringen, da nur durch eine feste Sprache der Kriegs-
 eintritt Amerikas verhindert werden könne.

Dortseitiges Telegramm Nr. 173 fehlt.

Ott

136585

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file.

Fuschl, 27 February 1941
Arrival, 27 February 1941 23.30

R.A.M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

1. Diplogerma Tokyo
2. For Cipher Bureau.

No.119 of 27.2

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 III)

For the Ambassador personally

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan takes possession of Singapore as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything else from the information telegram dispatched today, at the same time.

RIBBENTROP

Note: Transmitted to Tokyo at 23.50 27.2.1941 with No. 232

Cipher Bureau

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Verschlußsache
zu behandeln.

Tokio, den 28. Febr. 1941, 11.05 S
Ankunft: 28. " " , 19.15 Uhr

Nr. 292 vom 28.2. Citissime!

+) RAM 13/ R I
++) bei Pol VIII

Geheim. Auf Telegramm vom 21. Nr. 201+) und im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 21. Nr. 250++).

1.) Habe die mit angezogener Drahtweisung angeordnete Demarche bei Aussenminister ausgeführt und besonders unterstrichen, dass die Reichsregierung Thema einer Friedensvermittlung als völlig inaktuell ansieht. Der Aussenminister wiederholte sein mit angezogenem Drahtbericht gemeldetes Dementi. Er bedauerte nochmals, dass seine an Eden gerichtete Mitteilung veröffentlicht und von angelsächsischer Presse völlig falsch ausgelegt worden sei.

Der italienische Botschafter hat auf Weisung seiner Regierung im Einvernehmen mit mir gleiche Demarche ausgeführt.

2.) Der Aussenminister gab mir gestern Kenntnis von einer Note, die Churchill ihm auf seine Mitteilung an Eden durch den japanischen Botschafter London übermittelte. Diese Note befasst sich mit dem angeblichen japanischen Vermittlungsvorschlag, wobei Churchill behauptet, dass England für Ideal der Menschheit und Zivilisation kämpfe und sich deshalb auf keinerlei Kompromiss einlassen könne. Es kämpfe mit Zustimmung der ganzen englischsprechenden Welt für die Ausrottung des nationalsozialistisch-deutschen Regimes, das gekennzeichnet sei nach aussen durch Gesetzlosigkeit und Gewalt und nach innen durch kalte grausame Tyrannei. Die Britische Regierung würde ausserordentlich bedauern, wenn es zwischen Japan und England zum Krieg käme, da beide Länder auf lange Jahre glücklichen Bündnisses zurückblickten. Im übrigen könne selbst Verantwortung (Gr. verst.) Krieges an Seite Achsenmächte am endgültigen Sieg Englands nichts ändern.

Der Aussenminister hat mir wiederholt Gelegenheit

136594

Gelegenheit gegeben, bei der Abfassung seiner Antwortnote mitzuwirken. Er hat den japanischen Botschafter in London heute beauftragt, Churchill folgendes zu erwidern: Der Aussenminister Matsuoka möchte klarstellen, dass in seiner Mitteilung an Eden keinerlei Vorschlag einer Vermittlung zwischen den kriegführenden Mächten enthalten gewesen sei. Es habe ihn deshalb aufs Äusserste überrascht, dass seine Mitteilung in diesem Punkt in London völlig falsch ausgelegt worden sei. Was die Stellung Japans als Mitglied des Dreimächtepaktes anbelange, so möchte er mit aller Deutlichkeit erklären, dass Japan sich in unbedingter Loyalität zu den Zielen und Idealen des Paktes bekenne und jederzeit treu an der Seite seiner Verbündeten stehen werde. Dass Japan ein treuer Bundesgenosse sei, habe sein Verhalten während des englisch-japanischen Bündnisses bewiesen.

Der Aussenminister erwartet, dass durch diese Note Erörterung über den angeblichen Vermittlungsvorschlag abgeschlossen ist. Er begrüsst, dass ihm der Notenwechsel Gelegenheit bot, gegenüber der englischen Regierung ein eindeutiges Bekenntnis zum Dreimächtepakt abzulegen.

Ott.

