

Printed stats of Telegrams between
Tokyo, Rome and Berlin.

DGC. 4095

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(20)

UNCLASSIFIED

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



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Ex 2232

Rome, 2 September 1939

Tel. Enciphered -
Secret Cipher Process (good)

FOREIGN BERLIN

Quite secret

No. 404 of 2 September

For German Foreign Minister

Japanese Ambassador visited me today to inform me that he had now received his expected recall. Expects to depart in about three weeks would particularly welcome /opportunity/ to have detailed talk with German Foreign Minister on homeward trip which he may take via Moscow. He seemed to be of the opinion that with a new Japanese Cabinet there was a well-founded chance for successful continuation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis Powers. For this very purpose of being able personally to work more effectively than was possible from Rome he was going to Tokyo. Ambassador mentioned further that opinion was growing in Japan for a certain settlement with Russia which, if carried through in stages and via economic conversations, might eventuate in a non-aggression pact. Question was for us, too, of considerable significance, for a Japan freed from a Russian threat was in a position to reduce a possible tendency of the United States to intervene in Europe. Ambassador remarked finally that the ill feeling against us after conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact had improved considerably with the Cabinet change.

Sig. Mackensen

/Frame No. 302389/

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

V.PL/Kr.

Rome, 4 September 1939

Secret!Note

After previous appointment by telephone I visited the local Japanese Ambassador today. After Mr. Shiratori, referring to his conversation with the Ambassador on 2 September, had told me why he wished to speak to me, he stated in the course of the conversation -- which lasted a good half hour -- approximately the following:

As is known to me, the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact came as a severe blow and made a great sensation in Japan. The friends of Germany had since then been laboring to counteract this effect. He himself, who belongs to this circle, had been trying ever so long to induce the Japanese Government to conclude an alliance with us (and presumably also with Italy). This was the aim of his office here. Since this aim was not attained, he requested recall and was now returning to Japan, for he believes he can be of more use in the aforesaid direction there than here.

Mr. Shiratori went on to say /these words crossed through in original/ the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop proposed to him during his (Shiratori's) presence in Berlin on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday that Japan should enter into a closer alliance relationship with Germany. He sent this proposal on to Tokyo at the time without, however, receiving a reply from there. When he again saw the German Foreign Minister 16 June, the latter told him Germany would now conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia, since Japan had not agreed to our proposals. He reported this to Tokyo, too. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, who as a military man understands naught of these matters, reported to Japan at the time that it was out of the question that Germany would conclude a pact with Russia. The Tokyo Government believed the German Foreign Minister /von Ribbentrop crossed through/ had only "bluffed". It had also spread this around Tokyo with the addition that he (Shiratori) and Oshima had been led around by the nose. Two months had passed without Tokyo's answering him (Shiratori) and finally we had concluded the pact with Russia. Thereupon the Japanese Government had resigned and he had put in four times for recall until it was finally accepted.

As for the supposed Japanese protest against the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact, Mr. Shiratori told me Oshima had doubtless received instructions to protest. He (Shiratori)

had been informed thereof at the same time. He had then got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone in order to stop the protest action if possible. Some official -- the embassy counselor, if I am not mistaken -- told him that Oshima had already gone to the Foreign Office. State Secretary von Weizsacker did not accept the protest there. On his return to the Embassy Oshima found the news of his (Shiratori's) telephone call and then reported to Tokyo that he considered a protest inopportune. In spite of this he received instructions from Tokyo to carry out the step. This has, however, not yet taken place.

Concerning the present state of Japanese-Russian relations (here I come to the most important part of the conversation) Mr. Shiratori informed me the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had received instructions a few days ago to make the following proposals to the Russian Government:

1. To settle by diplomatic means the dispute on the border between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, where for a considerable time a regular battle has been in progress;
2. To appoint a commission for the settlement of the border problems there in general;
3. To conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of the discussions of the trade treaty Russia should make known her desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan, Ambassador Togo should enquire first whether Russia were disposed to deny help to Chang Kai Chek.

