













# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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## THESIS

THE CARIBBEAN: U.S. ECONOMIC  
AND MILITARY INTERESTS

by

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The Caribbean: U.S. Economic and Military Interests

by

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requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the reasons the Caribbean is of interest economically and militarily to the United States. It examines factors affecting foreign policy formulation; essential materials, supplies, and trade routes; Soviet and Cuban activities in the region; and political, economic, and military recommendations based on these aspects to ensure the continued existence of the Caribbean as a free area, secure from Soviet and Cuban involvement and interference. In so doing it examines why the region is important to United States security and economic prosperity.





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## I. THE CARIBBEAN: U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS

For the last two decades the affairs of the Caribbean have been largely ignored by the people and the government of the United States. With the perception of this vital area as our "backyard", the possibility of difficulties arising that could not be quickly remedied was not credible to the American people. Castro's Cuba, a major instigator of instability in the Caribbean area, was largely ignored, if not sympathetically viewed, as a pathetic little regime of no real consequence to the United States.

Something of an awakening began with the stationing of Cuban troops in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Also of emphasis was the overthrow of Somoza by the Sandinistas. Despite proffered United States friendship and aid, the true colors of the revolution showed themselves in increasing antipathy to the United States and in the export of the revolution to neighboring El Salvador.

Throughout all of this the United States public, by and large ignorant of the strategic importance of the area, and considerable segments of the United States government, question United States involvement in the region. To many it seems to be merely a retrogression to the days of gunboat diplomacy and saber-rattling, with all of the assorted negative connotations which that implies. Many are blinded to the realities



of the situation by the hue and cry raised over social issues in the region, ignoring the increasing levels of outside sponsored insurgencies. The necessity of maintaining this area as a source of vital raw materials, as the crossroads of much of the United States oceanborne commerce, and in its geostrategic military importance raises charges of imperialism and neo-colonialism. The idea that the United States is attempting to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures"<sup>1</sup> and that we are involved in an attempt to "assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way"<sup>2</sup> is dismissed as a cover for more insidious motives. Defending the United States' national interest has taken on negative connotations.

What is not recognized by the majority of these people is that the Caribbean is of major strategic concern to the United States. The region is economically, militarily, and hence, diplomatically important to the United States. The failure to defend United States interests in the region, whether perceived or actual, is a failure to adequately represent the people of the United States by the government which was elected to that purpose.

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<sup>1</sup>Richard S. Kirkendall, "Truman Doctrine", Encyclopedia Americana. Volume 27. (New York: Americana Corporation, 1976) p. 176.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.





## II. UNITED STATES INTERESTS

Prior to describing United States Interests in the Caribbean, it becomes necessary to conceptualize the national interest of the United States on a worldwide or macro viewpoint prior to analyzing any particular region. It is necessary to define those interests so as to not make them a matter of supposition. Elucidation eliminates, or at least reduces, possible confusion over basic core points. As policy does not occur in a vacuum, it is also necessary to describe the forces impinging on the development of strategies to best achieve the goals established by the national interest. The more prominent of these forces are realism, idealism, self-interest and the opinions of the Presidency, Congress and the public. These forces are important since it is through their interaction that the strategies (that is, domestic and foreign policy,) to achieve desired goals are determined.

### A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

One would assume that an in-depth analysis of the concept of the national interest would be a process of self-evident iterations. This proves to be far from the actual case. It becomes similar to an attempt at trying to describe the taste of salt. Everyone is quite convinced that he knows exactly what salt tastes like, but when it comes to describing that taste to someone, we are in a quandary as to verbalizing that



very basic tastes. It quickly proves futile to attempt a description. In a sense, this is much the same problem found when describing the national interest. Most people seem to feel that the national interest of the United States is very self-evident, but when they are pressed to conceptualize those interests, then it becomes a complex and evasive issue to them. It becomes very difficult to iterate the basis of United States policy: the national interest.

### 1. The Strategic Doctrine

As an aspect of defining the national interest, it is important to understand the strategic doctrine of the United States, since it is based on and is further illustrated by the national interest.

The strategic doctrine of the United States herein described was in existence prior to, but is most readily recognized in the contents of, The Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Constitution (1787). The basic concepts established in these documents have not changed, however, the means available to strive for their achievement have changed over time. The Preamble to the Constitution states that the government of the United States, that is, "We the people", are to "form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". These concepts are repeated throughout American history. Similarly, it was set down in the Declaration of Independence that:



We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these rights are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new government.

These "truths" were established in the history of the peoples that had come to America to find the freedom that could not be obtained in the countries from which they had come. This quest for freedom was to be a major force in establishing our national interests as they are described in two of the most famous (and idealistic) documents in the history of the United States of America.

In actuality, the national interest existed prior to these documents, but it was somewhat codified in them, and, in effect, created our strategic doctrine. In other words, the national interest determined what the strategic doctrine was to prove to be while itself being a component of the strategic doctrine. This strategic doctrine of the United States government; elected of, by and for the people, will take whatever economic, political, judicial or military actions are deemed to be in the best interest of the United States, that is, actions that are perceived as being possible, necessary and acceptable to ensure the continued existence and prosperity of our:

- 1) democratic principles and system of government,
- 2) economic growth and well-being,
- 3) physical safety and well-being, and
- 4) our non-secular, but religiose system.



All of these national interests are directly related to what President Woodrow Wilson was to come to entitle the Four Freedoms:

- Freedom of Speech and Expression,
- Freedom of Worship,
- Freedom from Want, and
- Freedom from Fear.

In this interpretation, the strategic doctrine is based on the national interest in the sense that the national interest is defined more concretely in the context of the strategic doctrine. The doctrine defines the interests, and the interests determine the doctrine. In this manner the two concepts are incorporated into an inseparable entity: the one is bound up in the other.

## 2. The National Interest

The postulation of the national interest is similar to a list derived by George F. Kennan. To Kennan, the first interest was in the physical security of the United States. Physical well-being and survival is the prime interest of a state. This is best shown by his statement about state interests and activities that,

The first and most obvious (interest) was that one ought to protect the physical intactness of our national life from any external military or political intrusion--in other words, that one ought to look to the national security--for only in the absence of hostile foreign interference could these processes, in the usefulness of which we believed, be given full freedom to operate.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>George F. Kennan, "The Two Planes of International Reality", in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign





This statement shows that to Kennan, the first interest of the United States was to the "continued existence and prosperity of our democratic principles and system of government, (and)... physical safety and well-being" of both the citizenry and of the nation. Kennan continues in this vein of thought when he suggests that to protect that system we need to take other affirmative actions. He stated:

Secondly, one could see to it that insofar as the activities of our citizens in pursuit of their private interests spilled over beyond our borders and into the outside world, the best possible arrangements were made to promote and protect them.<sup>4</sup>

Kennan here evinces the historic desire and attempts by the United States to promote and protect our "economic growth and well-being" and it also relates to the protection of the "physical safety and well-being" of the citizenry while so engaged. Historically, and according to Kennan, we can see the interests of the United States taking shape along the lines already established by the strategic doctrine.

Kennan hinted at what was also to prove to be an interest of the United States in a statement concerning the moral quality of Americans. Most Americans tend to perceive the United States as an inherently moral state and that if a truly

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Policy. ed. David L. Larson (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.



moral American perspective could be used in the field of international relations, problems could more adequately be solved. He postulated:

Problems could then be solved not with regard to the ugly political realities of the moment but strictly on the basis of general norms of state behaviour, laid down and accepted in advance. All that was needed was the framework, and this we Americans were eminently equipped to provide... (W)e saw ourselved moving benevolently, helpfully among the waiting peoples of the world...our virtues no longer just the virtues of the American frontier but the virtues of the world at large.<sup>5</sup>

This was not only an "interest" in preserving the American moral value system, but it was a crusade to promote it as a self-evident good to the less fortunate peoples of the world. While this would seem to take the "interest" of our value system a step further than preservation or protection, it does not invalidate the concept for two reasons. First, since it was perceived as the most beneficent value system to be in existence, it was therefore the mission of the Americans to expand and promote it for the benefit of all. Secondly, if it is viewed as being necessary to promote and expand the American moral value system in order to preserve it from attack by "baser" value systems that are in competition with it around the world, then the difference becomes one of tactics and not of what the national interest actually is. In this case, the best defense against moral incursion

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid. p. 34.



would be an aggressive, missionary attitude to spread the benefits of a superior system. In other words, the best defense is a good offense. The national interest is still in the preservation of the American moral value system, however, the strategy and tactics involved are the proselytization of that value system to ensure its' preservation.

This is where it becomes important to note the necessary distinction between national interests, the goals that they establish through the interactions of forces, and the various strategies created and tactics used to accomplish those goals. The levels of analysis must remain distinct to prevent confusion when discussing the national interest.

It is also extremely important that one not confuse strategy with the strategic doctrine. Strategy is a plan designed to achieve the goals established in the policy (foreign or domestic) that is based on the strategic doctrine and national interest. Policy then is the means of achieving the goals established in the strategic doctrine and by the national interest. Policy also entails layers of strategy, grand strategy being the culmination of the economic, political, military and judicial strategies that are, when combined, the grand strategy. Grand strategy, then, is the means of achieving the goals that were set by policy. It is possible, then, with this interconnecting system to have strategy, grand strategy and policy as means and goals at the same time, all due to the complex inter-relationships of this system.



## B. FOREIGN POLICY AS A PRODUCT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The national interests of the United States determined by the experiences of the early colonists, were stated in written form many ways, perhaps the best of which were the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. From these documents we cull the national interest and form it into a strategic doctrine that encompasses both the national interest and the means and methods available to achieve them, albeit in a vague, general format. It is then for the elected leaders of the country to institute methods to best achieve those goals (the national interest). The methods for achieving them are the policy. The method (means) of achieving the policy (goal) is then the strategy. The means to achieve the strategy become tactics. It is through this chain of goals and means that the national interest is achieved. The idea that the national interest changes with each administration is false. What actually changes are the means used to achieve those same goals. Where President Kennedy dealt with the Caribbean through his Alliance for Prosperity, the Nixon Administration used a policy of Benign Neglect. Both presidents wanted a Caribbean sympathetic to the United States, but they attempted to achieve it in different manners. The common thread that runs throughout is the national interest and foreign policy.

In any discussion of the national interest it seems inevitable that the discussion eventually become one of the foreign





policy of the United States. In a sense, this is natural. Any consideration of the national interest should of necessity revolve around foreign policy. Considering that the national interest is the goal to be achieved, then the means of achieving that goal, foreign policy, become intermixed, almost to seeming interchangeability. While semantically the terms remain separate and distinct, in the minds of people using them they are the same. As an example, if the national interest of preserving the physical safety and well-being of the citizens of the United States is the topic of discussion, such a discussion soon evolves into a consideration of the foreign policy concerning that subject. The topic has not essentially changed even though the level of analysis has shifted from a national interest to a method or means of achieving that interest.

George F. Kennan discussed the need for foreign policy and its application to the national interest in the following terms that sum up this contradiction:

The conduct of foreign relations ought not to be conceived as a purpose in itself for a political society, but rather as one of the means by which some higher and more comprehensive purpose is pursued. By this I mean that a political society does not live to conduct foreign policy, it would be more correct to say that it conducts foreign policy in order to live. Surely, the essential and important thing in the life of our own state is not what we do with regard to other nations but what happens right here among us, on this American territory for which we are responsible. Our foreign policy, in short, is only a means to an end.



And that end must consist in whatever we consider to be the general objects of American society.<sup>6</sup>

When this contradiction is related to the national interest, we see that foreign policy is inseparable from those interests in that it is the means to achieve them.

### C. ELEMENTS AFFECTING AMERICAN POLICY DECISIONS

American foreign policy, determined by the leaders of the country, based on the national interest, is not formed in a vacuum. There are many forces acting to influence the final decisions. These may be in the realm of the requirements of a prioritization of interests, resolution of the conflicting appeals of idealism and realism, determining what is in the best interest of the country, or the ameliorization of Presidential, Congressional and Public opinion. All of these areas need to be considered in each and every foreign policy decision.

#### 1. Hierarchy of Interests

On occasion, it may become necessary to forego the complete satisfaction of one interest in order to fully accomplish the goals established by another interest. In these cases, it becomes necessary to establish a hierarchy of interests. While it is difficult and risky to apply a theory of interpersonal relationships to the international scene, the application of Maslow's Hierarchy appears to conform to state behavior. Maslow postulated a hierarchy of needs, one requiring

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<sup>6</sup>Kennan, Puritan Ethic, p. 26.



satisfaction before another is desired. The basic need is Physiological. This, for an individual is the need for physical survival. For a state, this would equate to the continued existence of the state. As such, it means that the state "will take whatever economic, political, judicial or military actions are deemed to be in the best interest of the United States". This equates to survival. The national interests stem from this basic need to preserve the nation.

The second need is the Safety need. In people this equates to a predictable world and freedom within limits. On the state level this would be a desire to preserve the principles and government of the individual citizens.

Once that is met, the third need, Belonginess can be striven for. For a person, this can be seen as a desire for a place in his group. A state would strive for a niche in the international system. This niche can be on political, military or economic levels.

The fourth need is the Esteem need. On the personal level this is equated to self-respect and esteem from others. A state may also strive for this. It can be seen in the diplomatic areas and in alignments of other nations on issues of importance to that nation.

The fifth, and last, need is Self-Actualization. In an individual it becomes a desire for growth. On a state level it could be attempts at proselytizing their particular brand of state system to other states.



While a state may be at any of these five levels, if a threat is perceived to a lower need, actions to protect the lower need will be taken while forsaking the higher level need. This can be seen in many relations, but most especially when the physical security of a state is threatened. All other activities are forgotten in the effort to preserve the state. When dealing with states, this hierarchy needs to be kept in mind so as to understand why actions are taken, or what actions to take.

Also of consideration are what Maslow termed the pre-conditions for need satisfaction, freedom, justice, orderliness and a challenge or stimulation. The growth of international organizations has evidenced the desire for freedom, justice and orderliness and the economic competition of the market place is one of these many stimuli.<sup>7</sup>

While there is not a direct transference of Maslow from individual behavior to state behavior, there are enough similarities to establish that a hierarchy of interests does exist and that if pressure exists that will not allow the achievement of all goals, then an ordering process takes place so as to achieve what would be considered maximum advantage

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<sup>7</sup>For a short and concise summation of Maslow's Hierarchy see Frank G. Guble, The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow, with a Forward by Abraham Maslow (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), pp. 36-51.





from the situation based on the hierarchy of interests. An excellent example is a comment made by Ernst B. Haas:

Nations will not dedicate themselves to working for human rights and physical welfare until their military security is assured.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. Realism and Idealism

In all attempts at realization of the goals established by various policies, policies which are based on the national interest and guided by the strategic doctrine, the United States is caught in a dilemma of implementation. As such, the United States can maneuver between the opposite poles of realism (in the sense of constraints forced by political, military, economic, technological and manpower considerations) and idealism (in the sense of constraints established by our value system and culture that reflect the Judeo-Christian heritage and democratic ideas and goals such as are reflected in the Declaration of Independence). Historically it appears that there is a continuum between these two poles that is traversed in both designing and implementing policy. The United States emerges as a nation that maneuvers between the forces of realism and idealism while never acting exclusively in terms of one force or the other, that is, a country which is influenced by elastic forces that simultaneously attempt to pull us to the one extreme

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<sup>8</sup>Ernst B. Haas, Beyond The Nation-State (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 31.



while preventing the other extreme from achieving dominance. In a sense, it is similar to a constant tug-of-war between equally matched forces in which momentary advantage may be gained, but no complete victory of one over the other can be achieved. These elastic forces can readily be represented by the concepts that symbolize these opposing poles. The forces that attract us to idealism would be our Judeo-Christian heritage, the concepts of morality and justice, and American concept of "fair play" while the forces that attract us to realism would be an instinct and demand for the continued survival and maintenance of our economic, political, judicial, religious system and for the maintenance, if not improvement, of the American way of life and standard of living (public opinion being susceptible to either extreme). While these are not mutually exclusive concepts they can lead to similar solutions in one case, while being divergent in another. It is the constant interplay of these forces that determines the United States response to any particular situation. As the strength of each concept varies over time and in each situation, there can be no exact statement as to where the United States will stand on this continuum in each instance. The United States is constantly pulled back and forth between the forces of realism and idealism based on interactions and events in the national and international system. It does seem, however that as one force gains dominance it is modified by the restraining force of the other; realism by morality, idealism by self-interest.



As examples of these forces and their influence we examine the Cuban Missile Crisis and President Carter Human Rights Campaign. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of idealism and realism being in concert as to a solution, but for widely varying reasons. The President Carter Human Rights Campaign is an example of idealism and realism being at contradictory extremes with only one solution being applicable at a time.

With the placement of IRBM's and MRBM's in Cuba, the Kennedy Administration was faced with a situation that was perceived to be a threat to the physical security of the United States. Historically, the United States had been able to intervene both diplomatically and militarily in Caribbean affairs. This new consideration of a Soviet response to an action against a client state was a new consideration. The options that presented themselves were: ignore it, surgical air strikes, invasion of Cuba, and, eventually, blockade. The option of ignoring the missiles was immediately rejected on idealistic and realistic grounds. Idealistically it was considered immoral to allow the United States populace to be placed at such an imminent risk and realistically it could dramatically shift the balance-of-power. An invasion was ruled out as it would be morally unjustified without Cuba actually threatening the United States and realistically because it could precipitate launch of the missiles it was supposed to eliminate. It appeared that an air strike would be the selected alternative despite the moral



implications of an American President as another Tojo and a "Pearl Harbor in reverse", as Robert Kennedy termed it, until the realistic consideration that an air strike could not be assured of 100% success and the remaining missiles could launch brought that option to a stop. The option of a blockade proved to be idealistically and realistically acceptable and was eventually the choice. Idealistically it was morally acceptable as no force needed to be used unless the United States was forced to. Realistically it took advantage of United States strategic naval superiority to force a solution from the Soviet Union and Cuba.<sup>9</sup>

In the second case, President Carter's initial stand, and subsequent foreign policy, on human rights was predicated on the idealism of President Carter. While initially the policy was applauded for its recognition of what America stood for and as a means of achieving human rights goals around the world, it came to be perceived as having an adverse effect on the situation, particularly with respect to relations with many Latin American countries. Idealistically, most Americans were appalled by the authoritarian regimes of many of the United States' allies or supporters and it was an easy matter

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<sup>9</sup>For further discussion of the decision-making process involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).





to focus upon the American ideals of freedom that were lacking in those countries. As time passed, it was perceived by the public that not only was the policy failing to "democratize" these areas, but was costing the United States the support of many countries which resented this interference into domestic affairs. W. Scott Thompson summarized the public response:

The American public, sympathetic to Jimmy Carter's experiment but tempered by the experiences of a second oil shock, genocide in Southeast Asia, occupation in Afghanistan, bloody proxy wars in Africa, aggressive combat brigades ninety miles from Miami, and national humiliation in Teheran, rejected this idealistic approach in the 1980 election with a decisive confirmation of a new realism.<sup>10</sup>

This shift from idealism to realism was in response to a perceived movement to an extreme, which was unacceptable and, therefore, countered.

