

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO: BIN ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED  
SALIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, had participated in jihad.
    2. One of the detainee's family members stated the detainee was always eager to join the jihad and was very involved in al Qaida.
    3. The detainee first traveled to Afghanistan for jihad one to two months prior to Ramadan, 1997. The detainee traveled at the urging of a family member.
    4. The detainee was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs.
    5. The detainee traveled from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to Peshawar, where he stayed at Abu Zubaida's guesthouse while waiting to travel on to the Khalden Camp, outside of Jalalabad.
    6. The detainee visited the Y'aqub al-Balushi guesthouse while transporting remote controls and timers for explosives for an al Qaida operative.
    7. The detainee transported an al Qaida member from Qandahar, Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, via Quetta Pakistan, where they were to establish a safe house for organizing operations.

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8. The detainee worked with al Qaida members who provided timers, remote control devices, and explosives to groups in Khowst and Qandahar; the equipment was to be used in operations against United States personnel. The detainee said he transported the explosives to Afghans in Quetta.

9. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee also admitted he sent letters confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed a plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.

10. The detainee posted letters to a former mujahid living in Saudi Arabia, who was attempting to acquire guns and silencers to conduct assassinations in Saudi Arabia.

11. The detainee worked directly with a senior al Qaida lieutenant, who was in charge of Usama Bin Laden's cadre inside Pakistan. He was responsible for coordinating and facilitating travel for al Qaida and Mujahidin fighters, raising money through charitable organizations, and providing al Qaida operatives and Mujahidin with false documents, including passports, stamps, and visas.

### b. Training

1. In 1997, the detainee went to Afghanistan where he received basic military-type training in the Khalden Camp.

2. The detainee stayed at the Khalden Camp where he received training on weapons such as the Kalashnikov, Beeka, and Deshooka, as well as explosive devices such as mines, grenades, and mortars.

3. The detainee took bomb-making classes in Khowst, Afghanistan, at the Khalden and Jihad Wahl camps. The detainee was trained to make a bomb using TNT and C-4. The detainee was shown how to make remote detonators out of the game cartridges in Sega games.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama Bin Laden since the early 1980's. It was not uncommon for Usama Bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house, and the detainee had often been to the Usama Bin Laden family home in Jeddah.

2. The detainee worked with a senior al Qaida member involved in the operation against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.

3. The detainee assisted a senior al Qaida member with providing timing devices needed for an operation involving hotels in Karachi.

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d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee traveled back and forth from Karachi to Qandahar every two months, bringing money to support al Qaida operations.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was arrested on 11 September 2002, in a safe house, referred to as the "Tariq Road House." The detainee was arrested with a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated even though he was involved in correspondence with the attack on ships in the Straits of Hormuz, he claimed to have no further details about these operations.

b. At the Khalden Camp, the detainee received training on weapons. The detainee did not attend all the training, estimating that he attended less than 50 percent of the classes. The detainee speculated that he was given great leniency due to his young age.

c. The detainee indicated he did not know what the remote detonators he was asked to transport would be used for.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 October 2005

TO: SHARQAWL, AL HAJJ ABDU ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, AL HAJJ ABDU ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee joined the jihad in Bosnia. He traveled there using money from donations that people had made to mosques. This money was donated for people traveling to join any jihad.

2. The detainee sustained a chest wound and spent two months in the hospital recovering. He then returned to the fight in Bosnia at the front line for another four months before a ceasefire was declared. He waited another two months before returning to Yemen. After returning to Yemen, the detainee wanted to join the jihad in Chechnya but knew it was difficult to go there.

3. In 1996, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Kenya seeking to join the jihad in Somalia. The detainee returned to Yemen without joining the fight.

4. In 1997 the detainee traveled to Khartoum, Sudan in an attempt to support anti-government Islamic rebels in Eritrea. The detainee left Sudan after about a week because he was denied the opportunity to join the fight.

5. In 1997 the detainee went to Arakan, Bangladesh because he heard Buddhists were killing Muslims there. He was unable to enter Arakan so he then returned to Yemen. He also traveled to Burma and Bangladesh for Jihad but was denied the opportunity to join the fight.

6. The detainee assisted other Yemeni Mujahedin in traveling to Afghanistan.

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7. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to receive military training prior to traveling onward to Chechnya for jihad.

8. The detainee collected money to support the Chechnya jihad and he also traveled to Syria in an attempt to get to Chechnya to join the jihad.

9. The detainee flew to Pakistan en route to Afghanistan for training for the Chechnya jihad.

10. The detainee facilitated the travel of many Yemeni Mujahedin to Afghanistan in 2001.

11. The detainee solicited money to support Mujahedin fleeing Afghanistan in the wake of the United States campaign against the Taliban.

12. While in Pakistan, the detainee received funds from Saudi Arabia using the Hawala system.

### b. Training

1. The detainee trained with the Bosnian Army for forty days. Training consisted of physical training and weapons, such as the Kalashnikov and hand grenades.