He (Shiratori) does not consider these instructions to the Ambassador in Moscow fortunate, even /deems them/ dangerous. Russia, indeed, had never of her own accord proposed a non-aggression pact. The proposal for the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, too, had originated with us. In his opinion, the only way to secure a non-aggression pact with Russia -- which he also considered highly desirable -- was with Germany's mediation. He had therefore proposed to General Oshima, on his own, without instructions from Tokyo, to request Germany's good offices. All this had taken place a few days earlier. General Oshima had not yet been able to see the German Foreign Minister, since he /GFM/ had had no time to receive him before his departure for the front where he had gone with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer had received General Oshima before his departure, but that was only a matter of a very short visit during which the Fuehrer declared Germany wished to maintain the old, friendly relations with Japan, but during which Oshima had no opportunity

to broach the question of German mediation between Japan and Russia. He (Oshima) wished to attempt to speak to the German Foreign Minister after his return to Berlin.

Regarding these latest developments Berlin was not yet officially informed. He (Shiratori) wanted to keep us au courant here and considered it appropriate that we inform Berlin.

To a remark from me that he had, so far as I understood it, the wish to speak to the German Foreign Minister on his return trip to Japan Mr. Shiratori replied that his travel plans were not yet definite. He would presumably return to Japan via Scandinavia and America and would of course be happy to talk to the German Foreign Minister in case the latter wished it. I got the impression that Mr. Shiratori did not wish to ask for a conference on his own initiative, so to speak, probably out of regard for General Oshima. He expressed the view that the latter was to be found in Berlin.

In the course of the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact a secret accord was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that the two countries were not to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia. The whole situation had since then completely altered through the developments in Europe and no one could demand from any country that it commit suicide for a treaty's sake. At the time in question Russia appeared the chief enemy to us as well as to Japan. For both countries, however, (as a further development after the Tientsin Incident) England had now become the chief enemy, who absolutely has to be beaten. The advantage, to us also, of a cleansing or an amelioration of Russian-Japanese relations was self-evident, for America would in this case decide with much greater difficulty to intervene in the present conflict. The goal of Japanese policy in China remains, now as then, the establishing of a new order there, with which was linked the expulsion of England from China. In order to attain this goal Japan was hoping for financial help from America.

We then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shiratori believed that after the overpowering of Poland the opportunity of an understanding with France and England might present itself. Germany and Italy were not at present in a position, and France and England were not disposed, to wage a war on a truly large scale. If it should come to a general conflict into which Italy, the United States, Russia and Japan would then necessarily be drawn, it would simply be a catastrophe whose extent could not be conceived.

In reply to a question of Mr. Shiratori's as to Italy's attitude, I strongly emphasized that Italy was proceeding in closest accord with us and that her attitude corresponded to our intentions in every respect.

/sig./ Plessen

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That IPS Document No. 4095, consisting of sixteen photostatic pages, was received by the International Prosecution Section from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nurenburg War Crimes Trials.

/s/ Arthur A. Sandusky
ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Tokyo, 31 December 1946.

和四の九五号第二項目

ローマ一九三九年九月二日

独逸外務省

暗号電報

秘密暗号法(良)

九月二日附才四〇四号

独逸外務大臣閣下

日本大使ハ彼が今彼ノ期待セル召還ヲ受理セル旨ヲ報告スル
 タメ本日私ヲ訪問シマシタ。約三週間後出奔スルヲ定メ彼ハ
 「モスクワ」經由テナスデアラウ帰朝ニ関シ更ニ詳細ニ独逸外務
 大臣閣下ト談話ナシ得ルナラバ特ニ歓迎シマス。彼ハ新日本内
 閣ニハ停滞セル枢軸諸国トノ其後ノ接近ヲ成功裡ニ前進セシメル
 根拠アル希望ガ存スルト云フ意見見ル様デシタ。ローマカラヨリハ高
 一層力強く效果的ニ働キカケウル意見見ニ於テ彼ハ東京ニ赴ク
 デシタ。大使ハ更ニ日本ニ於テハロシヤトアル妥協ヲ望ム説ガ起リ
 ツンアリ段階的並ニ経済的会谈ヲ通シテノ并展ニ於テ行ハレバ
 不の復條約ニ并展シ得ルデアラウト述ベマシタ。向題ハ又我々ニトツ
 テ重大ナ意見ガアリマシタ。何故ナレバロシヤノ脅威カラ解放サレタ
 日本ハ「ヨーロッパ」ニ干渉セントスル合衆国ノ方ノ傾何ヲ和シル事ガ出
 来ルカラ大使ハ最後ニ独ソ不の復條約締結後ノ五ロマニ対スル悪
 感情ハ内閣ノ運送ニヨリ本復的ニ是正サレタユトヲ述ベマシタ。