Many writers have covered the concepts of idealism and realism. While all have seen these concepts as valid, not all agree as to affect on policy. Reinhold Niebuhr seems to feel that while idealism exists, it has little affect on foreign policy:

The idealists...must always remain a minority group. In the past they have not been strong enough to affect the actions of nations and have had to content themselves with a policy of dissociation from the nation in times of crisis,

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<sup>10</sup>W. Scott Thompson, "The Third World Revisited", in The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy, Revised Edition, ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983), p. 6.



when national ambitions were in sharpest conflict with their moral ideals.<sup>11</sup>

While initially this may seem to contradict the idea of the public not allowing extreme swings, he is concerning himself with crisis situations only. While policy may move to an extreme during the crisis, it always is adjusted when the crisis has passed. This supports the roles of idealism and realism as balancing forces. Hans J. Morgenthau sees the presence and the balancing accomplished by realism and idealism, or as he terms it; "political realism":

Political realism does not require, nor does it condone indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible--between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place...(it) represents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve.<sup>12</sup>

Morgenthau continues in the same vein when he comments further concerning the role of idealism in his construct of "political realism":

...(This) does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of... other modes of thought. It rather implies

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<sup>11</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Morality of Nations," in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy. ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 84-85.

<sup>12</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Politics," in The Puritan Ethic in United State Foreign Policy, ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966) pp. 66-67.



that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function. Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but 'political man' would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but 'moral man' would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence.<sup>13</sup>

And so it also would be in the foreign relations of the United States if either extreme were to be chosen. Edward Hallett Carr makes a similar argument in that idealism is an essential part of any political decision:

Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgement, and a ground for action... The necessity, recognized by all politicians, both in domestic and international affairs, for cloaking interests in a guise of moral principles is in itself a symptom of the inadequacy of realism. Most of all, consistent realism, breaks down because it fails to provide any ground for purposive or meaningful action.<sup>14</sup>

Carr makes this contention that idealism and realism are an essential mix in all relations when he makes the following statement:

Any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality. Here, then, is the complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of all political life. Politics are made up of two elements--utopia and reality--belonging to two different planes which can never meet. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid. p. 74.

<sup>14</sup>Edward Hallett Carr, "The Limitations of Realism", in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy. ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 99, 102.



elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power. Political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power.<sup>15</sup>

Dean Acheson proposes that a mix of realism and idealism is essential in foreign policy, but that a shift to an extreme would be harmful to the best interests of all.

The righteous who seek to deduce foreign policy from ethical or moral principles are as misleading and as misled as the modern Machiavelli's who would conduct our foreign relations without regard to them. ...The conduct of diplomacy should conform to the same moral and ethical principles which inspire trust and confidence when followed by and between individuals... but if we have an excess of moral or ethical enthusiasm or idealism, let us not try to find an outlet for it in the formulation of foreign policies.<sup>16</sup>

This emphasis away from idealism as the major force in foreign policy formulation is also espoused by Kenneth Thompson. He feels that "simple moralism" is not enough to base decisions on in the complicated field of international relations:

Any moral choice involves decisions in a complicated and ever-shifting field of action. The same course of action that under one set of circumstances may be moral, in another may be quite immoral. To sort out the moral elements in each successive crisis is the task of statemanship, and simple moralism is more often an impediment than guide.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid. pp. 103-106.

<sup>16</sup>Dean Acheson, "Ethics in International Relations Today," in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy, ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 131-132, 138.

<sup>17</sup>Kenneth Thompson, "Judeo-Christian Realism: The Cold War and the Search for Relevant Norms," in The Puritan Ethic In United States Foreign Policy. ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 121.





While all of these authors deal with realism and idealism in slightly different ways, they all seem to feel that realism and idealism, for better or worse, play a major role in foreign policy formulation in the United States. Any attempts at policy formulation must take these two forces into account in order to successfully design foreign policy.

### 3. Self-Interest

It is self-interest that motivates states to take the actions that they do. It was unequivocally put by Alexander Hamilton that:

It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another, is in the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them... good offices which are indifferent to the interest of a nation performing them, or which are compensated by the existence or expectation of some reasonable equivalent, or which produce an essential good to the nation to which they are rendered, without real detriment to the affairs of the benefactors, prescribe perhaps the limits of national generosity or benevolence...<sup>18</sup>

It is this aspect of self-interest that can be seen as a major force in the relations between the United States and the Caribbean; they, and we, act in self-interest and not necessarily on altruistic reasons. The Caribbean nations are interested in the United States as the potential benefactor/potential interventionist to the north. The United States is where they can receive assistance with their economies,

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<sup>18</sup>Richard B. Morris, ed. Alexander Hamilton and The Founding of the Nation. (New York: The Dial Press, 1957), p. 411.



possibly at the expense of United States interference in their internal economic and political affairs. The Caribbean nations are concerned with what they see as the inequitable terms of trade that exist between them and the industrialized world. They feel that as long as they are paid little for their raw materials and have to buy expensive manufactured items from outside the area, they can never develop as industrializing countries in order to improve their present economic situation. As long as the economic conditions remain as they are, they cannot hope to remove themselves from their traditionally violent political changes.<sup>19</sup> The United States, on the other hand, is interested in the area for a variety of reasons, economic, geostrategic, and as a matter of prestige, to name a few. It becomes apparent, then, that the United States, motivated by more than idealistic reasons, will act within the parameter of the realism-idealism context. The nation will act in its own self-interest within the confines of what is realistically feasible and idealistically acceptable. For a nation to behave in a manner that is not conducive to its own interest is an anomaly. This was emphasized by Alexander Hamilton when he stated:

Self preservation is the first duty of a nation and though in the performance of stipulations pertaining to war, good

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<sup>19</sup>This position is currently held by many Third World countries. In the Latin American region, Raul Prebisch appears to be a leading advocate of this position.



faith requires that its ordinary hazards should be fairly met, because they are directly contemplated by such stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary hazards should be run... An individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar course; and if it does so, ought to confine itself within much stricter bounds.<sup>20</sup>

While it can be shown that nations do sometimes apparently involve themselves in endeavors that to others appear counter-productive, is that sufficient evidence to assume that they are no longer acting in their own self-interest? We should be alert not to apply our standards onto other nations' policies. Applying our standards to different nation's choices of action, while providing an answer, does not take their strategic doctrine and national interest into account. We have to realize that the history and culture of each nation will determine its own, as it sees it, appropriate response to each circumstance. As an example, to an American it would appear ludicrous that a nation, such as Cuba, would willingly alienate a world power that is located a mere ninety miles away. In effect, this strategy was a calculated response to what Castro perceived as the absorption of the Cuban economy by the United States, and would give Castro a free hand to reorganize Cuba along the lines that he envisaged. Castro realized that to achieve this system he would assuredly enrage

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<sup>20</sup>Morris, Alexander Hamilton, p. 409.



the United States industries and capitalists that were present in the country (and which had invested millions of dollars of capital in the Cuban economy) when he nationalized their assets. This was sure to incur the wrath of the United States, but it was seen as a necessary step in achieving Cuban economic goals. While it may have seemed more logical to us to have continued courting the economic giant to the north, Castro felt that his objectives could not be met in that manner. It was, therefore, in the best self-interest of Cuba to proceed in its economic plan as Castro envisaged it should be.

In summary, all states act in their own self-interest, and that is no less than as it should be. The nation that fails to act in its own self-interest will inevitably cease to function, perhaps even cease to exist. As the citizens of a nation fully and correctly expect the nation (i.e., the government of that nation) to behave in a manner which will maximize benefits to that nation, it is essential that the actions of that nation take its own self-interest into consideration first and foremost. While these decisions may involve reverses for some, it is survival and the general welfare of the nation that is the dominant consideration. According to Morgenthau:

The individual may say for himself: *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*: (Let justice be done, even if the world perishes),





but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care.<sup>21</sup>

4. Influences of Opinion: Presidential, Congressional Public

Professor Donald Nuecterlein, when he established his model of Presidential decision-making and the national interest, performed a service to the field of political science. He provides a method of objectively analyzing a problem regarding the national interest effects on foreign policy decisions.<sup>22</sup> The disadvantage to the system is that it operates in a vacuum. Professor Nuecterlein acknowledges the influence of Congress and the public mood, but does not allow them access to the system. To fully analyze these areas requires the same system as was applied to Presidential decision-making with the additional interplay of forces between areas. It is obvious that Congress can thwart any foreign policy initiative of the Executive Branch if it so desires (Congress has several ways in which to do so: treaty ratification in the Senate, budget approval and appropriations, the War Powers Act, etc.). This must be considered by the Executive. The Public must also be considered in any decision. While the

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<sup>21</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Politics," in The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy. ed. David L. Larson (Princeton: D. Von Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 70.

<sup>22</sup>For a complete analysis of this decision-making system read Donald E. Nuecterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978).



public (the attentive public) does not have the official powers of the Legislative Branch, it does have the very formidable weapon of public opinion. The public can cause its will to be considered through the constant threat of future elections, be they Congressional or Presidential. With the Congressional system of rotating elections there will always be someone up for re-election every two years. Public pressure can thereby be exerted on the President in terms of re-election, or even on a President in his second term, through pressure on Congressmen that are up for re-election and through them, pressure on the decisions of the Presidency. These interrelationships are very dependent on the strength of attitudes in each sector. Professor Nuechterlein divided interests into four attitudinal areas: Survival, Vital, Major and Peripheral. While these were sufficient for analyzing only Presidential decisions, it is insufficient for an analysis of the interplay of forces between areas. To adequately analyze this interrelationship, the following intensity attitudes apply: Survival, Vital, Major, Minor and Apathy. This allows for a better analysis of the relationships between forces (although it does not overtly consider power politics, bargaining and compromise made in each sector, the final attitude is the result of those aspects of decision-making). As an example, if the Executive Branch takes the position on an issue as being Vital, then to be overruled, the system would require that at least one of the other groups determine that event to be a Survival or Vital issue



also for the other group to reach the dominant position. This can also be accomplished through one group having a higher attitudinal position, but in a different category.

A categorization of the national interest would give the following basic interests:

- Physical Security/Defense
- Economic Security
- Ideological Security/Preservation of Value System
- Psychological Security/Favorable World Order

Each of these areas may have a different level of intensity of attitude in a given situation and the interplay of these forces will determine the outcome.

An example of this interplay can be shown through the Cuban Missile Crisis. Initially, only the Executive knew of the Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's deployed to Cuba, therefore, the intensity of attitudes was markedly different. Whereas the Executive would place Cuba at the Survival level concerning Defense, the Legislative would have placed it at the Minor level (despite Congressional concern over the military aspects of Cuba), while the Public perceived little threat and placed it on the Apathy level (since while there was some public concern over the Cuban military, it did not play an important role in the issues of the day). Since there were no real concerns about an economic threat from Cuba, the Executive and Legislative placed Cuba at the Minor level, while the Public placed it at the Apathy level. The Public appeared to be equally concerned on the issues of Ideology and World Order. While



the Executive placed World Order at the Survival level and Ideology at the Vital level due to its special knowledge, the Legislative placed Ideology on a Major level and World Order on a Minor level. On a chart it would appear as follows:

|                        | <u>Intensity of Attitude</u> |       |       |       |        |
|------------------------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
|                        | Survival                     | Vital | Major | Minor | Apathy |
| <u>Basic Interest:</u> |                              |       |       |       |        |
| Defense                | EXEC                         | -     | -     | LEG   | PUB    |
| Economic               | -                            | -     | -     | EXEC  | PUB    |
|                        |                              |       |       | LEG   |        |
| Ideology               | -                            | EXEC  | LEG   | -     | PUB    |
| World Order            | EXEC                         | -     | -     | LEG   | PUB    |

After it was announced by President Kennedy that the Soviets had placed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, the Attitudes shifted drastically with respect to the Legislative and Public, while the Attitude of the Executive remained as it had been since it had already been privy to the information. The Legislative and Public shifted dramatically to the left on the scale in all areas except Economic.

While this showed that there was now a concurrence of opinion on the problem, it in no way offered a solution to the problem. It did, however, provide the Executive with more freedom of action since it became a Survival level problem and all groups concurred. This gave the Executive a full





Intensity of Attitude:

Survival    Vital        Major        Minor        Apathy

Basic Interest:

|             |      |      |     |      |     |
|-------------|------|------|-----|------|-----|
| Defense     | EXEC | -    | -   | -    | -   |
|             | LEG  |      |     |      |     |
|             | PUB  |      |     |      |     |
| Economic    | -    | -    | -   | EXEC | PUB |
|             |      |      |     | LEG  |     |
| Ideology    | -    | EXEC | -   | PUB  | -   |
|             |      | LEG  |     |      |     |
| World Order | EXEC | -    | PUB | -    | -   |
|             | LEG  |      |     |      |     |

range of options, up to and including war. If any of the groups had not perceived of the problem as a Survival issue, then this range of options would be reduced. It is this interplay of the groups that determines the bounds in which the responses may be formulated. While it does not determine the policy outcome, it does show the relationship of opinions throughout the three groups.

5. Summation

When considering the national interest and, thereby, the foreign policy of the United States, it is essential to consider all of the previous aspects that affect foreign policy decisions. It is with this in mind that we analyze, first, some of the threats to the national interest of the United States and, secondly, recommendations for action to provide outcomes in the best interest of the United States.



### III. CARIBBEAN RESOURCES AND TRADE ROUTES

#### A. RESOURCES

The Caribbean is of direct interest to the United States in the sense that it is not only a provider of the resources that are necessary to maintain the economic growth and well-being of the United States, but it is also a nexus of the many trade routes that are directly or indirectly connected to the area. It indirectly becomes an interest in the areas of physical safety and protection of the United States when consideration is given to the strategic quality of the resources that are necessary to the defense establishment. As a subset of this, if the people and government are threatened, so too would be our value system, as our chief opponents' beliefs commonly are the antithesis of our own.

##### 1. Mineral and Resource Dependence

The extent to which the United States is dependent on the rest of the world varies, but there is a consensus that a dependency does exist. Congressman Frank Church has admitted as much in a study done by Congress in stating:

Although the United States is blessed with a wealth of natural resources, all of these resources are not available in equally abundant quantities. Furthermore, there are simply many materials for which we do not possess significant reserves. Thus, for better or worse, we have come to depend upon foreign countries to supply many of



the resources which sustain our technological society.<sup>23</sup>

Minerals availability is essential to the economic well-being and military preparedness of any nation. Without the flow of minerals, industry would come to a virtual standstill. Without industry there can be no tanks, planes, missiles or any other weapons production with which to defend the country. As an example, the requirements to support the MX Missile program alone call for 10,000 tons of aluminum, 24 tons of beryllium, 2,500 tons of chromium, 150 tons of titanium, 890,000 tons of steel and 2.4 million tons of cement.<sup>24</sup> All of these, to a lesser or greater extent, come from minerals which the United States has to import.

In a similar study conducted by Congress in critical mineral needs, the problem of providing minerals to the economy were noted.

No issue facing America in the decades ahead poses the risks and dangers to the nation economy and defense presented by this Nation's dependence on foreign sources for strategic and critical minerals. America is now dependent on foreign sources in excess of 50 percent for 24 of the 32 minerals essential to national survival.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate. "Imports of Minerals From South Africa By The United States and the OECD Countries", Prepared for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, September 1980. p. III.

<sup>24</sup>The Raw Materials Group, "Raw Materials for the MX Missile", Raw Materials Report, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 7.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Congress, House. "Sub-Sahara Africa: It's Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World", Committee Print No. 8, A Report Prepared by the Subcommittee on Mines and



Many stress the cataclysmic results of a cut-off of minerals to the United States. Congressman David Marriott has stated that "our nation is facing a resource crisis potentially more devastating than any that could arise from a shortage of petroleum."<sup>26</sup> Mr. E. F. Andrews, a spokesman for the United States metals industry and Vice-President of Allegheny Ludlum Industries, speaking just of the minerals imported from South Africa has said that

we would have to revert 40-50 years in our standard of living and technology if deprived of the minerals and metals of South and Southern Africa. Without these strategic metals, all production of steel, aircraft, missiles, tanks, naval vessels, automobiles and weapons of all kinds would cease.<sup>27</sup>

To determine if these dismal predictions were valid, the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commissioned a study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. While this study dealt only with South Africa, the results could be generalized since a large portion of United States mineral imports come from that area. The study concluded that

means are available for dealing with an interruption. These means may be costly, and they cannot in all cases be implemented without disruption. But, in general, the disruptions can be minimized if preparations for a

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Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1980. p. VII.

<sup>26</sup>"Imports of Minerals" Subcommittee on African Affairs, p. X.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.





possible cut-off...are made in advance. Advance preparations suggested include stockpiling, conservation, process changes, alternative technologies, use of functionally acceptable substitutes where possible, providing incentives to encourage design changes, recycling, and exploiting untapped reserves.<sup>28</sup>

While this may sound heartening, in reality it is a glossing over of the difficulties that would be encountered. All of these solutions, while feasible in the long run, will not account for any short term deficiencies, especially if the United States is involved in hostilities anywhere.

Stockpiling has long been the solution offered as the best means of protection against mineral cut-off. The problem with that is that the stockpiling program of the United States is nowhere centrally coordinated and controlled. It is at best a hodgepodge of departments and bureaus. Captain Bruce P. Schoch, U.S. Army (Ret) illustrated that very point.

Our traditional answer has been to stockpile key materials that we would need to survive, with the goal of surviving for a relatively short period while cut off from traditional supplies. Little attention has been paid, however, to the national defense stockpile since 1959, when it assumed its present configuration.<sup>29</sup>

With no central control there can be no responsibility assigned.

With a lack of responsibility comes a lack of action.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid, p. XI.

<sup>29</sup>Bruce P. Schoch, "Elements of Power: U.S. Behind the Eight Ball", Army, April, 1983, p. 51.

<sup>30</sup>As of 1979 only 40 percent of the materials contained in the national stockpile were meeting their stated goals. Another 10 percent of materials met their goals only by credits



Stockpiling is not the answer to the problem, unless serious reforms are made and continuing effort is made to stock it and keep it out of political disputes. A sample listing of stockpiled minerals and their percentage requirements held follows:<sup>31</sup>

| <u>Commodity</u>               | <u>% of Goal: SEP 77</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Alumina                        | 56                       |
| Antimony                       | 202                      |
| Bauxites                       | 2,706                    |
| Beryllium metal                | 25                       |
| Bismuth                        | 269                      |
| Cadmium                        | 25                       |
| Chromite (metallurgical)       | 77                       |
| Chromium (ferro)               | 170                      |
| Chromium (metal)               | 37                       |
| Cobalt                         | 48                       |
| Columbium concentrates         | 56                       |
| Copper                         | 2                        |
| Lead                           | 69                       |
| Manganese (chemical grade)     | 91                       |
| Manganese ore (metallurgical)  | 177                      |
| Manganese (ferro, high carbon) | 136                      |
| Mercury                        | 370                      |
| Nickel                         | 0                        |
| Platinum group (indium)        | 17                       |
| Platinum group (palladium)     | 51                       |
| Platinum metal                 | 34                       |
| Rutile                         | 22                       |
| Tantalum metal                 | 15                       |
| Tin                            | 628                      |
| Titanium sponge                | 24                       |
| Tungsten ores, concentrates    | 1,176                    |
| Vanadium (ferro)               | 0                        |
| Zinc                           | 28                       |

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from materials that are held in the stockpile in other forms such as bauxite and aluminum. A total of 43 material categories were below their states goals, 13 of which were below the 20 percent stockpile requirement levels. From Bohdan O. Szuprowich, How To Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages: Dealing With Cartels, Embargoes, and Supply Disruptions. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981) p. 223.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid, p. 224.