Dir Ha Pol
43/41

Berlin, den 22. Februar 1941

F e r n s c h r e i b e n .

(Geheim).

Zur Unterrichtung des Herrn Reichsaußenministers für die bevorstehende Unterredung mit Botschafter Oshima.

I. Wirtschaftsverhandlungen.

Auf japanischen Wunsch fährt in einigen Wochen eine deutsche Delegation unter Staatsrat Wohlthat nach Tokio für Wirtschaftsverhandlungen über ein Warenaustausch-Abkommen. Die Japaner haben Wünsche für gegenseitige Lieferungen im Ausmaß von je 150 Millionen Yen mitgeteilt, die gegenwärtig geprüft werden. Darüber hinaus haben sie Wünsche geäußert auf Überlassung von Patenten, Zeichnungen und sonstiger technischer Unterstützung, hauptsächlich auf wehrwirtschaftlichem Gebiet, für deren Bezahlung sie zunächst einen Kredit von 100 Millionen Yen erbeten haben, obwohl der Wert der Patente usw. mindestens mehrere 100 Millionen Yen darstellen würde. Diese Patent usw.-Wünsche sollen nach vorgestriger Entscheidung des Herrn Reichsaußenministers nicht durch die Delegation Wohlthat in Tokio, sondern durch die Kommissionen des Dreimächtepakts in Berlin, und zwar in wirtschaftlicher Beziehung von der Wirtschaftskommission behandelt werden. Es wird sich empfehlen, bei der Besprechung mit Botschafter Oshima, wenn ihm großzügige Behandlung dieser japanischen Wünsche in Aussicht gestellt wird, doch auch bei den japanischen Gegenleistungen, soweit diese auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet liegen können, die Überlassung von japanischen Patenten und vor allem die japanische Hilfe beim Bezug wichtiger Rohstoffe zu erwähnen.

II.

136580

II. Kautschuk.

Am dringlichsten ist die Hilfe für den Bezug von Kautschuk aus Indochina. Schon im Oktober vorigen Jahres sind wir an Japan mit der Bitte herangetreten, uns beim Abtransport von Kautschuk aus Indochina, den wir von den Franzosen gekauft haben, behilflich zu sein. Die Japaner verzögerten die Zusage, teils um uns zu veranlassen, den Kautschuk über Japan zu kaufen, teils offenbar auch, um ein Entgegenkommen für die bevorstehenden Wirtschaftsverhandlungen zu verwerten. Nachdem der Führer den inneren Ressorts gegenüber angeordnet hatten, die Einfuhr von Kautschuk zu forcieren, hat Botschafter Ott beim japanischen Außenminister Ende Januar 1941 unter Berufung auf den Dreimächtepakt das Ersuchen um Transporthilfe erneuert. Matsuoka sagte zu, sich mit Nachdruck dafür einzusetzen. Anfang Februar wurden die Japaner um Angabe der japanischen Vermittlungsfirmen gebeten, jedoch steht trotz mehrfacher drahtlicher Erinnerungen die japanische Antwort noch aus. Der Abtransport der ersten Sendung ~~mitt~~ von etwa 6000 t hätte bereits Mitte Februar beginnen sollen.

gez. W i e h l

Durchdruck erhalten:

St.S. *W*

U.St.S./Pol

Dg Ha Pol

Ha Pol VIII

136581

Telegramm
(Geh. Ch. V.)

Tokio, den 15. Februar 1941 11.00 S Uhr
Ankunft: 16. " " 3.00 "

Nr. 224 vom 15.2.41

Aussenminister Matsuokas Erläuterung gestern auf Anfrage im Reichstag zu japanisch-russischen Beziehungen: Japan im Einklang mit Grundgedanken Dreimächtepakt, erhöhtlich bemüht, durch Bereinigung schwebender Einzelfragen grundlegendes Verbesserungsverhältnis herbeizuführen. Russland würdigt Aufrichtigkeit japanischer Absichten durch grösseres Entgegenkommen, wie zum Beispiel in Verhandlungen über langfristiges Fischereiabkommen und Handelsverkehr.