署名 マツケンゼン

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

第四〇九五才三項目
羅馬 一九三九年九月四日

秘

覺書

豫メ電話テ約束シテカラ余ハ今日当地、日本大使ヲ訪問シタ、
自身氏ハ九月二日、大使トノ会谈ニ言及シテ何故彼が余トノ面談ヲ
希望シタカニ付テ語ッタ後談話中ニソレハタツプリ半時間續イタ
が大約次ノ如ク語ッタ、

Doc 4095
余ノ了解スル所テハ独ソノ不_レ侵條約締結ハ日本テハドイツ衝撃ヲ
ヲ興ヘルト共ニ大_レヤンセイニヨリ若_レ起シ又獨逸ニ味方スル希運
ハ爾来コノ影響ヲ掃拭スベクヤカカシテ来タ、コノ仲間ニ属スル彼自
身モ久シイ以前カラ日本政府ヲ動カシテ我々ト(又即チウウイ太利トモ)
同盟ヲ締結スベクヤカカシテ来タ、此レが当地ニ於ケル彼ノ役目ノ目的
ヲアツタ、コノ目的が達セラレキカッタテ彼ハ召還ヲ申請シ今ヤ日本
ニ帰朝セントシテアルハデアル、何故ナレバ彼ハ上記ノ目的、タメニハ當
地ヨリ日本ノ方が一層役ニ立テ得ルト信_ジタカラデアル
自身氏ハ更ニ語ヲ續ケテ語ル譯註原文ニハ此ノ字句抹削シアリ
獨逸外務大臣ヲシテソノリッペントロツプ_レハ彼(自身)が總統ノ誕生日ニ際
シテ伯林ニ滞在中彼ニ日本ハ獨逸ト一層緊密ナ同盟關係ヲ締結
セコトヲ提案シタ、彼ハ當時コノ提案ヲ東京ニ送ッタが東京カラハ
回答ガナカッタ、彼が六月十六日ニ獨逸外務大臣ト再度面会シタ時
獨逸外務大臣ハ獨逸ハ日本ガ我々ノ提案ニ同意シキカッタテ今
ヤ露西亞ト不_レ侵條約ヲ締結セントスル日ヲ彼ニ語ッタ、