Conservation is more of an aid to keeping costs down than in actually handling a crisis. If the crisis comes, conservation will be an essential part of any effort to keep industry functioning. Currently conservation is usually practiced as a matter of profit. Waste is expensive and in a profit-oriented society it is usually discouraged by the profit motive. It in all probability could be improved upon in a crisis.

Process changes usually come about over the course of time as factors of production change. This can also be said of alternative technologies. In any event, changeovers are usually costly and time-consuming. Process changes are not answers to a short-term situation, but would be in the long-run.

The use of functionally acceptable alternatives also sounds like a possible solution until you examine what minerals have a ready substitute. The following is a sample list of strategic materials whose cutoff could be critical, the possibility of a ready substitute being available and the relative dependency of the United States on that mineral:<sup>32</sup>

| <u>Mineral</u> | <u>Ready Substitute</u> | <u>Dependency</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chromium       | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Maganese       | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Cobalt         | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Tungsten       | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Titanium       | NO                      | MODERATE          |
| Beryllium      | MODERATELY              | MODERATE          |
| Columbium      | YES                     | HIGH              |
| Tantalum       | NO                      | MODERATE          |
| Iridium        | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Lithium        | YES                     | MODERATE          |
| Osmium         | NO                      | HIGH              |



| <u>Mineral</u> | <u>Ready Substitute</u> | <u>Dependency</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Rhodium        | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Ruthenium      | NO                      | HIGH              |
| Vanadium       | YES                     | HIGH              |

From this relatively short list of materials it is evident that substitutability is of very questionable value. In areas where there are substitutes available, it is usually at a cost of a degradation in the quality of the end product. While there may be more ways to develop substitutes, industry will not attempt to discover new methods to any great degree unless they perceive it as being either more economical to do so or are forced to through actual shortages. In an economically competitive system, such as ours, substitutability is not a short-term solution.

Providing incentives to encourage design changes is actually the function of the market place. The consumers indicate their demands and producers respond as best as possible with available materials and capital. In the event of a material shortage, the demand will cause further research into replacements or substitutes. This, however, is an after the fact solution. Who then is to provide the incentives to encourage changes? In these times of record budget deficits it is unlikely that the government will undertake what would, in all likelihood, become a very expensive program. The

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<sup>32</sup>Bruce P. Schoch, "Elements of Power: U.S. Behind the Eight Ball," Army, April 1983, p. 52.





consumers are unlikely to demand change in advance of a materials shortage and the industries, while they all are involved in research and development to varying degrees, will probably not massively invest in alternatives research without the promise of compensation. Again, research will not compensate for shortages in the short-run.

Recycling should be put into even greater effect than it currently involves. Many metals and materials are now being recycled, but much more can be done. Recycling would prove beneficial in offsetting supply shortages, but it would in no way replace the lost materials.

Efforts to exploit untapped reserves usually sounds promising, but again there are problems. The reason that many reserves are untapped is simply because it has not been economically feasible to exploit them. Access has in turn led to the problem of processing the ores. Since many materials are now provided by foreign countries, the United States capability to process ores has diminished. With the development of mines in other countries came the associated development of processing plants. The United States has now become dependent on the import of processed materials and the capabilities of the United States has diminished in that area. Thus, even if these untapped reserves exist, United States mining and processing capabilities would not be adequate to replace many lost materials.

With these considerations in mind, the assumptions made previously become very questionable. The United States,



in the face of a cut-off from foreign materials, will face a major problem that will engender massive dislocation in coping with that cut-off.

Considering this, what then are to be considered strategic or critical materials to the United States? Bohdan Szuprowicz defines it as follows.

If there exists the possibility of a severe shortage or outright supply disruption of a material that cannot be readily substituted in an industry then it must be considered as being strategic or critical to the end-users. This is particularly true if such a material originates from foreign sources outside the political control of the country in which end-users and their industries are located.<sup>33</sup>

The actual analysis of how difficult materials are used will follow, but the amount of dependence of the United States needs to be determined. It has been warned that

we have become dangerously dependent upon foreign sources for a preponderance of strategic materials vital to our basic industries.

The most heavily industrialized nation in the world, the United States, is literally dependent upon the rest of the world, and in particular on some of the most unstable regions, for its basic minerals, with which to feed those industries.<sup>34</sup>

This is based on an analysis of the percentage of import dependencies that exists over a wide range of minerals currently used in United States industry. A list of some key raw materials and United States dependency follows:<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Bohdan Szuprowicz, How To Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages: Dealing With Cartels, Embargoes, And Supply Disruptions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981) p. 7.

<sup>34</sup>Schoch, "Elements of Power", p. 50.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 52.



|                |      |           |     |
|----------------|------|-----------|-----|
| Diamonds       | 100% | Potash    | 66% |
| Natural Rubber | 100% | Zinc      | 62% |
| Manganese      | 98%  | Mercury   | 62% |
| Cobalt         | 97%  | Gold      | 60% |
| Tantalum       | 95%  | Germanium | 60% |
| Bauxite        | 93%  | Tungsten  | 50% |
| Chromium       | 92%  | Beryllium | 50% |
| Platinum       | 91%  | Zirconium | 50% |
| Titanium       | 90%  | Silver    | 45% |
| Tin            | 85%  | Petroleum | 43% |
| Nickel         | 85%  | Barite    | 40% |
| Fluorspar      | 85%  | Gypsum    | 34% |
| Asbestos       | 84%  | Iron Ore  | 28% |

With these kinds of import dependencies it is easy to see that a cut-off would have drastic effects on the United States economy.

## 2. Mineral and Resource Supply Sources and Usage.<sup>36</sup>

To actually see what kind of impact this could have on the United States, it is helpful to analyze what uses are made of imported minerals. Rather than randomly picking minerals, the 26 critical minerals listed by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress in their report to the Subcommittee on African Affairs of September, 1980 is used.

### a. Chromium

The United States imports 70 percent of its chromium while also obtaining 20 percent from strategic stockpile

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<sup>36</sup>The usages of minerals described herein are drawn from a compilation of the following sources:

1. U.S. Congress, Senate. "Imports of Minerals."
2. Lee Calaway and W.C.J. Van Rensburg, "U.S. Strategic Minerals: Policy Options," Resources Policy, June, 1982, pp. 95-108.
3. W.C.J. Van Rensburg, "Global Competition for Strategic Mineral Supplies," Resources Policy, March 1981, pp. 4-13.
4. Bohdan Szprowicz, How To Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages.



sales and 10 percent from secondary recovery techniques. The main suppliers are South Africa and the Soviet Union. While being almost totally dependent on imports, there is a high possibility of reducing much of the demand for chromium in the short-run by eliminating non-essential uses. Currently chromium is essential in the production of stainless steel as an alloying agent to make it especially resistant to corrosion and oxidation. It is also used in nickel-chromium heating elements, pigments, catalysts, refractories, in the plating of metals and in leather processing. Of these uses approximately 20 percent of the chromium used in wrought and cast steel, tool steel and some other limited applications may be irreplaceable. There is only limited substitutability available by employing nickel, steel or titanium, and in some cases aluminum (in circumstances where chrome alloy stainless steel is now employed). The major military uses of chromium are in ammunition, armor plate, gun barrels, jet engines and stainless steel.

b. Cobalt

Domestic mining of cobalt ended in 1971, making the United States wholly dependent upon imports, mainly from Zaire and Zambia for ore and Belgium for refined ore. Cobalt is a vital alloying element in the aerospace and electrical product industries as it imparts the essential qualities of heat resistance, high strength, wear resistance, and superior magnetic properties. Its major uses are in cutting tools,





jet engine parts, electrical devices, permanent magnets, catalysts, pigments and dryers for paints and allied products. Nickel may be substituted in jet engines and gas turbines, but at a loss in effectiveness. In magnets it may be replaced by platinum, nickel, barium, strontium ferrite or iron may be used. Tungsten, molybdenum carbide, nickel and cermics may be used in some machinery, but there are no substitutes known in some steel and carbide tools. It may also be replaced by nickel for a catalyst and by copper, chromium and manganese in paints. It has military application in jet engines and aircraft.

#### c. Columbium

The United States imports the bulk of its Columbium. From 1969-72 62 percent came from Brazil and 16 percent from Canada. Zaire is now developing as a major supplier of columbium despite the Katanga secession war in the 1960's and the two Shaba province invasions from Angola. It is principally used as an alloying element in the manufacture of specialty steels and superalloys. It also has a potential use in nuclear and aerospace applications and in superconductors or electricity at cryogenic temperatures. There is some substitutability by tantalum and vanadium as ferrous substitutes. Columbium is used by the military in aircraft, jet engines, missiles, rocket motors and stainless steel.



d. Iron Ore

While the United States has long been known for its steel industry and availability of iron ore resources, iron ore is now being imported to meet domestic demand. Approximately 30 percent of the iron ore used in the United States is imported with the majority coming from Canada, Venezuela and Brazil. The uses of iron ore in iron and steel production involves the following end-user industries: transportation, construction, machinery, can and containers, oil and gas industries, appliances, and equipment. Iron and steel products surround us in a modern society. Aluminum is the only substitute available and cannot be used in many applications. The military uses of iron and steel are multifaceted and the military is heavily dependent on both.

e. Manganese

The United States has no reserves of manganese ore that have a 35 percent or greater concentration of manganese and must import at least 98 percent of its annual consumption. The major suppliers are Gabon, Brazil, Australia and South Africa. Manganese is used in the production of steel, aluminum, cast iron, dry cell batteries and certain chemicals. High quality steel requires large quantities of manganese, for which there is no substitute, and any shortage could cause serious problems for high technology industries that require specialty steels. Its military uses include stainless steel and water treatment.



f. Molybdenum

The United States is currently the largest producer of molybdenum and as such is in a position of assured supply. It is used in the manufacture of steels, iron castings and alloys, and as a refractory metal in the nuclear and space age metals. It is also becoming increasingly important in the chemical industry. Ferrous substitutes for molybdenum include chromium, manganese, nickel, silicon, tantalum, tungsten and vanadium while non-ferrous substitutes include aluminum and titanium. Perhaps more important, however, would be materials for which molybdenum can substituted since it is an assured domestic product. In that respect molybdenum can substitute, in some instances, for chromium cobalt, nickel, rhenium, tungsten, vanadium and zirconium. The military uses for molybdenum include jet engines, shipbuilding and submarines.

g. Nickel

The United States imports approximately 75 percent of its nickel, of which over 80 percent comes from Canada, the remainder coming from Norway and Australia. This almost assures a constant supply. Nickel is an important alloy with strength and corrosion resistance over a wide range of temperatures. It is vital to the iron, steel and aerospace industries. Nickel can be substituted in almost every use by either chromium, cobalt, manganese, molybdenum or vanadium, depending on use, but only at increased cost or loss of product performance. Again, with nickel being a relatively available material,



an analysis of what it can substitute for is helpful. In varying instances, it can be used instead of chromium, cobalt, molybdenum, aluminum, cadmium, copper, gold, hafnium, lead mercury, silver and zirconium. Nickel is a very versatile mineral and has proven beneficial in many areas. Militarily it is used in aircraft, armor plate, gun barrels, jet engines, rocket motors, stainless steel, and submarines.

#### h. Silicon

Silicon is found in one-quarter of the earth's crust and as such is extremely plentiful. Most industrialized countries produce for their own requirements. This is fortunate as it has no substitutes. It is used for deoxidizing and as a strengthening alloy in the production of iron, steel, and nonferrous metals. Fiber-optics used in communications, made from glass, are also dependent on silicon: This reduces the need for copper, but precision manufacturing technology and various critical mineral impurities may be required for the development of laser or LED signal emitters, fibers optics, fiber connectors, splices, and photodiodes required to use such systems. Silicon is also used in semiconductors. Military uses revolve around its strengthening properties in iron, steel, and nonferrous metals.

#### i. Tantalum

While the United States has small reserves of tantalum, it imports almost 100 percent of domestic requirement from Thailand, Canada and Australia. Zaire has larger reserves,





but has yet to become a major exporter to the United States. Tantalum is a refractory metal with unique electrical chemical and physical properties applicable for end uses in aerospace, electronic components, transportation, metal-working machinery, chemical equipment, and nuclear reactor components. It has some substitutability with aluminum and platinum. The military uses are in aircraft and satellites.

j. Tungsten

The United States depends on imports for over 60 percent of its tungsten, of which over 60 percent comes from Canada with the rest from Peru, Bolivia and Thailand. Its unique, high-temperature properties make it extremely important for end uses in carbides, ferro-alloys, and metals. It is used in aerospace, gyroscopes, nuclear reactors and rockets. Substitutes in some areas are columbium, molybdenum, rhenium, tantalum, lead, magnesium, titanium, and zirconium. It has military applications in aircraft, nuclear reactors, rocket motors, and stainless steel.

k. Vanadium

The United States imports 27 percent of its supply with 87 percent of that coming from South Africa and the rest from Chile. Vanadium is used as an alloy in steels and non-ferrous metals and is especially important for jet engines and airframes. Vanadium substitutes, to a certain degree, are columbium, manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, aluminum,



and platinum. Its military uses are in aircraft, helmets, and nuclear reactors.

#### 1. Aluminum

The United States is almost wholly dependent on imports of which the main suppliers are Jamaica, Australia and Surinam. Aluminum is used in the automotive, marine, rail, recreational, motor-scooter, and air-cushion vehicle industries; electrical and communications equipment; containers and other packaging; appliances; agricultural and other special industrial machinery; and in steel and aluminum chemicals. Various substitutes in different areas include chromium, iron, manganese, nickel, beryllium, cadmium, copper, lead, magnesium, tin, titanium, and zinc. Aluminum has military uses in aircraft, cartridge casings, missiles, and satellites.

#### m. Copper

The United States is the leading producer of copper, but still relies on imports for about 20 percent of its supply. Those imports are provided by Canada, Peru and Chile. Copper is important for electrical applications in motors, generators, power distribution systems, industrial controls, communications equipment, and house wiring. It is also important in the production of roofing, plumbing, decorative items, heat exchangers, shell casings, instruments, household utensils, jewelry, and coinage. In some areas the use of chromium, iron, nickel, and aluminum may prove sufficient as substitutes. Copper



has military application in ammunition, cartridge casings, and small arms, not to mention the myriad electrical uses to which it is put.

n. Gold

The United States imports 54 percent of its gold with the chief suppliers being South Africa, the Soviet Union, and Canada. While the primary recognized use of gold is for monetary and jewelry purposes, it has proven to be very useful in integrated circuits, for reliable connectors in computers, shielding for spacecraft, dentistry, glass, coinage and in brazing alloys for bonding turbine blades. There is little threat of running out of gold for electronics purposes due to the huge gold reserves held by the United States. In electronics in recent years, platinum, palladium, silver, and other metals have been substituted for gold, but at the risk of lower product performance and reliability. Gold is used by the military in satellites and electronics. To reduce waste the military runs its own recovery program to recover gold from scrapped equipment.

o. Lead

The United States is the second largest producer of lead, but still imports about 10-15 percent of its supply, mainly from Canada, Peru and Mexico. It is used as a metal alloy in storage batteries; in construction material such as roofing, piping, and caulking; in structures for protection against X-rays or radiation; in sporting ammunition; in solder;



in bearings; in gasoline antiknock additives; in the communication industry in cables and batteries; and in some brasses and bronzes. It is also used in chemicals, paints, glass, porcelain enamel, ceramic glazes, oxidizing agents, explosive detonators, insecticides, and as a stabilizer in plastics.

Nickel-cadmium batteries could substitute for lead, but it is expensive and the supply of nickel and cadmium could become less available than lead. The United States now recycles 40 percent of its lead and is estimated to hold 37 percent of global lead reserves. The military uses of lead are in ammunition and nuclear shielding.

p. Magnesium

While the Soviet Union has the largest supplies of magnesium, it appears that the United States has sufficient supplies to handle its demand. While magnesium has many uses, it is used in very small amounts. Its compounds are used in basic refractories, cement, rayon, fertilizer, insulation, metal, rubber, fluxes, uranium processing, paper processing, medicines, neoprene compounds and other chemicals, pigments and paints, glass, ink, ceramics, sugar refining, dyes, and explosives. As a metal it is used in aluminum alloys, magnesium alloys in the production of aircraft and missiles, machinery, chemical products, tools, and consumer products. It is also used as a reducing agent for producing titanium, zirconium, hafnium, uranium, and beryllium. Some substitutes in various areas are chromium, iron, aluminum, titanium, zinc,





and zirconium. Its military usage is in explosives, drugs, aircraft, and missiles.

q. Platinum Group

The platinum group consists of platinum, palladium, iridium, rhodium, ruthenium, and osmium, all of which exhibit outstanding anti-corrosive characteristics and are extremely rare. The United States imports 91 percent of its platinum, of which 82 percent comes from South Africa. Platinum metals are among the most strategic because practically all of the supplies must come from either the Soviet Union or South Africa. The platinum metals are used as catalysts in petroleum cracking and refining processes, the chemical, and automotive industries. They are also used as a corrosion-resistant material in the chemical, electrical, glass, and medical-dental industries. Platinum metals are used in only small quantities comparatively, but where they are critical, there are no practical substitutes. Military uses include fuels and aircraft.

r. Silver

The United States is a major producer of silver and there is little concern about disruptions in supply. The major uses are in photography, electronics, silverware, and jewelry. Despite this, the United States still imports roughly 50 percent of the silver used from Canada, Mexico, and Peru. Because of its importance in photography and electronics, it is considered strategic. For these purposes, there are few equal substitutes. Militarily its chief use is in photography.



s. Tin

Over 75 percent of United States tin is imported from Malaysia, Thailand and Bolivia. About 20 percent of the tin used is reclaimed from scrap. Tin is used in metal containers, tanks, boxes, closures, kitchen utensils, solder, engine bearings, as a plating agent to prevent corrosion; as an alloy of solder, bronze, and brass; in electrical and electronic machinery and equipment, jewelry, dental amalgams, and pewter. Tin is also becoming important in chemicals for plating baths, as a reducing agent, and as a perfume and soap stabilizer, in the production of polyurethane to strengthen glass bottles; and as a toothpaste additive. As such, tin is considered essential to an industrial society, and for many of its applications there are no completely satisfactory substitutes. In the cases where tin can be replaced, chromium, aluminum, antimony, bismuth, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc are used as substitutes. The most apparent military application is in electrical and electronic machinery.

t. Titanium

The United States is almost totally dependent on imports of titanium from Australia, Canada and India. Titanium serves an important function in the aerospace and aircraft industries, and as a superalloy. Its major use, however, is in the manufacture of pigments for surface coatings where it imparts whiteness, opacity, and brightness to paints and provides a pigment with a refractive index that also makes it



suitable for varnish and lacquers. In addition, it is used in making titanium sponge, welding rod coatings, carbide, and in ceramic and glass formulations. In many instances, titanium has no acceptable alternative, but in some areas it can be replaced by iron, aluminum, or zinc. Militarily titanium is very important in aircraft, helmets, and jet engines.