2. The detainee attended a training camp where he was taught electronics.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. On the day of the USS Cole bombing, the detainee evacuated Kandahar and fled to Kabul with Usama Bin Laden and his guards.

2. The detainee traveled with Usama Bin Laden's entourage for a few months in early 2001.

3. The detainee was responsible for the physical storage and distribution of al Qaida cash in Karachi.

4. The detainee served as a conduit for funds suspected to have been used to finance al Qaida attacks against Israeli interests in Kenya.

5. The detainee met the chief medical advisor for al Wafa at a guesthouse and invited him to visit him in Karachi.

6. The detainee provided details on Usama Bin Laden's security staff and his personal bodyguards and he described the selection process for security staff members.

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7. The detainee was an acquaintance of Ibrahim al-Thawr, one of the suicide bombers who attacked the USS Cole on 12 October 2000.

8. The detainee was a friend of Jamal Mohammad Ahmad Ali (Al-Badawi), who was convicted in the USS Cole bombing.

9. When the detainee was shown photographs of the known 11 September 2001 hijackers he recognized and identified each one of them.

10. Usama Bin Laden designated the detainee as a falcon. Usama Bin Laden was the only one with the authority to designate falcons and this falcon designation was based on how important someone was to bin Laden's organization.

#### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee provided money, visas, passports and airline tickets to Yemenis wanting to travel to Afghanistan to receive training for jihad.

2. The detainee stated that he feels that joining jihad and dying in the process of helping Muslims is a better way to die.

3. By his own estimate, the detainee assisted approximately 100 members of the Mujahadeen depart Pakistan before his capture.

4. The detainee bribed officials and forged documents to obtain visas and passports for people.

5. The detainee coordinated the distribution of video cameras to combat zones in Afghanistan. The video footage was intended for jihad recruitment in Saudi Arabia.

6. The detainee fought in Bosnia as a guard on the front line.

7. The detainee operated a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan to house Muslims going from Yemen to Afghanistan for military training.

8. The detainee placed travelers in local hotels, assisted in acquiring airline tickets for subsequent travel in Pakistan and instructing travelers on transit into Afghanistan.

9. The detainee housed escaping jihadists in his Karachi guesthouse after the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan began in September 2001. The detainee also secured Pakistani passport stamps for jihadists to allow them to return to their home countries.

10. The detainee stated he was brought up to believe that America is an imperial power only interested in protecting its own interest.

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11. The detainee believes that the U.S. is an enemy of Islam.

12. The detainee stated he wants to personally kill every American upon his release from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he is confused as to what he will do upon leaving Guantanamo Bay. He does not know if he will rejoin the fight against America with Usama Bin Laden and Zarqawi, or if he will resign and just go away into retirement.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 October 2005

TO: GULAM RABBANI, ABU RAHIM MOULANA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GULAM RABBANI, ABU RAHIM  
MOULANA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's brother recruited him into the jihad movement. The detainee later learned that the group he had been recruited into was al Qaida.

2. The detainee rented and supervised safe houses and provided logistical support to al Qaida operatives in Karachi, Pakistan, from roughly early 2000 through September 2002. The detainee also moved al Qaida operatives from Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that he took bags containing electronic devices to public locations in Karachi, Pakistan and gave the bags to an unidentified man.

4. The detainee brought supplies to injured individuals at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was unsure if the injuries were due to fighting or bombings.

5. The detainee received pay as his primary benefit for working with al Qaida operatives.

6. The detainee transported al Qaida members by car to a villa in Karachi, Pakistan. The al Qaida members stayed there for one month and prepared workshops on making remote control firing devices.

7. After 11 September 2001, the detainee accommodated members of the Mujahadeen leaving Afghanistan and transiting through Karachi.

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## b. Training

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Karachi, Pakistan to receive firearms training, with the intent of helping people in Burma who were being persecuted.
2. The detainee received instruction on approximately fourteen different firearms including the AK-47.
3. The detainee trained in the Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan, near Khowst for about three months.
4. An al Qaida leader told the detainee that he wanted him to attend grenade training and other types of training.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden several times while delivering people and goods to meetings that Bin Laden hosted.
2. The detainee reported meeting a senior al Qaida member in Kandahar, Afghanistan, sometime either in May or June 2001.
3. The detainee stated that he when he went to the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan he met a senior al Qaida member.
4. As a driver and facilitator, the detainee had direct access to high-level al Qaida and Taliban members.
5. The detainee identified seventeen of the September 11, 2001 hijackers who stayed at a facility that the detainee had rented in Karachi, Pakistan.
6. A senior al Qaida member commented that the detainee was a low-level assistant to a high level al Qaida member.
7. The detainee admitted becoming a facilitator for high-level al Qaida members.
8. The detainee identified five of the suspects indicted in the 1998 bombings of United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, as men he had seen in Afghanistan or men he had assisted in Karachi, Pakistan under the direction of a senior al Qaida operative.