Kloc 4095

彼ハ此事モ亦東京ニ報告シタ。此等事項ニ就イテハ何事モ
知ラナイ。伯林駐劄日米大使大島ハ當時日本ニ対シ独逸が露路
西亜ト同盟ヲ締結スルノドハ問題外事ダト報告シタ。

東京政府ハ独逸外務大臣ノ詠註「ソニリッペン」ト「ソ」文字抹削シテ
ハ軍ニ虚勢ヲ張ツタニ過ギヤイト信ジタ。東京政府ハ又コレニ彼(日
島)ト大島ハ顧問ヲ使ハレテ中々ダト尾端ヲ附ケテ東京ヲ吹聴シタ。
東京カラハ彼(日島)ノ所ヘ何等ノ回答ナク二ヶ月が過ギタソニテ遂
ニ我々ハ「ロシヤ」ト條約ヲ締結シタソコデ日本政府ハ辭職シ彼ハ四度
召還ヲ請求シテ遂ニ許サレタ。豫想ハテシタ獨逸ノ在ノ優待約ニ対スル
日本ノ抗議ニ関シテハ日島氏ハ私ニ大島ハ確カニ抗議ノ訓令ヲ受ケタ
ニ違ヒナイト語ツタ。彼(日島)モ此ニ就イテ同時ニ通告ヲ受ケタ。テ
アルソコデ彼ハ電話ヲ以テ在伯林日本大使館ト出来ルナラ抗議
提キヲ止メル様ニ連絡ヲトツタ。官吏ノ余ガ誤ツテキナケレバ大使館
参事官ガ一彼ニ大島ハ既ニ外務省ニ行ツタト告ゲタ。國務大臣
「マインツァイツッカー」ハソコデハ抗議ヲ受取ラナクタ。大使館ニ歸ツ
テ大島ハ彼(日島)カラノ電話ノコトヲ聞イテソレカラ東京ニ抗議
が時機ヲ得テキナイト考ヘル旨報告シタ。ソレモ拘ラズ彼ハ東京カラ
措置ヲ執ル様ニ「ソ」ノ訓令ヲ受ケタ。

テレドモ未ダニ抗議ハ提キサレテキナイ。日ソノ關係ノ現状ニ関シ(此處デ
余ハ本會談ノ最も重要ナル部分ニ入ル)日島氏ハ余ニ在モスコ「日本
大使ハ數日前ロシヤ政府ニ対シ次ノ如キ提案ヲナスヨウ訓令ヲ
受ケタ事ヲ告ゲタ。

No 3
(一) スニイ以前カラ正規ノ戦斗が行ハレテナル滿蒙國境ノ紛争ヲ外交
手段ニヨリテ解決スルコト。

Doc 4095

(二) 該地方ノ一般の国境問題解決ノタメ委員会ヲ設置スルコト
 (三) 通商條約ヲ締結スルコト若シ通商條約討議中ニロシアが
 日東ト不平等條約ヲ締結スル希望ヲ表示シタラ東郷大使ハ
 先ヅロシアが蔭介石援助ヲ否認スルニ及ガアルカドウカヲ復クネバ
 ナラナイ

彼(日島)ハモスコ駐劄大使へ此ノ訓令ヲ好適カト思ハズ否
 寧ロ危険ヲ考ヘテ事實露西臣ハ未ダ嘗テ自ラ進テ不平等條
 約ヲ提案シタコトハナイテアル、独ソ不平等條約ノ提案ヤモ我々ノ側
 カラヤサレタモノデアル、彼ノ意見テハ露西臣ト不平等條約ノ之ヲ彼モ
 亦全ク望ミマシイモト考ヘテ居タカ一ヲ物ニスル唯一途ハ独ソノ仲
 介ニ依ルコトデアル、故ニ彼ハ大島將軍ニ對シテ獨逸ノ斡旋ヲ懇請
 スルヨウ東京ノ訓令ナク自ラテ提案シタ之等スベテハ數日前行ハレ
 タモノデアル、大島將軍ハ外務大臣ニ未ダニ會フコトが出来ズニ居ル、
 何故ナラバ彼獨逸外務大臣ハ總統ト共ニ戰線へ旅立ツ前ニ彼ト
 面會スル暇ガナカツタカラテアル、總統ハ彼ノ出發前大島將軍ト面接シ
 ヲ知シ其レハ非常ニ短時間ノ訪問ニ過ガズノ際總統ハ獨逸ハ
 日本トノ古キ友好關係ヲ維持セント希白王ニテ中ル旨言明シタガ
 大島ニハソノ向獨逸ノ日ソノ向仲介ノ問題ヲ持去ス機會ガナカツタ、
 彼(大島)ハ外務大臣ガ伯林へ歸還後彼ニ話ヲシヨウト思ハツテ中々
 此等ノ最近ノ情勢ガニ関シテハ伯林ハ未ダニハハ式ニ知ラサレテ中ナカツタ
 彼(日島)ハ茲テ我々ニ之ヲ知ラセ度イト思ハツタ、ソニテ我々がソレヲ
 伯林へ知ラセルコトヲ適當ト考ヘテ、私ガ諒解スル所ナラバ彼ハ日本へ
 歸國ニシテ獨逸外務大臣ト會談スル希望ヲ有シテ中ルガロウ
 トナラ余ノ言葉ニ對シ日島氏ハ彼ノ旅行計畫ハ未ダ決定シテ