#### u. Zinc

The highest zinc reserves in the world are in the United States (27 percent) and Canada (20 percent), yet the United States imports over 50 percent of its demand for zinc from Canada, Mexico, and Australia and is only third in zinc production. Zinc is the third most commonly used nonferrous metal in the world. It is used as a galvanizing agent in construction materials; in brass fittings, the transportation industry for galvanized sheet steel, die-cast alloys, and brass. Zinc oxide is used in chemicals in photocopying paper, and in the manufacture of rubber, paint, textiles, and lubricants. There is no adequate substitute in galvanizing steel, but in some other areas iron, aluminum, cadmium, magnesium, titanium, or zirconium may be substituted. It is important to the military in ammunition, photography, and small arms.

#### v. Bituminous Coal and Lignite

The United States is the second leading producer of coal and has massive reserves. It does not appear that coal could be in extremely short supply in an emergency. It is indispensable as a fuel for the production of electric power,



iron, and steel. It is essential for space heating and general manufacturing used in the production of chemical raw materials as a byproduct of coal carbonization such as toluene, benzene, tar derivatives, and fertilizers. While it could be replaced in some instances by oil or natural gas, it would not be economically feasible. Militarily it has no direct use, but it is essential for its place in the steel industry.

w. Natural Gas

The United States is the leading producer of natural gas and can exist without imports. Natural gas is used primarily as a fuel resource although ethane, propane, and butane are used for petrochemical feedstocks.

x. Petroleum

Surprisingly, the United States is the third largest producer of oil, but still imports over 30 percent of its oil. This oil comes mainly from Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. It is a fuel for households, commercial enterprises, electric utilities, and transportation vehicles. Other end uses include the manufacturing of food products, paper products, chemicals, and nonmetallic products. It is of essential military use as a fuel.

y. Thorium

The United States has major reserves of Thorium. As of now it is consumed as a fuel for nuclear plants and metallic thorium and thorium oxide are used in radiation detectors, electric discharge tubes, computers, and incandescent gas





mantles. It may also be used in magnesium-base alloys and certain high-strength, corrosion-resistant metals. It could come into importance as a fuel for high-temperature nuclear reactors, but this is still at prototype level. Militarily thorium is important in aircraft, missiles, and nuclear reactors.

#### z. Uranium

The United States is relatively self-sufficient in uranium, importing less than 15 percent from Canada. Its major use is as a fuel for nuclear power plants, but it is also used as an alloy in metals for shielding from X-ray and gamma radiation, as a colorant in glass and ceramics, and in steel and non-ferrous metallurgy; as a target in x-ray tubes, in electrodes in ultraviolet light sources, and in resistors in incandescent lamps. Militarily it is used as an alloy in equipment such as artillery shells and missiles; in explosives, nuclear reactors, shipbuilding, and submarines.

### B. TRADE ROUTES

From the foregoing analysis it is evident that the United States is not only heavily dependent on minerals, but on certain areas of the globe. It is therefore incumbent upon us to examine where those regions are.

#### 1. Areas of Import Dependence

There are certain areas on each continental area or region that are of importance to the United States. In Europe there is only light dependence for minerals through Norway



and Belgium, but there is a disturbing dependence on the Soviet Union. In North America, Canada is a valuable supplier of minerals and a relatively secure source. In the area of South America-Central America-Caribbean there are minerals coming from Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Surinam, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico and Jamaica. The Pacific Basin area suppliers are Australia, India, Thailand and Malaysia. In Africa, or more precisely High Africa, supplies come from South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. The Middle East supplier is Saudi Arabia. Of these areas, most have a trade route relation to the Caribbean and the United States, but only Africa and South America-Central America-Caribbean region have another, more subtle, relationship.

In High Africa, and especially South Africa, United States dependence on minerals is heavy.

The United States depends on imports for 92 percent of its chrome, 91 percent of its platinum, 98 percent of its manganese, 54 percent of its gold, and 27 percent of its vanadium. The following percentages of these mineral commodities imported by the U.S. came solely from South Africa in 1978: chromite, 48 percent; platinum 82 percent (includes imports from United Kingdom); vanadium, 87 percent; antimony trioxide, 50 percent; ferrochrome, 80 percent; and ferromanganese, 45 percent. The major alternative supplier nation of chromium, platinum, vanadium, and gold is the USSR.<sup>37</sup>

The estimated reserves in High Africa alone are as follows:<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>U.S. Congress, House. "Sub-Sahara Africa", p. 15.

<sup>38</sup>Szuprowicz, Strategic Materials Shortages, p. 94.



| <u>Minerals</u>    | <u>Percentage</u> | <u>Countries with major deposits</u>        |
|--------------------|-------------------|---|
| Chromium           | 95                | S. Africa, Zimbabwe, Madagascar             |
| Platinum Metals    | 86                | South Africa                                |
| Diamonds           | 83                | Zaire, Botswana, S. Africa, Namibia, Angola |
| Vanadium           | 64                | South Africa                                |
| Vermiculite        | 60                | South Africa                                |
| Manganese          | 53                | South Africa, Gabon                         |
| Gold               | 50                | South Africa                                |
| Fluorspar          | 50                | South Africa                                |
| Columbium/Tantalum | 30                | Zaire, Mozambique, Zimbabwe                 |
| Uranium            | 27                | South Africa, Namibia, Gabon                |
| Asbestos           | 25                | Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland           |
| Mica               | 25                | Madagascar                                  |
| Cobalt             | 17                | Zaire, Zambia                               |
| Copper             | 13                | Zaire, Zambia, South Africa                 |
| Nickel             | 10                | South Africa                                |
| Zinc               | 10                | Namibia, South Africa                       |
| Graphite           | 10                | Madagascar                                  |
| Phosphate          | 8                 | South Africa                                |
| Gypsum             | 7                 | Angola, South Africa                        |
| Silver             | 6                 | Namibia, South Africa                       |
| Coal               | 5                 | Mozambique, Zimbabwe, S. Africa, Swaziland  |
| Arsenic            | 5                 | Namibia                                     |
| Beryllium          | 5                 | Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Rwanda          |
| Iron Ore           | 5                 | Angola, South Africa                        |
| Titanium           | 5                 | South Africa                                |
| Antimony           | 4                 | South Africa                                |
| Lead               | 4                 | South Africa                                |
| Tin                | 4                 | Zaire, Burundi, South Africa                |
| Cadmium            | 2                 | Namibia, Zaire                              |
| Germanium          | 2                 | Zaire                                       |

This supply source is currently threatened in two ways.

First, South Africa is the trans-shipment point for most of High Africa's minerals. The rail system in southern Africa is interconnected with the rail system of South Africa to lead to ports for shipment by sea.<sup>39</sup> These rail lines are in areas

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<sup>39</sup>"Why Black Africa Can't Break Hidden Trade Ties With South Africa," The Christian Science Monitor, 25 March, 1983, p. 3.



where guerrillas disrupt them on a regular basis, guerrillas supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The presence of 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola, 750 in the Congo and 750<sup>40</sup> in Mozambique pose a potentially serious threat should the insurgents progress into a general war throughout High Africa. In that event, the supply of minerals would be cut to the United States. This would

directly disrupt strategic and non-strategic sectors of the U.S. economy. This disruption would be so severe in the case of certain metals that the President of the United States would have almost no other choice but to assume economic mobilization powers, impose resource-use priorities, and provide for domestic production capacity if possible. Neither the stockpile nor substitution would compensate even in the near term for the loss of South African mineral exports to the West.<sup>41</sup>

The second threat would be to the disruption of sea routes in and through the Caribbean. At present, this does not seem to be likely, but with Soviet basing in Angola and privileges in Cuba, the potential is there.

The second area of consideration is that of South America-Central America-Caribbean. Here the Soviets and the Cubans have been working hard to make military and diplomatic advances that would be detrimental to the United States. This

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<sup>40</sup>The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1983-1984, (Cambridge, England: Heffers Printers Ltd, 1983) p. 109.

<sup>41</sup>U.S. Congress, House, "Sub-Saharan Africa", p. 20.





area provides minerals to the United States, but it is also the strategic backyard and sea route nexus of the United States.

## 2. Associated Trade Routes

The dependence of the United States on the Caribbean for its oceanborne trade is surprising. According to the U.S. Commerce Department

oceangoing vessels entering or clearing U.S. ports located in the Gulf Coast region transported 397 million long tons of U.S. oceanborne foreign trade during (calendar year) 1979. This accounted for 48 percent of all U.S. foreign trade moving via oceanborne trade routes. Imports accounted for 66 percent.

Gramercy, Louisiana was the leading Gulf port and became the leading U.S. port in terms of total tonnage. The port of Houston ranked second. New Orleans, the third leading U.S. Gulf port, ranked fourth among all U.S. ports. Eighth through thirteenth were Beaumont, Baton Rouge, Corpus Christi, Tampa, Port Arthur and Texas City.<sup>42</sup>

While this is impressive, equally dramatic is the amount of tanker service that traveled through the region. During that same time period

56 percent of all U.S. tanker service tonnage (239 million long tons) was transported through U.S. Gulf ports. Gramercy led all U.S. ports. Seven other Gulf ports were ranked in the top ten: Houston (3rd), Beaumont (4th), Corpus Christi (5th), Port Arthur (7th), Texas City (8th), Baton Rouge (9th), New Orleans (10th).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce. Maritime Administration. United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981) p. 14.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.



Also, while it would not seem as obvious based on the lists of minerals suppliers, the Caribbean is a major source of United States markets.

During 1979 the amount of cargo tonnage transported between the United States and the Caribbean totaled 226 million long tons. This accounted for 28 percent of all U.S. foreign trade tonnage. U.S. imports from the Caribbean totaled 212 million long tons and represented 40 percent of all U.S. imports.<sup>44</sup>

Further evidence of the importance of this area is that of the top thirty trading partners of the United States, five were in the region: Venezuela (5th), Mexico (8th), Bahamas (17th), Trinidad and Tobago (23rd), and Jamaica (25th).<sup>45</sup>

With all of this worldwide trade occurring, it is essential to establish the importance of the Caribbean in relation to it. The Commerce Department rated the top ten trade routes of the United States for 1979 as follows:<sup>46</sup>

| <u>Rank</u> | <u>Route</u>   | <u>Route Number</u> |
|-------------|--|---------------------|
| 1           | Gulf/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico                 | 19                  |
| 2           | Atlantic/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico             | 4                   |
| 3           | South Atlantic and Gulf/Med, Black Sea and Portugal  | 13                  |
| 4           | Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/Far East                  | 29                  |
| 5           | Gulf/United Kingdom and Continental Europe           | 21                  |
| 6           | Atlantic and Gulf/India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea    | 18                  |
| 7           | North Atlantic/Med, Black Sea and Portugal           | 10                  |
| 8           | Gulf/Far East  | 22                  |
| 9           | Gulf/West Africa                                     | 42 (14-2)           |
| 10          | North Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe | 5-7-8-9             |

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 325.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 332.



Examining these routes shows that 19 (1st), 4 (2nd), 13 (3rd), 21 (5th), 18 (6th), 22 (8th), and 42 (14-1) (9th) all involve the Caribbean at one point in the journey. There are many other designated traded routes that pass through or near the Caribbean and can be affected by events in that region. This can be seen by examining the maps of the essential trade routes, as determined by the Department of Commerce Maritime Administration.<sup>47</sup> (See Appendix A)

These trade routes are the lifeblood of the United States and present a tempting target in any attempt to cripple the United States. They must be protected by all available means to ensure the continued economic prosperity and strength of the United States.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp. 32, 36, 40, 48, 52, 60, 64, 68, 72, 76, 80, 84, 88, 92, 96, 100, 104, 108, 112, 116, 120, 124, 128, 132, 136, 140, 144, 148.



#### IV. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS

The Caribbean has been recognized as being important to the security of the United States since before Mahan noted the intersection of trade routes in the area. He pointed out that:

At the one all the highways of the Mississippi valley, all the tributaries and subtributaries of the great river, meet, and thence they part. At the other all highways between the Atlantic and Pacific focus and intersect.<sup>48</sup>

Professor Westcott observed, from the writing of Mahan, that Cuba was essential in the area and stated:

Cuba is the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and also controls three entrances to the Caribbean--the Yucatan, Windward and Mona Passages.<sup>49</sup>

In Mahan's analysis of the region he pointed out what he perceived as key to the area:

As between the three possible bases for attempted control of the Caribbean, no doubts can remain that Cuba is the most powerful, Jamaica next, and the Antilles least.<sup>50</sup>

These observations were not lost on the Soviet Union as is apparent by their actions in the region.

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<sup>48</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Strategic Features of The Gulf of Mexico and The Caribbean", in Mahan on Naval Warfare, ed. Allan Westcott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943) p. 100.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 108.





Considering the importance of the Caribbean to the United States, it would be extremely beneficial to the Soviet Union's correlation of forces<sup>51</sup> if they can negate the benefits of the area. To do this, they can avail themselves of several methods, overt and covert.

#### A. OVERT ACTIVITY

##### 1. Military/Diplomatic

Since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine on December 2, 1823<sup>52</sup> and the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904,<sup>53</sup> the Caribbean

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<sup>51</sup>The Soviet viewpoint of military comparisons are termed the correlation of forces and take all of the following into consideration when determining the balance of power: geography, history, politics, economic factors, morale factors and technology. Any change in one area thereby affects that balance. From a lecture by Professor Jiri Valenta on 23 January, 1983 on Soviet Military Policy presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

<sup>52</sup>In his historic address to Congress, President Monroe made four basic points: (1) No European power would be allowed to alter the status quo in the Americas. (2) The American system of republics was utterly distinct from the European monarchical system. (3) Any European effort to export its system to the Americas would be viewed as an unfriendly act, dangerous to peace. (4) The United States recognized existing colonial relationships and disclaimed any intent to interfere in European domestic affairs. See Family Encyclopedia of American History, (Pleasantville, New York: The Readers Digest Association, Inc., 1975) pp. 738-739.

<sup>53</sup>United States hegemony was formalized when President Roosevelt enunciated this corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that henceforth the United States would feel free to intervene in any Latin American state guilty of "chronic wrongdoing" or in danger of falling into anarchy. See Family Encyclopedia of American History. pp. 738-739.



has been perceived as an American lake. This perception held until relatively recently, and was more or less observed by most other powers. The credibility of the United States controlling the Caribbean was shaken with the fall of Batista, while the rise of Castro probably confirmed suspicions that the United States did not control the Caribbean. If any further proof was needed, it was provided by the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco.

The Soviet Union did not fail to notice this chain of events taking place in the strategic rear of the other superpower, the United States. After World War II the Soviet Union was incapable of involvement outside of the sphere of influence of its armies and was more concerned with surviving than in exploitation of other areas. As Soviet power grew and expanded, it was still mainly involved only in Asian and African affairs. The Caribbean and Latin America were seen as being in the "sphere of influence" of the United States. An opening was first seen in the area with the fall of Batista and growing disillusionment with Fidel Castro's Cuba.<sup>54</sup> Initially it appears that Castro sought assistance from the Soviet Union on economic and political terms to ensure Cuba's survival

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<sup>54</sup>In 1957-59, as the directing organism for anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements, including subversion, insurrection and guerrillismo, the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America was set up. From Alberto Daniel Faleroni, "Soviet Strategy in Latin America", in The Soviet Union and Latin America. ed. Joseph Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, (New York: Praeger Publishers: 1970) p. 40.



against growing United States antipathy. The Soviets did not appear to be overly eager to openly support Castro until the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and then it moved more overtly.<sup>55</sup> The question may never be answered as to who actually wanted the missiles in Cuba; Castro for defense through nuclear deterrence, Krushchev as a means to equalize the strategic balance, or a combination of both, but the rapid, massive United States response dampened what may have become Soviet adventurism in the Caribbean. The Soviets settled down to taming Castro's urge to spread revolution and instead, hold what they had and solidify their position while taking advantage of situations as they presented themselves. Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, Department of State reflected on the situation in testimony before joint session of the Subcommittee On International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee On Inter-American Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs.

For its first 10 years in power the new Communist government in Havana tried to replicate its revolution elsewhere in Latin America. Virtually every country was affected. In Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia, guerilla FOCOS actually flourished briefly. One by one, however, these Cuban-assisted insurrections were defeated, and

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<sup>55</sup>In 1966 the Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) was set up with its headquarters in Havana. See Faleroni, "Soviet Strategy" in The Soviet Union and Latin America, p. 40.



following the death of Che Guevara on a Bolivian hillside in 1967, Cuba stopped trying--for a while.<sup>56</sup>

It was also during this period that the Cold War began to thaw. With this thaw, better relations were being established by the Soviet Union in the Caribbean, and Cuban activity could jeopardize this involvement. The combination of these factors has led to the increasing Soviet involvement in the Caribbean to the present. Leon Goure states:

To exploit the growing opportunities it sees in Latin America, the Soviet Union is conducting a steady campaign to expand its influence directly throughout the continent. Moscow means to become a factor in Latin America not only through Cuba, but through the exercise of its own economic, political, cultural, and if possible, military capabilities. No longer opposed on the left by Cuban militancy or on the right by the hostility of the Cold War period, the Soviet Union intends to move in diplomatically, politically and economically whenever an opening presents itself.<sup>57</sup>

This interest in the Caribbean became apparent after the consolidation of Castro in Soviet eyes. Previously, interest in the Third World had been restricted to Africa and Asia, but in 1966 Premier Kosygin stated at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU:

We attach great importance to extending our economic relations with the independent Asian, African, and LATIN

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<sup>56</sup>U.S. Congress, House. "Issues in United States-Cuban Relations", Hearing Before The Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 December 1982, p. 8.

<sup>57</sup>Leon Goure and Morris Rothenburg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975), p. 12.





AMERICAN (emphasis added) countries. Those countries, whose population comprises about half of all mankind, have now become the arena of violent struggle against imperialism.<sup>58</sup>

This comment, following, Krushchev's statement, prior to the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Monroe Doctrine was a thing of the past,<sup>59</sup> combine to show that the Soviets no longer deemed the Caribbean an American lake and portended things to come. The unanticipatedly violent reaction of the United States to the Soviet move to introduce missiles into Cuba may have taught Moscow that to make inroads into the Caribbean they could not use the overt military methods that were tolerated inside the Soviet sphere of influence, such as were used in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. The Soviets have since attempted diplomatic and both overt and covert military means to change the correlation of forces in the area to one more favorable to the Soviet Union.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>59</sup> On July 13, 1960, Krushchev was quoted in Pravda: "Life moves forward: it sweeps away everything that does not correspond to the spirit of the times; it asserts the new, the progressive. We consider that the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its time, has outlived itself--has died, so to speak, a natural death. Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried, like all dead things, so that it does not poison the air by its decay. That would be the correct thing to do, and this is what will happen, apparently." (From Mose L. Harvey, Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba (University of Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute: 1979), p. 13.