## d. Other Relevant Data

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1. In 1990 the detainee was deported from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan for engaging in criminal activity and he then became a Pakistani Citizen.
2. The detainee was captured in early September 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD  
GHULAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee wanted to go to Burma to fight jihad.
    2. The detainee hosted jihadists heading to the fight in Iraq and showed his guests propaganda materials. The materials included speeches from Usama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi speaking of Muslim unity and the desire to destroy the American infidels. The detainee preached that it was the jihadists' duty to wage jihad, or they wouldn't get into heaven.
    3. The detainee recruited his brother into the jihad movement and went with him to train at Khaldan camp, Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee worked in hospitals, attending to injured al Qaida fighters.
    5. The detainee convinced his brother that training at Khaldan is mandatory religious training.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee trained at the Khaldan camp in Afghanistan in 1994 or 1995.
    2. The detainee stayed at Khaldan training camp for 3 months in 1997, renewing his training.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM**

3. The detainee's training at Khaldan camp included weapons, explosives and tactics.
- c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee joined al Qaida while in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1996.
  2. The detainee stayed at the Kandahar airport compound where Usama Bin Laden and his family resided. The detainee met and briefly spoke with Usama Bin Laden during his stay.
  3. The detainee met with Usama Bin Laden on six to seven occasions and on one occasion brought a water purification system from Karachi, Pakistan to him.
  4. Usama Bin Laden instructed the detainee to take a supporting role assisting al Qaida fighters moving between Karachi, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  5. After the bombings of the United States Embassies in East Africa, the detainee fled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at Usama Bin Laden's compound in Kandahar for two or three weeks.
  6. The detainee developed his relationship with the mujahidin in Kandahar by driving a taxi in the area where they lived.
  7. The detainee worked for an individual, who told the detainee to rent a house in Karachi, Pakistan to run as an al Qaida guesthouse for "special people". The detainee used what he described as mujahidin money to operate the house. The guests included al Qaida fighters who were sick, wounded, or did not have passports.
  8. The detainee knew and worked with a senior al Qaida facilitator.
  9. The detainee met and worked for a senior al Qaida leader.
  10. The detainee lived in the same house as a senior al Qaida leader in Karachi.
  11. After September 11, 2001, the detainee's guesthouses were also used to house Mujahidin fleeing Afghanistan.
  12. A senior al Qaida leader provided rent for the detainee's guesthouses.
  13. The detainee received funding and instructions for his facilitation activities directly from senior al Qaida members.

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14. The detainee translated for Burmese fighters at the camps in Afghanistan and during meetings between the fighters and Usama Bin Laden. The detainee met with Usama Bin Laden six or seven times and attended dinners with Usama Bin Laden's guests.

15. The detainee was arrested in Pakistan with individuals who had ties to the USS Cole bombing.

d. Intent

The detainee was involved in facilitating a plot to purchase a ship to be used in an attack off the coast of Yemen.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee used his safehouse to print news derived from the Internet and forwarded it to Afghanistan for distribution among al Qaida members and guesthouses there.

2. The detainee facilitated the travel of roughly 50 to 60 al Qaida Arabs from Karachi, Pakistan, after the coalition air strikes against al Qaida/Taliban forces in Afghanistan had stopped in December 2001. The detainee facilitated communications between senior al Qaida members and groups of junior Arabs who traveled from Karachi to other countries.

3. The detainee was involved in the transfer of explosive timing devices from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee distributed remote radio-type detonating devices provided to him by a senior al Qaida leader.

5. The detainee stated the United States is the worst terrorist organization in the world.

6. The detainee discussed several Muslim countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Dubai, stating they are all infidel countries. The detainee believes any Muslim that works with infidel countries (i.e.: the United Nations) is also an infidel.

7. The detainee believes the Muslim world was trying to create a truly Muslim society in Afghanistan, the United States went into Afghanistan to disrupt that plan and no one invited the United States to come to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee promised he would not return to fighting jihad if released.

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b. The detainee denied that he had any first hand information regarding any planned al Qaida attacks.

c. The detainee stated that he would like to be free again and promised not to return to fighting if he was released.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2005

TO: AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was involved in aiding al Qaida and other extremists through the provision of false passports and by giving them safe haven out of the country under the guise of deportation.

2. A terrorist facilitator identified the detainee as an Afghan Jihad veteran who had connections with Islamic extremists worldwide.

b. Connections/Associations

1. In 1997 or 1998, the detainee traveled from Germany to Italy, where he prayed at the Milan Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI).

2. The Italian Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) is a mosque that was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian combat group in Italy.

3. The detainee exploited his strong relationship with the Deputy Chief of the Political Security Organization (PSO) to secure the release of some extremist elements from prison, including Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli and Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharqawi.

4. Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharqawi is an al Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

5. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad was designated a terrorist entity by Executive Order 13224.
6. Muhammad Shauqi Islambuli is a Shura Council member for Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG), brother of Khalid Islambuli (the man who assassinated President Sadat). Muhammed Shauqi Islambuli has been involved in terrorist training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and served as liaison between the IG and Usama Bin Laden.
7. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) is Egypt's largest militant group, active since the late 1970s. Its senior member signed Usama Bin Ladin's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against the United States. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Ladin, and Afghan militant groups support the organization.
8. In July 1999, the detainee visited Nebil Ali al-Heila, in a Bosnian prison multiple times. Nebil Ali al-Heila is serving a six-year prison term for his role in a 1997 car bombing, and may be the detainee's brother.
9. The detainee's brother traveled to Bosnia for Jihad and was extremely close to a USS Cole bomber and a failed USS Sullivans bomber.
10. While in Bosnia, the detainee met with Muhamed Krimi, director of the nongovernmental organization al-Haramayn (HIF) in Zenica. HIF has been sanctioned under Executive Order 13224 for supporting terrorism.
11. HIF has been linked to the Mujahedin Brigade in Bosnia and the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) in Milan. HIF uses links to the ICI to remain active in support of the former mujahideen in Bosnia.
12. In late 2000, the detainee met with Abu Bakr Jayal several times concerning Jayal's plans to attack the United Kingdom and United States embassies in Yemen.
13. Jayul is serving a 12 year jail sentence after admitting to an attempted attack against the U.K. Embassy, the attempted assassination of the Yemen Minister of the Interior, a church bombing and a hotel attack in Aden.
14. Jayal was part of the Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) who was appointed by the PSO as a District Governor to act as a liaison between the AAIA and the Yemeni Government.
15. The AAIA is also known as the Islamic Army of Aden and has been designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The Islamic Army of Aden has publicly expressed support for Usama Bin Laden and appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen.
16. The detainee was involved in negotiations to bring in Abu Ali al Harethi for questioning following the USS Cole Bombing.

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17. Abu Ali al Harethi was the mujahadin leader in Yemen and reported directly to Usama Bin Laden.

18. The detainee met with Abd al-Qadir Mahmud al-Sayyid in Italy several times.

19. Abd al-Qadir Mahmud al-Sayyid was the chief document forger for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a fugitive Egyptian operative. The detainee helped al-Sayyid move to Italy where he lived under political asylum.

20. On 12 August 2000, the detainee traveled to Italy and was met at the Bologna airport by Sharif Hafiz al-Ashmawi and Mahmud al-Sayid. The purpose of the trip was to participate in the activities of the annual Milan Cultural Institute (ICI) summer camp/conference.

21. Al-Ashmawi is allegedly a member of EIJ. His job title at the ICI is "confidential affairs attaché." In 1995, Ashmawi was arrested by Italian police. Ashmawi traveled to Bosnia in support of the Mujahadin Brigade during the Kosovo conflict. He also traveled to Canada circa May-September 1996, to establish contact with members of the Canadian Islamic extremist circles.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee held the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel in Yemen due to his work as a tribal shaykh on behalf of the Yemeni PSO.

2. The detainee reported that, in April or May 2002, four individuals, including Abu Ali al-Harithi were involved in the planning of attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, the Big Ben Clock tower in London, United Kingdom, and the commercial center or train station in Milan, Italy if the United States invaded Iraq.

3. The detainee stated that the information he provided regarding attacks in Great Britain, Italy and Belgium in response to the American invasion of Iraq was not true and simply stated in order to please interrogators when he was initially captured.

4. In July 2002, the detainee was aware that Yemeni terrorist Qa'id Sunayyan al-Harithi threatened to attack a western oil company if the PSO did not release extremist prisoners.

5. The detainee knew and revealed to interrogators that al Harithi planned to attack the U.K. or United States Embassies in Sana, Yemen on 2 or 3 October 2002.

6. The detainee was in Cairo on a business trip, when he disappeared approximately 20 September 2002. He was allegedly lured to Cairo by Foreign Intelligence Services.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM**

7. The detainee was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on 19 September 2004.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated that he received no intelligence, negotiation, or weapons training in conjunction with working with the PSO.
  - b. Detainee stated that he never acted in any capacity as a travel facilitator for al Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
  - c. Detainee added that he had no desire to participate in or plan any terrorist activity because he may one day be the victim.
  - d. Detainee repeatedly stated that he never participated in any terrorist action and had nothing but loathing for terrorism as a whole.
  - e. Detainee stated that he had no prior knowledge of the September 11 attacks.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 Dec 2005