No 4

Doc 4095

中ナイト答ヘタ、彼ハ其ラク「スカンジナビヤ」及び米國經由テ日本ニ帰朝
スルデアラウソシテ若シ独逸外務大臣が均生ムナラバ勿論彼ト喜容
テ会谈スルデアラウ、余ハ日島（此が日島）氏が其ラク大島將軍ニ致兼ニテ

自ラ進ニテ会谈ヲ求メナイガト言フ印象ヲ受ケタ、彼ハ大島將軍ハ
伯林ニテト言ツタ、会谈中、日島大使ハ防共協定ニ関聯シテ日

独向ニ兩國ハ露西臣ト不の侵條約ヲ締結シテハナラナイト云フ内容
、秘密協定が締結セシタ事ヲ述ベタ、然シテ全般ノ情勢ハ歐洲

ニ於ケル情況、推移ヨリソノ後全然一般ニ誰モ條約ノ故ニ自殺スル様ナ
コトヲ如何ナル国ニ對シテモ望ミ得ナイテアル問題、當時ニ在ツテハ露西

臣ハ日本ニ對スルト同様我々ニトツテモ主タル敵ノ様ニ見エタ、然シテカラ
兩國ニトツテハ（天津事件後ノ情勢ノ推移トシテ）今ヤ英國が主タル

敵トシタラバ我々之コソ絶對ニ數マテ破ラズナラナイモノテアル日ノ國
係ノ清算或ハ改善ノ利益トシテ我々ニモ利益テアルガ一明瞭テアル

何故ナレバ米國ハコノ場合ニハ現在ノ紛争ニ干渉スルコトニ決スルニ一
層大ナル困難ヲ感ズルデアロウカラテアル、日本ノ對支政策ノ目的ハ依然

トシテ中國ニ新秩序ヲ建設スルコトデアリ之レト英國ヲ中國カラ驅逐
スルコトが結ビイテアルテアル、此ノ目的達成ノタメ日本ハ米國カラノ財政

的援助ヲ希望シテアル、

次デ我々ハ現在ノ紛争ニ関シテ談ズルコトヲナツタ、日島氏ハ「ホーランド」

征服後現ラク佛蘭西及ビ英國トノ諒解ノ機會ガアルデアロウト信ジテ

アル戰爭ヲ實際大規模ニ遂行スルコトハ独逸及伊太利現在ノ能ハ勢

ニナイシ、又佛蘭西モ英國モ希望シテナイ所デアロウ、萬一必然的ニ伊
太利合衆國露西臣及日本ガ引キ入レルデアラウ大戰爭ガ

起ル様ナ事ガアレバソレコソ測リ知ルコトノ出来ヌ破局トナルデアラウ。

No 5

no 6

doc 4095

白鳥氏ノ伊太利ノ能ク度ニ対スル復向ニ対シ余ハ伊太利
ハ我々ト最モ緊密ニ協力シテ進ミツマリソノ能ク度ハ如何
ナル矣ニ於テモ我々ノ意ハ圖ト一致シテ其ル事ヲ強調シタ。

署名 / プレッセン

No 7

Doc 4095

証 明 書

余、アーサー・エイ・サンダスキイハ、

一、余ハ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部、國際檢察部文書科長ニテ右資格ニ於テ、同部、入手シタル全書類ノ原文又ハ寫シ所持保管及管理ニ任シ居ルコト

二十六頁ノ直接複寫寫眞ヨリ成ル國際檢察部書類ヲ四〇九五号「トミールンブルグ」戦争犯罪裁判事務局長ヨリ、本國際檢察部が受領シタルモノナルコト

ヲ茲ニ証明ス。

署名 / アーサー・エイ・サンダスキイ

東京 一九四六年十二月三十日

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4095

9 Dec 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostats of Telegrams between Tokyo, Rome and Berlin

Date: 30 Aug 38- Original () Copy (x) Language: German
28 Jun 40

Has it been translated? ~~Yes~~ (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Nurnberg