<sup>60</sup> Leonid Brezhnev, at the Twenty-Third CPSU Congress is quoted as saying: "A relatively short while ago, the United States considered Latin America as its reliable backyard. Today, however, there is not on that continent a single country



On the diplomatic side, many areas have been exploited to gain access to the Caribbean and are still currently being used, such as economic credits, cultural exchanges and propaganda. These are in an effort to gain respectability and to strengthen ties between the Soviet Union and the Caribbean.

It has been postulated:

The expansion of Soviet and East European cultural relations with the Latin American countries may result in a further increase in the number of Latin American students attending Soviet bloc schools. The growing Soviet bloc assistance programs also are likely to increase the demand for Latin American technicians trained in East Europe.<sup>61</sup>

The process of involving Caribbean students in Soviet schools allows them to identify with the Soviet Union while, imports of East European hardware and machinery, also build a dependency on the Soviet Union. This dependency reduces the United States ties, while reinforcing Soviet ties.

The Soviet Union has also been quite adept at exploiting local feelings of nationalism through propaganda and the support of local movements. One form of this is:

The Soviet Union has been conducting a propaganda campaign against US military bases in the region, charging that they constitute another form of US domination of

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in which a fight against North American imperialism and its accomplices is not being waged... (and) the CPSU considers it to be its international duty to continue to do everything necessary to support the peoples' fight for final liberation from colonial and neo-colonial repression. From Faleroni, "Soviet Strategy" in The Soviet Union and Latin America. p. 44.

<sup>61</sup>Goure, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, p. 165.



the countries in the area and an infringement of their sovereignty.<sup>62</sup>

While this is obviously aimed at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, it is accepted as Soviet respect for local sovereignty, throughout the region, despite Soviet efforts to establish a submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba. Further proof of the Soviet interest in changing the correlation of forces in the Caribbean is reflected in a statement made by Leonid Brezhnev upon his visit to Cuba in 1974:

The CPSU and the Communist Party of Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba are determined, together with other fraternal countries and parties, to work for further positive changes in the international situation and for making them irreversible.<sup>63</sup>

All of these pronouncements create considerable goodwill for the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States. This is easily accomplished since the Soviet Union has no historical involvement in the Caribbean which thereby allows them to promote the concept of United States imperialism as opposed to Soviet benign aid. This has been turned into political, diplomatic and military capital in many instances. Two cases in point would be, diplomatically, the Nicaraguan abstention in the United Nations General Assembly's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan<sup>64</sup> and militarily, the alleged

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>64</sup>Roslyn Roberts, "Nicaragua: Conditions and US Interests", The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service Major



charge by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) that 500 enlisted Nicaraguans had been sent to Angola at the request of Cuban President Fidel Castro (though denied by Nicaragua).<sup>65</sup> In any event, the Soviet Union now has a flexible proxy arm with which to act in other Third World areas, while maintaining its claim of nonintervention and noninvolvement.

It is with this in mind that a shift to the military initiatives of the Soviets is now considered. Of necessity, the Soviet navy has been the most prominent military actor in the area. Despite the presence of a Soviet combat brigade, intelligence-gathering posts manned by Soviet soldiers and technicians, and of Soviet fighter pilots flying sorties in Cuba,<sup>66</sup> the most visible presence in the area has remained

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Issues System Archives. Dudley Knox Library, 1980-81 Supplement Reel VII 0756, Monterey, California.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>While each of these aspects taken separately is of no major concern, taken in conglomeration they form a definite trend,

"...the Soviet Union has attached great strategic importance to the acquisition of a military foothold in the Western hemisphere and has energetically seized upon the opportunity offered it by Cuban developments to make such an acquisition. It has been resolute, persistent, and largely uninhibited by U.S. policies in its efforts to capitalize on the opportunity. It has freely and repeatedly resorted to deception and has assumed relatively high costs and risks to attain its ends. It has relied heavily and with great success on salami-slicing tactics in its military penetration in Cuba. And it gives significant evidence that it intends now to use the same tactics to attain important offensive capabilities in Cuba" (From Mose L. Harvey, Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba. (University of Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute: 1979), p. 19.





the Navy.<sup>67</sup>

Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean began in mid-1969 when a task force consisting of a missile-armed cruiser, two missile-armed destroyers, three attack submarines (one nuclear) and three auxiliary ships operated in the Caribbean, making port visits to Cuba.<sup>68</sup> Since that time, the Soviet navy has continued to send units to the Caribbean. While the actual time spent in the Caribbean has varied, the actual percentage of out-of-area operations<sup>69</sup> has stayed basically stable (with the exception of 1980; possibly as a result of the increased build-up in the Indian Ocean to counter United States presence there) as is shown in Table 1.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>"To the extent that Soviet foreign policy seeks to promote and support instability along those littorals which provide the United States with geostrategic advantage, Moscow has the easier task of naval presence without the additional burden of denial and compellent operations. Soviet naval forces can demonstrate interest through presence, serve as a backdrop for diplomacy, provide a deterrent to denial or compellent actions by U.S./allied naval forces, and claim victory if local political instability undercuts U.S. interests. (William J. Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Stability, Political Decay and Navies," Orbis 26 (Fall 82). (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982), p. 582.

<sup>68</sup>United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981) p. 19.

<sup>69</sup>An out-of-area ship day is defined as one in which a navy ship is deployed beyond the normal and operating and training areas of home waters.

<sup>70</sup>Calculated and compiled from data obtained in Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 16 and Donald Daniels and Theodore A. Neely, Jr., "Their Navy in 1981", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October, 1982) p. 112.



Soviet Out-of-Area Ship Days

|       | <u>Mediterranean</u> | <u>Atlantic</u> | <u>Pacific</u> | <u>Indian</u> | <u>Caribbean</u> | <u>:Total</u>     |
|-------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1965: | 4200 (66.7%)         | 1100 (17.5%)    | 1000 (15.8%)   | ----- (00.0%) | ----- (00.0%)    | : 6300 Ship Days  |
| 1969: | 15800 (44.8%)        | 9200 (26.0%)    | 5800 (16.5%)   | 4200 (11.9%)  | 300 (00.8%)      | : 35300 Ship Days |
| 1972: | 18100 (37.1%)        | 14100 (28.9%)   | 5900 (12.1%)   | 8800 (18.0%)  | 1900 (03.9%)     | : 48800 Ship Days |
| 1974: | 20200 (38.0%)        | 13800 (26.0%)   | 7400 (13.9%)   | 10500 (19.8%) | 1200 (02.3%)     | : 53100 Ship Days |
| 1976: | 18600 (41.8%)        | 12400 (27.9%)   | 5200 (11.7%)   | 7300 (16.4%)  | 1000 (02.2%)     | : 44500 Ship Days |
| 1979: | 16500 (35.1%)        | 13500 (28.7%)   | 8400 (17.8%)   | 7600 (16.2%)  | 1050 (02.2%)     | : 47050 Ship Days |
| 1980: | 16600 (31.6%)        | 13750 (26.2%)   | 9700 (18.5%)   | 11800 (22.4%) | 700 (01.3%)      | : 52550 Ship Days |
| 1981: | 16750 (33.6%)        | 12450 (25.0%)   | 8800 (17.6%)   | 10700 (21.5%) | 1150 (02.3%)     | : 49850 Ship Days |

Compiled and calculated from data obtained in Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 16 and Donald Daniels and Theodore A. Neely, Jr., "Their Navy in 1981", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October, 1982)p. 112.



While these statistics do not show a massive commitment of forces to the Caribbean, they do indicate a political commitment to the area. It is, in essence, a statement to the United States and the world that the Caribbean is no longer the exclusive domain of the United States Navy, and as such, no longer is within the United States sphere of influence. Thus far, however, the Soviets have mainly only used their forces to show support for the Cuban regime. They have shown no overt military presence in other areas, though covert military assistance, usually channeled through Cuba,<sup>71</sup> has made itself felt throughout the region. The fleet, though, has to date only been used in a peaceful role and as a diplomatic tool.

## 2. Military Usage

What are the possible uses of military force? William J. Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottrell postulate several.

For the foreseeable future, military force will play the following peacetime roles in foreign policy, besides acting as a symbol of sovereignty, a backdrop for diplomacy, and a signal of commitment: deterrence, to prevent others from initiating an action that threatens a particular interest; denial, to make an adversary abandon a course of action already taken; compellence, to induce an adversary to initiate a particular course of action; acquisition, to seize territory or resources of others for exploitation or bargaining purposes; intervention, to stabilize a preferred regime or to overthrow a hostile regime; counterintervention, to prevent successful intervention

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<sup>71</sup>The discovery of massive arms caches in Grenada in three warehouses and in boxes marked food and agricultural supplies, some from Cuba and some in Russian, is only one such instance.



by a small (or another) power contrary to important interests; collective action, for purposes established under authority granted by the United Nations or by regional international organizations.<sup>72</sup>

An analysis of each of these uses of force in relation to Soviet/Cuban forces proves interesting.

In the area of deterrence, the Soviets present their own personnel in Cuba and the occasional presence of Soviet naval squadrons as a deterrent to direct United States military involvement in Cuba. The stationing of the combat brigade, technicians and advisors at SAM sites, garrisons, bases and intelligence collection facilities virtually assures Soviet casualties in the event of a military attack on Cuba. In effect, these personnel are serving a similar function as United States forces in Europe, that is, a tripwire. As such, an action against Cuba invites involvement by the Soviet Union. In this sense, they are a viable deterrent to any military action.

As a force for denial, the Cubans and Soviets do not have the conventional forces available to force the United States to abandon an action already taken. They lack the requisite force conventionally, but not unconventionally. Through military support for insurgent groups throughout the region, they hope to be able to force the United States to abandon areas by guerrilla warfare methods. This proved

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<sup>72</sup>William J. Taylor, Jr. and Alvin J. Cottroll, "Stability, Political Decay and Navies", Orbis. 26-3 (Fall 1982):579.





successful in Nicaragua, and if the United States is forced by public opinion to desert El Salvador, it will have succeeded again.

Compellence on the other hand can be far more subtle. Through the visits of Soviet naval forces to the area, the United States is compelled to respond. In response to increasing Soviet ship visits, though few in number, the United States countered by having United States ships make 475 port visits to 27 different Caribbean countries from 1978 to 1980.<sup>73</sup> While this can prove beneficial to the United States diplomatically in the short run, in the long run it can cause an increasingly hard pressed U.S. Navy to divert resources to an area away from the main Soviet threat in Europe.

In the area of acquisition, the Soviets again are approaching the situation from a different angle. Their military presence is part of a coordinated military-diplomatic-economic effort not to acquire the resources of the Caribbean Basin, but rather to deny those resources to the United States. Leon Goure points to this strategy of developing anti-US sentiment in the region.

The focus of Soviet interests and the main thrust of its purposes and activities with respect to the revolutionary movement in Latin America at the present stage is not so much an extension of Soviet control or the attainment of outright communist regimes, but the buildup of opposition

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<sup>73</sup>Taylor and Cottrell, "Stability, Political Decay and Navies", p. 580.



and hostility toward the United States and toward those elements in Latin American societies which have ties with the United States or favor following a traditional democratic course.<sup>74</sup>

This emphasis towards supporting revolutionary movements is an effort to achieve a military result without committing Soviet or Cuban forces directly.

The strategy calls for the exploitation of the nationalism of the people in the Third World... thus allowing Moscow to conduct an offensive by proxy against United States interests, while keeping the risks to the Soviet Union within acceptable bounds and maintaining a great deal of tactical flexibility.<sup>75</sup>

This strategy requires actions on the part of the Cubans to funnel weapons and train personnel, occasionally even providing their own people for certain missions,<sup>76</sup> while maintaining a pretext of Soviet and Cuban non-involvement.

In the realm of intervention and counterintervention, the Soviets have dropped none too subtle hints. Rear Admiral Stalbo has said that "the Soviet Union maintains a policy of prevention and prohibition of local wars, and of their most

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<sup>74</sup>Goure, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, p. 5.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>76</sup>A Salvadoran spokesman stated "that there is good evidence that the guerrillas are now benefiting from on-the-scene Cuban advice as well as their earlier training in Cuba." He suggested the presence of Cubans since the blowing up of the Oro Bridge required expertise with explosives not previously exhibited by guerrillas. K. Larry Storrs, "El Salvador: U.S. Interests and Policy Options", The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service Major Issue System Archives, Dudley Know Library, Monterey, California.



this by placing missiles on our borders. Aside from moving SSB's and SSBN's closer to our shores, the only currently available positions for them are in Nicaragua and Cuba. This seems to be a very unlikely proposal. Memories of the United States response to missiles in Cuba, possible damage to the Soviet Union's image as peaceful, the inability of the analogy to United States missiles in Europe to be maintained under any scrutiny, and potential loss of control of the missiles themselves combine to make the threat appear to be baseless. As propaganda, however, the threat serves its purpose as was shown by the impetus it provided to the nuclear freeze movement in the United States.

While the Soviets have committed only a small amount of their military force to the Caribbean, they have been able to reap disproportionately beneficial results. The forces in place still provides a sobering consideration of military potentialities in the event of a general war between the United States/NATO and the Soviet Union/WTO.

In the event of a general war between NATO and WTO forces, the actual presence of Soviet units in the Caribbean will be reduced. If, as is the conventional wisdom, the Soviets maintain most of their general purpose surface and subsurface units in bastions for the protection of their SSBN force, there will be few available units for deployment outside these Soviet zones of defense. Soviet policy could still be carried out



rapid cessation should they breakout."<sup>77</sup> While this seems to indicate a hands-off policy, experience has shown otherwise. He then went on further, however.

The experience of employment of naval forces in local wars generally bore a one-sided character. It cannot be fully extended to fleets in the case where they are operating against a naval opponent who is the equivalent or superior in forces.<sup>78</sup>

This seems to be an intimation that the United States can no longer be assured of mastery of the seas in the event of an attempted move into a local war. The threat seems to be that Soviet forces can now become involved in these activities to the detriment of the United States.

The threat of collective action, while minimal at present, may pose a potential future threat as more and more countries fall into the Soviet sphere. At such a future point the Organization of American States could potentially be subverted enough to actually invite the Soviets into an area as an arbitor. As farfetched as it seems now, if current trends continue, it could prove to be possible in the future.

The Soviets can make one more use of their military in the Caribbean: propaganda. In an attempt at forestalling the positioning of GLCM's and Pershing II missiles in Europe, the Soviets announced that they would thus be forced to counter

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<sup>77</sup>Rear Admiral K. Stalbo, Soviet Navy, Doctor of Naval Sciences, "Naval Forces in Local Wars", Morskoy Sbornik, No. 9 (1976) p. 23.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 28.





in the Caribbean, by proxy, perhaps with the assistance of a handful of Soviet submarines or other forces.

With the United States involvement in a general war in Europe, most naval and air units will be employed in the North Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean. The coastal defense of the United States will range from weak to nonexistent, leaving the US open to possible Cuban actions in the Caribbean. This would be possible due to the paucity of forces in the area with redeployments to Europe. This leaves the United States with a choice of retaining forces in the continental United States to prevent any "backyard" subversion or of leaving the Caribbean relatively defenseless. Without U.S. forces, Cuba and Nicaragua greatly "outgun" any combination of Caribbean forces. (See Appendix B) If the former option is chosen, the United States could either choose to neutralize Cuba and Nicaragua by military action or the poised threat of action. In either event, the forces that would be required for this would be of necessity, considering the size of Nicaragua and Cuba's defenses, very large. In either event, forces that are thus engaged are unavailable for the defense of Europe. This would be of great strategic import to the Soviet Union. In the event that no forces are devoted to the neutralization of Cuba and Nicaragua, then they would be available for both overt and covert operations. Covert operations could include surreptitious mine-laying in the Florida Straits for SLOC interdiction by merchant, naval surface and subsurface units,



or actual torpedoing of merchant vessels by submarine; all the while claiming it to be the action of Soviet units and maintaining neutrality. The threat of terrorist action would also prove feasible, many unguarded ports and facilities presenting tempting targets. In the area of overt operations, possibly delayed so as to lull defenses, there are many tempting targets, chief among them being the seizure of Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (justified by claims of territorial sovereignty). Other possibilities to consider would be on shipping by the Cuban navy, neutralization of SOSUS sites, destruction of oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, overt terrorist raids, raids on U.S. facilities, attacks of Cape Canaveral to disrupt U.S. intelligence satellite coverage or other actions. If the arming and militarization of Nicaragua proceeds along the lines similar to Cuba, the threat increases.

If it seems feasible to consider such actions, then consider the reasoning behind a 125,000 man army with 190,000 ready reserves, 350 T-34 tanks, 250 T-54/55 tanks, some 60 T-62 Main Battle Tanks, PT-76 amphibious assault tanks, a large styx-missile fleet, a limited amphibious assault capability, and an air force that includes MIG-23 fighters and large numbers of assault-capable transports.<sup>79</sup> Added to this is the

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<sup>79</sup>Data obtained from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984. (Cambridge, England: Heffers Printers Ltd., 1983) pp. 108-109.



consideration that the United States makes small provision for coastal/continental defense. There are few Air Force fighter or bomber bases in the area, and what is located in the area likely will be stripped for Europe. An added vulnerability is that a major resupply of Europe will pass through the Caribbean.<sup>80</sup> The possibility also exists of Soviet Bears or Backfires making strikes on Cape Canaveral, Bermuda or other selected strikes and then recovering in Cuba where they pose a serious threat. They can then either make a return strike on their return to the Soviet Union or they can remain in Cuba, where they threaten all of the Gulf Coast and much of the United States hinterland.

Also, consider the reasons given for the size of the Cuban military. If it is to defend against their neighbors, it is overequipped. If it is for a defense against the United States, while it is substantial, it could never be adequate against the United States, unless it only has to face a United States stripped to fight in Europe. Even a glance at Charts 1 and 2 will readily reveal that Cuba and Nicaragua devote far more to their military forces than would seem to be necessary

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
<sup>80</sup>In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on December 15, 1981, Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense stated:

"In wartime, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the Florida Straits and onward to Europe. Much of the petroleum shipments and important reinforcements destined for U.S. forces in Europe would be originating from Gulf ports. The security of our maritime operations in the Caribbean, hence, is critical to the security of the Atlantic Alliance."




GRAPHS 1 & 2

**MILITARY FORCES**  
(INCLUDES ACTIVE RESERVES)



**% OF POPULATION UNDER ARMS**



\* HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL EXPAND TO 250,000

Graphs obtained from testimony presented to the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on December 15, 1981.





to ensure their own security. The argument that they are needed as defense against the United States also lacks credence. This leaves one with the question of intent. What will they do in the event of World War III?