To: BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee supported himself and several other naturalized former Bosnian mujahidin and their families.
    2. The detainee planned to coordinate and assist with the travel and arrival of a number of travelers from Afghanistan.
    3. The detainee was identified by a foreign intelligence service as being suspected of terrorist activities.
    4. The detainee has been identified as a primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
    5. The detainee was one of several Mujahidin Fighters who remained in Bosnia and was known for his ties to the Chechen Movement.
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. The detainee was arrested and possessed numerous phone numbers that linked him to Usama bin Laden's operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni Extremist Network.
    2. The detainee denied ties to a senior al Qaida member whose phone number was found in a book in the detainee's possession.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH**

3. A senior al Qaida member reported he has known the detainee since 1993 when the detainee went to Afghanistan from the war in Tajikistan.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. According to a news article, the detainee was supposed to be in charge of coordinating terrorist attacks to take place after 11 September 2001 and was to become the chief of operations for al Qaida.

2. The detainee was discovered to have 3.5 million marks in Bosnian currency deposited in a Bosnian bank.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was adamant that he is not known by an alias that is associated with Abu Zubaydah.

b. The detainee adamantly denied involvement in the plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee reported that he was told that there was no case against him and that he would be sent back to Algeria.

c. The detainee stated he never associated with any terrorists or anyone who wanted to hurt the United States. He never worked with al Haramayn or al Furqan, although he has heard of al Furqan.

d. The detainee denied that he ever had a bank account in Sarajevo nor in Bosnia.

e. The detainee denied being involved in the facilitating of fraudulent passports for others; the only involvement the detainee had with fraudulent passports was that concerning his own fraudulent Yemeni Passport.

f. The detainee denied any knowledge of the al Farqan and Haramayn organizations. He stated the Saudi High Commission could not be a bad organization.

g. The detainee reported he heard of al Qaida and that Usama bin Laden was the leader but he knew this from the media reports.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 November 2005

TO: LAHMAR, SABIR MAHFOUZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAHMAR, SABIR MAHFOUZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee supported the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden against the United States.

2. The detainee proposed attacking United States troops in Bosnia to the Shura Council in Zenica, Bosnia.

3. The detainee expressed a desire to blow up United States soldiers and made threats against the international community in Bosnia.

4. The detainee was attempting to assume leadership of the Armed Islamic Group in Bosnia.

5. The detainee is a former Bosnian/Afghan Mujahedin.

6. On 27 September 2001, the detainee applied for an Iranian visa for onward travel to Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked for the Saudi High Commission for Relief from 1993 to 1994 and again from 1996 until 2002.

2. The detainee worked for El Haremein in Zenica and Sarajevo, Bosnia. He had close ties to the leadership of El Haremein in Zenica.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAHMAR, SABIR MAHFOUZ**

3. The detainee was known to be a close associate of an al Qaida member in Bosnia.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. In October 1997, the detainee was convicted and sentenced to a five-year prison term for the armed robbery of an American in Zenica, Bosnia. He was also involved in a shootout with Zenica police.

2. The detainee was released from a Bosnian prison after serving two years for his role in some 1997 explosions in Mostar, Bosnia. Authorities believe the detainee was involved in 1997 bombings in Travnik and Mostar.

3. The head organizer for placing a car bomb in Mostar in 1997, who was also close to the Saudi High Committee and El Haremein, frequently visited the detainee.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied being a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group.

b. The detainee denied being affiliated with al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied knowing anyone affiliated with al Qaida.

d. The detainee denied that he ever supported Usama bin Laden's fatwa against United States troops in Bosnia.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 November 2005

TO: NECHLE, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLE, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left Algeria in 1990 due to political and economic problems.

2. The detainee decided to go to Pakistan after reading newspaper advertisements looking for educated individuals to work with different charitable organizations.

3. The detainee traveled from Algeria, transiting through Tunisia, Moscow and Karachi before arriving in Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. The detainee spent time living in Islamabad, Pakistan and then moved to Tirana, Albania and worked with the Red Crescent Non-Governmental Organization.

5. The detainee's tenure with the Red Crescent ended when the Bosnian authorities accused the detainee and several others of being terrorists.

6. The detainee traveled to the Philippines where the Non-Governmental Organizations were looking for Arabic instructors. In Manila the detainee was offered a job as an Arabic teacher.

7. From Manila, the detainee traveled to Albania and was hired by the Abu Dhabi based organization, Bin Hamoodah.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLE, MOHAMMED

8. From Albania, the detainee went to Bosnia and worked in Zenica with a Qatari organization.

9. In Bosnia, the detainee trained to run an orphanage in Sarajevo and was then put in charge of an orphanage in Bihac.

#### b. Connections/Associations

1. In Bosnia, the detainee and a group of naturalized former Bosnian Mujahidin of Algerian decent lived and worked under the direction of an al Qaida member.

2. The detainee was identified as a close associate of an al Qaida member.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police arrested the detainee in October 2001.