Auf die Frage, welche Sicherungen Japan im Hinblick auf Artikel V Dreimächtepakt, gegenüber Russland habe, erklärte Aussenminister, dass zwischen Partnern Dreimächtepakt keinerlei geheime Abmachungen bestehen. Selbstverständlich widme japanische Regierung Frage künftiger Haltung Russlands ernsteste Aufmerksamkeit. Ob japanisch-russischer Nichtangriffspakt erreichbar sei, könne er heute noch nicht sagen.

Aussenminister erklärte weiter, dass Kündigung Antikominternvertrages, dessen ideologische Zielsetzung weder durch deutsch-russischen Nichtangriffspakt noch durch Dreimächtepakt berührt worden sei, von Partnern Dreimächtepaktes nicht beabsichtigt sei.

Ott.

24

- Hauptstadt in 16 Stück
Davon sind gegeben:
Nr. 1 an Pol. VIII (Arch. St.)
• 2 „ R.A.M.
• 3 „ SLS
• 4 „ Chef A.G.
• 5 „ R.R. & M.
• 6 „ Leiter Abt. Pol.
• 7 „ „ „ Recht
• 8 „ „ „ Pers.
• 9 „ „ „ W.
• 10 „ „ „ Kult.
• 11 „ „ „ Press.
• 12 „ „ „ Prot.
• 13 „ „ „ Dienstl.
• 14 „ Dg. Pol.
• 15 „ pers. Stab (Hauptst.)
• 16 „ Landt. Ref.

3

136565

Yap

13

T e l e g r a m m
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 3. Februar 1941 = 1.45S Uhr
Ankunft 3. Februar 1941 = 9.40 Uhr

Nr. 154 vom 3.2. C i t i s s i m e .

+) bei Ha.-Pol

Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 30.Nr. 140⁺)

Direktor Wirtschaftsabteilung Aussenministeriums teilte mit, dass telegraphische Berichtserstattung japanischen Geschäftsträgers Vichy nicht bestätigt habe, dass Deutschland 25 000 (25000) t Kautschuk in Indochina bereits fest von Frankreich gekauft habe. Durch Beschluss gemischten Waffenstillstands-Kommission für Wirtschaftsfragen vom 14. Januar seien vielmehr 25000 t Kautschuk für Europa und Asien, 18000 (18000) t für Frankreich und 25000 (25000)t für dritte Länder, insbesondere die Vereinigten Staaten bestimmt worden. Über die Aufteilung der für Europa und Asien bestimmten 25000 t müßten daher erst Verhandlungen zwischen Deutschland und Japan geführt werden. Ferner anstellt Japan darüber Erhebungen, ob 18000 t tatsächlich von Frankreich benötigt würden, nachdem Deutschland französischen Bedarf mit 9000 (neuntausend) t angegeben habe. Unverständlich für Japan sei, dass Deutschland sich Frankreich gegenüber einverstanden erklärt haben soll, dass von indochinesischer Gesamtmenge 25000 (25000) t an dritte Länder insbesondere die Vereinigte Staaten verkauft werden dürften. Auch französisches Aussenministerium habe Richtigkeit wiedergegebenen Inhalts Beschlusses auf Nachfrage ausdrücklich bestätigt. Direktor erbat Aufklärung und schnellste Übermittlung aller deutschen Kaufabschlüsse über 25000 t Kautschuk um Vorbereitungen für Abtransport aus Indochina rechtzeitig treffen zu können.

Hergestellt in 10 Stück
Die sind gegangen:
No. 1 an Ha Pol (Arb. F.)
" 2 " R. A. M.
" 3 " St. S.
" 4 " B. R. A. M.
" 5 " Leiter Abt P
" 6 " " " " Ha Pol.
" 7 " " " " Presse
" 8 " " " " P. S.
" 9 " " " " Dg. Ha Pol.
" 10 " " " " Dg. Pol.

Dies ist Nr.

ott

136543

Telegram from Ribbentrop dated 28 Feb. 1941.

To be kept in
locked file

Telegram

(In the Clear)

Special train, 28 February 1941
Arrival --- " ---

01.45 hours
03.00 "

No. 120 of 28.2
Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)

R A M - 51/R
Fuschl 27 February
Diplogerma Tokyo*)

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information!