In any eveny, Soviet gains in Latin America, made at very little cost to themselves and causing immeasurable confusion and turmoil in the United States, can best be summarized by a statement made by B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary:

These changes (in Latin America) are having, and unquestionably will continue to have, a strong impact on the further changes in the correlation of world forces in favor of the international working class and socialism.<sup>81</sup>

## B. COVERT ACTIVITY

Throughout Soviet activity in the region there has been a common thread. The Soviets, through the Cubans, have supported numerous insurgencies and they have almost inevitable resulted in gains for the Soviets at small cost.

### 1. Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare Theory

With the success of Castro in Cuba, focus was brought onto insurgency in the Caribbean.<sup>82</sup> Castro and Che Guevara began to promote what was to become known as the Cuban Guerrilla

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<sup>81</sup>Goure, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, p. 5.

<sup>82</sup>This section has been drawn heavily from a class on modern Revolution and Terrorism presented by Dr. R.H.S. Stolfi at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California during the time frame 11 July 1983 to 27 September, 1983.



Foco Theory. To most Americans, the use of insurgency and terror as a means of achieving goals was a new development, but it has been around for a long time. Terrorism has existed in all places and in all times. No terrorist movements, however, exist now or have ever existed in which terror was an end in and of itself. Terror is a tool to achieve an end, a technique of revolutionary combat. Guerrilla warfare, with its attendant terrorism, is a part of a revolutionary war. There are no guerrilla wars or guerrilla movements, only guerrilla warfare in the context of a revolutionary war.

Revolutions themselves appear to have similar backgrounds which, if observed in a country, can be exploited to produce a revolution. Most of these conditions can be found in the developing countries of Latin America.

There is usually the combination of a marked increase in the population, coupled with a revolution in the technology available, whether it is native to the country, imported, or as a result of an influx of immigration. In any event, these have a tendency to lead to increased commercial and industrial activity which in turn leads to progressive urbanization of the country. Attendant with urbanization comes the emergence of a middle class politically. This middle class usually tends to promote ideas of liberalism (in the classical sense), nationalism and modern democracy. All of these concepts, while not revolutionary in and of themselves, can be turned to the benefit of revolutionary groups. This series of events has come to



be known as the Latter Day Historical Equation. While this does not automatically result in a revolution, it can be built upon by other factors. Chalmers Johnson noticed this in his Political Scientific Equation. He postulated that multiple dysfunction in a given polity added to an intransigent elite can combine, when triggered by some event (an X Factor), to result in a revolution. In determining what exactly multiple dysfunction means to a society it is extremely helpful to equate it to the Latter Day Historical Equation. In this way the two theories not only compliment each other, but they build one upon the other. Professor Stolfi, in his studies on revolution and terrorism, has formulated an addendum to Chalmers Johnson. He has noted two additional aspects of revolution. The first is that there are not only intransigent elites in power, but intransigent elites out of power. This conflict between elites is essential to the creation of the tension involved prior to the outbreak of revolutionary conflict. If there is no opposing force there may be oppression by one group, but it cannot by itself result in a revolution. Secondly, in all successful revolutions there has usually been some form of charismatic leadership on the winning side. Without a known leadership, supported by the masses, there is a tendency to failure. Crane Brinton has also noticed what he terms Tentative Uniformities in his study of revolutions: Anatomy of a Revolution. In this area he has noted six tendencies in successful revolutions. The first is a desertion of the intellectuals.



Without the support of the learned segments of society, the confidence of the masses in their government is reduced dramatically.

Second, there is almost always an ineffectual use of force by the government. This is usually as a result of the third tendency, that is, the government comes to distrust itself and paralyzes itself through indecision. That is also a contributing factor to the fourth tendency, a breakdown of the machinery of government. If a government cannot function, it cannot expect popular support and leaves itself open to revolution.

A fifth tendency is the development of bitter class conflict as the classes begin to associate more closely with the development of a middle class and a working class in society. The sixth uniformity that Brinton discovered appeared to be contrary to a common belief about revolutions. He found that in most successful revolutions the economy and the society were both improving and were not failing. While they may have been having difficulties at the time (possibly even due to revolutionary activity), the overall trend was one of improvement. All of the aforementioned characteristics can play on one another, compounding the difficulties experienced by the government. Brinton also noticed a pattern that developed after the revolution. Immediately after a successful revolution the moderate forces come to power, but it is usually only temporarily. There then comes a radicalization of the revolution





resulting in the radicals or extremists coming to power. This results in a period of excess commonly referred to as the terror. Eventually there will be a break in the terror, or a thermidor, and the moderates will return to power. James Meisel noticed still another tendency, however. After a successful left-oriented revolution there is usually a subversion of that revolution by a right authoritarian figure. A very brief case study in the area will show these tendencies.

In Cuba, after the Spanish American War, there was a combination of population growth and an increase in available technology through United States investment. Out of this grew a middle class with a political identity and a large working class. Combining with these "multiple dysfunctions" was the rise of the intransigent elites; Batista being in power, while insurgent leaders, most notably Castro, represented the out of power elites. A charismatic leader presented itself with Fidel Castro and his insurgent campaign in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. Crane Brinton's tentative uniformities were also in evidence. The intellectuals, disillusioned with Batista's dictatorship and methods, did not support the government. The army was used very ineffectually by the government while allowing insurgent activities to cause breakdowns in the machinery of government. The actions of the government came to show that it distrusted itself and was unsure of what actions to take. The rise of wealthy landowners and industrialists had created conflict with the peasant population that



was exploited by the guerrillas. All of this was occurring in a society that was enjoying relatively good economic and social progress. The historical X Factor appears to have come during the Battle of Santa Clara (17-31 December, 1958) with the armored train incident of 22 December. An armored train with reinforcements for Santa Clara was attacked and the officers surrendered their forces to an inferior insurgent group. With the fall of Santa Clara comes the fall of Batista's government. Initially, after the fall of Batista, the guerrillas followed a moderate line and were actually supported by the United States populace who disapproved of Batista's methods. These good feelings were not to last for long as the new government made increasingly radical changes, including nationalizing hotels, cinemas and industry. As new economic policies proved to be failures, more moderate policies were adopted. In the midst of this left-oriented revolution, Fidel Castro emerged as the right-oriented (in style of leadership), authoritarian figure. Similar chains of events can be seen in Nicaragua and other Caribbean countries.

With Castro's success in Cuba came the development of a theory of waging successful guerrilla war that has come to be known as the Cuban Guerrilla Foco. Perhaps perceiving the events in the previous theories, Cuba argues that there is social justice throughout the world and that if properly exploited, a successful revolutionary war can be conducted utilizing the guerrilla foco which will result in a successful



revolution. The guerrilla foco consists of inserting a guerrilla unit into an area conducive to guerrilla operations and then operating under two premises: partisan warfare and psychological warfare.<sup>83</sup> Partisan warfare would involve waging a war against ones enemies while psychological warfare (terror) is waging war against ones friends. The goal is to provoke the government into repressive measures that alienate the populace while simultaneously instilling fear in the populace and a sense that the government is ineffectual and cannot protect anyone. This philosophy was outlined explicitly by Carlos Marighella in his Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. He stated that after identifying with popular causes and initially winning a popular base through revolutionary violence, then:

the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people, make life in the city unbearable. The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation is transformed into a military situation, in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other tripe designed to fool the masses.

Rejecting the 'so-called political solution,' the urban guerrillas must become more aggressive and violent, resorting

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<sup>83</sup>This is remarkably similar to the French Theory of Revolutionary Warfare which was developed after extensive experience in Southeast Asia and Algeria. It postulates that psychological warfare combined with partisan warfare results in revolutionary warfare. It may not necessarily result in a revolutionary war, but it might lead to that.



without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.<sup>84</sup>

While Marighella is situated in the cities and the Cuban Guerrilla Foco is set in the rural areas, the concept of operations is very similar. Marighella's thoughts on guerrilla/terror operations are not new and can be found in other places. Lenin, when discussing terror and guerrilla war, made the following statement.

Armed struggle pursues two different aims, which must be strictly distinguished: in the first place, this struggle aims at assassinating individuals, chiefs and subordinates in the army and police; in the second place, it aims at the confiscation of monetary funds both from the government and from private persons.<sup>85</sup>

Several years later in Brazil, Carlos Marighella wrote:

The armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives:

- (a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;
- (b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists.<sup>86</sup>

Just as the concepts of revolutionary war have been borrowed from the Soviet Union, it now appears that the supplies necessary to wage that war are being obtained from a similar source.

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<sup>84</sup>Claire Sterling, The Terror Network, (New York: Berkeley Publishing Corporation, 1981) pp. 20-21.

<sup>85</sup>V.I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare" in A Historical Anthology: The Guerrilla Reader. ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975) p. 510.

<sup>86</sup>Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975) p. 510.





## 2. Insurgency and Guerrilla Activity

After a relatively short period of time Cuba again became active in the internal affairs of her neighbors. Exploiting the revolutionary potential of Latin America pointed out in the Latter Day Historical Equation and by Chalmers Johnson, the Cubans and Soviets have manipulated events in the Caribbean to the disadvantage of the United States. This resurgence of activity was noted by Thomas Enders in testimony before Congress.

In 1978 Cuba turned once again to Latin America. Central America, where high economic growth had not been matched by political change and where repressive narrowly-based military governments clung to power, seemed ripe for revolution. Cuba's intervention helped tip the scale against the Somoza government in Nicaragua. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Columbia were targeted as follow-ons. In each case Cuba attempted to weld together disparate local revolutionary factions into a unity, provided training in Cuba and supplied--or arranged for the supply of--arms to attack the existing government.<sup>87</sup>

The success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was highly dependent on arms and aid provided by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Initially, Nicaragua professed neutrality, but subsequent actions proved otherwise, despite efforts by the United States to establish and maintain relations with the new junta. An example of this charade was a statement by Nicaragua's Interior Minister Tomas Borge "that his country would avoid buying arms from Communist nations in order to

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<sup>87</sup>U.S. Congress. House. "Issues in United States-Cuban Relations," Hearing Before The Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 December 1982, p. 8.



avoid the pretext to feelings that we are aligning ourselves with them politically."<sup>88</sup> While this sounded good to United States planners, it was soon to show signs of unreality. By January, five Soviet trade and planning officials began a 2 week visit in Nicaragua to advise the Nicaraguan junta on the development of its 1980 economic reactivation plan while also arranging for the sale of 500 tons of coffee.<sup>89</sup> It was in the area of trade and economics that initial contacts appeared, but they progressed to other areas. By March a delegation of the Sandinista Liberation Front of Nicaragua arrived in Moscow for talks with Soviet Communist Party officials (among them party leaders Kirilenko and Ponomarev).<sup>90</sup> This same delegation and officials of the CPSU signed documents on establishing links between the Sandinista Liberation Front and CPSU. They also signed agreements on economic and technical cooperation between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union.<sup>91</sup> In a move to provide the Sandinistas more power and thereby bring Nicaragua closer to the Soviet Union, the Nicaraguan council of state was changed by increasing Sandinista representation from

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<sup>88</sup>Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Latin America Area, 8 August 1979. Microfiche. Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

<sup>89</sup>FBIS, 18 January 1980.

<sup>90</sup>FBIS, 17 March 1980.

<sup>91</sup>FBIS, 19 March 1980.



one-third to a clear majority.<sup>92</sup> So it was that the revolution eventually became subverted to the Soviet cause. From support from the Cubans and Soviet Union, the Nicaraguans moved to support Cuban and Soviet aims through the support of Cuban and Soviet aid as was charged by the United States who released a special "white paper" and a volume of documents to prove that the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist nations provided arms to Salvadoran guerrillas in a "well-coordinated, covert effort" to overthrow the Salvadoran government.<sup>93</sup> While it was in the interest of the Soviets to picture the Salvadoran Guerrillas as oppressed freedom fighters, some nations ignored the similar circumstances of Nicaragua and agreed with the Soviet Union. France and Mexico issued a joint resolution, distributed to the UN Security Council, recognizing the FMLN-FDR opposition as a "representative political force" legitimately entitled to negotiate a political solution to the crisis.<sup>94</sup> While this was seized on by the American press as a reason for the United States to cease support to El Salvador, the response of nine Latin American nations only a few days later was largely ignored. Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, The Dominican Republic, Paraguay and

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<sup>92</sup>FBIS, 21 April 1980.

<sup>93</sup>FBIS, 23 February 1981.

<sup>94</sup>FBIS, 28 August 1981.



Venezuela issued a communique condemning that French-Mexican resolution and accused them of interfering in the internal affairs of El Salvador by favoring one of the subversive extremes trying to seize power.<sup>95</sup> Obviously, those nations see the threat. Nicaragua is a sepping-stone to El Salvador and the other nations are concerned of the outcome.

Ironically, many of the guerrillas that fought to overthrow the Somoza regime have now resumed the fight against the Sandinistas. They feel that the revolution has been betrayed and that the only option is to resume the fight. In a complete reversal, the Sandinistas, who came to power through a Cuban/Soviet-backed guerrilla war, are now decrying United States backing for many of the same guerrillas that assisted in the overthrow of Somoza. These guerrillas are fighting for the same reasons as previously. Now, however, the very actions that placed the Sandinista's in power are an anathema to them and they call upon world opinion and cite international law to end these guerrilla actions. These actions should, however, paint a truer picture of the situation in Nicaragua.

If one looks at Grenada there is more apparent Cuban-Soviet chicanery. With what appeared to be an opening of warmer relations between the Marxist-Socialist government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop in a visit to the United States came a swift response; in a coup led by Finance Minister Bernard

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<sup>95</sup>FBIS, 2 September 1981.





Coard. When thousands of supporters released Bishop, army troops fired on the crowd and led Bishop and several others away at gunpoint. Later it was announced that Bishop, Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman, Education Minister Jacqueline Creft, Housing Minister Norris Bain and two union leaders had been executed.<sup>96</sup> The coup had been taken over by a 16-member ruling "Revolutionary Military Council" led by General Hudson Austin.<sup>97</sup>

The threat to U.S. students at St. Georges Medical School and a request by Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Jamaica and Barbados to take action resulted in the assault.<sup>98</sup> While expecting some Cuban military personnel, the presence of as many as 1,100 Cuban troops and documents indicating that Castro intended to increase that by 341 officers and 4,000 soldiers to bring strength on the island to around 6,800 (including workers) surprised everyone.<sup>99</sup> The additional discovery of three warehouses stocked with weapons, far more than would be necessary to equip the entire Grenadian army and militia, gave the proof that Grenada was not the simple tourist island it proclaimed itself. The size of the Grenadian military in relation to its neighbors, those

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<sup>96</sup> Kenneth W. Banta, "Spice Island Power Play." Time, October 31, 1983, p. 78.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ed Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada." Time, November 7, 1983, p.27.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 26.



that even have a military, ought to have aroused some suspicion. The agreement in May 1980 whereby Grenada granted landing rights to TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft when the new airfield was completed<sup>100</sup> also was indicative of how Grenada was leaning.

It should appear obvious that Bishop was not ousted until he attempted to establish better relations with the United States and spoke of having elections. This would not have guaranteed the Cubans and Soviets a strategic position in the Caribbean and he was therefore ousted, then murdered, despite the exhibited support for Bishop. Popular desires were not part of the equation for Cuban and Soviet planners.

Events in Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada should be more than enough proof that the Soviets, through the Cubans, are slowly attempting to make the Caribbean into an area of unrest. This policy damages United States prestige, and if successful, can endanger the security and well-being of the United States.

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<sup>100</sup>Ed Magnuson, "D-Day in Grenada," Time, November 7, 1983, p. 26.



## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Much of the material presented was toward establishing that the United States does indeed have an interest in the Caribbean. With increasing Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region it is even more important to understand the relationship of the Caribbean to the United States. Considering the interests involved, and working within the constraints and considerations presented earlier, it is now necessary to draw conclusions and the requisite recommendations.

It is simple to see that the Caribbean is of considerable import to the United States. Not only is much of the United States' trade in the region, but the essential shipping routes that feed United States industry also are routed through or near the region. It is essential to maintain those routes and relationships.

Not as easily discerned, or rather, more easily ignored or dismissed, is the relationship of the Soviet Union to the region. The Soviet Union was quick to see United States weaknesses in the area and moved to exploit them. Furthermore, they can work both directly and indirectly through their proxies the Cubans. The Cuban economy is almost totally dependent on subsidies from the Soviet Union. To earn their way the Cubans undertake various tasks for the Soviets, be they combat troops in Angola or training and supplying insurgents



throughout the region. The Soviets can then make major gains at no cost to themselves or their reputation by relying on a local actor to do their "dirty work". Directly, the Soviets offer economic aid, training, schooling, and cultural exchange to the area, all being activities that provide the Soviets with goodwill and a foothold in the region without evoking charges of interference or intervention.

The United States, on the other hand, has a history of intervention in the region that can easily be played upon by nationalists in each country. These nationalist feelings can then be manipulated to the detriment of the United States. Also, the proximity of the United States, and its lack of proxies to influence events in the region, has helped to create the fear of United States involvement in the region. The economic and military might of the United States is very intimidating to the Caribbean countries and a trust that would allay fears of United States might has not been established. To establish trust and secure the region will require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military actions.

#### A. ECONOMIC/DIPLOMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the greatest stumbling blocks to United States relations in the region revolves around what is now called the New Economic Order (NEO) put forward by the countries of the Third World. The Third World feels that the developed countries have taken advantage of the less-developed and developing





countries. To accept the terms of the NEO outright would be both foolish and counter-productive to all. Instead, what is needed is for the United States to work with the Caribbean nations, preferably through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), to develop plans for the economic development of each country based on realistic capabilities and objectives. Rather than giving aid directly to each country and allowing them to spend it as they will, route that same funding through CARICOM for distribution. Distribution should be based on feasibility and long-term effects in each country, with a panel of impartial experts utilized as a deciding body. Each nation would need some guarantees of aid in order to avoid politics entering into discussion, but only a guarantee that they could receive the aid based on the panel's report. To further assist development, United States influence in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank could be employed to aid worthwhile plans, based on realizable repayment of all loans. Other assistance could be forthcoming through United Nations organizations that the United States plays a major contributing part in. With the United States only assisting through other agencies, the fear of direct involvement or dictation of plans is avoided while amassing substantial goodwill.

Furthermore, a rapprochement between multinational corporations and the Caribbean countries should be realized. Rather than arguing over equitable economic rents or taxing profits, it would be more rational to establish a profit-sharing and/or



some form of partial ownership system between each country and the multinational corporation. This gives the multinational the assurance and the incentive to establish industry or remain in a country while the country then has an incentive to work with the multinational to maximize profits and, thereby, its own revenues. The incentive for the multinational to attempt this may be induced by changes in the tax laws to allow the corporation to write off the share of profits paid to the country as a business expense and any partnership deals as a deduction. Encouragement should also be given to placing nationals on executive boards and in positions of leadership, along with running training programs to train nationals in all aspects of plant operation. These compromises give all concerned an interest in the preservation and efficient operation of the facility. This interest could alleviate bad feelings toward multinationals and the United States while also producing economically sound bases with which foreign countries may realize profits for use in their own countries.