2. The detainee's military service was investigated by a foreign security and intelligence service.

3. The detainee is a suspected terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and is suspected of having links to al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee had no knowledge of, and was not aware of, any plans of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

d. The detainee has never seen or met Usama bin Laden. He wants to burn Usama bin Laden alive if he is ever found for causing him to be detained.

e. The detainee hates terrorists because terrorists in Algeria killed many of his friends and relatives. However, the detainee was not able to provide any names or circumstances surrounding these events, but stated if any Muslims were killed, then it was just as if his family was killed. The detainee's family told him about an aunt of his who died from an illness approximately one to two years ago, but the detainee stated that terrorists might have killed her.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLE, MOHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 December 2005

TO: AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. From 1993 to 1995, the detainee worked in computer repair for the International Islamic Relief Organization in Split, Croatia.

2. The detainee served in the Bosnian Army from 4 January 1995 until 20 December 1995.

3. In February of 1995, the detainee traveled to Sarajevo, Bosnia to apply for Bosnian citizenship.

4. In August 1995, the detainee went to Bosnia and was hired by the Qatar Charitable Society as a secretary to the Director. He worked in Zenica, Bosnia and performed computer work as part of his duties.

5. In May 1996, the detainee was sent by the Qatar Charitable Society to work in Tuzla, Bosnia.

6. From 1997 to 2002, the detainee worked on computers for the Taibah Relief Agency in Sarajevo, Bosnia.

7. The detainee claimed he and another Red Crescent employee taught karate to orphans sponsored by the Red Crescent.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA**

8. In 1998, the detainee traveled to Germany. He obtained a visa at the Austrian Embassy that allowed him access to several European countries.

9. The detainee traveled with five other individuals to Mecca-Medina, Saudi Arabia in 1998 or 1999. They traveled in a van owned by an Egyptian based Nongovernmental Organization named Human Relief. An Egyptian who worked for Human Relief coordinated the trip.

10. The detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan in October 2001 as soon as his associate arrived to make arrangements. This associate was an al Qaida member.

11. In mid-October 2001, Bosnian authorities arrested the detainee as a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group.

12. The detainee was identified as a former Bosnian Mujahedin and chief marshal arts instructor for the Bosnian Mujahedin Brigade.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he knows a Chinese/Japanese style of karate and has seventeen years of martial arts experience and fourteen years as a trainer.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. In June or July 1996, the detainee met a worker for the Human Appeal Charitable Organization. They socialized frequently and the detainee visited him frequently at his home.

2. In 1998 or 1999, the detainee met an Algerian who was working for the Red Crescent. The detainee and the Algerian socialized regularly.

3. The detainee attended a meeting in December 1999 in Sarajevo, Bosnia, sponsored by the chancellor of the Algerian Embassy in Vienna, Austria. Algerians who worked for Nongovernmental Organizations in Bosnia were invited.

4. The detainee attended a meeting in 2001 with the ambassador from the Algerian Embassy in Hungary.

5. The detainee was identified as a close associate of an al Qaida member.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was held with five other Algerians in a Bosnian jail in Sarajevo for three months. Upon release the six men were taken into United States custody.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he was not in Bosnia when the fighting was going on and there was no way he could have been a trainer for the Mujahedin Brigade. He said he was in Croatia.

b. The detainee denied having any associations with people who conducted terrorist activities or were in any way involved with terrorism.

c. The detainee stated that at no time did he train the Bosnian Mujahedin in self-defense tactics and techniques.

d. The detainee stated that he has had nothing to do with terrorism, Usama bin Laden or killing Americans.

e. The detainee stated that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States were contrary to the teaching of the Islamic faith and against his personal beliefs. He stated that the perpetrators of the attacks were not human. The detainee further stated that any Islamic group who kills people has no right calling themselves followers of Islam.

f. The detainee denies ever encouraging anyone to use weapons of any kind in any situation.

g. The detainee denied ever participating in any jihad or that he had participated in any training in Afghanistan.

h. The detainee stated he never planned to travel to Afghanistan to take part in the jihad.

i. The detainee denied that extremist activities took place at Taibah, and that he never participated in extremist activities.

j. The detainee stated that he was not involved in nor associated with any extremist groups in Algeria and he did not know anyone who was.

k. The detainee was adamant that he did not engage in any of the fighting in Bosnia or Croatia at any time. He stated that he left Algeria for Croatia/Bosnia to work in a legitimate job, not to fight in the war.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 November 2005

TO: BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. According to a cooperative and reliable source, the detainee was known to be one of an al Qaida member's closest associates in Bosnia.

2. According to a foreign government service, the detainee is a suspected terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group. He is also suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida Terrorist Organization.

b. Intent

A source states that as of late September 2001, the detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan as soon as an al Qaida member arrived to make receiving arrangements.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee stated that he obtained Bosnia citizenship in September of 1998. He advised that he purchased the citizenship for 5,000 Deutsche Marks. He advised that it was legitimate citizenship, which was obtained by illegal means.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was an Algerian Army Border Guard from 1986 to 1988.