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHIRATORI, Toshio; OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy with Germany

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

These photostats sent by Col Brabner Smith to Mr. Sackett contain among others the following:

1. Telegram from Ott to Foreign Ministry and Army High Command in Berlin dtd 30 Aug 1938 containing information about the situation particularly re plans for an attack on Hankow, Canton. Japanese-English negotiations and discussions among radical circles about an action against Hongkong and Hainan at a time when the European conflict offers a favorable opportunity.

Item 2. Telegram from Mackensen in Rome to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin dtd 2 Sep 1939 re Shiratori's recall from his position as ambassador in Rome and conference with Shiratori in which he promises to work in Tokyo under the direction of an approachement by the Axis powers.

Doc. No. 4095

Page 1

Item 3. Memorandum by Von Plessen about a conference with Shiratori. Shiratori promises to work together with other friends of Germany for an alliance of Japan with Germany and Italy. He mentions a proposal of Von Ribbentrop in this connection as well as an advance notification re German-Russian Non-aggression Pact, both of which he stated forwarded to Tokyo. He then speaks about his efforts to avoid presentation of the Japanese protest against the above non-aggression pact. In regard to Japanese-Russian relations, he advocates a Non-aggression Pact concluded through the mediation of Germany. He mentions the secret agreement between Germany and Japan concluded in connection with the Anti-comintern Pact according to which two countries were prohibited from concluding a non-aggression pact with Russia. He states that since then the situation has completely changed inasmuch as then Russia appeared as Enemy No. 1, while England is in that position. Germany is interested in a settlement of Russo-Japanese relations as a deterrent against American intervention in the present conflict. He expresses the opinion that extension of this conflict into a general war with the necessary participation of Italy, United States, Russia and Japan would mean a catastrophe.

4. Telegram from Ott dtd 26 Jun 1940 re planned actions of Japanese South China Task Force. According to a spokesman of the navy, this action is partially modified by the intention to reconnoiter English and American reaction to Japanese military action in Southwest Pacific.

Analyst: 2dLt Kurt Steiner

Doc. No. 4095
Page 2

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)
Legal Division
APO 742

14 August 1946

International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP,
APO 500, San Francisco, Calif.

Attention: Mr. H. R. Sackett

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing further evidence of not great value. A very great amount of material covering foreign office records prior to the outbreak of war is available but it would take a large staff and considerable time to read it all, and only Collins is helping me, so am giving up the end of this week. The Haushofer trial was interesting but too late for Tokyo and probably too far removed from most of accused.

All those photostats in your possession and for which originals could not be found here in Berlin and which were stamped with a number preceded by "F", we have since discovered are photostats made from the so-called Von Loesch film found in Mullhausen by Lt. Col. Thompson (Br.) and Ralph Collins (U.S.) last Spring. Original of these films are with Foreign Office in London and micro-film copy with the F.C., State Department, Washington, D. C.

J. W. Brabner Smith
Special Assistant
to Chief of Counsel

DOCUMENT 4095

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That IPS Document No. 4095, consisting of sixteen photostatic pages, was received by the International Prosecution Section from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nurenburg War Crimes Trials.

ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Tokyo, 31 December 1946.

書類第四〇九五號

證

余高尾一孝ハ余ガ独逸語及

ビ日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並

ニ独逸語原文及ビ日本語原文

ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確

ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ

茲ニ證ス

昭和二十二年一月八日

右

高尾一孝

Certificate:-

I, Robert M Boyd, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4095. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

/s/ Robert M Boyd

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE Jan 20

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 4095 (orig introduced
in court
TRIAL BRIEF _____
EXHIBIT NO. _____
BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____
FILE NO. _____
PRESS TRANS. _____
U.S.S.B.S. _____

Exhibit # 2232

Signature McKinney
Room # 304A