On a more grandiose scale, the United States, jointly with the Organization of American States, should initiate action to lift the embargo from Cuba. Many countries are currently ignoring it anyway, and it mainly serves to provoke resentment among the people the United States should be working with. It is currently excellent propaganda in the hands of the Cubans who point to it as United States aggression and use it to mobilize support for the Castro government. To date it has mostly



been a counterproductive policy and should be curtailed. Maximum advantage should be made of Cuba's extended position as a Soviet satellite and its poor economic performance. Trade and exposure with the OAS, United States and Western powers may make gradual inroads into the Cuban economy, reducing their will to continue living under wartime conditions fearing imminent invasion. It is a policy that should be undertaken now, while Fidel Castro is still alive and ruling the island. Currently, Fidel Castro is enjoying the benefits of a "cult of personality" type of leadership. When he either dies or relinquishes control, it would be beneficial to have some other group than the fidelistas or raullistas, who are hard-core anti-United States, assume the reins of power. A softening of the United States position on the embargo would encourage and support more moderate factions in Cuba. If Castro claims responsibility for a United States backdown, it doesn't matter as long as the United States be the one to initiate the proceedings for renouncing the embargo. This should make it apparent that the United States has developed a new policy for the Caribbean; one of cooperation rather than coercion. The fear of the giant to the north must be reduced. The best way to accomplish this is not through obvious threats, but through cooperation. Americans know that it is highly unlikely that the United States would invade Cuba without very serious provocation, as does the Cuban leadership, so bluster does no more than to promote Cuban nationalism. This does



not mean that the United States force levels should be reduced in the region, rather their presence should be quietly increased. The old slogan of "speak softly, but carry a big stick" still applies. The rapid and effective use of force in Grenada yielded numerous beneficial results in other areas:

Nicaragua: 1000 Cuban advisors have left and offer to send remainder home if United States advisors leave also,  
-hinted that elections will be held in 1985,  
-made overtures to Catholic Church and business community,  
-eased censorship slightly,  
-agreed to regional peace talks,  
-announced that Salvadoran rebels are no longer welcome on Nicaraguan soil,  
Suriname: ordered the Cuban ambassador home,  
Cuba: a setback to revolutionary activity in Caribbean,  
Grenada: strong pro-United States feelings created.

Diplomatically, consideration should be given to recognizing Cuba and normalizing relations. As has been frequently noted, recognition does not imply approval. Normalization would assist United States efforts in dealing with Cuba by not dealing with them as a non-state. It will also serve to eliminate another Cuban propaganda device and to further show a change of attitude in the Caribbean. If properly handled, it need not be seen as weakness, instead, it needs to be presented as dealing with Cuba from a position of strength.

Another aspect that requires consideration is the state of affairs in agriculture in most of these countries. To begin with, some form of land reform is necessary to erase the discontent of the latifundist past. For this to be successful requires a gradual distribution of land based on ability to





work it. In conjunction with this would be an agricultural training program to acquaint the farmers with the best suited procedures and crops for the area. The United States should promote such programs as Vista and the Peace Corps and assist in providing seed to the area. This could prove to be beneficial to the individuals and countries involved in the program as it provides the small farmers with a stake in the future.

There is another aspect to consider, however, that of military relationships. Due to the poor economic conditions in the area, insurgencies have an excellent breeding ground. While the previous economic and diplomatic proposals could improve the situation, it is not to the advantage of the insurgents to have any beneficial changes take place. It is correct to assume that they will do all that they can to prevent or counter change that may prove detrimental to their cause. Therefore, it is necessary to include the military in any program for the region.

#### B. MILITARY/COUNTER-INSURGENT RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States has vital economic and military interests in the Caribbean, and accordingly, must take action to ensure their safety and security.

No longer can the United States consider the Caribbean a secure area which requires minimal expenditure of military force as a presence. An increased operating tempo for all forces is necessary, including joint activities with nations



of the region. The current Big Pine II exercises in the Caribbean are an excellent case in point. Not only is the United States showing a commitment to the region and receiving excellent training opportunities, but other nations are benefiting through cooperation with those forces. On a lesser scale there are many activities that can be jointly conducted. In the area of drug interdiction, the United States Air Force and Navy could fly joint surveillance flights, perhaps with some crew members or visitors from involved countries. The Navy could also work with local navies and coastal forces in the same area. Fisheries patrol is another area of possible cooperation. All efforts should be made to meaningfully employ joint forces in the region.

Also called for is a strengthening of United States air and coastal defenses. The United States must not appear vulnerable in this area. Basing and activity of air and naval forces should be such as to secure free and open sea lines of communication (SLOC) under any contingency. Negotiating from weakness is always a bad policy when it can be foreseen and avoided.

In the area of insurgency the United States must continue its policy of non-involvement of combat troops. The United States public suffers from an acute case of "Vietnam Syndrome" and any involvement of United States combat troops in local insurgencies would immediately be labeled "another Vietnam", irregardless of the situation. The United States public also



has little patience. The mission in Grenada was approved by the populace because it was quick and successful. If the troops had become bogged down in a guerrilla war, the public reaction would have been far different. The policy of training and supporting local forces to handle insurgencies is the correct path. Emphasis needs to be placed on training the officer corps of each country also. In the Caribbean, most of the militaries have an entrenched upper command, but the lower ranking officers are more amenable to counter-insurgent training. They must also be impressed with the idea that there are limits to the use of force. Local populaces are not won over by brute force. They may comply with the demands, but the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the civilian populace will be lost. Public works by the military will make a lasting impression. Bringing in doctors and nurses, repairing buildings, and non-interference with public life, as far as possible, will produce positive results. Right-wing death squads are as much the enemy as the insurgents, possibly more so, since they undermine support for the government. As such, they must be eliminated.

To defeat the insurgent does not only mean the defeat of his military force and political structure in an area, since they can be rebuilt, it requires attainment of the support of the populace. If the populace does not support the insurgent, or is at least apathetic, the insurgent cannot function. To attain support from the populace, the government must adopt



the cause of the insurgents and make it their own. Propaganda, however, is not enough to do this. It requires concrete, long-term action on the part of the government to achieve. If the problem, or cause, is being solved, the insurgency loses its momentum. Even if another cause is then espoused, the goodwill toward the government has increased and made the insurgents task more difficult.

The problem with this type of counter-insurgency is that it is long and costly. The governments will need the support of the United States to affect it. The costs to the United States may seem heavy, but the cost if it is not borne may be even heavier. The long-run needs to be emphasized over short-term considerations.

#### C. CONCLUSIONS

First, improve diplomatic relations with Cuba. Any lessening of hostility from that quarter can only benefit United States interests in the region and should improve the image of the United States throughout the region.

Secondly, work with the countries of the region to help solve their economic problems. Improvements in their industrial and agricultural areas should also spillover into the middle-class realm also. As these countries improve and stabilize, the region becomes of less strategic concern to the United States since its interests will be viewed as secure.





Third, the United States must establish a credible military force in the region. The appearance of weakness invites exploitation. There is no need to threaten; a quiet establishment of presence is more than sufficient.

Fourth, the United States should work with governments in the region in support of counter-insurgency operations. This should be done in conjunction with their being aided economically so as to benefit the local populaces. The United States need not tolerate despotic acts by local rulers and it should be made obvious that the interest of the United States is in the country and not a particular ruling elite.

Fifth and lastly, the United States populace needs to be informed as to what the United States is doing in the region in straightforward, non-ideological terms. Any policy worked out for the region can only be successful in the long-run if the American people understand and support it. Without that support, no matter how well thought out or intentioned, the policy will fail.




APPENDIX A: ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTES

Trade Route

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Atlantic/East Coast South America                                    | 1         |
| Atlantic/West Coast South America                                    | 2         |
| Atlantic/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico                             | 4         |
| North Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe                 | 5-7-8-9   |
| North Atlantic/Scandinavia and Baltic                                | 6         |
| North Atlantic/Med. Black Sea and Portugal                           | 10        |
| South Atlantic/United Kingdom and Continental Europe                 | 11        |
| Atlantic/Far East  | 12        |
| South Atlantic and Gulf/Med, Black Sea and Portugal                  | 13        |
| Atlantic/West Africa   | 14-1 (41) |
| Gulf/West Africa   | 14-2 (42) |
| Atlantic/South and East Africa                                       | 15-A (51) |
| Gulf/South and East Africa   | 15-B (52) |
| Atlantic and Gulf/Australasia  | 16        |
| Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific/Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore         | 17        |
| Atlantic and Gulf/India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea                    | 18        |
| Gulf/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico                                 | 19        |
| Gulf/East Coast South America  | 20        |
| Gulf/United Kingdom and Continental Europe                           | 21        |
| Gulf/Far East  | 22        |
| Pacific/Caribbean and East Coast Mexico                              | 23        |
| Pacific/East Coast South America                                     | 24        |
| Pacific/West Coast South America                                     | 25        |
| Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/UK and Continental Europe                 | 26        |
| Pacific and Hawaii/Australasia                                       | 27        |
| Pacific/India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea                              | 28        |
| Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska/Far East                                  | 29        |
| Gulf/West Coast South America  | 31        |
| Great Lakes/United Kingdom and Continental Europe                    | TA I      |
| Great Lakes/West, East and South Africa                              | TA II     |
| Great Lakes/Caribbean and South America                              | TA III    |
| Great Lakes/Med, India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea                     | TA IV     |
| Great Lakes/Far East, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australasia | TA V      |






UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 1 U.S. ATLANTIC-EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 20 U.S. GULF-EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 24 U.S. PACIFIC-EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TA III U.S. GREAT LAKES-CARIBBEAN, EAST & WEST COASTS SOUTH AMERICA






**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 2 U.S. ATLANTIC—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 25 U.S. PACIFIC—W. C. SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO & BALBOA
- TR 31 U.S. GULF—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 71 U.S. ATLANTIC—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO
- TR 72 U.S. GULF—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO








**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 4** U.S. ATLANTIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 19** U.S. GULF-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 23** U.S. PACIFIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 77** U.S. ATLANTIC-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE
- TR 78** U.S. GULF-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE






**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 5-7-8-9** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE
- TR 6** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-SCANDINAVIAN AND BALTIC PORTS
- TR 11** U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 21** U.S. GULF-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 26** U.S. PACIFIC/HAWAII/ALASKA-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TA I** U.S. GREAT LAKES-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE, & BALTIC PORTS




**TR 6** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-SCANDINAVIAN AND BALTIC PORTS



**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 5-7-8-9** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE
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- TR 11** U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 21** U.S. GULF-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 26** U.S. PACIFIC/HAWAII/ALASKA-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TA I** U.S. GREAT LAKES-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE, & BALTIC PORTS






UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 10** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES
- TR 13** U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC/GULF-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES
- TR 65** U.S. PACIFIC-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES






TR 11 U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS



UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES


- TR 5-7-8-9 U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE
- TR 6 U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC—SCANDINAVIAN AND BALTIC PORTS
- TR 11 U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 21 U.S. GULF—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 26 U.S. PACIFIC/HAWAII/ALASKA—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TAI U.S. GREAT LAKES—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE, & BALTIC PORTS





**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**  
**TR 12 U.S. ATLANTIC-FAR EAST**  
**TR 22 U.S. GULF-FAR EAST**  
**TR 29 U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII, ALASKA-FAR EAST**






UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 10** U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES
- TR 13** U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC/GULF-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES
- TR 65** U.S. PACIFIC-MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA, PORTUGAL & SOUTHERN SPAIN, MOROCCO, AZORES



**TR 41 U.S. ATLANTIC-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 41** \* U.S. ATLANTIC-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 42** \* U.S. GULF-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 43** U.S. PACIFIC-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 51** \* U.S. ATLANTIC-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 52** \* U.S. GULF-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 53** U.S. PACIFIC-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TA II** U.S. GREAT LAKES-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND

\* ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTE DESIGNATIONS 41 (14-1) 42 (14-2) 51 (15-A) 52 (15-B)








UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 41 \* U.S. ATLANTIC-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 42 \* U.S. GULF-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 43 U.S. PACIFIC-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 51 \* U.S. ATLANTIC-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 52 \* U.S. GULF-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 53 U.S. PACIFIC-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TA II U.S. GREAT LAKES-WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND

\* ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTE DESIGNATIONS. 41 (14-1) 42 (14-2) 51 (15-A) 52 (15-B)






UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 41 ° U.S. ATLANTIC—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 42 ° U.S. GULF—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 43 U.S. PACIFIC—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 51 ° U.S. ATLANTIC—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 52 ° U.S. GULF—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 53 U.S. PACIFIC—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TA II U.S. GREAT LAKES—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS-SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND

\*ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTE DESIGNATIONS. 41 114-11 42 114-21 51 115-A1 52 115-B1





UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 41 ° U.S. ATLANTIC--WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 42 ° U.S. GULF--WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 43 ° U.S. PACIFIC--WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 51 ° U.S. ATLANTIC--SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 52 ° U.S. GULF--SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 53 ° U.S. PACIFIC--SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TA II ° U.S. GREAT LAKES--WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS, SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND

\* ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTE DESIGNATIONS. 41 (14-1) 42 (14-2) 51 (15-A) 52 (15-B)










**TR 17 U.S. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC—INDONESIA, MALAYSIA & SINGAPORE**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 17** U.S. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC—INDONESIA, MALAYSIA & SINGAPORE
- TR 18** U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TR 28** U.S. PACIFIC—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TA IV** U.S. GREAT LAKES—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA, MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA



**TR 18 U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF-INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 17** U.S. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC-INDONESIA, MALAYSIA & SINGAPORE
- TR 18** U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF-INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TR 28** U.S. PACIFIC-INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TA IV** U.S. GREAT LAKES-INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA, MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA



**TR 19 U.S. GULF-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)**



**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 4** U.S. ATLANTIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 19** U.S. GULF-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 23** U.S. PACIFIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 77** U.S. ATLANTIC-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE
- TR 78** U.S. GULF-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE











TR 21 U.S. GULF—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS



UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 5-7-8-9 U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE
- TR 6 U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC—SCANDINAVIAN AND BALTIC PORTS
- TR 11 U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 21 U.S. GULF—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TR 26 U.S. PACIFIC/HAWAII/ALASKA—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EUROPE, NO. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS
- TA I U.S. GREAT LAKES—UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE, & BALTIC PORTS





**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**


**TR 12** U.S. ATLANTIC-FAR EAST

**TR 22** U.S. GULF-FAR EAST

**TR 29** U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII, ALASKA-FAR EAST

11 22 U.S. GULF-FAR EAST





**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**


**TR 12 U.S. ATLANTIC-FAR EAST**

**TR 22 U.S. GULF-FAR EAST**

**TR 29 U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII, ALASKA-FAR EAST**



**TR 23 U.S. PACIFIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)**




**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 4** U.S. ATLANTIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 19** U.S. GULF-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 23** U.S. PACIFIC-CARIBBEAN (INCLUDING CRISTOBAL & E. C. MEXICO)
- TR 77** U.S. ATLANTIC-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE
- TR 78** U.S. GULF-PACIFIC CANAL ZONE








UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR 1 U.S. ATLANTIC—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 20 U.S. GULF—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 24 U.S. PACIFIC—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TA III U.S. GREAT LAKES—CARIBBEAN, EAST & WEST COASTS SOUTH AMERICA



**TR 25 U.S. PACIFIC—W. C. SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO & BALBOA**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**


- TR 2** U.S. ATLANTIC—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 25** U.S. PACIFIC—W. C. SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO & BALBOA
- TR 31** U.S. GULF—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 71** U.S. ATLANTIC—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO
- TR 72** U.S. GULF—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO



TR 26 U.S. PACIFIC/HAWAII/ALASKA-UNITED KINGDOM, EIRE, CONTINENTAL EURDPE, ND. SPAIN, SCANDINAVIAN, BALTIC PORTS







**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

**TR 16** U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF-AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS

**TR 27** U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII-AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS.



**TA V** U.S. GREAT LAKES-AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE & FAR EAST











**UNITED STATES  
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**


TR 12 U.S. ATLANTIC—FAR EAST

TR 22 U.S. GULF—FAR EAST

TR 29 U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII, ALASKA—FAR EAST



**TR 31 U.S. GULF—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA**



**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 2** U.S. ATLANTIC—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 25** U.S. PACIFIC—W. C. SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO & BALBOA
- TR 31** U.S. GULF—WEST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 71** U.S. ATLANTIC—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO
- TR 72** U.S. GULF—W. C. CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO










**1A II U.S. GREAT LAKES—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS. SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 41** \* U.S. ATLANTIC—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 42** \* U.S. GULF—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 43** \* U.S. PACIFIC—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS
- TR 51** \* U.S. ATLANTIC—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 52** \* U.S. GULF—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- TR 53** \* U.S. PACIFIC—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND
- IA II** \* U.S. GREAT LAKES—WEST AFRICA/CANARY, CAPE VERDE & MADEIRA ISLANDS—SOUTH & EAST AFRICA, MALAGASY REPUBLIC, BRITISH WEST AFRICA, ST. HELENA & ASCENSION ISLAND

\*ESSENTIAL TRADE ROUTE DESIGNATIONS 41 (14-1) 42 (14-2) 51 (16-A) 52 (15-B)






UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES

- TR I U.S. ATLANTIC—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 20 U.S. GULF—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TR 24 U.S. PACIFIC—EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA
- TA III U.S. GREAT LAKES—CARIBBEAN, EAST & WEST COASTS SOUTH AMERICA



**TA IV U.S. GREAT LAKES—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA, MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA**




**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 17** U.S. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC—INDONESIA, MALAYSIA & SINGAPORE
- TR 18** U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TR 28** U.S. PACIFIC—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA
- TA IV** U.S. GREAT LAKES—INDIA, PERSIAN GULF & RED SEA, PAKISTAN & BURMA, MEDITERRANEAN & BLACK SEA



**TA V** U.S. GREAT LAKES—AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS., INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE & FAR EAST



**UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES**

- TR 16** U.S. ATLANTIC & GULF—AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS.
- TR 27** U.S. PACIFIC, HAWAII—AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS.
- TA V** U.S. GREAT LAKES—AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NEW GUINEA & SO. SEA IS., INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE & FAR EAST





APPENDIX B: CARIBBEAN MILITARY FORCES

COLOMBIA:

Army: 57,000 (28,500 Conscripts)

10 Infantry Brigades

1 Training Brigade, including Presidential Guard

1 Independent Mechanized Group

1 Ranger Battalion

1 Parachute Battalion

1 AA Battalion

12 M-3A1 lt tks; 41 M-8, 200 EE-9 Cascavel armd cars,

15 EE-11 Urutu, 45 M-3A2 halftrack, M-113A1 APC,

48 M-101 105mm how; 125 81mm, 148 107mm mor; 30

M1A1 40mm AA guns

RESERVES: 70,000

NAVY: 9,000 (including 5000 marines)

2 Type 209 subs

2 SX-506 midget subs (in reserve)

3 destroyers: 2 Halland (1 in reserve), 1 US Sumner

1 US Courtney frigate

3 US Cherokee large patrol craft

6 gunboats: 2 Ashville, 3 Arauca, 1 Barronquilla

2 coastal, 8 river patrol craft

2 marine battalions

(On order: 4 FV-1500 corvettes (1 for delivery 1983))

Bases: Cartagena, Buenaventura

Air Force: 4,200; 28 combat aircraft, 10 armed helicopters

Combat Command

1 fighter squadron: 12 Mirage 5 COA, 2 5COR, 2 5COR, 2 5COD

1 COIN squadron with 12 AT-33A (A37-D to replace)

1 recce hel sqn: 10 Hughes 500C (OH-64A)

Military Air Transport Command:

Transport Squadron: 1 C-130E, 4 C-54, 20 C-47, 3 HS-748

3 Arara, 2 F-28, 10 DHC-2, 1 Aero

Commander 560A

Helicopter Squadron: 19 UH-1B1H, 13 Bell 205A1, 20

SA-315B Lama

Training and Support Command:

11 T-37C, 27 T-41D, 3 RT-33, 12 T-33A, 25 T-34 A/B,

10 A-37B ac; 8 Bell 47(OH-13) hel.

AAM: R-530

(On order: 12 Kfir C-2 FGA, 12 A-37D COIN, 14 EMB-326

Xavante trg ac; 12 UH-1H hel; AIM/RIM-7F Sparrow AAM,

ASM)

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO) 500.