2. In October of 2001, the detainee was arrested along with three other individuals.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR**

3. During an investigation into the military service of the Algerian nationals, the Bosnian Federation Ministry of Defense found the detainee's Bosnian military records to be forged.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not support Usama Bin Laden's manipulation of Islam to gather support for his actions.

b. The detainee claims he had no association with Taliban or al Qaida forces.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Number Not Used

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 November 2005

TO: AL HAJJ, BOUDELLA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, BOUDELLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was recruited to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya.
    2. The detainee traveled from Afghanistan to Bosnia for the purpose of teaching at the Benevolence International Foundation sponsored school in Tesanj, Bosnia.
    3. The detainee was in charge of two Benevolence International Foundation sponsored schools in Bosnia.
    4. The detainee was identified as a combat instructor who worked in Bosnia.
    5. The detainee planned to meet a close associate in Afghanistan where the associate planned to join the jihad against the United States.
    6. The detainee traveled through Karachi, Pakistan to the Taliban Center in Quetta, Pakistan and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    7. The detainee was in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan with several al Qaida and Taliban fighters.
    8. The detainee is identified as a suspected terrorist belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and was suspected of having links to Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, BOUDELLA**

**b. Training**

1. The detainee attended a 45-day boot camp after the Algerian Army drafted him.
2. An al Qaida trainer trained the detainee on the AK-47 and grenades.

**c. Connections/Associations**

1. While in Afghanistan, the detainee met an Egyptian al Qaida leader.
2. At the time of his capture, the detainee was in possession of a ring similar to those that identified the Red Rose Group members of Hamas.

**d. Other Relevant Data**

1. In January 2002, the Bosnian Supreme Court ruled to overturn the Lower Court's decision to revoke the detainee's Bosnian citizenship. This ruling was based on a technical error.

2. According to another individual, the detainee quit working for the Benevolence International Foundation after the director indicated that the organization would operate strictly as a international relief organization in Bosnia and that nobody carrying a firearm or wearing military-type clothing would be allowed in the office.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. In 1994, the detainee found a job teaching the Koran and other Islamic teachings to soldiers in the Bosnian Army. The detainee insisted he was not actually in the Army but rather taught the courses in exchange for food items.

b. The detainee claims no affiliation with al Qaida or any terrorist organization.

c. The detainee stated that 11 September 2001 was not true Islam.

d. The detainee further denied ever being trained as a soldier for Bosnia or Algeria, stating that cooks and administrative personnel do not receive weapons training.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, BOUDELLA**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 July 2005

TO: KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought for the Northern Alliance against the Russians.

2. In 2001, the detainee was arrested in Peshawar during a raid by local police and released when authorities determined he was not Arab.

3. The detainee was arrested along with two Arabs, Musa, a 25-28 year old Syrian, and Abdul Rashad, a 25-30 year old Saudi, during a raid of Musa's house.

4. When the detainee was captured, his hands tested positive for explosive residue. Authorities were looking for an explosives expert named Abdul Latif Al Turki.

5. The detainee told Pakistani authorities his name was Abdullah Mohammed Khan, but he was identified as Abdul Latif Al Turki, the name printed on his Turkish passport.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee became good friends with Musa and would sometimes stay with Musa and his family at their house in Peshawar.

2. The detainee was arrested in Musa's residence.

3. Musa (aka Abd Al-Hamid Al-Suri) is an al-Qaida suspect.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD

4. Musa (aka Abd Al-Hamid Al-Suri) is also known as Baha'Bin Mustafa Muhammad Jaghal, Musa Muhamat Julaq Augolo, Abd Al-Hamid Al-Sharif, and Musa Uglo.

5. An al-Qaida detainee identified the detainee in a still photograph as Abdul Latif Al-Turki.

6. A Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member identified the detainee in photo as Abdul Latif Al-Turki. The member said he saw the detainee several times at the Al-Ansar guesthouse in Pakistan.

7. An Iraqi detainee identified the detainee in a photo and reported he had seen the detainee at the Khana Gulam Bacha guesthouse on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during late 1999-2000.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee interrupts and monopolizes the interpreter constantly to disrupt interrogations.

2. The detainee manipulates interrogations by using linguistic differences as his excuse.

3. When detainee was arrested in January 2002, police confiscated his counterfeit passport, as well as numerous additional forged passports from the house that was raided.

4. When the detainee was arrested in January 2002, a compact disk (CD) containing 19 English-language manuals covering manufacture of improvised explosives, poisons, timers, firing devices and other bomb initiating/delivery systems were discovered on the hard drive of a computer during the raid of the safehouse where detainee was arrested.