The Japanese Ambassador OSPIMA visited me at Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As regards details, it took the following course:

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation. After war with England had become inevitable, the Fuehrer decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run, the agreement also lay in the interest of Japan, which is interested in the speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, the further development of this /agreement/ must follow. For Germany, there are not more military problems of any kind on the continent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching developments in France, was not interested in occupying the whole country, also lest French Africa should fall to De Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time. Garrison the Occupied Countries was merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance. In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Partite Pact. Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand.

The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish withdrawal from military developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would take any action in the event of a German intervention in Greece. Jugoslavian statesmen had recently expressed their desire for peace by their visit to Germany. Jugoslavia must come over to our camp sooner or later. Consequently the Balkans were in our hands. The English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without our knowledge and with poor military preparation. However the Italian front in Greece was now stable. General WAVELL's advance in North Africa was to be explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians, who had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against tanks. We had not sent an organization /verband/ to Libya, to bring about a change there if possible. The Italian people stood firmly behind the DUCE: we were helping with the supply of raw materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner or later she would come over to us openly; she hesitated still at present because of the difficulties of her food supply. With Russia relations were good. Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would beware of taking any action against us! STALIN was a cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing matters in the East with supreme ease. A Russo-German conflict - not wished by us - would mean a gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

In the war against England our bombs had created serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was having a strongly retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the beginning of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to a definite minimum, below English subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was prepared, but depended on various factors. ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan. However it was in our interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come in to the war despite this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast extent of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategically more favourable position vis a vis England. We were not only equal to a combination of the British and American air forces but superior at any time. The number of pilots was unlimited,

likewise the aircraft production potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on U-boat fleets, air fleets and flak. The war was won today, militarily, economically, and politically; we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and for England to ask for peace soon. In this connection co-operation with Japan was important. In her most personal interests she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be an attack on Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation of Singapore must take place with lightning speed, if at all possible without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace, to contribute to a speedy termination of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador OSFIMA replied, that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials, especially re: steel and iron, was difficult. Construction of 45,000 ton ships had been suspended and instead they were building submarines, torpedo boats and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the sea. The occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need.

I remarked that it would be better to delay the Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone. In case of a corresponding explanation and motivation of the occupation, America would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy action were of importance:

- (1) Occupation of Singapore would mean a decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.
- (2) America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected, even ROOSEVELT's argument re: prestige for entering the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the war, America would have to look on powerlessly, how Japan would take away the Philippines from her.
- (3) Japan must secure for herself for the coming New Order in the world that position which she hoped to

have at the conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador OSFIMA agreed completely with this line of thought. He declared himself willing to do everything to realize this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told OSFIMA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest co-operation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria in an exemplary. The Ambassador intends to set up a program with our representatives for the intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U.S.A., I remarked that blunt speaking should be employed appropriately vis a vis them. The U. S. people did not like National Socialism, but on the other hand, were against entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U. S. people felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued toward the U.S.A. The U.S. people must know that if they had aggressive desires, an iron front of determined peoples, which practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with the closest co-operation. For this a continuous exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about principles was necessary. In this connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration of the Jap. ambassador in Washington NOMURA, on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To my reference that we had already made a great contribution to the shaping of the fate of the Allied Nations through the victory on the continent, also that in the future, on account of geographical factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war, while Japan would only have to fight against the periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her, and should not evade the final consequence - OSFIMA replied that Japan was determined to maintain her Imperial position. As he confidentially told me, KONOYE and MATSUOKA thought as he did and were for an early attack on Singapore.

I then discussed the tasks of reconstruction in Europe and East Asia facing the powers of the Tri-Partite

Pact after the war. Over centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the great spheres of interest, the European-African sphere of power under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the East Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the western hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China, etc. In both economic spheres preference should be given over third powers. Ministerial Director SOPLTAT's task was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined in Berlin according to agreement by the Economic Commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the grounds of renewed U.S. impudence for common action to open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation and possibly bring about a change in public opinion in favour of isolation. I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with the U.S. by the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of this action.

RIBBENTROP

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