Para-Military Forces: National Police Force 50,000; 1 HS-748ac,

30 hel. Coastguard, 9 Craft.



CUBA:

Army 125,000 (75,000 conscripts)

2 Army, 4 Corps HQ

1 Armd division

3 Mech divisions

6 Inf divisions

1 AB assault brigade; Special Force (35,00 men)

Some artillery brigades

AFV: 350 T-34, 250 T-54/55, some 60 T-62 MBT, PT-76

lt tks, BRDM-1/2 armd cars; some 100 BMP MICV;

400-40/60/152 APC.

Artillery: 1,200 guns / howitzers including: 76mm, 85 mm,

100 SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm; BM-21

122mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-24 240mm MRL; 50

FROG-4 SSM; M-43 120mm mortar.

ATK: 57mm guns; 57mm RCL; Sagger, Sapper ATGW

AD: 1,500 AA guns including: ZU-23, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm,

100mm towed, ZSU-23-4 23mm, 30mm M-53 (twin)/

VTR-60P, ZSU-57 57mm SP, SA-7 SAM.

Reserves: 190,000

Navy: 12,000 (8,500 Conscripts)

3 subs: 2 Soviet F-class; 1 W-class (non-operational, trg)

1 Soviet Koni Frigate

11 Soviet large patrol craft: 9 OSA-1, 2 Kronshtadt.

26 Soviet FAC(M) with Styx SSM: 5 Osa-I, 13 OSA-II, 8 Komar

26 Soviet FAC(T): 8 Turya, 6 P6, 12 P-4

22 Soviet Zhuk FAC (P); 12 coastal patrol craft

12 Soviet minesweepers: 2 Sonya, Yevgenya

2 Polnocny LSM, 7 T-4 LCM

Naval Infantry: some 350

Bases: Cienfuegos, Cabanas, Mariel, Punta Ballenatos, Banes.

Air Force: 16,000 (11,000 conscripts), 250 combat ac, 38 combat hel.

4 FGA squadrons: 1 with 15 Mig-17, 3 with 36 Mig-23 BN

Flogger F

16 Interceptor squadrons: 2 with 30 Mig-21F, 3 with 34 21 PFM,

2 with 20 21PFMA, 8 with 100 21 bis,

1 with 15 Mig-23 Flogger E

4 Transport Squadrons: 16 Il-14, 35 AN-2, 22 AN-26, 4 Yak-40.

8 Helicopter Squadrons: 60 Mi-4, 40 Mi-8 (perhaps 20 armd),

18 Mi-24 Hind D.

Trainers include: 2 Mig-23U, 10 Mig-21U, some An-2,

30 Zlin 326, some L-39.

AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid

28 SAM bns with 60 SA-2, 140 SA-3; 2 with 12 SA-6

Forces Abroad: Angola 25,000; Congo 750; Ethiopia 11,000;

Mozambique 750; Other Africa 500; S. Yemen

300, Nicaragua 1,000.

Para-Military Forces: Ministry of Interior: State Security

15,000; Frontier Guards 3,500; some 22 craft. Ministry of

Defence: Youth Labor Army 100,000; Civil Defence Force

100,000; Territorial Militia 500,000.



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:

Army: 14,000

3 Infantry Brigades

1 Field Artillery Regiment (2 Battalions)

1 AA Artillery Battalion

1 Mixed Armored Battalion

1 Presidential Guard Battalion

1 Engineer Battalion

20 AML armd cars; 6 V-150 Commando, 20 M3A1 half-track  
APC; 20 M-101 105mm how; 24 120mm mor; 20 40mm AA guns.

Navy: 4,500 including naval infantry

1 Canadian River frigate (training)

5 US corvettes: 2 Admirable (ex-minesweepers), 3 Cohoes

5 large patrol craft (3 US Argo, in reserve)

8 coastal patrol craft

1 LSM, 2 LCU

1 naval infantry battalion; 1 commando unit

(on order: 3 PTF-23 patrol boats)

Bases: Santo Domingo, Bani, Haina

Air Force: 4,000; 19 combat aircraft

1 fighter squadron with 8 F-51D Mustang, 11 T-34B Mentor

1 transport squadron with 5 C-47, 1 DHC-2, 1 Aero Commander

1 helicopter squadron with 2 Bell 205A-1, 2 UH-12E, 6 OH-6A,  
3 Alouette II/III, 2 H-19, 2 UH-1

1 Presidential transport flight with 1 SA-365 Dauphin 2

Training: 12 T-6G, 2 AT-11, 2 T-33A, 3 Cessna 170, 4 T-410,  
T-34

Para-Military Forces: Gendarmerie 10,000.

EL SALVADOR:

Army: 22,000

6 Infantry brigades

1 Mechanized Cavalry Regiment

1 Artillery Brigade

1 Engineer Battalion

1 Artillery Brigade (2 Battalions)

1 AA Artillery Battalion

1 Parachute Battalion

1 Special Forces Battalion

12 AMX-13 lt tks, 18 AML-90 armd cars; 10 M-113, 20  
UR-416 APC; 30 M-101, 6 M-56 105mm, 6 M-114 155mm  
how; 81mm, 8 UB-M52 120mm mor; 57mm, M-20 75mm  
RCL; LAW RL; 20mm, 6/70 40mm AA guns.

Reserves: 12 infantry regiments

Navy: 300

10 patrol boats

Air Force: 2,350 (including AD and security gp); 36 combat ac,  
19 combat hel.

2 FGA squadrons: 1 with 4 Ouragan, 6 A-37

1 ltCOIN squadron with 7 Magister, 15 Rallye

1 Recce unit with 4 O-2

1 Transport Squadron with 5 C-47, 2 DC-6B, 5 Aram, 2 C-123

2 Helicopter Squadrons: 1 COIN with 19 UH-1H; 1 SAR/liason  
with 3 Lama, 2 Alouette III, 1 FH-1100.



Training: 3 T-34, 8 T-6, 6 T-41, 9 Cessna (7 180, 1 182, 1 185)  
(On order: tpt ac, hel)  
Para-Military Forces: National Guard 3,500; National Police  
4,000; Treasury Police 2,000; Orden  
(territorial civil defence force) perhaps  
70,000 (2,000 effective)

GUATEMALA:

Army: 20,000

5 Regional Brigade HQ  
1 Presidential Guard Brigade  
1 Armored Battalion  
17 Infantry Battalions  
4 Field Artillery Groups (12 Batteries)  
1 AA Artillery Group (2 Batteries)  
2 Parachute/Special Forces Battalions  
1 Engineer Battalion  
4 Recce Squadrons  
8 AMX-13, 7 M-3A1 lt tks; 8 M-8, 10 RBY-1, 6 M3A1,  
10 M4A1/3 armd cars; 15 M-113, 7 V-150 Commando APC;  
12 M-116 75mm, 36 M-101 105mm how; M-1 81mm, 12  
M-30 4.2 in (107mm), 12 EClA 120mm mor; 12 M/A1  
40mm AA guns.

Navy: 960 including 650 marines

15 coastal patrol craft  
1 LCM; 2 small troop carriers  
8 small craft; some armed  
12 Zodiac-type assault boats (marines)  
Bases: Santo Tomas de Castillas, Sipacate.

Air Force: 600, 16 combat ac, 4 combat hel

1 COIN Squadron: 10 A-37B, 6 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer  
1 Transport Squadron: 1 DC-6B, 10 C-47, 11 Arava  
1 Comms Squadron with 17 Cessna: 4 170 A/B, 8 172K, 2 180,  
2 U-206C, 1 310.  
1 Helicopter Squadron with 25 Bell: 9UH-10 (4 armed), 1 Bell 212,  
6 412, 5 206B, 4 206L-1.  
1 Presidential Flight with 1 Super King Air 2000

Training: 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer, 5 T-33A, 3 T-37C, 12 T-41

Para-Military Forces: National Police 9,500; Treasury Police  
2,100; Territorial Militia (300,000) forming.

HONDURAS:

Army: 13,500 (10,000 Conscripts)

3 Infantry Brigades  
1 Armored Car Regiment  
11 Infantry Battalions (1 Airborne)  
3 Artillery Battalions  
1 Engineer Battalion  
1 Special Forces Battalion  
16 Scorpion lt tks; 12 RBY MK 1 recce veh; M-1 81mm,  
M-2 4.2in (107mm), 30 120mm mor; 57mm, 106mm RCL.





Navy: 500 (50 conscripts)  
8 Swiftships patrol craft: 3 105-foot fast, 5 65-foot coastal  
Bases: Puerto Cortes, Amapala  
Air Force: 1,200 (200 conscripts), 26 combat ac.  
1 FGA Squadron with 12 Super Mystere B2  
1 Coin Squadron with 4 F-86E Sabre; 10 A-37B.  
1 Transport Squadron with 11 C-47, 2 Arava, 1 Electra, 1 Westwind  
1 Support Squadron with 1 Beech Baron, 4 Cessna (2 180, 2 185),  
1 Piper PA-31 Cheyenne ac, 2 S-76 hel  
1 Helicopter Squadron with 10 UH-1H (on loan), 5 UH-1B  
Training: 12 T-28A, 7 T-41A  
Para-Military Forces: Public Security Forces (FUCEP)  
(national police) 4,500

#### NICARAGUA:

Army: 47,000 (including 25,000 reservists)  
7 Military Regions  
3 Armored Battalions  
10 Infantry Battalions (being reorganized)  
1 Field Artillery Group (3 Battalions)  
1 Engineer Battalion  
1 AA Artillery Group (9 Batteries; with Air Force)  
3 M4A3, 45 T-54/55 MBT; BRDM-2, 20 Staghound armd  
cars; 12 BTR-60 APC; 12 105mm how; 12 D-30, some D-20  
152mm gun/how; BM-21 122mm MRL; 24 120mm mor;  
48 ZIS-2 57mm ATK guns.  
Navy: 300  
4 Dabur, 1 Sewart, 8 other coastal patrol craft, 1 LCM  
(On order: 2 French patrol craft)  
Air Force: 1,500 including Air Defence; 10 Combat ac  
1 COIN Squadron: 3 T-33A, 3 T-28D, 4 SF-260 Warrior  
1 Transport Squadron: 1 C-212A, 1 Arava, 4 C-47  
1 Helicopter Squadron: 2 OH-6A, 2 Alouette III, 2 Mi-8 Hip  
Air Defense (Army/Air Force): 138 ZPU-4 14.5mm, ZU-23  
23mm and 6 M-1939 37mm guns, SA-7 SAM.  
(On order: 100 Matra LRF-2 68mm ASM pods)  
Reserves: (all services) 50,000, 25,000 on duty in Army  
Para-Military Forces: Border Guard, some 4,000 (under Army)  
6 Battalions Civilian Militia, perhaps  
30,000. Ministry of Interior troops.

#### VENEZUELA:

Army: 27,500  
5 Divisional HQ (regional)  
1 Armored Brigade (3 medium, 1 light tank battalions)  
1 Ranger Brigade (2 Parachute Battalions)  
1 Cavalry Battalion (horsed)  
26 Infantry Battalions (2 Mechanized, 11 heavy, 13 light(jungle))  
4 Artillery Groups, 1 AA Artillery Group  
5 Engineer Battalions  
75 AMX-30 MBT; 40 AMX-13 lt tks; 10 AML-245, 12 M-8,  
60 M706E1 armd cars; 25 AMX VCI, 100 V-100 APC;



40 75mm, 50 AA-56 105mm, 35 M-101 105mm towed,  
20 MK F3 155mm SP how; 25 160mm SP MRL; 81mm  
120mm mor; 35 M-18 76mm SP ATK guns; 106mm  
RCL; SS-11, AS-11 ATGW; 50 40mm AA guns.

Army Aviation

1 Transport Squadron with 1 Islander, 2 Queen Air, 2 King Air  
1 Helicopter Squadron with 1 Bell 206B, 7 UH-1D/H  
(On order: 2 G-222 transport ac)

Navy: 8,500 including naval air and marines

3 subs: 2 Type 209, 1 US Guppy II  
6 Sucre (Lupo) frigates with 8 Otomat SSM, 1x8 Albatross/  
Aspide SAM, 1 hel.

3 Vosper Thornycroft FAC (M) with 2 Otomat SSM  
1 LST, 2 LSM, 12 LCVP (all US)

2 US transports  
(On order: 4 LST)

Naval Air Force: 6 combat hel

1 ASW Helicopter Squadron (afloat) with 6 MB-212AS  
1 SAR Squadron with 3 C-212/200 MR  
2 Transport Squadron: 1 DHC-7, 1 HS-748, 1 King Air,  
2 Cessna 310/310R, 2 402 ac, 6 Bell  
47J hel.

(On order: 2 Cosa C-212 Ariocar transports, 6 AB-212 ASW hel)

Marines: 4,500

3 Battalions  
LVTP-7 APC, M-42 SP 40mm AA guns

Coastguard:

2 Heavy Cutters (Almirante Clemente frigates)  
3 Vosper Thornycroft FAC (G) '121 ft'  
1 Squadron with 6 S-2E Trackers ac

Bases: Caracas, Puerto Cabello, La Guaira, Puerto de Hierro,  
Falcon

Air Force: 4,500; 79 combat ac

2 Light Bomber/Recce Squadrons: 20 Canberra (12 B-8s, 5 B(5)-82,  
1 PR-83, 2 T-84)

1 FGA Squadron: 12 Mirages (5 III EV, 5 5V, 2 5DV)

2 Interceptor/FGA Squadrons: 1 with 14 CF-5A, 2 CF-5D; 1 with  
10 Mirage III EV, 4 5V, 2 5DV

1 COIN Squadron with 15 OV-10E Bronco

1 Presidential (Transport) Squadron with 1 Boeing 737, 1 DC-9,  
1 Gulfstream 2, 1 Cessna 500 ac;  
2 Bell UH-1H hel

2 Transport Squadrons with 5 C-130H, 5 C-47, 7 C-123A, 2 G-222

2 Utility/Liason/Recce Squadrons with 3 King Air, 9 Queen Air,  
8 Cessna 182N ac; 4 Bell 47G,  
13 Alouette III hel

1 Helicopter Squadron with 14 Bell (10UH-1D/H, 2 214ST, 2 412)

Training: 12 Jet Provost, 20 T-2D Buckeye (12 armed), 23  
T-34 Mentor

AAM: R-530 Magic

1 Parachute Battalion

(On order: 18 F-16A, 15 CF-5A ftrs, 6 G-222 tpt, 4 CF-5B, 6  
F-16 B/D trg ac)



Para-Military Forces: Fuerza Armada de Cooperacion: 20,000:  
25 UR-416 MICV; 15 Shortland APC; 120  
60mm mor; 3 Arava, 1 Islander, 1 King  
Air ac; 3 Agusta 109A, 3 Bell (2 206B,  
1 214ST) hel; 40 coastal patrol craft.

#### HAITI

Army: 6,300  
Presidential Guard (2 Infantry Battalion, 2 Artillery Battery)  
1 Infantry Battalion  
Garrison detachments  
5 M-5A1 lt lks; 6 V-150 Commando APC; 2 75mm, 4 M-101  
105mm how; 81mm mor; M-18 57mm RCL; M-3 37mm, M-1  
57mm ATK guns  
Navy: 300 (Coastguard)  
15 coastal patrol craft  
Air Force: 200  
8 A-37 COIN  
4 C-47, 3 DHC-3, 1 Baron, 1 Cessna 310, 1 402 transports  
3 Cessna 150, 1 172, 1 Bonanza training ac  
6 S-58/CH-34C, 2 Hughes 267C, 2 369C hel  
Para-Military Forces: (police) 14,900

#### PANAMA:

Army: 1500  
7 light infantry groups  
16 V-150 armd cars  
Navy: 300 (Coastguard)  
6 patrol craft  
2 LSM  
3 LCM  
3 support vessels  
Air Force: 200  
15 transport ac  
12 lt ac  
20 hel  
Para-Military Forces: (7,500)  
Panama Maintains para-military forces only

#### TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:

Army: 500  
1 Infantry Battalion  
1 Reserve Battalion  
1 Support Battalion  
6 81mm mor  
Navy: 250 (Coastguard)  
6 large patrol craft  
7 coastal patrol craft.  
Air Force: 50  
1 Cessna 402 ac  
2 Gazelle hel  
2 S-76 (SAR) hel



JAMAICA:

Army: 3,000  
2 Infantry Battalions  
1 Reserve Battalion  
1 Support Battalion  
10 V-150 Commando APC; 12 81mm mor  
Navy: 140  
1 large patrol craft  
3 coastal patrol craft  
Air Force  
2 Islander ac  
1 King Air ac  
1 Cessna 337 ac  
1 Centurion II ac  
4 Bell 206B hel  
3 212 hel  
Para-Military Forces: 6000

GUYANA:

Army: 6,500  
3 Infantry Battalions  
1 Artillery Battery  
EE-11 Urutu, 4 Shortland armd cars; 6 130mm guns; 12 81mm,  
18 82mm, 20 CH T-53 120mm mor; SA-7 SAM  
Navy: 300  
1 large patrol craft  
7 coastal patrol craft  
Air Force: 200  
6 BN-2A, 2 DHC-6, 1 Super King Air 200, 1 Cessna U-206F tpt ac  
3 Bell 206B, 3 212 hel  
Paramilitary Forces: 5,000

COSTA RICA:

Army: para-military  
1 V-100 armd car  
Navy: para-military  
10 patrol craft  
1 armed tug  
Air Force: para-military  
8 lt ac  
6 hel  
Para-Military Forces: 7,000





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