5. When detainee was arrested in January 2002, a Kuwaiti telephone number was found, registered to a Pakistani national who transferred money from Kuwait to Pakistan for large numbers of Pakistanis. He had dealings with villagers of Peshawar.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee argues that he is innocent of all the charges brought before him other than he was associated with Musa (an al Qaida suspect) upon his capture.

b. The detainee stated he never owned a valid passport. His previous travels between Afghanistan and Pakistan only required a small bribe to the border guards to allow him to cross the borders.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Numbers not used

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 November 2005

TO: KHENAINA, MUHAMMAD ALI HUSSEIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHENAINA, MUHAMMAD ALI  
HUSSEIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran in Arabic. However, he says he did not actually teach the Koran.

b. Connections/Associations

1. In August 2001, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a person that had previously spent time in Afghanistan and offered to help the detainee with his travel.
2. Once the detainee arrived in Kabul, he stayed with Abu Yahya al Sharqi, a.k.a. Abu Omar.
3. Abu Omar ran a guesthouse in the Karti-Barwan area of Kabul. He was well known to Taliban in the area and they protected his house. Abu Omar arranged transportation for guests to a Taliban training area 35 minutes north of Kabul.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. Initially, the detainee stated he lost his passport at Abu Omar's house. He later admitted giving his passport to Abu Omar for safekeeping.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHENAINA, MUHAMMAD ALI HUSSEIN**

2. The detainee was at Abu Omar's house on 11 September 2001 when he heard about the attacks. He was concerned about retaliation by the Americans and wanted to get out.

3. Prior to Ramadan 2001, Abu Omar arranged for the detainee to travel to Logar and then to Khowst. He stayed at the home of an Afghan. After waiting about one and a half weeks for Abu Omar, the detainee decided to leave with a group of five Arabs and an Afghan guide.

4. The Afghan guide took the detainee and five other Arabs through the mountains by foot where they met another 19 fleeing men and joined their group.

5. The group continued to the Pakistan border where they were detained by authorities, jailed for approximately two weeks and handed over to United States Authorities.

6. The detainee was captured with 8530 Pakistani Rupee Notes and a Casio watch.

7. The Casio watch that the detainee was wearing when he was taken into custody was given to him by Abu Omar.

8. On 3 January 2002, the detainee was transferred from Pakistani control to United States Military Custody.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was not in Afghanistan to participate in Jihad.

b. The detainee did not have a weapon while in Afghanistan.

c. A Saudi caught departing Afghanistan through the Tora Bora Mountains, recognized the detainee as being a Turkistani. The Saudi said the detainee did not have a weapon.

d. The detainee denied being associated with the Taliban while in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September.

f. In reference to the 11 September attacks, the detainee stated that he felt it was a crime and that it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.

g. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

h. If released, the detainee would return to Yemen and marry a cousin who has been betrothed to him and never leave again.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHENAINA, MUHAMMAD ALI  
HUSSEIN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Numbers not used

00939-00940

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 October 2005

To: DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUJSTAF A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUJSTAF A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee was an expert in passport and document forgery. He also worked with the Libyan groups and used computers in his passport forgery work.
    2. The detainee is associated with the Islamic extremist group Asbat Al-Ansar.
    3. In May 2000, the detainee and his family left Damascus, Syria for Tehran, Iran. He says he stayed in Tehran for a month then flew to Zahidan, Iran where he stayed with Sheikh Ibrahim. From Zahidan, the detainee and family took an 18-hour bus ride through Quetta, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan then moved to Kabul, Afghanistan to start a business selling honey.

b. Training

The detainee is identified as having fled to Afghanistan where he joined al Qaida's military training camps.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was on a list of individuals whose telephone numbers were associated with assorted jihadists based in Yemen.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEYAB, JIHAD AHMED MUJSTAFI

2. The detainee's name was found on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering the six month period of May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was on a 20-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with an al Qaida financial operative.

3. The detainee's name was found on a list of Syrians who were trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and believed to be fighting with or on behalf of Usama Bin Ladin.

4. The detainee allowed Abu Musab Al Zarqawi to stay in his house.

5. A September 2002 raid by a foreign government service on an alleged al Qaida residence recovered a personal address book and pocket litter containing names and telephone numbers. The detainee's name and phone number were among a list of names and telephone numbers recovered.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee first left Afghanistan for medical treatment in Lahore, Pakistan in August 2001. Following hostilities in Afghanistan in October 2001, he returned to Afghanistan to retrieve his family. He claims he went to Kabul, Jalalabad and finally Khowst Afghanistan before he found them.

2. From Khowst he was aided by Riyadh, a Pakistani, who helped Arab families. He was then transferred to a safe house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan then Lahore. In Lahore he tried to leave Pakistan with the aid of the Al-Qaddafi organization to flee to Libya. He was then moved to a second house in Lahore where he was captured with two other Arab families.

3. The detainee has consistently refused to acknowledge interrogators or speak during interrogations.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Numbers not used